

The  
**Montagu-  
Chelmsford  
Report**  
on  
**Indian  
Constitutional Reform**

Extracts from a criticism published by

**The Backward Classes of  
the Bombay Presidency**

in the Indian Press of August, 1918,

with

Notes and Comments thereon

by

**The Indo-British Association Ltd.**

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***Extracts from a Memorandum of the Backward Classes of  
the Bombay Presidency on the Report of Mr. Montagu  
and Lord Chelmsford.***

After the opening paragraphs which touch upon the machinery of Government, proposed in the Report of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, the Memorandum proceeds as follows :—

“ As the signatories of the report themselves admit, and as was clearly pointed out to them by the Deputation of the Deccan Rayots' Association, ‘ among Hindus education is very much a matter of Caste,’ there being very immense differences in the educational progress of castes and castes. Unless, therefore, the voters from the educationally backward classes are alive to their own needs and claims in this respect—which admittedly they are not—the Indian Ministers who are to be indirectly responsible under the scheme to the electors cannot be expected to recognise in practice the paramount claims of the backward (and we include among them the depressed) classes to extensive measures involving heavy expense for popularising all kinds of education among them. The framers of the scheme perhaps contemplate that the powers reserved to the Governor or to the Government of India will be used to secure a right policy in this respect. Past experience however shows that the Government cannot meet even the just and legitimate demands of the backward, and even more of the depressed classes, where the prejudices of the higher classes of Hindus stand in their way. With the Councils devoid of representatives of these classes—and they cannot be otherwise if the view of the Viceroy and Mr. Montagu in respect of special representation ultimately prevails—and the administration of the Educational Department placed under the control of Indian Ministers who will be naturally influenced by the prevailing opinion in the Councils, the influence of Government in favour of the backward and depressed classes will be reduced to nullity. If it be contended that the advice given to the educated classes by the joint report will be enough to persuade the coming Councils and the Indian Ministers to adopt a generous policy towards the backward and the depressed, we should simply say that the whole case for the Indianisation of the administration

and the democratisation of the Indian constitution would topple down like a house of cards, and it would be enough to advise the present bureaucracy in the strain of Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu and leave matters to its affectionate care. The 'appeal to Hindu, Muslim, Brahmin and Non-Brahmin, to cultivate a community of interest in the greater welfare of the whole,' as well as the emphasis laid on the fact that the 'duty of the leaders of every party in the State is to unteach partisanship' have our heartiest approval, and experience in the past warrants the belief that the backward and the depressed classes will be more ready than others to forget the past and march on the path of progress hand in hand with the advanced classes. Is it, however, reasonable to rely wholly on the efficacy of an advice which has fallen on deaf ears for centuries past and leave the claims of the backward and depressed classes to the tender mercies of the politically-minded classes, whose traditions and past activities have not a little tended to help the intellectual degeneracy of the masses of India? We have absolutely no doubt that the disregard of the past on which the joint report bases its proposals in this connection is a serious mistake."

In the above-quoted paragraph, the fear is expressed that, under the proposed Reform Scheme of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, the education of the backward and lower classes will not progress, and the Provincial Governor-in-Council will be powerless to secure the advancement of their interests in this direction. Their apprehensions are only too well-founded. Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford have expressly stated in their report that they are opposed to the system of communal electorates, notwithstanding that they have recommended it in the case of the Muhammadans and Sikhs and that the vital need of this system for the safeguarding of the interests of the masses was repeatedly brought to their notice by non-Brahman organisations belonging neither to the Extreme faction, which demands the overthrow of British rule, nor to the so-called Moderate party, which has been called into being by Mr. Montagu. If, therefore, in the future constitution of India, seats in the various Councils and Boards are not to be reserved for those castes, sects or communities, which provide the soldiers of the Indian army (*e.g.*, the Marathas, Rajputs, etc.) which pay the bulk of the taxes and support the agriculture and industry of the country by the sweat of their brow (*e.g.*, the Kunbis, the Konkani Marathas, the Namsudras, the Jats, the Vellalas, the Kammas, etc.) and which together form 95 per cent. of the total population of India, it is absolutely certain that all the seats available for elected members in those Councils will be wholly monopolised by the very small class of men



educated on Western lines, who represent none but themselves and who for years past, in the guise of lawyers, priests and moneylenders, have subsisted as parasites upon the working and industrial classes.

The history of education in India offers ample proof that these classes, the upper castes of the Indian social system, have always opposed the spread of education among the lower and working classes. The first college, founded in Calcutta in 1817, for teaching Indians the English language was expressly reserved for "*children of the higher castes,*" and not even the association of the Hindu reformer, Ram Mohan Roy, with the establishment of the institution, operated to prevent this unhappy but typical exhibition of class-selfishness. In Western India at that date another college existed exclusively for the education of Brahmans, and, but for the exertions of Mountstuart Elphinstone, would have continued to debar Hindus of other classes from participating in its tuition. Indeed, up to 1854, the privileged castes, the Brahmans and others, were able by clamour and intrigue so to stultify the policy of the British Government in India that education was denied to all except a few picked classes of the population. This monopoly of education by the favoured few at the expense of the masses has continued, practically unchecked, to this day, in consequence of the subtle, but none the less powerful, pressure brought to bear upon the Indian Government by the upper-class Indian oligarchy. Primary education has been starved in order that the "twice-born" upper classes might obtain that secondary and higher education which enables them to read Western philosophy, learn the art of bomb-making, or rob their poorer and illiterate compatriots through the medium of the law courts. "Primary education," wrote the Government of India solemnly in 1904, "has hitherto received insufficient attention and an inadequate share of the public funds," and further added that "the expansion of primary schools has been impeded by the indifference of the more advanced and ambitious classes to the spread of primary education."

In most parts of India, the upper classes have shown more than indifference to the educational welfare of the non-Brahman classes; they have shown actual hostility. People like the Mhars of the Bombay Presidency, who are the watchmen and menial servants of the Deccan villages, are actually forbidden by caste-prejudice to send their children to the existing village schools. The same prohibition extends to the children of the village tanner and shoemaker. In Madras the Brahman is responsible for worse tyranny, and authentic cases occur in which low-caste Hindus, even when converted to another faith, are refused admission to colleges in consequence of objections raised by Brahmans and upper-caste students. From the proceedings of the Madras Legislative Council one can obtain an idea of the attitude of the educated upper-class Indian

towards the primary education of the lower-caste masses. Some little time ago a resolution was moved to empower Local Boards and Municipal Bodies to introduce free and compulsory education within their jurisdiction, and if necessary to raise a special cess for it. In the debate on this resolution an upper-class Hindu, who is chairman of a Municipal Board and one of the shining lights of the Home Rule party, said that he had no objection to the introduction of free and compulsory primary education in municipal areas, provided that the Government defrayed the whole cost of such introduction; but that if municipal bodies were asked to levy any special education cess he would strongly oppose such proposals.

Remembering these facts, which can be multiplied from every province in India; remembering that Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford suggested in their scheme the transfer of the entire administration of Education to Indian ministers; and remembering that, by setting their faces against communal electorates, they absolutely preclude the majority of the non-Brahman and lower classes from obtaining any proper representation in the Councils and Committees which will administer the country, can we wonder that the Backward and Depressed Classes are disposed to see in the vaunted proposals of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford an engine of oppression rather than a Magna Charta of future liberty and enlightenment?

The Memorandum of the Backward Classes then proceeds as follows:—

#### SPECIAL REPRESENTATION.

6. "We are here brought face to face with the question of the special representation of the masses in the Councils of the future, which is in fact the most vital of the questions connected with constitutional reforms in India. The report lays great stress on the creation and training of large electorates to whom the Councils will be responsible. Their absence is admitted. The ignorance of the masses and the influences to which they are an easy and willing prey are also admitted to be unquestionable facts. The report enumerates the numerous wants of the ryot which on their very face demonstrate the very fact of their being in conflict with the interests of the politically-minded classes (paragraph 138) and concludes a sketch of his position thus:—

"He has sat on caste *panchayets*; he has signed joint petitions to official authority. But he has never exercised a vote on public questions. His mind has been made up for him

by his landlord or banker or his priest or his relatives or the nearest official. *These facts make it an imperative duty to assist and to protect him while he is learning to shoulder political responsibilities.* (Italics ours.)

“ We have carefully tried to find out from the report how the Viceroy and Mr. Montagu propose to assist the ryot in the task of learning to shoulder his political responsibility. The powers reserved to Government may be meant to protect him as hitherto. But to ask him to learn this from a system of elections which, in the case of existing Local Boards for instance, has taught him nothing during the past is absurd. Paragraph 84 of the Report tells us how the present system of elections has led to the “ political predominance of men of one calling ” who usually belong to one class, and how it is necessary “ to ensure that men of other classes and occupations find a sufficient number of seats in Council ” by, it may be, “ prescribing certain definite qualifications for rural seats.” But search how you will no clue to these “ definite qualifications ” can be found in the whole of the report. And we can very easily see how they do not find a place in it. For we are convinced that no such qualifications can be proposed or thought of by the most ingenious of mankind. As long as the ryot is void of any but the communal life, he cannot be taught to vote for the right man or compare the merits of two candidates seeking his vote, by reference to questions which he has never yet learnt to consider as falling within the sphere of his influence. Lay down any qualifications you will, it is the money-lender, or the pleader, or the priest, or the landlord who will pocket him. Residence in the rural area and living by actual agricultural or some other peculiarly rural occupation seem to be the only qualifications for rural seats that may be proposed to secure to the ryot some sort of real representation. But neither these nor any other expedients can secure this object. The system of election in which all castes take part will never teach him to stand on his own legs and outgrow the ideas of life which have made him helpless. It is only the caste-panchayet on which he has hitherto set and worked as the equal of the richest or the wisest or the most influential of his fellow-men. Outside that circle and when he meets his priest or his “ nearest official,” he is every inch a slave. The only way to teach him to consider public questions

like a freeman is to ask him to consider them from his seat in that panchayet. By setting their faces against communal electorates in any form, Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu have closed to him the only school in which he will best learn to be a free voter. They have indeed attempted to protect him by means of the powers reserved to Government which, we are afraid, will be so increasingly weak as never to be able to protect him. As for assisting him to learn his new duties and rights, we find no provision whatsoever in the whole of the report.

7. "This is partly due, it appears from the report, to an imperfect appreciation of the mental weakness of the masses of India. "We must remember, too," says the report, "that the educated Indian has come to the front by hard work; he has seized the education which we offered him because he first saw its advantages; and it is he who advocated and worked for political progress." At the best it is only a superficial view of the situation in India. It ignores the effects of the social system which placed the educated Indian—and he is in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred a member of the higher castes—in a position of advantage which enabled him to benefit by the education offered to Indians. It ignores the causes which make the masses so dead averse to educational efforts. It ignores the fact that the ryot is the victim of an essentially unjust social system. Having ignored these facts, the report proceeds to frame a scheme of reforms which leave him a victim to another system which, though just in theory, is sure to drive him to the wall in the free fight of general competition between the strong and the weak."

This constitutes a grave indictment of the proposals for democratic government formulated by the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. These two high officials have made no serious attempt to ensure that the masses of the people shall be properly represented in their new artificial constitution, and by the very nature of the administrative machinery which they seek to saddle upon India, they undermine the central authority of the Government which has hitherto been, and must for many years continue to be, the only safeguard of the masses against the neglect or tyranny of the upper and educated castes. The reform proposals, as pointed out in the Memorandum, ignore the very points—the very considerations which, assuming this to be a sincere attempt to introduce democratic government, should have been regarded as of paramount importance. The past history of education, the actual facts to be gathered

from Local Board elections, the blighting tyranny of Caste, the hostility of the educated Indian classes to the advancement and welfare of the agricultural and industrial masses, as depicted in the history of land and factory legislation during the last twenty-five years, are all ignored by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford in their eager desire to satisfy the Indian politician. They are not even consistent in their view that special representation by communal voting is to be deprecated as retarding the growth of nationality, for they grant special representation in the case of the Muhammadans and Sikhs. The reasons given for the exceptional treatment of these two important communities are, in the case of the Sikhs, that they provide an important contribution to the fighting forces of India, and in the case of the Muhammadans that a small section of them made a pact with the extreme Hindu politicians, under which the former were in all circumstances to be allowed to choose their own representatives through their own sectarian electorates. The provision of men for the Indian Army is a test equally applicable to the Muhammadans, the Marathas, the Rajputs and others; and if special representation is to be allowed to three million Sikhs of the Panjab, there seems no valid reason why the same concession should not be granted to the five million Marathas and the seven million Rajputs of India. One cannot help suspecting that the real reason why Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford have permitted these two exceptions to their policy of discouraging communal representation is that both these communities, being by nature men of action rather than orators and dialecticians, have it in their power to create disturbances most damaging to "peace, order and good government"; and as regards the Muhammadans any attempt to place them in political subjection either to the Extremists or to the Moderates of Mr. Montagu's manufacture would certainly end sooner or later in a serious appeal to force. On the other hand the masses of India, estranged from the "politically minded" upper classes by a tyrannical social system and by centuries of neglect and injustice, are dismissed with a few fine phrases to obtain representation as best they can by submitting their claims to a Committee, of which the Chairman and two members are wholly ignorant of India and the Indian people, and at least two of the other members (Indian) are chosen from those very classes which have been chiefly responsible for the ignorance and abasement of the labouring and industrial population.

The memorandum then proceeds as follows :—

8. "The objections to a further extension of the communal principle as a basis of electoral groups as understood by the writers of the report are based on a wholly wrong perception of the needs of the situation and a misunderstanding of the demands of the backward and depressed or the non-Brahmin communities in the Deccan and Madras. The history of self-

government in nations which have developed it, the possibility of a charge of hypocrisy or short-sightedness being levelled against Government on the ground that it seems to "divide and rule" India and the fear that a "minority which is given special representation owing to its weak and backward state is positively encouraged to settle down into a feeling of satisfied security"—these three are the grounds on which the report founds its objections to communal electorates. The first of these grounds ignores the obvious fact that Indian society has no parallel in the whole world, and therefore the absence of communal electorates elsewhere is no justification for refusing them to India. The history of self-government in other parts of the world is no guide in a country whose social structure is so peculiar. It is a wonder to us how Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu, who recognise "that there runs through Indian society a series of cleavages—of religion, race and caste—which constantly threaten its solidarity, and of which any wise political scheme must take serious heed" or that "running through the whole body politic (in India) is a series of divisions of sect and race which, as the Public Services Commission saw, still affect the minds of educated Indians" should at once refuse to apply to India any remedy except the one that must have been found to be successful in countries whose social conditions are as wide apart from these of India as the two poles. The grant of communal electorates to Muslims has distinctly improved their relations with the Hindus and encouraged the growth of national feelings among the former, who were more sectional without the communal electorates. The lesson is obvious; but the report does not show that its writers have learnt it. The second objection betrays a mental weakness which is not only regrettable but positively disastrous when found in persons in the responsible positions of the Governor-General of India or one of His Majesty Secretaries of State. Are not the Government amenable to the same charge of being desirous of "dividing to rule" by the Muslims and the Sikhs being separated from the rest of India for electoral purposes? Or is it safer to allow the charge in respect of these two communities rather than incur their displeasure and create discontent among them? What lesson would this teach to the other classes which are demanding but are refused exactly the same rights? Do these statesmen prefer to be called cowardly in their dealings with strong and

martial classes and brave only in the face of peaceful and disorganised people ?

#### COMMUNAL REPRESENTATION.

9. "The last argument against the grant of communal electorates, is more specious than convincing. If special electorates are likely to make the minorities weak, their absence would surely place them at the mercy of the stronger castes. We must also remember that special representation is a form of protection which will help the growth of these minor backward classes into strong and vigorous bodies in times to come. The choice lies between (1) the likelihood of their remaining in a sense of satisfied security with stronger likelihood of their recovering strength under the protection of communal electorates, and (2) the sure and certain victimisation of these communities to the interests of the so-called superior castes. We do not for a moment hesitate to make our choice in favour of the first course.

10. "We are positively opposed to nomination as a substitute for communal representation. Reservation of certain seats in plural constituencies will better secure the object of giving to the minor or backward communities real representation in the Councils, though under them the training which communal electorates are expected to give to the voters will be entirely absent.

11. "We shall here express our sincere concurrence with the view that the constitution of the country should train the people to a sense of non-sectional citizenship as soon as possible. We realise as fully as anyone the mischief done to India by the predominance of communal prejudices. We shall be the first to wish that the lines of cleavage due to communal divisions in India should be wholly obliterated. But we contend that the way to the accomplishment of this object is not by ignoring the existence of facts, but by meeting them fairly and by creating in every branch of the body politic a sense of assurance that its interests will be safe in the constitution. It is said that communal electorates will perpetuate existing differences and that "it is difficult to see how the change from this system to national representation is ever to occur." These fears are based

on presumptions which are not true. The principal address on behalf of the backward and minority communities in the Deccan submitted to the Viceroy and the State Secretary proposed that there should exist a large number of territorial electorates in which all citizens will participate irrespective of caste or creed side by side with special electorates which should be reduced in proportion to the growing ability of the backward, depressed, or minor communities to secure seats in the general or territorial wards. This is a sufficient answer to the fear that a transition from the communal to the national electorates would be objected to by these communities. Some had even proposed that the Statute creating these electorates should specifically provide that after a given number of years the communal electorates should automatically disappear. To be swayed by such an imaginary fear in the face of these proposals is simply absurd.

The only comment necessary upon these paragraphs (8-11) of the Memorandum has reference to the position of the Muhammadans. As shown above, the All India Moslem League—representing a small section only of the Muhammadans of all India—made a compact with the Indian National Congress in regard to separate representation; and it is in consequence of that fact that Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford agree to granting communal representation under their scheme to Muhammadans. It is pertinent to enquire into the reasons why a community so widely separated from Hinduism by virtue of race, religion, language, history and social habits and customs, should have entered into a pact with the extreme Hindu politicians of the Congress, artificial and ephermal though that pact may prove to be. The underlying cause, without doubt, was the alienation by the Indian Government of Muhammadan sentiment and support. In recent years the ordinary Muhammadan, who had loyally supported Government and had often fought for Government against its enemies, perceived that the Government was permitting itself to be swayed more and more deeply by the agitation and clamour of the Hindu politician. Lord Curzon had endeavoured by the partition of Bengal incidentally to safeguard the welfare and interests of thousands of poor Moslems. In response to a violent agitation Lord Curzon's act was cancelled and Muhammadan sentiment was alienated by obvious disregard of Muhammadan interests. And that action formed the keynote of a policy of indifference or snubbing, not perhaps actually intended, but at any rate acutely felt by the Muhammadans. In a hundred small matters, of trivial importance perhaps by themselves, connected with educational progress, representation on Committees or Boards, appointments in the District administration, the annual pil-



grimage to Mecca, and so forth, the Muhammadan detected a certain coolness in the attitude of Government towards his desires and claims, which necessarily arose out of the fatal weakness of the Imperial and Provincial Governments in dealing with constant and violent agitation by the coterie of Hindu extremists in each province. He remarked on the other hand that the Hindu was able by means of political extremism to obtain all or most that he wanted; he watched anarchy and murder grow to alarming proportions in Bengal; he saw another Local Government making every effort to assist a non-Moslem shipping firm to carry Musalman pilgrims to the Hedjaz at the expense of Moslem companies who had hitherto held the monopoly of this intrinsically Musalman traffic; he faced various other facts which convinced him that the Government of India, upon which he had hitherto relied with confidence to keep the balance level between Hindu and Musalman, was growing weaker and weaker, and that if he was not to suffer ultimately from the predominance of Hinduism, which is as anti-Muhammadan as it is anti-British, he must without delay come to terms with the Hindu extremists and obtain from them, in return for his support of their agitation against the British Government, such conditions as would safeguard the position of Islam in any future Indian polity. The danger arising from this feeling of neglect has by no means diminished in consequence of the union of the small Moslem League with the Hindu Congress. The Muhammadans are still profoundly discontented at the attitude of Government and their persistent attempts to placate by concession a movement which is essentially anti-British and in a secondary degree anti-Muhammadan; there will assuredly be trouble and revolt, though none can say when it will break out; and the predisposing cause of that outbreak, when it comes, will be the weakness of the Government of India and the baleful attempt of Mr. Montagu to assist the revival of Hinduism under the cloak of democratic government.

Thus it comes about that the abandonment of the policy mentioned in the Montagu-Chelmsford report (para. 229) of dividing men in order to govern them,—a policy which the report deprecates,—has actually resulted in forcing the Viceroy and Mr. Montagu to concede to the Muhammadans the very system of communal representation to which they expressly take objection as being inimical to the growth of nationality. Vacillation and the neglect of loyal friends in an attempt to placate disloyal enemies brings its own punishment; and it will be a matter for surprise if these vital mistakes, in conjunction with the proposed revolutionary changes in the Indian constitution, do not lead, perhaps rapidly, to political disturbances of a far more serious character than any that have happened during the last twenty-five years. The Calcutta riots of September, 1918, are the first ominous mutterings of the storm. When it does break, neither Mr. Montagu nor Mrs. Besant and her Home Rule satellites will be able to avert a catastrophe.

The next two paragraphs of the memorandum are as follows:—

12. "That the writers of this report should have tried to dogmatise on this question without knowing the facts fully is extremely unfortunate. The necessity of a more "careful survey of all the material available in the province for an electorate" is admitted by them and they have themselves proposed the appointment of a committee with a view to "ascertain what sort of franchise will be suited to local conditions," and "how interests that may be unable to find adequate representation in such constituencies are to be represented." They have further admitted the necessity of giving communal representation to at least one new community. How were they sure that the proposed investigations of the committee may not prove the necessity of similar provision for other communities also? On general principles, we are ready to admit that communal electorates are a painful institution. But facts which we know, and which unfortunately Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu have not fully grasped, have to be investigated by a committee, and there is no reason in the haste with which these high persons have theorised with such imperfect knowledge. The thought of the politically-minded castes accusing Government of a desire to divide and rule seems to have sat upon their minds like a frightful incubus, and it will not be unnatural if people of the backward classes begin to believe that their interests have been sought to be sacrificed for the purpose of propitiating the politicians who have been misunderstood by the signatories of the report to be the leaders of India. Were it in any way possible we would be only too glad to disclaim communal representation and secure the interests and training of the backward and depressed classes. The report asks us to disclaim it without saying a word as to how those interests and that training are to be secured. We have no hesitation in saying that this is an essentially unjust policy and is bound to exasperate the communities which have hitherto been confident of the Government's adherence to justice even at the risk of incurring the displeasure of the educated Indian castes.

13. "Unless the report is fundamentally modified in this respect and the committee to be appointed is so constituted

and instructed as to be able to approach the question with an open mind, no transfer of substantial power to Indians would commend itself to the acceptance, or be conducive to the interests, of the masses. If no steps are taken in this direction, we are afraid that such discontent will take root among them as will lead to extremely undesirable social as well as political consequences. The belief that the Government can be induced to yield to clamour, or that martial spirit and "a heavy strain on the feelings of loyalty" bring in political privileges while quiescent confidence in the justice of one's cause is disregarded, is, to say the least of it, likely to lead to undesirable results. We earnestly appeal to Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu, and, failing them, the Parliament to reconsider this question. It is in the meantime the duty of the backward classes to press the question on the attention of the Cabinet with all the power that they can command."

"It will not be unnatural," runs the Memorandum, "if people of the backward classes begin to believe that their interests have been sought to be sacrificed for the purpose of propitiating the politicians who have been misunderstood by the signatories of the Report to be the leaders of India." There is much to support the view of the backward classes that Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford have sought to placate the enemies of England in India by sacrificing the interests of her loyal friends. The very proposals themselves in the Reform Report in regard to the constitution of the Imperial and Provincial Governments, the franchise, the abolition of the British element in the I.C.S. and the transfer of certain functions and departments of the administration to Indian hands, are a concession to the minority which seeks to dominate India. The scanty consideration shown in the Report to the important interests of the British merchant community is a concession to that school of agitation which desires by protective tariffs, taxation and other means to drive British merchants out of India. The definite suggestion in "New India" of July 8th that Mrs. Besant, and possibly others of her school, were privately consulted and shown certain early draft proposals before the publication of the Report is, if true, a complete justification of the view that the proposals are essentially a concession to anti-British agitation, and that interests, other than those of extreme Hinduism, are considered of no account. The further fact that the Rowlatt Committee's Report on Sedition, which throws a most sinister light upon the "political hunger," that Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford seek to satisfy, and which must be read in conjunction with the Reform scheme, has been deliberately withheld from publication in India from April 15th (seven days prior to the date of the

Montagu-Chelmsford Report) until the middle of July, and has not yet been published in England, confirms the belief held in some quarters that there has been a deliberate attempt to throttle opinion and facts which are adverse to the anti-British agitators in India, and therefore also to proposals which in effect place all power in the hands of this class. The suspicion revealed by the backward classes in their Memorandum appears to be well-founded, and the palpable neglect of all interests, save those of the educated upper classes, which can be detected under the verbal camouflage of the Report, is merely the corollary of that weakness and vacillation which has led the Government of India during the last few years to try and secure a dubious political truce at the cost of alienating the loyal masses of Muhammadans and lower class Hindus. The support of the so-called Moderate party, called into sudden existence by Mr. Montagu, is a vain thing and will not stand the test of time. The strength of the Government in India must depend always upon the loyalty and contentment of the backward millions, both Muhammadan and Hindu, whom Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford have, as they state in their report, "deliberately" decided to disturb. It may some day be said that these ill-conceived reform proposals paved the way for the *Lalki* incarnation of Vishnu, when, according to the Hindu Nationalist Press, the *Mlecchas*—i.e., British and Moslem infidels—will be driven out of India.

# The Danger in India.

## Sedition and Murder

An Epitome

of the

Rowlatt Committee Report  
1918

with a foreword and notes

by

The Indo-British Association, Ltd.

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## Foreword.

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In connection with the Rowlatt Committee Report on Sedition in India, which has established the existence of an extensive conspiracy for the overthrow of British rule, four points deserve notice:—

(i.) The first point is that for many months the Bengali press has resounded with the wrongs of innocent youths interned without a trial and even without a knowledge of the crimes laid to their charge; the legend of ruthless oppression was echoed by such divers and important persons as Mr. Byomkesh Chakravarti, Mrs. Besant and Sir Rabindranath Tagore; and even public men—"earnest" Indian politicians—associated themselves with an agitation which was based on the assumption that hundreds of young men had been wrongly interned. A Committee composed of Mr. Justice Beacheroff and Sir N. G. Chandavarkar (an ex-Judge of the Bombay High Court) was appointed to hold an impartial and searching enquiry into these misrepresentations and has now reported that out of 806 persons interned by the Bengal Government all except 6 were implicated in some form of revolutionary enterprise!

(ii.) The second point is best explained in the following remarks in a leading article in the *Madras Mail*:—

"In the Montagu-Chelmsford report such grave incidents as the attempt on Lord Hardinge in 1912, the capture in 1914 of a large consignment of arms and ammunition in Calcutta, utilised in the series of outrages which ensued, and the dangerous *Ghadr* conspiracy in the Panjab—are touched upon, as it were, incidentally. The conclusion suggested by the authors of the Report (Montagu-Chelmsford) is that these were merely attempts made "by very small sections of the population" to create trouble; and even the facts that the Bengal anarchists established communication with German agents and "with agents of the revolutionary party outside India," and drew money from German sources for the purpose of starting an armed rising, do not appear to have perturbed "the calm atmosphere" which pervades the Report. On the contrary prominence is given to such vague and agreeable assertions as that "the spirit of liberty was abroad and active"; to the stress laid by Indian critics of British Rule on "the advantages" of conciliation and the engendering of trust instead of suspicion; and, not least, to criticism of the activities of the C.I.D. as being "too widespread." The Montagu-Chelmsford Report falls short on the ground of history and truth. It is better to face unpleasant facts than to burke them."

"The Rowlatt Report will enable the ordinary Englishman to obtain a juster view of the Indian situation and to weigh against the amiable theories of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford the stern realities of Mr. Justice Rowlatt's Report. He will be able to hold the scale of judgment even between the *Swaraj* of Bepin Chandra Pal and the shibboleths of British Radical politicians."

(iii.) The third point is that the publication of the facts in the Rowlatt Committee Report has been greeted with a storm of denunciation by Indian publicists and politicians. Thus, at the latest session of the Indian National Congress, Mr. C. R. Das, the Bengali lawyer, an ardent advocate of Home Rule, moved a resolution condemning the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee on the grounds that they would "interfere with the fundamental rights of the Indian people and impede the healthy growth of public opinion." The resolution was carried unanimously.

Such papers as the *Hindu*, the *Indian Patriot*, and the *Kesari*, have protested against the publication of the Report and against its recommendations. The Honourable Mr. Khaparde moved in the Imperial Legislative Council that the Report be held in abeyance and an enquiry instead be conducted into the working of the Police! As a Simla telegram to the *Times*, dated August 23rd, remarks, "The Extremist Press has ridiculed the Report. One journal declared that the Report was full of romantic stories which had formed the subject of innocent amusement in the press and on the platform. This is the journal that described the Government disclosures regarding German conspiracies as a huge joke."

It is of such people as these that Sir Reginald Craddock said in a recent speech, "They may condemn anarchy with their lips, but they encourage it by the methods which they adopt. They minimise its guilt, and they deprecate its punishment."

Yet these are the people who will be placed in positions of authority and power under the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme of Reforms!

(iv.) The fourth point hinges upon the broad facts to be gathered from the Rowlatt Committee Report. They are briefly as follows:—

(A) The very wide extent and ramifications of the conspiracy against British Rule and the elaborate arrangements for corrupting boys and young students.

(B) The assistance given by Germany.

(C) The inference that much remains undiscovered and that very large numbers of persons must now be infected with the revolutionary poison.

(D) The numerical weakness of the Police Force, for which the constant objections of elected Indian members of the Legislative Councils to any strengthening are chiefly responsible.

Surely, to weaken British authority now, as Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford propose, is tantamount to inciting a grave political disaster.

# The Rowlatt Committee Report on Sedition in India.

## PRELIMINARY.

1. The Committee, known as the Rowlatt Sedition Committee, was appointed in December, 1917, (A) to investigate and report on the nature and extent of the criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in India, and (B) to examine and consider the difficulties that have arisen in dealing with such conspiracies and to advise as to the legislation, if any, necessary to enable Government to deal effectively with them.

2. The Committee was composed as follows :—

### *President :*

The Honble. Mr. JUSTICE ROWLATT, Judge of the King's Bench Division.

### *Members :*

The Honble. SIR BASIL SCOTT, Chief Justice of Bombay.

The Honble. DIWAN BAHADUR, C.V.K., Sastri, Judge of the High Court, Madras.

The Honble. SIR VERNEY LOVETT, Member of the Board of Revenue, United Provinces.

The Honble. Mr. P. C. MITTER, Additional Member of the Bengal Legislative Council.

3. The reasons underlying the appointment of this very influential Committee are referred to in the following extract from a leading article in *The Times of India*, of July 23rd, 1918 :—

“ In November last (1917) when Lord Ronaldshay (Governor of Bengal) announced that his Government had asked for the appointment of this Committee, he said that he contended that there was in existence in Bengal a widespread conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government and the facts he then disclosed showed there was good ground for the belief. Yet responsible persons had declared their belief that innocent young men were being persecuted, and that the Defence of India Act was an oppression of India Act\*. Congress† (*i.e.*,

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\*These are the persons referred to in the Foreword, the most notable being Sir Rabbrindranath Tagore.

†The Congress was composed at that date both of the Extreme and the Moderate politicians. Several of the latter, who are now openly supporting the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform proposals in the belief that they will be enabled to obtain practically unlimited power thereby, were allied with the Extremists in refusing to admit the existence of revolutionary conspiracies and in declaring the action of Government against the anarchists to be unmerited oppression



the Indian National Congress) had described the internments as part of a system of repression, and the wilder spirits all over the country had been, and still are, clamouring for the rescinding of the Defence of India Act, and for the abolition of the Arms Act. All those critics of the official policy have now an opportunity of seeing how fully justified the Government of India have been in resorting to extraordinary measures to deal with the situation, and it is to be hoped that some at least of them will acknowledge their error and abandon lines of argument, or rather of abuse, which can no longer be honestly followed."

4. The Report of the Rowlatt Committee on Sedition is dated April 15th, 1918, and was, therefore, in the hands of the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India seven days before the Montagu-Chelmsford Report upon Constitutional Reforms, which is dated Simla, April 22nd, 1918. No adequate explanation has yet been forthcoming as to why this Sedition Committee's Report, which throws a most sinister light upon the demands of leading Indian politicians for self-government, was not published in India until the middle of July, and has not yet (October 31st, 1918) been published in England. The official explanation given by Mr. Montagu in the House of Commons on October 23rd, that non-publication is due to the officials having failed by mistake to despatch the copies by a certain boat, is wholly inadequate to explain the delay in India and England, particularly in view of the fact that the whole subject of constitutional reform in India has been prematurely pressed upon the public attention in both countries by the publication of the later report of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford.

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# Epitome of the Report.

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## CHAPTER I.

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5. The first indications of a revolutionary movement were observed in Bombay in connection with the development of two annual festivals, one in honour of the Hindu God Ganpati (the Elephant-headed God), and the other of the Maratha leader Sivaji, who united the people of the Deccan against their Mahommedan rulers. Simultaneously with these movements the brothers Chapekar, both Chitpavan Brahmans of Poona, formed a society for physical and military training, with a pseudo-religious tinge, and endeavoured to inflame the mind of those attending the two festivals above mentioned, by the recitation of verses which definitely urged the assassination of Englishmen. In May, 1897, when the plague was at its worst and the attempts of the Government to prevent the spread of the disease had caused both alarm and resentment, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a Chitpavan Brahman, "published an article in his paper the *Kesari* (the most influential paper in Western India) imputing not merely to subordinate officials, but to the Government itself, a deliberate direction to oppress the people." This was followed by another inflammatory article in the *Kesari*, of the 15th June, and on June 22nd the brothers Chapekar murdered Mr. Rand, the Plague Commissioner and Collector of Poona, and Lieutenant Ayerst, as they were returning from a gathering at Government House, in celebration of the anniversary of Queen Victoria's Coronation. In 1899 other members of the Chapekar Brothers' Association endeavoured to murder a Chief Constable in Poona, and afterwards killed two brothers, who had given information to the Government leading to the arrest and conviction of one of these brothers.

6. "The publications of the *Kesari* of the 15th June, 1897, led to the trial and conviction of the proprietor, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, for sedition. The position taken up by Tilak had been one of "casuistical apology" for political assassination." "It will be seen," proceeds the Report, "that afterwards the same attitude was maintained by him at a time when

younger men were openly disseminating incitements to political assassination."\* Between 1897 and 1908 the anti-British press in Poona, and in particular the *Kesari* continued to vilify the Government, while Shyamaji Krishnavarma started in London, in 1905, his India Home Rule Society, with the object of carrying on a propaganda in England and securing Home Rule for India. Among his recruits was Vinayak Damodhar Savarkar, a Chitpavan Brahman student of 22 years of age, who aided Krishnavarma both in London and Paris in his campaign of sedition.

7. In April, 1908, Mrs. Kennedy and Miss Kennedy were murdered by Khudiram Basu in Bengal, who threw a bomb into their carriage. "Among those who united to excuse the murderer and to praise the bomb as a weapon of offence against unpopular officials was Tilak. For two articles in the *Kesari* published in May and June, 1908, in connection with the Muzaffarpur murders he was convicted and sentenced to six years' imprisonment."

8. The activities of Krishnavarma, Savarkar, and others led to the opening of the "India House" in London, the celebration of the Indian Mutiny in 1908, the delivery of lectures on bomb-making, the practising of revolver-shooting, and finally the assassination of Colonel Sir William Curzon Wylie at the India Office in 1909 by Madan Lal Dhingra. They were also responsible for the introduction into India of very violent pamphlets† and a manual for bomb manufacture. The arrest in India and transportation in June, 1909, of Savarkar's elder brother led directly to the assassination in December of that year of Mr. Jackson, the District Magistrate of Nasik, who was shot dead by a young Brahman with one of a consignment of Browning pistols sent to India by Vinayak Savarkar.

9. The Report describes the history of the Abhinav Bharak secret society in Bombay, a conspiracy set on foot in the territories of the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior, the attempted assassination of Lord Minto at Ahmadabad in 1909, a conspiracy at Satara in 1909, and the discovery in 1914 of a secret

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\* Bal Gangadhar Tilak whose attitude towards the assassination of English officials and loyal Indians was, according to the Rowlatt Committee, one of "casuistical apology" was one of those to whom Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, accorded the honour of a personal interview during his visit to India.

The view taken by the Rowlatt Committee does not apparently commend itself to a section of the English Press. Reference may be made to the *Herald* of May 25th, 1918, in which Tilak was described as "Indian patriot, worshipped by millions of his countrymen," and to a letter published in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of May 8th, 1918, which eulogised Tilak and described him as never hostile to British rule.

† One of these pamphlets contained the following maxims:— "Terrorise the officials, English and Indian, and the collapse of the whole machinery of oppression is not very far. The persistent execution of the policy that has been so gloriously inaugurated by Khudiram Basu, Kanai Lal Datta and other martyrs will soon cripple the British Government in India. This campaign of separate assassinations is the best conceivable method of paralysing the bureaucracy and of arousing the people."

printing press in Poona, which had been issuing seditious pamphlets and bomb formulæ. It points out that the various conspiracies in Western India were engineered and controlled by Chitpavan Brahmans; that their principle crime "was effected at a time when Tilak, the most prominent journalist in the Deccan, was publishing incitements to his countrymen to strike a blow for independence and disregard the limitations of the Penal Code"; that the virulent anti-British writing of the Chitpavan Press in Poona was the primary exciting cause of the conspiracies; and that the Savarkar brothers, one in India and the other working with Krishnavarma in London, provided for the younger extremists suitable literature illuminating the road to political assassination.\*

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## CHAPTER II.

10. This chapter discusses the beginnings of the revolutionary movement in Bengal. The story commences with the arrival in Calcutta, in 1902, of Barindra K. Ghosh, a young Bengali Hindu, who, attracted by stories of the exploits of secret societies in Europe, endeavoured to spread revolutionary ideas among the *bhadralok*, the English educated class in Bengal, who belong chiefly to the Brahman, Kayasth and Vaidya castes.† In order to create an atmosphere suitable to his projects, Barindra and his followers deliberately perverted the religious ideas preached by Rama Krishna, the ascetic, and the Swami Vivekananda‡, and the teaching of the *Bhagavad Gita*. The victory of Japan over Russia, synchronizing with the Universities Bill introduced by Lord Curzon, added fuel to the flame; and the opportunity for a revolutionary movement was finally completed by the political agitation arising out of the Partition of Bengal in 1905. The worship of Kali was proclaimed far and wide, the famous "*Bande Mataram*" song

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† The Chitpavan Brahmans' position in Western India during the last two centuries is given in an introduction to the Report. The Report however omits to point out that this very intellectual sect of Brahmans is essentially a foreign element, which is supposed to have entered Western India centuries ago by sea. The true Chitpavan Brahman has a very light, almost white, skin and light-grey eyes, which are known in Marathi as "*Manjare Dhole*," i.e., Cat-eyes. Its two greatest political thinkers were Ranade and Gokhale.

\* i.e., the sacerdotal, clerical or professional, and medical castes. These three castes are regarded with some hostility by the numerous population of Tilis and Namsudras and other lower castes, in consequence of their selfish arrogance towards those lower in the social scale. The Tilis regard the Brahmans, Kayasths and Vaidis with almost as much dislike as the Non-Brahmans regard the Brahmans in other parts of India.

† Both Rama Krishna and the Swami had advocated the worship of Kali as the Mother of Strength. This worship of Kali as the Sakti or Personified Energy of the Supreme God has a darker side to it, which is well described in Barth's Religions of India. This cruel and libidinous cult was practised by the Bengal revolutionaries and formed the basis of constant incitements to assassination. The gross eroticism and obscenities of the "left-handed" cult of Kali are taught by the Tantras (7th or 8th Century A.D.).

appeared, Tilak himself visited Calcutta, and the Boycott movement with its picketing of shops by students and schoolboys was carried on in all towns and villages. Barindra Ghosh opened gymnasia, collected young men and taught them physical exercises and politics; started a revolutionary paper, the *Jugantar*; collected revolvers and rifles; and with his associates commenced preparing explosives and bombs. The main object of himself and his associates was to persuade the English-educated youths of Bengal that the British Government was founded on fraud and oppression and that religion and history dictated its removal. They formed the Anusilan Samii (society for the promotion of culture and training) with branches in various towns, published newspapers, which contained violent incitements to revolution and murder, and thousands of leaflets which still issue intermittently, and devised a series of textbooks, nominally religious, which employed such principles as that of absolute surrender to the Divine Will to influence and persuade the youth of Bengal to commit every form of crime for political objects. Underlying most of them was the appeal to the worship of Kali, the notorious *Sakti-puja*, with its frequent accompaniment of nameless sexual obscenities and of bloody sacrifice.

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### CHAPTER III.

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11. This chapter of the Report deals with the evidence upon which the Committee base their classification of revolutionary crime and their general conclusions as to the nature and extent of the conspiracy behind this crime. They point out that the large majority of the revolutionaries in Bengal are *students*, teachers or persons of no occupation, belonging to the *bhadra lok* class and to the Brahman and Kayasth castes; that there is a strong family likeness in the type of implements employed by the revolutionaries and in the methods employed by them (*e.g.*, cutting of telegraph wires, rudimentary military formation of gangs, use of motor-cars); that the fire-arms used have frequently been traceable to a common source; that the Committee's conclusions have been affirmed over and over again in the judgments of the Indian Courts, which have dealt from time to time with cases of sedition and ancillary crime; and finally that, while treating an enormous body of statements by approvers and persons in custody as confidential, and being debarred thereby from citing particular deponents by name and discussing their means of knowledge and the corroboration which they receive from ascertained facts and independent statements, they have nevertheless had remarkable opportunities for testing these statements and fortifying their conclusions with actual facts verified from these.

## CHAPTER IV.

13. This chapter gives a chronological account of the outrages, etc., committed by the revolutionaries in Bengal from 1906 to 1917. They may be briefly summarised as follows:—

- 1906. 2 attempted dacoities.
- 1907. 1 robbery.
  - 2 projected dacoities.
  - 1 case of rioting.
  - 2 attempts at train-wrecking.\*
  - 1 attempt to murder.†
- 1908. 6 dacoities (loot Rs. 7,481).
  - 1 dacoity with murder (Rs. 26,000 looted).
  - 1 dacoity with arson (damage Rs. 6,400).
  - 2 attempts to murder.‡
  - 6 murders.§
  - 2 conspiracy cases (bombs, dynamite, etc., discovered.)
  - 1 bomb explosion.
  - 4 cocoanut bomb outrages.
- 1909. 7 dacoities (Rs.8,834 looted).
  - 1 train dacoity with murder (Rs.23,000 looted).
  - 1 dacoity with arson (Rs. 27,827 looted).
  - 1 theft of arms.
  - 2 cocoanut bomb cases.
  - 1 conspiracy (seditious literature and bomb formula found).
  - 2 murders (one victim was the Public Prosecutor of Bengal; the other was a young Bengali).

The Report states that there is information indicating that a number of other murders and dacoities were plotted in 1909. "It is worth mentioning, however, that in November, when the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal was paying a visit to Agartala in Hill Tippera, three young men, two of whom have since been convicted of revolutionary crime, were found loitering there disguised as religious devotees and gave false names when questioned."

- 1910 (first half). 4 dacoities (Rs. 15,079 looted).
  - 1 murder (of Deputy-Superintendent of Police).
  - 1 conspiracy (Howrah).

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\* Both these plots were directed against the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. On one occasion the train in which he was travelling was actually derailed by a bomb.

† This attempt was made against Mr. Allen, formerly District Magistrate at Dacca, who was shot in the back at a railway station.

‡ One attempt was against the Maire of Chandernagore and the other against the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

§ The six victims were Mrs. and Miss Kennedy, Sub-Inspector Nanda Lal Banerji, and three Bengali members of the revolutionary party who were considered likely to give information to the police.

1910 (second half). 1 conspiracy (Dacca).\*

1 theft of arms.

1 discovery of bombs.

2 dacoities (Rs. 53,028 looted).

1 dacoity with murder (Rs. 1,500 looted).

Three dacoities were planned by the *students* and *teachers* of the Sonarang National School, the loot being used partly for the defence of the accused in the Dacca conspiracy case.

1911. 1 assault case.†

11 dacoities (Rs. 41,257 looted).

1 attempt at murder‡ (by bomb).

7 murders.§

In this year Mr. Ashe, Collector of Tinnevelly, was murdered in the Madras Presidency.

1912. 9 dacoities (Rs. 56,000 looted).

1 preparation for dacoity.

1 arms case.

1 attempted murder (with bomb).

2 murders.

The events of this year led up to the Barisal conspiracy case, and were proved to have been engineered by the notorious Dacca Anushilan Samiti, which had branches in various parts of Bengal. A great collection of revolutionary stores, arms and documents was discovered, the latter of which disclosed the wide ramifications of the secret society and gave accounts of the loot taken in various dacoities. In one of the dacoities above mentioned, the revolutionaries attacked in military formation!

Of the two murders committed by the society one was that of a Police Head Constable, employed in watching political suspects. The man whom they attempted to murder by bomb was a police informer.

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\* It was in the course of the Dacca conspiracy trial, as Sir V. Chirol as shown, that the famous letter written by Mr. Surendranath Banerjee to one of the Extremist leaders was produced. "My suggestion" wrote this distinguished politician, who was then head of Ripon College, "is that you should organise a religious ceremony on the 7th August such as *Sakti-puja* and *Kali-puja*. . . . Give a religious turn to the movement (the Boycott of British goods)." "Shakti rites and the worship of Kali," writes Sir V. Chirol on page 341 of "Indian Unrest," "are associated with some of the most libidinous and cruel of Hindu superstitions."

Mr. Surendranath Banerjee's latest incarnation is that of the trusty Moderate politician, intent upon supporting the acceptance and introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform scheme. It is not at present clear whether this scheme, like the Boycott agitation, is also to be under the special patronage of the goddess Kali.

† This assault upon a postal peon was perpetrated by the students and teachers of the Sonarang National School. They stole his bag containing registered orders for money and cash.

‡ The bomb, which failed to explode, was thrown into the motor car of an Englishman called Cowley, and was really intended for Mr. Denham, of the C.I.D.

§ The victims in these cases were people who had been assisting the police to unravel revolutionary crime; also an inspector; a sub-inspector; and a head constable of the Bengal police.

In December an attempt was made on the life of Lord Hardinge at Delhi.

1913. 8 dacoities. } (Rs. 61,000 looted).  
2 dacoities with murder }  
2 attempted murders.  
2 murders (both of police officers).  
2 bombs thrown.

“By this time,” says the Report, “the members of the ‘Violence Department,’ as the revolutionaries who engaged in dacoities styled themselves, had reached an almost complete disregard of human life.” They shot villagers in cold blood, tried to murder an English member of the Indian Civil Service, assassinated the two police officers mentioned above, and made two attempts to murder police officials by picric acid bombs. “The object of these outrages seems to have been sheer desire to murder.”

Revolutionary literature and implements used in bomb making were discovered, the trial of the culprits proving that “the revolutionaries were secretly manufacturing bombs of a very dangerous type from simple materials.”

This year a bomb exploded in Lahore, and a brutal murder was committed by revolutionaries in Behar and Orissa.

1914. Eastern Bengal. 4 dacoities (Rs. 38,200 looted).  
1 dacoity with murder (Rs. 17,700 looted).  
3 attempted dacoities.  
1 bomb outrage.  
2 murders.  
Bengal (Calcutta). 2 dacoities (Rs. 2,210 looted).  
3 attempted dacoities.  
1 murder and 1 attempted murder.

This year the revolutionaries stole 50 Mauser pistols and 46,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition from a firm of gunmakers in Calcutta. “The authorities have reliable information,” says the Report, “that 44 of these pistols were at once distributed to 9 different revolutionary groups in Bengal, and it is certain that the pistols so distributed were used in 54 cases of dacoity or murder, or attempts at dacoity and murder, subsequent to August, 1914.”

“In the Panjab from September onwards large numbers of disaffected Sikhs arrived from America. Dacoities and murders took place with alarming frequency and a military outbreak planned for February, 1915, was only detected and prevented at the last moment. It is certain that the revolutionaries in Eastern Bengal were aware of its imminence.”

“During the same winter there were dangerous intrigues in Burma, a conspiracy of Bengali origin was hatching at



Benares, and an attempt was made under Bengali management to found a revolutionary society in the Central Provinces."

1915. Bengal (Calcutta

and neighbourhood) . 5 murders.  
 7 dacoities (Rs. 53,000 looted).  
 2 dacoities with murder (Rs.43,000 looted).  
 1 robbery.  
 1 attempted robbery.  
 Eastern Bengal. 6 dacoities (Rs. 49,270 looted).  
 3 attempted dacoities.  
 3 dacoities with murder (Rs.33,500 looted).  
 1 bomb thrown.  
 2 murders.

In Calcutta the revolutionaries commenced to commit outrages with the help of automobile taxi-cabs. Several police officers were murdered. In Eastern Bengal the headmaster of a school was murdered for political reasons, and a police officer, who was sitting at the door of his house with his little child on his knee, was brutally assassinated with the child by four or five youths armed with Mauser pistols. Northern Bengal commenced this year to be the scene of revolutionary crime, though hitherto free. Two dacoities by youths armed with Mausers took place, and an attempt was made to murder an Indian Police Superintendent.

1916. Bengal. ... 3 dacoities (Rs. 19,500 looted).  
 5 attempted dacoities.  
 1 affray.  
 2 attempted murders (of police officers).  
 7 murders (of police officers and constables, 2 informers and a headmaster).

" There was no more crime in Calcutta," says the Report, " during the year, owing to the vigorous action of Government in exercising their powers under Regulation III. of 1818, and under the Defence of India Act for the arrest and detention of political offenders."\*

Eastern Bengal ... 5 dacoities (Rs. 79,000 looted).  
 4 dacoities with murder (Rs.83,500 looted).  
 2 attempted dacoities.  
 1 murder.

One of these dacoities " was the work of students from Faridpur. Most of them belonged to the Ishan Institute, a

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\* It is permissible to enquire why the Bengal Government waited for eight years before taking vigorous action. A grave responsibility rests upon those who represented the Government of Bengal prior to the advent of Lord Ronaldshay.



Another document, giving the duties of visiting inspectors of the revolutionary societies, was described by Mr. Justice Mukharji as indicating clearly "that systematic effort was to be made to have a network of Samitis throughout the length and breadth of the land."

Among other documents found were (A) seditious literature' (B) military works, (C) exposition of Russian revolutionary methods, (D) rules for members, (E) a district organisation scheme, and (F) a pamphlet by one Amulya Sarkar, one of the organisers of the revolutionary crusade, in which, *inter alia*, he required information to be collected "of a kind which could only be required for purposes of massacre."

The ideals of the revolutionaries were set forth in such books as the *Bhawani Mandir*, which glorifies Kali under her names of Sakti and Bhawani and preaches the gospel of force as the necessary condition of political freedom. "The revolutionary societies in Bengal infected the principles and rules advocated in the *Bhawani Mandir* with the Russian ideas of revolutionary violence. While a great deal is said in the *Bhawani Mandir* about the religious aspect, the Russian rules are matter of fact."

As regards the co-operation of the various revolutionary groups, the Committee says:—"We have heard it suggested that the later outrages were the work of isolated gangs of youths who had abandoned themselves to a life of crime. It may be that this aspect of the matter presents itself to those who merely see the outrages mentioned from day to day in the newspapers. When, however, we study the statements made by the persons arrested, too closely interwoven to be invented, anticipating their own corroboration by way of subsequent discoveries and strikingly connected in important matters by documents, we are driven to take quite another view." The most striking co-operation is revealed in 1914-15, when an outbreak in the Panjab and the landing of German arms in Bengal were in prospect; and to this evidence must be added that furnished by the actual distribution of arms among the various revolutionary parties, by the discovery of cipher lists of arms, by the fact that the leading men of one group were killed in affrays or arrested in conjunction with men of other groups, and by a study of the bombs used by the various groups, which belonged to one of three main types.

The various revolutionary organizations "were widely extended and overlapped each other's territory. The Dacca Samiti was throughout the whole period the most powerful of these associations. *The existence of this body alone, even if there had been no other, would have constituted a public danger.*"

After detailing the ramifications of the revolutionary groups, this chapter ends with a description of the leaflet literature of the revolutionaries. "These documents have been discovered in great numbers at searches where revolutionaries have been arrested."

*“ These leaflets embody a propaganda of bloodthirsty fanaticism directed against the Europeans and all who assist them. The last of these documents, namely, that published in December, 1917, in view of Mr. Montagu's visit, is specially important, for it shows that the attitude of utter irreconcilability is maintained up to the present moment.”\**

As the Committee remark, “ The expression of these views, at the moment and in the connection in question, is obviously a matter of grave importance,” and they proceed to prove that “ the author of the leaflet was the fellow-worker of a numerous band already in custody as revolutionaries and of others wanted as such.”

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## CHAPTER VI.

14. “ Abundant evidence,” say the Committee, “ has compelled us to the conclusion that the secondary English schools, and in a less degree the colleges of Bengal have been regarded by the revolutionaries as their most fruitful recruiting centres.” They quote the following extracts from the Annual Report of the Director of Public Instruction :—

“ It is customary to trace the genesis of much sedition and crime to the back streets and lanes of Calcutta and Dacca, where the organisers of anarchic conspiracies seek their agents from among university students. This view is correct as far as it goes, but it is in the high schools, with their underpaid and discontented teachers, their crowded, dark and ill-ventilated classrooms, and their soul-destroying process of unceasing cram, that the seeds of discontent and fanaticism are sown.” The influence of revolutionary newspapers and leaflets, the direct seduction of masters, students and school boys by district agents of these secret societies, as explained in the Report, only serve to corroborate the words of the judge who tried the earliest Bengal Conspiracy Case. “ Those responsible for this conspiracy did their work well. They realised that their best chance was to get hold of the youth of the country and inflame them by appealing to their sense of religion and their sense of chivalry, and to this end they have prostituted the teaching of their sacred books, and represented that under English Rule the chastity of their mothers and sisters is not safe.” As an example of the results of this conspiracy the Committee gives the record of a High English school, of which two ex-pupils have been

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\* Two of the paragraphs of this leaflet are as follows :—

“ What then must we do. Our duty is plain. We have no concern in Mr. Montagu's coming or going. He is coming in peace, he may depart in peace for ought we know or care.

“ But first and last let us spread Terror. Make this unholy Government impossible. Hide like invisible shadows of doom and rain death upon the alien bureaucracy. Remember your brothers who are perishing in jails or rotting in swamps. Remember those who have died or gone mad. Remember, watch and work.”

hanged, one committed murder and was afterwards killed fighting the police, others have been imprisoned and others bound over under the law to be of good behaviour. One of the pamphlets reproduced in the Report contains details of a clever and elaborate organisation for the corruption of Bengal youths.

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## CHAPTER VII.

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15. In this chapter the Committee show that Germany was in touch with the revolutionary organisation in India. An article in the *Berliner Tageblatt* in March, 1914, called attention to "England's Indian Trouble," while, "according to the case disclosed by the prosecution in a State trial which opened in San Francisco on the 22nd November, 1917, Hardayal, a Hindu ex-student of the Panjab University, had planned a campaign in America prior to 1911, with German agents and Indian revolutionaries in Europe, and in pursuance of the scheme founded the *Ghadr* Revolutionary Party in California, spreading throughout California, Oregon, and Washington the German doctrine that the Fatherland would strike England." In 1914 an "Indian National Party" was formed and attached to the German General Staff in Berlin, which produced and disseminated anti-British literature. Later one of this party "was detailed to direct a campaign to win Indian prisoners of war captured by the Germans from the British ranks from their allegiance. Another (Pillai) was at one time trusted with a Berlin Office Code, which he made over in Amsterdam in 1915 to an agent who was leaving for Bangkok *via* America to start a printing-plant and publish war-news to be smuggled over the Siamese-Burmese frontier. Heramba Lal Gupta was for a time Indian agent of Germany in America and arranged with Boehm, of whom more will be said, that he should go to Siam and train men for an attack on Burma." A letter from Zimmermann of the Berlin Foreign Office is quoted appointing Chakrabarti as German agent in America.

The Germans had a scheme dependent upon Moslem disaffection directed against the North-West Frontier, another scheme dependent upon the returned Sikhs of the *Ghadr* party which centred in Bangkok, and a third scheme dependent upon co-operation with the Bengal revolutionaries. The two latter schemes were under the general direction of the German Consul

General in Shanghai acting under orders from the German Embassy at Washington.

The Committee traces the history of the German plot in Bengal, the tale of "Martin," who was really a Bengali named Naren Bhattacharji, the sailing of the *Maverick* with a cargo of rifles and ammunition for Bengal, the arrival of a Bengali from Bangkok with a message from a Panjab conspirator that the German Consul in Siam was sending by boat 5,000 rifles and ammunition and one lakh of rupees, and the sailing of another ship the *Henry V.*, also loaded with arms and ammunition. The *Maverick* had on board five so-called Persians, who signed on as waiters, "They were all Indians, and had been shipped by Van Brincken, of the German Consulate at San Francisco and Ram Chandra\*, the successor of Hardayal on the *Ghadr*." On the *Henry V.* was Boehm, who "was instructed by the German Consul at Manila to see that 500 revolvers were landed at Bangkok and the rest of the consignment of 5,000 sent to Chittagong." The revolvers were Mauser pistols.

"There is reason to believe," say the Committee, "that when the scheme connected with the *Maverick* failed, the German Consul-General at Shanghai arranged to send two other ships with arms to the Bay of Bengal, one to Rai Mangal and the other to Balasore. The first was to carry 20,000 rifles, 8,000,000 cartridges, 2,000 pistols and hand grenades and explosives and two lakhs of rupees; the other was to carry 10,000 rifles, a million cartridges and grenades and explosives."

"In October, 1915, the Shanghai Municipal Police arrested two Chinamen in possession of 129 automatic pistols and 20,830 rounds of ammunition, which they had been instructed by a German named Nielson to take to Calcutta, concealed in the centre of bundles of planks." The addressee to whom they were to be delivered was Amarendra Chatarji, one of the conspirators who absconded to Chandernagore.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

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16. This chapter deals with revolutionary crime in the Province of Behar and Orissa. Though little affected by the revolutionary movement, it was the scene of two of its worst

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\* Ram Chandra was eventually shot dead in Court during the hearing of the conspiracy trial in America.

crimes. "The circumstances of these murders," say the Committee, "were remarkable and show clearly the baneful influence exercised by the Bengal propaganda of robbery and homicide on youthful minds, outside Bengal." And they conclude the chapter with the following words:—"This province, however, has been used and will in all probability continue to be used, both as a seed-bed for propaganda and as a harbour for absconders."

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## CHAPTER IX.

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17. This chapter details the efforts of revolutionaries in the United Provinces. The first impulse towards a revolution came from the establishment of the *Swarajya* newspaper in 1907, which was suppressed in 1910. The history of the great Benares conspiracy, which commenced in 1908, is traced in detail, and discloses not only the wide distribution of seditious leaflets, bomb explosions, and the attempt to train the famous *Ghadr* revolutionaries in bomb making with Bengali assistance, but also various persistent attempts to tamper with Indian Troops., *e.g.*, a certain young Maratha named Pingle was arrested in the lines of the 12th Indian Cavalry at Meerut "with a box in his possession containing ten bombs, sufficient to annihilate half a regiment."

"These incidents show clearly," says the Report, "that *the position and circumstances of Benares will always render that city a point of peculiar peril. They prove that when contagion permeated, it spread gradually and secretly, through poisonous literature and teaching among critical and impressionable youths; that within these narrow limits it worked unchecked for years, and finally developed a conspiracy which almost achieved a horrible tragedy.*"

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## CHAPTER X.

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18. This chapter explains the effect of the revolutionary movement upon the Central Provinces. The evil effect of a hostile press is described, with particular mention of a Hindi edition of B. G. Tilak's paper the *Kesari*, as also the rowdiness of the school boys and an attempt in 1915 to cause a mutiny of troops at Jubbulpore.

## CHAPTER XI.

19. The history of revolutionary movements in the Panjab is described in great detail in this chapter. New ideas began to ferment about 1907, "when the *Jugantar* and similar publications were daily pouring forth their poison among thousands in Bengal, while the Alipore and Dacca conspirators were laying their plans, recruiting their ranks and collecting their weapons." The Lieutenant-Governor considered the whole situation in that year "exceedingly dangerous and urgently demanding remedy." There were riots at Lahore, riots at Rawal Pindi and gratuitous insults to Europeans. The remedy adopted was the deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. Lajpat Rai was subsequently proved to have been fomenting sedition by the discovery of letters written by him to another conspirator, in whose possession a bomb-manual was found.\*

In 1912 occurred the Delhi bomb outrage, when Lord Hardinge was wounded and one of his attendants killed. Five months later an Indian orderly was murdered by a bomb at Lahore. This led to the Delhi conspiracy case, in which three revolutionaries were arrested and after conviction hanged, and a fourth—the notorious Rash Behari—escaped. Between 1911 and 1914 the *Ghadr* conspiracy was initiated in America by Hardayal, so-called from the paper which Hardayal printed in San Francisco. "*The paper was printed in more than one Indian language. It was widely distributed among Indians in America, and was forwarded to India. It was of a violent anti-British nature, playing on every passion which it could possibly excite, preaching murder and mutiny in every sentence, and urging all Indians to go to India with the express object of committing murder, causing revolution and expelling the British Government by any and every means.*" Hardayal was arrested in America, released on bail, and absconded via Switzerland to Berlin. In September, 1914, occurred the famous Budge-Budge riot, when a large body of Sikhs who had returned to India in the *Komagata Maru* tried to march in a body on Calcutta. They were the vanguard of thousands of Sikh emigrants who, but for precautionary measures taken by the Government, would have caused an outbreak on a considerable scale.

They were followed by a shipload of Sikhs who came in the *Tosa Maru* from the Far East. "Of all the October, November, and December shiploads of returning emigrants, the *Tosa Maru* was the most dangerous. It contained malcontents who had divided themselves into sections, each of which was to work

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\* This man Lajpat Rai, now an exile in America, has recently been allowed by the Editor of the *Nation*, a London newspaper, to occupy 1½ columns of the paper in an attack upon Lord Sydenham and Sir John Hewitt, coupled with exuberant adulation of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford.



under a leader in a particular area of the Panjab." They committed roughly 11 dacoities and several robberies, and made six separate attempts to derail trains between December, 1914, and February, 1915; Pingle, a Maratha, joined them in December and offered to introduce a Bengali bomb-expert; attempts were made to organize gangs of villagers to take part in a rebellion; bombs were prepared; arms were collected; flags were made ready; instruments were collected for destroying railway and telegraph wires; a declaration of war was drawn up. The plotters designed simultaneous outbreaks at Lahore, Ferozepore and Rawal Pindi, and intended to extend their operations to Benares and Jubbulpore. By the 25th February the dacoities committed by revolutionary bands numbered 45, and the situation was so serious that the Panjab Government wrote again to the Government of India asking for *extraordinary legislation* to cope with the danger. "*The Government of India*," say the Committee, "*was reluctant to supersede in any degree the courts and processes of ordinary law, but was practically forced by the gravity of the situation to pass the Defence of India Act. Armed with powers under that Act the Panjab Government grappled with the danger and suppressed it. 'It is evident,'* remark the Committee, "*that the Ghadr movement in the Panjab came within an ace of causing widespread bloodshed.*"

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## CHAPTER XII.

20. The history of revolutionary crime in Madras commences in 1907 with the delivery of a series of lectures by Bepin Chandra Pal, whose visit was followed by an outburst of seditious activity. Pal himself was imprisoned at the end of 1907 for refusing to give evidence in connection with charges against the notorious sedition-monger, Arabindo Ghosh. A serious riot in Tinnevely, violent and revolutionary articles in certain papers, continuous plotting by members of the India House, London, working with Madame Cama and Krishnavarma in Paris, eventually culminated in the murder of Mr. Ashe, the District Magistrate of Tinnevely. The Tinnevely conspiracy trial brought revolutionary activity to a close.

"We do not consider," say the Committee, "that there was any indigenous revolutionary movement in Madras, and

but for the influence of Bepin Chandra Pal\* and his revolutionaries plotting in Paris and Pondicherry there would have been no trouble in Southern India."

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### CHAPTER XIII.

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21. Six pages are devoted to the tale of revolutionary conspiracy in Burma. "It has been the scene of determined efforts to stir up mutiny among the military forces and to overthrow the British Government. Such efforts have originated in America, have been concentrated in Bangkok and thence, with the assistance of Germans, have been directed from the Siamese frontier against Burma."

"The Muhammadan *Ghadr* party at Rangoon are known to have planned a rising on the occasion of the *Bakr-Id* in October, 1915, when English were to be killed instead of goats and cows. During November a *Ghadr* plot in the Military Police battalion at Pyawbwe was discovered, and revolvers, dynamite and other things to be used in the mutiny were seized."

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### CHAPTER XIV.

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22. Mahommedan plots are dealt with in this chapter, from which the following extracts are quoted :—

"But among a small and vaguely defined group of fanatical Mohammedans there has been a desire to assist or join the

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\* In May Bepin C. Pal addressed a meeting at a *Sakti* celebration in Calcutta at which he recommended the organisation of *Kali puja* in every important village. See footnote, Chapter II. above.

In 1908 (October 2nd) we find the *Manchester Guardian* publishing a letter from him on "The Indian Nationalist Programme."

In 1909 Mr. Pal edited a paper called the *Swaraj*, in which appeared (No. 6-7 of Vol. I.) an article styled "The Ætiology of the Bomb," which was described by the High Court Appeal Bench as "wicked and seditious." In 1910 (February) the "Contemporary Review" published an eleven-page article by Mr. Pal on the political situation in India.

enemies of England, a wish to substitute a new Islamic Empire for present British Rule in India.”-

“The Germans of the mission, failing to achieve their object, left Afghanistan early in 1916; but the Indians remained and ‘the Provisional Government’ despatched letters to both the Governor of Russian Turkestan and the then Czar of Russia, inviting Russia to throw over her alliance with Great Britain and assist in the overthrow of British Rule in India. These were signed by Mahendra Pratap and subsequently fell into British hands.”

“The facts narrated in this chapter (XIV.) establish clearly the anxiety of some Muhammedan fanatics to provoke first sedition and then rebellion in India. For the purpose of accomplishing their objects they seek to co-operate with the enemies of Britain. Their methods of waging war range from subterranean intrigue and propaganda to open defection. Sometimes they send recruits to collect and remit money. Sometimes they go themselves. Always they preach sedition. Against their designs the loyalty of the general Muslim community and the effective power of the Government are the only safeguards.”

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## CHAPTERS XVI. AND XVII.

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23. These chapters deal with the difficulties which have confronted the Provincial Governments in dealing with these widespread conspiracies under the ordinary laws of British India, and suggest the special legislation and punitive measures required to enable the Indian Government to deal effectively with revolutionary movements and conspiracies.

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## CONCLUSION.

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
24. Such in brief outline is the tale of conspiracy, murder and attempted revolution which Mr. Justice Rowlatt and his colleagues have unfolded. That no great catastrophe took place during the last few years is due, not to the absence of

desire to wreck the British Government, but to the stupidity of Germany's agents, to the loyalty of the non-Brahman and non-political classes in India, and to the brilliant services of the much-maligned Indian Police. It is typical of the attitude of the Moderate Indian politicians that none of them have shown any readiness to thank the Rowlatt Committee for its work, to acknowledge the gravity of the problem which the Committee has disclosed, or to congratulate the authorities on the skill and courage with which the various conspiracies were detected and crushed. This much might surely have been expected from men who profess loyalty to British rule. But they have maintained silence and have allowed their Extremist brethren publicly to denounce the report of Mr. Justice Rowlatt's Committee as a tissue of fairy tales, without uttering a word of loyal remonstrance. In their eyes, the brutal murder of English men and women and of Indian Police Officers appears to be a negligible matter in comparison with the appeasement of their "political hunger." It is to the hands of men who on the one hand find dishonest excuses for a system of organised sedition, fortified by crime, and on the other hand utter no word of condemnation of the system thus exposed, that it is now proposed to entrust the task of governing India.

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Note  
on  
The Indian  
R e f o r m  
Proposals



By

Sir J. P. HEWETT, G.C.S.I.

# Note on the Indian Reform Proposals

By

Sir J. P. Hewett, G.C.S.I.

1. Criticism of the report on Indian Constitutional Reforms must, it seems, be limited to the means suggested for carrying out the policy announced by the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons in reply to a question on August 20th, 1917. One may regret that such a pronouncement was made when the preoccupations of the war were engaging everyone's interest; and that no discussion took place, either outside or inside the Houses of Parliament, before what the Viceroy and Secretary of State describe as "the most momentous utterance ever made in India's chequered history" was settled. But the announcement is a pledge by Parliament to the people of India. It must be honoured by every Englishman. Criticism must be restricted to endeavouring to secure that the proposals do conform with the announcement made on August 20th last, and that they are directed towards the good of the people of India as a whole. Surely this is the real test, and not that described in the words in paragraph 228, "the crucial test to which, as we conceive, all proposals should be brought is whether they will or will not help to carry India towards responsible Government." That form of Government will only be suitable for India when it has become the best form of Government for the people, and they have become fit for it.

2. The policy embodied in the announcement is that of the 'increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.' Towards this end "substantial steps" were to be taken as soon as possible. But it was made clear that progress in this policy could only be achieved by successive stages, and that the British Government and Indian Government must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance.

There are certain of the proposals made in the report which I would support unreservedly, and some which I could endorse with reservations. It will be well to mention these before referring to those which seem to be objectionable. Thus there

is nothing in the proposals regarding the extension of popular control in local bodies which I could not support with enthusiasm. Indeed, the Resolution issued by the Government of India in May, 1918, to carry out the proposals summarised in paragraphs 194 to 197 of the report, appears to be in some respects halting and unsatisfying, and might, many will feel, have been more generous in some respects. Again, I am wholly in favour of relaxing the meticulous control exercised, in both administrative and financial matters, over the Provincial Governments by the Government of India, and in particular of changing the existing financial arrangements by abolishing the system of dividing certain heads of revenue between the supreme and the local Governments, and by giving the latter power to impose taxation and power to borrow money. The scheme detailed in paragraph 206, however, for carrying out the distribution of revenue between the Government of India and the Provincial Governments seems to me, as will be explained later, open to grave exception. The proposals regarding the native States (Chapter X.) seem to be excellent in most respects. The appointment of a Committee to enquire into and report on the organisation of the India Office will receive general support. The proposal to give British Commissions to Indian officers appeals to me personally, though I should be averse from too indiscriminate a distribution of them. Lastly, the suggestions in Chapter XI. (iii.) regarding industries and tariffs are such as I could wholeheartedly support.

3. On the other hand, it is impossible for me not to feel apprehensive about the other main features of the scheme. Lord Morley, after a talk with the late Sir Denzil Ibbetson, remarked "It cannot be easy for any man to waken up to new times, after a generation of good honest labour in old times." One of the principal efforts of this report seems to be to tear up by the roots the system of Government in India under which men like myself have lived their lives. "We have (paragraph 120) to demolish the existing structure at least in part before we can build the new." Perhaps one may be forgiven for regarding the proposals as involving the entire demolition of the structure. I have lived most of my life in India, and become very fond of the country and the people, particularly of the great agricultural class numbering three-quarters of the population, who have enjoyed under British rule security of their rights and their possessions such as their ancestors never dreamed of. I recently noticed a statement in a newspaper, which was supporting this scheme of reform, that people were constantly leaving British India for the native States because of the unpopularity of British rule. This is utterly untrue. Let us look at the other side of the shield. There are in a certain district of the United Provinces a number of British villages intertwined with villages of a native State, the ruler of which stands very high among the Indian Princes for his honesty, uprightness and fair government. The landlords and tenants of a village



which it was proposed to exchange with another in the State in question petitioned me in the following terms :—

- (1) " Our village adjoins British territory and — on two sides.
  - (2) " We do not at all approve of the transfer, because in the State there are other rules. All our rights both ancestral and non-ancestral will be destroyed.
  - (3) " In — we cannot cut our trees, whether fruit-bearing or not fruit-bearing, without paying 1/4th of their value to the State, nor can we sell them. On every mhowra (the tree *bassia latifolia*) an annual fee is levied. On sale or purchase of cattle is a tax.
- " On ghi, tili, cotton, linseed, cottonseed, mhowra flowers and nuts and all kinds of grain—on all these a tax is taken. We cannot cut mhowras or even thorns for making hedges without paying for it. Nor is there any zamindari right as in the district. Their zamindars only get 12 per cent. for collecting, and even out of that 12 per cent. is cut what cannot be realised from non-paying tenants.
- " We do not want to be transferred to the State, else we cannot live at all. We are not at all agreeable to leaving our village.
- " There are also other rules in the State about which we cannot write in a petition. We want our village not to be transferred."

So the countryside does after all benefit from British rule: the Indian peasant does realise that the British officer has worked for his good. He will not relish any withdrawal of the protection that he now gets from British rule and British officers. Lord Morley expressed, when his reforms were under consideration, his objection to anything that would affect the strength and steadiness of the paramount power. It appears to me that these proposals, if carried into effect, will necessarily weaken and render unsteady the paramount power.

4. The announcement of August 20th last contemplated progressive steps being taken towards responsible Government. This scheme seems to proceed at a much faster rate than that announcement contemplated. Transitional arrangements made with pointers in the direction in which further demands may be made with the certainty that they will be granted are not calculated to discourage agitation, or to make for quiet, orderly and settled life in India. The Maharaja of Patiala on June 13th last said: " There is no country within the Empire in which British rule, which presents in every respect such contrasts to German domination, is more valued and loved. I say emphatically that it is an absolute essential for the welfare of India." But British rule can only be interpreted by British agents. There is no manner of doubt whatever that the people who are asking for power in India want to rule according to their own methods and not according to ours. British rule cannot be administered

through Indianised services, and no one realises that better than the Indian agriculturist. The scheme of the report is designed to hand over the Legislative Councils bodily to the educated classes who have agitated against our Government and to place the executive Government under the control of the Legislative Councils, with the result that the chief elements of British rule must inevitably be eliminated.

I feel bound to make this general criticism before turning to the details of the scheme.

5. The difficulty of considering the proposals made regarding provincial legislatures and provincial executives is greatly increased, because the questions of the franchise and the manner in which business should be divided between the Government of India and the Provincial Governments and the business of the Provincial Governments distributed between "reserved" and "transferred" have been left for future examination by two Committees. The question of representative legislative assemblies depends entirely on the electorate that can be established. The object aimed at is to give the Councils real work to do and real people to call them to account for their doing of it (paragraph 81). The present franchise is condemned (paragraph 83) because it is too restricted and indirect. It is not easy to feel sure even of the general principles which the framers of the report finally held on this matter. In paragraph 162 their proposal is said to be to introduce "a system of direct election on as wide a franchise as is possible, having regard to the materials at hand for the creation of an electorate." Again, in paragraph 187, occurs the passage: "No one could propose to prescribe an educational qualification for the vote; but no one can deny the practical difficulties which make a very general extension of the franchise impossible, until literacy is far more widely spread than is the case at present." In paragraph 226 two principles are stated: (i.) "We consider in the first place that the system of indirect elections should be swept away"; (ii.) "Secondly, we consider that the limitations of the franchise, which it is obviously desirable to make as broad as possible, should be determined rather with reference to practical difficulties than to any *a priori* considerations as to the degree of education or amount of income which may be held to constitute a qualification." In paragraph 189 it is admitted that "electoral experience is almost entirely lacking," and in paragraph 263 that "the much larger electorates that will now be set up, though still a mere fraction of the population, will be devoid of political experience." In paragraph 262 occurs the passage "indeed we regard the development of a broad franchise as the arch on which the edifice of self-government is to be raised, but there must not be such inordinate and sudden extension of the franchise as might lead to a breakdown of the machinery through sheer weight of numbers." (Paragraph 226.) Finally in paragraph 273, referring to electorates for the Legislative Assembly of India, an opinion somewhat different from that already given is recorded: "Our decided

preference is for a system of direct electorates, but the immensity of the country makes it difficult, it may be impossible, to form constituencies of reasonable size in which candidates will be able to get into direct touch with the electorates." And referring to the work of the special Committee, "They may find it wholly impracticable to arrange for direct election. We are fully aware of the objections attaching to all forms of indirect election; but, if the difficulties of direct election compel us to have recourse to indirect, we incline to think that election by non-official members of Provincial Councils is likely to prove far more acceptable to Indian opinion, and, in spite of the smallness of electoral bodies, certainly not open in practice to greater objection than any of the other alternative methods which have been from time to time proposed." The composition of the Provincial Councils, to which is to be given control over the executive, cannot be determined till the franchise has been determined, and, whatever the difficulties were of having an electoral survey completed before the report was made, the fact that the franchise and therefore even the probable constitution of the Councils is wholly undetermined, makes the task of visualising the working of the machine well nigh impossible. The task which the Committee to report on the franchise has to undertake will be one of amazing intricacy. The same difficulty arises from ignorance as to what subjects will be reserved and what transferred. In any case, it seems to me that the two Committees ought to have been appointed earlier. As they will be appointed after the presentation of the report it will be difficult to make the public understand that their appointment does not mean that the proposals made in the report have been accepted by the Government.

6. The report does not refer to the memorials received by the Viceroy and Secretary of State against the grant of Home Rule in India. There were many protests from non-Brahman communities (especially in Southern India), from the depressed classes, from Muhammadan Societies, from the Indian Christians, and from the European and Eurasian communities. These representations embodied objections which apply as much to the scheme put forward in the report as to the Congress-League Scheme for Home Rule. The reference to the depressed classes does not go further than saying that it is intended to make the best arrangements feasible for their representation in order that they, too, may ultimately learn the lesson of self-protection. The British Commercial and the Eurasian communities are in the same way told that they are to be given representation, and expected to make good use of it. The interests of the non-official English community, which has built up the India of to-day, receive but scant consideration in two paragraphs of the report. It is admitted that the number of people who really ask for free institutions is only a small proportion of the population.

In paragraph 144 of the report Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford contend that it does not matter how small that

proportion is. The reason why they want to give responsible government is "the faith that is in us." Presumably they refer to their belief in democratic institutions. They regard themselves on safe ground when they argue that because democracy is good in Europe it is good in Asia. But there is another side to the question. The Bishop of Bombay has stated publicly that India is not the home of the spirit of democracy. A similar opinion was conveyed to me by a distinguished Indian, formerly a member of the Council of the Secretary of State. Under date May 30th, 1918, he wrote: "The Home Rule propaganda as carried out by some of its members has done an immense deal of mischief. You will pardon my saying that you English people in India and at home seem to forget that democracy and democratic ideas are perfectly alien to the Indian mind, and the few Indians who have adopted it have done so from pure imitation, not understanding that they were going against the grain of their national feeling. In my opinion, if the British Government in India had not always been so weak in many respects no such agitation could ever have been set on foot." At the non-Brahman Conference at Tinnivelly, on November 30th, 1917, Raja Sobhanadir Appa Rao Bahadur said: "The Home Rulers incessantly and venomously attack British administration in India, and the non-official European. . . . Like the famous Scotch army which consisted of three-and-thirty pipers and four-and-twenty men, our political movements in India have more leaders than followers." Again, M. Chailley writes in his book on India: "As a matter of fact, this so-called National Party is really a party of privilege, a concourse of representatives of the high castes and the rich classes, which is really a stranger to the nation on whose behalf it professes to speak, etc., etc. It is not for a foreigner to judge whether the Indians are sufficiently wise and self-possessed to take these conversely to heart, but what he cannot fail to observe is that the National Party is far from representing any unanimous Indian opinion. It is certainly not representative of that amorphous, dull, but formidable mass of many millions whose horizon is limited by the cares of its daily bread." Again, Sir Valentine Chirol, writing to the "Times" of June 6th last, on the situation in India, remarked: "It does not, of course, affect the great dumb masses whose horizon has been limited through the centuries, and will be limited for generations to come, to the fields they till and to the jungles in which they move and have their being." In the report itself they are referred to as "an enormous country population, for the most part poor, ignorant, non-politically-minded and unused to any system of elections—immersed, indeed, in the struggle for existence." It is realised that to make the scheme proposed a success, it will be necessary to teach these people the value of a vote, and how to shoulder political responsibilities. It seems to be assumed that the raiyat must necessarily come to regard a vote as a good thing to have. On the other hand, it is not in the least unlikely that there may be difficulties in inducing

him to take a fancy for it, and, if his attitude proves to be one of indifference or obstruction, he will be found an uncommonly difficult person to drive.

7. The report does not seem to take sufficient account of the fact that by no conceivable stretch of language can India be described as homogeneous or anything like a nation. It does indeed, lay stress in more than one passage on the cleavages of religion, race and caste (though it says little enough about the last of the three), but one finds no mention of the extraordinary variety of language. This is the more remarkable as there is on page 65 a quotation from Sir Alfred Lyall, who draws attention very pointedly to the difficulty arising from our centralisation of "an immense polyglot empire." Competent authorities recognise 50 or more languages in India and 150 dialects. The languages of 91 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Madras Presidency are of Dravidian origin, while the people of Northern India derive their speech from Aryan sources. In the Central Provinces, a half-way house, there were, when I was Chief Commissioner 15 years ago, about ten million inhabitants, speaking such different tongues—within well-defined tracts—as Hindi, Urdu, Marathi, Uriya, Telugu, and a number of Munda and Dravidian dialects. M. Chailley, writing of the National Congress, shrewdly remarked: "The language is English, the one tongue which enables men differing in race and language to understand each other." The report (para. 134) notices that, when the Census was taken in 1911, 6 per cent. only of the population were able to comply with the test of literacy, which consisted in reading and writing a letter in their own script. It seems desirable to give the figure to show literacy in English, which is of even more importance than the general figures, as it is not mentioned in the report. The number returned as literate in English was 1,670,387 out of a total population of 313,415,389. Just over a million belonged to the Hindu (Brahmanic) group; only 180,000 of the 66 millions of Muhammadans were returned as literate in English. Delhi, the capital, returned 7,151 of its 232,837 inhabitants as knowing English. In the United Provinces out of a population of 47 millions there were, including those under instruction, only 86,000 persons, outside the Christian population, literate in English. When I was preparing the regulations to carry out the Morley-Minto reforms the advanced politicians of the United Provinces pressed for a rule that no one not familiar with English should be eligible to become a Member of the Legislative Council. The numbers have, of course, increased since the census of 1911, but the very slight diffusion of English among the general population is still one of the most serious matters for consideration in connection with any scheme for a large devolution of power and authority to the limited *intelligentsia* who desire to advance.

#### *Provincial Governments.*

8. The proposal to attain responsible Government in the provinces first by the devolution of responsibility in the transferred subjects, and then by gradually increasing this devolu-

tion by successive stages until complete responsibility is reached, is developed by the framers of the report in a scheme of great complexity. I have already referred to the difficulty of completely appraising these proposals while the division into reserved and transferred subjects remains undetermined. The list of transferred subjects is to vary in different Provinces, and the question of what limitations are to be placed on the Ministers' complete control of them is not decided. But the specimen lists appended to the report seem to suggest that, among other subjects, agriculture, education, medical and sanitary, and forests might be found suitable for transfer in most provinces. One may suggest a doubt as to whether Ministers nominated from among the members of the Legislative Council will be found capable of dealing with any one of these subjects.

There is no more important matter in India than the improvement of agriculture. The Government of India have never spent enough on it. It is desirable that developments in the cultivation of such staples as cotton and sugar should proceed in different parts of India on lines of a similar character. Will the Ministers in a province be likely—even under the guidance of the Governor—to keep this idea sufficiently before them? In particular, will the Ministers in Bengal be qualified to deal with questions relating to the cultivation of jute and tea, in which English capital is so largely invested? Agriculture is the greatest industry in India: it touches every other industry in the country; it is the Englishman, not the Indian, who has, and will, initiate industrial enterprises in India. To make agriculture a transferred subject will not, I conceive, be a wise move.

A somewhat similar objection applies to forests. The Indian takes little interest in forest conservation: he usually fails to see why his traditional right to cut down every tree he likes should be interfered with: the forest service contains in its upper grades a highly-trained and intelligent English personnel: the educated Indian does not seek employment in the Department, as it does not keep him sufficiently in the lime-light, while the life, if healthy, is certainly not luxurious. Is it fair to put this service under Ministers, or likely that the latter will be enthusiastic promoters of a proper forest policy?

My observation of the attitude of well-to-do persons when municipal regulations have required something from them in the matter of sanitary improvement, and my experience for eight years as Secretary in the Home Department of the Government, and particularly that gained as a Member of the Indian Plague Commission, have satisfied me that English initiative is very necessary in the prosecution of sanitary reform. Nor does it appear to be either right or likely to be acceptable to the members of the profession that the British Medical Officers taken from the Indian Medical Service for civil employment should be placed entirely under the control of Indian Ministers.

One cannot contemplate with equanimity education being generally a transferred subject. One of the most distinguished Missionaries engaged in Education in India—the Principal of a

College in Bombay—gave me his very emphatic opinion a few days ago that it is hopeless to give Western education through Indian teachers. He mentioned that the Indian Principal of a College in the Bombay Presidency contemplated the number of students at the College being raised to 3,000 to be taught by 40 Professors, the idea being that any clever graduate would do for a Professorship. The general principles of Indian School Masters in respect of education were described by him as a large number of pupils, a small staff, and a paying business from fees. One of the strongest attacks made upon me when I was Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces was aroused by the support which I gave to a rule of the Director of Public Instruction limiting to 30 the number of pupils to be taught in a class in a secondary school. This rule was denounced as being tantamount to a denial of education :

9. One might almost have expected a more emphatic opinion about the need for keeping law and order, among the reserved subjects throughout British India, than is found in the words: "We should not expect to find that departments primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order were transferred." Last autumn, in a village in what is usually a very quiet tract of country in the Province of Behar and Orissa, a dispute arose about the sacrifice of a cow by the Muhammadans on the festival of the Bakr 'Id. The Hindus looted over 100 villages, troops had to be called out, and a number of people lost their lives.

The following report appeared in the "Pioneer" of December 12th, 1917 :—

"In their judgment in the Peru case, the Commissioners said that one incident mentioned by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and Mr. Chatterjee threw a still more lurid light on the maltreatment of the Muhammadans. Mr. Sanyal (the District Superintendent of Police) collected in Peru, after the looting, some 120 women and children. The women were not in their ordinary clothes, but wore anything they could snatch up. It was clear from independent evidence—the Muhammadans themselves, for reasons that could well be understood, were, almost to a man, silent on the point—that a number of women were stripped naked by the Hindu rioters. The outrageous treatment to which these unfortunate women were exposed by mobs of men, of whom the highest Hindu castes formed a large proportion, had left an indelible disgrace both on those who engineered the disturbances and on those who took part in them. It was quite clear that the mobs, who were led by men of position in the neighbourhood, such as patwaris, tahsildars, and petty zamindars, committed almost the most serious crimes that such mobs could commit short of actual murder. Men of the highest castes were prominent in the mobs."

Whatever the Government may attempt (paragraph 151) in order to discourage religious animosities, it is not in the least likely that India will for a very long time be free from serious breaches of the peace due to religious quarrels between

Hindus and Muhammadans. It is not unreasonable to ask how a Government, which must always largely consist of Hindus, would be able to take effective measures in the case of an outbreak due—as this one was found by the Court to be—to their co-religionists.

10. This question of the removal of reserved subjects to the transferred list will be the source of constant struggle and dispute. The suggestion that after five years (paragraph 260) provision should be made for the hearing of applications from either the provincial Government or the provincial Council for the modification of the lists will ensure that agitation on the subject shall never be allowed to subside while there are any reserved subjects left. As the popular element gains strength the transferred subjects are to be increased, so that eventually the reserved ones will entirely disappear, and there will be no need for any official element in the Government or for procedure by Grand Committee. Meantime (paragraph 239) the Government and, as a final resort, the Governor, will be in the unenviable position of having constantly to give a decision when it is doubtful whether a transaction relates to a reserved or to a transferred subject. The powers of re-entry (paragraph 240) by the Government of the Province or the Government of India may have now and again to be resorted to. It seems obvious that the difficulties of the situation will be enormous, and paragraph 241 does not, by the admission that all alternative plans would lead either to a deadlock or to more friction, provide an adequate justification of the proposals.

11. The composition of the dual Government will be so complex as to make its working very difficult. On the one side is the Governor in Council, the Members of the Executive Council, in addition to the Governor, being two, of whom one must be an Indian, dealing with reserved subjects, and with one or two additional public servants (without portfolios) to supplement when necessary the Governor's want of familiarity with Indian subjects by "consultation and advice." The other portion of the Government will be the Ministers chosen by the Governor, for the life-time of the Legislative Council, from the elected members. They will hold the portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects; their decisions in respect of them are to be final "subject only to the Governor's advice and control." The explanation of the meaning of this qualification given in paragraph 219 does not amount to a very clear exposition of the Governor's part in the business, but the "instrument of instructions" to be issued to the Governor on appointment will doubtless be explicit on the matter, though it may not be always very palatable to the Governor himself. The two portions of the Government are to associate in deliberation, but the Governor is to be empowered to discuss a question with either part of it. Each portion will be responsible for the final decision on a subject which comes under its jurisdiction, but the Government is to present a united front



to the world. It is claimed for the scheme that it aims at minimising causes of friction: there should certainly be plenty of opportunities for it. One may be permitted to doubt whether "mutual forbearance and a strong common purpose" will be found to be prevalent enough, as appears to be anticipated, to prevent friction from occurring with considerable frequency. This could hardly be otherwise with "two forces" which, as is admitted, "may pull different ways."

The proposal in paragraph 224 to appoint some Members of the Legislative Council to assist the Members of the executive in their departmental duties, and of representing them in the Legislative Council, in a position analogous to that of a parliamentary Under Secretary of State is not likely to be received enthusiastically by the executive, but, compared to other suggestions, is of comparatively minor importance.

#### *Provincial Legislatures.*

12. The provincial legislatures are to be almost entirely composed of elected Members, with nominated Members to represent some minorities, and a small official *bloc*, to consist of the Members of the executive Council and of "so many other official members" as will provide the Government with first-hand knowledge of the matters likely to be discussed both in the Council and the Committee." The Councils are to differ in size in different provinces: the proposal that there should be "a substantial elected majority" (paragraph 225) perhaps hardly describes the overwhelming strength of the elected portion of the Council. Moreover, the official members are to "abstain from voting," on transferred subjects, and to leave the decision of the question to the non-official members of Council (paragraph 233). Is this a reasonable provision when these men will have a first-hand knowledge of the subjects under discussion, gained in their work as District Officers? It seems doubtful whether they will be allowed to speak on such subjects either, as a special provision is made for giving them freedom of "speech and vote" on other matters. In any case it would tax the self-respect of an official member of Council to have to speak in a discussion on a subject about which he would be debarred from voting.

13. The standing Committees with advisory functions, to be elected from the elected members of the Council, and attached to the different departments, do not seem likely to facilitate the work of Government either by the Executive Council or by Ministers. The refusal to them by Government of information, and the rejection of their recommendations, are likely to add to the general friction.

14. The proposals for dealing with the legislation in the Legislative Councils are not the least complicated portion of the scheme. When the Governor thinks that the enactment of a Government Bill cannot be safely left to the Legislative

Council he will have power to certify that the Bill, which must relate to a reserved subject, is "essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquility of the province or any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsibility for the reserved subjects." After discussion in the Council the latter by a majority vote can ask that the question whether the certificate was properly given should be referred to the Government of India. If no reference is made or if the Government of India uphold the certificate, the Bill is to go before a Grand Committee of about half the Council, a bare majority being nominated by the Governor, and the rest elected. There is no security whatever that such a Grand Committee will support the Governor, however urgent the need may be for legislation. The Legislative Council will be able to discuss the Bill when it returns from the Grand Committee, but not to alter it except on the motion of a Member of Government. This will be the only means by which the Governor can endeavour to secure any alteration of the Bill as modified by the Grand Council. The modifications may be vital, but he will have to accept them. The argument that, if he has 14 officials on a Grand Committee of 40, and the Governor cannot get 7 of the non-officials on it to vote for his Bill, no great harm will ensue from deferring it, takes little account of recent events in the Legislative Councils in India, and attaches little importance to the need for good Government in India. Moreover, the treatment of mixed legislation is provided for by an even more cumbrous procedure, the effective working of which is to be left to the "good sense of the Council itself."

15. There are few who will not welcome the proposal to make the Provincial Governments more autonomous than they are in financial matters. The first principle of any such scheme must be that advocated, viz. :—that certain heads of revenue having been earmarked as belonging to the Imperial Government, the different Provincial Governments must contribute from the provincial heads of revenue to make the funds at the disposal of the Government of India adequate for its needs. Everyone outside Bengal recognises that the wealthiest province in India is, by reason of the permanent settlement, under-assessed to land revenue compared with other Provinces. This affords no argument for annulling the permanent Settlement, since very many of the present owners of land have paid prices for it based on the low rate of assessment. But the inequality ought to be removed by imposing on Bengal some form of taxation to ensure its paying a contribution towards the cost of Government proportionate to that paid by other Provinces. The first step, then, towards provincial autonomy in financial matters would be to see that Bengal was adequately taxed. This thorny question is put aside, and the proposal made that financial devolution shall be arranged on the existing basis of taxation. This arrangement can only be carried into effect by continuing to treat the population of Bengal leniently at the expense of

those resident in other Provinces. Bengal has one-fourth of the area in India and Burma under rice, one-fourth of the tea, and almost the whole of the jute. It is immune from famine. It pays some 2½ million pounds sterling of land revenue compared with 4½ million pounds in the neighbouring United Provinces. The statement in paragraph 203 "Land revenue, which is by far the biggest head of all, is at present equally shared between the Indian and all the provincial Governments, except that Burma gets rather more than half and the United Provinces get rather less," is literally correct, but still somewhat misleading. If the United Provinces were treated as other Provinces are, and given half the land revenue, they would receive nearly £550,000 more a year. The fact that Bengal is undertaxed is responsible for there being less difference there between the gross provincial revenue and the gross provincial expenditure than in any of the larger Provinces. Therefore (*vide* statement on page 102), Bengal will contribute 69 lakhs (a lakh equals £6,666⅔) towards the Government of India's resources, while Madras will contribute 428, the United Provinces 327, the Punjab 215, Burma 140, and Bombay 88. No one outside Bengal can applaud such an arrangement as fair. It is said not to be "intended to be of a final nature." But what chance will there be of reviewing it, once the complicated constitution suggested is introduced ?

16. The financial arrangements suggested as to expenditure on famine relief in paragraph 204 cannot be regarded as adequate, unless the allowances based on each Province's average liability to famine in the past are assessed on principles altogether different from those hitherto followed by the Finance Department of the Government of India. The special famine assignment in the United Provinces was 4½ lakhs (£28,000) a year, to accumulate up to a maximum credit of 30 lakhs. In 1907/08 the Province had 4½ lakhs to its credit, but the Government of India was responsible for expenditure up to a limit of 5 years' assumed credit, or 22½ lakhs (£150,000). The famine of that year affected an area of 66,000 square miles in the Province, and a population of about 30 millions. The value of the crops lost was estimated at 38 millions sterling. The direct expenditure on relief works and gratuitous relief came to nearly 1½ millions sterling. About half a million of land revenue was remitted, and £600,000 suspended. Advances to the amount of £1,800,000 were made to cultivators for seed, bullocks, agricultural implements, wells, etc. It is obvious that no provincial Government could either from (1) its famine assignments or (2) its large provincial balance (though in the United Provinces at present this amounts, I believe, to about a million sterling) meet the cost of such a calamity. The report expresses the belief that liabilities arising out of famine relief will tend to be smaller in the future than in the past owing to the improvement of protective measures, and to the increasing recuperative power of the people. True—but no one can foretell what expendi-

ture a particular famine may involve. It was rather cynically said in my hearing the other day that it is not intended to have famine relief in the future on the scale that was adopted in the past. God forbid that this should be one of the ways in which efficiency may be sacrificed to the desire to make the people of India responsible for their own Government! Lord Lytton's Government decided in 1877 as follows: "We say that human life shall be saved at any cost and effort." This, subject to the condition that there shall be no waste, has been the principle at the back of all proposals for famine relief made by the Famine Commissioners that have sat, from that of Sir Richard Strachey to that of Lord MacDonnell, and of the action of every Local Government that has fought a famine for the last 40 years. No act that I can recall during my service in India was so popular as the distribution in 1907/08 of a million and three quarters sterling in advances: these were all repaid within three years. We have prided ourselves on the effective way in which we have met famines compared with previous Governments: to allow a relapse to ante-British methods would be criminal. The suggestion that, if a Local Government has to spend on famine more money than it has got, it should receive from the Government of India a loan—to be repaid—is utterly inequitable so long as the Province most immune from famine pays to the Government of India far less revenue than those whose misfortune it is to have to combat it with more or less frequency.

17. The question of budget procedure in provincial legislative Councils is of the utmost importance, and the methods suggested are almost the most impossible part of the whole scheme. Decisions on the supply for reserved subjects in the provincial budget are to rest with the Governor and his Executive Council: decisions on the supply for transferred subjects with the Governor and the Ministers (No. 29 of Summary). Yet in paragraph 257 of the report it is provided that "the budget will be considered by the whole Government acting together." At these joint discussions (1) the provincial revenues will be estimated, (2) the contribution to the Government of India will be set apart, (3) the proposed allotments for the reserved subjects will be scrutinised and examined "with a view to facing criticism in the Legislative Council," and the remainder of the revenue will be at the disposal of Ministers. If such residue is not sufficient it will be open to Ministers to suggest extra taxation. It is admitted that anxiety may be felt as to the supply for the transferred subjects: and that there is an exaggerated view of the possibilities of economy in the reserved subjects. The conditions are favourable for an annual dispute between the members of Government on the division between reserved and transferred subjects. The Governor may be fresh from England: he will have one Indian colleague on his Executive Council, and one or more Indian Ministers. He will have one Englishman on his Executive Council, and one or possibly more senior officials to advise him. The contest will be an

unequal one : reserved subjects may even go to the wall when the Government is itself considering the budget. But, after it has done this, the budget has to run the gauntlet of the Legislative Council. The Council may reject or modify the proposed allotment for reserved subjects (paragraph 256). The Governor in Council may restore the whole or any part of the allotment originally provided, on the Governor certifying that, for reasons to be stated, such restoration is, in his opinion, essential either to the peace or tranquillity of the Province or any part thereof, or to the discharge of his responsibility for reserved subjects. It may well be that in acting thus the Governor will be in a minority with himself and his European Member of Council on one side, and the Indian Member of the Council and two Ministers on the other. The Governor stands to be gibbeted before the periodic Commission if he compels Ministers and the Legislative Council to "accept allotments for the reserved subjects with which they do not agree." The procedure seems to make for perpetual friction. For what encouragement is there for the belief that the majority of the elected Members of the Legislative Council will be in favour of giving adequate funds for the maintenance of law and order ?

18. The duties imposed on the Governor will be of a very exacting nature. He will have to gang warily in his relations with his Ministers (paragraph 219) just referred to. He will have to be President of the Legislative Council (paragraph 236), but can appoint a Vice-President. It will be for him alone, as a final resort, to determine whether a transaction belongs to the category of reserved or of transferred subjects (paragraph 239). Such a decision may be challenged in the Law Courts or be made the subject of appeal to the Government of India. He will, subject to the limitations imposed on his discretion by general instructions, certify to Government Legislation being necessary on reserved subjects (paragraph 252) with a view to a Bill being referred to a Grand Committee instead of left to the consideration of the whole Legislative Council. He will decide (paragraph 254) whether a Bill on a transferred subject, challenged on the ground that it trenches on a reserved subject, shall proceed in the Legislative Council or not, but the Council may require the matter to be referred to the Government of India. He will (paragraph 256) have the power of restoring to the budget an allotment for reserved subjects removed by vote of the Legislative Council. These duties need to be very delicately handled ; and to carry on for even a fraction of his term of office without, on the one hand, surrendering some principles of good Government, or, on the other, offending members of the Legislative Council, a Governor will need to possess a combination of tact and strength which is not common.

### *The Government of India.*

19. No one will cavil at the general principle laid down in the summary of paragraph 266 that the Government of India should preserve indisputable authority on matters adjudged by it to be essential in the discharge of its responsibilities for peace, order, and good Government. The Secretary of State's control is doubtless irksome and extends unnecessarily to details, but it may fairly be questioned whether what is wanted, viz.: decision and dispatch, will be likely to be secured by the increase of establishment adumbrated in paragraph 269. The phrase "the collective responsibility of the Government is weighty, especially in time of war," might cause a smile if one reflected how Lord Hardinge regularly held Councils in Simla and Delhi regarding the Mesopotamian Campaign, at which only he and the Commander-in-Chief were present. The real trouble about the Government of India is that for ten years or more it has ceased to attempt to govern. If it is to regain its position and prestige a radical change will have to be made in this respect. An increase in the Indian element in the Executive Council will not help towards this very desirable end. The whole constitution of the Government of India, as conceived in the Statute and Rules of business made under it, has been obscured of recent years. Departments have become watertight, the position of the Secretaries, who owe allegiance not only to the Members in charge of their particular Departments, but also to the Governor-General and the Council as a whole, has been systematically weakened, and the inevitable result of the increase of the power and authority of individual members of Council in their own Departments has been a decrease in the power and authority of the Government of India as a whole.

20. To the general principle of a Legislative Assembly of 100 members, two-thirds to be elected and one-third nominated (one-third of the nominated number to be non-officials), there may not be any great objection. The trouble arises when checks have to be devised to prevent an assembly so constituted from having its own way. That point will be referred to later. The establishment of a Privy Council (paragraph 287) is also a matter not in itself open to criticism except on the ground that it will be another of the many bodies which will fence in the Governor-General, and that one does not quite see where with the Legislative Assembly, the Council of State, and the Council of Princes, with its standing Committee, there will be much room left for the consultation of the Privy Council on questions of policy and administration which is to be the justification of its existence. The Members of the Legislative Assembly and of the provincial Legislative Councils will not welcome the privilege of putting after their names the letters M.L.A. and M.L.C. respectively, instead of putting the title "Honourable" before them. This little reduction in dignity is due to the need for reserving the latter

title for the Members of the Privy Council and the Council of State. The Governor-General is to nominate the President from among the official Members. This follows the suggestion that the Governor shall, in respect of provincial Councils, nominate the President and the Vice-President from the official members. Experience as President of one of the first provincial Councils constituted under the Morley-Minto reforms satisfied me that it is a great mistake to appoint a Member of the responsible Government to preside at Council Meetings. At one moment he may have to give a ruling as to the interpretation of the rules of procedure; at another to justify or defend the acts of his Government. The Councils under the Morley-Minto reforms were supposed not to be little Parliaments. The Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Councils will, in effect, be little Parliaments. Would it not be wise to have some independent authority to preside over their deliberations, *e.g.*, a High Court Judge? There have already been scenes in the Governor-General's Council owing to discussions proceeding beyond the authorised limits. It is asking the head of the Government or his deputy too much to expect him to decide with judicial temper the question whether a Member is or is not transgressing the limits of debate in making a particular charge against his own Government.

21. With a Legislative Assembly in which 77 out of 100 will be non-officials, 66 elected and 11 nominated, some difficulty may be anticipated in ensuring the passage of Government Bills. This difficulty is to be surmounted by the creation of a Council of State. This will consist of 50 Members, 25 of whom (including the Executive Council) will be officials, and 4 nominated. The remainder (21) will be elected to represent the provincial Legislative Councils and special classes. Elected Members cannot also sit on the Legislative Assembly or on a Legislative Council. Will they appreciate this disability being made applicable to them but not to official Members?

The means devised for ensuring that legislation which may not be acceptable to the Legislative Assembly, shall be carried into effect by the agency of the Council of State is very intricate. The provisions on the subject in paragraph 279 are certain to result in much friction between the Government and the Legislative Assembly, and the advantages claimed for the procedure in paragraph 281 are not convincing.

22. The provision that the budget shall be introduced into the Legislative Assembly, but that the Assembly shall not vote on it, and that resolutions on it shall be advisory only in their effect, constitutes a disparagement of the Legislative Assembly as compared with the Provincial Councils, and is certainly open to criticism on the ground that it indicates distrust of the effects of a policy aiming at responsible Government, which it is the design of the report to support.

23. Joint Standing Committees formed of Members of the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly, two-thirds

being elected by these bodies, and one-third nominated by the Governor-General, are to be associated with certain departments to be settled by the Government of India, and to discuss such matters as the Member in charge of the Department may decide. Presumably the Governor-General will be liable to be approached, if a particular Member of the Executive is not as eager in consulting the Standing Committee as its members would wish.

*The Native States.*

24. The proposal to have a Council of Princes brings into the constitution the Conferences which the Viceroy has held of recent years. I have not much experience of Native States, but do not see much, from such experience as I have, to criticise in the proposals under this head.

*Proposals Regarding Parliament and the India Office.*

25. The proposal to modify the control of Parliament and the Secretary of State merits support. Parliament has interfered, owing to the desire of the Government to placate Members who possess a certain following, but no special acquaintance with Indian problems. The form which Parliamentary interference has taken has frequently had the most deleterious effects on the administration in India. The Secretary of State's control is meticulous to a degree. But will Parliament be prepared to reduce its control over reserved subjects, and be ready to say that, when a subject is transferred, it will agree that neither it nor the Secretary of State shall have any concern with it? An almost comical condition might arise from the fact that, owing to the different procedure contemplated as regards the transfer of subjects, a subject, transferred in one Province and reserved in another, would come under the control of Parliament and the Secretary of State in the latter case and not in the former. Would not such an arrangement breed perplexity and lead to great complications, even if the control of reserved subjects were much more restricted than it is at present? There will probably be two sets of opinion about the proposal that the salary of the Secretary of State should be placed on the estimates. The practice hitherto followed has not prevented matters of Indian administration from being treated as party questions, and one need not feel much apprehension as to the effects of this particular proposal.

The Select Committee of the House of Commons, which is proposed, would add one more to the many Committees which fence in the Governor-General. The suggestion that, if appointed, this Committee should be confined to the House of Commons, does not carry conviction with it. The experience of India in the House of Lords is infinitely greater than in the House of Commons. What possible grounds can there be for dispensing with the aid of such experience, if the object of establishing the Committee is to "Inform" even the House of Commons only on Indian matters? When Lord Morley suggested to Lord Minto that the old Parlia-



mentary Committee should be restored he referred to "a joint Committee of Lords and Commons" (p. 194, vol. II. of Recollections).

¶The appointment of a Committee to examine and report on the present constitution of the Council of India and the establishment of the India Office seems obviously desirable. The maintenance of a Council in the present form will not find many supporters.

26. One rises from a perusal of this scheme with the feeling that far too little attention is paid in it to the position of the non-official Englishman. I feel it necessary to be emphatic about this, because the European Association at Calcutta invited me to visit India with a view to helping them to place their case before the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. That invitation, much as I valued it, I had in view of my position as an ex-official, reluctantly to decline. It is admitted (paragraph 232) that the material interests of the general European community are "out of all proportion to their numerical strength." Yet they are to be represented by means of nomination instead of election. They will not appreciate this, and no reason is given for the proposal that will satisfy them. Nor will they appreciate the homily in paragraph 155. People familiar with India some years ago realise that there was a time when the English community did play their part in the political life of the country. One need only mention Sir Charles Paul, Sir Griffith Evans, Mr. Pugh, and Mr. Steel. There were a number both before and after them. That was before the capital was moved from Calcutta to Delhi, and when the Government of India did come into touch with other representatives of public opinion than the 40 Indian Councillors who visit Delhi. It is not entirely the fault of the English in Calcutta (which they made and which is the chief home of the non-official Englishman) that they have taken of recent years less interest in politics than they used to. If it be true, as stated in paragraph 344, that Englishmen engaged in commerce mix less than officials with educated Indians of a certain class, it is equally true that the relations between the British merchant and the Indian engaged in commerce, who is, after all, not entirely uneducated, are in Calcutta most harmonious. The phrase in paragraph 348, "if there are Indians who really desire to see India leave the Empire, to get rid of English officers and English commerce, we believe that among their springs of action will be found the bitterness of feeling that has been nurtured out of some manifestation that the Englishman does not think the Indian an equal," has no application to the relations between the European and the Indian engaged in commerce in Calcutta. The latter knows he is not the equal of the Englishman. Over and over again English merchants have tried to give Indians openings in their business: universal experience has been that they have failed in initiative. The most successful merchant of the present generation, who went to Calcutta in 1875 and was last there in 1917, told me recently that the reason of the failing of most Indians in business is

that they lean on you too much. He has, therefore, to employ Europeans in positions of trust. But let him start a new enterprise in Calcutta, and the Indian community will subscribe the capital for it over and over again. The same defect has been noticed by officials who have been associated with Indians in administrative work ; but little value is attached to their opinion on the subject, as it is the fashion to say that they are not impartial. Their view is, however, supported by the passage in paragraph 124 of this report: "The elected members of the Boards appear to have difficulty in facing the disfavour aroused by a raising of the rates, or a purification of the electoral roll, or drastic sanitary improvements, unless they feel that the district officer is behind them." At one of the large cities of India elaborate arrangements were made for the celebration of "Our Day" last autumn. The district officer very wisely stood entirely aloof. But it was no use. The non-official Committees had very soon to call in his assistance, the first demand on him being that he should settle a dispute about a tennis tournament !

27. There have been a number of cases in which Indian Members of the Civil Service faced with a crisis have entirely failed to act up to it. It is only fair for me to say that, amid several experiences of that kind, I met with two in which an Indian acted with all the resource and all the spirit which could be expected in anyone. In each instance he was the son of a man of position, and a large land holder, who had himself done good service to the State. This criticism of the educated Indian is offered with no idea of jeering, flouting, or gibing at him. It is based on the wide experience of the many officers with whom I was associated when occupying in succession the posts of Secretary to the Government of India in the Home Department, Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, Member of Council, and Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces. It is based on absolute fact, and anyone engaged in settling the future constitution of the executive services in India will be unwise to ignore it.

#### *The Public Services.*

28. My remarks will refer more directly to the Indian Civil Service, but apply with obvious qualifications to such Services as the Medical, Police, Education, Public Works and Forests. In paragraph 324 the opinion is expressed that the continued presence of the English Officer is vital, and that, so far as any man can foresee, a strong element of Europeans will be required in India's public service. In paragraph 318 occurs the observation: "The restriction of the number of Europeans in the services, and the constitutional changes, taken together, will make it absolutely necessary for India to secure the very best type of European officers that she can get." Again, paragraph 323 runs: "We are certain that the English members will continue to be as necessary as ever to India. They may be diminished in numbers; but they

must not fall off in quality." In the discussion on the place of the Indian Civil Service in present arrangements (paragraph 126) it is noticed that it has been much more a Government Corporation than a purely Civil Service in the English sense. Its duties have indeed been entirely different from those of the permanent Civil Service in London.

Hitherto, the conditions for recruitment of the Indian Civil Service have depended in the main on the need for recruiting a certain proportion of British. This has ensured its being a British Service, but the principle will no longer be followed. It is sometimes forgotten that the Service is, as must be the case since it is recruited by open competition, as democratic in origin as any service in the Empire. There is no place in Great Britain where education is on more democratic lines than in Scotland, and the number of men educated at Scotch schools and Universities who have entered the Indian Civil Service is enormous.

Lord Islington's Commission was appointed on 31st August, 1912. After a not inexpensive enquiry, involving tours in India in 1912/13 and 1913/14, and discussions in London, the report was signed in August, 1915, and presented to Parliament in January, 1917. It recommended that provision should be made for a "minimum of 25 per cent. of statutory natives of India in the superior posts," to be recruited in India, and that the figure should be revised every 5 years "in the light of the strength of the service for the time being and of the general working of the arrangement." This would allow of 189 out of 755 posts being held by Indians recruited in India, while others could be obtained by Indians recruited in England. By that time, *i.e.*, the time of publication "the war had," so the framers of the present scheme write, "raised the pitch of Indian expectations to an extreme height, and we are not surprised that a report which might have satisfied Indian opinion two years earlier was generally denounced in 1917 as wholly inadequate." So the Secretary of State and Viceroy have jettisoned it, and make fresh proposals of their own. They propose (paragraph 317) that 33 per cent. should be recruited in India, and that  $1\frac{1}{2}$  more per cent. should be added till the periodic Commission reports after 10 years. By that time 48 per cent. would be recruited in India. In addition Indians will have been recruited in England all the time. Let us see how this will affect the Civil Service in my old Province (the United Provinces). The number of superior appointments there on which recruitment is based is 122. In 10 years 58 will be recruited in India. But there are 15 Indians in the United Provinces recruited from England, who will also be entitled to superior posts. By that time, then, Indians will have been recruited for 73/122nds of the superior appointments. The service will have been converted from a service which has been hitherto essentially British to an Indian service, in which a certain proportion of Englishmen will be tolerated for a time. Will there be any inducement for Englishmen of ability and character to enter such a service? I think not. In 1908 I warned Lord Minto that the service was going down the hill,

and, specially urged that the proposal of Lord Morley to encourage the independent medical practitioner in India at the expense of the I.M.S. would operate greatly to the prejudice of the service. The Muhammadan will not permit the Hindu doctor to attend his wife, nor the Hindu the Muhammadan doctor. No Englishman of any spirit, or who regarded his wife with ordinary respect, would permit an Indian doctor of any kind to attend her for certain ailments. Again, in 1910 I told the present Secretary of State for India, in conversation, that were any young man to ask my advice as to his adopting an official career in India, I would reply: "Don't go there unless you go in the British Army." In a letter addressed to me by Lord Curzon on January 18th, 1910, he asked me whether I anticipated a decline in the spirit and morale of the Civil Service. I will quote my reply of February 9th, 1910. "I think that the Civil Service in these Provinces is as good as it is anywhere, and better than it is in most Provinces. There are a number of *very* good men here, but there are also a number who will never do any good. I fear that the service has deteriorated, and is deteriorating. I have told the Viceroy so: the class is not so good as it was, and will get worse. Young Englishmen with the qualities required in India will not come out for an Indian career and exile, if they cannot expect to exercise power and authority. . . . I don't think that the service is disheartened, but I doubt whether many of its members have yet realised the extent of the change which the reforms must bring about, and I feel sure that the attractions of an Indian career are not so great as they used to be, and fear that, in consequence, our men will deteriorate." I have a number of correspondents in the Indian Civil Service still serving in India, and they now write in no uncertain terms as to the evil future of the service. Now when the Civil Service becomes Indianised, the young Englishman may find himself on arrival from England placed under the tuition of an Indian superior; he may be sent to a station where the bungalows are all taken by permanent Indian residents; he may, when he marries, find that the only doctor at the station is an Indian; he may continue at intervals to serve under an Indian as his superior officer until he reaches what is the final appointment for the man of no special capacity, viz., a Collectorship on the executive or a District Judgeship on the judicial side. If he is specially fortunate he may become a Member of the Executive Council or a High Court Judge. If the former, he will not, as a member of the Government, be allowed to advise executive, or vote in the Legislative Council, on the transferred subjects, though he may be better qualified, by reason of his experience, to give an opinion about them than either the Governor or his Ministers. Is this an engaging prospect as the end of a life's work? No doubt it is true (paragraph 326) that "it is harder to convince than direct, to prevail in consultation than to enforce an order." Harder, perhaps, even than that will be the fate of a man, who, having been unable to advise or vote on it, is called upon to present a united front in respect of a decision on a transferred subject which he feels is wrong.

The recent treatment of the Civil Service, too, may well make young Englishmen ponder before endeavouring to enter it. It is admitted (paragraph 326) that it has been vehemently and malignantly abused. Mrs. Besant has been permitted to describe its every act for 50 years or more as having been injurious to India. When the Minto-Morley reforms were introduced, one of the men now leading the advanced Guard in India expressed especial pleasure that they were a distinct slap at the Indian Civil Service, a result which he attributed to the fact that the then Viceroy (Lord Minto), Governor of Madras (Sir Arthur Lawley), and Governor of Bombay (Lord Sydenham) were all soldiers!! The Government of India and Secretary of State have for 10 years stood by and allowed the service to be abused without defending it. Nay, more, one Secretary of State has joined in the hue and cry. Lord Morley has dubbed them "Tchinovniks." This bitter sneer finds its worst expression in one of the published letters to Lord Minto. "It is not you nor I who are responsible for "unrest," but the over-confident and over-worked Tchinovniks who have had India in their hands for fifty years past."

Referring to a speech made in the House of Commons by the present Secretary of State last year, Mr. Hasan Imam, who had just retired from the post of High Court Judge at Calcutta, said in a speech delivered on August 28th, 1917, at the Behar Special Provincial Conference, "Never before in the history of Anglo-Indian Administration the bureaucracy were subjected to such searching, withering criticism by one who has held the high office of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State." On the other hand, the present Secretary of State recognised that the Indian Civil Service is not so attractive as it used to be in the speech made by him to his constituents in August, 1910, when he asked, "If a man hesitated to make the sacrifices necessary to put his services at the disposal of the great Empire of India in the face of hostile, unsympathetic, and cowardly criticism, ought it to surprise us?" The position of the Indian Civilian in recent years, exposed to constant attack, deprived of the right of defending himself, and unprotected by those above him, has not been an exhilarating one, and it is not surprising if the spirit and morale of the service have declined. The life of a civil servant is, indeed, not all "beer and skittles." Too many fall by the way. In May last three Members of the Civil Service in the United Provinces—Messrs. Dampier, Burkett, and Ingram (a brother of the Bishop of London) died within 10 days of one another after they had completed the period of service necessary for pension, and having, owing to the exigencies of war time, served 6, 3½, and 5 years respectively without getting leave to England.

It must be realised that the attractions of the service are not now great, and I firmly believe that the bribe offered, viz. : (1) increase of pay, (2) the refund of the 4 per cent. contribution towards pension, and (3) a relaxation of the leave rules, so as to allow shorter periods on full pay to be substituted for longer periods on half-pay will not be sufficient to induce good men to enter the service.

29. I should like to say a word with regard to a sentence in paragraph 140, viz., "The old assumption that the interests of the ryot must be confided to official hands is strenuously denied by modern educated Indians. They claim that the European official must, by his lack of instruction and comparative lack of skill in tongues, be gravely handicapped in interpreting the thoughts and desires of an Asiatic people." I admit that some of the young Indian Civil Servants of the present day do not know the vernacular as well as they ought to. This is, however, the exception rather than the rule. But what of the "modern educated Indian"? Some, for instance Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya, have a knowledge of the vernacular to which no Englishman could aspire. Many know little or nothing of their own vernacular. Speaking at the Educational Conference of Directors of Public Instruction at Simla on September 20th, 1904, Lord Curzon said: "As regards the vernaculars which must for long be the sole instrument for the diffusion of knowledge among all except a small minority of the Indian people, we found them in danger of being neglected and degraded in the pursuit of English, and in many cases very bad English, for the sake of its mercantile value. By all means let English be taught to those qualified to learn it; but let it rest upon a solid foundation of the indigenous languages, for no people will ever use another tongue with advantage that cannot first use its own with ease." Three years later I had, as Chancellor of the Allahabad University, to comment on this matter. I found that the recommendation of the University Commission that "the study of the vernacular languages should be encouraged at each stage of a University student's career" had been persistently ignored. At the last final examination of schools in the United Provinces, in which the vernacular is the medium of instruction, only three out of 6,322 candidates had obtained distinction in either Hindi or Urdu. I insisted on the moral danger involved in the growing neglect of the literature of their mother country by young Indians. I do not believe that the "modern educated Indian" is entitled to point the finger of scorn at European members of the public service in Northern India on account of their want of proficiency in the vernacular.

#### *The Army.*

30. It is not necessary to say anything about the recognition of the services of the Army, except that I have always been in favour of the grant of commissions to Indians. My military friends do not, however, agree with me. I cannot see why a commission should ever be given, except on clear demonstration that the individual to be rewarded by it has himself earned it. No one will grudge any of the other suggested ameliorations of the conditions of service in the Army, though they will hesitate to see in the good service of the Army any particular justification for rewards to other classes. Nor will anyone be found to under-rate the gratitude which Britain owes to India

for the sacrifices which Indian soldiers have made with their blood. But is it reasonable (paragraph 24) to overstate the help given in treasure ? There have been many generous individuals who have subscribed largely to private funds ; but what about the help given by the State in India ? India has accepted the responsibility for a loan of £100,000,000 : would it have been unreasonable to expect her to have guaranteed five times as much ? The Budget for 1918-1919 provides for a surplus of £6,000,000, without any extra taxation being imposed. It is the fault of the Government of India, rather than of the people, that India has not given more financial help, but it seems hardly wise to exaggerate the assistance that she has given in treasure. Gratitude for the services of the Army would not justify the grant of " a considerable number of Commissions " (paragraph 330) unless men fit to be officers are available to hold them. I deeply sympathise with the contention that an Indian who serves with a British unit should be eligible for a Commission. A young Indian friend of mine was in the Harrow XI. last year. His father wanted him to go to Oxford, but finally agreed to his enlisting in the H.A.C. The boy came to see me during his leave before going to France. He has a fine spirit, had been well treated by the English lads with him, and showed some of the qualities needed to make a good officer.

31. Who is going to support this scheme, the general effect of which is to hand over every act of government to an irresponsible, and what must be an unrepresentative, body of politicians, and whatever trouble arises, to restore the position by the use of the bludgeon ? The electorate which would return members truly representative of *all* important interests cannot, the Viceroy and Mr. Montagu admit, be devised for a long time (paragraph 179). The elected members of the representative Legislative Councils will be and must be men belonging to the educated minority of Brahmans and Lawyers, who do not represent the masses, and who can be shown to have done their best in the past to block and reject legislation designed to safeguard the welfare and improve the position of those masses.

It is easier to ascertain who will be opposed to the scheme than who will support it.

It is certain that the following interests will be opposed to it :—

(1) The Home Rule party. That party believed that Mr. Montagu was going to India to give Home Rule. Immediately after the announcement of August 20th, Mr. Hasan Imam, referred to above (paragraph 29), alluding to the passage in the announcement of August 20th, in which it was stated that the British Government and the Government of India must be Judges of the time and measure of each advance, observed : " No, gentlemen, we cannot and should not accept the view propounded by Mr. Montagu, while giving him full credit for the very best of motives and intentions, that the Government

of India should be 'the Judges of the time and measure' of each advance towards self-government. We desire to remodel and reconstitute the Government of India and the provincial Governments by making them subject in all matters of administration and legislation to popular control, *i.e.*, to subordinate the executive to the views and wishes of popular legislatures, and yet it is the very instruments of our proposed reconstitution that are to be the judges of our capacity to do so." And "That scheme, therefore" (of the Congress-League), "represents for us at present the irreducible minimum of claims, and, while we shall be grateful to Mr. Montagu were he to give us more, it is quite certain that we cannot be, and shall not be, content with anything less than what is set out in our scheme. That is our plain and emphatic demand." Others, notably Mr. Tilak, have said as much. To this gentleman, twice convicted of sedition, the Viceroy and Secretary of State gave the honour of an interview. Within the last few days the Commission, presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt, has described him as a casuistical apologist for assassination. Passive resistance, including the boycott, has been threatened if this claim is not conceded. Mrs. Besant has said: "The question of deadlocks in a constitutional struggle for political liberty seems to be regarded in a curious way by many Indian politicians." "You produce a deadlock" is accepted as though it were an objection to a scheme of reforms, whereas such production is an essential of every transition scheme which aims at securing responsible government." But for the time she seems to have yielded to some hidden influences which have induced her to support Mr. Montagu's scheme. If she does not abandon this position she will lose her influence.

(2) **The Ruling Chiefs.** If the Maharaja of Patiala correctly interprets the feeling of the ruling Princes, they will assuredly not be found to be enthusiastic supporters of the scheme.

(3) **The Great Landlords.** One of the leading and wealthiest Taluqdars in Oudh wrote to me on December 6th, 1917: "I had an interview with the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. I told them that responsible government meant independence, which means severance of the connection of India with England, at however remote a date: severance is bound to be disastrous to India: hence reforms to reach that goal would be a mistake." Many of his class think the same.

(4) **The European Non-Officials.** They will obviously oppose the scheme.

(5) **The Retired European Officials.** The dearest object of a lifelong service of many of us was to ensure the peace and quiet of the countryside. The whole structure under which the work of our lives—such as it was—was done is to be demolished, and all we have lived for is to be scrapped. It is not a pleasant thing to feel that one's life has been wasted. The ex-official



will demand that the whole existing scheme for governing India shall not be rooted up without clear and substantial justification, and he will seek in vain in these papers for evidence which would reconcile him to the need for such a revolution. He will comment on the fact that the report discloses nothing about the views of the heads of the Local Governments.

(6) The serving European Official will not be able to give his opinion, but the vast majority of them will feel strongly against the scheme. It means the destruction of the British services. As a non-official of many years' experience in India recently wrote: "It is certain that the Anglo-Indian" (he was using the term in its proper sense, and not in that invented by Lord Hardinge) "cannot be reduced to insignificance—he must either direct or go."

(7) The non-Brahman communities of Southern India and the depressed classes generally who made representations to the Viceroy and Mr. Montagu can hardly regard the scheme as satisfactory from the point of view of their interests. There are 50 million "untouchables" in India. The text of the report pays very little attention to this aspect of the question.

(8) Lastly comes the great mass of the people, the ryot who is to be taught—*nolens volens*—to shoulder his political responsibilities. They are the people most interested in a scheme for substituting bad government for good government. They will not say anything now; perhaps they will never say anything. As the late Sir Charles Crosthwaite truly said: "They act; they do not talk about acting." The recent atrocities in Behar prove that clearly enough. God help a Government of educated Indians, when the people come to realise that they are being badly governed by it!

## Do the Indian Masses want “Home Rule”?

**R**EA**D** the following extracts from the Presidential Address of Raja Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur, at the Non-Brahmin Conference held at Tinnevely, India, on 30th November and 1st December, 1917 :—

You have now the sorry spectacle of the most undesirable elements in Indian politics speaking in the name of the people of India. It is thus that Home Rule has risen from the ashes of the constitutional Indian National Congress. . . . .

The Home Rulers incessantly and venomously attack British administration in India—and the non-official European. I hold no brief for either, but in the name of decency and because these attacks are making co-operation between Europeans and Indians impossible, I propose to examine briefly the charges directed against European officials and non-officials. . . . .

The European official in India may have his defects; he may be too much the slave of routine, too impatient of criticism and too apt to believe that his way of doing things is the only way. But, as a rule, to a great extent, he is upright, conscientious, competent and **invariably anxious to hold the balance even between warring creeds and castes.** As for the non-official European, no doubt hitherto he has been too much absorbed in his own business to heed Indian movements which have a genuine claim on his sympathy. But he has no doubt played a great part in the economic development of India, and besides what he has done himself, he has served as a pioneer and as an example of patient enterprise, from whom our Indian business men have learned a good deal and must learn a good deal more. . . . .

If you were to compare the profits of all European merchants in India with the amount of the increase in the prices paid to cultivators and wages paid to labourers as the result of the enterprise of these merchants, you would find the balance of advantage well in India's favour. . . . .

Though we have our Tatas and some few others, and though we all hope the number of great Indian directors of commercial and industrial enterprise will increase rapidly, we are not in a position to do without the British merchant, banker and economic expert. Now here we must not forget that, next to the strength of British Rule in India the character and ability of the British merchant are the chief inducements to the European capitalist to invest his money in India. Let Mrs. Besant or Mr. C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer go to the city of London to raise a few crores for enterprises to be run by B.A., B.L.'s under Home Rule and see how much capital they can get and at what rate. I do not think they would get any except from charitable societies. I am for Swadeshi; but I am also for common sense.

As the Brahmin Home Rulers explain, they are very moderate in their demands. They do not like to drive the British entirely out of India, any more than they want to exterminate the non-Brahmins. Far from it. **We, non-Brahmins, are to remain and multiply, in order that the chosen few may have subjects to rule and the British are to remain to keep off external dangers by their military and naval forces, and to suppress us if we should dare to oppose the orders of a Brahmin oligarchy.** Home Rule, in other words, is to be Brahmin in policy, but British in the means used for enforcing that policy. Now, gentlemen, that is utterly impracticable. It is also utterly immoral. Great Britain has the right to demand from us obedience and if necessary to secure it by force, provided she rules well and is willing to give us a share in ruling as we become fitter and fitter to bear the responsibilities. But I say emphatically that Great Britain has no right to say to us:—"I will put over you an oligarchy in which you have no share, which you distrust, which is socially contemptuous of you." She has no right to say that. **England is responsible for the welfare and for the uplifting of the socially down-trodden and silent masses who form the majority of the population of India. She cannot in the name of fair play make a present of them to the Home Rulers like *Dakshana* given to the officiating Brahmin in a temple.**

I want progress as all of you do, but the progress we want should be steady and genuine and so directed that no community shall be defrauded or persecuted or kept back. All the communities in India are not in the same stage of civilisation; in the historic past our Brahmin friends had taken good care they should not be. **Under British Rule, all can go on peacefully developing and the more backward can gradually enter into the enjoyment of political rights and powers.** Eventually we can thus reach true self-

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The Proposed  
Constitutional

Reforms  
in India

And What They Mean

By  
The Indo-British  
Association



# The Proposed Constitutional Reforms in India

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By

The Indo-British Association.

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The objects of the Indo-British Association are

“ To promote and foster the unity and advancement of the Indian peoples under the British Crown. This Association realises that the natural result of British rule in India has been to encourage the growth of the spirit of nationality among Indians, and recognises therefore that British policy must be directed to lead them along safe and prudent lines, compatible with their security, contentment and moral and material progress, towards the goal of responsible Government.”

The Association believes that these objects can only be attained by gradual and orderly evolution. The Pronouncement in Parliament of the 20th August, 1917, contemplates an evolution of this character. The proposals of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India do not, in the opinion of the Association, conform to the principles then enunciated. They would result in a sudden and violent transfer of authority which would, the Association believes, gravely endanger the tranquility, progress and prosperity of India.

The appalling object-lesson which Russia presents is a plain warning of the disastrous effects of any weakening of a centralised form of Government. If British rule in India, which is the only guarantee of law and order among the most heterogeneous population in the world, is weakened, the conditions which followed the break up of the Moghul Empire will be reproduced.

It is from this point of view that the proposals of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State must be carefully considered. A mistake at the present moment, when a violent agitation and widespread intimidation of all moderate opinion in India are proceeding, and when in the crisis of a great war neither Parliament nor the public at home have time to give to an exhaustive examination of the problems of India, might prove fatal.

It is impossible within reasonable space to explain all the details of the Report. It contains much which will be cordially approved by everyone who knows the presents defect in the Government of India, and who earnestly desires that the path towards ultimate self-Government shall be made smooth, continuous, and safe.

Speaking broadly, there are two ways by which Indians can be brought into closer responsible relations with the administration.

1. The geographical process, by which the administration in defined areas would be handed over to Indians, the areas being increased when experience proved that Indian interests were being secured and promoted by the transfer.

2. A division of services in the executives, beginning with a selection of those to which Indian control might be considered now suitable, and proceeding by successive transfers until the entire executive of a province falls into Indian hands.

The Viceroy and the Secretary of State have chosen the second method, in face of the earnest warnings and the evident alarm expressed in addresses from Indians of all classes who clearly realise the position in which they will be placed if uncontrolled authority is given to the dominant political party in India.

This decision has led to certain specific proposals, which, in the opinion of the Indo-British Association, must prove unworkable in practice, while ensuring the maximum of friction and inter-racial ill-feeling. These proposals, being based upon a wrong principle, do not contain the elements of a fair compromise. They cannot satisfy the demands of the Home Rule party; but, if persisted in, they will quickly bring British rule into contempt in every province in India, and will lead to the employment of force under British authority to carry out measures conflicting with British principles. This result is foretold in some of the memorials presented by Indians to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.

The "diarchy" which had to be introduced because the geographical principle was rejected can be briefly explained.

An Indian province is to have one Legislative Council and two Executives, which may be styled, for the sake of brevity, A and B. The two Executives must eventually involve two secretariats.

A.—An Executive, corresponding to that which now exists, but reduced in number by one, so as to consist of one British and one Indian member. Such a Government can work satisfactorily as experience has shown, unless a permanent anti-Government majority in the Legislative Council, which it is the principal object of the political party led by Mr. Tilak and Mrs. Besant to create, is brought into being.

B.—Another Executive of one or more Ministers, chosen by the Governor from the elected majority of the Legislative Council and appointed for the life-time of that Council, from which they cannot be removed until a fresh election takes place.

In addition, there *may* be one or two members without portfolio, status or vote, chosen from the ranks of officials, for purely advisory purposes.

Certain services to be hereafter decided are to be transferred to B, and subsequently extended until A disappears.

The Indo-British Association believes that it is not necessary to criticise this scheme in detail. Nothing of this description exists in any country in the world, or has been hitherto suggested. The Association objects to the scheme on the following main grounds:—

(a) It is impossible to separate services the administration of which throughout the country is closely interwoven. A Commissioner or the head of a district cannot serve two masters.

(b) It is impossible for the Executive, which is responsible for law and order, to be obliged to carry out decrees of another Executive which has no such responsibility. The masses of India could never be made to understand the "diarchy" and to discriminate between the action of Executive A and Executive B. They will naturally and inevitably hold the authority, which wields force, responsible for measures of which it may wholly disapprove, and every measure taken by Executive B will be attributed to Executive A—or, in other words—to British rule, while Executive B could, if it wished, quickly make the latter appear hateful.

(c) The services transferred to Executive B will depend upon the Budget provision for their efficiency. So far as can be seen, no effective control over policy which is expressed in Budget allocation is to be retained by anyone. If the Governor wields this control by veto, as seems to be intended, he will be liable to violent attacks every year when the Budget comes round unless he conceded the demands of Executive B; while, in any case, Executive A and Executive B will be in perennial conflict. The only solution of the difficulty put forward in the Report lies in the words "no insuperable difficulty will arise if reasonable men conduct themselves in a reasonable manner," a solution which to any person with experience of the hard facts of Indian political spirit and Indian administration must appear unconvincing.

(d) In the Legislative Councils all matters connected with transferred services may not be voted upon by the official members, who must silently acquiesce in decisions that will be frequently based upon perversions of facts. While Executive B can vote on all measures, the Executive responsible for law and order can only vote on reserved subjects. The inevitable result of this extraordinary arrangement must be that every Legislative Council will be permanently divided into hostile camps.

(e) The framers of the Report seem to realise that the Government, which is to be split into two conflicting Executives, of which one is responsible for order among tens of millions of people and the other has no responsibility of this

nature, may be unable to obtain legislation which it regards as vital. There is strong probability that this would occur, with the disastrous result that the authority of all government throughout India would be shaken to its foundations.

To palliate this evident danger, the following procedure is proposed:—The Governor may certify that “a Bill dealing with a reserved subject (a subject not relegated to Executive B) is a measure ‘essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquility of the Province.’” It is then open to a majority of the Council to appeal to the Government of India, which is to decide “whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject.” If the Government of India supports the certificate, a violent agitation against that Government or the Viceroy may be set up. If, on the other hand, the Governor’s judgment, on a matter which he must know better than the Government of India, is thrown over, his position may be made impossible. If the elected members do not take action, or if the Governor receives the support of the Government of India, the fate of the Bill is still undetermined. It is to be referred to a Grand Committee, consisting of 40 to 50 per cent. of the Legislative Council, reproducing “as nearly as possible the proportions of the various elements in the larger body,” but the Governor may nominate a “bare majority.” But the opportunities afforded for friction and delay are even so not ended. The Grand Committee is to debate the Bill and may then refer it to a Select Committee. After the Select Committee has completed its labours, the Grand Committee will again debate the Bill and then report it to the Legislative Council, which will have power again to discuss the Bill generally, subject to a time-limit imposed by the Governor. The Bill will then pass automatically. *But* the Legislative Council may still insist upon its objections being forwarded with the Bill to the Governor-General and the Secretary of State, who, if they choose, can severally refuse sanction to the Bill. It is difficult to imagine anything more cumbrous and unsuitable than this procedure, which might last for months, and must incidentally create acute irritation.

(f) Apparently Bills dealing wholly with transferred subjects can be passed in defiance of the Governor’s disapproval, but are subject to the veto of the Governor, the Governor-General, or the Secretary of State, the exercise of which in some circumstances would be difficult. Such measures might, however, if not vetoed, create an outbreak of disorder which the Governor and Executive A would have to suppress, though they might be in complete sympathy with the disturbers of the peace.

To state these proposals is to make clear their danger, even to persons who have no knowledge of India. Anyone with experience of the working of civilised governments in any form, or of practical administration, must come to the conclusion that, quite apart from the special and peculiar conditions of India, the “diarchy” can only lead to administrative anarchy.



The proposals in the Report also operate to undermine British authority even in the sphere of the supreme Government in India, where a complicated bi-cameral Legislature is to be set up, in which a Government majority is secured only in the Upper Chamber. The effect will be that the Lower Chamber will, as regards a certain class of measure, be in permanent opposition. The Report admits that "the capacity of the Government to obtain its will in all essential matters must be unimpaired"; but the machinery provided is complicated and dilatory. Each measure will be debated in both Chambers, and, if agreement cannot be reached, they will sit together, in which case five nominated members might defeat the Government. Certification by the Governor-General in Council may then be resorted to; or, if urgency is claimed, a Bill may be passed in the Upper and reported to the Lower Chamber.

There is no justification for saddling India with two Chambers, and the only result will be long delays in legislation, and ample opportunities for the elected members in both Chambers to form a *bloc* capable of embarrassing and humiliating Government, while a premium will be set upon political intrigues, in which the East excels. No man with strength of character and first-class ability would accept the Governor-Generalship on these terms, and the weakness which for some years has been the most marked characteristic of government in India will become permanent under a system which aims at "deliberately disturbing the placid, pathetic contentment of the masses" (Report, para. 144) and discarding our heavy responsibilities.

The diarchical principle appears to be extended in disguised form to this country, where a new committee of the House of Commons is to be set up which, though dealing with Indian matters, appears to be debarred from exercising control over transferred subjects. The far greater personal knowledge which exists in the House of Lords is to be thrown away, and Indian matters will be handled by persons most of whom will be totally ignorant of the affairs and conditions of that country. The general effect will be administrative chaos arising from divided authority in India and at home, which will be felt right through the entire machine of Government down to the humblest officials.

A few years ago a large Commission toured through India at great cost, with the result of stirring up some ill-feeling. This body recommended that 25 per cent. of superior appointments in the Civil Service should be allotted to Indians. The Report ignores this proposal, and increases the proportion to 33 per cent., with an annual increment of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. until another Commission is appointed to review the situation after ten years. To this percentage, presumably, has to be added the number of those who are recruited through the open competitive examination in England. The effect of this will be that progress in India on Western lines will be quickly

checked, while the Civil Service itself, offering diminished chances of advancement and entailing a strenuous life passed in conditions of perplexity and discouragement, will rapidly deteriorate and cease to exercise any influence upon the masses. So far as regards those who are already in the Indian Civil Service, it is questionable whether these proposals do not in some measure transgress the provisions of the Covenant which is mutually binding upon them and the Secretary of State.

The main effect of these proposals must be the destruction of authority, which, among Eastern peoples, is not only universally desired, but is the one steady force.

Destructive criticism standing by itself is futile, and the Indo-British Association desires, therefore, to indicate in brief outline the reforms which it advocates and which it has reason to believe will satisfy sane and moderate opinion. It makes these proposals on the understanding that the powers, authority and constitution of the Imperial and Provincial Governments are unimpaired.

These reforms are :—

1. Readjustment of the responsibilities of the Secretary of State in Council and the Viceroy in Council in order to put an end to the meticulous interference in financial matters, which is injurious to the interests of India, while retaining the control of Parliament over general policy. (It is announced that a committee is to be set up to consider this question.)
2. Reconstruction of the India Office, not only with a view to remedying patent defects in office machinery long obsolete, but to secure greater and more recent knowledge of the conditions and affairs of India.
3. Decentralisation of the excessive powers wielded by the Government of India, so as to confer full authority upon provincial Governments in all their domestic affairs, and to transform the most centralised Government in the world into a federal system. This change was advocated in the Delhi Durbar despatch of 1911 ; but nothing has been done, and reform is long overdue. The general progress of India has been checked for years by crass centralisation. Incidentally, the federal principle would automatically give greater influence to Indian opinion in every province. (It is stated that another committee is to be set up to deal with this question.)
4. Reconstruct the electorates of the provincial Legislative Councils on a broader basis. The electorates created in 1909 have not proved satisfactory. If real Indian opinion is to find a voice in these Councils, the communal principle must be adopted, and all large communities, or groups of communi-

ties, must be represented by their own members. As the alliance between the Congress extremists and the little Moslem League was only effected on condition that the Mahommadans were to receive separate representation, the Indian politicians cannot oppose an extension of a principle which is essential in a caste-ridden country, unless the workers are to be entirely excluded from all influence upon affairs. The communal principle is extended in the Report to the Sikhs of the Panjab, because "they supply a gallant and valuable element to the Indian Army." (A third committee, of which the chairman is to be a person who does not know India, is to be set up to deal with the whole question of the franchise and electorates.)

5. Transfer all municipal and local government to elected bodies, subject only to such control as is exercised by the Executive Government and coupled with such safeguards as will ensure both the adequate representation on such bodies of all interests in the municipal and local areas concerned and the proper protection of all interests, which are not confined to such local areas. The effect will be (a) to give to Indians large powers, including taxation, and experience of the administration of practical business; and (b) in time to develop a sense of responsibility, now wholly wanting, among voters. It is only in comparatively small areas that this sense can be created among the illiterate masses. Local government might, however, be reorganized by creating Boards dealing with larger than District areas, so as to confer more importance upon these bodies. It would be of advantage to have a uniform franchise for the Legislative Councils and local bodies.
6. Press forward elementary education, which has been neglected owing to initial misdirection in 1833, and later to the efforts of Indians to advance secondary and university education, which could be done only at the expense of elementary education. There is no country in the world where the disproportion of public expenditure upon elementary and higher education is so marked as in India. Special attention should be paid to agricultural, industrial and technical schools.
7. In every province place one or two districts wholly under the Indian members of the different services. This has been done in Bengal, but the experiment is inconclusive because of the want of a revenue system. If, after a period of trial, this system is proved to work well, other districts can be similarly staffed. Later a Commissioner's division can be so handed over, and the process, if shown to be successful, can be continued until a whole province comes under Indian rule in the future.

The Indo-British Association is convinced that, by the

geographical method referred to on page 4, effective powers can be gradually and safely transferred to Indian hands without dislocating the existing machinery, creating interminable friction, and undermining throughout all India the only authority which holds the heterogeneous masses together and stands between them and such anarchy as now prevails in Russia.

Viewing the Report as a whole, the Association is painfully impressed by the absence of any adequate recognition of existing conditions in India. In a country where the tyranny of caste has effectually prevented the growth of a democracy, the application of a democratic form of government, even with the temporary and illusive limitations proposed, can only lead to the negation of all the principles on which democracy rests in Western countries.

The adoption of the Report will result in the transfer of authority to a little upper caste oligarchy, composed of elements which have never shown any sympathy with the vast masses of working Indians, and have frequently obstructed measures by which the position of the cultivators, who number 72 per cent. of the population, have largely benefited. This little oligarchy is largely denationalised by Western education, often imperfectly assimilated. It is mainly town-bred, and its interests conflict to a large extent with those of the dwellers in the 750,000 villages of India, who have hitherto looked to British Rule as their only safeguard against caste oppression. As soon as it is in possession of executive powers, it will inevitably develop sharp antagonism to the principles by which British Rule has been guided and inspired. Such authority as the Viceroy and Secretary of State propose to leave in British hands will then have to be exerted either in support of measures which British officials strongly disapprove, or in restraint of powers formally conceded to the oligarchy. The first course would be revolting to British ideals; the second would have the effect of shattering the edifice which it is proposed to set up. So long as India remains wholly dependent upon the British Government for the preservation of internal order and for defence against external aggression, and upon British credit for commercial and industrial advancement, the authority of that Government must be maintained intact. Two authorities—one based on the resources of the British Empire, and the other upon an insignificant fraction of the Indian upper classes masquerading as a democracy—cannot co-exist

In the opinion of the Indo-British Association, the adoption of the ill-conceived proposals of the Report must lead to the weakening of *all* authority among 315 millions of people, and to the rapid deterioration of the public services, to the guidance and energies of which the prosperity and the wonderful progress which India has attained are wholly due. The result will be "red ruin and the breaking up of laws," and the advance of India towards nationhood, which it is our object and our duty to promote, will be checked indefinitely.

NOTES ON EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS.—No. 3.

# POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN EGYPT:

Their Growth and Hindrances.

- I. BYGONE INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR SURVIVALS;
- II. THE NATIONAL AWAKENING;
- III. EUROPEAN INTERVENTION;
- IV. REFORMERS AND "REBELS."

BY

H. R. FOX BOURNE.

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## NOTES ON EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS.

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THE first and second of this series of 'Notes,' entitled 'Lord Cromer's Supremacy' and 'Military Control in Egypt,' were issued in February and April last, and it was intended that these should be followed at short intervals by others. Immediately after the publication of the second, however, Lord Cromer unexpectedly resigned his office as British Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and, in view of the appointment of a successor and a possible change in the line of policy adopted by that successor, or dictated to him by the home authorities, there were manifest reasons for delaying continuance of the series until time had been afforded for the indication of any such change of policy, and consequently until political work had been resumed after the summer vacation. In the altered circumstances that have thus arisen, the most pressing question now to be dealt with appears to be as to the propriety of according self-governing powers to the Egyptian people, and for an understanding of the present situation some acquaintance with the facts leading up to it is necessary. The following pages are, therefore, mainly historical, and introductory to a statement of 'The Case for Constitutional Reform in Egypt,' in the fourth 'Note,' which is issued concurrently with the present one.

H. R. F. B.

Broadway Chambers, Westminster,  
30th November, 1907.

## POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN EGYPT.

IN the introductory portion of the Annual Report issued by him shortly before his retirement from the British Agency and Consul-Generalship in Egypt, the Earl of Cromer wrote:—

“It is difficult even for those who have an extensive knowledge of Egyptian affairs to differentiate the various currents of thought which, in one form or another, are moving in the direction of creating a local public opinion favourable to the entirely novel idea of Egyptian Nationalism. I say that the idea is entirely novel, for it has to be remembered that for centuries past the Egyptians have been a subject race. Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs from Arabia and Bagdad, Circassians, and, finally, Ottoman Turks have successively ruled over Egypt; but we have to go back to the doubtful and obscure precedent of Pharaonic times to find an epoch when possibly Egypt was ruled by Egyptians. Even now Egyptian Nationalism is a plant of exotic rather than of indigenous growth.....It has been evoked by the benefits which, with a rapidity probably unparalleled in history, have been conferred on the country by the introduction of Western civilisation at the hands of an alien race, and it is surely the irony of political destiny that that race, or the instruments through whom it has principally acted, should be represented as the principal obstacles to the realisation of schemes the conception of which is mainly due to their own action.”—(‘Egypt, No. 1, 1907,’ p. 3.)

In those sentences the most potent of the instruments of the alien race that has taken the lead in introducing Western civilisation into Egypt makes bold assumptions, one of which is at variance with facts, and another in defiance of political morality. It is not true that the idea of Egyptian Nationalism is entirely novel, and even now exotic rather than indigenous in its growth. Nor can it honestly be said that, because “the Egyptians have been a subject race for centuries past,” therefore it is their duty to remain for ever a subject race, and the duty as well as the right of their present race of alien rulers to keep them in subjection. It may be, as Mr. Silva White points out, that, from the earliest times, “the favourable geographical position of Egypt and her natural resources as a granary, necessarily challenged the ambition and cupidity of nations seeking to establish political and commercial supremacy in the Mediterranean, and to command the trade routes to the East”—(‘The Expansion of Egypt, 1899,’ p. 33). But, as attempt is made in the following pages to show national aspirations, of indigenous not of exotic origin and growth, had taken shape and substance in Egypt long before the British occupation, and were only prevented by that occupation and its

and had ensured the political as well as the financial bankruptcy of Egypt, before Ismail Pasha, who had succeeded to the Pashalik in 1863, to whose heirs the right of succession to his African pro-consulship had been ensured by an Imperial Firman in 1866, and who had been promoted by another Firman to the rank and title of Khedive in 1867, was deposed by yet another Firman thirteen years later.

As Ismail had bought the privileges conferred upon him by the Porte in 1866 and 1867 with a raising, at the cost of the Egyptian people, of the annual tribute sent to Constantinople from about £400,000 to about £750,000, it might have been supposed that, so long as the "unearned increment" was duly provided, Egypt would now be practically relieved from interference or dictation by the "Paramount Power." But Egypt is, notoriously, "the land of paradox," and Ismail Pasha's bargainings, instead of weakening, strengthened its bondage to the representatives of the Sultan, whose spiritual pretensions as Khalif it had never formally acknowledged, but whose temporal authority had been imposed upon it since 1517.

The supremacy of the Porte was chiefly maintained, of course, by the cleverness, when it showed itself, with which the Sultan or his representatives by turns really or ostensibly favoured the pashas, who were backed up in their persecutions of the people, and the people, who were backed up in their resentment of the pashas' oppressions; the one object consistently aimed at throughout being to bring in supplies to the imperial exchequer and to enhance as far as possible the imperial power and dignity. To this end the patronage accorded to religious and educational organisations enabled the mosques and universities to do more in enlightening and otherwise assisting large sections of the population than has generally been done by similar organisations in other Moslem communities. On the whole, however, and inevitably, the influence of the Porte, as the paramount despotism, in upholding the despotic projects of its satraps—whether Mamelukes or of the dynasty of Mohammed Ali—was baneful; and to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt was due the embarrassing complication of *imperia in imperio* incident to the Capitulations with twelve European Powers, as well as with the United States and Brazil, which became operative in the country as soon as it fell under the control of the Turks.

However serviceable, and even necessary, in the Middle Ages and down to present times, may have been the opportunity afforded by



these Capitulations for the official agents of civilised nations to protect not only their own countrymen, but also natives having a recognised claim to such protection, from the lawlessness and legalised wrongdoing of Egyptian rulers and their subjects, the fact of their being tolerated, and deemed to be beneficial, is in itself an evidence of the rottenness of the rule in vogue under Ismail Pasha, and his forerunners for centuries.

It is customary to abuse Ismail Pasha in unstinted terms, and much of the abuse may have been warranted. His career, according to Lord Milner, was "a carnival of extravagance and oppression."

"No equally reckless prodigal ever possessed equally unlimited control of equally vast resources. He came to the throne at a moment when there seemed no limit to the potential wealth of Egypt.

The whole land was his to do what he liked with.

**Ismail's  
Traducers.**

All the world was ready to lend him money to develop it. Moreover, Ismail combined in himself every quality, good as well as bad, that goes to make the ideal squanderer. Luxurious, voluptuous, ambitious, fond of display, devoid of principle, he was, at the same time, full of the most magnificent schemes for the material improvement of the country. Over and above the millions wasted in entertainments, in largess, in sensuality, in the erection of numerous palaces, structurally as rotten as they were æsthetically abominable, he threw away yet other millions upon a vast scheme of agricultural development, started with inadequate knowledge at inordinate cost."—('England in Egypt,' 1907, p. 176.)

Unjust and untrue as is much in that paragraph and others, much in the following is yet more ungenerous and misleading:—

"If the personality of Ismail was an essential factor in the ruin of his country, it needed a whole series of unfortunate conditions to render that personality as pernicious as it actually became. It needed a nation of submissive slaves, not only bereft of any vestige of liberal institutions, but devoid of the slightest spark of the spirit of liberty. It needed a bureaucracy, which it would have been hard to equal for its combination of cowardice and corruption. It needed the whole gang of swindlers—mostly European—by whom Ismail was surrounded, and to whom, with his phenomenal incapacity to make a good bargain—strange characteristic in a man so radically dishonest—he fell an easy prey."—(*Ibid.*, p. 177.)

If the "swindlers"—some of them fathers or grandfathers of British peers and foreigners of high rank—were as base as Lord Milner here implies, neither Ismail's ruin nor Egypt's would have been as grave and disastrous as both were had the culprits not been encouraged and supported by European Governments. If Egyptian

bureaucrats were cowardly and corrupt, their worst misdeeds would probably not have been committed, had it not been for European prompting. If Egypt was without "a vestige of liberal institutions" when the European prompters and "swindlers" appeared on the scene, and if, when the British occupation of Egypt occurred some twenty years later, no sign was visible of "the slightest spark of the spirit of liberty," there had been in the interval, as we shall see, a remarkable upheaval of national opinion in favour of "liberal institutions" which European machinations had ruthlessly suppressed, and it was the flash of much more than a "spark of the spirit of liberty" which brought about the crisis that furnished excuse for the British occupation.

It ill becomes those who have profited by Ismail's faults and follies to throw on him all the blame for offences in which their and others' share was at least as great as his.

## II. THE NATIONAL AWAKENING.

Apart from the very notable material advantages, commercial and industrial, which Egypt derived from the Suez Canal, and yet more from the irrigation and other public works incident to the economical developments promoted thereby, it also indirectly profited by the financial profligacy of Ismail and his forerunners. Not altogether without compensations were the cruelties resorted to in extorting from the natives, already impoverished and hardworking, both labour for carrying on the extravagant enterprises started by the Khedive and his partners or tempters and money for payment of the excessive interest imposed upon him by those partners and tempters.

It may be true that half a century ago Egypt enjoyed few if any "liberal institutions," and that there was little or no "spirit of liberty"

abroad, but there was widespread resentment of the intolerable tyranny experienced not only by the fellaheen, who constitute the vast majority of the population and who appear to have been for the most part actual descendants of the oldest inhabitants known of in history, but also by what may be called its middle-class section—mainly the result of mixed unions, with a predominant strain of Arab blood, and contributed to by all other groups of colonists, earlier as well as later; Assyrian, Persian, Greek, Italian, Circassian, Albanian, Coptic, and what not. It was to appease such resentment that a land law, decreed by Said Pasha in 1858, secured, or at any rate pretended to secure, for the fellaheen protection of their freehold rights; and the unparalleled use made of the

### **Pioneers of Revolution.**

corvée and the courbash inclined all right-thinking leaders of public opinion—in so far as any real public opinion had begun to take shape in Egypt—to consider the propriety of modifying, if not of abolishing, these time-honoured abuses.

The leaders of this opinion, whatever its strength and merit, were, of course, chiefly to be found in Cairo and Alexandria, wherein were collected, along with the alien adventurers and their dupes and tools, generally of mixed origin, many of the ablest and worthiest natives, attracted by European civilisation, whose influences can be beneficial as well as malign. In Cairo, too, at the university of El Azhar, the head quarters of Moslem education, they found, at any rate, germs of "liberal institutions," under the guidance of devout men like the Sheikh Jemal-ed-din and his disciple Mohammed Abdu, afterwards Grand Mufti of Egypt, who, in that capacity, had the unique honour of being praised both by Lord Cromer and by Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. Of Jemal-ed-din Mr. Blunt tells us:—

"An Afghan by birth, he had received his religious education at Bokhara, and in that remote region, and apparently without coming in contact with any teacher from the more civilised centres of Mohammedan thought, he had evolved from his own study and reflection the ideas which are now associated with his name. Hitherto all movements of religious reform in Sunnite Islam had followed the lines not of development, but of retrogression.....On the other hand, reformers there had been of a modern type recently, both in Turkey and Egypt, who had Europeanised the administration for political purposes, but these had introduced their changes as it were by violence, through decrees and approvals obtained by force from the unwilling Ulema, and with no serious attempt to reconcile them with the law of the Koran and the Traditions. The political reforms had been always imposed from above, not suggested from below, and had generally been condemned by respectable opinion. Jemal-ed-din's originality consisted in this, that he sought to convert the religious intellect of the countries where he preached to the necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic position, and, instead of clinging to the past, of making an onward intellectual movement in harmony with modern knowledge. His intimate acquaintance with the Koran and the Traditions enabled him to show that, if rightly interpreted and checked the one by the other, the law of Islam was capable of the most liberal developments, and that hardly any beneficial change was in reality opposed to it.

**The Sheikh  
Jemal-ed-din.**

"Having completed his studies in 1870, and being then about thirty-two years old, he passed through India to Bombay and joined the pilgrimage to

Mecca, and, this duty accomplished, he came to Cairo. He remained on this first visit no more than forty days in Egypt, but he had time to make acquaintance with certain of the Azhar students and to lay the foundations of the teaching he afterwards developed."—('Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt,' 1907, pp. 100, 101.)

Proceeding to Constantinople, his bold and eloquent preaching there soon led to his being denounced as "an atheist and a perverter of the law," and he was ordered to take shelter in Egypt.

"It was thus under the cloud of a religious persecution that he returned to Cairo, but not without having sown the seed of inquiry which was to mature some years later at Constantinople in the shape of a general demand from the Softas for constitutional reform. It was the religious part of the movement which was to culminate in the political revolution attempted by Midhat Pasha in 1876.

"At the Azhar, when he returned to Cairo in 1871, his reputation had, of course, preceded him, and, though Egypt was then in the darkest night of its religious unintelligence, for the moral corruption of the Government, especially in Ismail's reign, had infected all classes, and had extinguished every tradition of courage and independence among the Ulema, considerable curiosity was felt about him. The few friends he had made on the occasion of his first visit welcomed him, if not openly, in secret, and presently the wonderful fire of his zeal and conversation drew around him, as it had done at Constantinople, a group of young and enthusiastic followers. The most remarkable of these, his earliest disciples at the Azhar, were Sheikh Mohammed Abdu and Sheikh Ibrahim-el-Aghani, the well-known publicist. To these he was able to communicate without reserve his stores of varied knowledge, and he inspired them with his critical spirit and something of his courage. Courage, indeed, was needed for any man at Cairo to speak out. Ismail brooked no kind of opposition, and wielded power so absolute in the country that independent speech, almost independent whispering, had disappeared from men's mouths. It was only the fellaheen of the villages, already despoiled of all, that dared complain, or those in the city too poor to be of any political account. The highest religious authorities, as well as the highest officials, had long been silent about injustice, and had chosen their part of acquiescence, content so long as they could get their share, each one however small, of the general plunder. On this dark state of intellectual and moral things Jemal-ed-din's courageous teaching broke like an apparition of strange light, and his very courage for a while secured him a hearing undisturbed by admonition from the Government.....He was allowed during the whole of the remaining years of Ismail's reign to carry on his lectures, and it was only on Tewfik's accession and the establishment of the Anglo-French Condominium that he was arrested on an executive order, sent untried

to Alexandria, and summarily exiled. He had, however, already done his work, and at the time of which I am writing (1880), his principles of liberal reform upon a theological basis had so far prevailed at the Azhar that they had already been adopted by all that was intellectual there among the students. The reformer's mantle had fallen upon worthy shoulders."—(*Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.)

Of Jemal-ed-din's successors Mr. Blunt—who speaks from intimate personal acquaintance, dating from January, 1881, regards Mohammed Abdu—as the worthiest, and, in fact, “one of the best, and wisest, and most interesting of men.” He adds :—

“When I use these words it must not be thought that they are a light or exaggerated judgment. I base them on a knowledge of his character gained in a variety of circumstances on very difficult and trying occasions: first, as a religious teacher; next, as leader of a movement of social reform and as intellectual head of a political revolution; again, as prisoner in the hands of his enemies, as exile in various foreign lands, and for many years under police surveillance at Cairo when his exile had been annulled; lastly, by the strength of his intellect and his moral character, reasserting himself as a power in his own country, resuming his lectures at the Azhar, placed in the judicature, named Judge of Appeal, and finally Grand Mufti at Cairo, the highest religious and judicial position attainable in Egypt.”—(*Ibid.*, p. 105.)

Mohammed Abdu, some eight years younger than Jemal-ed-din, was about seventeen when Ismail Pasha's rule began, and, though for a long time he chiefly concerned himself with theological questions, his conviction that, as Mr. Blunt puts it, “what was needed for the Mohammedan body politic, was not merely reform, but a true religious reformation,” necessarily brought him into touch with all the leading Egyptians who, whether or not themselves sufferers by the policy recklessly pursued by the Khedive, were intelligent enough and patriotic enough to seek guidance from him. There were evidently, throughout Ismail's Khedivate, in and out of Cairo, more such men than has generally been supposed, and the help rendered by them towards the building up of “liberal institutions” must not be ignored because much of it was crude and faulty.

Even Ismail himself might almost have been one of the number had not foreign tempters and his own weaknesses led him into evil courses which caused Mohammed Abdu to describe him in 1882, as “the greatest enemy Egypt ever had.” According to Mr. Edward Dicey :—

**The Sheikh  
Mohammed Abdu.**

**Ismail Pasha's -  
Promises.**

"The accession of Ismail Pasha was regarded in his own country, but still more abroad, as the advent of a new and a brighter era for Egypt. He was deemed, and rightly deemed, to be a man of exceptional ability; he was understood to possess unusual ability as an administrator; he was reported to entertain a high appreciation of Western civilisation, and to be wishful of introducing European reforms into Egypt, in as far as their introduction was consistent with Oriental ideas.....He had sufficient intelligence to realise that the State should be sufficiently well administered to promote its productiveness.....He was desirous, not only as a matter of policy, but of individual predilection, to stand well in the public opinion of Europe; and all these motives confirmed his wish to earn the repute of an enlightened sovereign, whose rule, however autocratic, was directed to the development and improvement of the country over which he had been called to reign." —('The Story of the Khedivate,' 1902, pp. 51, 52.)

It was in keeping with that character that, in November, 1866, Ismail issued a decree appointing, and fixing the powers of, a Chamber of Notables or Deputies, to sit at Cairo whenever and so long as its services might be required. Some of the rules laid down for the management of this body were promising. For instance:—

**The 1866 Chamber  
of Notables.**

"It shall be the duty of the Chamber of Deputies to discuss all that has reference to the internal administration of the country, and all the measures which the Government considers as coming within the powers of the Chamber.....All questions relating to the administration of the country which shall have been discussed by the Chamber shall be submitted to the Privy Council, and shall then be examined by the Bureaux and Commissions dependent on the Chamber.....Every proposal which the Government shall deem it expedient to submit to the Chamber shall be read to it.....printed and distributed for examination by the different bureaux. The united bureaux are then to name, by secret voting, a committee of five members, and this committee shall be entrusted with the task of studying these proposals and of drawing up a report upon them.....On this report being presented to the Chamber, and read at the sitting, it shall be discussed, and every one shall give his opinion upon it.....The members will vote by ballot and by a majority of votes.....The Chamber must respect the opinion of the majority, and hear their observations." —(Parliamentary Papers, 'Egypt, No. 3, 1882,' pp. 41—48).

But this promise of parliamentary institutions was not kept, and the promise itself was delusive. The proposals as to election of members were farcical. Only after there had been six elections was it necessary that "the members should be bound to know how to read

and write," and after the tenth that "the electors would also have to know how to read and write." The President and Vice-President of the Chamber were to be nominees of the Khedive; and so, in effect, were all its seventy-five members. It resolved itself, in fact, into—and probably was never intended to be other than—merely a Chamber of Notables, as it was generally called, composed solely of the Khedive's favourites and supporters; and it appears to have only been convoked and then but rarely, when a pretence of national sanction was wanted for some exceptionally outrageous scheme of the Khedive's or his masters.' Nothing of much significance is recorded about it during the fifteen years before 2nd October, 1881, when Sir Edward Malet, as British Consul-General at Cairo, sent to Lord Granville the following report as to the course he and Mr. (afterwards Sir Auckland) Colvin, as British Financial Adviser, were following in their plans for the overthrow of Arabi and the National party that had arisen in the interval:—

"The next step to be taken was the convocation of the Chamber of Notables, and for the last two days rumours have been abroad that difficulties had supervened. It was well known that Sherif Pasha intended that the Chamber should be convened under the law of 1866, but it was stated that Arabi Bey was opposed to this, and insisted upon the adoption of a law giving a much wider scope to the powers of the Chamber which had been elaborated during the last days of the reign of Ismail Pasha. It appears that this law had never received the Khedive's sanction, but had been prepared by the Chamber under his auspices and under the Ministry of Sherif Pasha.

"Here was a new difficulty. It was clear that Sherif Pasha could not give way on such a point. Should he even, for other reasons, be willing to consent, the assembly of a Chamber to which are attached all the privileges of a Chamber in a Constitutional country would bring him into immediate conflict with the Sultan, who will not permit a Constitution in Egypt. But apart from this the further dictation of Arabi was fatal to Sherif's power.

"Arabi Bey, however, dined last night with one of the most influential of the Notables, Sultan Pasha, who undertook to endeavour to persuade him of the danger of the course he was pursuing. In this he seems for the present to have succeeded, and Arabi Bey has once more professed confidence in Sherif Pasha, and the intention to leave the matter entirely in his hands. How long he may remain in this mind is uncertain, and Mr. Colvin has urged Sherif Pasha to issue the decree convoking the Chamber with all possible dispatch."—(*Ibid.*, p. 49).

### III. EUROPEAN INTERVENTION.

To understand the full meaning of the cynical report just cited—but one among hundreds of the same sort—and also the conditions under which the national demand for such a Chamber of Deputies as Arabi insisted upon in 1881 arose, we must recall some events of the preceding dozen years or more.

The loans negotiated by the Egyptian authorities through European bankers, for which a precedent was made in 1854, amounted to about £4,000,000 before Ismail's succession in 1863. In the twelve years ensuing the total of national indebtedness, for outlay neither authorised by the people nor in any way under their control, was increased by nearly £100,000,000; the sums raised in Europe exceeding £50,000,000, a floating debt of £26,000,000 secured by Treasury bonds having accumulated, loans for about £11,000,000 having been effected with private persons, and an aggregate exceeding £13,000,000 being made up of claims for work done, services rendered, and money advanced. This result—only a prelude to worse—was not reached without repeated protests and denunciations from the Porte, on the ground that its ownership of Egypt and the revenue appertaining to it therefrom were being imperilled by such wanton mortgaging. Ismail, however, had weakened the Porte's hold on Egypt—except as a fiction useful to the European Powers for diplomatic purposes—by his bargains with the Sultan in 1866 and 1867, and at this time it suited the European Powers, as patrons of the great financiers and adventurers in London, Paris, and elsewhere, to encourage, or at any rate to tolerate, the iniquitous folly by which the "gang of swindlers" to whom Lord Milner objects were enriched, by which less discreditable traders were assisted, and by which the Khedive's vices and hobbies were pandered to and some real improvements brought about in Egypt, at a cost of unspeakable misery to the great bulk of the population.

At length, in the interests of the bondholders, and apparently at the instigation of the Khedive, Mr. Stephen Cave was sent out in 1875 to inquire into the financial situation. His report made appalling disclosures as to the sufferings of the fellaheen resulting from the monstrous taxes imposed on them, as well as from "forced loans which the peasant cannot distinguish from taxes," from "special duties which lead to oppression and extortion," and from much else, the effect of



which was that nearly a third of the gross revenue of the country was swallowed up by interest at from 12 to 26 per cent. per annum on loans represented by but one, and that at the time a very questionable, asset. "For the present large amount of indebtedness," Mr. Cave reported, "there is absolutely nothing to show but the Suez Canal, the whole proceeds of the loans and floating debt having been absorbed in payment of interest and sinking funds, with the exception of the sum debited to that great work."\*

Mr. Cave's hint that Egypt should be practically annexed by England, in order that its political advantage might be ensured and the investments of British speculators adequately protected, was not openly and completely acted upon. But the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal, carrying with them a controlling power in its administration, were promptly acquired by the British Government, and—International Courts for legally defining and upholding the "rights" of foreigners in Egypt having been formally instituted on 1st January, 1876—Mr. Cave's mission was followed by another, entrusted to Mr. (afterwards Sir C.) Rivers Wilson, which resulted in the establishment of the *Caisse de la Dette* in May, 1876, and by yet another, entrusted to Mr. (afterwards Viscount) Goschen and M. Joubert, of which the issue was the Dual Control set up in November of the same year, and, after suspension in December, 1878, revived in July, 1879, to be finally abolished in 1883.

These arrangements and re-arrangements only concern us here in so far as they indicate the progress of European meddling with Egyptian politics, the primary intention being to maintain and forward the interests of European financiers, but the methods pursued to that end being of such a sort that they led perforce to assertion of absolute control over the whole administration of the country by England and France, as joint champions of all bondholding interests, and ultimately to the fullest extent by England, not only as the most enterprising of the Powers concerned, but also as the one whose political stake in the business was supposed to be the largest.

The Khedive, at that time the recognised and autocratic

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\* The whole history of Egyptian dealings with European financiers, and the Governments backing them up, between 1862 and 1882, was summed up by Mr. Seymour Keay in an able pamphlet, consisting almost entirely of extracts from Blue books, which was published in the latter year, and entitled 'Spoiling the Egyptians: a Tale of Shame.' From this pamphlet several of the quotations given above are borrowed.

spokesman for Egypt in European diplomacy, was, it must be admitted, in the first instance responsible for the state of things thus brought about. It was by his reckless extravagance, and his yet more reckless folly in placing himself at the mercy of the money-lenders who pandered to it, that Egypt also was placed at their—and, consequently, at their champions'—mercy. With characteristic imprudence, in April, 1876, as soon as the purport of Mr. Cave's report was known, Ismail suspended payment of the interest due on the Treasury bonds issued in his name, being emboldened thereto by the fact that in the previous October a like course had been taken by the Ottoman Government, and that in the intervening half-year nothing effective had been done by the European Powers to enforce payment. He speedily discovered his blunder; but, with all his skilfulness in tactics of dishonesty, he could not repair the harm that he had done to himself, and, in attempting to do so by further sacrifice of the country's interests, he hastened his own downfall, besides seriously aggravating the difficulties to be overcome by his subjects before Egypt could obtain even such opportunities of political development as he had promised to it in 1866.

The arrangements arrived at in 1876 were more or less adhered to until 1882, some of them—notably those concerning the Caisse de la Dette—continuing in force to this day. Besides the French and English Controllers, the earliest of whom were M. de Bliignières and Mr. Rivers Wilson, and the Commissioners of the Caisse de la Dette, on which Capt. Baring (afterwards Lord Crómer), was the first English representative, sundry other European officials were nominally in the employ and under the control of the Khedive, while Consuls and Consuls General, as previously, looked after European interests at large the British Consul General at that time being Mr. (afterwards Lord) Vivian, who succeeded Col. Stanton, and who was authorised, among his other functions, and while ostensibly debarred from dictatorial action, to give to the bondholders and their agents “such unofficial assistance as he properly could.”

The sole object of the new machinery, and the strengthening of old machinery, it appears, was to secure revenue sufficient to pay the exorbitant interest claimed by the bondholders, and all the lavishly incurred expenses incident to collection and distribution of the money. In the summer of 1877, for instance—although he had

reported in the previous autumn that, in the levying of considerably over £2,000,000 for payment of the January coupon, "under the extreme pressure put upon the authorities, the taxes were being collected in some districts for six months in advance"—Lord Vivian confessed, with evident shame, to the pressure he put upon Ismail with a view to another £2,000,000 being provided in payment of the July coupon of the same year. At one interview, we are told, the Khedive, "while pleading the utter want of resources, frankly admitted that, in order to pay the coupon, the taxes were being collected for nine months, and in some cases even for a year, in advance." On being warned that any failure on his part would be "courting a serious danger," Ismail protested that "he had already given up everything to the bondholders, and he saw no possibility of offering creditors better terms without ruining his country, which was already overburdened." Lord Vivian's only answer to that apology was "that the creditors ought not to suffer for a deplorable state of things for which they were in no way responsible." There are tokens of an uneasy conscience, however, in a later dispatch, dated 12th July, 1877:—

"The money required (£2,074,975) was fully paid up yesterday. But I fear that these results may have been achieved at the expense of ruinous sacrifices to the peasantry, by forced sales of growing crops, and by collecting taxes in advance. All this must be wrung, in some shape or other, from a country already crushed by taxation. Meanwhile, I fear the European Administration may be unconsciously sanctioning the utter ruin of the peasant-creators of the wealth of the country, for which I hold that Englishmen are incurring a serious responsibility."—('Egypt, No. 4, 1879,' pp. 72-3.)

The mischief and the misery increased with the efforts made, and only successful by means of monstrous cruelty, for the raising of money with which to pay each succeeding half-year's coupon, and by the end of 1877 the difficulties of collection had reached such a pitch that the British Government yielded to the Consul-General's repeated argument that "official pressure would have the greatest weight and authority with His Highness." Sanction was therefore given to abundant application of "official pressure," with the consequence that more harshness than ever was shown in the exactions resorted to in the interests of the bondholders, and, when it became manifest that, without some radical change in the machinery of government, no violence would suffice to keep up for long the supply of £2,000,000 every six months, steps began to be taken to bring about such a change.

**" Official  
Pressure."**

In March, 1878, the Khedive was coerced into appointing a Commission of Inquiry, consisting of six Europeans, under the presidency of Sir Rivers Wilson, to deal with "the whole financial situation of Egypt," and one of its earliest exploits was, in May, "a persistent attempt to seize the furniture in the Khedive's palace for a debt due to a European firm." Less undignified, but perhaps not less improper, seeing that the sole object aimed at was the gratification of the bondholders, were the wholesale seizure of two-thirds of the Crown lands and other measures as arbitrary, the carrying out of which was facilitated by the enforced resignation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Justice by Sherif Pasha—subsequently one of the British Government's principal and most trusted assistants in the administration of the country; the excuse being that Sherif, while declaring "his readiness to give written answers to any questions," had declined to make oral reply to "questions requiring great precision." "The prestige and authority of the Commission," Lord Vivian reported to Lord Salisbury, "will now be greatly enhanced by the fall of the most prominent man in Egypt for disobeying its summons."\*

The way was thus cleared for the crowning achievement of the Commissioners of Inquiry in compelling Ismail to sanction, as they put it in their report to Lord Salisbury, "the limitation of the absolute power which the Khedive has hitherto wielded," and to adopt the policy indicated or misstated in a letter dated 28th August, 1878, which Ismail addressed to Nubar Pasha, whom he had previously invited to return to office as Sherif Pasha's successor:—

**The Anglo-French  
Condominium.**

"Instead of absolute personal rule, the principle on which the existing government of Egypt is based, I wish to have a personal rule which will direct the general course of public affairs, but which will be counterbalanced by a Council of Ministers. In one word, I wish to rule henceforth with and by my Council of Ministers. In order to carry out this idea, I consider that, for the execution of the reforms I have already announced, the members of the Ministry must be jointly and severally responsible for one another. This point is essential. The Council of Ministers will discuss in common all important measures affecting the country. The opinion of the majority will determine the opinion of the minority. All Ministerial decisions will, therefore, be taken by the vote of the majority of the Ministry, and, by giving my approval, I shall sanction in consequence the opinions which have

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\* The above and later details are culled from the Official Correspondence in 'Egypt, No. 4, 1879.'

carried the day. Each Minister, therefore, will have to carry into execution the decisions of the Council which have received my approval, and which concern the special department entrusted to his care.....I consider that the appointment of a Ministry possessing these attributes is not incompatible with our customs and ideas, and is, on the contrary, in accordance with the precepts of the Sacred Law, and consistent with an organised judicial system. The institution, therefore, will be sufficient to meet the exigencies of our social system, and will permit us to realise our expressed intentions."

This project was specious. Under honest guidance and other favourable conditions it might have been a starting point for the liberal political institutions of which Egypt had so long been in sore need. But, from the first, it was only a sham, and worse. Nubar Pasha being designated as Prime Minister, Sir Rivers Wilson, without resigning his English Controllorship, "consented" to be Finance Minister, on condition that he was to have "full and uncontrolled authority over every official under his orders, including the power of appointment and dismissal," and a similar stipulation was made by M. de Blignières, the French Controller, who was proposed as Minister of Public Works. The scheme was thus merely a reshaping and strengthening, in the guise of an Anglo-French Ministry, of the Dual Control—reminding us of Milton's statement that "new Presbyter is but old Priest writ large"; and it is not strange that, immediately after Sir Rivers Wilson's visit to England in the autumn of 1878, the Rothschilds easily floated a further loan of £8,000,000 on security of the Domain lands, and that the British Consul General at Cairo cheerfully reported that "Egyptian Stock has risen rapidly since the news of the arrangement became known."

Six weeks later, on 14th December, Lord Vivian, in accordance with his instructions from Lord Salisbury, had an interview with the Khedive, of which he duly reported as follows:—

"I said I had been instructed to inform His Highness.....that Her Majesty's Government had every confidence in the resources of Egypt, and in the successful working out of the new system, if it were only allowed a fair trial, but if it were opposed **Ismail's Dilemma.** by those in power, or if they showed any disposition to discredit it, the difficulties of the new Administration would be enormously increased, and any responsibilities for their failure would involve its authors (whoever they might be) in the disastrous consequences that must result therefrom; and that both the British and French Governments earnestly desired to see the establish-

ment of a stable Government and sound Administration in Egypt, and relied upon the Khedive's steady support to the endeavours of Nubar Pasha and his colleagues to re-establish the financial credit of the country. Such a result, I said, would tend more than anything else to strengthen the position of His Highness and his dynasty; but a contrary result might seriously compromise their position.

"The Khedive listened to me most attentively, and, when I had finished, said, with evident signs of great annoyance, that it was one of the most serious and painful communications he had ever received from Her Majesty's Government, and that he regretted greatly that they should have thought it necessary to use language to him which he thought was undeserved and unjust. Hitherto, the advice given to him by Her Majesty's Government had always been dictated by evident 'benevolence' for himself and his dynasty, but now it seemed as if they had taken a 'parti-pris' against him.

"Moreover, the responsibility they sought to cast upon him for the successful result of the new order of things, and for the due entry of the taxes, was neither logical nor just, and he must entirely disclaim it. What was his present position in Egypt? He had surrendered his personal property and his personal power, and deliberately accepted the position of a constitutional prince; a responsible Ministry had been formed to advise him, and, if he rightly understood the first principle of constitutional government, it was that the Ministers, and not the Chief of the State, were made responsible under such circumstances; while, as to the entry of the taxes, he had no control or power over it, and therefore could not be held responsible for it.

"He must decline to meddle with the proper functions of his Ministers. His advice or opinion was entirely at their disposal if they chose to ask him for it, but he could not thrust it upon them unasked, and, although he quite understood that he was the person principally interested in the successful working of the new scheme, he could not interfere with the attributes of his Ministers. If they were not responsible for their own acts, what was the meaning of a responsible Ministry? Responsibility, he thought, could only attach to him if he attempted to interfere improperly in the government of the country; otherwise he must entirely disclaim it.

"I replied that.....His Highness must remember that, although he had surrendered his personal power and a constitutional régime was established in Egypt, the new order of things was in its infancy, and it was rather too early for the strict application of the doctrines of constitutional government as understood in Europe. His Highness had still all the prestige and influence of the Chief of an Eastern State, combined with greater knowledge and experience of Egypt than that of any other person."—('Egypt, No. 5, 1879,' p. 3.)

However numerous and outrageous may have been Ismail Pasha's faults, no impartial person can fail to commiserate with him in the treatment to which he was here subjected, or deny that his attitude was more dignified than that of his persecutors. The British Government and its agents on the spot had brought themselves into a position humiliating indeed—though they may have been themselves almost unconscious of it—when they called upon the Khedive to make himself their tool in continuing as many as they chose of his old malpractices, on the ground that it was "rather too early" for fulfilment of the promises made by them as regards constitutional government, but warned him that, while they alone were to profit by any success attending his work, he alone would incur all the disgrace incident to it, and that, if their plans failed, all the blame for that failure would be thrown upon him.

It was probably as the result of a compromise with his "controllers," but in the hope of weakening their hold on him, that Ismail consented to assist in further money-raising, and made a pretence of seeking support from influential natives for the fresh taxation called for, by reviving an abortive project of thirteen years before. "The Chamber of Notables, consisting of native delegates elected from the various provinces," Lord Vivian reported on 3rd January, 1879, "has been specially convoked by the Khedive for the consideration of certain important financial proposals;.....I believe the principal object is to propose the increase of the 'Okuri' land tax or 'dime,' by which the richer class of proprietors are assessed at rates below the present value of their land, which has been much improved by cultivation." The reason for this desperate measure Lord Vivian stated five days later in another letter:—

**The 1879 Chamber  
of Notables.**

"With an empty Treasury chest and a ghastly amount of debt, heavy demands impending, a serious deficit on the year, and taxes coming in very slowly, the prospect is anything but hopeful; and, with no wish to be a pessimist, I confess to very grave doubts whether the utmost financial skill can enable the country, at least for the moment, to meet all its engagements in full, which, as I have often reported, it has only done hitherto by ruinous expedients that can no longer be resorted to under a reformed Administration."—(*Ibid.*, pp. 3-7.)

The Chamber of Notables, whose "election," if more than nominal, could not possibly in the time have been obtained by any representative process, was opened on 2nd January "by the Khedive in person, in the presence of all his Ministers," that is, with the public sanction of

Sir Rivers Wilson and his European associates ; but it promptly showed itself more restive than its promoters seem to have expected. More than that, the sudden calling together of a bogus Parliament gave occasion for, and impetus to, a really popular, and in a sense national, movement which was still less expected. On 11th January, Lord Vivian wrote :—

“ There is a certain amount of fermentation in the country, as evidenced by the arrival of large deputations of sheikhs from the provinces, to protest against any pressure for the payment of taxes at this moment, and I am told that there is a probability of opposition in the Chamber of Notables to the proposition that is to be submitted to them by the Government for an increase of the ‘Okuri’ tax, which falls especially upon the richer class of proprietor. If this fermentation were natural, it would not be an unhealthy symptom, but I have good reason to suspect that it has been secretly fomented by agents, probably employed by the Khedive, and I hear from a reliable source that the leading men of the Chamber of Notables have been secretly convoked and told that the Khedive would not be displeased to see them oppose the measures of an Administration which was imposed upon him, and which was entirely in the hands of Europeans.”—(*Ibid.*, p. 11.)\*

Whatever encouragement the Khedive may have given, secretly or openly, to the native malcontents, Lord Vivian had before long to admit that the popular indignation was less artificial, and even better grounded, than he had “suspected.” Early in February he informed the British Government of an exceptionally discreditable device of its money-raising agents on the spot. This was a decree with reference to the “abadieh” lands, which, as Lord Vivian explained, were “privileged land tenements,” formerly uncultivated, and consequently “only liable to payment of the tithe, the cultivators residing on the property being also exempt from the corvée.” “This privilege,” he added, “naturally attracted the fellahs of the neighbouring lands, who, in order to escape

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\* The next sentence in Lord Vivian's letter so grotesquely illustrates the self-deception or hypocrisy more plentiful and offensive in the Egyptian Blue-books than perhaps, in any others that it may here be quoted : “Thus, in addition to their serious financial difficulties, and to the task of attempting to create order out of chaos, the new Ministry have to struggle not only with open enemies, but with internal treachery of the most dangerous description, carried on in spite of serious warning ; they can only hope to succeed under such circumstances by showing a bold and thoroughly united front ; by a courageous and vigorous policy, eschewing all shifts or expedients ; and by the strong support of the English and French Governments.”



the *corvée*, squatted in large numbers on the various 'abadiéh,' and it is with the object of checking this abuse that the present decree has been enacted"; its philanthropy having the effect of "extending to cultivators of the 'abadiéh' lands the liability to forced labour for works of public utility, but enabling them to purchase exemption from personal service by the payment of a sum of money representing the value of the number of days' labour for which they would be liable." In other words, the fellaheen who had hitherto found exemption from slavery in these uncultivated "abadiéh" lands, which to them were "cities of refuge," were made liable to the *corvée*, unless they were rich enough to pay an equivalent for it.

Yet more provocative of public indignation, seeing that it affected a higher grade of the population and involved wider interests, was the arbitrary treatment of the Egyptian army, which led to much besides what Lord Vivian called "a serious military riot" on the 18th and 19th February, 1879, and of which he reported as follows on the 20th:—

"I had of late received several warnings that serious discontent had been created in the army by some recent Government measures of economy, and particularly by the compulsory retirement on half-pay of about 2,500 officers, who were owed heavy arrears of pay which were not liquidated when they were sent away, the sufferers being thus left in great distress, and many of them in a state of destitution. I was, therefore, prepared for an outbreak; but at length I became so convinced of the imminence of the danger that I had an audience of the Khedive, and officially called upon him to take immediate measures, if possible, to redress the evil, and in any case to repress disorder, for which I held him responsible as Chief of the State.....

"The Ministers seem not to have realised the gravity of the position, for on the 17th, the day before the outbreak took place, Mr. Wilson, in a long conversation with Mr. Baring and myself upon the position of affairs, refused to admit the probability of any such danger as I anticipated, or the existence of any serious discontent, and evidently considered me an alarmist; while actually only half an hour before the outbreak occurred the Minister of the Interior came to call upon me, and ridiculed the idea of its possibility. However, on Tuesday, the 18th instant, at about noon, I received two messages in quick succession that Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson had been mobbed by a crowd of officers armed with swords, taken out of their carriage, and dragged off to the Ministry of Finance, where they were shut in by the rioters, who had cut the telegraph wires. I immediately galloped off to the Palace and informed the Khedive, urging him to repair to the spot at once."

This Ismail did, and by his influence order was soon and easily restored, except that the turmoil and some rowdyism continued for a day and a half. "But for the Khedive's presence," said Lord Vivian, "the affair might have taken much more serious proportions," and he deplored "the resumption by the Khedive, under the force of circumstances and for the protection of public order, of no small portion of the power which it was hoped had been wrung from him for ever."

**Ismail's  
Defiance.**

To Lord Vivian's chagrin, when he and the other consuls went to accord formal and grudging thanks to Ismail for his assistance :—

"He begged us plainly to inform our Governments that he could no longer accept the position in which it had been sought to place him, of great responsibility, without any corresponding power or authority. The present outbreak, of which he, the Chief of the State, had received no notice or warning whatever except through me, and which could never have occurred had he been kept properly informed or been faithfully served, showed how his authority had been sapped and undermined. He left us to say, from what we had seen that morning, whether any other sufficient authority had been put in its place. He referred to the serious and growing discontent in Upper Egypt, and to the disorganisation of all authority throughout the country, and he distinctly warned us that, unless his position was changed, and his proper share in the government restored to him, he would not be answerable for the consequences. As I was leaving the room he added to me that he could not retain Nubar Pasha in his service after what had happened."—(*Ibid.*, pp. 26, 27.)

Nubar Pasha was accordingly dismissed by the Khedive, and the British agents in Egypt, while protesting against this as well as other assertions of his independence, did not venture to insist upon the reinstatement of the wily politician who had, for the time, thrown in his lot with them. But the discreditable and unprofitable quarrellings and plottings that ensued only hastened the overthrow of Ismail and his replacement by his son Tewfik, which took effect on 26th June.

In the interval, at the instigation of Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Balignières, the Chamber of Notables had been summarily dissolved, and, in retaliation for this arbitrary proceeding, a new Egyptian Ministry had, on 8th April, been formed, with Sherif Pasha as President of the

**Nationalist  
Developments.**

Council and Prime Minister, and two natives as substitutes for the British and French Controllers. At a memorable meeting of the European consuls, summoned to the Palace on the following day, the

Khedive pointed out that this course was rendered necessary by the popular demand for "a purely Egyptian Ministry, which would be responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, in the mode of election of which certain modification would be made." Sherif Pasha, moreover, stated that "His Highness had no choice but to follow the course of action he had adopted, in order to allay the discontent which, if it had been allowed to continue, would have led to disastrous consequences"; that "this discontent among all classes of the population arose, in the first instance, from the manner in which the Chamber of Deputies had been treated, and more especially by its sudden dismissal without ever having been consulted at all"; and that "the nation saw in this an insult to their representatives, and a very painful impression was produced."—(*Ibid.*, p. 85.)

There were, of course, other, and doubtless far more cogent reasons for Ismail's reckless defiance of his European controllers than the pressure put upon him by the advocates of Constitutional Reform in Egypt, and its Reform Party was, at that time, far weaker in itself, and much faultier in its information and ideals, than we are asked by a few enthusiasts to believe. But, unquestionably, in the year of Ismail's deposition and Tewfik's promotion to the Khedivate, there was a distinct and important outburst of Egyptian Nationalism, the nature and value of which are described by Mr. Blunt in a passage which is substantially confirmed by official records :—

"It had its origin as a practical idea in the last desperate efforts made by the Khedive Ismail, when he had quarrelled with Wilson, to maintain himself in power against the consular tutelage in which he had, by his folly and his debts, placed himself. He sought to recover the moral status he had lost and the goodwill of his subjects by making to them an appeal for support, and in the spring of 1879 he proclaimed his intention of calling together an Assembly of Notables. There is little doubt that his intention was, under the cloak of a national demand, to repudiate at least a portion of the debt, and though no one in Egypt, except, perhaps, certain European residents, thought him sincere, the idea of a constitutional form of government, as a remedy for the ills they were suffering, began at that time to be popularised at Cairo. Sheik Jemal-ed-din and his school had always maintained that the growing absolutism of Mohammedan princes in modern times was contrary to the spirit of Islam, which in its essence was a Republic, where every Moslem had the right of free speech in his assemblies, and where the authority of the ruler rested on his conformity to the law and on popular approval. Ismail was condemned by the Azhar reformers on the

double ground of his being a breaker of the law and a political tyrant. In the spring of 1879 it had been much discussed among them in private how, and by what means, he could be deposed, or even, if there were no other way, removed by assassination. It was the consciousness of his double peril, both at home and from Europe, and of the opinions held at Azhar, that determined him to appear as a Constitutionalist.

"Constitutionalism, it must moreover be remembered, was much in the air just then, not only in Egypt, but at Constantinople, where an assembly had met, convoked by a decree of the Sultan, only five years before. Little, therefore, as Ismail was trusted by the Reformers, his new move was one of which they could not but approve, and it was taken up and expounded by such printed organs of opinion as had furtively begun to be established at Cairo under their direction. Apart from the Azhar, there were not a few of the high officials who at this time were Constitutionlists, notably Sherif Pasha, Ali Pasha Mubarak, and Mahmud Bey Sami-el-Barodi. Nor was this all. The Khedive's heir apparent and eventual successor, Mohammed Tewfik, had come under Jemal-ed-din's potent influence, and through him was in close communication with the Reformers, and had given them repeated pledges that, if ever he came to the Khedivial throne, he would govern on strictly constitutional lines. Ismail's latest Ministry, which lasted three months, included Tewfik and Sherif, Constitutionlists both, and they were actually in charge of the Administration when the old Khedive was deposed.

"Tewfik's accession was, therefore, greeted by Jemal-ed-din and the Reformers as a stroke of good fortune, and, though they regretted that it had not been in the power of the Egyptians themselves to depose the tyrant, they looked forward to the new régime with the confident expectation of men who had at last obtained a lever to their wishes. The new Khedive, however, like many another heir apparent when he has succeeded to power, was not long in changing his opinions, and a month had hardly elapsed before he had forgotten his promises and betrayed his friends."—('Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt,' pp. 124-126.)

#### IV. REFORMERS AND "REBELS."

Although the immediate cause of Ismail Pasha's deposition on 26th June, 1879, was Prince Bismarck's unexpected intervention in business that had for some time been left mainly in the hands of the British and French Governments, the ground for this intervention being Messrs. Rothschild's overwhelming appeal to the German Government for assistance in safeguarding their financial interests, Ismail's overthrow, sooner or later, had been rendered certain by his dismissal of Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignières from his Cabinet. The

official view of the situation was set forth in a remarkable dispatch of Lord Salisbury's, dated 18th June, in which he explained the "reformed system of government" that had been adopted at the suggestion of the Commission of Inquiry :—

**British  
Requirements.**

"The essence of it was the creation of an independent Ministry, through whom and with whom the Khedive undertook to govern, and by which his own power should be balanced. The appointment of two European Ministers was a valuable portion of this arrangement, not only on account of the eminence of the two gentlemen selected, but also, and perhaps chiefly, because their presence in the Government appeared to be, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, an important security for that Ministerial independence which was the essence of the reform."

Not only "the essence of the reform," but its whole substance, "its be-all and its end-all," as understood by the British Government and the British agents in Cairo, was admittedly the procuring from the rulers and people of Egypt, by any and every method that could be devised, of money enough to satisfy the demands of the bondholders. Therefore, as Lord Salisbury acknowledged in the same dispatch, the expulsion of Nubar Pasha and his replacement by Sherif as nominal head of the Egyptian Government would have been forgiven had it not been for "the sudden and ignominious dismissal of the two European Ministers" which followed. According to Lord Salisbury's dispatch :—

"Nothing could indicate more clearly the Khedive's resolution to suffer the existence of no power that should balance his own than the mode in which he finally disposed of the remains of the Cabinet appointed in the autumn. They were not dismissed because he differed from the conclusions at which they had arrived, or because of any alleged misconduct. They were dismissed suddenly, because the Khedive disagreed with some financial proposals contained in an incomplete draft which Mr. Wilson had communicated to him confidentially, and simply for his information.....It has become evident that any further attempt on the part of the Powers to assist the Khedive in averting the consequences of his own misgovernment can have no other effect than to make them responsible for it in future. His power to frustrate all projects of reform and his resolve to use it have been sufficiently demonstrated by events."—('Egypt, No. 3, 1879,' pp. 10, 11.)

Six weeks earlier, the Khedive, who actually invited the Powers to revive the Dual Control, and offered to recognise Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignières in that capacity, had given a different account of the position and of his objection to the reinstatement of those gentlemen in the Cabinet. "He was afraid," he said to Lord Vivian on 3rd May,

“that, considering all that had taken place, the proposal was not one that could be complied with. He would be prepared to submit to any control, however stringent it might be made, but not to the presence of foreigners in the Cabinet, who would certainly be regarded as having been imposed upon him.” And the Prime Minister spoke more emphatically. Lord Vivian reported :—

**Sherif's Reform Policy.**

“I have since had an interview with Sherif Pasha, who declared to me that, while the apology for what had taken place concerned the Khedive, who was alone responsible for any offence towards the Powers or for the breach of any of the engagements into which he had entered, the question of the reinstatement of European Ministers was one for the consideration of the Cabinet, who were determined not to allow His Highness to agree to it, even if he should be inclined to do so. They would resign and leave the Khedive to his fate if he should yield in spite of them. He said that the principles upon which the new Ministry accepted office did not allow them to agree to the re-establishment of a system which had become odious after all that had occurred, although they were prepared to submit to the most stringent control that could be devised.”—(*Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5.)

It may be taken for granted, therefore—and this is the point which most concerns us here—that when Sherif and his colleagues accepted office under Ismail Pasha on 8th April, 1879, it was their intention, with the Khedive's sanction, to carry out a vigorous reforming policy, leaving the British, French, and other Powers in practically complete control over Egyptian finances, so far as these were hampered by obligations to the bondholders and their agents, but brooking no outside interference with the internal affairs of the country.

They went so far, indeed, in the way of compromise that they drafted, or at any rate agreed to, a Khedivial Decree, dated 23rd April, instituting a Council of State, in which the Prime Minister, as President, was to be assisted by two foreign Vice-Presidents, and in which four of the eight Councillors were to be foreigners, two out of four “*Maitres des Requêtes*” being also foreigners. This body was “to consult upon all the projects of law which are to be submitted to the representatives of the nation, and require the sanction of the Khedive; to prepare the projects of law and administrative regulations in cases in which the Government will give it the right of initiative; to give advice on all questions of law and general interests, and upon all matters which the Council of Ministers may submit to it; to settle any difficulties which may arise between the Ministers themselves; to judge the acts of public

functionaries; and, lastly, to sit as an Administrative Tribunal." —(Egypt, No. 5, 1879, p. 171.)

This formal, but of course ineffective, institution of a Council of State, in which, through their "men in possession," the European Powers and the bondholders protected by them could have considerably more than their legitimate right of interference in the government of Egypt, was manifestly intended to work with and help forward the reformed Chamber of Deputies, concerning which, as Sir Edward Malet said in a dispatch already cited, "a law had been elaborated during the last days of the reign of Ismail Pasha, under the Ministry of Sherif Pasha, giving a much wider scope to the powers of the Chamber," but which, he added, "had never received the Khedive's sanction."

It may be assumed that this early attempt on Sherif's part to bring about what may be called a "Parliamentary Reform Bill" for Egypt, about which detailed information is lacking, was in the main identical with the measure introduced by him in 1832, and that, along with proposals for widening and strengthening "the powers of the Chamber," it suggested arrangements for making the Chamber much more representative in its character than was the unsatisfactory organisation set up by Ismail in 1866, which, unsatisfactory as it was, proved itself too democratic and patriotic to be tolerated by Sir Rivers Wilson and his French comrade.

Whatever may have been the purport of Sherif's Reform Bill of 1879, however, Ismail Pasha had been deposed before it could be adopted, and the new Khedive, Tewfik, succumbing easily to the flatteries and more substantial allurements of his European masters, had broken away from his old instructors at El Azhar and the friends with whom he had worked during his father's lifetime. As a result, Sherif's loyalty to his convictions caused his downfall on 18th August. On the following day Mr. (now Sir Frank) Lascelles, Lord Vivian's *locum tenens*, reported to Lord Salisbury:—

**Tewfik's  
"Absolutism."**

"I called upon the Khedive, who told me that a project for a Constitution had been submitted to him by the late Cabinet, of which he disapproved as being inapplicable to the country. The Ministry had, in consequence, resigned, and His Highness had accepted their resignation.....The Khedive went on to say that he was aware it would be said that his action was an attempt to return to the old system of personal government. He could assure me that he had no wish to do so, but at present liberal institutions and popular representation were utterly unsuited to the country, and the

Constitution which had been submitted to him was nothing more than a 'décor de théâtre.' He hoped that in time the country would become fitted for parliamentary institutions, and therefore he proposed to make no change with regard to the Chamber of Delegates, which might eventually become a really representative body. He would also consider whether it would be advisable or not to establish a Council of State. He fully understood the responsibility he assumed by undertaking the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, but there was a great deal of important work to be done which, during the tenure of office of the late Cabinet, had been neglected, and His Highness, who was himself responsible for the government of the country, had determined to take his share of the labour, and not to shelter himself behind an unreal and illusory Constitution.

"On leaving the Khedive I called upon Sherif Pasha, who said that, although he was personally glad to be relieved from his duties, as, in consequence of the obstacles which had been put in his way, his position had become most difficult, as an Egyptian he regretted the return to personal power. There were many persons, both in and out of the Palace, who would be glad, for their own ends, to see the absolute power of the Khedive re-established, but it was a real misfortune for the country if it should again fall under the rule of an absolute sovereign."—('Egypt, No. 1, 1880,' p. 65.)

Such "personal government" as Tewfik Pasha was equal to, but Ismail Pasha was too anxious for "absolute government" to accept—that is, the arbitrary rule of British and French Controllers, using the Khedive as their puppet with assistance from a Law of Liquidation and other tyrannical enactments for which he was forced to make himself responsible—lasted for more than three years. It has, in fact, and except for a brief interval, lasted to this day, with the important modifications consequent on the abolition of the Dual Control and the establishment of British supremacy under the paramount guidance of a British Consul General. But the demand for Constitutional Reform, and some approach to Representative Government, was only silenced for a time by the excess of tyranny resorted to, and that excess of tyranny naturally conduced to its revival in sturdier shape than formerly within the next two years.

There is an ominous dearth of official information about the progress of events between 1879 and 1881, except as regards squabbings over arrangements for extorting money from the people under more and more serious difficulties. Ample evidence is furnished by the Blue books, however, as to the oppressions of which the fellaheen and others were victims; "the whip and bastinado being the necessary



concomitants of every demand for the payment of their taxes"; "comparatively few persons being imprisoned for failing to pay their taxes, the use of the whip being found more expeditious and effective"; the village sheikhs, who "often sold the cattle, lands, and palm trees of some of the natives at very low prices without the knowledge of the owners," being "empowered by the Governors to deal with the natives as they thought best, provided they brought forth the money," and being "not interfered with, even if they paid over only a portion of the sums received and kept the rest themselves"; and so forth.—(*Ibid* pp. 19, 25, 118).

In all such persecutions the whole resources of Tewfik's "absolutism," backed up as it was by the British and French interest-collectors for the bondholders, and enforced in detail by Sherif Pasha's successor, Riaz Pasha, necessarily revived and intensified the widespread discontent which had been kept within bounds while there was hope of reforms being effected under Sherif's sympathetic leadership, but for which indignant protest afforded the only chance of remedy under Riaz. Perhaps it was merely by accident that this discontent asserted itself most vigorously, as it had already done in Ismail's time among the ranks of the army.

The Egyptians employed in military service had special grievances, however, seeing that not only were the soldiers recruited by force from the native population at a disadvantage as regards payment for their work and other treatment, in comparison with the foreign mercenaries freely imported, but that also native officers were persistently sacrificed to the interests of Circassian and other favourites at Court. Mutinous feelings had been growing for years among the native born or fellah officers, winked at and practically encouraged by Ismail for his own purposes, long before the military disturbance in February, 1879, which led to Nubar's overthrow, and, though he was not personally engaged in that affair, Ahmed Arabi soon afterwards became the recognised leader of the movement. Born in 1840 and the son of a small village sheikh, Arabi had risen from the ranks and worked himself up to the position of a colonel before the close of 1880. He had also become a disciple of Jemal-ed-din and Mohammed Abdu, and an aggressive member of the Constitutional party directed by the reformers of the Azhar University. Early in 1881, he was in communication with two discontented members of the Riaz Pasha

#### The Rise of Arabi.

Ministry, and even, it would seem, with the Khedive Tewfik, who was at this time, as at others, weakly scheming and plotting for deliverance from his bondage to the Dual Controllers and Riaz their tool.

"The arrest of the three colonels," as it was called, on 1st February, 1881, brought matters to a crisis, and established or confirmed Arabi in the position he was to hold for a year and a half as a great popular leader. Two or three weeks before, in conjunction with two other colonels and on behalf of their brother-officers, Arabi presented to Riaz Pasha a statement of their grievances, which Riaz, after reading it, declared to be "a hanging matter." No hanging was at that stage seriously proposed, and the malcontents had the sympathy of Sir Edward Malet, who had succeeded Lord Vivian as Consul-General, and who wrote to Lord Granville on 23rd September:—

"It sprang from the comparative, or rather total, neglect of necessary reforms in the army....., The representations then made, instead of receiving due consideration, merely aroused the suspicions of the Government, and the officers who presented the petition were ultimately dealt with in a way calculated to destroy all confidence in the Khedive and the Government although it was in harmony with the traditions of Oriental statesmanship. They were instructed to come to the Ministry of War on the morning of 1st February, to join in settling the arrangements for the military procession which was to accompany one of the Princesses on the occasion of her marriage. It had been decided at a meeting of the Council, at which the Controllers were not present, that, on presenting themselves at the Ministry of War, the three petitioning colonels were to be arrested.

"The colonels, however, had wind of the design, and, before proceeding to the Ministry, left orders with their officers to come with their men and release them if they did not return within two hours. The colonels were arrested, and released by force. The Minister of War had to escape through the window and, a few hours later, was dismissed from office by the Khedive under compulsion of a riotous soldiery."—('Egypt, No. 3, 1882,' p. 28.)

Other conciliatory measures or promises followed, and the appointment of a Military Commission to deal effectively with the whole question and to aim at securing adequate reforms "had," according to Sir Edward Malet, "apparently brought about a good understanding, which found its expression in a speech of unexceptionable character made by Arabi Bey at a banquet at the Ministry of War at the end of April." But, as Sir Edward added, "the traditions of the days of Ismail stalked like a spectre across their path, and the colonels have

never been able to understand that, through the participation of the English and French Governments in the administration of the country, the possibility of a repetition of the crimes of those days has vanished." —(*Ibid*, p. 28).

That was a pretension that, throughout the past six-and-twenty years, others besides Egyptian patriots have been unable to understand or find either warrant or excuse for, and no one ought to be surprised that the national as well as the military discontent, after something like a lull for half a year, asserted itself much more vigorously than before in the military rising of 9th September, especially as Sir Edward Malet, in the naïve dispatch already cited, acknowledged—in words appropriate to much more than the detail he referred to—that "it is a singular feature in the history of the movement that the Government was always in the dark as to the intentions of the colonels, and the colonels appear to have been thoroughly informed of every move of the Government."

**Arabi's  
Coup d'État.**

All that concerns us here, however, is the growth of the National movement, mainly under Arabi's guidance, which, though the European Controllers and Consuls were "always in the dark" about it, was growing rapidly between February and September, 1881, and, after being in full vigour for a year, was only crushed for a time by the British occupation consummated in September, 1882.

The result of the disturbance of 9th September, 1881, was that Arabi, at the head of some 2,500 soldiers of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, made what was virtually a willing capture of Tewfik Pasha and most of his Ministers, with the exception of Riaz Pasha. Thereupon, although the Acting British Consul-General and the British Controller objected, the first of the three demands submitted to the Khedive by Arabi—that Sherif Pasha should supersede Riaz as Prime Minister—was at once acceded to and acted upon; and promises were as promptly made in respect of the other two—that is, the summoning of a representative Chamber and granting of a new Constitution, and the carrying out of the recommendations of the Military Commission as regards several reforms in the army. "The three months which followed this notable event," says Mr. Blunt, in his 'Secret History,' "were the happiest time, politically, that Egypt has ever known.....All classes were infected with the same happy spirit—Moslems, Christians, Jews, men of all religions

**Its Sequel.**

and races, including not a few Europeans of those at all intimately connected with native life. Even the foreign Consuls could not but confess that the new *régime* was better than the old, that Riaz had made mistakes, and that Arabi, if he had not been wholly right, had at least not been wholly wrong" (P. 152). That statement is at variance with the information of others, and even with other passages in Mr. Blunt's book. A great deal of "unhappiness" undoubtedly continued in Egypt, and Arabi's success provoked many jealousies and increased the alarm of many besides "the foreign Consuls." Sherif's return to office was naturally resented by all who had supported Riaz in his reactionary policy, especially by the Porte and its representatives in Egypt, and was only tolerated by the British agents on account of the readiness already shown by the new Prime Minister to submit to the wishes of the Dual Control, and to separate himself from the extreme views put forward by Arabi and the other reformers.

Sir Edward Malet, who visited Constantinople on his way back from a holiday in England, discussed the situation with the Sultan on 13th September. The proposal to grant a Constitution to Egypt, he reported, "was one, his Majesty said, which he could not concede; it was not possible for him to allow a Constitution in one province of his dominions and to withhold it from others." Reaching Cairo on 18th September, Sir Edward received from Sherif eager professions of friendship for England and opposition to Turkish interference, and also of opposition to the military faction that had restored him to office, although he still considered himself loyal to the Constitutional party. "He said," according to Sir Edward, "that it was his intention later on to convoke the Chamber of Notables, which he hoped would by degrees become the legitimate exponent of the wants of the country, and by this means deprive the army of the character which it had arrogated to itself in the late movement. He said that the Notables would be a representative body on which the Khedive and the Government would be able to lean for popular support against military dictation" ('Egypt, No. 3, 1882,' pp. 24, 26). So little reliance, however, was placed by Sir Edward on Sherif's professions, or at any rate on his competence to act up to them, that Earl Granville was asked to arrange for a British war-ship to be sent to Alexandria—a request that, when complied with after prolonged correspondence with the French Government and the Porte, rendered almost inevitable, and speedily resulted in, the bombardment of Alexandria in the following June, and all the turmoil ensuing.

Meanwhile Sir Edward Malet and the new British representative on the Dual Control, Sir Auckland Colvin, were, with or without fair excuse, losing any sympathy they may formerly have felt for the Constitutional Reformers, of whom Sherif had been one of the more moderate before Arabi came to be their leader. The dispatch to Lord Granville, dated 2nd October, which has been quoted from on an earlier page, shows the animus that was even then at fever heat in the minds of Sir Edward and his colleagues. They brought about the virtual expulsion of Arabi from Cairo, where he was using his influence with the army to secure, before the promised convocation of the Chamber of Notables, "the adoption of a law giving a much wider scope to the powers of the Chamber, which had been elaborated during the last days of Ismail." And, the assembling of a Chamber of Notables of some sort being unavoidable, they contrived that it should be merely a revival of the very inadequate body initiated by Ismail sixteen years before, and hitherto much more serviceable in strengthening tyranny than in procuring reforms. For all that, the Chamber, when it met in accordance with "forms and conditions," as Sherif admitted, "no longer in harmony with the aspirations of the country," proved itself far more patriotic than Sir Edward Malet or Sir Auckland Colvin expected or could allow.

In issuing the decree authorising the election of delegates for the Chamber and fixing 23rd December as its first day of meeting, Sherif sought to conciliate the Consuls and Controllers by declaring that "the conventions and institutions in force, created by the financial situation, cannot be discussed by the Chamber, any more than the laws and decrees which render them binding, they being the outcome of international engagements which cannot be modified in any way without the assent of the Powers who were contracting parties to them," and that "the Chamber will fulfil its mission without injuring interests which must be respected." His statement of the subjects that the Chamber would be invited and permitted to deal with, though modest enough, indicated the zeal and thoroughness of his and his Government's intentions. On 4th October he wrote:—

**The 1882 Chamber  
of Notables.**

"My colleagues and I will devote the next three months to preparing the proposals which we shall submit to the examination of the delegates, especially calling their attention to the claims connected with taxation, to forced labour, and to loans for public works, which is a matter of such pressing interest for our agricultural population. We shall consult them

also on the institution of provincial councils. They are, so to speak, in constant and direct relationship with the soil and with its inhabitants, and their knowledge of local interests will be particularly valuable for studying the organisation and functions of these councils."—('Egypt No. 3, 1882,' p. 61.)

Before the opening of the Chamber (the actual date being 26th December) there was much brewing of trouble. Certain outspoken articles—which, however, if the extracts published in the Blue-books are fair specimens, were by no means outrageous—having appeared in the recently started Nationalist journals, a despotic Press Law was insisted on by the European Controllers and issued as a Khedivial Decree. The Government having asked the Controllers to allow enough money to be spent in effecting the reforms in the army which Sir Edward Malet had recognised as absolutely necessary, and in raising its strength to the level admitted to be requisite, Sherif was warned that no such extravagance would be tolerated. Everything that could be done to alienate Sherif and his fellow-Ministers from Arabi, and to drive Arabi and his immediate following into courses that could be represented as inimical to European interests.

If British representatives took the lead in browbeating the Egyptians in their own country, moreover, it was from Paris that, at this time, the tyrannical tactics were liveliest. On 15th December, Lord Lyons reported to Lord Granville that, in an interview with M. Gambetta:—

"He observed that the approach of the meeting of the Chamber of Notables at Cairo made him uneasy. It was, he said, impossible to foresee what line they would take. They might be moderate, support the Khedive's authority, and assist the Government in carrying into effect useful and practical measures. It was, on the other hand, quite as probable that they might make common cause with the colonels, and insist upon the adoption of the reactionary and anti-European schemes of the so-called National party. It might be taken for granted that they would be beset by intrigues proceeding from Constantinople, as well as from Egypt itself. They might weaken or even upset altogether the authority of Tewfik Pasha. They might admit or even invite the active interposition of the Porte. In short, their meeting might put an end to the present tranquility, and be the signal for a fresh and more serious crisis than that which has recently been tided over.

"In this state of things M. Gambetta thought it would be prudent for the French and English Governments to consult with each other on the course to be taken by them in common, in the face of certain not improbable events. The first and most important thing was that the two Governments should not only be perfectly united, but should make their union unmistakably apparent, both to their friends and to their adversaries in Egypt. If any one could

contrive to get his little finger in between France and England in Egyptian matters, there would be an end to all the good the Powers had done or might do in Egypt—nay, there would be an end to the co-operation of the two Powers throughout the world, which might confer so much benefit on mankind."—('Egypt, No. 5, 1882,' p. 21.)

There we have revealed to us the genesis of the Dual Note, which was not presented formally till 6th January, 1882, but the purport of which had been communicated, and backed up in divers ways, before the opening of the Chamber. The Chamber, therefore, started its proceedings, and conducted them until it was dissolved, under wholly inexcusable intimidation and coercion, and, considering its quandary, its action appears to have been highly creditable to it. A week having been occupied with necessary preliminaries, it proceeded to discuss a series of new rules for the organisation of the Chamber which had been adopted by the Council of Ministers on 31st December, and which were doubtless based on the abortive proposals of Sherif in 1879. This draft Constitution was only agreed to, however, after a month had been spent in discussions within the Chamber, and in graver disputes between the Chamber and the Consuls and Controllers, which caused the document to be ineffective. Its chief importance, in fact, is in its evidence of the self-governing capacity—in the matter of constructive theorising, at any rate—of a body of Egyptian politicians brought together in most unfavourable circumstances and exposed, while they were deliberating, to the most potent threats and the subtlest wiles that experts in European diplomacy, backed up by overwhelming force, could employ.

This document will be dealt with hereafter. At present it may be sufficient to call attention to a momentous quarrel growing out of it. Sir Edward Malet appears to have seen little or no harm in the original draft of the scheme when he transmitted a copy of it to Earl Granville on 2nd January, 1882, with the following remark:—

**The Organic Law and Budget Difficulties.**

"Your Lordship will observe that guarantees are given in these regulations for the observance of the duties of Egypt towards foreign Powers. With the exception of these restrictions, the Constitution is extremely liberal, and there is little doubt that, as time goes on, further changes in a liberal direction will be made."

On 10th January, however, Sir Edward thus telegraphed to the Foreign Office:—

"Article 31 of the new Organic Law of the Chamber authorises the Chamber to express opinions on the Budget. The Budget has two sections

—one devoted to revenues assigned to the Public Debt, the other to revenues not specially assigned. The Chamber insists on the right of voting the latter. Sherif Pasha and the Controllers consider that, if the Chamber acquires this right, the Council, and therefore the Controllers, lose their hold on the finances."

To which Lord Granville replied on 11th January :—

"Her Majesty's Government do not wish to commit themselves to a total or permanent exclusion of the Chamber of Notables from handling the Budget. Caution, however, will be required in dealing with it, regard being had to the pecuniary interests on behalf of which Her Majesty's Government have been acting."

Next day his Lordship telegraphed by way of postscript :—

"I should be glad to have a report from you by telegraph as to what will be the precise effect if the Notables obtain the power over the finances claimed by them."

The report, dated 13th January, was as follows :—

"The sanction or rejection of any part of the Budget of unassigned resources, receipts or expenditure would rest with the Chamber, which, however, by Article 32 of the draft Organic Law, cannot discuss the Tribute, the service of the Public Debt, or any charges arising from the Law of Liquidation or International Conventions. Official salaries, not regulated by contract, would be under the control of the Chamber ; so that it would be able to abolish the land survey, which is the result of no international engagement, and to dismiss many Europeans in the Administration."

From this instructive correspondence it is clear that, after they had had a week or more in which to study the proposed Egyptian Constitution, neither the British Government nor its representatives in Cairo saw anything to object to in the project, except in so far as it afforded opportunity for interference by the Chamber with "official salaries" paid to recipients not safeguarded by treaty obligations, and might lead to the dismissal of "many Europeans in the Administration" holding their offices as nominees of the Khedive in his capacity of puppet to the Consuls and Controllers, not by virtue of his headship over a Constitutional Monarchy.

The British Government and its representatives in Cairo, moreover, were, to say the least, urged on in taking up this discreditable and mischievous attitude by the French Government, whose Dual Note had been signed by Earl Granville, after much hesitation, on 6th January. On the 12th, Lord Lyons, British Ambassador in Paris, wrote to Earl Granville :—

**Gambetta's  
Interference.**

whose Dual Note had been signed by Earl Granville, after much hesitation, on 6th January. On the



"During an interview which I had with him this afternoon, M. Gambetta introduced the subject of Egypt, apparently for the purpose of expressing a very strong objection to any interference at all by the Egyptian Chamber with the Budget. He said that it behoved France and England to be very firm, lest any appearance of vacillation on their part should encourage the pretensions of the Notables to lay their hands on the Budget; and he argued that their touching the Budget must inevitably lead to the overthrow of the arrangement made by the Liquidation Commission, to the subversion of the French and English Control, and to the ruin of the Egyptian finances. Finally, M<sup>r</sup> Gambetta expressed his conviction that any explanation of the joint communication of the two Governments would serve to swell the arrogance of the opponents of France and England, and encourage them in their designs upon the Budget."

M. Gambetta was doubtless discreet in deprecating any public "explanation" of the browbeating policy he insisted upon—more, of course, because he deemed it necessary to the success of the policy he was then pursuing in Tunis, and its bearings on European politics in general, than because he had special sympathy with the European office-holders in Egypt, or even with the European bondholders. But no "explanation," probably, could have made more vigorous either the "arrogance" of the Egyptian patriots or their zeal in seeking to save their country from further spoliation and to secure for it the prime essential of national independence. Sir Edward Malet had good grounds for the warning he addressed to Earl Granville in a dispatch written on 11th January, five days before he was ordered from the Foreign Office to act at all hazards in accordance with M. Gambetta's wishes. Having already notified that Sherif had been brought over by the Controllers to agreement with their views, Sir Edward said:—

"Sherif Pasha and the Controllers General are of opinion that, if the Chamber is to have the right of voting the Budget, the Council of Ministers, and, therefore, the Control, will lose all hold over the finances. It is possible that the Chamber, if it possessed the right, might use it with moderation and good sense; but it would be a leap in the dark to confide the power to it before it has, in other matters, proved its political capacity.

"On the other hand, the Chamber exists, and will continue to do so until it is forcibly suppressed, which can only be done by intervention, and this is a last resource which the possible eventuality of the infraction of the Law of Liquidation would in no way justify.

"It is not impossible that the breach which has thus been created between Sherif Pasha and the Chamber may, if not avoided, ultimately cause His Excellency's resignation; in which case the present Minister of War

would be the popular candidate of the National party for the Presidency of the Council. But, supposing the Khedive names a Minister who comes into office on a point on which he at once finds himself at variance with the Controllers, the situation becomes extremely difficult. I confess, that, rather than that this situation should supervene, I should prefer to give the Chamber the right, and to wait till this right is abused before interfering.

"It must be borne in mind that the Egyptians have distinctly, for good or for evil, entered on a constitutional path; that the Organic Law of the Chamber is their Charter of Liberties."—('Egypt, No. 5, 1882,' pp. 39, 44, 45, 48, 49.)

Sir Edward's predictions were partly realised. The Chamber insisted on having control over the portion of the Budget which dealt exclusively with Egyptian affairs, and, Sherif having been forced to resign on 2nd February, a new Ministry was formed on the 5th, under the Presidency of Mahmud Pasha Sami, one of the oldest and staunchest of the Nationalists who drew their inspiration from Jemal-ed-din, and War Minister in Sherif's Cabinet. Arabi, who had previously been Under-Secretary for War, succeeded to the more responsible post, and used it perforce in making such preparations as he could for meeting the armed intervention openly threatened by less responsible champions of European interests in Egypt, if not as yet by the Governments and their representatives on the spot.

The Khedivial Decree, embodying the Organic Law proposed by Sherif Pasha with several alterations, was issued on 7th February, and on the next day was also issued an Electoral Law, completing the scheme of Constitutional Reform put forward by the National Ministry.—('Egypt, No. 7, 1882,' pp. 23, 65.) No effect could be given, however, to the second of these measures of primary importance or to others of lesser value to which the members paid as much attention as was possible in the now steadily increasing turmoil preliminary to the inevitable crisis which resulted in the British occupation. The Chamber was closed without ceremony on 26th March, and on 27th May Mahmud Sami and his colleagues resigned their posts as Ministers of the Khedive by way of final protest against his acceptance of the conditions imposed upon him by England and France in their Dual Note of 6th January.

But at an earlier date what is described as the Military Dictatorship of Arabi, had begun, and, all efforts at any sort of Constitutional Reform being in abeyance, no account need here be given of proceedings in which, whatever may have been his qualities as a patriot, Arabi showed himself to be deplorably lacking in statesmanship, and in which the

share taken by Great Britain, whatever its statesmanship, cannot be looked back upon with satisfaction by any who are mindful of their country's honour. Mr. Blunt, who took the lead, among Englishmen, in protesting against the treatment of the Egyptians in those days, quotes a letter he received from Mr. John Morley near the end of January, 1882, in which the latter said, with cynical truth, "Egypt, unluckily for its people, is the battlefield of European rivalries, and an honest settlement in the interests of its population will be prevented to suit the convenience of France. I don't see any way out of it. It is that curse of the world, *'a haute politique*, which will spoil everything."—('Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt,' p. 200.)

"La Haute  
Politique."

A worse curse than the overthrow of Arabi might have befallen Egypt, for, whatever were the capacities and possibilities as a patriotic reformer with which he started, his chances of honourable success and his country's prospects of speedy advantage from the system of constitutional government adapted at his dictation from Sherif Pasha's project in 1882 had been spoilt before Egypt was occupied by British troops in the same year, and many financial and other reforms and innovations that the people were not in a condition to work out for themselves, and could not elsewhere have obtained, were consequent on the British occupation.

But the political institutions that the Egyptians supposed to be within their reach, if not actually possessed by them, were wrecked. Lord Milner is by no means the only influential Englishman who, with or without official experience to offer as excuse for his opinion, has not been ashamed to complain openly that the British Government did not in 1882 break faith with the Egyptian people and the European Powers much more completely than it did, and, being then "in absolute possession of the country," did not at once "elect for the right of might," and either annex it outright or "proclaim a protectorate." As he frankly puts it:—

"It is true that even the proclamation of a protectorate would have been very little in keeping with the professions under cover of which we sent out our military expedition. But the fulfilment of the professions made by a nation in the act of going to war is not in common human practice—whatever ought to be the case in an ideal world—apt to be rigidly exacted of the same nation at the moment of victory. In the heat and flurry of a resort to arms, and under the natural impulse to justify so extreme a measure, much

is always promised which, even if intended, it is afterwards found impossible to perform ; and such non-performance is, within reasonable limits, readily condoned by the public opinion of mankind."—(' England in Egypt,' p. 26.)

As Lord Milner has satisfaction, however, in declaring, the fraudulent desires of the would-be annexationists have been substantially achieved by the " veiled protectorate " which he had a share in building up. As a consequence, the Egyptians have already been kept waiting a quarter of a century for the yet better and more liberal institutions promised to them when Lord Dufferin was sent out to devise measures for making them masters of their own affairs on "a basis affording satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity."

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## The British Raj\* in India

The invasion of India from the West, in modern times, began in earnest by way of trade and commerce. There was no preconceived intention of conquering that vast territory by any of the Europeans who first landed and made settlements on its shores, except, perhaps, for a short time by the Portuguese. Nor has there ever been a successful propaganda of Christianity in Hindustan such as menaced the well-being of China and Japan. At the beginning of the rivalry of the two principal nations of Europe for influence over the Indian courts and kingdoms the French were the statesmen and administrators, the English were the merchants and traders. Such men as Dupleix and Bussy took a wider view of Indian affairs and better understood what would be to the advantage of Indians themselves than did the English of the same period. Indians, also, were first trained to war on European principles and formed into armies of sepoy by men of the Perron and De Boigne type. Yet England succeeded in establishing her rule where France failed; because her adventurers as they gained power were supported from home, which the French were not; because the English fleets eventually obtained control

\*Raj = rule.

of the eastern as well as the western seas; and because at the critical moment the present masters of Hindustan made better use of the trained Indian levies and played upon the differences between the Indian courts with greater astuteness than their opponents.

Nevertheless, the conquest of India, mainly by Indian troops led by Englishmen, was achieved, as it were, by accident. There was no organized effort whatever. The *conquistadores* of South America and Mexico were born again in a new shape, and equally destitute of scruple, throughout the settlements granted as trading centres by the *rajahs* and *nawabs* of India. The East India Company was not in the least desirous of annexing and governing large and populous districts. On the contrary, the directors were never weary of impressing upon their representatives in India the permanent necessity of keeping their direct possessions within the narrowest possible limits. Above all, they should avoid war with their neighbors. Hostilities of any kind were injurious to business. The sole aim and objects of these advocates of profitable peace and lucrative persuasion was to secure the means for distributing enormous dividends on the shares of their Com-



pany. Aggression must be avoided, but adequate profits and commercial returns must be made. Agents on the spot took the most effective means at their disposal to satisfy the pecuniary demands of their chiefs in London and paid little attention to their prohibition of remunerative rapine. Thus was seen the marvelous spectacle of clerks and supercargoes developing into great generals and administrators of the first mark and winning an empire against fearful odds. This unexampled fashion of conducting the business of a mere trading company, taking possession of a civilized empire as a detail of business and waging great wars in order to pay huge dividends to shareholders thousands of miles away is quite exceptional on such a scale in all human history. Nothing like it had ever before been seen in the East; probably nothing like it will ever occur again.

From the first began that steady withdrawal of wealth from India to England which in one form or another has gone on ever since. Throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century, the wealthy English *nabob*, denounced by Pitt, who had returned to his own country after shaking the pagoda-tree to some purpose in his own interest, was the familiar type of the rich man of yesterday. There are the records of the East India Company to bear witness to the conduct of the fortune-hunters of that halcyon period of plunder. India was the El Dorado of the unscrupulous and cruel commercial adventurer. The legitimate proceedings of the great Company chartered by Queen Elizabeth and successfully carried on up to our

own time were bad enough. There is no doubt about that. It was no rose-water management which paid such stupendous dividends and drove the stock of the lucky shareholders to such an enormous premium. But the illegitimate business of the East was infinitely worse in every respect. Even the lowest commercial morality cannot justify the robbery and rascality which pervaded every department of English administration in India from the time of Clive's rise to power until the first Governor-Generalship of Lord Cornwallis. The praises of many of the successful freebooters have been chanted for 150 years with national pride and exultation; the effect of their depredations upon the luckless Indians who suffered from their extortions, though denounced at the time by Englishmen of the highest character and reputation, has since been overlooked and is now almost forgotten.

It is unnecessary in any case to enlarge upon the crimes of the men who plundered in this way a great and ancient civilization. Whether Warren Hastings could or could not have avoided the transactions stigmatized by Burke, but disregarded by the Indians themselves in consideration of his other qualities; whether Clive and smaller men were entitled to be "amazed at their own moderation" in the loot which they appropriated, are matters of comparatively small importance. The guilt or innocence of individuals counts for little in such a system of robbery as afflicted the provinces under immediate English control, and especially Bengal and Oudh, in the generation between 1757,

the date of the Battle of Plassey, and 1786, when attempts at reform began. What the total amount of wealth may have been which was abstracted from India and transported to India without any valuable return at the end of the eighteenth century will probably never be known. It must have been quite enormous, transcending indeed the drain from America to Europe which followed upon the discoveries of Columbus and Vespucci. The wealth thus accumulated and used in the form of productive capital in English industries, especially cotton, enabled Great Britain to obtain the lead in manufacture and commerce which gave her the control of markets in the century which followed. And the Indians themselves, who provided the means for the attainment of this commercial supremacy, suffered a second time, and even more horribly than they did from direct expropriation, by the economic consequences of their original losses.

In the seventeenth and during a great part of the eighteenth century the importation of Indian calicoes into England was prohibited on the ground that their competition would have crushed the rising home industry in similar goods. At the end of the same century, however, owing to the accumulation of riches chiefly from Hindustan, England had become possessed of a virtual monopoly of new machinery run by steam power which enabled her to undersell the whole world in textile goods of every description. English hand-loom weavers and spinners suffered seriously from the competition of the machine-made products at their own door, but their miseries

were child's play in comparison with the horrors inflicted upon the weavers of India at the same time. No protective tariff was allowed to safeguard them. Unchecked competition, free-trade in English goods in English territory, was a commercial religion. As a consequence, these poor producers of Indian fabrics saw their means of livelihood swept away from them by a process which they could neither understand nor withstand. Tens upon tens of thousands of them perished of starvation; for there was no place for them in the English society of that day apart from the one which they occupied. The foreign government made not the slightest attempt to regulate this fatal free-trade competition, and the effects of the English connection in this respect have been wholly harmful to the people of India. The fatal results of economic causes are carefully disregarded. Successful wars and continental annexations quite eclipse in interest the sad fate of the unfortunate Indian weavers who perished silently on the field of commercial war.

Effective steps were taken to check this objectionable form of the exploitation of India by England and to regularize the methods by which the dominant power in Hindustan remunerated itself from Indian resources for the services rendered to the subjugated territories. The improved system of administration was set on foot in 1786 and, after having incidentally conquered the Mahrattas, the native states which rose to great prominence on the decay of the Mogul authority, the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, finally established English administration in India in much the same

shape in which it exists today. Honesty was favored, if not insured, by payment to the Europeans employed at such high salaries that the temptation to accept bribes, or to indulge in illegal appropriation, became less and less inducive in proportion to the risk of removal and punishment. Whether the form of government thus created was suited to the character of the people, whether foreigners were capable of sufficiently sympathizing with the social system into which they had burglariously forced themselves, or whether the European ideas, laws and economic conceptions imposed upon the population were not likely to prove injurious; these were points which the new government never stopped to consider.

For 130 years, from 1786 to 1916, the official class of foreign administrators have done their utmost—alike in India and in England—to convince the world that British rule has conferred immense benefit on its subjects and that the inhabitants of Hindustan are quite incapable of governing themselves. This has never been the view of the mass of Indians themselves, ignorant, peaceful and submissive as the great majority of the cultivators may be, who constitute more than four-fifths of the entire population. And there are the great "protected" Indian states, with nearly 70,000,000 of people, to prove still that administration of India is by no means the hopeless business that Englishmen as a rule believe it to be. The Montague-Chelmsford Report, unsatisfactory as Indian radicals have pronounced it, constitutes important evidence in the case, for it bears official witness to the

necessity for wide-sweeping reform, as well as to the honest conviction that the Indians themselves must more largely share in and uphold a responsible government.

During the whole of the period referred to (1786-1916) conquest by force of arms and annexation by that means or by chicanery have gone steadily forward. Some of the military operations, always carried on in the main by native troops, exhibited great skill and courage on the part of the European leaders; though such a disaster as that of Ferozsha showed that Indian troops under Indian generals had not degenerated from the earlier days. But the most remarkable fact, brought out by those of the English administrators who were in closest touch with their subjects, was that the worst rule by their own people was preferred to the best management by foreigners. Thus, Sir William Sleeman of the old East India Company was a man so thoroughly versed in Indian languages and customs and so completely at home in Indian dress and manners that he succeeded in doing that which even the great Akbar at the height of his power was unable to achieve. He was able to put down that extraordinary semi-religious sect of stranglers, the Thugs, whose members had been the horror of all Indian travelers for hundreds of years. The capacity of disguise, the astounding coolness and courage displayed by Sleeman in the course of this triumph of detective enterprise and repression of crime have never been excelled, if ever equalled. But, in addition to this marvelous performance, Sleeman was one of the

ablest and best of the Company's civil servants. Naturally, too, he was loyal to British rule.

Yet what does he tell us of a specific instance with which he was familiarly acquainted? Native rule in the great province of Oudh was in every way abominable. It is doubtful whether in time of peace any worse tyranny was ever seen in any part of Hindustan. Robbery, torture, the most fiendish barbarities of every kind, were inflicted daily upon the wretched inhabitants. If ever interposition by a neighboring state under peaceful and law-abiding foreign control could appear not only justifiable but inevitable, this was such a case. Interposition and annexation, therefore, actually took place. What followed? Though all this anarchy and misgovernment were suppressed, and life and property were secure under English law and justice, the people were bitterly opposed to the change, which seemed to foreign eyes to be so much for the better. Amid all these horrors, so shocking to Europeans of the nineteenth century, Indian habits, Indian customs, and Indian laws were in the main upheld. The land-tax was roughly and not unreasonably assessed and levied, the rapacity of native money-lenders was checked, the existing legal methods were simple and generally understood.

To give Sir William Sleeman's own words: "There were neither accumulating arrears of land revenue nor ruinous back debts to weigh down the proprietors; there were no unsatisfied decrees of Court to drive debtors to hopeless despair . . . arrears were remitted when the impossibility of pay-

ment within the year was clearly demonstrated. . . . There could be no black despair in those days of change-ful misrule." Never was there a more crushing exposure of the idea that honesty of administration and peace within the borders of a subject country really justified foreign domination. "The people," so this master of Indian affairs openly declared, "the people generally, or at least the greater part of them, would prefer to reside in Oudh . . . than in our own districts, under the evils they were exposed to from the uncertainty of our laws, the multiplicity and formality of our courts, the pride and negligence of those who preside over them. . . . I am persuaded that if it were put to the vote among the people of Oudh, ninety-nine in a hundred would rather remain as they are, without any feeling of security in life or property than have our system introduced in its present complicated state."

This was in 1856. Two generations have passed since then and the system is more complicated than ever. No fewer than twenty-five thousand new laws were put on the statute-book in the first ten years of this century alone!

Annexation, therefore, to the British Empire in India has never been welcomed by the people annexed. Yet the direct government of Englishmen who did not interfere with Indian habits, but did their best to insure honest and prompt judgment in case of difference and used their authority to restrict economic hardship and to secure fair play, has often been immensely popular. Such men are never forgotten by the inhabitants of the

provinces over which they have once exercised their benign sway. Whole districts would turn out to welcome them, men, women, and children would cover them with flowers and chant their praises when they returned after the lapse of many years. This one-man rule called, of course, for thorough knowledge of the country and the language, as well as long and continuous residence among the people themselves. But such instances of individual success were not rare under the Kumpani Bahadurs. The servants of the Government who were given appointments found themselves at the early age of seventeen or eighteen thrown among a strange population and often entrusted with powers which rendered it imperative that they should become thoroughly acquainted with those over whom they were placed. It is creditable to our race that after the early days of rapine and rascality so many were successful under such trying circumstances.

Moreover, the East India Company itself, though it kept up a European and a powerful Indian Army, was not lavish in its expenditures; nor, in spite of all drawbacks and the general objection to the new methods gradually gaining ground, was it regarded with hatred by its subjects. The drain of produce without return from India to England was trifling in Company days, compared with what it afterward became. Some of the most capable of those who rose to high appointments remembered what India had been and might be again. A few saw that European domination could be only temporary and endeavored to prepare their countrymen for the

withdrawal which they knew sooner or later was inevitable. But the general opinion both in India and England was that the Indians, split up into many races and peoples, with at least four antagonistic religions professed by millions of people and with the caste system which shut out whole sections of inhabitants from any close contact with one another, were quite incapable of common action against the foreigners, however much they might dislike their rule. The great past of Hindustan was already being forgotten in any estimate of the future of the Empire. Already it was taken for granted that Europeanization was the one thing needful to make of India a greater empire than ever before, and thus to increase the power and wealth of England.

Yet many hundreds of years before the nations of India had been a collection of wealthy and highly civilized people, possessed of a great language, with an elaborate code of laws and social regulations, with exquisite artistic taste in architecture and decoration, producing beautiful manufactures of all kinds and endowed with religious ideas and philosophic and scientific conceptions which have greatly influenced the development of the most progressive races of the West. One of the noblest individual moralists who ever lived, Sakya Muni, was a Hindu; the Code of Manu of the ninth century before the Christian era is still as essential a study for the jurist as the Laws of the Twelve Tables of the Institutes of Justinian; Akbar the Mohammedan was the greatest monarch who ever ruled the East; while even in later times nations over

whom the English held supremacy have proved that there are among them no unworthy descendants of the authors of the Vedas, of the Mahabharata and Ramayana, of the architects of the Taj Mahal and Bÿapur, of Toder Mull and Nana Furnavis, of Baber, Hyder Ali and Runjeet Singh. Nevertheless nine-tenths of what has been written about India in England is so expressed that we are led to believe stable civilized government in Hindustan began only with the European Raj and that nothing short of wholesale Europeanization can save Hindustan from permanent anarchy.

It is now recognized that the revolt, which goes by the name of the Indian Mutiny, was in reality a national rising against the growing extension of European domination. The native troops of the East India Company were roused against their officers by misrepresentations calculated to outrage the dearest feelings and prejudices of soldiers of all creeds and castes. But the scope of the upheaval went far beyond the army itself. A considerable part of India was directly hostile to English rule, so far as the more intelligent and well-to-do classes were concerned. The plans of the leaders were all laid; the discontent upon which they could reckon was widespread; the recent refusal of the ancient right of adoption by the Government and seizure of the territories of Indian chieftains on that ground had alarmed all the princes; the date of the attack had been well chosen, being a hundred years after the manifest superiority of the white man in arms had been first admitted;

the secret of the conspiracy was on the whole, well kept. Yet the insurrection failed. This circumstance resulted from several causes. The original mutiny at Meerut began before it was intended, and before the general outbreak which was to follow, or to occur simultaneously, was ready. The agricultural population over the greater part of India did not sympathize sufficiently with the revolt to oppose actively, or even passively, the operations of the Government troops; the vast number of camp followers required to enable an army to move under European leadership never fell short for want of recruits. The insurgents developed no really capable leader, with the exception of Tanjia Topee and that famous princess, the Ranee of Jhansi, who were not sufficiently supported. On the other hand, the English soldiers and officers exhibited wonderful vigor, courage and endurance, while individual civilian officials of the Government who had long been in the country and were well known and trusted by the Indians under their control kept quiet whole districts that would otherwise have joined the insurgents. But above all, the English Government owed its successful suppression of the outbreak to the fact that the Sikhs, the great people who had most recently been defeated by the foreign rulers, took sides with their conquerors and rendered invaluable assistance which ensured victory to the Europeans. The rising was, therefore, put down, and all Hindustan came under the direct or indirect control of the British Crown.

India with its 300,000,000 inhabitants has for sixty years been under

the management of the most extraordinary and fortuitous system of foreign domination known to the memory of man. The rulers of these people come in succession from without, educated, until their appointment at the age of more than twenty-one, in accordance with methods as remote from, and as irreconcilable with, Asiatic ideas as it is possible for them to be. Alike in their work and in their pleasure, they keep as far aloof as possible from the people they govern. Very rarely do they marry Indians: still more rarely do they settle permanently in the country. The head of the Government, who himself is brought out fresh from Europe and entirely ignorant of India, does not remain in office for more than five years. His subordinates return "home" frequently for their holidays and go back to England permanently, to live on a considerable pension, after their term of service is completed.

I quote an English writer who knew India well:

"Not only is there no white race in India, not only is there no white Colony, but there is no white man who purposes to remain. . . . No white man takes root in India, and the number even of sojourners is, among these masses, imperceptible."

The longer this reign of well-meaning but unsympathetic carpet-baggers continues, the less intimate do their general relations with the Indian people become. The color and race prejudices, which existed not at all, or to a very small extent, at the beginning of English dominance, now become stronger and stronger every year. In India itself men of ancient lineage, be-

side which the descent of the oldest European aristocracy is a mushroom growth, are considered in the presidency towns, as well as on the railways, unfit to associate on equal terms with the young white bureaucrats just arrived in the country. And these "competition-wallahs," owing their position too often to desk work, though clever enough in their own way, lack nowadays that indescribable quality of the *sahib*, or "gentleman," which is nowhere so instinctively recognized as in Asia.

And what is this alien supremacy based on? Upon fifteen hundred foreign administrators isolated among the hundreds of millions of Indians—*rari nantes in gurgito vasto*—not one of whom, with the best intentions in the world and even enjoying a far closer intimacy with his subjects than a modern civil servant claims, can exercise any lasting influence on the people committed to his charge. These are the district officers, the real rulers of India, upon whom the true responsibilities of government fall. Each is in his way a governor, and these are some of his duties. He is: collector of the land revenue, registrar of the landed property in the district, judge between landlord and tenant, ministerial officer of the courts of justice, treasurer and accountant of the district, administrator of the district excise, ex-officio president of the local rates committee, referee for all questions of compensation for lands taken up for public purposes, agent for the Government in all local suits to which it is a party, referee in local public works, head of the police, ex-officio president of municipalities, and magis-

trate, police magistrate and criminal judge.

It is utterly impossible that all these multifarious duties, with the endless reports that have to be written and the questions with superiors which have to be discussed, can be performed satisfactorily. Many of the ablest of the civil servants themselves admit that this is so. Constant transfers from district to district and frequent furloughs to Europe make things worse. Here again is a criticism by an English official in India when the situation was by no means so critical as it is today. This official himself was brought into contact with Indians much more familiarly than most of his countrymen. His family had been connected with India for more than a century and furnished two or three directors to the East India Company:

"It is in general sadly true that Englishmen in India live totally estranged from the people among whom they are sojourning. This estrangement is partly unavoidable, being the result of national customs, language and caste. . . . The English contempt proceeds . . . from English ignorance, and English ignorance is accomplished, as so often happens, by English bluster. Those who have known the natives well have generally liked them, even loved them, and their love has been returned with a remarkable wealth of unselfish affection.

The natives are worth the effort of knowing . . . but because . . . it does take some effort to know them, most Englishmen keep aloof. This tendency to aloofness is increasing. . . . Certain it is, the natives consider the *sahib* is not what he used to be—certain, too, that English rule is not popular. This is the great social calamity attending our Raj in India . . ."

Over and above the Europeans immediately concerned in administration there are many more occupied directly or indirectly in other branches of government affairs. But in all India there are no more than 200,000 Europeans and Eurasians altogether. These are, for the most part, entirely outside the official class. The British Empire in India consists, therefore, of the bureaucrats spoken of above, and in pre-war days 75,000 English troops, of which 50,000 at the outside can be reckoned as fit for active service at any given moment. A peaceful upset of the entire English system is quite possible, seeing that, as has been truly said, the Indians themselves have only to refuse to work for Europeans and the whole white empire would be brought to an end within a month. Certain it is that if the agricultural population, hitherto so quiescent, with the exception of a few local outbreaks, were to become even passively hostile, British rule would soon be a thing of the past.



## The Economic Basis in India

The agricultural population of India is the most poverty-stricken mass of human beings in the whole world. It constitutes four-fifths of all the inhabitants of Hindustan. The true test of the prosperity and good government of any country is not the average income of the whole population in which the great revenues of the millionaires, big landowners, and heads of industrial or transport combines balance the wages received by the artisans, small cultivators, or agricultural laborers, but the real well-being of the whole of the producing class. Now this in India is steadily deteriorating decade by decade and year by year. Mr. William Digby's book with the misleading, ironical title, *Prosperous British India*, which I implored him not to use, was published in 1901. It contains the most terrific indictment of British rule in Hindustan that has ever been penned. The facts and statistics contained in its 650 pages are drawn almost entirely from official reports, documents and calculations. The whole constitutes a social, economic and political investigation of surpassing interest and value. One categorical statement alone is enough to condemn our entire system:

In the year 1850, seven years before

the Mutiny, the estimated income of British India was 2d. per head per day.

In the year 1882—a generation later—the officially-estimated income was 1½d. per head per day.

In the year 1900 an analysis of all sources of income gives less than ¾d. per head per day.

What the real impoverishment of the Indian *ryots* or agriculturists of British India actually must be, when the incomes of all the well-to-do population in the cities and districts of Anglo-India are deducted can scarcely be imagined by the inhabitants of the poorest European state. Mr. Digby's previously quoted 12/6d. per head per year is probably now an over-estimate. Can we wonder that a sense of deadly dullness, depression and ruin weighs on that portion of Hindustan where Europeanization is supreme? It is not poverty alone that occasions this sad state of things. Everything tends in the same direction. Native Indian arts are disappearing, education is neglected, there is no life or pleasure available, no outlet for energy, no hope for change, no variety of occupation. An American traveler in a recent book full of glorification of Europeans and European rule has de-

scribed the vivacity, color and magnificence of the court of Udaipur in all its ancient splendor, side by side with ancient indifference, ancient abhorrence of the new, ancient customs and ancient devotion to a sacrosanct ruler possessed of a pedigree directly traceable for thousands of years. And then he cannot restrain himself from comparing this un-Europeanized relic of the past, still holy to scores of millions of Hindus, with the squalid monotony and unending sadness which pervades British India.

It may be, as the majority of Englishmen and European visitors believe, that India can never emancipate herself without external aid from her present position of subjugation. Whether it is consonant with the claims of England to be the champion of justice and freedom in other directions that she should keep what might be a great and glorious empire under her permanent and ruinous domination, is a matter which must soon be considered. It will be seen also that, of late years a school of extremists, as well as a school of moderates, has grown up, both of which demand self-government and in the long run complete emancipation of India.

When these criticisms on European rule are made and evidences of continuous and increasing poverty of the ryots are adduced, the defenders of the British Government bring forward a number of facts and figures which are conclusive of prosperity to the ordinary western mind. Against the contention that so far 150 years of European management and teaching have produced no enduring effect on the Indian mind and have introduced no

permanent improvement in Indian affairs, one great argument also is used. "See," say the optimists, "how we have introduced everywhere the blessings of peace! From the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from Burmah to Bombay, wars have ceased, internecine struggles are unknown, religious riots are at once quelled, life and property are secure as they never were before in the history of Hindustan. The Pax Britannica is more profound and affects a larger population than the Pax Romana ever did. Here all these numerous nations and peoples and religions and castes dwell together, if not in unity, at any rate with trifling differences. Hindu and Mohammedan, Sikh, Pathan and Marhatta go on from year's end to year's end with no more than local squabbles which are easily suppressed. Raids and organized robberies are almost equally unknown. Justice is administered without the suspicion of bribery or the possibility of dangerous disputes out of court because of the decision reached. The military caste no longer exercises any influence. Peace, the greatest boon that can be vouchsafed to the hundreds of millions under the suzerainty of the Emperor-King, is secured so long as the British remain masters of the country. But only so long. Let that superior power be once withdrawn, or even greatly shaken, and all the anarchy of the past will be revived, all the infinite passions now kept down will be re-awakened."

Such is the tone not only of Englishmen but of most Europeans who visit the country and rush by rail through the Europeanized towns and

cities and garrisons and health resorts which constitute the white man's India. That the horrors of peace may in many ways be worse than the horrors of war is a consideration which never enters their minds, still less affects their judgment. All the tests of prosperity which they are accustomed to apply are fulfilled. Population is increasing rapidly: poverty is favorable to generation. Exports are rapidly increasing: what is the amount of return? Railways have been built over a large portion of the country: transport does not necessarily increase wealth. Vast irrigation works have been built: old irrigation tanks have been allowed to decay throughout huge areas and the charges for the new water are heavy, rendered still heavier by the enforced use of government water to the exclusion and shutting down of Indian wells. These counterbalancing drawbacks are never noted. Foreign-manufactured peace is a doubtful benefit at best.

All that is great and admirable in India was created during the period when she was an independent empire with groups of fine provinces, first under local rulers, and then under the central domination of the Moguls. With all their drawbacks and hideous cruelties, they lived in the country. Though they themselves were Moham-medans, they employed Hindus of all races in the very highest posts as financiers, as administrators and as generals. Asiatics ruling Asiatics, they knew how far it was safe to go without bringing ruin upon the people and being overthrown themselves. Even in their period of decay, when debauched incompetents sat on the

throne of Akbar and Aurangzib, the rule which they maladministered was native rule and the dull despair of the upright foreign despot never settled like a miasma on the country. The Mahratta *chouth* levied by the bold reavers of the Deccan and the West was hard to bear. But impoverishing as it was in its degree and in its time, it reckoned as child's play beside the persistent transfer of wealth to a far-away country year after year, which was the inevitable consequence of costly foreign rule. Moreover, all home-bred rulers encouraged native art and native manufacture, and the best of them, such as the great Bah-muny dynasty of Byapur, developed local irrigation works to such an extent that the menace of famine in the irrigated districts became more and more remote. There were terrible famines indeed in some districts and provinces in these days prior to European invasion. But they came at long intervals and in the periods between them there was no steady, continuous reduction of the amount of food available for the people whose persistent labor provided the whole of the agricultural produce.

Peace, in fact, may be purchased too dear, and law and order, however admirable theoretically, may become a grinding economic and racial tyranny if enforced by foreigners who fail to comprehend alike the nature of the many diverse races beneath them and the best means of raising them to a higher level of prosperity—foreigners who never remain permanently in the land they control. Suppose a succession of capable Chinese mandarins, supported by a Chinese army and an

Italian army under Chinese officers had ruled in Italy, imposing peace, perfect peace, upon the City Republics a few hundred years ago. They would have imposed also Chinese ideas of morality and justice, industry and culture—and very high ideas they were and are—upon the countrymen of Dante and Petrarch, Borgia, Machiavelli and Leonardo da Vinci. But is it not clear that the world would have been infinitely poorer for the repression of Italian initiative and for the sombre, dead level of monotony and dependence thus brought about? Would not Italians have been justified in resorting to any means in order to relieve themselves from such a rule, however high-minded and well-intentioned its Chinese representatives in Italy might have been? Would not this have applied in like manner in England during the Wars of the Roses, to France at the time of the anarchic and bloody struggle between Catholics and Huguenots and even to Germany when devastated by the Thirty Years' War? There can be but one honest answer to these questions. Yet India was never in a more perturbed condition, never suffered more from internal misrule or attacks from without than the different countries named at the above periods. And the rigidity and miscomprehension of Chinese domination in Europe could scarcely under any circumstances have been greater than the rigidity and miscomprehension of European despotism in Hindustan.

It was the economic pressure which perhaps first roused the more intelligent Indians to a full comprehension of the permanent injury which persis-

tent Europeanization was inflicting upon India as a whole. And this was first appreciated and forcibly expounded not by Indians themselves but by English merchants and administrators in the days of the East India Company, long before the Mutiny or the National Revolt of 1857 had openly manifested the discontent that existed on other grounds. Thus even at the time when the real significance of the yearly drain of produce to England from India was far less, alike in amount and effect, than it is today, an Englishman, Mr. Montgomery Martin, pointed out what the wholesale transfer of Indian wealth to England really meant. During the early times of unregulated appropriation, the amount paid away to the West, in one shape or another since legal methods had been introduced and enforced up to 1857, amounted to many hundreds of millions of pounds sterling, without any commercial return. That is to say, India had been depleted of her wealth to that extent for the benefit of England, as a consequence of European conquest and rule. Even the abolition of suttee by Lord William Bentinck, the check to female infanticide and the suppression of the Thugs made no economic amends for this ruinous impoverishment of a poor country, all the territory of which was already occupied, some of it tilled to the point of exhaustion, and some very densely populated. But this drain of produce enormously increased after the assumption of direct government by the Crown and the great extension of Europeanization in every direction.

The higher minds in the government service strongly insisted upon the great

and increasing danger of this economic policy. Civil servants and military men alike enlarged upon the ruin that was being wrought. Mr. James Geddes and Mr. A. O. Hume, Major Evans Bell and Colonel Osborne, Mr. William Digby and Mr. Knight, all in their various ways did their best to represent to the government in England and in India the irretrievable mischief that was being done. So did others. The famous Parsee, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, only too fast a friend of British rule in India, devoted himself also for many years to this question. All to no purpose. At one point, 1878-79-80, the English Government at home did appreciate what was going on, and Lord Salisbury and Lord Iddesleigh, with the concurrence of Lord Cranbrook, Lord Beaconsfield, Mr. Edward Stanhope and Sir Lewis Mallet, made the first steps toward the gradual restoration of Indian rule. A beginning had been made most successfully in this direction in Mysore in 1868 to the permanent advantage of the population. There the removal of the rigid system of taxation and the revival of the old Indian system of consideration of Indian needs at once uplifted the well-being of all the inhabitants of that territory.

But the influence of the hide-bound Indian bureaucracy and the personal interests of the middle class at home were too strong to be resisted. On the return of Mr. Gladstone's Liberal administration to power, all the preliminary reforms introduced were swept away, and from that time to this, Europeanization has become more and more the panacea for all evils, the foreign government has become even

more expensive and extravagances such as the creation of new and wholly unnecessary capital cities at Delhi and Dacca encouraged waste to the extent of many millions sterling. Naturally, to keep pace with this fatal system, the land tax is more cruelly exacted than ever and the agriculturists get poorer all the time. Compare this with the statement of Mr. Chester Macnaghten in regard to the comparative results of Indian rule:

"The fact is that under existing circumstances, a Native State under British superiors is almost an ideal of prosperity. This remark is a general one, applying to Travancore, Mysore, etc., as well as to Baroda. While the people are governed in their own simple way, the revenue is not wasted. The peace and prosperity which characterize the rural population of India are maintained, while the corruption and dishonesty which characterize native courts are checked. The system is an inexpensive one to the states which enjoy it and contains all that is best in British and native methods. I believe it is only true to assert that there is not a single Native State in India which, if so administered, will not show a surplus." And these Indian states have little if any drain of payments to Europe. Even so, there is in some of these states too much meddling by the European residents with a tendency to the current bureaucratic belief in Europeanization.

But the phenomenon of the economic drain calls for closer investigation. This is especially injurious, of course, to a poor country. It may arise to all appearance advantageously and without the additional drawback of

foreign rule, and yet be a very serious hindrance to the country which suffers from it. On the other hand, it may constitute comparatively so small a proportion of the total wealth of the country increased by the investment of loaned capital on which the economic drain represents the interest that the advances can be redeemed with ease at maturity. Both the United States and Russia have been large borrowers—the former to a comparatively small amount in relation to its wealth of late; the latter has constantly required loans. But the United States was an undeveloped country, rich in virgin agricultural soil and vast mineral resources, developed by the constant exertions of a vigorous and in the main not needy population from Europe. Railway communication afforded profitable outlet for all products and if the lines were overloaded with indebtedness the companies simply did not pay. As the wealth of the vast territory grew, the loans and bonds were bought back or the capital borrowed again at a lower rate of interest for new enterprises. It is the same with municipal borrowings and state loans issued in Europe.

With Russia the case has been different. The country outside of Siberia was already settled, the people were poor and ignorant, the development, except in the oil regions, did not keep pace with the borrowing; the body of agriculturists, mostly emancipated serfs, got no richer. Therefore the unwieldy Muscovite Empire with all its wealth of undeveloped resources could not sustain the drain of produce to the West for the interest on the money that was advanced. Thus it be-

fell that even more and more loans were needed to keep up payment of interest. Prior to the war of 1914, Russia was fully £150,000,000 behind in the payments to meet her liabilities to western creditors, mostly French. Her yearly debt on this account was not far short of £55,000,000 sterling. So, as shown in her account of exports and imports, she was nearly three years overdue in meeting her indebtedness—a deficit which had been covered by all sorts of shifts. Russian agriculture, the mainstay of that great country, had lost instead of gained strength, as was clearly shown by Professor Miliukoff. The difference between the United States and Russia is obvious. In one case the imported capital had enhanced and quickened production far beyond the amount needed to pay the yearly interest: in the other case the interest represented for the most part a deduction from production, which had been little increased, if not diminished, in agriculture and not sufficiently expanded in manufacture and mining. Hence, the drain of Russian produce has been ruinous and the inevitable outcome is bankruptcy and repudiation.

But the real economic condition of India is far worse than this. Putting aside the profits on tea-planting, gold-mining and other enterprises established and financed by English capitalists, which cannot be fairly regarded as withdrawals from actual Indian wealth, seeing that these ventures are purely European, the total amount of the payments made in produce from India to England without any commercial return is not less than £30,-

000,000 every year. This is an understatement of the truth. Moreover, the drain does not apply to the so-called Native States—that is to say, to states under British protection but not under direct British rules. These great provinces not only are relatively wealthy, in comparison with the rest of poverty-stricken Hindustan, so far as their agricultural population is concerned, but also they have practically no remittances to make to England on civil and military account and little for interest on railways. Their trade, therefore, is relatively greater per head of population. But, as the English trade returns are made out, it is practically impossible for any outside investigator or critic to discriminate correctly between the commercial dealings of British territory proper and those of these great Native States which contain considerably more than one-fifth of the entire inhabitants of Hindustan. The drain of produce, therefore, is derived not from the 315,000,000 of people in India, but from 245,000,000: the 70,000,000 in the protected territories should be deducted.\* And the trade of these 70,000,000 constitutes in reality much more than one-fifth of the total trade. This is a very important fact in considering the economic effect of European rule in Asia and it is not generally recognized. For, in the calculations which follow, it must always be borne in mind that certainly not less than one-fourth of the trade imports and a very much greater proportion of the treasure imports go into the countries which are not under direct British rule—the

great Native States with 70,000,000 inhabitants.

Under pre-war conditions the total amount of exports by sea of private merchandise of Indian products from British India and the Native States together for the five years 1909-10 to 1913-14 was £731,657,602, or an average of £146,331,520 a year. The total amount of imports by sea of private merchandise during the same period of five years was £486,157,310. Here is a difference of not less than £245,000,000 between the exports and the imports of private merchandise, or a yearly disparity of £49,000,000 without return in the form of merchandise, although the imports for 1912-13 and 1913-14 reached the exceptional figures of £107,000,000 and £122,000,000 respectively. Against this extraordinary discrepancy the almost equally remarkable import of treasure, ranging from £25,000,000 to as high as £41,000,000 in the years under consideration, is naturally put forward by official apologists for India's desperate poverty. But the Government of India has always refused to make any distinction between the exports and imports of the Native States and those of British India. I am quite confident that at least half of the imported treasure, as well as a great deal more than their proportional part of the imports of merchandise, goes into these Native States. The yearly drain from British India of commercial produce for which there is no commercial return I put at upward of £30,000,000 a year.

If India with its vast population were even a moderately rich country this drain of produce to a foreign

\*Census of 1911.

power going on year after year and increasing rather than diminishing would be a matter of concern, especially as it has proceeded now for just 150 years. But when the amount thus calculated is extorted from the poorest population on the planet, then it is clear that the name which I gave to this process nearly forty years ago, "Bleeding to Death," represents what is being done.

Lord Curzon estimated the average income of the Indians at not more than £2 a year. Mr. William Digby put the average value of the production of the cultivators at not more than 12s. 6d. a year per head. It is inconceivable to us that human beings can exist upon such a miserable pittance. Yet out of this despicable return for constant work upon the soil the Government Land Tax, which produces the Land Revenue, deducts no less a sum than £21,000,000 a year. Moreover, the British Government insists upon this tax being paid by the cultivators before the crops are grown, and paid in silver calculated at a factitious rate. This means that while the actual value of a rupee on the markets of the world may not be more than 11d. or 1s., the defrauded Hindu *ryot* is compelled to pay his Government Land Tax in rupees at the rate of  $\frac{1}{4}$ d., or above 30 per cent. more than the rupee is worth—this, I repeat, before the crops are grown and reaped! What is the result of this? Inevitably that the cultivators are forced into the hands of the native money-lenders at rates varying

from 15 to 60 per cent. And then official apologists for the Government hold up their hands in horror at the exactions of the usurious money-lenders. The result is that the position of Indian cultivators and their families is becoming more and more hopeless.

It is preposterous to argue that irrigation is remedying this state of things. Nothing of the sort. Irrigation applies to a very small area as carried out under European engineers. Sometimes the quality of the water supplied has proved actually injurious, owing to miscalculation as to the nature of the silt it would carry with it. In other cases the charges have been in excess of the value of the water to the cultivators, who were compelled to take it and to close down their own wells in order to do so. If the soil is constantly being exhausted by over-cropping, irrigation by itself does no good. It was not an Indian but an Englishman, Mr. Thorburn, holding a high official post in Bengal, who said: "We are driving a juggernaut car of western progress over the fortunes of the people of India." The word "progress" is evidently used there in an ironical sense. Mr. Donald Smeaton, too, declared that England was working up in India to a revolt besides which "the Mutiny would be child's play." That is my own conviction.

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One pound in English money is equal to about five dollars.



## Some Books on India

Following is a critical list of books compiled on the economic and political situation in India. We recommend these to all students of Indian problems, and to those who are anxious to know the truth about India. Some of the books (those marked with an asterisk) are published abroad, but could be found in any public library in the United States. The others can be obtained through Young India bookshop, 1400 Broadway, New York City.

- |                        |   |  |
|------------------------|---|--|
| ABHEDANANDA, SWAMI     | : | India and her people   |
| *AIYANGER, S. R.       | : | Ancient India  |
| *BESANT, ANNIE         | : | The Case for India<br>How India Wrought for Freedom<br>India, a Nation                             |
| BOSE, SUDHINDRA        | : | Some Aspects of British Rule in<br>India   |
| *CHATTERJI, RAMANANDA  | : | Towards Home Rule—3 volumes  |
| *COTTON, SIR HENRY     | : | New India  |
| *DIGBY, SIR WILLIAM    | : | "Prosperous" British India   |
| *DUFF, GRANT           | : | History of the Mahrattas   |
| *DUTT, ROMESH C.       | : | Ancient India<br>England and India<br>India in the Victorian Age<br>India under Early British Rule |
| HARDIE, JAMES KIER     | : | India, Suggestions and Impressions   |
| HAVELL, E. B.          | : | The History of Aryan Rule in India   |
| *HOUGHTON, BERNARD     | : | Bureaucratic Government  |
| *HYNDMAN, H. M.        | : | Bankruptcy of India  |
| ILBERT, SIR COURTENAY  | : | The Government of India  |
| KHAN, AGA              | : | India in Transition  |
| *MACDONALD, J. RAMSAY  | : | The Awakening of India   |
| *MAHARANI OF BARODA    | : | The Position of Women in India   |
| MANN, HAROLD H.        | : | Land and Labor in a Deccan Village   |
| *MOOKERJI, RADHA KAMAL | : | Foundations of Indian Economics  |
| MOOKERJI, RADHA KUMUD  | : | Fundamental Unity of India<br>History of India's Shipping and<br>Maritime Activity                 |
| *NAOROJI, DADABHAI     | : | Poverty and Un-British Rule in<br>India  |
| *NEVINSON, HENRY W.    | : | The New Spirit in India  |

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|--------------------------|---|--|
| NIVEDITA, SISTER         | : | Footfalls of Indian History<br>Studies from an Eastern Home<br>Web of Indian Life                  |
| *PEARSON, W. W.          | : | For India  |
| RAI, LAJPAT              | : | England's Debt to India<br>Open Letter to Lloyd George<br>Political Future of India<br>Young India |
| RAWLINSON, H. G.         | : | Shivaji the Maratha<br>Indian Historical Studies   |
| *SHASTRI, SHRINIVAS      | : | Self Government for India  |
| SMITH, VINCENT A.        | : | Early History of India   |
| SUNDERLAND, J. T.        | : | Causes of Famines in India   |
| *WEDDERBURN, SIR WILLIAM | : | The Indian Ryot<br>The Skeleton at the Jubilee Feast   |

## Worthwhile Periodicals in India

### DAILIES

- |            |   |                                 |
|------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Allahabad  | : | Independent<br>Leader           |
| Bombay     | : | Chronicle                       |
| Calcutta   | : | Amrita Bazar Patrika<br>Bengali |
| Karachi    | : | Home Ruler                      |
| Lahore     | : | Tribune                         |
| Madras     | : | Hindu<br>New India              |
| Poona City | : | Maratha                         |

### MONTHLIES

- |           |   |                                      |
|-----------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Allahabad | : | Economic Journal<br>Hindustan Review |
| Bombay    | : | Young India                          |
| Calcutta  | : | Modern Review                        |
| Madras    | : | Indian Review<br>Wealth of India     |

## The Only Reliable Source

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The  
New Situation in Egypt

By  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

*A Reprint from THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN,  
September, 1908.*

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BURNS & OATES  
28, ORCHARD STREET, W.  
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# The International Peace Movement and the Present Crisis

OFFICES OF THE NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL,  
AVENUE CHAMBERS, VERNON PLACE,  
SOUTHAMPTON ROW, W.C.1.

November 20th, 1918.

## TO ALL WORKERS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

The International Movement in this country is, at the present time, faced by three facts of immense importance to the future of the world and of our people. The four years' fighting is over, and in a very short time the Congress of the Powers to determine the Peace will meet; changes of a far-reaching character in the nature of the Governments of the three great Continental Empires and vitally affecting the settlement have taken place; the war Parliament at home has come to an end, and an immediate General Election is to be held in which the Prime Minister has announced that one of the main questions before the country will be the nature of the settlement.\* It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the international movement should concentrate every effort upon the great issue of what the peace is to be. We have not reached peace yet, and the peace when it comes may be a good peace or a bad. President Wilson has declared for a good peace and the Prime Minister also demands that the peace be good, and free from the spirit of vengeance.

The National Peace Council meeting in London to-day addresses itself to all the movements that have been, and are now working for a peace that is sane, durable, and humane; reminding them that their active co-operation is essential in making known the nature of a "good peace."

All the belligerent Powers have accepted President Wilson's fourteen points as the basis for peace, save for a reservation by the Allies upon the question of the Freedom of the Seas.

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\* One of the principal issues at the forthcoming General Election will be the nature of the Peace Settlement. It will mean the settlement of the world. What are the principles on which that settlement is to be effected? Are we to lapse back into the old national rivalries and animosities and competitive

It is not, therefore, the outline Terms of Peace, but the interpretation of these Terms with which we are concerned.

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS.**—The outstanding problem of the settlement is the League of Nations, from the standpoint of acceptance of which all the problems involved, territorial, economic, and otherwise, ought to be considered. We would observe that whilst any settlement which did not utterly destroy that root cause of evil, the Balance of Power, would be no real settlement, a mere alliance of Governments might be a mere alliance of vested interests to make impossible the free growth of the new democracies. And therefore the first essential of an International Union is a democratic basis, and an inter-State diplomacy which "shall proceed always frankly and in the public view." (*President Wilson, Point 1.*)

**DISARMAMENT.**—The purpose of a league is to render the world safe for a progressive and democratic civilisation, and to rid the world of war. But no condition can be safe when military and naval force is at the disposal of rival political powers. International Disarmament is a main point in the programme of democracy.

**RUSSIA, "The Acid Test."** Peace has not yet come, and there can be no disarmament until the war completely ceases. At the present time the Allies are invading Russia and there is no clear statement of the purpose of this invasion. Yet President Wilson in his sixth point, accepted by all the Powers, demanded "the evacuation of all Russian territory," and declared with keen insight that "the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy." The Allies ought at once to come to terms with Russia and leave her to determine her own form of Government and political and economic destiny.

**CONSCRIPTION.**—We demand the total abolition of conscription in all countries as an integral part of the Settlement. No democracy is possible where the Governments of the world control the lives and liberties of the whole of the citizens. No League of Nations can last which is faced by conscripted national armies. Conscription and a free world cannot live together.

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armaments, or are we to initiate the reign on earth of the Prince of Peace? . . . What are the conditions of Peace? They must lead to a settlement which will be fundamentally just. No settlement which contravenes the principles of eternal justice will be a permanent one. The peace of 1871 imposed by Germany on France outraged all the principles of justice and fair play. Let us be warned by that example. We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to override the fundamental principles of righteousness.

Mr. Lloyd George to his Liberal supporters, Nov. 12, 1918.

*ECONOMIC FREEDOM.*—Any policy of economic exclusion would be fatal to the hopes of an enduring peace based on a League of Nations. And a peace which maintained an economic war after war would be utterly illusive. President Wilson's third point against economic barriers, with which the principles of the Paris Economic Conference are inconsistent, is vital to the Settlement.

There are three grave difficulties in arriving at a durable peace, and it is for the international movement frankly to face them.

These are :—

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

THE REALITY OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

THE GERMAN COLONIES.

*FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.*—It is clear that this is a problem to be closely associated with that of the League of Nations. The question as to whether the freedom of trade from capture in war-time would have been of greater advantage or disadvantage to the Allies in the war may be a matter of doubt. While no country is more open to the weapon of starvation than a highly-populated island, the demand for a change very naturally appears to our countrymen as a demand for a weakening of our naval power and hence of our national security. It does, therefore, appear that this question cannot be effectively dealt with apart from the League of Nations, international Disarmament, and Economic Freedom which alone will guarantee that security which is commonly supposed to rest upon unchecked armed national force.

*REALITY OF SELF-DETERMINATION.*—We rejoice that the peoples of the Continental Empires are finding at last their freedom to determine the nature and form of Government under which they will live. Especially our sympathy goes out to the Polish people after their long endurance of dismemberment and tyranny. But if this principle of self-determination is to be applied with any sincerity to Poland, to the Czecho-Slovaks, and to Jugoslavia, it cannot, for example, be denied to Alsace-Lorraine, to the proposed Italian acquisitions, to Russia, to India, and to Ireland. To apply it to the territories of the Central Powers and to deny it to our own is not to seek settlement, but the spoils of victory, and to plant new and dangerous seeds of war.

*THE GERMAN COLONIES.*—The international movement stands for the internationalisation of tropical Africa. The right solution is to take away from all nations the power to continue the iniquity of the selfish exploitation of black Africa. All tropical

Africa should be governed for its own interest and development by an International Commission under the League of Nations.

These are some of the outstanding problems of the settlement now before the country. The General Election is imminent. We urge upon you that individually, and as organisations, you see to it that every candidate in your division be faced with the questions below. Do not be content with writing. Go and make sure that the questions are answered fully and frankly. And make a public record of the answers. For upon the Parliament the electorate now chooses may depend the whole future of the modern world. We urge upon you to demand clear answers to the following specific questions :—

1. Will you insist upon a constitution for the League of Nations involving a real control by the Peoples and adopted as an integral part of the Peace Treaty?
2. Will you insist on International Disarmament as an integral part of the Settlement?
3. Will you support the demand for the prompt evacuation of Russia by the Allies?
4. Are you in favour of the abolition of Conscription?
5. Will you support the demand for democratic and direct Labour representation at the Peace Congress?
6. Are you for economic freedom and the setting aside of the Resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference when Peace is declared?
7. Will you demand the application of the principle of self-determination to all Peoples alike?
8. Will you support the demand that the main proceedings of the Peace Congress of the Powers be conducted openly?

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Copies of this leaflet can be obtained from the Office of the Council, price 3/- per 100; 13/6 per 500; 25/- per 1,000. Carriage paid.

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LABOUR AND WAR PAMPHLETS.

NUMBER ELEVEN.

# MOROCCO AND ARMAGEDDON

By

**E. D. MOREL,**

*Author of "Morocco in Diplomacy" (cheap edition),  
just issued as "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy."*

"Our chief propaganda must thus be with the Foreign Offices of the Powers. It is they which need missionising as much or more than the heathen. They are all, through designs upon others, through their efforts to advance their own supposed interests, the great enemies of peace."

*—Rear-Admiral F. E. Chadwick, in the American  
Journal of International Law. January, 1913.*



**ONE PENNY**

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**NOTE.**

*This series of pamphlets is published by the Independent Labour Party to enable fair and just judgments to be made by those who have neither the time for long study nor the money to buy big books.*

*Its aim is two-fold: (1) To enable the reader to understand the causes of the War; (2) To prepare the way for the steps that must be taken to secure a lasting peace.*

*A list of the pamphlets in the series (which are not necessarily to be taken as expressing in every line the official view of the Independent Labour Party) will be found on page three of the cover.*

FOREWORD

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RATHER late in the day, the part played by the triangular Anglo-Franco-German quarrel over Morocco in bringing about the cataclysm which has overwhelmed Civilisation is seen to have been of capital importance.

The 1913 despatches from the French Ambassador and *Chargé d'Affaires* at Berlin published in the *French Yellow Book* on the war, as a sort of introduction to the documents registering the events of last July and August, place this truth in bold relief.

Produced with the apparent object of showing that the rulers of Germany intended to provoke war more than a year before it actually broke out, these despatches prove in the clearest way two things:—

First, that the way in which Germany was treated by Anglo-French diplomacy over the Morocco affair had aroused among all classes in Germany a profound resentment;

Secondly, that if peace was kept at that time it was due to the personality of the Emperor and to his influence over German statesmen.\*

Both the Emperor and the German Government had incurred unpopularity by their attitude. "Public opinion," writes the French Military *Attaché* "has forgiven neither them, nor us (i.e., the French). People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again." Elsewhere in this despatch the writer expresses the fear lest "the moderation of the Imperial Government will, perhaps, be powerless" to resist the consequences of a further wound to the "national vanity." The Morocco affair, we are told, in effect by the French Minister in Bavaria, had left upon the German mind the impression that the Imperial Chancellery was incapable of making itself respected abroad.† We find the French Ambassador‡ reporting that German public opinion believes itself to have suffered "a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige," the German Foreign Secretary was "the best hated man in Germany." The Emperor's admittedly pacific intentions are stated, in the alleged conversation recorded by the French Ambassador,¶ to have become affected.

I find a melancholy satisfaction in recalling that I stood, almost

\* No. 1, No. 5, No. 6. Cd. 7717.

† No. 1, Encl. 1, Cd. 7717.

‡ No. 4 id.

§ No. 5 id.

¶ No. 6. The despatch transmits an alleged conversation between King Albert, the Emperor, and General von Moltke which took place at the beginning of November, 1913. General von Moltke has since denied that the Emperor was present and also the accuracy of the report itself.

alone, at that period in endeavouring to persuade Parliament and the nation that, failing a searching and public discussion of the events of the summer and autumn of 1911, in which the conduct of our diplomacy throughout the Morocco business and the precise character of our diplomatic relations with France, should be tested in the light of accessible documents and forced into the open, an Anglo-German collision was inevitable and speedy.\*

The Morocco quarrel will, by future generations of English-speaking people, be regarded as one of those episodes in a nation's history which leave indelible traces upon its destinies, forging links of inter-connected circumstances affecting a remote posterity.

It marked a definite breach in the friendship of Anglo-Teuton officialdom, which, with occasional periods of temporary friction, had endured for nigh upon one thousand years, and which in the last two hundred years had given to the British Empire, amongst other things, a line of kings of German stock.

It marked the inauguration of the policy of secret military and naval understandings with France and Russia which, however it may have been regarded on the British official side, was in fact, and so far as the other partners to it were concerned, a policy deliberately hostile to the Germanic Powers.

Too great an emphasis cannot be laid upon this point. The secret Anglo-French military "conversations"; or, in other words, the Anglo-French military plan of campaign on the Continent in the event of a general European war, and the Anglo-French naval arrangement, had their origin in the Morocco quarrel. British foreign policy was committed without the nation's knowledge to what, personally, I consider to have been the utterly insane adventure of identifying the national interests with the "revanche" and with the "colonial" sections of French official life, and, therefore, by a fatal sequence, with the Imperialistic Bureaucracy of Russia; through the Morocco quarrel.

How swift has been the Nemesis of Europe's callous treatment of Morocco. The Moorish State was what in European terminology is described as a "barbarous" or "semi-barbarous" State, situate in North Africa, inhabited by some eight million people of Berber stock. From the European point of view it required "reforming"; and that point of view contained this amount of truth, that administrative and financial reforms had become essential in Morocco if Morocco was to survive the shock of intimate contact with the reckless expansionism of modern enterprise and with the speculative and financial element in modern commercialism. But if the Governments of Europe had been honest they could have assisted the Moorish State to introduce those changes and modifications in its administration which had become indispensable for the preservation of its inde-

\* A cheap edition of the book treating the whole story which I wrote in 1912 is now accessible: "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy: An Unbeeded Warning." (The National Labour Press, price 1/-.)

pendence. If their repeated professions had been sincere they could have collaborated in helping the Moors to put their house in order. They could, with very little difficulty, with hardly any expense, have really contributed to build up that "regenerated Morocco" which they hypocritically declared themselves to be desirous of evolving. But they were not sincere. For the diplomats of Europe, Morocco and the Moors were merely pawns in the intrigues and rivalries which make up the life of the European diplomatic world.

And so, what happened was this. With a calculated cruelty and perfidy which have seldom been exceeded in the record of European diplomacy, the rulers of Morocco were bullied, tricked, exploited, led on to borrow large sums at a usurious interest, mulcted in preposterous claims for compensation on the least provocation. Little by little, European finance dug its grip into Morocco's entrails until all national sources of revenue were hypothecated to pay interest to European bondholders. First one piece of territory was filched; then another. The authority of the Sultan was systematically undermined. Quarrels were forced upon the unhappy country on every possible occasion. Thousands upon thousands of Moors were slain. Their land was extorted and wrested from them by scandalous transactions, both financial and political. Finally, Morocco sank into bloody chaos. Its independence and integrity disappeared. It became a French Protectorate, in defiance of solemn Treaty obligations.

But note the sequel. That result was not obtained without bitter international friction. On the one side French officialdom (I will not write France, for to speak of "France" in this matter is as untrue as to speak of "England" in connection with the betrayal of Persia—the *people* are not responsible for these odious things), supported to the uttermost by British officialdom, had, for years, with incessant pertinacity, worked to destroy an International Agreement guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Morocco, which both Governments were pledged to uphold. German officialdom had striven no less energetically to prevent that Agreement, to which the German Government was also a signee, from being destroyed, not from any high altruistic motive, but for the following reasons. Because destruction of that Agreement meant the absorption of Morocco by France and the assured strangulation of all non-French enterprise in a country in which German economic interests were actually and potentially important. Because Germany had acquired a political *status* in regard to the future of Morocco, as a signee to two international Agreements concerned with that country, which she could not allow to be contemptuously thrust aside, merely because France and England had come to a private understanding.

In the final phases of this struggle, friction had become intensified to such a degree that war between France and England on the one side, and Germany on the other, had almost resulted.

We are told to-day in the French Yellow Book that the pacific disposition of the German Emperor and his Chancellor was one of the most powerful factors in restraining German feeling. But the attitude of British officialdom, of the British Tory Press headed by the *Times*, and, more than anything else, the speech delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Mansion House, had worked incalculable and enduring mischief to Anglo-German relations, in Germany. Judged from the standpoint of international ethics, Germany's *case* in the Morocco affair was based upon the preservation of the Public Law of Europe; upon the preservation of the *international* character of a problem proclaimed to be international in 1880 and again in 1906. The way in which the British Foreign Office swept aside both Germany's *international* position and her national interests in Morocco, which were concerned in standing out against the French claims, and interfered threateningly in defence of the French in what was intrinsically a Franco-German dispute caused the utmost *popular* resentment in Germany.

The Moors have lost their independence and their country. But, if it be any satisfaction to them, they have their revenge. For the legacy of international ill-will to which their treatment gave rise must count as one of the most powerful of the originating causes of a war which finds Britain and Germany at one another's throats.

## Morocco and Armageddon.

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### THE FIRST PERIOD.

The story of Morocco as it affects the review of international affairs which this series of pamphlets is intended to cover, may be divided into three periods. The first period extends from 1880 to 1903; beginning with the Madrid Convention of 1881. The Convention is a landmark in Moorish history because Morocco emerged from the Madrid Conference, a problem recognised by the Powers as a problem of an *international character*. The Conference was concerned with the *status* of Europeans and of European trade in Morocco.

At the instance of Germany—in which she was supported by England—the Madrid Convention placed the trade of all nations on an equal footing in Morocco.\*

At that moment, precedently, and until 1903, the policy pursued by the British and German Governments was that of maintaining the independence and integrity of Morocco. Both Governments desired the "open door" for trade in Morocco, and the British Government was resolutely opposed to France acquiring the Mediterranean seaboard of Morocco. British policy towards Morocco was laid down in Lord Salisbury's famous despatch to Sir C. Euan Smith in 1891.†

The policy of the French Government was wholly different. Though doing lip service to the principle of the independence and integrity of Morocco, the French Government and the French Administration of Algeria (which played a very important part in Franco-Moroccan relations) was determined upon its conquest and absorption, and steadily worked for that end over a long course of years. An aggressive Imperialism and hostility towards England were the inspiring motives of this policy. They became incarnate and active under the direction of M. Delcassé, who was Foreign Minister in 1898 when France and England were brought to the verge of war over the Fashoda incident. Fashoda was followed by the Boer war, and M. Delcassé thought his chance had come. In 1901 he made an agreement with Italy whereby he undertook that France would not interfere with the exercise of Italian "claims" in Tripoli, the Italian Government undertaking

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\* Previously Britain and France alone benefited by the "most favoured nation treatment."

† C. 6815. All the documents and facts referred to in these footnotes are either quoted from or dealt with at length in "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy."

a similar self-denying ordinance with regard to French "claims" in Morocco. Having squared Italy, M. Delcassé then turned to Spain, which had had sentimental and traditional interests with Morocco for many centuries, and made a secret proposal to the Spanish Government that France and Spain should divide Morocco between them. The projected partition gave France a substantial portion of the Mediterranean seaboard. The matter was debated between the French and Spanish Foreign Offices all through the year 1902.\* Then the British Government heard of it and put pressure upon Spain with the result that the Spanish Government declined at the last moment to ratify the arrangement and broke off negotiations.

### SECOND PERIOD.

The second period of Morocco's entanglement in the meshes of European diplomacy opens with the conclusion of a series of Anglo-French Agreements removing both old and recent causes of friction between the two Governments. The period concludes with the Act of Algeciras (June, 1906). It is notable for the first German intervention in Morocco against France and for the embitterment of Anglo-German relations which ensued.

The series of Agreements with France covered disputes over the Newfoundland Fisheries, West African boundaries, Siam, Madagascar, the New Hebrides and Egypt. Friends of peace in both countries welcomed the close of Anglo-French bickering over matters remote from the *national* interests of the French and British peoples; but to which the diplomatists had attached importance and which had perpetuated a purely artificial ill-feeling between the two countries. Alone among these Agreements, that concerning Egypt was, as it were, double-barrelled. The French Government had undertaken to abandon its policy of "pin-pricks" against us in Egypt, and acquired from us in exchange an official recognition of special French interests in Morocco. The pertinent paragraph in the Agreement read as follows:

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France more particularly, as a Power whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of any administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

The significance which might otherwise have attached to that paragraph was considerably minimised by the preceding paragraph, which read as follows:

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have *no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.*

That, at any rate, was clear enough.

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\* It has been asserted, although I have never been able to find anything in the nature of real proof, that M. Delcassé also approached Germany at least tentatively on the subject, and met with a rebuff.

The German Government appears to have interpreted it literally. The Agreement was signed on April 6 (1904). Questioned in the Reichstag on April 12, the German Chancellor (Prince Bülow) replied that he had no reason to believe the Agreement—of which he said he had had no official notification—to be directed against Germany. He added:

Our interests therein (Morocco) are, before all, commercial interests; also are we specially interested that calm and order should prevail in Morocco. We must protect our commercial interests, and we shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be set aside or infringed by any Power.

These words have often been quoted in order, apparently, to establish that the German Government's subsequent change of attitude was Machiavellian and inspired by aggressive intentions towards France and England.

But Machiavellianism was not on the German side in this instance at any rate.

*Behind the open and published Agreements there were secret ones, and those secret ones provided for the revival and the execution of the first Delcassé plan—the plan of a Franco-Spanish political and economic partition of Morocco: but, henceforth of a partition which would keep the Mediterranean sea-board of Morocco from falling into French hands.* Lord Lansdowne saw to that.

The German Government was not aware of this fact when Bülow made his statement in the Reichstag on April 12, 1904. Indeed, the Franco-Spanish partition was only foreshadowed and provided for in the Secret Articles attached to the Anglo-French arrangement. *The Franco-Spanish partition Treaty was itself not signed until the ensuing October*, four months after Bülow's speech. Hints as to its true character were given out by Reuter's Agency and indiscreet French politicians. It was doubtless through these hints that the German Government got wind of the "plot." Possibly the German secret service filled in the details.\* But, in point of fact, the actual text of both these secret arrangements was only revealed to the world *seven years later*—in November, 1911. Whether all the members of the then Unionist Cabinet and whether all the members of the Liberal Cabinet which succeeded it were in the secret, I do not know. But that M. Delcassé did not inform all *his* colleagues we have proof, because, when the secret arrangements were published in November, 1911, the Minister of Marine and the Colonial Minister, who were M. Delcassé's colleagues in 1904, declared in the French Chamber that they had had no knowledge of their existence until, like the

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\*It should be added that German suspicions had been aroused before the public indiscretions attending the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish Treaty. M. Delcassé ostentatiously omitted officially to notify the German Government of the Anglo-French arrangement, contrary to the wishes of the French Ambassador in Berlin. This was a gratuitous slight, and was doubtless meant as such.



ordinary man in the street, they had read them in the newspapers. So, as in another case which touches us even more nearly, a Foreign Minister is seen to be concluding agreements involving his nation without informing his colleagues.

For seven years the British (and the French) people were kept in ignorance of what had been done in their name, *and thus for seven years, it was possible for British and French officialdom to represent the action subsequently taken by the German Government as inexcusably hostile and aimed at driving a wedge between England and France*; whereas Germany had been humbugged and flouted and was protesting against the secret disposal of Morocco in the interests of France, Spain, and England.

No more unpardonable betrayal of the *public* interest; no more indefensible perversion of the public mind has taken place in our generation, and in the French Parliament, at least, the action of British and French diplomatists has been stigmatised as it deserved to be.\* But our own Parliament was dumb.

In March, 1905, the Kaiser—acting upon his Chancellor's advice†—paid a visit to Tangier where he was met by the Sultan's representative to whom he declared that he looked upon the Sultan as an independent Sovereign and was determined to safeguard Germany's interests in Morocco. Simultaneously the German Government pressed for a further International Conference on the affairs of Morocco. The Foreign Offices of London and Paris were very angry and opposed the project of a Conference to the last. Indeed, both the British and French Governments began by informing the Sultan that they would not respond to his invitation. The temper of the British Foreign Office may be gauged by the *Times*; the ever-faithful thermometer of Downing Street temperature. A perusal of the issues of the *Times* from May to November, 1905, is enlightening. Its threats and insults to Germany, its abuse of the Emperor, are inconceivable. Germany's right to a voice in the Moroccan settlement is scornfully and violently denied. The idea of a Conference is derided. It would be a "humiliation," a "capitulation," *for England!*

The more disposed did the French become, as month succeeded month with tension ever growing more acute, to think better of their original refusal, the more did the *Times* fulminate in the opposite direction. After a while it became apparent that the whole of the French Cabinet had come round to the idea of a Conference except M. Delcassé, who felt that his personal prestige was at stake and who declined to give way. Finally he was compelled to. Indeed, the French Premier (M. Rouvier) began friendly "conversations" with Germany before his bellicose colleague left the Cabinet in June, 1906.

An account of what had transpired at the Cabinet meeting

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\* *Vide* "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy." Extracts from the speeches of the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, M. Ribot, and M. de Lamarzelle.

† "Imperial Germany." Prince Bülow (Cassell).

at which M. Delcassé tendered his resignation leaked out. It was published, and added fuel to the flames of German resentment, which the violence of the *Times*—believed all over the Continent to be the mouthpiece of the British Foreign Office—had occasioned. M. Delcassé—so ran the statement (which M. Delcassé, perhaps unjustly, was held to have inspired)—had informed his colleagues that if a rupture occurred between France and Germany, England would mobilise her Navy, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men on the Continent. M. Delcassé improved the occasion by himself making an incendiary declaration to the *Gaulois* newspaper, the character of which may be estimated by its opening passage:

Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war, in which England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany's ports, of her trade, of her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated.

Couple this sort of thing with the attitude of the *Times* and virtually all the British Tory Press, and ask yourselves whether the German contention that the German fleet is a *defensive* measure imposed upon Germany by circumstances, is not worthy of consideration? At any rate, it is not surprising that the German Navy Leaguers should have found in these utterances the best possible kind of fuel for their agitation in favour of a "strong navy."

Being forced to shed their protégée, the *Times* and its satellites thereupon sought—and succeeded—in establishing the legend that the German Government had insisted upon M. Delcassé's fall, short of which it would have declared war upon France. The truth of the matter was obviously very different. M. Delcassé's colleagues—those who knew (if any did), and those who were unaware of the secret Treaties—agreed that M. Delcassé had treated Germany with cavalier discourtesy. They did not share his bellicosity. They thought the German demand for a Conference reasonable and internationally legal, and as their fiery associate would not modify his attitude, they got rid of him. Not a single colleague followed him in his retirement. The idea that the French Government would have shed M. Delcassé at the summons of the German Government shows an abysmal ignorance of the French character. The Frenchman is the worst possible person to threaten if you wish to make him reasonable.

The Conference was held at Algeciras, in February, 1906, and laid down in explicit terms the Public Law of Europe with regard to Morocco's future. The Act of the Conference was drawn up "In the name of God Almighty." It declared its provisions to be "based upon the threefold principle of the Sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominion, and economic liberty without any inequality."

The only privileges that France obtained were the right—shared with Spain—to lend a certain number of Officers to a

Moorish police force to keep order in a certain number of ports; that the regulations of the Act (as to customs, smuggling, etc.) should be jointly administered by France and Morocco on the Algeria-Morocco frontier, and by Spain and Morocco on the Spanish-Moroccan frontier, and that a "Morocco State Bank" should be instituted as a limited liability company, registered by French Company Law and capitalised by the various Powers. In other words, the Algeiras Act gave to the Anglo-French *public* Agreement of 1904 the interpretation which Bülow had placed upon it in his speech in the Reichstag:

### THIRD PERIOD.

The third episode dates from the morrow of Algeiras to the conclusion of the Franco-German Agreement of November, 1911, involving Germany's acquiescence in a French Protectorate over Morocco.

British statesmanship has seldom had such an opportunity of repairing an international breach as it had after Algeiras. With the Algeiras Conference a new chapter could have opened in Anglo-German-French relations. Sir Edward Grey was not responsible for the secret agreements. They were the work of Tory diplomacy. Internationally, Morocco was back again in the *status quo ante*. Germany had declined to be treated as a negligible factor in an *international* problem. It was quite clear that she intended to maintain that attitude in any development which the future might bring, and if her case was strong before, it was infinitely stronger after Algeiras because, thenceforth, it rested upon a detailed and published International Agreement. That was the cardinal fact in the situation. And this was the way of an easy and honourable escape from a false position. In the hands of a man of imagination and broad sympathies, it could have been handled with the happiest of consequences. There were two parties in French official life after Algeiras. One favoured a moderate and patient policy in regard to Morocco, leading to an eventual Protectorate, but a Protectorate established with German consent by corresponding compensations elsewhere, and by an economic *régime* in Morocco which would leave the economic field open to German enterprise on a basis of equality with other Powers, France included. The other—the Delcassé and Algerian School—desired to push things roughly and brutally forward, even at the cost of once more riding roughshod over Germany. By throwing its weight in the scale on the side of the moderates, the British Foreign Office would have been working for peace and reconciliation. It did the precise opposite. It identified itself from the first with the bellicose Imperialist party, and we have known (since August 3, 1914) that the Algeiras Conference was contemporaneous with the initiation of the Anglo-French military "conversations."

It has been argued that the German Government was not entitled to expect any compensation from France in the matter of Morocco. Let us examine the argument. What, in homely language, was the proposition from the German point of view? At a given moment British and French diplomatists say to one another, "Let us have a general settlement." Agreed. "Cease your interminable worrying of us in Egypt—declares the British Foreign Office—and as far as we are concerned, you can—except as regards the Mediterranean sea-board—Spain must have that—do as you like in Morocco. Agreed, replies the French Foreign Office." But Morocco does not belong to France or Britain—it belongs to the Moors. Moreover, *all* the Powers have acquired a voice in its future, especially Germany, which has had official representatives at the Moorish Court for many years, which has received Embassies from, and signed Agreements with Morocco, which has a growing trade with it, has established therein a number of industrial enterprises, and looks for a considerable business development later on. But the French Foreign Office, having given Italy, Britain, and Spain a *quid pro quo*—three Powers with which it had to reckon—calmly ignores Germany. With the active concurrence of the British Foreign Office it proceeds to negotiate a paper partition of Morocco with Spain, according to which the whole of Morocco becomes French except the Mediterranean sea-board and one or two smaller districts on the Atlantic sea-board. Moreover, Article 10 provides that all economic "undertakings" throughout the entire area of Morocco "shall be executed" by France and Spain, which closes Morocco to free trade and ousts Germany from a potential market she has been cultivating for twenty years.

In other words, the French Government secretly proceeds to put Morocco in its pocket, politically and economically, and having bought British, Italian, and Spanish acquiescence, completely and ostentatiously ignores Germany!

It was an act of deliberate and *intended* provocation, if not on the part of the British Foreign Office, assuredly on the part of the French Foreign Office—unknown to the British and French peoples.

Any restraining influence in London after Algieras must have been utterly lacking, because the Act of Algieras, instead of marking a close time in Morocco, heralded an immediate recrudescence of French aggressive Imperialism; supported at every stage by the British Foreign Office. The capital Clauses of the Act were treated as waste paper. The policy embodied in the Secret Agreements was steadily pursued, as though no Algieras Conference had been held at all.

The French began to seize slice after slice of Moorish territory, first on one pretext, then on another. Military occupation once begun, became permanent. German representations were met with promises of evacuation which were never fulfilled. French

loans were literally forced upon the Sultan. Sedition was encouraged; anarchy assisted. The successive steps taken by the French Government to place Morocco at its mercy are described in my book and I shall not recapitulate them here. One or two outstanding points of the 1906-1911 period must, however, be touched upon. Repeated attempts were made by the German Government to come to terms with France. French opinion continued to be divided as to how these overtures should be met, with the result that French policy was characterised by incessant vacillation, rendered still more unsatisfactory by the kaleidoscopic rapidity with which one ephemeral French Cabinet succeeded another.

In February, 1909, a Franco-German Agreement was signed, in which the German Government formally recognised special political French interests in Morocco, and proclaimed once more that its own interests in that country were purely economic, while the French Government again declared that it "remained firmly attached to the independence and integrity" of Morocco and was resolved to preserve therein the open door. In the course of that year, too, both Governments began a general discussion of Colonial questions affecting both countries, which was preparatory to a gradual acquiescence by Germany in the inevitability of an ultimate French Protectorate, subject to compensation in tropical Africa and a broad understanding tending to a permanent improvement in relations. These negotiations dragged out their weary length throughout 1910 until early in 1911. But it was impossible to come to any positive arrangement; owing to the causes above mentioned, and owing—there can be little doubt—to the jealous watchfulness of the anti-German elements in the British Foreign Office, which (as was made painfully apparent later on), were thoroughly averse to the idea of a general Franco-German accommodation. Anglo-German relations had again worsened through the German naval increase of 1907 and the dishonest naval scare of 1909 and articles kept on appearing in British newspapers and periodicals urging an Anglo-German war before the German fleet became too powerful. For a respectable presentation of that argument see Sir Edmund C. Cox's article in *The Nineteenth Century* for April, 1910.

Into the detail of these abortive negotiations, initiated by one French Government only to be dropped by its successor, I will not enter. Suffice it to say that the incoherence and exasperating tergiversations of French politicians were afterwards strongly denounced in the French Chamber, and justification for German irritation admitted.

All this time the French "forwards" were busily engaged in "working" up affairs in Morocco to the desired crisis. It came, in April, 1911. By this time, the Moorish Sultan had been deposed by his infuriated subjects who saw their country being gradually stolen from them. Another had taken his place. He in turn, deprived of all sources of revenue by the operations

of French finance which had laid an embargo upon all public revenues; had driven his subjects to rebellion by exactions and cruelties inflicted in the desperate attempt to raise the wherewithal to support the internal mechanism of government. Moreover his advent had loosened in no way the French pincers. The whole country was in a state of effervescence. Fez was besieged by insurgents, and the Europeans within it were said to be in danger.\* The supreme moment had arrived.

The French despatched a force of 30,000 men to the relief of Fez. They entered the capital with very little resistance and proceeded to occupy the surrounding country—despite their definite pledges to the contrary. Sir Edward Grey hastened to declare in the House that French action had his entire approval. It should be noted that right up to this moment the French Parliament had repeatedly placed on record by large majorities its invincible determination to abide by the Act of Algeciras. Such resolutions were voted on December 6th, 1906; November 12th, 1907; January 24th and 28th, 1908; June 29th, 1908; December 23rd, 1908; January 10th, 1909; November 23rd, 1909; and finally on March 24th, 1911. These resolutions expressed the wish of the French *Parliament*, which was undoubtedly pacific. But the Imperialists, militarists, and the jingoes were the stronger, for while the French Parliament said one thing, they *acted* in an entirely opposite sense.

With the occupation of Fez the independence and integrity of Morocco had vanished for good and all, and the Act of Algeciras had become waste paper. While the German Government was content to issue a formal warning to France that Germany, in view of these events, reserved full liberty of action, the Spanish Government, fearing to be cheated out of its share in the Secret Agreement (*still unknown to the world*) adopted drastic steps. It landed 40,000 troops on the Mediterranean sea-board and proceeded to occupy with a military force the districts of Larash and El-Kasr reserved to her under that Agreement. Thus had the original Secret bargain come to fruition. Thus was the "scrap of paper" consecrated to "Almighty God" summarily disposed of.

Germany waited until June to see if the French would keep their promise to evacuate Fez. Then she despatched a small gunboat of 1,000 tons burthen, with an equipment of 125 officers and men, to Moorish waters. In this manner did the German Government intimate once again as in 1905, that she declined to be treated with deliberate and contemptuous indifference.

When the Panther anchored off the so-called "Port" of Agadir on July, 1911, *over one hundred thousand French and Spanish troops were occupying Morocco*—Morocco had ceased to be anything but a name. Yet the act of Germany in sending her ridiculous little gunboat to anchor in a Moorish port was de-

\* This was afterwards denied, and the whole fiction exploded by French publicists.

nounced in the British Press as a violation of the Act of Algeciras!

If the issues had not been issues of life and death for millions of innocent people in England, France, and Germany, the whole episode might well have been described as Gilbertian. The despatch of the Panther was a signal for an outburst in the British Tory Press similar in all respects to that which greeted the Kaiser's visit to Tangier in 1905. The excitement manifested by the *Times*, the *Spectator*, and other organs inspired by certain elements in the Foreign Office, greatly exceeded the feeling displayed in France. In British official circles the action of the German Government was received with undisguised anger and was represented almost as a *casus belli*. In France such anger as was manifested was confined to certain groups. Outside those groups public opinion, and especially official opinion, was calm and restrained, and an underlying feeling prevailed that the Panther's arrival at Agadir was not to be interpreted as a hostile act or as an intimation that Germany intended seriously to dispute the French occupation of Morocco (which was an accomplished fact): but as a final intimation that long-protracted negotiations would have to be brought to a close and the issue settled once and for all.

Indeed, the difference in the British and French attitudes at that moment was extraordinary. The French Foreign Minister—*i. e.*, the Foreign Minister of the Power directly concerned and supposedly threatened by Germany's "brutal" act—went off to Holland with the President of the French Republic on an official visit, while the French Premier, M. Caillaux—who throughout worked steadily for peace—began a friendly conversation with the German Foreign Office through the French Ambassador. But the British Foreign Office was profoundly disturbed. Sir Edward Grey summoned the German Ambassador, told him that "a new situation had been created," and declared that the British Government could not recognise any new arrangement to which it was not a party! In short, at the very outset the British Foreign Office which had acquiesced in every step taken by the French since the Algeciras Act, whereby that "scrap of paper" had been torn up piece by piece, and which had publicly approved of the march on Fez, went out of its way to "father" the Franco-German dispute and adopted an ostensible bias against Germany. The *Times*, for its part, clamorously insisted upon Britain taking part in the Franco-German negotiations. The attempt to prevent a Franco-German *tête-à-tête* conversation was evinced in almost every issue of that paper. All the strings were pulled simultaneously: the same note was sounded by the *Times* correspondent in Berlin, by the *Times* correspondent in Paris, by the *Times* editorials. Every effort was made to convert this *Franco-German* affair into an *Anglo-German* affair. A desperate eagerness was displayed to convince the British public that Germany's "affront" was an affront to us: that Germany was threatening us. We were invited to be more French than the French.

If we assume—as one would naturally wish to do—that British diplomacy was peacefully disposed, the attitude taken up by the Foreign Office was utterly incomprehensible. Re-reading all the contemporary documents at this time, one is forced to the conclusion that a section of British official life was only terrified of one thing—a Franco-German *rapprochement*.

Meantime the Franco-German negotiations had begun in Berlin, and the world was subsequently to be apprised by the French Foreign Minister speaking in the French Chamber, that the German Government had opened the ball at once by agreeing to recognise a French Protectorate over Morocco—and in these words:—

Very well. We accept. Take Morocco, establish therein your Protectorate. But since you have made a Treaty with England in the matter, that you have made a Treaty with Italy, that you have made a Treaty with Spain, on what basis will you treat with us? Our public opinion will not permit that we should not obtain compensation elsewhere for our abandonment in your favour and the undertaking we shall give you that our diplomacy will assist in getting the Powers to ratify the arrangement we arrive at.

With these revelations—unhappily withheld until December (1911)—the edifice of untruth attributing to the German Government the intention of seizing Moroccan territory fell to the ground. And yet the statement that the German Government was working for a German Protectorate over Morocco continues to be made, just as though the French Government had not itself disposed of the whole story for good and all!

The Franco-German conversations then turned upon the "compensation" to be accorded to Germany. On the 16th July, as we learn from the French Yellow Book (published more than a year later) this point was definitely approached in an interview—thenceforth destined to be historic—between the German Foreign Secretary and the French Ambassador. In response to the latter's request, the German Foreign Secretary replied that he only possessed "very vague ideas" as to the form the compensation should take. He sent for a map of Africa and indicated the portion of the French Congo between the Atlantic and the Sangha River (rather more than half the French Congo territory) *offering by way of exchange to make over to France the small but flourishing German West African Colony of Togo and a portion of the German Cameroons Colony*. The French Ambassador declared that France could not give up so large an area of the French Congo; whereupon the two practised debaters went over their respective "cases." Finally, they adjourned the discussion apparently on quite friendly terms, and made an appointment to renew it a few days later.

While this was taking place in Berlin unknown, of course, to the British public, British official opinion was becoming more and more restless and "nervy." Both France and Germany had



ignored Sir Edward Grey's demand to share in the discussion which, as we have seen, had opened. This was apparently a source of irritation, although Sir Edward Grey (or the permanent officials) must have known that the German Government had conceded the main French claim, because he afterwards told the House of Commons that the French Government had kept him regularly informed throughout.\*

The scene shifts dramatically to London. A clever and unscrupulous intrigue was hatched—by whom and where constitutes as yet, and probably for ever will remain, a mystery. The Franco-German conversation on July 16 appeared, distorted and misrepresented in the *Times* of July 20, dated from Paris and headed "German Policy and *British* interests": Note the *British!* The despatch alleged that Germany was "demanding impossible compensation" from France. The bargain proposed was "monstrously unfair." What Germany was really aiming at was the acquisition of Agadir and its neighbourhood! This would compromise British interests. It would put a fatal strain upon the "entente." But this did not exhaust the turpitude of the German Government. Suggestions had actually been made in German newspapers which "amount to nothing less than a general reconciliation of France and Germany on the basis of the unreserved opening of the French money markets for the benefit of the German national credit and German industrial enterprises at home and abroad."

Such an idea was intolerable to the *Times* correspondent in Paris. The "political consequences of a settlement on this scale," the despatch continues would be, "too far-reaching," and "quite apart from the question of Anglo-French relations it would mean the death blow of the Russian Alliance!"

In other words, the *Times* correspondent in Paris looked upon a Franco-German reconciliation as an outrageous conception to be condemned. But why? Will the reader pause here for a moment and ask himself why the Paris correspondent of an English newspaper should, of his own volition, object to a 40 years' feud between two great nations being brought to a close? Can it be supposed for a moment that this correspondent was expressing his own views? Can the conclusion be resisted that the *Times* was used by the elements in the British diplomatic world, whose conceptions of the "Balance of Power" required that France and Germany should not become reconciled? And this the *Times* editorial of equal date made abundantly clear. The *Times* assailed the German Government in an article of incredible violence, which contained, moreover, an overt threat to France:

They (the Germans) must know equally well that no British Government could consent to suffer so great a change to be made in the distribu-

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\* It is, of course, possible that the French Ambassador in London withheld the information. But in that case Sir E. Grey's subsequent statement in the House was inaccurate.

tion of power in Africa, even were a French Government to be found feeble enough to sanction it.

It should be mentioned that the *Times* had added to its correspondent's list of charges against the German Government, the further charge of having demanded from France the reversion in Germany's favour of France's reversionary interest in the Congo Free State (Belgian Congo). There was not a word about this in the Paris despatch and, as subsequently transpired, the charge was quite untrue. Will the reader ask himself where the *Times* could have got that particular information!

The match had been laid on the powder magazine. It burnt for 24 hours. Then the explosion occurred. The next day—July 21st—Sir Edward Grey sent for the German Ambassador; told him that he had been "made anxious by the news which appeared the day before, as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government"; that these demands involved "a cession of the French Congo, which it was "obviously impossible for the French Government to concede"; that if the negotiations were unsuccessful "a very embarrassing situation would arise"; that according to "native rumours" the Panther's people were landing and negotiating with the Tribes\*\* and that it might be necessary "to take some steps to protect British interests." The German Ambassador protested, and immediately telegraphed to his Government. The German Government's reply was in London on July 23rd. It contained a detailed denial, and a protest against the misreporting of an official conversation. But Sir Edward Grey did not wait for it. On the same day as his interview with the German Ambassador, *i.e.*, on July 21st, he communicated with the Prime Minister and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but not with the Cabinet. That very evening Mr. Lloyd George made his notorious speech at the Mansion House, in the course of which he said:

I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. . . . But if a situation were forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.

When one looks back at that speech and considers the appalling mischief it provoked, one cannot trust oneself to say what one thinks about it.

I would only beg the reader to recapitulate the facts for himself. Five years before, the British Government had set its seal to a "scrap of paper"—the Algeciras Act—solemnly proclaiming

\* Subsequently ascertained to have been untrue, and never, apparently, credited in France.

the "independence and integrity" of Morocco; and from that date onwards had connived at and approved the systematic violation of that document by France, in accordance with a secret arrangement dated two years previously, and which the Algeciras Act had in effect invalidated. When Mr. Lloyd George made his speech, French troops to the number of about 80,000 were occupying the interior of Morocco, including the capital; and Spanish troops were occupying a large portion of the seaboard—once more in accordance with the secret arrangement of which the British public were in entire ignorance when Mr. Lloyd George made his speech. The Algeciras Act was dust and ashes. If any Power could complain of having been treated as of "no account in the Cabinet of nations" that Power was, surely, Germany. But Mr. Lloyd George, or those who drafted his speech for him, cleverly reversed the parts. What vital *British* interest was threatened? Absolutely none; unless the fact that the French and German Governments were discussing a settlement, and that hopes were entertained on both sides of the Vosges that the settlement might be a comprehensive one, leading to a general reconciliation such as had occurred in the case of England and France—unless it was a vital English interest that *that* happy consummation should not take place.

Mark the sequel to that speech. While that evening the Liberal editors were rubbing their eyes and wondering, or pretending to wonder, what it all meant; at any rate preserving silence, the *Times* editorial staff was engaged in explaining the significance of the Chancellor's utterance to the world. The next morning, in a leader redolent with effusive praise of Mr. Lloyd George's patriotism, the *Times* proceeded to rub salt into the wound and to surpass in outrageous violence even its performance on the 20th, comparing Germany to "Dick Turpin," reiterating the legend (thenceforth credited by the public at large) of an intolerable German "demand" upon France,\* suppressing all indication that the German Government had offered German territory in exchange for French and, of course, allowing it to be assumed that the claim to the Congo Free State had been put forward.

There is little more to add. The Chancellor's speech was at first received in Germany with a sort of stupefaction; and as the comments of the *Times* and the campaign of the other Tory papers gradually sunk in, with an outburst of furious popular indignation. Naturally, as in 1905, the German Navy Leaguers redoubled their clamour for increased naval estimates, and the spirit of jingo-

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\* The actual words of the German Foreign Secretary, as quoted by the French Foreign Minister in the Chamber, had been: "Voici ce que nous demandons," which means "This is what we ask"—not "demand"; if the German Foreign Secretary had meant "demand" he would have used quite a different word.

militarism received an enormous impetus. But I am only stating a truth known to every person competent to judge when I assert that the speech (and its interpretation in the *Times*) came upon all classes of opinion in Germany as a profound and utterly unexpected shock. It was like a sudden blow in the face. The most reasonable and pacific of Germans were as incensed as the jingoes: They regarded England's interference as utterly unjustifiable; indeed, as something astounding and incomprehensible.

German public opinion as a whole was not particularly interested in Morocco. But the Chancellor's speech converted Morocco into a matter of national honour. The average German argued thus: "This is a matter between ourselves and France. We have international law on our side. We are endeavouring to reach an accommodation with the French, and you thrust yourselves between us with threats, trying to pick a quarrel with us and to force us into a rupture with France."

Nor was German opinion likely to modify its view when Captain Faber made his sensational disclosures as to the British Government's intention to give military and naval aid to France in the event of a rupture occurring, a disclosure succeeded by similar statements from Lord Charles Beresford, Admiral Fremantle, and others. The substantial truth of these disclosures, which were denied at the time, were revealed to us in Sir Edward Grey's speech on August 2nd last and in the documents—now officially treated as authentic—discovered by the Germans in Brussels.

Nor yet was the publication by a couple of French newspapers on November 9 and 11 (1911) of the Secret Franco-British-Spanish Agreements of 1904 calculated to induce a different frame of mind in Germany.\*

\* Let me accentuate once again that these secret arrangements upon which the whole course of British diplomacy was based were withheld from the knowledge of the British people for seven years.

The Foreign Office had committed the nation (or so interpreted its commitments) to unreserved support of France in a policy at variance with an international Treaty—to which our signature and that of Germany were attached—and inevitably bound to produce acute Franco-German friction, possibly war. In other words, the British people had been pledged behind their backs to assist France in the attainment of an object to which she was not entitled, although its attainment must result in a Franco-German quarrel.

That result was clearly foreseen by the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office authorised the "conversations" between the British and French military staffs: in other words, the Foreign Office sanctioned conferences between the military leaders of the two countries in order to prepare for the eventualities which were the logical outcome of the secret pledges to France. The details of an eventual plan of campaign were worked out, plunging the nation deeper and deeper into a maze of undertakings of which it knew nothing at all. As the *Spectator* declared, truly enough, last December:

"If Germany had decided to try to invade France by the direct route instead of by way of Belgium, we should still have been under a profound obligation to help France and Russia. It is useless to tell us that we were free to act as we pleased. . . . All our dealings with France—our sanction of her line of policy, our military conversations with her staff, our definite association with her acts abroad—had committed us to her cause as plainly as though we had entered into a binding alliance with her."

During the whole of those seven years the truth of its position was kept from this nation, and the entire Tory Press prepared public opinion in such a way that when the inevitable Franco-German climax arrived, Germany would, in popular estimation, be

The Franco-German negotiations, concluded in a treaty signed on November 4, 1911. Under that treaty Germany recognised a French Protectorate over Morocco, subject to detailed and meticulous safeguards, ensuring the "open door" for the commercial and industrial enterprises of all nations—thereby rendering British commerce a service, too; receiving in exchange a territorial area in the French Congo, aggregating some 107,270 square miles, and ceding to France 6,450 square miles of German territory in the Upper Cameroons.

But between England and Germany a new chapter had been opened, a chapter of capital importance, creative of the tragedy which has ended in "Armageddon."

E. D. MOREL.

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regarded not as protesting against the violation to her detriment of an international Treaty, but as the wanton disturber of the peace of Europe. That war did not eventuate when the climax arrived was due in large measure, so the French Yellow Book tells us, to the German Emperor.

And the astounding thing is that the now defunct Government which was pursuing this foreign policy in secret was basing its material defence of that policy on an expeditionary force of 160,000 men! For a policy which committed us to the material support of France in a Franco-German war was a policy which committed us to Armageddon: there could be no localisation of the long-threatening European conflict if once it broke out. Thus the nation, being committed to this policy, was also being committed to its effects—national militarism. The situation is tersely described in the following passage in the quarterly review, *The Candid*, for May of this year: "The point and the appalling significance of the story lies in the proof it affords that we live under a political system which leaves the greatest of all issues in the absolutely uncontrolled hands of one or two or three, acting secretly, and without the knowledge of what they are doing being shared by any of those on whom the real burden must fall, or even by their own most confidential and trusting colleagues. For the wisdom of the many we have substituted the conspiracy of the few." That situation still exists.—E.D.M.

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# MEMORIAL

TO

HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL,

FROM

**THE CHIEF OF JUNJEERA,**

**REGARDING**

**THE INFRINGEMENT OF HIS RIGHTS.**



**Bombay:**

DUFTUR ASHKARA PRESS.

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1870.



**To His Excellency the Right Honorable**

**SIR W. R. SEYMOUR V. FITZGERALD, K.C.S.I.,**

**GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL,**

**BOMBAY.**

**RIGHT HONORABLE SIR,**

I have the honor to address your Excellency with a request that you will by an early opportunity be pleased to transmit to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for India in Council the accompanying memorial with reference to the measures recently taken by your Excellency's Government for depriving me of the control of the criminal jurisdiction which I and my predecessors Chiefs of the State of Junjeera had heretofore exercised in our said State.

I remain,

Right Hon'ble Sir,

Your Excellency's Sincere Friend

and well wisher,

(Signed) SEEDEE IBRAHIM YAKOOT KHAN,

*Nawab of Junjeera.*

*Bombay 5th April 1870.*

To,

THE RIGHT HON'BLE

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL,

HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL,

LONDON.

MY LORD,

I beg leave to submit for your Grace's careful consideration the following representation which I desire to make to your Grace in Council as representing Her Majesty's Government in its administration of the British Indian Empire. I appeal to your Grace for redress against the invasion of my rights as an independent sovereign by the Government of Bombay, which has, with the sanction of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council, recently deprived me of the control of criminal jurisdiction within my State—a jurisdiction which I and my predecessors have, for centuries, exercised.

2. ~~The under-mentioned facts will enable your Grace~~ correctly to appreciate my position and the character of the relations subsisting between my State and the British Government.

3. I am the rightful Chief or Nawab of the Principality of Junjeera situated on the western coast of India about fifty miles south of Bombay, commonly called Seede's or Hubshee's Junjeera. The territory under my sway, though not large in extent, contains the Forts and Islands of Junjeera and Kasa, the town of Rajapooree, the maritime town and district of Jafferabad on the coast of Kattywar and numerous thriving villages, occupy-

ing an area of upwards of three hundred square miles. The rule over this Principality I inherited from my predecessors, who had been in uninterrupted possession of the same for upwards of three hundred years. The general character of the administration of my State is thus described by Mr. G. B. Seton Karr, a former Collector of Tanna in the Bombay Presidency, in his Rough Notes communicated to the Bombay Government in June 1854 :—

“The successive Chiefs who have occupied the Gadee are generally reported to have been popular with the Ryuts and to have always inclined to a mild and lenient rule.”

4. I succeeded to the Gadee on the 31st August 1848 when my father the late Nawab Seede Mahomed Khan abdicated in my favour. On his death, which took place in November following, the Government of India in their letter to the Government of Bombay No. 501 of 1849 directed the latter to recognize my right to the Chiefship. (Vide “Rough Notes connected with the petty Principality of Junjeera by Mr. G. B. Seton Karr, Collector and Magistrate of Tanna,” submitted to Government in 1854, printed in the Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XXVI. New Series, compiled and edited by Mr. R. H. Thomas, Assistant Secretary, Political Department, p. 3.)

5. On the 6th December 1733 a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded with my predecessors the former Chiefs or Seedees of Junjeera by Messrs. Lowther and Dickinson on the part of the late Hon'ble East India Company and confirmed on the 11th December 1733 by the Hon'ble Robert Cowan, President and Governor of Bombay in Council. The object of this solemn engagement, (a true copy of which is hereunto annexed, marked A) is thus described in the preamble:—

“Articles by which the English Nation and the Seedees of Junjeera have adjusted an Alliance, defensive and offensive, on the coast of India to establish upon a firm and lasting foundation a perpetual alliance and sincere friendship between the Governments of Junjeera and Bombay.”

In this Treaty the Government of Junjeera is treated with as an independent sovereign Government, and the two parties engage to co-operate in military undertakings against the enemies of both Governments and particularly against Angria (a State in the neighbourhood then much addicted to piratical practices.)

6. During the century that has elapsed since the execution of the said Treaty the independence of the State of Junjeera has always been acknowledged by the British Government and its officers; and, till the recent occurrences, which form the subject of this representation, no interference has been attempted in the management of the internal affairs of my Principality. In an official Report communicated to the Bombay Government in June 1854 by the above-mentioned Mr. G. B. Seton Karr, that officer observes:—

“The Chief of Junjeera pays no tribute, and is regarded as independent of the British Government; and, as far as lies in his power, he seems determined to remain so. No British Agent of any description resides at Junjeera.” (V. Selections from Bombay Government Records No. XXVI, New Series, p. 5.)

7. In another communication addressed to the same authority by the Deputy Collector and Magistrate of Tanna in January 1855, that officer says:—

“The Chief of Junjeera is still independent in his own State.” And again “the intercourse between the British authorities and the Hubshee (i. e. myself) consists in rendering mutual assistance in apprehending and delivering up persons accused of criminal offences, and on miscellaneous matters arising out of proximity of position.”

8. In reply to a question put by Mr. Eykyn in the House of Commons on the 6th April last, Mr. Grant Duff, Under Secretary of State for India, is reported to have made the following declaration:—

“Our relations with the small maritime State of Junjeera are of the most curious kind. Unconquerable by our predecessors in the sovereignty of Western India, this little State, although absolutely insignificant in point of material strength, has been

“unconquered even by us. The attitude of Junjeera towards the British Government is partly courteous, partly apprehensive, partly repellent. This attitude our authorities respect, never interfering except when absolutely forced to do so. Although Junjeera is so near Bombay, its rude independence is not tempered by the presence of a British resident, and hence we have not the same facilities for knowing what goes on there, that we have with reference to most Native Courts.”

9. I regret to have to complain to your Grace that the Government of Bombay has recently departed from the policy of non-interference with my State hitherto observed and has not only interfered in the internal affairs of my State, but has gone the length of totally depriving me of the control of criminal jurisdiction. On the 28th of October last under instructions from the Government of India His Excellency the Governor of Bombay sent Mr. Havlock (a civil servant of the Bombay Government) to Junjeera with a force of about 150 soldiers. On the following day this officer had an interview with me and delivered to me a letter from His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, dated 21st October last, hereunto annexed marked **B**, conveying to me the astounding intelligence that he had, with the sanction of the Government of India, resolved to deprive me of criminal jurisdiction throughout my territory and that the criminal authority of the Junjeera State would thenceforth be exercised by a British Political Agent residing in the State, and that I was required to defray out of the revenues of my country the estimated cost of maintaining that officer and a suitable establishment, amounting to Rs. 15,000 per annum and to provide him with a proper residence. I naturally protested against this unjustifiable proceeding. I could not of course offer any resistance to so powerful a Government as that of the British and can only invoke the Government of Her Majesty not to allow such a wrongful invasion of the rights of an independent State to be continued.

10. I have been deprived of one of the most valued rights of sovereignty which I possessed in my Principality, viz : the criminal administration. I have been

degraded from the position, which I occupied as an independent Chief, and have been reduced to the condition of a dependent and subject. My power and authority have been wrested from me only under pressure of superior force. Mr. Larcom, the officer appointed by the Government of Bombay, was installed with pomp and ceremony in my Principality as the head of the police and criminal administration, backed and supported by a force of British troops brought to my capital without my permission in an armed vessel the Steamer Coromandel of 32 guns. The British Flag was planted in my territory and I was compelled to receive the Political Agent under a salute of 11 guns. My character as a Chief has been degraded, my authority has been destroyed, and my power undermined.

11. I am not unwilling to discuss the alleged grounds, on which the proceedings, of which I complain, have been adopted and to explain and refute the charges brought against me. In doing so, however, I submit that those charges, even if true, are not on any recognised principle or precedent of the law of nations a warrant for depriving me of my criminal jurisdiction. My recognized character as an independent Chief is in itself sufficient to show that I am not amenable to the British Government or any other power for the internal administration of my Chiefship: and I deny and protest against the assumption of the local representative of the British Government to hold me responsible for any faults or misdeeds alleged to have been committed by me in the administration of the internal affairs of my Chiefship; but, subject to this reserve and protest, I shall proceed to show to your Grace that the instances cited by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay in his letter of the 21st October last in proof of the above-mentioned charges are either destitute of foundation or wholly insufficient to afford any justification of the proceeding of the Government.

12. It is alleged against me by the Government of Bombay,

First.—That I have “during a series of years” committed various acts of “systemetic misbehaviour and disregard of the duties of good neighbourship”.

Secondly.—That I have inflicted “such cruel and barbarous punishment” on my subjects as to induce the Bombay Government to express “its strong reprobation and disgust.”

Thirdly.—That I have committed “acts of oppression to British subjects” and have shown “contumacy to the British Government.”

Fourthly.—That I have been guilty of “abuse of power,” “maladministration” and “acts of cruelty and oppression committed under the color of judicial authority exercised by myself at the dictates of my own arbitrary will.”

13. The first case cited by His Excellency in proof of the first charge is as follows. That in the year 1853 when a Native vessel called the Nasir Muknoon, belonging to a Native merchant of Hydrabad in the Nizam's territory, was stranded and wrecked near Junjeera, my people plundered the wreck and cargo unrestrained by me.

14. That the alleged plunder was instigated or approved by me is not suggested; and as for restraining it, I had no knowledge of the occurrence till afterwards. On the shipwreck being reported to me I immediately sent instructions to my officers, who provided, at my expense, shelter, food and clothing to the passengers and crew, numbering about 125 men, saved from the wreck, buried the dead bodies of persons who had perished, and rendered every assistance to Nacoda Abdoolla bin Abdool Alleem, the commander of the vessel, who was also provided with a guard and with the means of recovering and removing the goods saved from the wreck. On his departure from Junjeera he gave me a writing dated the 12th of Asad Sood Samvut year 1909, (17th July 1853) a true translation of which is hereunto annexed.

marked **C.**, declaring that he had received all the articles and cargo that had been found and landed on shore and ascertained. On his departure from Junjeera he left Mahomed Ally the supercargo of the vessel in charge of the wreck. The latter recovered and removed considerable quantities of goods from time to time during the years 1853 and 1854. Under these circumstances I am at a loss to see how it can be reasonably alleged that I was responsible for the loss of the cargo. And yet the Government of Bombay held that I was responsible, and compelled me to pay the large amount of Rupees 54,000 as compensation without even communicating to me the grounds on which they made such requisition or the principle on which they estimated such amount. In vain I remonstrated against the hardship and injustice of being made liable for the loss. Mr. G. B. Seton Karr, Collector and Magistrate of Tanna, who was the channel of communication between me and the Bombay Government, when requested to transmit my explanation and remonstrance to the Government, declined to do so until I complied with the demand and paid the money, which I was peremptorily called upon to pay within four days. Under date the 28th November 1854 Mr. Karr wrote to me as follows :—

“I have received your letter dated 7th of Rubioolavel A. H. 1271 regarding the vessel called Naser Muknoon, enclosing a memorandum for being translated into English and transmitted to Government. Your letters cannot be received nor acknowledged until justice is done to Mahomed Aly (the supercargo of the vessel,) as distinctly intimated by Government in their letter to you. I cannot therefore send your letter (to Government) as requested by you.”

15. I was thus forced to pay the heavy penalty, which the Bombay Government exacted from me in a peremptory manner for losses, for which I was neither morally nor legally responsible. Instead of giving me credit for the relief and assistance, which I gave to the passengers saved from the wreck and for the aid given to the Commander and supercargo of the vessel to enable them to



recover the cargo, I have been heavily mulcted. If any person has reason to complain of oppression in this case, I am the individual.

16. The second instance of misconduct charged against me refers to the assault which officers of mine were charged to have committed ten years ago on a boat flying the British colors whilst engaged in surveying the coast between Allybaug and Junjeera. The circumstances relating to this accident are these. I had received no notice of the intention of the Bombay Government to send a vessel to survey that part of the coast which lies in my territory. The English boat suddenly came up close to my Fort of Kasa, in which prisoners of my State were confined. In conformity to general instructions which had been given for more than a century to the keepers and guard not to allow any vessels to come in close proximity to the Fort, some stones were thrown against the boat to keep her off. Thus what the guard did with a view to guard against the possible escape of the prisoners confined in the Fort has been construed into an assault deliberately committed on a boat flying the British colors though there was no such intention on the part of my officers.

17. The third instance of misconduct imputed to me is that of the punishment inflicted by my orders on a Sepoy in my service, who was convicted of theft in 1855. As he was an old offender, who could not be reclaimed, it was considered advisable to make an example of him by inflicting on him the severe punishment enjoined in the Mahomedan law as laid down in the Koran<sup>\*</sup>; and in accordance with this the culprit's hand was cut off. This punishment, which was inflicted on a convicted and irreclaimable criminal in conformity to the law as laid down in the Koran and enforced by all Mahomedan Governments, has been construed by the Bombay Government into an act of barbarous cruelty on my part. The

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\* Vide Sale's Koran, Chapter V. p. 80, 81 and Hidaya, Vol : II. p. 18.

culprit in question immediately made his escape, took refuge in British territory and lodged a complaint against me. The Government of Bombay not only entertained the complaint, but addressed a severe reprimand to me, condemning the act in strong terms and declaring that, in case such conduct was repeated, I would incur the serious displeasure of Government, and that Government would no longer abstain from interfering in the internal administration of the affairs of my Chiefship. The relations subsisting between my Principality and the British Indian Government and my position as an independent Chief ought to have induced the Government of Bombay to refrain from entertaining the complaint of a convicted offender of my State or from administering to me any censure like that which has just been referred to.

18. The fourth instance of misconduct referred to as a ground for the charge of oppression to British subjects and contumacy to the British Government is as follows. The Government of Bombay allege that in 1862 a British subject named Purushram Krustna Mahajun was forcibly removed from British to Junjeera territory and was detained in one of my forts for six months, for which a fine of Rupees five thousand was levied from me by order of the Government of India and, in consequence, I was required "thenceforward to maintain an accredited "Vakeel in attendance on the Political Agent of Tanna in "order to secure attention to communications from the "British authorities," and was warned that if "this arrangement proved insufficient a Political officer would be appointed to reside at Junjeera" at the expense of my State.

19. For the information of your Grace I beg to submit a brief account of the circumstances relating to the above-mentioned affair, which will, I trust, satisfy your Grace that my conduct in that matter did not warrant the proceedings of the Bombay Government. The said Purushram Kristna Mahajun, having offered his services, was employed by me as "Tulatee" or revenue Collector of one of the villages in my charge. He continued in

my service for ten years, at the end of which time he was suspended on a charge of having committed breach of trust and defrauding my State of a portion of the amount of revenue, which he had realized on account of the sale proceeds of the produce of the village. He had, I contend, ceased to be a British subject. He was not forcibly removed from British territory, but came of his free will to Junjeera to answer the charge pending against him. He was not imprisoned, but was kept under surveillance for some months pending the arrival of his accuser Shaikh Mohedeen, who had gone to Rutnagherry. Before I had time to confront him with his accuser and investigate the charge that was pending against him, the Government of Bombay sent an armed Steamer to my Fort to demand the immediate surrender of the said Purushram, whom I had refused, on the ground just explained, to give up. I was thus coerced and forced to comply with the demand of the British Government. Eighteen months afterwards I was informed that the Government of India had directed that Rupees three thousand should be recovered from me and paid to the said Purushram as damages. I paid the said penalty under protest and now appeal to your Grace for redress against the wrong done to me by the Governments of India and Bombay in subjecting me to such a penalty. The circumstances, which I have brought to your Grace's notice, will, I trust, convince your Grace that I have not been guilty of any misconduct or oppression in detaining my own servant pending investigation of the charge that had been preferred against him. I contend that the said Purushram was not a British subject. I say that he was not forcibly carried off from British territory, and I contend that the British Government was not justified in demanding his surrender. In a case like this it cannot, I submit, be held that one independant State, however small in extent or weak in power, is bound to accede to the demand of another State, however strong and powerful, or that in case of refusal the latter State has a right to inflict a fine on the former.

20. The fifth instance of misconduct imputed to me relates to the case of Mahomed Ayoob, which is adduced in proof of the above-mentioned charge of "abuse of power" and "exercise of cruelty and oppression under color of judicial authority." The Bombay Government assert that in this case, "which formed the subject of a special investigation at Junjeera by Mr. Havelock in November 1866, it was found that Mahomed Ayoob had been convicted by me of murder on very unsatisfactory evidence and, having been sentenced to one year's imprisonment, was tortured to death in prison by the use of fetters weighing from 12 to 15 lbs and being so constructed as to keep the body in a bent position."

21. I am in a position to show to your Grace that the above accusation is totally unfounded. On a complaint made to the Government of Bombay by one of my subjects, Muriam, widow of the said Mahomed Ayoob deceased, Mr. Havelock was deputed by that Government to my capital to make enquiries regarding the cause of the death of the said Mahomed Ayoob. That officer accordingly came to my capital and conducted the investigation. He examined several persons, whose depositions he recorded and transmitted to His Excellency the Governor of Bombay. Fukee Mahomed bin Fukee Ahmed, brother-in-law of the deceased, who attended the said Mahomed Ayoob for eight or nine days during his illness in the jail, in his examination taken on the 16th November 1866, deposed that the deceased had been suffering from fever, that he (the deponent) visited him and supplied him with food and conjee every morning and evening and that he died in the jail of fever. In consequence of the false charge preferred against me by the Vakeel of the widow of the said Mahomed Ayoob that her deceased husband, though innocent, had been unjustly convicted by me of murder, Mr. Havelock called upon me to produce before him certain witnesses, who, it was alleged, would prove the charge. I complied and desired those persons to give their evidence before Mr. Havelock. They all failed to sub-

stantiate the charge. Two witnesses named Seedee Hasan bin Seedee Kasim Chawoos and Syed Ibrahim bin Syed Abdool Kadir proved that the deceased Mahomed Ayoob flogged the said Sukeena (the woman with whose murder he had been charged) so violently, that she shrieked and they went up to the spot, and found her arms pinioned and suspended to the roof, and that the said Mahomed Ayoob said he would strike her until she expired and would throw her down. Another witness Mahomed Beg bin Ismael Beg declared that he saw the deceased Mahomed Ayoob throw Sukeena down from the wall of the Fort one morning at 5 O'clock. He further deposed that he had made this statement on one occasion in the presence of Mahomed Ayoob, who acknowledged having committed the act. This evidence was, I contend, quite sufficient to prove that the deceased Mahomed Ayoob was really guilty of the crime, for which I had sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment and that he died not from torture inflicted on him during confinement, but from a natural cause, viz: fever.

22. The above statement will, I trust, satisfy your Grace that I am innocent of the charge of torturing to death the said prisoner Mahomed Ayoob. I may be allowed further to observe that the best regulated judicial and police administrations in Asia as well as in Europe are not free from defects. Although the British Indian Government keep up an extensive establishment to take charge of criminals, yet cases of ill-treatment and torture committed with impunity not unfrequently occur. The Commissioners, appointed a few years ago by the Government of Madras, brought to light the extensive prevalence of the practice of torture in the Madras Presidency. Permit me to refer your Grace to the following passage which occurs in the Report of the Government Commissioners just referred to:—

“That many of the practices (of torture) which beyond all question exist, must necessarily cause acute if

“temporary or even momentary agony, is beyond dispute: and that in no few recorded instances (as appears by the Calendars) even death has followed upon their infliction is only too undeniable.”\* I am not aware that it has ever been contended that the existence of such practices, if proved, constitutes any ground in law for interference with the Government by whose officers they may have been committed.

23. To my surprise the Government of Bombay instead of being satisfied with the result of the enquiry that had been made by their direction regarding the alleged case of torture, above referred to, came to an adverse decision and made a report to the Government of India, and on the 30th April 1867 the following communication was made to me :—

“The proceedings relating to the death of Mahomed Ayob whilst undergoing the sentence of imprisonment inflicted by you for the murder of Sukeena having been reported by the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, a copy of the following resolution, recorded by the latter on the 24th March 1867, is transmitted to you for your information.

“The proceedings held by the Chief in the case of Mahomed Ayob were far from satisfactory, and it is the distinct determination of the British Government to hold him responsible for any abuse of power which may be brought home to him, and that in the event of acts of cruelty or oppression being committed under color of judicial authority exercised by him, it will be a question whether the forfeiture of the extensive powers of jurisdiction enjoyed by him over his subjects shall not ensue. After this warning it rests with himself by the provision of an independent tribunal for the trial of serious offences, the proceedings of which shall be open and public and the records of which shall be honestly and carefully kept, to place the administration of justice in the Junjeera Chiefship on a footing that shall ensure the Chief himself from the consequences which must sooner or later befall him if he continues to discharge the judicial functions in his own person, and at the dictates of his own arbitrary will.”

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\* V. Report of the Madras Torture Commission, paras 54 and 67, P. p. 45 and 50.

24. The above despatch, which I received from the Bombay Government on the occasion just referred to, was, I submit, totally uncalled for. It was, I consider, dictated by a desire on the part the Bombay Government to take cognizance of complaints made against me by my subjects, to exercise control over me and to interfere in the conduct and management of my judicial administration. My position is not that of a dependant or tributary of the British, but an ally, possessing equal rights. I do not owe allegiance to the British Crown, although I regard that powerful State with the respect and veneration due to its rank and power. I contend, as I have always done, that the British Government are not warranted in interfering in the internal affairs of my Chiefship. The British Government have, I submit, no right to compel me to adopt any measures which they may think proper to dictate in regard to the conduct of judicial administration in my territory. My predecessors and myself have never been responsible to the British Government for the manner in which we have discharged the functions of our internal government. The Government of India has no reasonable ground on which to support its claim that I am responsible to it for the administration of justice in my own country and that if I do not conduct such affairs to its satisfaction, it is entitled to deprive me of my power and authority and in particular of the judicial administration of my Principality.

25. The last charge, which has been preferred against me related to the case of the two jailors Mirza Sirnobot and Dajeerow Soobedar, to whose custody I had committed the state prisoners confined in my Fort, and regarding whom the Bombay Government have come to the conclusion that they died from the effect of the flogging inflicted on them by my orders.

26. To enable your Grace properly to appreciate this case, it is necessary for me to give a connected narrative of all the circumstances relating to it.

27. In 1867 Seedee Hoosein Juburtee, father of one of my late wives named Fatima Beebee, formed a conspiracy with my Jumadar Shaikh Hasan and my steward Mahomed Saleh to deprive me and my eldest son Seedee Mahomed Bukhshee of our lives and take possession of my Chiefship in the name of my infant son Seedee Ahmed the son of Fatima Beebee. I received timely information of this plot, and, on being satisfied of the guilt of the said conspirators I confined them in my Fort of Kasa and placed them in charge of my Killedar named Seedee Hasan and two jailors named Mirza Sirnobot and Dajee-row Soobedar.

28. Suckharam Sudasew, a Karkoon, who had been employed to collect the revenue of one of my villages which I had allotted to my late wife Fatima Beebee, complained to the Collector and Magistrate of Tanna that I had illtreated several members of my family and had imprisoned the said Seedee Hoosein. This complaint was entertained and communicated to the Government of Bombay, who instructed the Collector and Magistrate of Tanna to communicate to me the regret of Government at the domestic quarrels which raged in my family and its hope that I would make such arrangements as would not render it necessary for members of my family to complain to Government. In reply I requested the Collector and Magistrate to inform the Bombay Government that no members of my family had complained and that no weight should be attached to the representations made by a man like Suckharam, who had been guilty of having appropriated to his own use a portion of the revenues of the village in which he had been employed, and who had absconded from Junjeera and taken refuge in British territory. I therefore requested that this culprit should be delivered up to me; but such request was refused, and I explained the grounds on which the said Seedee Hoosein had been placed in confinement.

29. In 1866 Seedee Hoosein Juburtee my father-in-



law, who had been confined by me in the fortress of Kasa for treason, complained to the Political Agent of Tanna, alleging that I had deprived him and my late wife Fatima Beebee of all the property belonging to him and her and had placed them both in rigorous confinement; that I was trying to poison them both; that I had been guilty of robbery and that he was entitled to the Chiefship of Junjeera. The Political Agent on the 8th September 1866 called upon me through my Vakeel to answer the said complaint. I replied through my Vakeel that the said complainant was a pretender, who had no right to my Chiefship, that his claim was totally unfounded, that he had been placed in confinement with two other persons on a charge of treason, that I was entitled to all the jewels &c. which I had given to my said wife, that she had not been placed in rigorous confinement and that all the other charges were false and fabricated by the said Seedee Hoosein.

30. In consequence of a complaint made on behalf of my late wife the said Fatima Beebee the Government of Bombay recorded a Resolution No. 3106 under date the 4th October 1867, calling upon me to state what crime had been proved against the said Seedee Hoosein and what punishment had been inflicted on him by me and when. In reply I referred Government to my previous letter, which contained an explanation of the charge against the said Seedee Hoosein and protested against such complaints being entertained by Government.

31. In April 1869 the said prisoners, viz. Seedee Hoosein Juburtee, Shaikh Hasan and Mahomed Salch escaped from my said fortress of Kasa and took refuge in British territory. In effecting their escape they were abetted and assisted by my officials the above-mentioned Seedee Hoosein, keeper of the said fortress, and the jailors Mirza Sirobut and Dajeerow Soobedar. The said state prisoners instead of being kept separate, as expressly directed by me, were allowed to meet and consult with each other. They were allowed to escape from

the fortress in a boat belonging to my State, which had been placed in charge of the said keeper and jailors. On receiving intelligence of their escape I ordered the said Seedee Hoosein Killidar and the jailors Mirza Sirnobut and Dajeerow Soobedar to be brought up before me, and, on enquiring into all the circumstances connected with the escape of the said state prisoners, I was satisfied of their complicity and connivance. I therefore sentenced each of them to the punishment usually inflicted on such culprits, viz : flogging and imprisonment. The flogging so awarded was administered in my presence in the usual mode, and each of the offenders received twenty stripes with a bamboo cane. No undue severity, much less cruelty, was resorted to in carrying out this sentence. Two of the offenders walked from the spot to the prison, and the third, having fainted from the effect of the flogging, was carried away, but revived in about an hour. A few hours after their lodgment in jail two of them were seized with vomiting and purging, of which they died in the afternoon.

32. Having been informed that the prisoners, who had so escaped from my fortress, had taken refuge in British territory in Alibaug Rohai, I applied to the Government of Bombay on the 25th April last to deliver them up to me ; but no attention was paid to my application. Afterwards on a complaint made to the Political Agent of Tanna by the escaped prisoners, that officer on the 12th May last called upon me through my Vakeel to explain the causes of the deaths of the said Seedee Hoosein Killedar, Mirza Sirnobut and Dajeerow Soobedar, who were reported to have died in consequence of the flogging administered to them, and also to explain the cause of the death of one of my wives the late Fatima Beebee. I replied that Seedee Hoosein Killedar was alive, that Fatima Beebee had died of consumption in the house of her father Seedee Hoosein Juburtee about a year after I had divorced and put her away, and that Mirza Sirnobut and Dajeerow Soobedar had died of cholera and not from the effect of

flogging. Not satisfied with the explanation given by my Vakeel by my orders, the Government of Bombay, without giving me any intimation, deputed Mr. Havelock on the 4th July last to enquire into the cause of the deaths of the above-mentioned individuals. Mr. Havelock, accompanied by Mr. Robertson the Political Agent of Tanna and the state prisoners, who had escaped from my fortress, came to my capital, Junjeera, with an armed escort in a war Steamer on the 4th July last. I did not offer any opposition, but allowed Mr. Havelock to conduct the enquiry, and produced before him all the witnesses he wished to examine. I requested him to deliver up to me the prisoners who had escaped from confinement in my fortress and who had accompanied Mr. Havelock. My request was not only refused, but a guard was stationed to protect the fugitive criminals, and, as the enquiry had been undertaken on their representations, they were allowed to assist at the same and to make suggestions. Thus, at the instance of a man, who had conspired to deprive me and my son and heir apparent of our lives and usurp the Chiefship, the Government of Bombay thought proper to insult and degrade me before my own subjects in my own capital by sending Mr. Havelock to enquire into my conduct and acts, in other words to impeach and try me on certain charges that had been preferred against me regarding the conduct and management of the administration of my Principality. Mr. Havelock, having conducted the enquiry for three days, made a report to His Excellency the Governor of Bombay in July last, but which report was not communicated to me. From the *ex parte* representation made by Mr. Havelock His Excellency the Governor came to the conclusion that the said Mirza Sirobut and Dajeerow Soobedar died from the effect of the flogging inflicted on them by my orders, and that I had been guilty of "cruel and illegal proceedings" in that case. The Government of Bombay thereupon made a representation to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, recommending that I should be deprived of the criminal jurisdiction,

which I possessed and which I and my predecessors had exercised for upwards of three centuries without control or interference on the part of any other Government. With the sanction of the Government of India this sentence of deprivation has recently been carried into effect by the Government of Bombay, who have appointed a young officer of comparatively small experience, Mr. Larcom, to conduct the police and criminal administration of my Principality.

33. In the first place, I earnestly contend that it is not competent for the Government of India to sit in judgment over my judicial acts, nor to exercise any control over me in regard to the conduct of the internal affairs of my State. In the second place, I trust that on an impartial consideration of all the circumstances relating to the case just referred to, Her Majesty's Government will come to the conclusion that I have not been guilty "of cruel and illegal proceedings," as unjustly imputed by the Bombay Government, but, on the contrary, that my proceedings in the case in question were perfectly just and legal and were not characterized by any undue severity or cruelty.

34. The said Seedee Hasan Seedee Kasim had been appointed Killidar or Governor of the fortress of Kasa and Commander of the garrison and the said Mirza Sirnobut and Dajcerow Soobedar were jailors of the prison in the said fortress. I entrusted to these three officers the custody of the state prisoners, Seedee Hoosein Juburtee, Shaik Hasan Jamedar, and Mahomed Saleh, whom I ordered to be confined in the said fortress on a charge of having conspired to compass the death of myself and my eldest son and usurp my Chiefship. The said Officers wilfully disobeyed my injunction carefully to watch the state prisoners and to keep them separate in order to prevent them from plotting. They were found guilty of the crime of abetting and being accessory to the escape of the said state prisoners. For this grave offence I sentenced them to the punishment usual in such cases, viz:

to receive 20 stripes and to be imprisoned. This corporal punishment was inflicted as usual by persons whose duty it was to carry out the sentence. Such punishment is one of those recognised by British Law and itself surely cannot be characterised as "cruel and illegal." Of the three persons, who were flogged at the same time and place, two were subsequently taken ill and died in the afternoon. It is not by any means established that they died in consequence of the flogging and not, as I have already represented, from poison, or cholera, which was then raging at Junjeera. It was deposed by some of the witnesses examined before Mr. Havelock at Junjeera that cholera was raging there about the time the said culprits were flogged and that after the flogging was administered in the morning the said Dajeerow Soobedar and Mirza Sirnobut were seized with vomiting and purging, of which they died in the afternoon. Seede Hasan Killedar, who was flogged at the same time as his fellow offenders, deposed that the flogging took place at about 9 O'clock in the morning, that he and his said companion Mirza Sirnobut did not faint but walked to the Jail, that Dajeerow fainted a little but revived on drinking water, that Dajeerow and Mirza Sirnobut were seized with vomiting and purging and died at 2 or 3 O'clock in the afternoon and that he did not know whether they died from cholera or flogging. Mirza Yoosoof Beg the son, and Shaikh Hasan bin Shaikh Moheedeem the uncle, of Mirza Sirnobut stated in their depositions that they did not know the cause of his death. Ragoba Govind Kotwal deposed before Mr. Havelock that the said Mirza Sirnobut and Dajeerow Soobedar were addicted to the use of Gauja (an intoxicating drug) and opium, were very weak and that he could not say whether they died from want of nourishment or what other cause. Thus there is at least considerable doubt as to what was in fact the cause of the deaths of the two men in question.

35. But looking at this occurrence in the most unfavourable light and even admitting that the conclusion,

arrived at by the Government of Bombay that the deaths of said Jailors were brought about either directly or indirectly by the flogging administered to them by my orders, is correct, it does not follow that I ought to be held in any way responsible for the fatal consequence which resulted from carrying out the sentence, It is not a consequence, which could be anticipated as the inevitable or even probable consequence of such a punishment. There was nothing in the punishment itself or in the mode in which it was administered, which can reasonably be made the subject of animadversion, and if the punishment was in fact the cause of death, that consequence was an accidental, and not ordinary or probable, effect of it.

36. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, Her Majesty's Government will, I trust, recognise the injustice of the charge of cruelty and illegality brought against me by the Government of Bombay in regard to my proceedings in the above-mentioned case. It would be a work of supererogation on my part to attempt to argue before so eminent an authority as your Grace that the trial and punishment of servants of my State, who had been guilty of aiding and abetting the state prisoners confided to their charge in escaping from lawful confinement, are legitimate proceedings, for which no blame can possibly be attached to me and which cannot afford the shadow of a ground for depriving me of my criminal jurisdiction.

37. In connection with the above-mentioned case I desire to bring to your Grace's notice the conduct of the Government of Bombay towards me, standing as I do in the position of an ally. Under the provisions of Act No. VII of 1854 of the Governor General of India in Council the Government of Bombay were bound to deliver up to me the said Seedee Hoosein, Mirza Sirnobot and Dajeerow Soobedar, who had escaped from my Fort of Kasa whilst undergoing confinement for the commission of a most serious offence in my territory. In refusing to comply with my request to deliver the offen-

ders to me, the Bombay Government have acted in contravention not only of the special law, just referred to, but also of international law and the treaty subsisting between me and the British Government.

38. The facts and circumstances which I have adduced will, I trust, be deemed sufficient to convince your Grace that the grounds, on which the Government of Bombay have sought to justify their resolution to deprive me of one of my prerogatives, are utterly futile and untenable.

39. It is needless for me to cite authorities from approved writers on the law, regulations and international relations for the proposition, which, in different forms, they one and all lay down, that it is unlawful for one State to interfere with the internal administration and Government of another, which is in law its equal. For one State to do so is to appeal to the law of the strongest, not to the law which alike governs the strong and the weak. In Europe such an aggression might be effectually resented, and, by the support of others, resisted; and it is hardly consistent with the character, which the English Government possesses, to attempt an interference with my rights as an independent Prince, which it would not do in the case of a more powerful and dangerous one. In its proceedings towards me the Bombay Government has practically deposed me from that position of independence, which, as Chief, I have hitherto held; and this not for any breach of international duties, but on account of certain alleged oppressions and from an idea that criminal justice will be better administered by a British officer than by myself and my own officers. I would recall to your Grace's attention the language of a well-known author, Vattel, in his work on the Law of Nations:—

“The greatest monarch ought to respect in every sovereign the eminent character, with which he is invested. The independence, the equality of nations, the reciprocal duties of humanity, all these circumstances should induce him to pay even

“to the Chief of a petty State the respect due to the station which he fills. The weakest State is composed of men as well as the most powerful : and our duties are the same towards all those who do not depend on us.”\*

The same author, in Chapter IV of his work where he describes the right to security and the effects of the sovereignty and independence of nations, enunciates the following axioms :—

“It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no State has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is doubtless the most precious, and that which other nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury.

“The sovereign is he, to whom the nation has intrusted the empire and the care of the government : she has invested him with her rights ; she alone is directly interested in the manner in which the conductor she has chosen makes use of his power. It does not, then, belong to any foreign power to take cognizance of the administration of that sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to alter it. If he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them with severity, the nation alone is concerned in the business ; and no other is called upon to oblige him to amend his conduct and follow more wise and equitable maxims. \* \* \* The Spaniards violated all rules when they set themselves up as judges of the Inca Athualpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations with respect to them they would have had a right to punish him. But they accused him of having put some of his subjects to death, of having had several wives, &c.—things for which he was not at all accountable to them, and to fill up the measure of their extravagant injustice, they condemned him by the laws of Spain†.”

The same writer again lays down the following proposition:—

“Since nations are *free, independent and equal*, and since each *possesses the right* of judging, according to the dictates of her conscience, what conduct she is to pursue in order to fulfil her

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\* V. Vattel's Law of Nations by Chitty, p. 153.

† V. Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 155, 156.



“duties ; the effect of the whole is, to produce, at least externally  
 “and in the eyes of mankind, a perfect equality of rights between  
 “nations in the administration of their affairs and the pursuit of  
 “their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their  
 “conduct, of which others have no right to form a definitive  
 “judgment ; so that whatever may be done by any one nation,  
 “may be done by any other ; and they ought, in human Society,  
 “to be considered as possessing equal rights.”

40. Judged by the above infallible standard, your Grace will, I trust, have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Governments of Bombay and India were wrong in attempting to compel me to introduce in the judicial administration of my Chiefship such innovations as they thought proper to dictate to me in the despatch which I received from the Government of Bombay, dated 30 April 1867, referred to in the, annexed letter, addressed to me by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay. I did not introduce these changes because I did not consider them necessary or expedient. Disregard on my part of this injunction is one of the grounds on which I have been deprived of my criminal jurisdiction. The other acts of interference on the part of the Government of Bombay and their officers, detailed in paras 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29, 30, and 32 of this letter, were, I submit, equally unjustifiable. The Government of Bombay had no right to entertain the complaints of my refractory and disaffected subjects nor those of convicted criminals and prisoners, who had escaped from lawful confinement in my Jail. In giving encouragement to their complaints and deputing British officers to my own capital to enquire into the charges preferred against me by my servants and subjects, the Government of Bombay have not only overstepped the limits of their authority, but have been guilty of personal disrespect towards me and of conduct derogatory to the equality of rights subsisting between sovereign States.

41. The interference of the Bombay Government once commenced will, there is little doubt, soon extend itself. Thus Mr. Larcom, the Political Agent

appointed by the said Government to reside in my State, in a letter, dated 15th January last, claims the right of exercising criminal jurisdiction over crimes and offences committed and adjudicated upon prior to his appointment and thus of sitting in appeal over decisions heretofore passed by myself and my officers during the whole term of my administration, extending over twenty years. He has also addressed a letter to me, complaining of my revenue system and alleging that the rate levied from the Ryots is too high, and calling upon me to redress the alleged evils, and intimating that, in the event of my failing to do so, he will have to take the matter into his consideration. It will thus be seen that the officer in question, not content with the criminal jurisdiction he is appointed exercise, asserts his right to interfere also with my revenue system. So it will doubtless continue to be; one encroachment will only prepare the way for another, till every shred of power and Government has been torn from me.

42. I have hitherto refrained from troubling Her Majesty's Government with complaints against the interference, which has of late been frequently attempted to be exercised in the conduct of the internal affairs of my Chiefship by the Government of Bombay; but, as efforts have been recently made by that authority with the sanction of the Government of India to destroy the independence of my State by depriving me of my criminal jurisdiction, and as His Excellency the Governor of Bombay desires me to co-operate "in fulfilling the commands of Her Majesty's Government," I am under the necessity of appealing to your Grace against the encroachment of my rights and subversion of my independence. I make this appeal to your Grace in fulfilment of the duty, which I owe to myself, viz: the preservation of my independence, guaranteed to me by the law of nations, by treaty and by the solemn pledge given by Her Gracious Majesty the Queen in the Proclamation issued to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India on the direct assumption of the sovereignty of India in November 1858.

43. Your Grace will observe from the stipulations contained in the Treaty, concluded between my predecessor, and the late Hon'ble East India Company in the year 1733, to which I have already referred, that "a perpetual alliance and sincere friendship" have been established on a footing of mutual equality and independence. The attitude recently assumed towards me by the Governments of Bombay and India is utterly incompatible with the relations subsisting between my State and the British Government, and are utterly subversive of my independence. I would also recall to your Grace's recollection the pledge which Her Britannic Majesty has given in her royal proclamation issued to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India:—

"We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Hon'ble East India Company are by us accepted and will be scrupulously maintained; and we look for the like observance on their part."

"We shall respect the rights, dignity and honor of Native Princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government."

44. It grieves me exceedingly to have to complain to your Grace that in interfering in the conduct of the internal affairs of my State, in attempting to control my acts, and finally in depriving me of my criminal authority, the Governments of Bombay and India should have violated the above-mentioned solemn pledges given by Her Britannic Majesty—pledges on the due fulfilment of which the integrity and independence of the different Chiefships in India mainly depend.

45. In conclusion, I earnestly request your Grace as the head of the British Indian Government to cause justice to be done to me and procure the reversal

of the Resolution of the local Government, by which I have been deprived of my judicial authority and the withdrawal of the Political Agent, who has been appointed to reside in my State and to send out instructions to the British authorities in this country to refrain in future from interfering in the internal affairs of my Chiefship and encroaching on my rights and position as an independent prince, which rights and position are recognised and guaranteed to me by the law of nations, by treaty engagements and by Her Majesty's proclamation above referred to. I cannot regard myself as soliciting your Grace for any grace or favour, but for that redress, to which I am justly entitled for a grievous injury that has been inflicted on me and my rights. The Native Princes and Chiefs of India rely on the scrupulous observance of treaties and the maintenance of existing rights of sovereignty, which form the basis of England's Anglo-Indian policy. By affording prompt redress for the great wrong that has been inflicted on me by the local Government your Grace will vindicate the high character of the British Government for justice, enhance its glory and strengthen the attachment of the Native Princes of India to the British Crown.

I remain,

Your Grace's devoted friend and  
faithful ally of the British Government,

(Signed) SEEDEE IBRAHIM YAKOOT KHAN,

*Nawab of Junjeera.*

*Bombay, 5th April 1870.*

## APPENDIX A.

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*Treaty of Alliance, concluded on the 6th December 1733 by Messrs. LOWTHER and DICKINSON, on the part of the Honorable EAST INDIA COMPANY, with the SEEDEES OF JUNJEERA OF RAJAPOOREE ; confirmed on the 11th December 1733, by the Honorable ROBERT COWAN, President and Governor in Council.*

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*Articles by which the English Nation and the Seedees of Junjeera have adjusted an Alliance, defensive and offensive, on the Coast of India.*

For to establish upon a firm and lasting foundation a perpetual alliance and sincere friendship betwixt the Governments of Junjeera and Bombay, Seedee Saad, Seedee Oomur Affajee, Seedee Musood, and the other principal Seedees residing in the said Junjeera, have agreed and settled with the Honorable Robert Cowan, Esq., President and Governor for the Honorable English Company and Council,—

### ARTICLE I.

That they shall make a league against all the enemies of both Governments in India (Europeans, subjects of the Kings of Hindoostan, Persia, Arabia, and China excepted), and particularly against Angria, both Governments making a vigorous war by sea and land, not regarding any offers of peace from that enemy ; and neither of the two allies shall hear alone nor particularly any thing relating to peace, unless both are present at the same time any thing is proposed, and are to resolve on nothing without the consent of both Governments.

### ARTICLE II.

That in case one of the two Governments may have an enemy that is in amity with the other, in such case the league is only to be defensive, and must not fail on any pretence to assist them

that are invaded ; and in case of any invasion, the Government that is in amity with the aggressor shall interfere their good offices as mediators, to accommodate the differences that have happened.

#### ARTICLE III.

As to the union of the forces of Bombay and Junjeera in their actions against Angria, as well by sea as by land, all the marine forces of Bombay are to be in conjunction with those of Junjeera, who are to be commanded by their own proper officer, yet he is to act as subordinate to the chief commander of the English forces, as being more experienced in sea fighting, and the fleet of Bombay of greater force ; and, as in Bombay there is no more infantry than is sufficient for their garrisons, the necessary land forces are to be provided by the Seedees of Junjeera.

#### ARTICLE IV.

And likewise, in case the territories of the Seedee should be invaded by any power that is an enemy to both Governments, they are to be assisted with all the marine force of Bombay ; and in case that the Government of Bombay should be invaded by any power that is an enemy to both Governments, they shall be assisted from Junjeera with thirty fighting gallivats, and two thousand sepoy.

#### ARTICLE V.

That all that is taken in this war by sea by the united forces of both Governments shall be given to the English, and what shall be taken by land shall be given to the Seedees, according as is expressed in Articles VI. and VII.

#### ARTICLE VI.

And if God shall be pleased to give this alliance the desired success, and that Angria shall be expelled the Fort of Khandéry by the united forces of both Governments, that place shall be given to the English, with all the ammunition and artillery that shall be found therein ; and all the other forts that shall be taken from the said enemy shall be given to the Seedee, with all the ammunition and artillery found in them, except Colaba, which shall be entirely demolished, with all its bulwarks and batteries, so as one stone shall not be left above another, and shall never be rebuilt without the consent and pleasure of both Governments ; and the revenues and produce of the lands annexed to that fort,

and whatever tribute belongs to it (except royal grants and possessions in the hands of the ancient proprietors) shall be annually and equally divided, half to the English, and the other half to the Seedees of Junjeera, and the care and security of these lands is to be provided for by both.

ARTICLE VII.

In the place called Mhopat, betwixt the rivers of Nagotna and Penn, in the district of Colaba, the English may build, if they think proper, a warehouse and small fort, with artillery sufficient for the better security of those lands and their roads, and the conveniency of merchants trading, putting a garrison therein; and the customs and other rents that shall be recovered shall be annually and equally divided, half to the English and half to the Seedees of Junjeera, and likewise they shall pay equally the charges of building the fort and its garrison, and both Governments shall take care to encourage trade and preserve the subjects.

ARTICLE VIII.

That all the ammunition that shall be expended in this war, as well by sea as by land, by either of the Governments, shall be on their respective accounts, and in case one should be necessitated to take of the other, if they can spare it, they are to give it for its just price.

ARTICLE IX.

If any robberies are committed on either side, restitution is immediately to be made to the persons wronged.

ARTICLE X.

That deserters, who put themselves under the protection of either Government, shall not be delivered up, if they have committed a crime worthy of death.

ARTICLE XI.

That the Seedees of Junjeera shall, on no pretence, hereafter issue out their passes to the shipping and people of Angria.

ARTICLE XII.

That after Colaba is taken, with its dependencies, if it should be attacked by the enemy, the charges of the forces that shall be left for its defence shall be equally defrayed by both Governments.

## ARTICLE XIII.

That after the ratification of these Articles, by which the league is adjusted, we are immediately to put them in execution.

*This 10th day of the month of Rujub, and the 16th year of His Majesty's reign, and 1146 of the Law (or A. D. the 6th December 1733).*

(Signed) ROBERT COWAN.

Hon'ble  
East India  
Company's  
Seal.

Khyrit  
Khan's  
Seal.

Seedee  
Abdool  
Rahman's  
Seal.

Seedee  
Yakoot  
Khan's  
Seal.

Seedee  
Saad's  
Seal.

Seedee  
Musood's  
Seal.

Seedee  
Samboll's  
Seal.

Seedee  
Oomur's  
Seal.

MEMORANDUM.—The above Treaty was ratified by the Governor in Council of Bombay on the 11th December 1733.


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*The following separate Engagement between the Governments of Bombay and Junjeera of Rajapooree was agreed to and signed at the same time as the foregoing General Treaty of Alliance:—*

In equipping a fleet to chastise and destroy the enemy Angria, the Government of Bombay have expended two lakhs of rupees ; that the same be effectually represented to Court, and the King's order obtained upon the Governor of Surat, for the payment of three lakhs of rupees on account of the Tunkha of the fleet and forts, which order we oblige ourselves to deliver to the Government of Bombay. In which order it shall be expressed that the said money shall be paid out of the Treasury of Surat to the Government of Bombay, and after the said three lakhs of rupees are received from the Surat Government, they shall take to themselves two lakhs of rupees, and one shall be given to the Seedees of Junjeera

*This 11th of the month Rujub, in the 16th year of His Majesty's reign, or A. D. the 7th of December 1733.*



(Signed) ROBERT COWAN.



(TRUE COPY.)

(Signed) SEEDEE IBHRAHIM KHAN YAKOOT KHAN,

*Nawab of Junjeera.*

## APPENDIX B.

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To,

HIS EXCELLENCY,

SEEDEE IBRAHIM KHAN YAKOOT KHAN,

NAWAB OF JUNJEERA.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On the 3rd of July last, I deputed Mr. Havelock, a high officer of my Government to visit Junjeera, with instructions to enquire into the circumstances of the death of two persons in your service, viz: Mirza Nowbut and Dajeerow Soobedar, and also regarding the death of Fatima Beebee one of your Excellency's wives. After receiving Mr. Havelock's report on the subject and after considering the explanation contained in your "Khureeta" of the 14th July last, I regretted greatly to be unable to come to any other conclusion except that the deceased Mirza Nowbut and Dajeerow Soobedar died from the effect of the flogging inflicted on them by your orders.

I must now remind your Excellency that during a series of years past various acts of systematic misbehaviour and disregard of the duties of good neighbourship on your part have come forcibly under the notice of the British Government. In the year 1853, the unrestrained plunder by your people of the wreck and cargo of the merchantman "Nassir" on the coast of Junjeera compelled the Bombay Government to exact restitution from your treasury to the extent of Rupees 54,000. In the year 1860 Sir George Clerk found it necessary to address a remonstrance to your Excellency for an assault by your officers on a boat flying the British colors while peaceably engaged in surveying the coast between Alibaug and Junjeera, the scene of frequent shipping disasters.

In a letter addressed to your Excellency by the Bombay Government on the 1st November 1855, with reference to the case of a sepoy in your service, who had been mutilated by having his hand chopped off from the wrist and who had afterwards

sought an asylum in British territory, you were informed that the British Government had hitherto abstained from interfering in the internal administration of your country in cases in which the interests of your own subjects had been concerned, but that it could not allow such cruel and barbarous modes of punishment as this case disclosed to be inflicted without expressing its strong reprobation and disgust at them, and that on any repetition of similar barbarous conduct, the displeasure of the British Government, would, in a most exemplary manner, be manifested towards yourself and to all who might be concerned therein.

In October 1862 your Excellency will remember that my predecessor Sir B. Frere, after several fruitless requisitions addressed to you, despatched the Political Agent of Tanna in an armed Steamer to Junjeera and compelled your Excellency to surrender a British subject, Krishna Purushram Mahajun, who had been forcibly removed from British to Junjeera territory and had been detained in one of your Forts for six months. For this act of contumacy the Government of India imposed a fine of Rs. 5,000 on your Excellency and required you thence forward to maintain an accredited Vakeel of your own in attendance on the Political Agent of Tanna in order to secure your attention to communications from the British authorities. You were, at the same time, warned in a Khureeta from the Political Agent, that if this arrangement proved insufficient and further acts of oppression to British subjects and contumacy to the British Government occurred, a Political officer would be appointed to reside at Junjeera at the expense of your state.

In another case, which formed the subject of a special investigation at Junjeera by Mr. Havelock in November 1866, namely that of Mahomed Ayoob, a former minister of your state, it was found that he had been convicted by you of murder on very unsatisfactory evidence, and, having been sentenced to one year's imprisonment, was tortured to death in prison by the use of fetters weighing from 12 to 15 lbs. and being so constructed as to keep the body in a bent position.

In a Khurreeta, addressed to you by the Political Agent of Tannah on the 30th April 1867, you were informed that your proceedings in the case of Mahomed Ayoob had been brought to the notice of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, by whom it had been declared that it was the distinct intention of the British Government to hold you responsible for any abuse of power, which might be brought home to you; and that in the event of acts of cruelty or oppression being committed under the

color of judicial authority exercised by yourself, it would be a question whether the forfeiture of the second class powers of jurisdiction enjoyed by you should not ensue. You were further told that after this warning it would rest with yourself by the provision of an independent tribunal for the trial of serious offences, the proceedings of which should be open and public and the records of which should be honestly and carefully kept, to place the administration of justice in the Junjeera State on a footing that would secure you from the consequences, which, it appeared, must sooner or later befall you if you continued to discharge the judicial functions in your own person and at the dictates of your own arbitrary will.

Your Excellency will understand that after the very serious warning thus conveyed, it was impossible that the cruel and illegal proceedings disclosed by Mr. Havelock's investigation at Junjeera on the 3rd and 4th July last, could be disregarded; and it now becomes necessary for me to announce to you that viewing these proceedings in connection with previous instances of mal-administration on your part, it was my painful duty to recommend to the Government of India that you should be deprived of your criminal jurisdiction. In this recommendation the Viceroy and Governor General has seen fit, after careful consideration, to concur. This deprivation will remain in force as against you during the pleasure of the British Government.

In accordance with this decision the criminal authority of the Junjeera State will henceforth be exercised by a British Political Agent residing in the State. The cost of maintaining this officer and a suitable establishment will, it is computed, amount to Rs. 15,000 per annum, which you will be required to defray out of the revenues of your country. You will also be required to provide a proper residence for the Political Agent.

This Khurrecta will be delivered to you by Mr. Havelock, whom I have charged to arrange with you the necessary details to give due effect to the orders of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

Mr. Havelock will also introduce to you the Political Agent appointed to reside in your State, Mr. J. B. Larcum, an officer in whose ability and descretion I have every confidence, and who is actuated by a sincere desire to promote your Excellency's welfare.

In conclusion, I beg your Excellency will accept my assurance that the measure which the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has now felt it his duty to impose on you, has been undertaken in the best interests of the Junjeera State and it is my earnest hope that you will co-operate in a loyal and friendly spirit in fulfilling the commands of Her Majesty's Government.

I remain,

Your Excellency's Sincere Friend

(Signed) W. R. SEYMOUR V. FITZGERALD.


*Bombay Castle, 21st October 1869.*

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(TRUE COPY.)

(Signed) SEEDEE IBRAHIM KHAN YAKOOT KHAN,

*Nawab of Junjeera.*

## APPENDIX C.

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Translation of a letter addressed to the Chief of Junjeera by  
Abdoolla bin Abdool Aleem Nacoda of the Vessel Nassur.

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To,

THE CHIEF OF JUNJEERA OF RAJPOOREE.

Written by Nacoda Abdoolla bin Abdool Aleem, native of Bhownugger at present residing in Junjeera. I execute and deliver this deed of satisfaction to the Sirkar (or Chief) to the effect that the Ship Muknoon belonging to Abdoolla bin Aly Jemadar, a Native of Hyderabad (in the Nizam's territory), was wrecked off Moria point on her return voyage from Arabia. With regard to the cargo, goods, articles and things, which were on board that Vessel and which were found and were landed on shore and ascertained, I have fully received them all. In regard thereto I have given this deed of satisfaction to His Excellency (the Chief.) Dated 12th of Asad Sood Samvut year 1909 the 11th day of the month of Shaval (17th July 1853 A. D.)

(Signature in Arabic.)

ABDOOLLA BIN ABDOOL ALEEM,

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(A True Translation.)

SEEDDEE IBRAHIM KHAN YAKOOT KHAN,

*Nawab of Junjeera.*

**To His Excellency the Right Honorable**

**SIR W. E. SEYMOUR V. FITZGERALD, K.C.S.I.,**

**GOVERNOR AND PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL,**

**BOMBAY.**

**RIGHT HONORABLE SIR,**

I am under the necessity of bringing to your Excellency's notice the conduct of my late servant, Seedee Hoosein Juburtee, whom I had confined in my Fort for having conspired to deprive me and my eldest son of our lives and who escaped from imprisonment and took refuge in British territory under circumstances described in paras. 27, 31, 32, and 34 of my memorial to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India of this date. Since the refusal of your Excellency's Government to deliver up this culprit to me and since the appointment of Mr. Larcom to exercise criminal jurisdiction in my State in October last the said Seedee Hoosein Juburtee openly exults in my deposition, which he ascribes to his own efforts and to the complaints which he frequently made to your Excellency's Government. Thus elated, he has embraced every opportunity to annoy, injure and insult me and openly to defy my authority. The indignities, to which he has recently subjected me are so great as to be beyond endurance. He often rushes into my presence against my wish and desires me to entrust to him the administration of the affairs of my Chiefship on the false pretension that he is entitled to the Principality of Junjeera. He interferes with, and intimidates, the officers and subordinates, whom I have employed in my Chiefship and instigates them to disobey me and defy my lawful authority. On the 21st day of Shawal (24th January last) he and his friends Seedee Kasim Shaikhanee, Seedee Ibrahim Sumbool, Seedee Mahmood Shaikhanee and Saed Aly Saed Fukroodeen desired my Durban of guard at the gate of the Fort of Junjeera not to allow any

person to enter or leave the Fort without their permission, and called upon my Dufturdar to deliver up the keys of the record room and to refrain from writing and keeping the books that were in his charge. On the same day the said Seedee Hoosein Juburtee and his friends came into my presence in company with the Political Agent, Mr. Larcom, whom they brought to me on the false representation that I wanted to see him. On that occasion Mr. Larcom stated to me that my subjects suffered from excessive oppression on account of my disinclination to entrust the administration of the affairs of my Principality to persons belonging to my tribe (i. e. Seedees). The Political Agent, I regret to say, interfered in this matter with the object of inducing me to entrust administrative duties to the said Seedee Hoosein and his friends, in whom I have no confidence. If the man who had plotted against my life and escaped from imprisonment is allowed to have free access to the Political Agent stationed in my territory and receives encouragement and countenance from that officer, he will, I apprehend, continue to conspire against me and subvert the remnant of my authority. A conspirator like Seedee Hoosein Juburtee, who is my sworn enemy and a pretender to my Chiefship, who has exerted his utmost with a view to ruin me and has further endeavoured to compass my death, is a most dangerous character, and ought not to be allowed to remain at large in my territory. I consider it unsafe to return to Junjeera so long as the said conspirator is permitted to reside in my Fort. I therefore solicit your Excellency in Council to order the said Seedee Hoosein Juburtee to be delivered up to me to be placed again in confinement and thereby deprived of the opportunity of injuring me and plotting against me. Under the circumstances, which I have described in paras. 34 and 37 of my Memorial to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, I contend that I am entitled to the custody of the criminal, who has escaped from confinement in my Fort. But should your Excellency in Council take a different view and object to deliver up the said Seedee Hoosein



into my custody, I request your Excellency to prohibit that offender from entering or residing in my territory.

2nd. I have also to complain of the conduct of Mahomed Abbas, who has been employed under the Political Agent as Fouzdar at Junjeera. This subordinate officer has embraced every opportunity to assist and encourage the above-mentioned conspirator Seedee Hoosein Juburtee and has threatened to procure my deposition if I should refuse to follow his advice. Whether it is advisable to displace such a subordinate, who has been guilty of misbehaviour towards me, is a question for your Excellency to decide.

3rd. Having been deprived of my criminal jurisdiction I find it difficult in several cases to recover the revenue due to me by my Ryots, who not unfrequently defy my authority, refuse to pay revenue and forcibly remove, and dispose of the crops. Pending the result of my appeal to His Grace the Duke of Argyll to restore my criminal jurisdiction, I have to request your Excellency to instruct the Political Agent to give legitimate assistance to my officers so as to enable them to recover the amount of revenue due to my State by defaulters.

4th. In conclusion, I solicit your Excellency in Council to desire the Political Agent to refrain from attempting to interfere in matters relating to the revenue administration of my Principality, the selection and employment of my subordinate officers or other affairs of a like nature, which do not come within the proper scope of the duties entrusted to that functionary by your Excellency's Government.

I remain,

Your Excellency's Sincere  
Friend and Ally,

(Signed) SEEDEE IBRAHIM KHAN YAKOOT KHAN,

*Nawab of Junjeera.*

*Bombay, 5th April 1870.*

## THE CHOLA ADMINISTRATION, (900—1,300 A. D.)

### PART II

Having attempted, in the previous part, to give a connected account of the Chola Empire let me now proceed to bring together what little is known of their system of administration.

To follow in the wake of Sir William Lee-Warner, shall begin with the unit of administration of the Cholas which was the village-community, composed either of a single village, or oftener, of a group of villages. This union was called in Tamil 'kūṭṭam' (or sub-division). Each one of these sub-divisions had an assembly of its own called the mahāsabha. This assembly, though subject to supervision by the divisional officers or intendants (Adhikārins), exercised an almost sovereign authority in all the departments of rural administration. To illustrate this rural administration, I shall take as a specimen the village of Ukkal near Māmanḍur, on the road between Conjeeveram and Wandiwash. The fourteen published inscriptions from this place give us a better insight into the rural administration than any equal number I could choose. I extract the following, therefore, from the records.

#### THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE ASSEMBLY.

Ukkal<sup>6</sup> was in Pāgur nāḍu sub-division of the Kaliyūr kōṭṭam in the Tonda—or the Jayangonda Chola—maṇḍalam. According to other records Ukkal belonged to its own sub-division of the same kōṭṭam (Sans-kōshṭaka).

No. 1, The assembly received 200 kaḷanju of gold from Tiruvikraua Bhaṭṭa *alias* Brahmādhirājar, one among the commissioners of Uttaramērchaturvēdimangalam (Uttaramallur) for feeding 12 Brahmans before the God of Puvanimāṇikkaviṇṇagar received his noon-day offerings.

No. 2, States that the assembly received 550 kuḷi of land measured by 'the graduated rod,' made over to them by Narāyana

Rajasimha, a native of the Chola country, to supply the God with 4 nâli of rice daily. "Having received the revenue of this land and having exempted it from taxes for as long as the moon and sun exist, we, the assembly, engraved this on stone."

No. 3. Records that a certain Peṛṛân Â'dittan of the Chola country purchased two pieces of land, the first from a private person and the second from the village assembly and made over both pieces to the villagers for maintaining a flower-garden. "The same person had purchased from us, the assembly, for a flower-garden 501 kuḷi of land measured by the graduated rod to the west of the irrigation channel, &c." "Having received in full the purchase-money and the revenue of the land..... and having exempted the flower-garden and (the land assigned) for the maintenance of the garden from taxes for as long as the moon and the sun exist, we, the assembly, engraved this on stone." "Having been present in the assembly and having heard this order, I, the arbitrator, Â'yirattunûṛṛuvan *alias* Brahmaguṇâkhara Vidhyâsthana Mangaḷâditya Samanjasapryan, the son of Nâlâyiravan wrote this."

No. 4. Kaṇṇan Â'rûrân of the Chola country and a servant of Râjarâja who got a well sunk and a cistern constructed by the roadside in the name of his royal master made assignments of paddy for the up-keep of this charity. In order to supply this paddy, we, the assembly, of this village having received from him the revenue and the purchase-money, and having exempted the land from taxes, &c. . . ."

No. 5. "We have received 1,000 kâdi of paddy from Saḍayan. We the assembly shall close (the sluice of) the tank (to collect water for irrigation) and shall cause 500 kâdi of paddy to be supplied every year as interest on those 1,000 kâdi of paddy. The great men elected for the year (the Perumâkkal) shall cause the paddy to be supplied."

No. 6. "We the great assembly of Sivachûḷamaṇichaturvêdimangalam, including the great men elected for (the management of) charities during this year.....in our village and the commissioners (in charge of the temple) of S'âttan in our village."

They make a grant to the temple of Mahâsâsta. "The commissioners of the temple of S'âttaṅ shall protect this charity." "The great men elected for the supervision of the tanks shall be entitled to levy a fine of one kaṅṅju of gold in favour of the tank-fund, from those betel-leaf sellers in this village, who sell (betel-leaf) elsewhere but at the temple of Piḍâri."

No. 7. "The inhabitants of our village.....the lands, everything else that is not the object of deeds of gift, in the environs of the village, the common property (madhyama) of the assembly." "We shall sell this land which has thus become common property (of the assembly) to those inhabitants who promise to pay taxes on each kuḷi. No person shall be allowed to produce deeds of gift or deeds of sale (âvaṅṅam) in order to show that the land thus sold belongs to himself. We, the assembly, shall levy a fine." "Those inhabitants who do not submit to this, shall be liable to pay into Court (Dharmâsanâ) a fine of 108 kâṅṅam..... per day." "If through indifference though.....was thus given to those who pay the fine, and they themselves have fined them, they are not able to remove the obstacles to the possession, the great men elected for the year shall be liable to pay an additional fine of 24 kâṅṅam."

No. 8. The assembly received 400 kâdi of paddy from Saḍayan to feed 2 Brahmans from its interest of 100 kâdi.

No. 9. "The Lord Sri Râjarâjâdêva, being graciously seated in the college (kallûri), on the south or the painted hall (chitra-kûṭa) at the great hippodrome gate in Tanjore was pleased to order as follows:—

"(The land of) those landholders in villages of Brahmans, in villages of Vaikâṅṅasas (a section of Vaishnavas) in villages of S'ramanas (Jains) in S'ôṅṅâdu, in Tonḍanâḍu, and in Paṅḍinâḍu *alias* Râjarâjâvaḷanâḍu who have not paid on the land owned by them, the taxes due from villages, along with the other inhabitants of those villages, for three years of which two are completed between the 16th and the 23rd year of my reign, shall become the property of the villages and shall be liable to be sold by the inhabitants of those villages to the exclusion of the (defaulting)

landholders. Also (the land of) those who have not paid the taxes due from villages for three years (of which), two are completed, from the 24th year of my reign shall be liable to be sold by the inhabitants of those villages to the exclusion of the (defaulting) landholders." "Accordingly, having been written by the royal secretary, Rajakêsarinnallûr Kîlavan, and having been approved of by the chief secretary Mummuḍichôla Brahmamârâyan, and Mummuḍichola Pôsan (Bhoja), this order was engrossed from dictation on the 143rd day of the 24th (year of my reign)."

No. 10. "We have sold and executed a deed of sale for (i) 3,000 kuḷi measured by the rod of 16 spans beginning (to measure from the west of the land which was the common property of the assembly.....(ii) five levers to the east of this land, &c." "Having received in full the purchase-money and the revenue of the land, we, the great assembly, sold it free of taxes and executed a deed of sale." "Having been present in the assembly and having heard the order, I, the accountant and arbitrator of this village, Pôrrikuḷi Kalidêvan *alias* Irandâyirattu-nûrṟuvan wrote this."

No. 11. "We the great assembly, including the men elected for the year, and the great men elected for the supervision of the tanks, assigned at the request of Chakrapani Nâmbi....." "Half a measure of land in the fresh clearing (Puduttiruttam) on the west of the village of Sôḍiambâkkam."

No. 12. We, the assembly of Sivachûlamanichaturvêdimangalam, (ordered as follows)." "To the god of Puvanimânikkavishnugriham in our village shall belong, as a divine gift (dêvabhôga) the village called Sôḍiambâkkam, &c." "We shall not be entitled to levy any kind of tax from this village. We (the great men) elected for the year, we (the great men) elected for the supervision of the tanks, and we (the great men) elected for the supervision of the gardens, shall not be entitled to claim at the order of the assembly, forced labour (veṭṭi), vedili, vâlakkânam, from the inhabitants of this village." "If a crime or sin becomes public the God (temple authorities) alone shall punish this village."

No. 14. A cultivator named Sēnai granted one paṭṭi (Sans. nivarthana:—40,000 Sq. hasthas or hands) from the proceeds of which water and fire-pans had to be supplied to a maṅṭapa frequented by Brahmans. "The great men who manage the affairs of this village in each year shall supervise this charity."

This series of extracts, from inscriptions ranging in time through three centuries, say from 800 to 1100 A. D., shows clearly how rural tracts were governed during those centuries. The village assembly were the sole government of the village (or village-unions) in all its departments.

They were the absolute proprietors of the village lands. When fresh clearings were made the assembly became proprietor of the newly acquired lands. When lands were thrown out of cultivation, the Sabha took over the lands to give them to others, who would pay the stipulated taxes per kuḷi. It was the business of the assembly to see that the actual cultivator was not molested in the possession of his holding. Failing in their duty "the great men of the year" laid themselves open to be fined by the general assembly. The assembly received deposits of money and grants of land for charitable purposes and administered the trusts by a board of commissioners specially appointed for the purpose from year to year. They often sold common village lands for these purposes and received in return the purchase-money and an additional sum, from the interest of which the assembly had to pay the state dues upon the alienated lands made tax-free by themselves. They received all the taxes; and made independent grants of villages tax-free for purposes of charity and could waive all customary claims on landholders. They could take over the lands of villagers for default of payment of taxes, the collection of which, however, appears to have been made with great elasticity. This is not all; they could even transfer jurisdiction over villages to other corporations such as temple-authorities. Where they did not feel themselves competent to interfere they sought instruction from head-quarters as in No. 9 quoted above, where the lands concerned were those made over to other proprietors. This record is a copy of a circular order issued by Rājarāja the Great.

It was drafted by the royal secretary on the verbal instructions of the Emperor himself and approved of by the chief secretary (O'lainâyakam) Srîkishnarâma *alias* Mummuçichôla Brahmamâryan and Perundaram I'râyiravan Pallavaiyan *alias* Mummuçichôla Pôsan (Bhoja) and then despatched to the Mahâsabhas. These sabhas had treasuries of their own, as would appear from the inscriptions of Râjarâja at Tanjore which refer to up-country treasuries.

The great assembly of the village (or kûṛram) was divided into several committees. There were certainly three :—the great men elected for the year, (a committee of the assembly for general management), the great men elected for the supervision of the tanks (another committee to administer the tank-fund and see them in good condition) and those elected for the supervision of gardens. There were besides the great men in charge of the temples, charities, &c. The work of this assembly was subject to supervision by the imperial divisional officers (adhikârîns) often associated with the divisional commanders of the forces (sênâpathis). These officers moved through their divisions, asked for the accounts, examined them and made allotments out of the royal revenues which had, however, to be appropriated for the special purposes by the assemblies themselves.

No. 49. at Tiruvallam<sup>87</sup> records that a certain Madhurântakan Kandârâdittan (Kandârâdittan, son of Madhurântaka), "while he stood in the temple observed that the offerings presented to the Âṣvar (God) were reduced to two nâli of rice, the offerings of vegetables, ghee and curds had ceased and the perpetual lamps had been neglected." He called the S'aiva Brahmans of the temple and the assembly of Tikkâlivalam and said : "State the revenue and expenditure of the temple in accordance with the royal order and the royal letter." The rest of the inscription is unfortunately built in.

SUPERVISION :—

No. 57. at Tiruvallam<sup>88</sup> records that two royal officers, the magistrate (adhikâri) Purân Â'dittadêvanâr *alias* Râjarâjendra

87. South Ind. Ins., vol. III, pt. I.

88. South Ind. Ins. vol. III, pt. I.

Mûvendavêlar, and the Sênâpathi, Râjarâja Paranripârâkshasan *alias* Vîra Sôla Iḷango (probably a prince of the blood) met at Gangaikondân Sôlan maṅṅapa to the east of the temple of Tirumayânamuḍayâr (the lord of the crematorium, another name of god Siva) at Kanchipuram in Eyil naḍu sub-division of Eyil kôṭṭam and called for the accounts of the villages which were the dēvadânas (divine gifts) of the temple of the lord of Tiruvalam (Tiruvallamuḍayâr).

“The magistrate Rajarajendra Mûvendavêlan ordered as follows :—(The incomes) from the villages which are the ‘dēvadanas’ of this temple, *viz.*, ûrkaḷanju, kumârakachchânam, the fishing-rent, the rent of the goldsmiths and other minor taxes and rents, the cloth on the loom, vêlikkasu, the tax on collecting rents (tanḍal), the sonship of the right-hand and the left-hand and the other internal revenue, which was being collected at the rate of 25 kasu per 1,000 kalam (of paddy) had been entered in the register, and made over to this temple exclusively from the year which was opposite to (*i.e.*, followed after) the seventh year of the reign of the Emperor Sri Vîrarajendradēva. Accordingly Kukkanûr a ‘dēvdâna’ of this god in Tûynâḍu sub-division of Perumbânappâḍi has to pay 38½ kâsu or at the rate of 4 kalam of paddy by the Standard-measure (Râjakêsari) per kâsu, 153 kalams of paddy ; and Mandiram in the same nâḍu has to pay 26½ kâsu or 153 kalams of paddy ; altogether 65 kâsu or 260 kalams of paddy were allotted to this temple for expenses not previously provided for and should be given from the third year (of the king’s reign).” A large committee then assembled and made allotments from this revenue for various heads of temple expenditure. This is the kind of supervision to which the assembly of a sub-division was subject. Otherwise in all matters of fiscal administration the village assemblies were practically supreme.

In a record of the time of Âditya II Karikâla, it is stated that the village of Siṛṇiyârûr had been granted as a dēvadhana and as a brahmadêya in the 21st year of Tonḍamânârûr-Tunjina-Uḍaiyar to the Sabha of Puduppaâkkam in the same nâḍu and



kôṭṭam, on condition that the donee made over a certain quantity of the produce of the village and a fixed sum of money in gold, every year to the temple of Mahâdeva at Tirumâlpêru. The next year the boundaries of the village were fixed and a document was drawn up. But the village was not entered in the accounts as a dêvadhana and brahmadêya. The mistake was rectified in the 4th year of Parântaka the next ruler and the sabha were making over the stipulated produce and gold to the temple. In the 36th year of the same ruler an additional item was made payable from the village to the temple and entered in the accounts. The village assembly were misappropriating this item and the temple authorities made a complaint to the king while he was at Conjeevaram. The king sent for the parties and satisfying himself after enquiry, fined the assembly and restored the grant to the temple.

#### JUSTICE.

In the administration of justice the village assembly exercised equal power, if not even more. We have a few inscriptions in which such exercise of power is clearly on record. The normal punishment for causing death was, of course, death as shown by some of the Chola inscriptions in Mysore territory ;<sup>90</sup> but the punishment depended usually upon the merits of the case. In three instances on record, death was caused without intention on the part of the culprit and owing to pure accident. The Governor and the assembly which he convened for the purpose, in one instance, and the latter alone in the others sat in judgment and passed sentence that as death was caused unintentionally, the extreme penalty of the law should not be meted out to the culprit; all the same the accused should not go scot-free. He was, therefore, ordered to burn a perpetual lamp in the village temple for which he made over to the village assembly 16 cows. This fine of 16 cows, which would have been of the value of a quarter of a year's maintenance of an ordinary family, must have been rather heavy but would certainly have acted as a powerful deterrent against crimes caused by negligence. In all three

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90. Haggadedevanakote 18, Epigraphica Carnataka, Vol. IV.

cases on record death was due to shooting accidents.<sup>91</sup> A merchant had a concubine on whom another attempted an outrage. The latter was stabbed to death by the merchant. He could not be prosecuted for murder and paid a fine like the others against whom the charge was neglect<sup>92</sup>. It is not out of place here to remark that the jury system which is believed to be the special birthright of Englishmen and spoken of generally as unknown in India, is found to have been in full swing. In the first instance above given, the Governor, it was, that took cognizance of the case first; but he did not find himself competent to proceed without the assembly; whereas in the latter cases the assembly proceeded without even a reference to the Governor.

Such were the powers of the village assemblies in those days. Considering the extent of the country and the want of rapid communication, and considering that the assemblies took great interest in the discharge of their manifold functions, (as the many references to the assembly having "met without a vacancy" would show), there is no gainsaying the fact that the administration was efficient and well-suited to the times. The Assembly for each rural unit was constituted as follows:—

#### THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY, ETC.

From certain inscriptions of the time of the Chola King Parântaka<sup>93</sup> we are enabled to form an idea of the rural administration in those days not only, but even of earlier times. The particular records referred to are of the nature of instructions laid down by Parântaka to explain how the system that had come down from ancient times had to be worked. The object of these regulations being that the 'wicked men might perish, while good men might prosper,' we have to take it that they are of the nature of supplementary regulations.

Every unit, sometimes a single village, oftener a union had a general assembly to look after the affairs of the village or the

91. Sec. 26, Govt. Epigraphist's Report for 1900.

92. Epigraphist's Report for 1907, Sec. 42, this also contains 7 other instances of accidents.

93. Epigraphist's Report for 1899 of Secs. 68—73.

union as the case may be. Under this general body whose number varied perhaps even up to five hundred, there were smaller bodies whose business it was to look after particular sections of the administration. These were the committees for tanks, for gardens, for justice, for general supervision, for the wards, (kuḍumbu), for the fields, for supervising Udâsinas, etc. There are two others which are mentioned sometimes: 1. for gold supervision, and 2. pancha-vâra-vâriyam. The latter probably refers to the committee of general management corresponding to the pancha pradânas or aimberungulu. The former, of course, would refer to a currency committee.

*Election Rule* :—Each union was divided into hamlets and wards, the former appears to have been geographical and the latter political. Uftaramallur the particular union under consideration, had 12 hamlets and 30 wards. First of all the names of men eligible in each ward were written on tickets and sent to the assembly with a covering ticket stating the number recommended. Secondly, these tickets were to be thrown into a pot and one chosen by lot. The following were eligible for the pot ticket:—

1. One with  $\frac{1}{4}$  vêli of tax-paying land.
2. One with a house built on his own site.
3. Those who were below 75 and above 35.
4. Those that knew Mantrabrâhmana and were able to teach it.
5. " Even if one owns only one-eighth vêli of land, he shall have his name written on a pot-ticket and put into the pot in case he has learnt one Veda and one of the four *Bhashyas* and can explain it."
6. Among those possessing the foregoing qualifications :—
  - (a) Only such as are conversant with business and conduct themselves according to sacred rules shall be chosen ;
  - (b) Those who have acquired their wealth by honest means, whose minds are pure and who have not been on any of these committees for the last three years shall also be chosen.

## DISQUALIFICATIONS :—

1. Those who have been on any of these committees but have not submitted their accounts and their relations specified below.

- (a) The sons of the elder and younger sisters of their mothers.
- (b) The sons of their paternal aunts and maternal uncles,
- (c) The brothers of their mothers.
- (d) The brothers of their fathers.
- (e) Their brothers.
- (f) Their fathers-in-law.
- (g) The brothers of their wives.
- (h) The husbands of their sisters.
- (i) The sons of their sisters.
- (j) The sons-in-law.
- (k) Their fathers.
- (l) Their sons.

2. Those against whom illicit sexual intercourse or the first four of the five great sins are recorded, *viz* :—killing a Brahman, drinking intoxicating liquors, theft, committing adultery with the wife of a spiritual teacher, and associating with any one guilty of those crimes.

All the various relations of these as specified above.

3. Those that were excluded, perhaps personally :—

- (a) Those who have been outcast for association (with low people) till they should have performed the expiatory ceremonies.
- (b) Those who are foolhardy.
- (c) Those who had stolen or plundered the property of others.

4. Those who were excluded for life :—

- (a) Those who had taken forbidden dishes and become pure by expiation.
- (b) Those who had committed . . . . . sins and have become pure by expiation.

- (c) Those that had become village pests and similarly pure.
- (d) Those guilty of sexual intercourse and purified likewise.

All these were excluded in the election, and the other qualified candidates had their names entered in the pot-tickets sent with a covering ticket stating the actual number from each ward. A full meeting of the village assembly including the young and old was then called for the purpose. All the temple priests in the village on the day were to attend without exception and be seated along with the assembly, in the village hall. In the midst of the temple priests one of them, the oldest, stood up and lifted an empty pot to be seen by all those present. Any young boy who knows nothing about the matter hands over one of the thirty packets received from the wards. The contents of the packet are thrown into the empty pot and well shaken. From this packet one ticket is taken by the boy and handed over to the standing priest, the arbitrator. The latter receives it on the palm of his hand with his five fingers open. He then reads out the name on the ticket. This ticket is read again by all the priests in the hall. The name thus read is then put down and accepted. Similarly one man was chosen for each of the wards.

“Of the thirty persons thus chosen, those who had previously been on the garden supervision (committee), and those who are advanced in learning and those who are advanced in age shall be chosen for the committee of annual supervision.” Of the rest twelve shall be taken for the garden supervision and the remaining six shall form the tank supervision (committee). The last two committees shall be chosen after *an oral expression of opinion*. The great men who are members of these three committees shall hold office for full three hundred and sixty days and then retire. If any one who is on the committees is found guilty of any offence, he shall be removed (at once). For appointing the committees after these have retired, the members of the committee for the ‘supervision of justice’ in the twelve hamlets (of Uttaramallur) shall convene a meeting with the help of the arbi-

trator. The selection shall be by drawing pot-tickets according to this order which lays down the rules (thereof)."

For the Pancha-vâra-vâriyam and the (committee) for the 'supervision of gold,' names shall be written for the pot-tickets in the thirty wards, and..... ..thirty men shall be chosen as above. From these thirty tickets twelve men shall be chosen. Six out of these twelve (men) shall form the gold supervision (committee) and the remaining six constitute the pancha-vâra-vâriyam. When drawing pot-tickets for the appointment of these two committees next year, the wards that had already been represented (during the year in question) or the committees shall be excluded and the appointments made from the remaining wards by *an oral expression of opinion*. Those "who have ridden on asses" and those who have committed forgery shall not have (their names) written on the pot-tickets and put in the pot."

"Arbitrators and those who have earned their wealth by honest means shall write the accounts (of the village). One who was writing the accounts shall not be appointed to that office again until he submits his accounts (for the period during which he was in office) to the great men of the big committee (in charge) of the accounts, and is declared to have been honest. The accounts which one has been writing, he shall submit himself and other accountants shall not be brought to close his accounts.

These were the rules promulgated by Parântaka I to make rural administration more efficient. The rules shew considerable anxiety to keep the wicked ones among the villagers out; but who the wicked ones were and what their wickedness consisted in we are not informed. Failure to render accounts of the year appears to have been the chief trouble. It is not clear whether the accountants were honorary or paid and how they were elected. Offices seem to have been strictly annual, though this strictness itself would imply that the tendencies were the other way at the time, perhaps abnormally so. Both election and lot were, on the Athenian model, made use of for appointing the officials of the year. This strict rotation of offices would give every one of the villagers the chance of acquainting himself with the work of

administration of the affairs of his village; and make the general committee of supervision very efficient in its control of the smaller committees. This and the committee for the supervision of justice appear to have been constituted in a way to command respect, but how they were constituted and in what manner they differed from the others we are not informed. In this fashion was the machinery provided for carrying on the various functions which fell to the lot of a rural unit.

That these rules were acted upon and enforced severely is in evidence in No. 583 of 1904 of date 1234-35 A.D. which records the dismissal of a village accountant and the debarring of his relations from holding the appointment for cheating.

#### DIVISIONS, &c. OF THE EMPIRE.

A number of these rural units constituted a district (or *nāḍu*) and a number of these again formed a *kōṭṭam* (Sans. *kōshṭaka*) elsewhere but a *vaḷanāḍu* (fertile country) in the Chola country proper which, as far as could be made out, was divided into eight such divisions, *viz.*, (1) *Arumolīdēva vaḷanāḍu*, (2) *Kshatriya sikhāmaṇi vaḷanāḍu*, (3) *Uyyakonḍān vaḷanāḍu*, (4) *Rajēndra-simha vaḷanāḍu*, (5) *Keralāntaka vaḷanāḍu*, (6) *Rajāsraaya vaḷanāḍu*, (7) *Pandyakulāsani vaḷanāḍu*, (8) *Nittavinōdha vaḷanāḍu*. A number of these divisions went to make a province (*maṇḍalam*) which had originally been an independent kingdom gradually absorbed into the rising Empire of the Cholas. Each province was under a viceroy, who was either a scion of the dispossessed royal families or a prince of the blood. At any rate from the days of *Rajādhiraja* it had become the fashion to confer viceroalties upon near kinsmen such as, uncles, brothers, sons, &c., perhaps because of the general revolt of the frontier provinces. We find, however, several Pallavas in positions of influence and trust. The whole Empire of the Cholas (except the *Vengi* country which occupied all along the position of a dependent ally) was divided into six provinces, each of which had, at least, two alternative names: (1) its original name as an independent kingdom and (2) a new name derived generally from the titles of the Emperor who conquered or from those of the viceroy whose

rule over the province was specially distinguished. These provinces were :—(1) the Tonḍamaṇḍalam or Jayangondachōla-maṇḍalam (the Pallava country, embracing the coast districts between the rivers, the Southern Pennar and the North Pennar, if not the Krishna. (2) The Chōlamaṇḍalam itself. (The districts of Tanjore and Trichinopoly). (3) Rājarājamaṇḍalam comprising a part at least of the Pandya and the Kērala country, (Parts of Madura and the Travancore country). (4) The Kongu country or Adhirājarāja maṇḍalam, earlier Sōla Kēralamaṇḍalam, (Districts of Salem and Coimbatore). (5) Gangaikondachōla maṇḍalam, (Districts of Mysore and Bangalore),—the western part of the Ganga country of Mysore. (6) The Nikharilichōla maṇḍalam embracing the eastern part of the Ganga country of Mysore, the Bāna kingdom to the south-east and the Vaiṭumba country to the north-east (District of Kolar in Mysore, a part of North Arcot and Salem and the Maharājavāḍy, part of the Cuddapah District).

#### CHARACTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

That the administration of the Chōlas was highly systematised early is amply proved by the fragments of their records that have come down to us on stones and copper. But the wonder is what could have happened to the records in the archives of the Government. Much earlier than the days of Rājarāja or even Parāntaka, the Chola administration had been reduced to some sort of system and the title of the Chief Secretary "O'laināyakam" shows that there were royal records on palmyra leaves (of which the epigraphical records were mere copies) kept at head-quarters. Besides these, as the inscriptions at Karuvūr and other places show, there were registers kept of the royal orders by each of the Mahāsabhas. Regret, as we may, the disappearance of these records, we have, thanks to the untiring industry of the epigraphical department, enough of material before us to gain an idea of the general character of the Chōla administration.

We learn that the lauds under cultivation were carefully surveyed and holdings registered at least a century before the



famous Domesday record of William the Conqueror. The inscriptions of Rājarāja referring occasionally to "the book" show that the survey was correct to  $\frac{1}{52,428,800,000}$  of a vēli of land which would approximately be equivalent to  $\frac{1}{50,000}$  of a square inch (a vēli being  $6\frac{2}{3}$  acres). The unit of linear measure was the 'royal foot' Śrīpātha of Kulōttunga) during the later period, from which was derived the unit measure of area. We find also graduated rods of 16 and 18 spans used in land measure earlier. Measured lands were entered either in kuḷi or in vēli in the Chola country proper; while the standard measure of other portions of the Empire varied a little from that of this part. The royal dues, were taken either in kind or in gold or in both. These were fixed per kuḷi and the expressions "calculated" (Kāṇikkaḍan) and "settled" (Nichaiyitta) produce occur in some records which probably meant the revenue as entered against the particular holding by previous survey calculation and that founded on actual yield (during revision) <sup>94</sup>.

This latter must have been quite feasible as the revenues were

94. Here I beg leave most respectfully to differ from Dewan Bahadur Srinivasaragava Aiyangar who 'surmises' that these terms meant respectively the gross outturn and the Government share. He refers to an inscription of Kulōttunga, and finds, that in some cases the revenue exceeds the outturn and in others it comes up to near two-thirds of the outturn. The former he explains away as due to errors of writing. A glance down the list given on the next page of his work shows as do a number of Rajaraja's inscriptions in the Tanjore Temple, that the Government demand came up to 100 kalams of paddy a vēli. Kulōttunga made a re-survey of the lands in 1086 A. D. (Epigraphist's report for 1900, section 25, page 10) and the record quoted is only a re-adjustment. Kulōttunga had the reputation of having abolished the tolls (Sungandavirtachola). Many of the figures quoted in the passage, as calculated produce, work up to 100 kalams a vēli and in several there had been brought about a reduction. In others there was an enhancement, which would naturally follow a re-survey which was, as seems probable, undertaken to bring about an adjustment, as some lands might possibly have been over-assessed in consequence of the village assemblies receiving often the cost as well as the capitalized value of the revenue of lands made tax-free by themselves. One result of this might have been to enhance unduly the revenue payable by the tax-paying lands as the assemblies would have had to pay the same amount to Government, as would appear from the large number of extracts quoted above (*vide* Progress of Madras Presidency, appendix sec. I. D. and E., pp. 17 to 20) *vide* previous part of this paper, p. 78.

collected by the village assemblies which could find out the actual yield to a nicety. If the Government dues were not paid the penalty was, of course, the taking over of the land by the village assembly to be disposed of otherwise; and the liability of the landholder ceased there. The person and the personalities of the man were not touched, as they are in our more civilized times. A record of the time of Vikrama Chola shows that the land revenue was not paid owing to floods and the villagers put the land up to sale by public auction and sold 2,000 kuḷi of wet land for 25 kâsu and another bit of 4,250 kuḷi of dry land for 20 kâsu. The same power was given to the sabhas over lands transferred to other proprietors by the circular order of Râjarâja above quoted.

#### THE EMPERORS AND THEIR WORK.

The Emperors whether they were in their capitals or out in their progress through their dominions did transact office-business. In a number of inscriptions we find it stated that the Emperor was seated in a particular part of the palace and issued orders which were committed to writing by the Royal Secretary (corresponding to the Private Secretaries of our days).<sup>95</sup> Whatever was the order it had to be approved of by the Chief Secretary (Olainâyakam) and by another high Dignitary, (Perundaram) Irâyiravan Pallavaiyan in the days of Râjarâja and his son. Finally it was transmitted to the party concerned by the despatching clerk (Viḍaiyadhikhârî) which again meeting the approval of the viceroy or governor and the assemblies concerned was registered and sent into the record office. In illustration of how this was done I quote the following from an inscription of Vîrarâjêndra :—“ Being graciously seated in the royal bathing-hall within the palace at Gangaikonḍa Sôḷapuram (the King) granted with libation of water, the village of Pâkkûr in Vengâla nâdu, (a district) of Adhirâjarâja maṇḍalam, (and) was pleased to order that this village, excluding the tax-paying lands in the possession of the ryots, should become tax-free temple land from (the year) which was opposite to the third year (of his reign) including revenue, taxes, small tolls, eḷuvai, ugavai,

<sup>95.</sup> Epi. Rep. and Vikrama Cholan Uta., verse 50. Indian Antiquary, Vol. xxii, p. 145.

the three fines called manṛupāḍu, danḍam, kuṛṛam, everywhere where the iguana runs, the tortoise crawls, an ant-hill-rises and sprouts grow, the grass for the calves and the lands enjoyed in full by the great village; that (this village) should pay to (the God) Mahâdêva of Tiruvânilai (temple) at Karuvûr in the same nâḍu, the revenue hitherto paid by this village, *viz.*, 303½ kaḷanju and one and one-twentieths manjâḍi of gold; and 3,531 kalam, 1 tûṇi of paddy and that this village should be entered in the revenue register (*vari*) as tax-free temple land from this year forward."

"Accordingly the Royal Secretary Vânavan Pallavaraiyan, the lord of Tâḷi Tiruppanangâdu and the Lord of Nêrivâyil in Paṇiyûr nâḍu, a district of Kshatriya Sikhâmani vaḷanâḍu, having written that the king had been pleased to order (thus,) and the Chief Secretary Achchudan Râjarâjan *alias* Tonḍamân, the citizen Uttamachôlan *alias* Râjarâja Brahmâdhirajan, Araiyan Râjarâjan *alias* Vîrarâjendra Jayamurinâḍâlvân, and Vîrarâjendramangalappêraraiyan having unanimously approved (of this document) Vîrabhadran Tillaiviḍangan *alias* Villavan Râjarâjan ordered :— "Let it be entered in our register in accordance with intimation received." In accordance with this order there was a meeting of a number of members, but here the record of their deliberations is unfortunately obliterated. "Our revenue officers having entered (this) in the revenue register in accordance with the royal order, let it be engraved upon copper and on stone (that this village was given) as tax-free temple land to the God Mahâdêva of Tiruvânilai temple for the expenses of burnt offerings, oblations and worship."

#### RESOURCES OF THE EMPIRE.

This extract will give a far better idea of the administrative machinery of the Cholas than pages of description. I shall now proceed to a consideration of the resources of the Empire and how they were spent. Quoted under is a part of an inscription of Tribhuvanachakravartin Kônêrinmaikonḍân, which enumerates in the fullest available detail the numerous fiscal items of the Chôla rule. What detracts, however, from the full interest of the inscription is that at this distance of time we cannot understand the exact

nature of any ; nor even the general character of a few of these. The record is a gift of land free of taxes :—<sup>96</sup> “ These seventy-seven, six-twentieths, and one-hundred and sixtieths (vēli) of land, which may be more or less, we gave : including the trees over ground, the wells underground, in the land and all other benefits (prâptis) of whatever kind, having first excluded the farmer owners and the hereditary proprietors, and having purchased (it) as tax-free property (Kâṇi) for the 106 Bhāṭṭas of this village and for the two shares (of the image) of Sâmantanârâyanavinṅgar Emberumân, from the rainy season of the 35th (year of our reign) as a meritorious gift (dharmadhana) with libations of water, with the right to bestow mortgage or sell (it) as a tax-free grant of land to last as long as the moon and the sun.

(This grant) includes all kinds (vargas) of taxes (kaḍamai) and rights (kuḍimai), *viz.*, the right to cultivate kâr (a kind of paddy), maruva (a fragrant plant : origanum majoranum), single flowers (orupu), flowers for the market (kaḍaipu), lime trees, dry crops, red water-lilies, areca-palms, betal-vines, saffron, ginger, plantains, and all other crops (payir) ; all kinds of revenue (âya) including tax in money (kâsukkaḍamai), oḍukkuppaḍi, urainâli, the share of the village watchman who is placed over the vēṭṭis (paths), the share of the karnam who measures (paddy, &c.), the unripe fruit in kârtigai (month), the tax on looms (tari irai), the tax on oil-mills (sekkirai), the tax on trade (setṭirai),<sup>97</sup> taṭṭoli, the tax on goldsmiths (taṭṭârpaṭṭam), the dues on animals and tanks, the tax on water-courses (oḷukkunîr paṭṭam), tolls (vaḷi âyam), inavari, (appears to be a tax on caste) the tax on weights (iḍaivari), the fine for rotten drugs (aḷugal 'sarakku), the tax on bazaars (angâḍipâṭṭam) and the salt tax (uppâyam) ; [what follows is different from either of the above groups ; and the bearing of the items is not known ; I set them down here with the hope that some one who has the means may explain the terms correctly : panjupili (பஞ்சுபிலி), Sandhivîgrahapperu (சந்திவிக்கிரகப்பேறு), ilânjinaipeṛu (இலாஞ்சினைப்பேறு), vâsalvinyôgam (வாசல்வினியோகம்), paḍaiyilârmuraimai

<sup>96</sup> No. 22, Vol. II, Pt. I ; South Ind. Inscriptions.

<sup>97</sup> (Rather on profits).

(படையிலார்முறைமை), kūrṛilakkai (கூற்றிலக்கை), kaḍaikkūṭṭilakki (கடைக் கூட்டிலக்கை), taṇḍalilakkai (தண்டலிலக்கை), viḍaipper (விடைப்பேர்), mādhappaḍi (மாதப்படி), araikkālvasi (அரைக்கால்வாசி), ūsivāsi (ஊசிவாசி), vilaittuṇḍam (விலைத்துண்டம்), ṇirāni (நீராணி),<sup>97(a)</sup> kaverikkulai (காவிரிக்குலை), dēvakuḍimai (தேவகுடிமை), nāṭṭuppāḍhi (காட்டுப்பாதி), ānaikkūḍam (ஆனைக்கூடம்), kudiraipandi (குதிரைப்பந்தி).] Thus in accordance with this order (ōlai) it shall be engraved on stone and copper."

This is a long list of taxes and would stand comparison with the list of seigniorial dues of Europe before the French Revolution; but we are dealing with times about a 1000 years from us. That there were so many imposts and of such variety points to the conclusion that these were so many devices for increasing the income of the Government. The chief source of this income was the land revenue; and if this were capable of direct increase, the state revenue could be easily raised by taking a greater proportion of the gross outturn of produce without having recourse to the vexatious and roundabout way of gaining the same end. If the customary proportion could not be altered, the only other course would be to devise a number of petty imposts which, though not the most economical, is still an indirect way of increasing the revenue and as such less seen or understood. We may then take what is actually stated in one of the inscriptions of Rājadhira as true:—that the portion of the produce demanded and taken by the Government was one-sixth of the gross outturn. He is said to have taken 'the sixth and assumed the title Jayaṅgonaḍchola as though the sixth were the most usual proportion. The additional taxes (āyas) were divided into two classes: the internal (antarāya) and external (other āyas). The latter must have been of the character of tolls and octroi generally. The incidence of the former was chiefly on land as even handicraftsmen were paid often in land for their customary work. This, we find, was commuted into one-tenth,<sup>98</sup> in the inscription of Vīrarājendra at

97 (a) Probably corresponding to the Nīrganti, the official who controls tank sluices for irrigation.

98. 25 Kasu it is; but commuted into 100 Kalams at 4 Kalams per 1,000 Kalams. In the days of Rājārāja a Kasu=2 Kalams.

Tiruvallam quoted above. The total demand upon land, therefore, would have come up to four-fifteenth of the gross outturn. From a number of inscriptions we find that the total revenue, on an average, from lands in the most fertile portions of the Tanjore and Trichinopoly Districts was 100 kalams per vèli by the Âḍavallan measure (equal to the Rajakêsari or Arumolîdêvan, the standard measure of the days of Râjarâja) kept in possession of the temple authorities for safe custody. The Âḍavallan measure of paddy is found by the late Mr. Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar to have weighed 192 tolas while its modern counterpart weighs 240 tolas. This would give the revenue per vèli of six acres and two-thirds (2,000 kuḷi) at 80 modern kalams of paddy (a kalam is about 3 maunds) and the gross outturn at 300 kalams, a very high yield, perhaps not impossible as the lands in question are those that pay the highest revenue situate in the most fertile parts of the Tanjore and Trichinopoly districts. All lands had not to pay the same revenue which varied from 50 to 80 modern kalams of paddy or from 4 to 9 kaḷanju of gold. The village assemblies<sup>99</sup> must have collected the royal dues with some elasticity as the order of Râjarâja quoted above would show.

The unspent part of this revenue was kept in "up-country" treasuries against demands from headquarters. At a certain stage these revenue demands might have become so heavy that it must have been deemed necessary to abolish some at least of these dues.

One such act of clear-sighted statesmanship, it is, that got Kulôttunga the First, the popular soubriquet of 'Sungandavirtachôla (the Chôla who abolished the tolls), which is handed down to us in a suburb of that name in Tanjore town. In case of floods and other calamities remissions of taxes would appear to have been expected; but in one instance on record in Vikrama Chola's reign re-

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99. The village assemblies often remitted taxes on certain pieces of land receiving its cost and the capitalized value of the revenues due. How they spent this money is not on record so far; but that the revenues might have been spread over the other lands is probable. Perhaps they applied the money for general improvements and making fresh clearings. In the latter case they began with a nominal revenue upon the lands in question gradually raising it through a term of years to the normal proportion. South Ind., Ins., Vol. I, 65.

missions were not granted in case of floods and some of the village lands had to be put up to public sale by the villagers, as referred to above. This would not seem to be enough to warrant the inference that "remissions were unknown" in those days.

#### STANDARDS OF MEASURE, &c.

It was stated before, that the royal dues were paid either in kind or in gold or partly in the one and partly in the other. Some of the minor taxes were paid in *ka'su*. The unit of land was a *vêli* of 2,000 *kuḷis* (six and two-thirds acres) ; of grain a *kalam* (about 3 maunds); of gold a *kaḷanju* (about one-sixth ounce Troy). The unit of currency was the gold *ka'su* (seven-twentieths of a *kaḷanju* or about 28 grs. Troy). This coin appears to have passed for its metallic value; because the great Râjarâja got all gifts to the temple carefully weighed and appraised. All gold ornaments among these are entered with their weights alone and no value, while jewels set with brilliants, &c., are entered with their weights (by the standard *Âdvallân kâsukkallu*) and their value in *kâsu*. We can safely infer that the *kâsu* passed for its weight in gold although its value in grain and cattle might vary. Each *kâsu* was equivalent to 2 *kalam*s of paddy in the days of Râjarâja and his son, though it exchanged for so much as 4 *kalam*s about 50 years later. One buffalo, 2 cows and 6 sheep exchanged for 2 *kâsu* in the former period. The total amount of revenue realized by the temple authorities was probably turned into cash, although it is possible that they kept a portion in grain alone. Much of the cash in the treasury, however, was lent out to village assemblies or even to individuals on the guarantee of the assemblies. Occasionally when they lent out to townfolk, the loan was given on the joint responsibility of the relatives of the person or even the whole trade concerned. An interest of 12½ per cent. was uniformly charged whether in grain or in *kasu*. Several of these loans were given for providing the temple with the daily and periodical requirements ; but often loans were made for purely agricultural purposes. In the former case the debtors had to pay interest in ghee, oil, camphor, or any other commodity agreed

upon before hand, while in the latter the interest was paid either in cash or in kind.

#### EXPENDITURE

The main heads of expenditure of the royal revenues were the civil administration, the maintenance of armies, the building and beautifying of temples and cities, and the carrying out of useful public works on a scale beyond the capabilities of local revenues and administrations.

The cost of civil administration was met from the rural revenues, the higher officers as well as the lower ones being rewarded by gifts of land or by assignments of revenue. Deducting this cost from the total revenue, the residue reached the royal treasury, to be spent on the other items.

The Cholas appear to have had a regular army divided into sections according to the kind of arms they carried and according as they were mounted or otherwise. We find reference to the 'chosen body of archers,' the 'chosen foot soldiers of the body-guard,' the 'chosen,' horsemen and the 'chosen' infantry of the "right hand" <sup>100</sup>. I have not come across any reference to the infantry of the "left hand" <sup>101</sup>. Some of the princes are referred to as 'ânaichêvagan' (perhaps commander of an elephant corps). "Malaiyânai Oṛṛaichchêvagan" (the unequalled elephant man.) That they maintained an efficient fleet is borne out by references to the destruction of the Chera fleet at Kândalûr, placed on the west coast by Dr. Hultzsch; the capture of Kaḍâram by Râjendra after a sea-fight, and several invasions of Ceylon and Burmah. Besides this epigraphical evidence, ancient Tamil literature is full of details and descriptions of the sailing craft of those days. They also shew abundant evidence of nautical experience by the figures and tropes made use of in the works. To give only one example in illustration; the author of the 'Epic of the Auklet' refers to beacon lights being placed on the tops of palmyra trunks in lamps made of fresh clay at Puhâr or Kaveryppûmbaṭṭinam on

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100. Infantry recruited from the artisan class.

101. The agricultural class is excluded from military service in the code of law.



dark nights when the sea was rough. No clear reference is available as to the administration of the army.

#### PUBLIC WORKS

The Cholas were great builders ; builders not only of cities and temples (sometimes for strategic purposes, sometimes in obedience to the dictates of their vanity) but also of useful irrigation works. These may be divided into major works and minor works. These latter were probably constructed, and certainly looked after, by the P. W. committee of the sabhas. The former were made and perhaps maintained by the Government. Passing over the ancient Chola Karikala<sup>102</sup> and his more modern namesake reputed by tradition to have built the embankments on the Kavery and cut the main channels for irrigation respectively, we find works of the kind undertaken by later rulers. The names<sup>103</sup> of most of the main channels of irrigation at present watering the Kavery Delta occurs in the inscriptions of this dynasty of rulers. The following two instances should suffice to give us an idea of the importance attached to artificial irrigation works in those days. Driving across the town of Tanjore along the road to Trivadi the first river we pass over is now known Vaḍavâru (northern river). This river is called in the inscriptions Vīrachōla Vaḍavâru. (There is another Vīrachōlan river branching from the Kavery a few miles below the bridge at Kumbhakonam). This was evidently cut out from the Venṇâr by Vīrachōla to feed a big irrigation tank in the now postal town of Vaḍuvur in the Mannarguḍi Taluq, which has no other feeder channel and which waters a large area, else unfit for cultivation.

102. "Madras can claim to have introduced, if not originated, a style of construction, which has been widely adopted within and without the Empire, and to have established a plan of dealing with deltaic lands which has not been improved upon. A portion of the credit for these achievements belongs to the native engineers of the days preceding the British advent. They had conceived the idea of controlling a river at the head of its delta, and of thus securing the regular watering of their lands."—*Irrigated India* by Hon. Alfred Deakin.

103. The Peruvajavōy Channel, in the District of Trichinopoly, The Arasalar, The Nāṭṭâr, The Kaḍuvâyâru and the Pāndavōyâru should suffice. Of the last two, the first is a branch of the Veṭṭâr and the next from the Venṇâr (*vide* any irrigation map of the Kavery Delta).

The other instance is the large artificial reservoir at Gangaikondaśolapuram in the Wodiarpalliam Taluq of the Trichinopoly District. I take the following from Pharoah's Gazetteer of South India<sup>104</sup>—"It may also be mentioned that in Wodiarpalliam Taluq there is an embankment 16 miles long running north and south provided with several substantial sluices and of great strength, which in former times must have formed one of the largest reservoirs in India.....The tank has been ruined and useless for many years and its bed is now almost wholly overgrown with high and thick jungle. It is said traditionally that its ruin was wilful and the act of an invading army. Near the northern extremity of the bund there is a village now surrounded by a jungle, called Gangaikondapuram ; immediately in its vicinity is a pagoda of a very large size, and costly workmanship ; and close by surrounded and overgrown with jungle are some remains of ancient buildings now resembling the mounds or 'heaps' which indicated the site of ancient Babylon, but in which the village elders point out the various parts of an extensive and magnificent palace. When this palace was in existence Gangaikondapuram was the wealthy and flourishing capital of a small monarchy<sup>105</sup> and the great tank spread fertility and industry over miles and miles of what is now trackless forest..... Speaking of the noble temple of Gangaikondapuram it must not be omitted that when the lower Coleroon Anicut was built, the structure was dismantled of a large part of the splendid granite sculptures which adorned it and the enclosing wall was almost wholly destroyed in order to obtain material for the work." This magnificent relic of lost greatness and a forgotten empire was the work of the great son of a still greater father who built the temple at, and fortified the city of, Tanjore. The temple at Gangaikondapuram measures 372 ft. by 584 ft. The lingam made of a single

104. pp. 338-339 of Mr. Kanakasabbai Pillai's "The conquest of Bengal and Burma by the Tamils," *Madras Review* for August 1902, pp. 247, *et seq.*

105. Yes ! Small indeed as it did embrace what is now the Madras Presidency and a part of Mysore. (For the extent of the Chola Empire see *ante* p. 43)

block of polished granite is 30 ft. now unfortunately split in twain by a stroke of lightning. The main tower of the Tanjore temple is about 200 ft. high and the single block of granite which forms the minaret is  $25\frac{1}{2}$  ft. square,<sup>106</sup> calculated to weigh about 80 tons and had been raised to its present position by an incline which rested on the ground 4 miles away from the temple. These structures are believed to be the outcome of absolute power commanding unlimited labour.<sup>107</sup> There is a tradition current, however, of Karikâlachola (may be either the first or the second of the name, it does not matter for our purpose) that he paid the labourers on the Kavery embankments in depreciated coin (coins of leather, as it is said) in consequence of which there was a dust-storm which overwhelmed the capital and made him flee for life. This story has its value alongside of the inference that as these temples were years in building and of very great cost, they must have been the result of forced unpaid labour. The labour might have been forced or not, provided it had been paid. The builders of these structures ruled over what is now the Madars Presidency and half of Mysore; their administration was not very expensive; and as great conquerors they must have brought from their wars much of the accumulated treasure of other powerful and prosperous kingdoms.<sup>108</sup>

Whether the labour was paid for or not, (there are instances of slavery in the 13th century and where five men and women were sold for 100 Kâsu<sup>109</sup>) we owe to these Chôlas not only the grand structures, the temples, and palaces (indirectly useful, at least, as providing material for anicuts) but also the great part of the net-work of irrigation channels in the Tanjore District and a part of Trichinopoly:

We have ample evidence of the country having been traversed by grand trunk roads. That armies could march to Kôttâru

106. Sewell's List of Antiquities, Vol. I, p. 227.

107. Progress of Madras Presidency, pp. 14 & 15.

108. Rajaraja's inscriptions of gifts to the Tanjore temple refer to the captured Chera Treasure.

109. Epigraphist's report, for 1905 Sec. 20; date of record, 1239-1240 A. D.

near Cape Comorin at the one end and the banks of the Mahanadhi, if not the Ganges, at the other of the peninsula, and that trade was carried on largely by means of 'vessels' and 'vehicles' <sup>110</sup> are enough to prove their existence. If more proof be needed we have it in the fact that Kulôttunga planted agricultural colonies "along the road to Kôttâru"; and in the references in some of the inscriptions to roads of 64 spans, &c. There is besides mention of Vaḍugavaḷi road going to the telugu country, Taḍigavaḷi road leading through Tadigaḷnâḍu, and what is more Kīḷavaḷi Eastern Road in inscriptions. There appears to have been a regular service of ferries across rivers maintained either at public expense or by private charity.

#### STANDARD OF LIFE.

We can form an idea of the standard of life in those days from the following few facts gleaned from a number of inscriptions. Râjarâja made allotments from the temple revenue for the several officials in temple service and their annual salaries were fixed as follows. The officer in charge of the temple treasury is mentioned, but the figure opposite his name is obliterated. An accountant got 200 kalams of paddy by the Âḍavallan measure every year; and an under accountant 75 kalams. Bachelor Brahman servants of the temple got each 61 kalams and 4 kâsu, 61 kalams and 5 kâsu, and 91 kalams and 4 kâsu according to their work. These latter officials drew their pay at the city-treasury and the other officials above-mentioned at up-country treasuries. Each temple watchman was paid 100 kalams a year; and each temple woman 100 kalams. An allowance of 120 kalams was made for the annual enacting of the Râjakêsarinaḷakam. The offerings to a particular image, regulated probably by the requirements of a temple priest, are put down at 130 kalams a year. These allowances were probably fixed with reference to the requirements of the family of the class from which the official came. If this had really been the case, we may take the 200 kalams of the Brahman accountant as representing the requirements of an average Brahman family (a

110. Silappadhikaram and Paḷḷinappalai.

temple priest has several perquisites over and above his salary); and the 100 kalams of the watchman, those of the Sudra family. If, with Adam Smith, we can take it that over a long period of time the value of corn does not vary however much its price may, and assume that these represent the value of an equal quantity of grain to-day, the average income of a family per month would have been sixteen rupees and two-thirds and eight rupees and one-third for a Brahman and a Sudra, respectively, on <sup>III</sup> the supposition of the average price of paddy at 1 R. 4 As. per modern kalam. We cannot form any definite conclusion on the slender evidence we have; but if this represents at all the standard of life of those days we have all that is possible for us to know at present.

#### RELIGION, &c.

The Cholas were Saivas by religion; but there is no evidence of the Vaishnavas or the Jains <sup>II</sup> having been persecuted as such, before the days of Kulōttunga who appears to have driven out Rāmānuja from Srfrangam. Râjarâja and his son patronised the Saivitic devotional works by providing for their recital in temples on stated occasions. We find references to gifts to Vaishnava temples and to provision made for the recital of portions of the Nâlâyiraprabhadam. The great temple builder Kōchchengan appears to have been a builder of both classes of temples. <sup>III</sup> Appar, Sundarar, and Sambandar are referred to in some of the inscriptions of Râjarâja and somewhat later we find reference to the works of Kula-sêkhara and Tirumangaiâlvar, two of the twelve Vaishnava âlvârs. The god at the temple of Ukkal is referred to by


111. Mr. Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar's figures per head are Rs. 3-12-0 and Re 1-12-0. The Government of India's Rs. 20 a year per head.

112. The Jains had to pay a tax but the other Hindus also had to pay, such as the righthand and lefthand castes. There is an 'inavari' which if it means anything, ought to have been a tax on caste.

113. Mr. Fergusson writes of the Tanjore Temple:—One of the peculiarities of the Tanjore Temple is that all the sculptures in the gopuras belong to the religion of Vishnu, while everything in the courtyard belongs to that of Siva, an instance of the extreme tolerance that prevailed in the age at which it was erected before these religions became antagonistic.

the name Tiruvāymoḷidēva and Dr. Hultsch is of opinion that Nammāḷvar, the author of the Tiruvāymoḷi, must have lived 'centuries before 1000 A.D.' There is an inscription of Rajendra, of the battle of Koppam fame, which makes provision for the enacting of the Rajakēsarinaṭakam every year. Popular tradition makes Kulōttunga and some at least of his successors great patrons of literature. This dynasty of the Cholas encouraged Tamil literature, but for the date of composition of the great body of extant works we have to look much earlier.

## Revised Pedigree of the Cholas.



deliberate action of the Government of India, who seem to have hesitated long before taking any strong step, although the misgovernment of the Maharaja has been, I fear, of a very glaring description. I would only venture to make this one remark. It should be a satisfaction to members on this side of the House to find with respect to the Government of India that it has not been drawn into the annexation policy which my hon. friend (Mr. Bradlaugh) deprecates, but that it leaves the government of Kashmir under a council of natives of India, guided by the Resident of India; and, in concluding a despatch addressed by the Viceroy of India to the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Viceroy treats him with the greatest consideration and courtesy, and expresses a hope that it may be possible to give greater power to him in the future. At present the Maharaja is put in an ornamental position. He is not deposed, but simply relieved of the powers of ruler of the country, and these powers are confided to a council. I hope, therefore, the House will pause before voting for this motion.

I venture most respectfully to submit that even if—which I entirely deny, and which denial I will, before I conclude this letter, completely maintain—the papers submitted in proof to you by Sir John Gorst did, in your view, justify the Government of India, in its own opinion, in taking action, seeing that the Prince accused denied those allegations, and that no evidence in support of them was produced, the inquiry asked for ought to have been granted. Further that Liberals were justified in expecting that if you took part at all in the division it would be in support of the prayer of the motion.

There are many things germane to the issue in which the Indian Government played the threefold part of Accuser, Judge, and Executioner, which do not appear in the papers you have seen. Some of them



I produce in the pages of this communication. All that Mr. Bradlaugh asked for was that an opportunity should be given for the Maharaja's case to be stated before a competent authority. The decision of such a tribunal would be accepted as final. There is much more involved in the proceedings, which you appear to have treated with so light a heart, than transpired even in debate. First, there are the rights of the people of Kashmir. Surely the Kashmirian population may be permitted to have something to say about the deposition of their ruler. Mr. Gladstone, your honoured chief and mine, on the cession of the Ionian Islands, laid down the true principle of the rights of peoples in such a regard when he said that it was only with the consent of the people ruled that a change of rulers should be made. At the present moment, probably with your acquiescence, the Liberal party and Liberal journals are taking exception to the proposed cession of Heligoland and the Heligolanders to Germany, without the consent of the island people having been first asked and obtained. What is due and fitting in regard to the two thousand Europeans of Frisian race, on a solitary rock in the North Sea, is not unfitting in regard to the million and a-half Kashmirians living under the shadow of the Himalayas and in valleys renowned in poesy, whose ruler has been deposed against their wishes.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, although the

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<sup>1</sup> As an instance of the manner in which the action of the Government of India is regarded in Jammu, the following petition addressed to Mr. C. Bradlaugh, M.P., and presented by him to the House of Commons in July, 1889, is of interest:—

*'The humble petition of the following Dogras of Jammu.*

“The Kashmir State is divided into two portions: one is *Kashmir* proper, inhabited by Brahmin Pundits, and the other is *Jammu*, inhabited by *Dogras*.

Government of India has professed to act in the interests of the people of Kashmir in removing their ruler, no complaint whatever has been made by them. They do not declare that they are aggrieved. On the contrary, if a plebiscite were taken, it is believed nine-tenths or more of the people would call for the Maharaja's speedy restoration. No doubt there was misgovernment in Kashmir, as there is misgovernment in many parts of British India, and as there is, you and I consider, in one important part of the United Kingdom. The misgovernment in Kashmir, however, was misgovernment which could have been removed with His Highness, Pertab Singh, on the Kashmir throne, quite as well as with his removal from all power and authority in his own dominions. Indeed, it was in process of removal by the Maharaja, Lord Dufferin being my authority. Mr. Wingate, the solitary witness cited by the Government of India, says, what no doubt the Maharaja's subjects all felt, namely, that 'His Highness has a ready sympathy for the poor, a keen interest in land questions, and a determination to protect the cultivators against the officials.'

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These *Dogras* form the fighting portion of the State. The present Maharaja Pertab Singh belongs to their caste, and is loved to devotion by them. He has been by a trickery deposed, and his *gadi* occupied by a few strangers, and these strangers are nothing but tools in the hand of the British Resident. The *Dogras* have never known Foreign domination, and the condition to which they have been just reduced has thrown them into great alarm and distress. At the moment the saying among the *Dogras* is that they would rather prefer to be plundered by their own Maharaja than to be rewarded with gold by the slavish Council. The *Dogras* have always fought for the British Government, and will ever fight for it to their last drop of blood. In India it is said that you are the friend of the people, and, therefore, the petitioners appeal to you for help and protection.'

[Here follow signatures.]

I may here mention a few facts concerning the Prince who has been so cruelly maligned by anonymous slanderers—maligned in a manner which would be scouted as disgraceful if adopted in connection with a European Prince. Sir Lepel Griffin, with the shameless audacity which characterizes his conduct towards the Indian races, people and princes alike, declared the Maharaja to be a 'drunken debauchee.' While in India, last year and the year before, I had special opportunities of ascertaining the real character of the Maharaja and of his rule. I am compelled, in justice to Pertab Singh, to say that all the information I received showed that he ruled his dominions with much kindness and good sense; he was animated by staunch loyalty to the British dominance, highly appreciating British over-rule and its many merits, sincerely anxious to further the objects of the Government of India so far as these were compatible with the maintenance of those sovereign rights guaranteed by the Queen to all Indian princes in 1858. No acts of misgovernment have been proved against His Highness; according to my information none exist. It is true, misgovernment—tested by a European standard—exists in Kashmir as it exists in British India. The Maharaja did his best to remedy the evils which were prevalent, and would have continued his good work if opportunity had been given him. It has not yet been proved that the people of Kashmir are not lightly taxed; it is not denied that justice is dispensed with even-handedness by honest and thoroughly capable and trained judges—barristers in some cases having been raised to the Bench, or that public works are flourishing; while those who know the country well

declare that the people are contented and happy, and that in every direction there were, when the Maharaja was deposed, signs of a desire to keep Kashmir in line with the most advanced provinces in the Empire.

I know that vague statements of a contrary character are made. I also know, unfortunately, that it has been the practice of some Anglo-Indians to trade largely on abuses in Kashmir which existed only in their imagination. Writing a year ago on this question, I found occasion to remark that during the reign of the late Maharaja certain Anglo-Indian newspapers were continually writing of the misgovernment of Kashmir, declaring that that misgovernment established occasion for British intervention. The gravest charges of neglect, and even of dreadful cruelty, were brought against the late Maharaja. On one occasion it was declared that His Highness, in order to be saved the expense of feeding his people during a time of great scarcity, actually drowned them by boat-loads at a time in the Srinagar Lake. The Maharaja declined to sit quietly under this calumny, and at his request a Mixed Commission was appointed by the Government of India to inquire into the truth of the story. The Commission found there was no truth in the hideous statement; the people who were said to be drowned were discovered to be living, and were actually produced at the inquiry. Other calumnies of a like kind were circulated, and all, on examination by the British Resident, were found to be false. The late Maharaja was a man of strong will and resolution, and was able to defend himself and his country against the wretched charges brought against him. For a time the land had peace. The present Maharaja,

unfortunately, has not the strength of character and indomitable will of his predecessor. He is an exceedingly kind-hearted and good-natured man, fond of work, never sparing himself, and is greatly solicitous for the welfare of his subjects. All who are brought into contact with him speedily learn to love him.

If ever there was an issue in connection with our administration of India in which a Liberal statesman could have no ground for doubt as to the course he should take it was, I respectfully submit, the issue presented by Mr. Bradlaugh on the 3rd of July. Your late colleagues, with a minor exception or two, recognised this. While it is matter for serious regret and even for indignation that none of them supported Mr. Bradlaugh, there is this much of grace in their conduct, that they left you to go alone into the Government Lobby. The barest justice, that of an accused person being allowed to show cause why a particular course should not have been taken, was sought. You, alone (as I beg again to remind you), among Liberal ex-officials, deliberately refused to a feudatory Prince of the British Empire in India what you would insist upon being granted to the most wretched tenant in Connaught or Commemara.

The significance of your action, and the chief justification for the liberty I am taking in publicly addressing you, lies in the fact that you have been the member responsible in a Liberal Government to the House of Commons for the conduct of Indian affairs; you were honoured by a place in an Administration which gave emphatic proof of its desire to act fairly towards India, under the leadership of one who has been

most friendly in his feelings and expressions towards the Indian people. Several acts of Mr. Gladstone's Governments of 1880-86 put the English rule of India in an altogether new light. There was then—surprising, nay wonderful, as it may seem—a desire displayed to treat the people of our great Empire with fairness. Nothing more than fairness. But that was a marvel. Such conduct aroused hopes of brighter and better times for the princes and people of India alike. A yet higher position than that you have already occupied towards India may, ere many months are past, be conferred upon you. In the House on Thursday, July 3, you represented the past, and possibly the future, Liberal official relations of your party with two hundred and sixty millions of people. Your vote, therefore, in itself carried great weight. More than that, your conduct must have influenced some of your fellow-members to vote against Mr Bradlaugh's motion. And, as things go in the House of Commons, not surprisingly so. It is easy to imagine hon. members who would shield themselves under the remark: 'Oh! Shuttleworth has looked into the matter: he is satisfied that the Government of India has done rightly'; and who, having satisfied their consciences by allowing you to think for them, followed you into the 'No' lobby. Even if the Government of India had done rightly in the course they took, the Maharaja of Kashmir, I submit, was entitled to the fair and open trial which he desires, and which Mr. Bradlaugh was hindered in securing by *your* vote among others, and by your vote more than by any other. *Your* vote, the vote of a sometime Under Secretary of State for India, a possibly high official in a new

Administration, prevents your reconsideration of the case when, as you must have known, in due course it would in all probability be submitted to you should Mr. Gladstone, as it is reasonable to suppose he will, again ask you to go to the India Office. Loyalty to the Department over which one has presided, and may again preside, is, I venture to urge, carried too far when it permits of the intervention in a debate of an ex-official of your eminence, and the prejudgment by you of a case only a portion of one side of which was before you.

So grievous a wrong has been maintained by the vote of the House of Commons on the 3rd of July that, as one acquainted, to some extent at first hand, and more largely by the possession of many documents from wholly trustworthy parties, and also as a humble member of the political party of which you are an eminent representative and office-holder, I venture to publicly address to you this letter. I endeavour, in the pages which follow, without a particle of passion against members of the Government of India who are responsible for the course which has been taken against the Maharaja of Kashmir, to tell the story of the treatment to which His Highness Pertab Singh has been subjected. The blanks left in the Government papers are, as far as may be, filled up by facts which, if opportunity were given, could be fully established. Some degree of heat may be found in a portion of my remarks. I do not profess to be able to write of such doings as are here portrayed without stirrings of indignation. If passion of any kind be displayed it is directed against the institution known as the Calcutta Foreign Office, and not against any

individual. Some day the many wrongs perpetrated by that department of the Government of India may obtain publicity. Should the day ever arrive, Englishmen will hardly credit the statements which must be made if an honest record is forthcoming. The lack of any controlling power over its doings, either in India or in England, has enabled the Foreign Office of India to act in a manner which could not receive sanction in any English Parliament which this century has known. However, that is a matter which, in due time, will come up for settlement. The many wrongs done by the Calcutta Foreign Office, like the proverbial chickens, will one day come home to roost. The reckoning will not be a satisfactory one.

In the succeeding pages I set forth with the utmost fairness all that has been urged for and against the virtual deposition of the Maharaja of Kashmir. I keep back nothing urged on the other side; I do not, consciously, extenuate any wrong done by him for whom I plead, while, most assuredly, I set down naught in malice. I hope my presentation of the facts may be considered worthy of your most attentive perusal, and that it may be read with care by you and by the many other persons to whom this communication, publicly addressed to an ex-Secretary of State for India, will be sent.



## THE BEGINNING OF THE END IN KASHMIR.

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EARLY in last year much excitement was caused in India and (in a less degree) in England by the announcement that the Maharaja of Kashmir had been discovered to be engaged in treasonable correspondence with Russia. It was stated that the British Resident in Kashmir had proceeded to Calcutta with ample proofs in his possession of the Maharaja's treachery. Further, it was remarked that the Maharaja, conscious of his guilt, had placed the resignation of his rule in the hands of the representative of the British Government. Soon afterwards it was stated that the resignation had been accepted, and that a Council of State, under the control of the Resident, had been appointed. By these means Kashmir virtually passed under the direct control of the Government of India. Another independent State in India was wiped out of existence.

In England it was felt that a danger to the Empire had been removed, and not a little credit, it was agreed, attached to the Viceroy of India for what he had done. At what seemed like a crisis in affairs, Lord Lansdowne had acted with decision and promptitude, entitling him to much honour. Within a very short time, how-

ever, a telegram was published in the London papers to the effect that the Maharaja, in an autograph letter addressed to the Viceroy, denied that he had been guilty of treacherous conduct. He asserted that the treasonable letters were forgeries. He protested in strong and pathetic language against the harsh treatment to which he had been subjected, denied that he had resigned his rulership, begged for a further opportunity of ruling his own dominions, and, in a not unnatural frenzy, besought Lord Lansdowne, if he would not restore him and thus save him from present ignominy, to shoot him through the heart, as life had become unsupportable.

It was clear from these circumstances that there were two sides to the matter, and that it would not be fair to rely implicitly upon the *ex-parte* statements which, in great haste, had been forwarded to England. It became certain that, so far as the Maharaja was concerned, there was much to be urged which might put a different complexion upon the affair.

The deposition of His Highness Pertab Singh formed the subject of inquiry in Parliament. In your House, on March 14, 1889, Mr. Webster, the (Conservative) Member for East Saint Pancras, asked whether it was a fact that letters of Lachman Das, late Prime Minister of Kashmir, had been discovered showing a course of treason on the part of the Maharaja towards the Indian Government; whether these letters, amongst other things, revealed a design set on foot by the Maharaja of Kashmir to poison the British Resident; and, if the information was correct, what steps the Government of India proposed to take. Sir John Gorst disposed of the questions in a very easy fashion. 'The Secretary

of State,' he said, 'is advised that the Government of India attach very little importance to the intercepted letters.'

A month later Mr. Caine asked for papers relating to the charges against the Maharaja. Sir John Gorst again pooch-pooched, and treated with contempt and as of little importance, the so-called treasonable letters.<sup>1</sup> He, however, now, as on a previous occasion, raised a distinctly false issue by speaking of 'intercepted letters' as though certain communications on the way to an enemy had been discovered. This is a wholly incorrect rendering of the facts.

Two months passed without the India Office or the Government of India being disturbed by questions in Parliament. Mr. Bradlaugh, on the 20th of June, put an important series of questions, covering the whole ground of the action of the authorities in regard to Kashmir. His question was in these terms:—

I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the Secretary of State for India is aware that the Government of India have, virtually, annexed the State of Kashmir to British India, and subjected its ruler to great indignities ;

Whether the Secretary of State is aware of the contents of a letter, No. 11 C, of 1889, dated 17th April, from Colonel Nisbet, C.I.E., Resident of Kashmir, to Raja Amir Singh, Prime Minister of Kashmir ;

Whether such letter is a violation of the solemn promises made by the Queen on the assumption by Her Majesty of the direct rule of India, that the Native Indian Princes should be safeguarded in

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<sup>1</sup> Sir J. Gosr: I stated in reply to a question on the 14th of March that the Government of India attached very little importance to the intercepted letters. No official papers have yet arrived in this country, and it is, therefore, impossible to say whether the Secretary of State will lay any on the Table.—*Indian Hansard*, 1889, 63.

their dominions, and that no annexation of Native territory should be made;

Whether the Maharaja of Kashmir has been removed from the position of an active and responsible ruler of his dominions to that of a mere pensioner on State funds;

Whether the Maharaja has been informed that 'he will be expected to refrain from all interference in the administration,' that 'he will have no power of obtaining the State revenues,' that he is to receive 'an annual sum sufficient to maintain his household in due comfort,' but nothing for what is called 'extravagance,' that he is not to attend meetings of the Council, and that the Council is 'expected' to exercise the powers of administration it possesses 'under the guidance of the British Resident';

Whether the Councillors, three or four of whom (out of five or six who constitute the Council) being 'officials selected by the Government of India,' have also been informed that they are to 'take no steps of importance without consulting the Resident,' and that they are to 'follow his advice whenever it may be offered';

Whether he is aware that, in an autograph letter to the Viceroy, the Maharaja has protested against the treatment to which he has been subjected, begging that if liberty cannot be restored to him his life might be taken;

Whether the Secretary of State will state why the course described has been taken with the Maharaja, without any opportunity being given to him of being heard either by the Government of India or by any other authority;

Whether, in view of the alarm which the course adopted by the Government of India has already caused among the feudatory Princes in India, an opportunity will be given to the Maharaja to apply for a reversal of the decree contained in letter No. 11 C, of 1889, either before a Select Committee of this House or in some other suitable manner; and,

Whether the Secretary of State will, with as little delay as possible, give the House an opportunity of discussing the important step which has been taken by the Government of India, and will lay all papers connected with Kashmir upon the Table of this House.

An answer was given to this series of statements, followed by cross-questioning. As given in the *Indian Hansard* (331, 332), the answer and further questions are as follows:—

Sir J. GORST: The Government of India has neither annexed the State of Kashmir nor subjected its ruler to great indignities. The Secretary of State has as yet received no information respecting the letter referred to. The Maharaja has voluntarily resigned the administration of his State, and his resignation has been accepted. But he will receive from the revenues of the State a suitable allowance for his maintenance. The answer to this question is in the affirmative. The Secretary of State has as yet received no information respecting the letter referred to. The Secretary of State has no reason to think that recent events in Kashmir have caused any alarm amongst the native chiefs in India, whose rights are, subject to the duties of the paramount power towards the people of the Native States, scrupulously respected by the Government of India. There is no correspondence upon the subject which could, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be at present laid before Parliament without detriment to the public service.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: May I ask if the hon. gentleman is aware that the Maharaja repudiates the voluntary action imputed to him in the hon. gentleman's answer? Will he afford some opportunity of having the matter investigated?

Sir J. GORST: The Secretary of State has no official information, but I am quite sure that he will not be surprised if that is the fact. If the hon. member knew the Maharaja of Kashmir as well as the Government of India do, I think the hon. gentleman himself would not be surprised.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Does the hon. gentleman mean that, although the Secretary of State has no official information, he is aware, unofficially, that the Maharaja repudiates the voluntary action imputed to him?

Sir J. GORST: The hon. gentleman is mistaken if he draws that conclusion from my answer.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Then, has the Secretary of State any know-

ledge, officially or unofficially, that the Maharaja does deny the voluntary action attributed to him, and does he not think that in so grave a matter, affecting so large a question, an opportunity should be afforded for investigation?

Sir J. GORST: My answer was perfectly clear—namely, that the Secretary of State has no information, but I should not be surprised if the statement should turn out hereafter to be true. I should attach no importance to the fact.

Meanwhile, comments were freely made in the Anglo-Indian press as to the alleged badness alike of the Maharaja's character and of his rule. Some of these comments were quoted in English journals.

In the House of Lords the deposition occupied attention. From Hansard's report I quote as follows:—

LORD HERSCHELL: I wish to ask my noble friend the Secretary of State for India whether there is any foundation for the rumour, which seems to have occasioned some alarm in different parts of India, that it is the intention of the Government to take possession of the Native State of Kashmir.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Viscount Cross): I can find no foundation for that report, and it is certainly absolutely untrue. It is true that the Viceroy felt bound, with my entire concurrence, to accept the resignation of the ruler of Kashmir for the present, and place the State under a Native Council, a course advised by the Resident who was there; but anyone who has looked into the way in which the State of Kashmir has been governed for some time past can have no doubt whatever that a wise step has been taken. There is not the slightest intention on the part of the Government or of the Viceroy to annex Kashmir to the British Crown. On the contrary, we have every hope that, when the state of things has been remedied in Kashmir, the late ruler will see it to be advisable to re-assume control of his State, and to govern in a way which will be a benefit to his subjects and to neighbouring countries as well.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Later, early in September, at Sheffield, Viscount Cross said: 'I have been accused lately of wishing to add to the Indian Empire by the annexation of

It will be seen the charges of treachery, and reliance upon the trustworthiness of the treasonable letters, were speedily abandoned; the so-called evidence of treasonable designs was scouted by the Government of India as unworthy of credence. Other issues were depended upon as justifying the course taken. These, as will be shown later, were as destitute of foundation as were the silly and contemptible letters themselves.

With what was happening in India at this time I need not now stay to trouble you. The proceedings there will appear later on. When those proceedings are recorded it will be seen that the Government of India refused to produce papers to justify the very serious step which they had taken, that they acted in a despotic manner and without the semblance even of that fair-play which is popularly supposed to be a British attribute and, for many hundreds of years, an essential part of British procedure everywhere.

As early as possible in the present session Mr. Bradlaugh pressed for the publication of all documents relating to the 'deposition'<sup>1</sup> of the Maharaja. On the 18th February this happened:—

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Kashmir. I had determined to say from my place in Parliament that we had no notion of annexation of any description. It is quite true that we did interfere in the matter of Kashmir, and why? Because the people of Kashmir were so ground down by the tyranny and ill-government of the Maharaja that we were bound as the paramount Power to interfere for the protection of the interests of the inhabitants of that country. We have not annexed it to our Empire: we have placed it under native rule, subject, of course, to the advice of our Resident, and the moment the Maharaja sees the mistake he has made and we can trust him to govern his country as he ought to do, for the benefit of his people and not for his own, we shall be perfectly willing to hand the whole thing back to him.—*Times* Report.

<sup>1</sup> I have to thank Lord Dufferin for this admirably descriptive word. In his speech before the London Chamber of Commerce in 1889, his lordship used this expression.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the Government will, at an early date, present to the House the papers relating to the action of the Government of India towards Kashmir since H.H. Pertab Singh became Maharaja. And whether, if the Maharaja of Kashmir, in the words used by the Secretary of State on the 27th August last, 'sees it advisable to resume control of his State, and to govern it in a way which will be a benefit to his subjects and to neighbouring countries as well,' the Government of India will facilitate his doing so.

Sir J. GORST: The Government is anxious to give full information to the House of Commons respecting the affairs of Kashmir, and papers recently received will be laid on the table. The statement of the Secretary of State quoted by the hon. member was contingent on the existing state of things in Kashmir being first remedied. The Government are anxious to show every consideration to the rights of the Maharaja consistent with a due regard to the still more sacred rights of the people of Kashmir.

Months passed and no papers were produced. In June—on the 10th—Mr. Bradlaugh returned to the charge. He inquired for the papers which had been promised and were not produced. The record of what passed is as follows:—

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India when the papers relating to Kashmir, stated on the 18th February to have been recently received from India, and early publication of which was then promised, will be presented to the House; and, whether the Secretary of State will state what condition he wishes to insure in Kashmir before he gives the Maharaja the opportunity of governing his State 'in a way which will be a benefit to his subjects and to neighbouring countries as well,' which it was stated the Government of India would be prepared to facilitate.

Sir J. GORST: The papers relating to Kashmir are now before my noble friend the Secretary of State, and will be immediately presented to the House—I have little doubt before the expiration of the week. The hon. member asks me what condition the



Secretary of State wishes to insure in Kashmir before he gives the Maharaja the opportunity of governing his State in a way to benefit his subjects and neighbouring countries. The condition which the Secretary of State wishes to insure in Kashmir is one of just and upright government in the interest of the people of the State.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Is the right hon. gentleman aware that the majority of the people of Kashmir are of opinion that the only way to secure the state of things which the Secretary of State desires is the restoration of their lawful ruler and the withdrawal of all improper interference?

Sir J. GORST: No, sir, there is no reason to suppose that the majority of the people of Kashmir entertain any such opinion.

Even then the papers were not forthcoming. Never was greater difficulty experienced by learned counsel in a criminal court in extracting facts from a hostile witness than the hon. member for Northampton had to face in his efforts to get the papers he repeatedly asked for. One opinion—and one only—could be cherished regarding the conduct of the Government. It could only be because their case was very bad, would so little bear scrutiny, that the authorities were reluctant to place information in the hands of hon. members so as to enable them to judge for themselves as to the course which the Government had taken. Mr. Bradlaugh once more returned to the charge, and on this occasion (June 26th) succeeded in getting the papers. Hansard's report gives the particulars of what occurred as follows:—

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the repeatedly promised papers relating to Kashmir will be presented to this House; and whether, in view of the present painful position of His Highness the Maharaja, the Secretary of State will at once authorize a judicial inquiry into the

grave charges made by the Government and solemnly denied by His Highness.

Sir J. GORST: I have to-day laid the papers on the table. The action of the Government in Kashmir has been based, not upon grave personal charges made against the Maharaja, but upon the long-continued misgovernment of Kashmir, which rendered it necessary in the interests of the people to put an end to chronic oppression and misrule. Neither the Secretary of State nor the Government of India, as I have several times stated in Parliament, has ever attached any importance to certain treasonable and criminal correspondence attributed to the Maharaja. It is obvious that the conduct of the Government, in making such arrangements as involve the withdrawal of the Maharaja for a time on political grounds from certain participation in the government of the State, cannot be made the subject of investigation by a judicial officer.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will ask when the papers are likely to be circulated to members, and whether, if they disclose a state of things different from that which has just been stated, the Government will afford any opportunity for this unfortunate gentleman to repel accusations which he declares to be absolutely without foundation.

Sir J. GORST: The distribution of papers does not rest with me. It depends on the printing authorities of the House, over whom I have no control. With regard to the second part of the question, I think the hon. member had better wait until he sees the papers.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: In view of the excessive gravity of the matter, as I understand the papers, I shall avail myself of such opportunities as the forms of the House permit, unless the Government afford some opportunity to this unfortunate gentleman to answer the charges made against him.

The papers are now in the hands of hon. members. An attentive perusal of them makes it perfectly clear why the Secretary of State for India was so reluctant to publish them. The surmise that the Government of India really had no case is now made perfectly clear. Viscount Cross and his advisers must have been satisfied

as to the weakness of the pleas on which they proceeded to deprive one million and a-half of people of their rightful ruler, and sensible of the gross injustice to which they had resorted in their treatment of Maharaja Pertab Singh. Assertions, in these papers, are plentiful; proofs are, with one exception which cuts both ways, entirely wanting. The papers, among other things, show:—

1. A breach of treaty stipulations;
2. A complete effacement of promises made by the Queen-Empress of India, promises which were proffered as a buttress to treaties and engagements—those treaties and engagements having been found undeniably weak so far as the inferior parties to them were concerned;
3. The deposition of an independent ruler on vague charges for which, only in the latest communication, is there a shred of evidence, and that evidence is accompanied with observations which wholly cut away the ground from under the feet of the Government;
4. An independent ruler, secured in his position by treaty stipulations, condemned and deprived of all power, wholly on the unsupported statements of interested parties, and without any opportunity whatsoever being given him of defending himself;
5. The ignoring of evidence which, had it been fairly considered, would have proved there were no grounds for proceeding against the Maharaja;
6. An assertion of voluntary resignation of power by the Maharaja against his explicit denial of this act; and
7. While misgovernment and the alleged unhappy condition of the people of Kashmir were described

as necessitating the action taken, these were not the whole, and there is grave reason to believe not the real motives: the real motive being that fear of Russian aggression India-wards, which has led to the commission of so many questionable acts from time to time by the Government of India of the day, while it seems clear there was a desire to obtain complete control over, if not the actual possession of, the Kingdom of Kashmir.

These various propositions it will be my duty to establish, very largely from the Government papers themselves. The duty is a distasteful one. My personal respect for some of the eminent men now ruling India is very great. Opportunities have been vouchsafed to me of seeing the admirable manner in which certain among them have laboured for the good of the Indian people. No one is more ready than I am to bear testimony to the many excellent qualities of Indian administrators generally. My writings abound with such testimonies. But a recognition of worthy doings must not blind me to the real character of acts which are contrary to justice, acts which are the outcome of policies with which the leading men in India at the present time have themselves had little or nothing to do. There is a bad side, an exceedingly bad side, to Indian bureaucratic rule. That it is which I condemn, and not the executive officers for the moment in charge of the respective departments, or the Viceroy who has control of all.

The Kashmir incident, like scores of others affecting Indian Princes and their States, happened because the Government of India is in no way subject to that embodied conscience of present-day civilization—an

enlightened public opinion possessing punitive power. Without meaning it, and doubtless working, as it considers, with a single eye to the maintenance of British supremacy in India, the Indian Foreign Office is frequently guilty of grievous injustice. That Office, more than other departments in the Indian Government, is in a position which neither man nor institution is good enough, or free enough from liability to error, to bear. There is no one to call it to account, no one to check its (maybe inadvertent) over-zeal, no one to suggest that there is, perhaps, another side to a matter than that which has fixed itself in the Foreign Secretary's mind; not a whisper is ever raised, or is likely to be ever raised, by any one possessing power in India, suggesting that the traditions of The Office might with advantage be at times broken; it is prosecutor, judge, and executioner; in its hands an Indian Prince is between the upper and nether millstones. The healthy criticism, the more or less adequate knowledge, and the sense of responsibility to Parliament and the Press, which keep the Foreign, Home, and Colonial Departments in Britain in touch with the nation, and which prevent any gross injustice or wide deviation from righteousness, are wholly wanting in India. They are not supplied by the British Parliament, the ultimate ruler of India. As a consequence, the Indian Foreign Office, without possibly knowing it, and certainly in many instances without meaning it, has been and is responsible for a vast number of acts of injustice, which, if set forth in detail, would hardly be credited. The Kashmir incident is one of them.

I now proceed to establish, from the papers published by Parliament and from another official document, admitted—in its most material portion—by Lord Lansdowne to be authentic, and from other evidence, the truth of my several contentions. In an Appendix—for the purpose of easy reference—I republish all the documents, save a long one from Mr. A. Wingate. Of the latter, however, the subject of each paragraph is stated, and the few paragraphs which bear, even incidentally, on the main point, and which are alluded to by the Government of India, are given in full. In all instances, where practicable, sources of information will be stated.

It may be noted in passing that, with the exception of certain unimportant despatches by various Secretaries of State—unimportant inasmuch as they simply echo the observations of the Government of India, and display a mere automaton mind, seemingly incapable of independent judgment—only extracts from despatches and other documents are published by Viscount Cross. The authorities have had the opportunity of preparing their own case. How they understand their duty, and perform it, is shown by their giving just so much of a despatch or minute as will, they think, establish their position. There may be, in other portions of the respective

documents much that would tell in another direction, possibly against the main contentions put forward. These are carefully eliminated. Indeed, when one observes the large amount of irrelevant matter published in Mr. Wingate's report, it is perfectly clear that the suppressed parts of the correspondence would not support the action which has been taken. The case before us, then, may be regarded as the best which can be produced. Anything and everything which would be calculated to weaken the course adopted, and to strengthen the contention of the Maharaja and his friends, have been withheld. That is the way in which an Imperial Government, a *British* Imperial Government, marks its sense of right-mindedness and of justice. Even then, out of their own mouths, from their own carefully compiled record, is full condemnation to be found. Time was when there was chivalry enough in the British character to ensure to an opponent fair-play. If there was not the Quixotism which said, 'Gentlemen of the Guard, fire first,' there was a strong desire not to unduly take advantage of an opponent. That time is not wholly past, so far as individuals are concerned. There never, perhaps, was a time when such characteristics were displayed by a bureaucratic administration or by an Office as such. With neither a soul to be saved nor a body to be kicked, Departments sin against justice most grievously, and have no compunctions regarding gross injustice. History bears no record of a time when official nature as official nature—especially such official nature as the bureaucratic government of India develops—even gave so much as a moment's 'law' to the pettiest creature in its toils. Certainly

no Indian Prince, with whom a difficulty has arisen, has ever been fairly treated by the Foreign Office of Calcutta. On the other hand, many of our feudatories have been most unjustly dealt with.

(1) *A Breach of Treaty Stipulations.*—The Treaty by which Kashmir<sup>1</sup> came under the rule of Ghulab Singh contained the following articles:—

I.—The British Government transfers and makes over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Ghulab Singh and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly and mountainous country, situated to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravee, including Chamba and excluding Lahoul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore

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<sup>1</sup> Kashmir was under Afghan sway until 1819, when it was conquered by the Sikhs. From that time it was ruled by a governor appointed by the Maharaja of the Punjab, until the Sikh War in 1845. Ghulab Singh, who had begun life as a horseman under the Maharaja Runjit Singh, but by distinguished conduct had raised himself to independent command, was presented with the principality of Jammu, whence, nominally on behalf of the Lahore State, he soon extended his authority over his Rajput neighbors, and eventually into Ladakh and Balkistan. In the revolution which preceded the outbreak of the Sikh War, he was elected Minister of the Khalsa, and he took an important part in the negotiations which followed the battle of Sobraon. The results were, that he was enabled to secure his power by a separate treaty with the English at Amritsar, in March, 1846, by which, on payment of 75 lakhs of rupees, or £750,000, he was confirmed in possession of the territory he held as feudatory of the Sikhs, and also obtained the Province of Kashmir. By treaty he bound himself to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, to refer all disputes with neighbouring States to its arbitration, to assist British troops when required, and never to take or retain in his service any British subject, or the subject of any European or American State, except with the consent of the British Government. The Maharaja sent a contingent of troops and artillery to co-operate with the British forces against Delhi during the Mutiny of 1857. Ghulab Singh died in August, 1857, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Maharaja Runbir Singh, G.C.S.I., who is by caste a Dogra Rajput, and was born about 1832. The Maharaja of Kashmir is entitled to a personal salute of twenty-one guns, and has received a *sanad* giving adoptive rights. On the occasion of the Delhi Durbar, in January, 1877, he was gazetted a General in the British Army, and created a Councillor of the Empress. Maharaja Runbir Singh died in 1886, and was succeeded by his son, Pertab Singh.—*Gazetteer of India.*



State, according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.

II.—The eastern boundary of the tract, transferred by the foregoing article to Maharaja Ghulab Singh, shall be laid down by Commissioners appointed by the British Government and Maharaja Ghulab Singh, respectively, for that purpose, and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey.

III.—In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing articles, Maharaja Ghulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of rupees (Nanakshahi) fifty lakhs to be paid in ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five lakhs on or before the 1st October of the current year A.D. 1846.

IV.—The limits of the territories of Maharaja Ghulab Singh shall not, at any time, be changed without the concurrence of the British Government.

V.—Maharaja Ghulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or any other neighbouring State, and will abide by the decision of the British Government.

VI.—Maharaja Ghulab Singh engages for himself and his heirs to join, with the whole of his military force, the British troops when employed in the hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions.

VII.—Maharaja Ghulab Singh engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the British Government.

VIII.—Maharaja Ghulab Singh engages to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of Articles V, VI, and VII of the separate engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated 9th March, 1846. [These clauses in the Lahore Treaty referred to the Jagirdars, to arrears of revenue, and to the property in the forts thereby transferred.]

IX.—The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Ghulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies.

X.—Maharaja Ghulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the

British Government, and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female), and three pairs of Kashmir shawls.

'In independent possession.' The condition of things existent at the time the treaty was made was intended to continue. Under the treaty no Resident was appointed to the Kashmir Court. The position of Maharaja Ghulab Singh was different to that of the Nizam or of any other Indian Prince. In the *Statistical Abstract of British India, Population Returns*, where every State in alliance with, or in subordination to, the Government of India appears, Kashmir is conspicuous by its absence. Only in late years has a reference even been made to it in a foot-note. When the Indian Government had any communications to make to the Maharaja, an agent ('officer on special duty' was the official designation) stationed at Srinagar or Jammu, as the case might be, was employed. His business was of a comparatively unimportant character and was strictly defined. Meanwhile the most friendly relations existed between the rulers of Kashmir and the Government of India. During the Mutiny of 1857, the son of Ghulab Singh, father of the present Maharaja, rendered inestimable service, and did his part both unselfishly and ungrudgingly. The Maharaja refused even to take rations for his troops, and when offered an increase of territory, in recognition of what he had done, refused to accept it. He proudly remarked that he had helped the Indian Government out of his loyalty and good-will, and not with the sordid object of receiving remuneration. That spirit was manifested by

Runbir Singh and Pertab Singh, the past and present Maharajas. At no time has the Government of India been placed in a position of difficulty without the Kashmir ruler proffering the full resources of his State in aid of the maintenance of British power. This has been the case alike in regard to internal enemies and external foes.

Until about fifteen years ago the possession or virtual control of Kashmir does not appear to have been regarded by the British authorities as a matter of much importance. After the ill-starred Afghan war of 1878, however, a desire seems to have been cherished for the possession of the fertile valleys and the strong mountain-passes of Kashmir. Under the Treaty of 1846, what might be called effective control, was not possible. Everything, nevertheless, that a self-respecting and honestly-minded Government should desire, save actual control or possession, was at the service of the Viceroy. A courteous and friendly bearing towards the Maharaja, followed by kindly counsel and assistance in good administration, would, in any crisis that might have arisen, have ensured the last energy of the last man in the State. The Power which received such assistance would have been honoured in accepting it, as the State proffering it would be proud to give it. Such a mode of obtaining allies, however, is foreign to the conception of Indian civilians. Another course, that of forcing a Resident on the Maharaja, was preferred. It is, unfortunately, the fact that of two courses—friendly co-operation by a semi-independent ally or the absorption of every square mile of land possible into British territory—the Foreign Administration of India always prefers the latter, but

cannot, in every instance, secure it. The modes adopted to secure the desired end are not always, are not often, honest or straightforward.<sup>1</sup>

In 1884, so far as the published Papers show, the Government of India—Lord Ripon being Viceroy—in a despatch addressed to the Secretary of State (Lord Kimberley), describe what they call the disorganization of the administration of Kashmir, and, because of

‘The increasing importance to the Government of India of watching events beyond the North-Western frontier of Kashmir,

(these words are especially noteworthy), it was determined to force a Resident on the State. I say ‘force’ advisedly. Any resistance by the Maharaja, beyond a verbal protest, would have led to his non-recognition as ruler and the setting of him aside for a more pliable individual. The Government of India, in this same despatch, add:—

‘Any disturbances which continued misgovernment might create in Kashmir would be acutely felt on the frontiers of Afghanistan; the connection of Kashmir and its dependent chiefships would, in all probability, be severed, and grave political complications might easily ensue.’

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Edwin Arnold, K.C.S.I., Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, in his book on Lord Dalhousie's Administration, says: In 1853 ‘the Nizam came into our power by a process which has been often and successfully repeated in our Indian annals. There is a curious phenomenon in the insect world where an egg is deposited in the body of a living creature, which nourishes itself upon the substance of its unwilling nurse, gradually taking up all the fat, flesh, and tissues of the victim, till it dies, or drags on a futile existence. Our Government in India has frequently laid such an egg in the shape of “a Contingent,” within the confines of friendly States. Oudh, Gwalior, and the territories of Scindia were thus treated, and by no other means were the dominions of the Nizam brought within the grasp of Lord Dalhousie.’

The doctrine is unexceptionable, as much of the preached doctrine of the Indian authorities is. Disturbances in Kashmir might be mischievous. But, as a matter of fact, there have never been any disturbances. The practice in this, as in so many other instances in Indian experience, was to make opportunities which should, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, justify overt action. Leave was asked of the Secretary of State to post a Resident at Srinagar when the then Maharaja died.

It goes without saying that the Secretary of State of the day gave the Viceroy the authority he asked for. Except where questions of Home patronage arise, the functions of the Secretaries of State for India seem to be confined to echoing the observations addressed to them by the Viceroy for the time being. Of independent judgment and action they are innocent. Resistance, independent review of circumstances, a determination that when a mistake has been made it shall be rectified, —these things are never seen in a Secretary of State's despatch on any matter concerning which the Viceroy of the day cares anything, always, of course, excepting, as has been remarked, matters of the Horse Guards', or other, patronage. Consequently, when, in the autumn of 1885, the Maharaja Runbir Singh died, and his eldest son, Pertab Singh, succeeded him, the Agent of the Governor-General, Sir Oliver St. John, informed His Highness that a Resident would be appointed to his Court.<sup>1</sup> In his report to the Government of India on

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<sup>1</sup> Previous to this there used to be only an 'officer on special duty,' who was located for eight months at Srinagar, to look after the Europeans sojourning in the 'Happy Valley' during the summer season. He also sat in a mixed

16th September, 1885, Sir Oliver St. John describes the consternation with which the Maharaja received what 'was evidently an unexpected blow.'

The Maharaja protested against the appointment. In his thanks to the Viceroy (Lord Dufferin), for a kindly letter of condolence, Mian Pertab Singh said:—'It has, however, pained me exceedingly to learn that exactly at the time when I had made up my mind to deserve and win your Excellency's approbation and encouragement, by proving myself equal to the onerous and responsible duties of a good ruler, your Excellency has been thinking of changing the status of the British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir to that of a Political Resident, and thus lowering me in the eyes of my subjects and in the estimation of the public. It is fully known to your Excellency that I have only just now acquired the power of showing to the world that without any interference from any quarter or any, the smallest,

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court, consisting of himself and an official of the Maharaja's, which heard and decided litigation between these European sojourners and the Maharaja's subjects. He never used to be the medium of communication between His Highness and the Government of India. The appointment of a Resident put a stop to this practice. The Maharaja objected to the appointment, but to no purpose. The objection was not groundless. Firstly, direct communication with the Government of India is a great desideratum with the Native States. It often happens that a Prince and the Resident are not on the best of terms, and in such a case it becomes difficult for the former to lay before the Government his complaints against the proceedings, however unjust and oppressive, of the latter, through whom, under existing rules, those complaints are to be forwarded. Secondly, the 'officer on special duty' had nothing to do with the internal affairs of the State. But a Resident, by the very tradition of his office, interferes in such affairs, and if the Prince, at whose Court he is posted, fails to please him or to fall in with his views of government, he becomes a positive stumbling-block in the way of good and effective administration. Thirdly, the appointment of a Resident was in violation of the treaty engagement entered into with Maharaja Ghulab Singh in 1846.—*Kashmir and its Princes*, by Jogendra Chandra Bose.

diminution of the long-enjoyed rights and dignity of this State, I am able and willing of my own accord to introduce and maintain such reforms as are calculated to entitle a ruler to the lasting gratitude of his subjects, and the encouraging approbation of the Paramount Power as well as the public at large.'

It was, of course, stated in reply that the Resident would simply advise His Highness and in no way interfere with the administration of the State. With the sarcasm of which he is so accomplished a master, Lord Randolph Churchill, then Secretary of State for India, in acknowledging the despatch describing what had been done, told the Indian Government that they had shown 'the utmost consideration. . . . to the susceptibilities of Maharaja Pertab Singh.'

The story in the 'Arabian Nights' of the camel and the householder has found exemplification in Kashmir. The Resident arrives. He is not to interfere, he is merely to advise; then he does interfere; and, finally—as is now the case—he becomes virtual ruler of the country. The *arrière pensée* which foretold all this, is to be found in Lord Ripon's despatch of 1884, already referred to and quoted. Under the stress of a North-Western frontier scare the early and complete control of Kashmir became a 'fixed idea' in the Calcutta Foreign Office in 1884. Probably, had Lord Ripon, or a Viceroy with his characteristics, remained in power, Pertab Singh would have been differently treated and his country have maintained its independence. Viceroys come and Viceroys go: the Foreign Office, with its yearly-hardening intentions, traditions, and ideals, remains.

(2) *A Complete Effacement of Promises made by the Queen - Empress, Promises which were Proffered as a Buttress to Treaties and Engagements.*

The Indian authorities, under the Treaty of 1846, it may be repeated, had no right or power (save the power which Might gives) to send a Resident to Kashmir, and certainly none to force him upon the State against the Maharaja's wishes. Twenty-eight years before this high-handed step was taken, the Queen, on assuming control of India, told the Maharaja of Kashmir, among others,

'That all treaties and engagements made with' [the native Princes of India] ' . . . WILL BE SCRUPULOUSLY MAINTAINED. . . . We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as our own.'

In the letter to Lord Derby, instructing him as to the tenour of the Proclamation, the Queen, in her own handwriting, referred to her remarks as 'pledges which her future reign is to redeem'.

The representative of the Sovereign who spoke such gracious words and so emphatically expressed her determination to do right and right only, approaches the Maharaja of Kashmir with a letter of sympathy, in



which the new ruler is informed by the Viceroy that 'in all difficulties,' of whatsoever kind, 'he may rely with confidence upon the good-will of the British Government.' That 'good-will' is displayed in breaking the provisions of a treaty, and in forcing a foreign official upon a friendly feudatory and ally.

As Sir Edwin Arnold, in a passage quoted in a footnote on p. 47 has told us, there is nothing new in this sort of thing. The annals of India are full of such incidents. Our course is strewn with them. Fewer instances have occurred since 1857 than occurred before, but many a promise and pledge have been 'cast as rubbish to the void' in recent times. If Parliament and the powers that be generally could only realize the effect which such flagrant contradiction between promise and performance has upon British dominion in India, there are no exigencies in the history of our administration which would prevent the Indian house being instantly set in order.

(3) *The Deposition of an Independent Ruler on vague Charges for which, only in the latest communication, is there a show of evidence, and that evidence is accompanied with observations which wholly cut away the ground from under the feet of the Government.*

In this connection allegations 4, 5, and 6 may be taken. They are as follows:—

(4) *An independent ruler, secured in his position by treaty stipulations, condemned and deprived of all power, wholly on the unsupported statements of interested parties, and without giving him any opportunity whatsoever of defending himself;*

(5) *The ignoring of evidence which, had it been fairly considered, would have proved there were no grounds for proceeding against the Maharaja;*

(6) *An assertion of voluntary resignation of power by the Maharaja against his explicit denial of this act.*

In their despatches to the Secretary of State, of April 3, 1889 (signed, I believe, only by Lord Lansdowne, Sir Charles Elliott, and Sir David Barbour),<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This does not appear from the published papers. The despatch in question, however, found its way into the Indian newspapers last year, and had the signatures of the officials mentioned, and of them only, attached.

the Government of India give the following reasons for deposing the Maharaja :—

(1) 'The condition of things in Kashmir was by no means satisfactory.'

(2) 'The discovery of certain letters alleged to be of a treasonable character.'

(3) 'Other circumstances of the case.'

This, in sober truth, is all the Government of India allege! And Lord Cross, in whom Indian Princes should find a trustworthy Court of Appeal, humbly states that Her Majesty's Government 'fully approve your proceedings!'

In his letter (Simla, June 28, 1889) to the Maharaja himself, Lord Lansdowne gives the following reasons for the deposition of Pertab Singh :—

*a.* 'Extremely unfavourable reports' as to 'the manner in which the affairs of your Highness were administered by your Highness;'

*b.* 'The finances of the State were in disorder,' 'a disorder which, there could be little doubt, was increased by your own extravagance, squandering of the revenue of the State in a most reckless and improvident manner;'

*c.* Neglect to act upon the advice given by Lord Dufferin to carry out reforms;

*d.* Certain treasonable letters alleged to have been written by the Maharaja;

*e.* Offer by the Maharaja to resign the rule of the State.

The Maharaja's own statement as to the circumstances under which his government was carried on

will be found set forth in his own letter to Lord Lansdowne. (See Appendix B.) Briefly, His Highness declares he did all he could in the way of reform; that he never had a free hand with which to do all he desired; that he was persistently thwarted by the Resident; that his younger brother was encouraged to intrigue against him; that he had never resigned his position in the sense alleged, but that what he did do in this direction was the result of 'many-sided pressures,' which he was powerless to resist, and from which he expected a just Government in India would relieve him. A letter of a more pathetic character, or one calling more loudly for consideration on the part of a friendly Paramount Power, is not to be found in the whole range of Indian history. Lord Lansdowne was not altogether unmoved by it. He answered it, but could not find himself called upon to do more than to reiterate stale charges, and to make promises of which, it is clear, the Foreign Office, if it can control matters, will never permit the fulfilment.

A complete answer can be given to every accusation made against the Maharaja, whether those accusations be political or personal. Before, however, furnishing these answers it may be well to note the manner in which the Resident was performing his duties at the time when the deposition took place. The story has been well told by Mr. Jogendra Chandra Bose, M.A., B.L., of the Punjab Chief Court Bar, at one time himself an official in Kashmir, from whose pamphlet entitled 'Kashmir and its Prince: An Authentic Exposition of the Recent *Imbroglia* in Kashmir,' I quote as follows:—

'The Maharaja visited Calcutta in the cold season of 1885-86. Shortly after his return to Jammu, Sir Oliver St. John was transferred from the Kashmir Residency and succeeded by Mr. Plowden. Sir Oliver, though not on very cordial terms with the Maharaja for the reasons mentioned above, did not set himself in opposition to the Maharaja's Government at every step, nor withdraw every sympathy with its aims and objects. Mr. Plowden, however, from the moment he took over charge of his office, assumed an attitude unfavourable to His Highness. He seems to have joined his post with a foregone conclusion against the Maharaja. He affected a lofty, supercilious air, and treated the Durbar with almost undisguised contempt. On occasions, he went so far as to insist upon the Ministers retiring before he would condescend to speak to the Maharaja. Latterly, after the dismissal of Dewan Luchman Das, he somewhat relaxed the stiffness of his behaviour, but, at the time of which I am now speaking, every one could perceive that his appointment was a misfortune to the Maharaja. His Highness had just ascended the *gali*, and, anxious as he was to reform the administration, he wanted a friend and a sympathizer rather than an adversary, in the person of the Resident. Mr. Plowden soon began to make himself obnoxious. He joined his post about March, 1886. Shortly afterwards, the summer season setting in, he went to Srinagar and became anxious that the Maharaja also should go there. His Highness himself had entertained a desire of visiting Kashmir, but the Maharani fell ill, and he had to put off his departure from day to day. On this, the Resident grew impatient. He began to telegraph to His Highness in a somewhat imperative tone, and hinted the displeasure of the Government of India in case of delay. The Maharaja, always loyal and obedient to the wishes of the Paramount Power, was thus in a manner dragged away from his bed-ridden wife—a paragon of a Hindu lady. Some ill-feeling was generated in consequence. Nevertheless, when the Maharaja reached Srinagar, he did not show any unfriendliness towards Mr. Plowden,

but treated him with the courtesy and consideration due to the Representative of the British Government.

'The Maharaja stayed at Srinagar about a month on this occasion. During all this time, Mr. Plowden, who had been so solicitous for His Highness's arrival in Kashmir, had not many improvements to suggest in the administration. His visits to the Maharaja were rare and formal, and he seldom discussed State matters with the Durbar at these visits. There was one thing, however, which attracted his particular notice. The Maharaja was anxious that his subjects should receive a liberal education. This seemed to excite Mr. Plowden's worst alarms, and he did not rest until he had secured possession of the Educational Rules which the Durbar had framed.

'The Maharaja had been thinking of an equitable land settlement in Kashmir. To carry out this object, he had written a letter to his friend Sir Charles Aitchison, late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, who used to take a great interest in the welfare of the State, for a well-qualified Native Settlement Officer. Sir Charles Aitchison, after the needful inquiry, recommended a couple of men, and asked the Maharaja to make a selection between them. His Highness, in reply, requested Sir Charles himself to make the selection, and expressed preference for a Muhammadan, the population of Kashmir being mostly Muhammadans. On this, Sir Charles made a selection which was forwarded to the Government of India for sanction, as is necessary in all cases of transfer of services from British India to a Native State. But Mr. Plowden expressed a wish to His Highness that it would be better to appoint an Englishman for settlement work in Kashmir. The Maharani's illness at this juncture having taken a serious turn, and the season for the performance of the annual *shradh* of the late Maharaja having also arrived, His Highness started for Jammu before the matter could be settled. On his way he received a telegram from the Resident, advising the appointment of Mr. Wingate as settlement officer. By this appointment both the

Maharaja and Sir Charles Aitchison were placed in a delicate position, and the latter even got a little offended with His Highness for having readily submitted to it.

Soon after the Maharaja's return to Jammu, Mr. Nilambar Mookerjee resigned his post. It may not be out of place to say a few words here regarding this gentleman, who cut a prominent figure in Kashmir politics for a period of nearly twenty years. One of the most distinguished graduates of the University of Calcutta, he went to Lahore in 1867 to join the bar of the Punjab Chief Court. In the following year, Dewan Kripa Ram, the late able and liberal-minded Prime Minister of Kashmir, who had heard of Mr. Mookerjee's talents and learning, recommended him to Maharaja Runbir Singh, who appointed him Chief Judge of Kashmir. While working in that capacity, he was deputed by his master to make arrangements for His Highness's property in Lahore. This work, as well as his work as Chief Judge, was so satisfactorily performed that the Maharaja, in token of approbation, almost doubled his remuneration. Shortly after this, the silk industry was started in Kashmir, and Mr. Mookerjee was placed in charge of it. The industry rapidly developed and expanded, and Mr. Mookerjee was favoured with the commendatory notices of the Government of India and the Secretary of State. He rose very high in the estimation of his master, but his brother officials now began to eye him with jealousy, and to whisper ill-natured reports against his management of the silk concern. This disgusted him, and he prayed his master to be allowed to retire from his charge. Maharaja Runbir Singh, while granting his prayer, showed a due appreciation of his valuable past services by promoting him to the rank of a Minister, which he held till the date of His Highness' death. Prince Pertab Singh had not been very favourably inclined towards Mr. Mookerjee in his younger days. But, as he grew up, he came to understand Mr. Mookerjee, whom the late Maharaja also, on his death-bed, enjoined

upon him to regard as his most faithful servant and trusted councillor. Maharaja Pertab Singh, on ascending the *gadi*, appointed Mr. Mookerjee his Finance Minister. Mr. Mookerjee worked with the zeal, honesty, devotion, and single-mindedness that characterize him, for a period of twelve months. But finding that, far from receiving any help, he was treated with coldness and suspicion, and seeing that he could do little good to the State, he tendered his resignation in September, 1886, which the Maharaja thrice declined to accept, but which His Highness accepted, when pressed a fourth time, with great reluctance.

‘Different men take different views of Mr. Mookerjee’s resignation. For my part, I think matters had been driven to such a crisis that it became impossible for a highly honest and conscientious man to continue in office any longer. It must, however, be admitted that his resignation intensified the difficulties of his master’s position, and rendered His Highness an easy prey to the machinations of his designing opponents.

‘On the departure of Mr. Nilambar Mookerjee from Jamnu, Dewan Gobind Sahai was removed and Dewan Lachman Das made Prime Minister in his place. Mr. Plowden had longed for this consummation, and felt glad that it had been brought about. Dewan Lachman Das was his special favourite, and he moved heaven and earth to raise him to dignity and power. But the Dewan, though not devoid of intelligence, never possessed business habits, and soon after his elevation to the Premiership, gave himself up to enjoyment, leaving the affairs of State to be mostly taken care of by his subordinates. He was, besides, a staunch advocate of everything that was old, and, from inclination as well as from self-interest, had never looked upon the reforms, introduced by his master during the previous year, with favour. The abolition of vexatious imposts and cesses had the effect of reducing the income of the State; and Dewan Lachman Das, who, according to an arrangement entered into by Maharaja Ghulab Singh with his father, was entitled to a payment of Rs. 4 on every



Rs. 1,000 of revenue, resented the loss which it caused him. So, on assuming the reins of office, he swept away with little scruple or hesitation most of the reforms that had been introduced during the preceding twelve months, and the Maharaja, rendered powerless by Mr. Plowden, could not save them from total wreck. Neither did Lachman Das's method of work nor his action in this particular call forth the slightest disapproval of his patron. He had been appointed with the sanction of the Government of India, Raja Amar Singh siding with him at the outset, and the Maharaja was reduced to a nullity. But Nemesis was near at hand. The Plowden-cum-Lachman-Das régime fell through on account of its own weakness, in spite of the support accorded to it. Its inconsiderate bearing towards the Maharaja and its apathy to the best interests of the State became more and more apparent, till even the Anglo-Indian Press, which a few months before had glorified it, pronounced it "a phenomenal failure." About this time, Raja Amar Singh, who was closely watching his opportunity, came over to join the Maharaja, and moved His Highness, already exasperated, to be rid of his Minister, Lachman Das, who was accordingly dismissed. This was in the spring of 1858. Mr. Plowden continued in Kashmir for a few months after the dismissal of his *protégé*. He was grieved to see the toils which he had so elaborately woven around the Maharaja torn into shreds, and he maintained a sullen dignity. But Lord Dufferin was aware of the overbearing manner in which he conducted himself towards the Maharaja, and His Excellency found it necessary to order his transfer. This was done on the happening of a vacancy for his promotion.

'After the dismissal of Dewan Lachman Das, the Maharaja telegraphed to Mr. Nilambar Mookerjee to return to Kashmir and to resume his duties. Mr. Plowden, getting intimation of this, immediately sent a counter-telegram, forbidding Mr. Mookerjee to join without the permission of the Government of India in the Foreign Department. By what right he did this

does not appear, but the Maharaja's idea of forming a Ministry of his choice was thus frustrated. Then the formation of a Council under His Highness's Presidentship was conceived, and the Maharaja again made an attempt to get back his trusted and faithful servant as Financial Member, Mr. Mookerjee possessing an intimate acquaintance with the finances of Kashmir. But this was disallowed, on the ground that Mr. Mookerjee was not a good financier! Then His Highness suggested that Mr. Mookerjee, an experienced and practical lawyer, might serve him at least as Judicial Member, proposing, in the alternative, the name of Mr. P. C. Chatterjee, of the Punjab Chief Court Bar, for long the Legal Adviser of the State, in case Mr. Mookerjee's services were refused. But neither the one nor the other was permitted to be employed by His Highness. It would appear that even an eminent lawyer like Mr. Chatterjee, who has filled with credit the post of a Chief Court Judge, was held disqualified for working as Judicial Member in the Kashmir Council. I mention these facts to show how, in the face of an existing treaty engagement and in spite of the most cordial relationship, His Highness's wishes were, without any justifying cause, ruthlessly over-ridden. In place of men whom the Maharaja knew and wanted, others, perfect strangers to His Highness, were thrust upon him as Members of his Council.'

Independent and most competent authorities, whose communications are in my hands as I write, fully confirm all Mr. Jogendra Chandra Bose has set forth.

The occasion for all this intrigue will appear later on.

I may now return to the charges preferred by the Government of India. In their letter of August 1, 1884, to Sir Oliver St. John, the Government indicated the reforms which the new Maharaja, upon succeed-

ing to power, must carry out. It nowhere appears that the officer on special duty put them specifically before His Highness. They are thus described in the letter:—

1. The introduction of a reasonably light assessment of land revenue, collections to be in cash, if practicable;
2. The construction of good roads;
3. The cessation of State monopolies;
4. The revision of existing taxes and dues, especially transit dues, and the numerous taxes upon trades and professions;
5. The abolition of the system of farming the revenue, wherever it is in force;
6. The appointment of respectable officials, and their regular payment in coin;
7. The establishment of a careful system of financial control;
8. The removal of all restrictions upon emigration;
9. The reorganization and regular payment of the army; and
10. The improvement of the judicial administration.

In a word, the ruler of Kashmir was called upon to reorganize the government of an Oriental State, governed after an Oriental fashion with the general acquiescence of the population, and produce a standard of perfection according to the Western ideas. There was a lifetime's honest work in the complete realisation of the various points of the programme. Before four years had passed the Maharaja was deposed because he had not accomplished thirty years' results. Yet the Maharaja had a good record. Had he been called upon to show

cause why he should not be deposed, had he been permitted to defend himself before an impartial tribunal, he would have been able to prove that, in spite of the adverse influences (to be described in detail hereafter) arrayed against him, he had made great progress in good government. He could have shown that important changes had been accomplished and that certain great improvements had been made in his administration. For example, against the ten demands made upon him he could have proved that in sixteen important respects he had achieved excellent results:—

1. Payment of all civil and military salaries monthly instead of at irregular intervals, thus avoiding accumulation of arrears.

2. Abolition of export duties.

3. Abolition of numerous vexatious duties on manufacturers and traders.

4. Abolition of the *harkarabashi*, the *sewai*, and other heavy taxes levied on the cultivators of the soil.

5. Stoppage of the inhuman practice of punishing the innocent relatives of deserters from the army when the deserters themselves could not be found.

6. Partial abolition of the pernicious practice of farming the land revenue by letting it to the highest bidder.

7. Abolition of the practice of buying ghee, horses, wool, and other articles, through the revenue officials, from cultivators, at nominal prices fixed by Government.

8. Abolition of the tax on Muhammadan marriages.

9. Increased allotment of funds for public works.

10. Stringent orders issued to prevent high officials

and influential men influencing the decisions of courts of justice.

11. Equalization of the customs duty on salt.

12. Establishment of high schools at Jammu and Srinagar.

13. Municipal constitution granted to the cities of Jammu and Srinagar.

14. Equitable adjustment of import duties.

15. Leave Code, Educational Code, and other rules calculated to promote public interests, provided. And,

16. Corruption checked among civil and revenue officials by the introduction of a system of strict supervision as well as by the importation of an honest and educated element into the service.

In the face of all this the Maharaja was deposed because, forsooth, he had shown *no* disposition to improve the condition of things in his dominions! Indian Government procedure towards Feudatory Princes is an advance on Jedburgh justice which hanged a man and then proceeded to inquire whether he was guilty. In India condemnation takes place, sentence is carried out, and no attempt is made to ascertain whether occasion for condemnation really did exist, or whether a sentence ought to have been pronounced.

The charges in the two communications (the despatch to the Secretary of State, and the letter to the Maharaja himself) may now be examined in detail. The facts submitted will show how flimsy and untenable were the reasons given for this last step in reprobation of a mis-government which may or may not have existed, but of which no adequate proof had been given by any one, neither to the Government of India, nor to the Resident, nor to the Maharaja himself. 'Nothing in the shape of 'evidence' good enough to satisfy a London Police Magistrate in a case of petty larceny is forthcoming to justify the deposition of a monarch from the rule of his dominions.

(1) 'The condition of things in Kashmir was by no means satisfactory'; *a.* 'Extremely unfavourable reports' as to 'the manner in which the affairs of your Highness were administered by your Highness.' The Government of India are on their defence. Driven at last by Mr. Bradlaugh's Parliamentary pertinacity to justify their conduct, they submit the papers now in the hands of hon. members as their justification. Will the statement be believed? Only one piece of evidence is forthcoming. Meanwhile, before that evidence is submitted, an admission had been made by the Government of India which puts Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues

in the wrong. Lord Dufferin himself (July 28, 1888, Letter to Maharaja) admitted these facts: 'Considerable progress has been made in the direction of reform; useful work has been done with regard to the Revenue administration, and in the reorganisation of the Public Works and Medical Departments.' Surely, if so much could be said in July, 1888, things cannot have gone so completely wrong in eight months as to justify—without an opportunity of defence—the extreme step of deposition. Even if there were occasion for interference it by no means follows that His Highness was alone to blame.

The Indian Government, however (despatch of July 26, 1889), have, as I have several times remarked, one piece of evidence which, they declare, contains abundant proof of the misgovernment they allege existed in Kashmir. It is a Report addressed by Mr. A. Win-

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<sup>1</sup> The Maharaja himself, in his letter to Lord Lansdowne, indicates how greatly he was thwarted in all his efforts. He says: 'Now, to put it very plainly, I have never up to this time enjoyed complete independence of action in State affairs. Some sort of pressure or other has always been put upon me since my accession to the throne, and I have never been free to administer the State according to my internal satisfaction. Under such circumstances it has been very cruel indeed to hold me personally responsible for any maladministration, and punish me severely as a criminal. By the above order of your Excellency it is plain enough to understand that matters have been so represented as to prove that only my interference has brought about this state of affairs, for which the Government of India has been obliged to pass such strictures. Whereas the case is quite the contrary. The man whose disloyal interference is the chief cause of all mismanagement, and who should have been severely punished, has got not only scot-free, but has been placed over my head, enjoying perfect satisfaction of having been successful in his wicked design. Had there been any other loyal and faithful Prime Minister of mine than Raja Amar Singh he would have been expected to send in a suitable reply to the Resident's communication, and to save me from the deadly disgrace which I have been put to; but my brother, the present Prime Minister, quietly submitted to it, and was extremely satisfied to see me thus disgraced, as it was really his own hearty intention to see me so.'

gate, C.I.E., land settlement officer to the Maharaja, in August 1888, shortly after the time that Lord Dufferin declared that 'considerable progress' had been made in the direction of reform. Mr. Wingate's report is a long one, and is mainly of a technical character. The only parts which can, by any torturing, be held to support the statements of the Government of India are paragraphs 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, and 76. Most important among these are paragraphs 27 and 28. These I proceed at once to quote; the others mentioned are given in full in Appendix A. In paragraphs 27 and 28 Mr. Wingate says:—

From the above it will be remarked that floods are rare, and, occurring as they usually do in the spring, the damage is not serious, whilst the fertility of the soil is increased. Severe earthquake has occurred twice in the present century, and, so far as I know, not at all in the previous century. Severe famine has also occurred twice, caused each time by the heavy and continuous autumn rains of 1831 and 1877, and on each occasion producing a scarcity that lasted till the reaping of the second *shali* harvest after the failure. The visitations of cholera have not been numerous and have seldom been severe. The general result of the last seventy years appears to be that the population is now little more than half of what it used to be. That it is considerably less there can be little doubt. Traces of disused irrigation and of former cultivation, ruins of villages or parts of villages, of bridges, &c., local tradition—all point to a greater prosperity, which by the end of the Sikh rule in A.D. 1846 had well-nigh disappeared. Since that date, progress has been made, though arrested by the famine of A.D. 1878, but that the present revenue management and system of government seriously hinder progress there will be little difficulty in showing. To maintain the population, two devices have been resorted to, both I believe of old date. The first, prohibiting export of rice, is still in existence; at least, last year I understand rice was prevented going to the Punjab. The second, prohibiting



any Kashmiri crossing the passes, was removed during the last famine. The door of hope was, however, opened too late, for of the numerous refugees few succeeded in reaching the open country, and consequently few came back. Since then, numbers of Kashmiris visit the Punjab every winter, where they find employment and save on their wages, returning in the early spring to cultivate their fields, generally bringing with them some cloth or other trifle for their wives, but getting frequently roughly handled by the customs clerks for their pains. Doubtless some remain in the plains, but, as on their return they would find their lands given away, few of the regular cultivators overstay the winter. And besides, the Kashmiri cultivator says he cannot live in the plains. Difficulty of getting food during the winter is quite as strong a cause of the annual exodus as the desire of gain. As the families of Kashmiris are decidedly large and the emigration from the valley is not, I should say, considerable, the gaps made by famine would quickly be filled up were it not for the winter mortality from insufficient clothing and food which must take place among the children. The Kashmiri requires more and more frequent nourishment and warmer clothing than his brother of the plains. Not only does the climate necessitate more, but the Kashmiri has the body and strength of an elephant. The collectors of *shāli* often pay insufficient attention to this point, and, as the aim is to collect for the use of the city all that can be safely taken, they are apt, acting on the experience of what a family consume in the plain, to leave too little to properly support and multiply the agricultural population.

In a valley where during the last nine years there have been seven good harvests and only two indifferent ones, and where the ruler is averse to raising the price of *shāli* lest the poor should suffer, it seems strange to speak of chronic scarcity affecting the population, and yet last year, and from reports I have read, the same thing has more or less been going on for years; I saw mobs struggling and fighting to secure a chance of getting a few seers of the Government *shāli*, in a way that I have not witnessed since the great famine of Southern India. I have found it impossible to obtain any record of bazaar prices, but I believe I am correct in saying that before A.D. 1846 the normal price of *shāli* was about

eight annas per kharwár, and that it varied with the harvests. For example, during the famine of A.D. 1831-33, the price rose greatly, and even after A.D. 1833 it remained for some time as high as Rs.  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per kharwár. Whether the kharwár was reduced to 15 traks instead of 16 traks then, I have not ascertained. Shortly after Maharaja Goláb Singh assumed the control, the present system of collecting *sháli* in large granaries in the city and selling it by retail through Government officials appears to have been introduced, and the price of *sháli*, with a brief interval about A.D. 1879 when it was raised to Rs.  $1\frac{1}{2}$ , has remained stationary at Rs.  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per kharwár of 15 traks = two maunds and one seer of standard weight at 80 tolas per seer. For over forty years the system has been sufficiently profitable to support a large body of the pandit population of the city in idleness, and the Government has gradually become on the one side a farmer working with coolies under a management closely approximating forced labour, and on the other side, a gigantic bannia's shop doling out food to the poor in exchange for their coppers, and keeping with every cultivator an account showing what is taken from him whether in the way of grain, oil, wool, ponies, cows, etc., and what is given to him in the shape of seed, plough-cattle, cotton or wool to spin and weave, and a hundred other petty details. There are neither grain shops in the bazaar, nor bannias nor bankers anywhere.<sup>1</sup> I do not know whether it is an offence to sell *sháli*, but I do know that the cultivators are afraid to do so, and in tehsils nominally under a cash settlement, and with an abundant harvest, my establishment have once and again been literally starving, and the only way they can get food is by having it sent out, rice, atta, dall, etc., etc., from the Government storehouses in Srinagar to the tehsildars, who thereupon sell to my men for cash. My men still find difficulty in procuring the necessaries of life, and only very urgent representations at head-quarters have secured the supplies necessary to stop the angry, and to me humiliating, clamour of my subordinates to be allowed to buy food for ready money. Doubtless this annoyance has been partly due to the feeling of hostility with which my department is regarded by every official, from the

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<sup>1</sup> Cultivators, however, do get advances from people in the city.

highest to the lowest,<sup>1</sup> but the scenes I have described in the city convinced me that the widow and the orphan, the weak and the sickly, must fare badly when it comes to physical wrestling for the daily bread. In Kashmir the tehsildar is the bannia, and he is a branch of the great official firm in Srinagar, where the chief business is conducted.

In noting the statements made by Mr. Wingate, it must be remembered that they are merely the observations of a stranger sent to the country for the very purpose of showing that all was wrong, that he was in active hostility towards the officials, that his statements are unchecked, and that, probably, close examination of the various points urged might minimize some of the harsh judgments expressed.

This is all the Government have to go upon in defending their deposition of the ruler of a great State, a ruler of whom their solitary witness himself said, in paragraph 71 of the same Report: ‘I have been impressed during my interviews with your Highness with the belief that *your Highness has a ready sympathy for the poor, a keen interest in land questions, and a determination to protect the cultivators against the officials.*’<sup>2</sup> Only one witness is called, and he testifies to the good faith and energy of the alleged criminal in securing the good of his people, those very people in whose behalf the Government of India have interfered. Yet not one of those people—so far as the Papers show—has made a single complaint against his ruler. It is

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<sup>1</sup> This season several of the circles are able to supply themselves in the villages by paying rather more than the fixed price.—A. W.

<sup>2</sup> In para. 71, which I quote in the Appendix, there is much more to the same effect, all showing how zealous the Maharaja was in his desire to reform the abuses of a bad system of land revenue administration.

not as if when Mr. Wingate saw the Maharaja his Highness had contemptuously thrust him aside, and had said he did not care what became of the people. In such a case the Paramount Power might rightfully have intervened. But here was a sympathetic, tender-hearted, kindly despot, who was extremely anxious for the happiness of his people, and who might have secured that happiness if only British influence had allowed to him a measure of fair-play.

Mr. Wingate puts in the forefront of his charges a belief that population has decreased during the past seventy years. No doubt a diminution of population in any district does argue some degree of misgovernment. I will say nothing of the argument as it applies to Ireland. I will confine myself to India. One of the members of the House of Commons, Sir Edward Watkin, in a book he wrote last year on India, said that where population decreased the Government stood discredited. It may be well to see where the Government of India, the very party who make this one of their most important charges against the Maharaja, themselves stand. Can it possibly be that if the same measure were meted out to Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues, to Lord Cross and his councillors, to the present Under Secretary and to the right hon. gentleman who preceded him in office, as they have not scrupled to mete out to Maharaja Pertab Singh, a Power stronger than themselves would be justified in taking away from them the Empire which they administer or have administered? There are certain facts which, founded as they are on the tables published in the *Statistical Abstract of British India*, issued from

the India Office, cannot be gainsaid or impugned. An examination of the records reveal these startling figures:—

POPULATION RETURNS: CENSUS OF 1881 COMPARED WITH 1872.

Presidencies or Provinces.	Districts.		Remarks.
	Increase.	Minus.	
1. Bengal .. ..	43	8	Increase considerably more than 1 per cent. per annum.
2. N.-W. Provinces and Oudh .. ..	33	16	Nearly two millions decrease. In the districts showing increase that increase is often infinitesimal.
3. Panjab .. ..	27	5	1,415,019 minus. Thirteen years have passed between the respective Censuses.
4. Central Provinces	18	—	Increase more than 2 per cent. per annum. The purely Indian States show an increase of nearly 75 per cent., viz., from 1,049,710 to 1,709,720, chiefly on the Bengal side.
5. Madras .. ..	13	8	2,000,000 deficient, or, at 1½ per cent. p.a., over 4,000,000.
6. Bombay .. ..	16	8	Nearly 1,500,000 deficient.
TOTALS .. ..	150	45	

POPULATION FIGURES—ALLOWING 1 PER CENT. PER ANNUM INCREASE.

	Minus.	Plus.
N.-W. Provinces and Oudh .. ..	2,000,000	Bengal .. .. . 6,200,000
Panjab .. ..	1,415,019	Assam .. .. . 760,000
Madras .. ..	3,000,000	Ajmere, Berar, etc. 520,000
Bombay .. ..	1,500,000	Central Provinces .. 1,564,967
Mysore .. ..	1,250,000	TOTAL .. .. . 9,144,967
TOTAL .. ..	9,165,019	

That is not a very satisfactory record. The loss more than balances the gain. If I take the rate of normal increase which the Indian Government declare, under

their administration, ought to accrue, the minus total would be nearly 14,000,000.

Is anybody prepared to say that a like record can be compiled of Kashmir? No one has yet done so.

More than that. While of Kashmir there is merely allegation, in regard to British India there is solid fact. Mr. Wingate hazards the opinion that the population in Kashmir has decreased by one-half during the past seventy years. That is merely a guess of his. I can take you to districts under British administration, which have been under such administration for nearly the whole of this century, where, in the course of two years, the population was reduced by one-third. That is not a matter of opinion, but of absolute fact—fact ascertained by the Government of India itself. It ill becomes us to talk of decreased population.

In Kashmir there has only twice been severe famine in the present century. As much cannot be said of British India; in eighteen years twelve millions of people have died of starvation in the Provinces under English government.

Then, as to the allegation of excessive assessment of the land revenue in Kashmir, and the increasing difficulty of the cultivators to pay the same, if such a state of things is to justify deposition, then ought the present administration of India to be impeached. The burden of life in British India is not easier now than it was. On the contrary, the burden has become heavier, and is much harder to bear. Assessments in some cases are four times higher than they were wont to be: salt is much more heavily taxed; rights over grazing lands have been abolished; fuel is harder to get, with the

result that the labouring classes can barely provide sustenance for themselves and their families, even in the most hand-to-mouth fashion.<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Alfred

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<sup>1</sup> Look to what a Member of Council said the other day, in the light-hearted fashion in which people speak of sufferings which they do not share: 'Our survey assessments have been lower than those of former rulers.' True in one sense, utterly false in reality, just as a clothier might urge that he charged less than a former dealer, because he only charged Rs. 2 for a suit and the other asked Rs. 3. But when you look into it and find that for Rs. 3 the former man supplied not merely coat and trousers, but pugree, waist-belt, over-cloth, shoes, and that the new man now charges Rs. 1 extra for each of these over and above Rs. 2 for the coat and trousers, you don't think much of his pretended liberality and fair dealing. Now, that is just our case, and if Mr. Peile did not know it, he ought to have known it. A particular number [every field in Bombay has its official number] may be pointed out which pays a lower assessment than it did under former rulers, though I doubt even this. But if you take the landholders, the cultivators as a body, you will find that with no more land to live on—and it is the land and the land only on which they live—they are made to pay one way and another at least four times what they ever paid under any previous rulers, no matter how grasping and unmerciful. Take my own lands in Ratnagiri; they have been assessed at the late survey at not less than ten times what they were assessed at under the Arba Suman survey under the Mahommedan Government. People may ask why we are now pressing for a Permanent Settlement—why did we never ask for it in former times? I will tell you, gentlemen. It is because in former times we could easily pay for the suit, even a little more than what is now nominally asked for; for in those former days we got the shoes, and the pugree, and the kummerbund, and the over-cloth and everything else free, and now we have to pay separately for everything and heavily for everything. Our means of subsistence, *i.e.*, the produce of the land, is the same, or even less. There is the same amount of water in the pot, but there are now six holes by which it runs out, when before there was but one. Gentlemen, we got our salt, life's first necessary, at a nominal price for ourselves and for our cattle. Now it is so dear that the latter cannot have it at all. We had our cattle in plenty, lots of grazing free, and salt to keep them healthy. Now the land is all taken up by the Forest Department and we have no grazing, and, if the starving herds stray where there is food, they are run into the pound and we are fined. And, day by day, cattle, the first necessity of agriculture here, are decreasing in number and deteriorating in quality. We had plenty of fuel free, both for our own purpose and to make the *rab*, or ash manure, without which our rice will not grow; but the forests have absorbed all the woodlands and our warkas lands are assessed, and we must buy our fuel and buy it dear. We had plenty of wood for our houses, our ploughs, for every agricultural purpose; now it is all under the lock and key of the Forest Department, and if we touch it without leave we are run in, and if we want a stick we have a week's running about from one official to another before we get it, and we have to pay, pay, pay! We had arms, and we could shoot or destroy the wild beasts that ravage our crops, but now we have an Arms Act that allows

Elliott, one of the three members of the Government of India who signed the deposition despatch, is currently reported in an official document to have remarked: 'I do not hesitate to say that half our agricultural population never know, from year's end to year's end, what it is to have their hunger fully satisfied.' 'Half our agricultural population' means considerably more even than the forty millions of our Indian subjects who, according to Sir William W. Hunter, 'go through life on insufficient food.' Nothing so bad as this has been said, or could be said, by any one of Kashmir. Yet it is, so they say, on account of the suffering caused to the people by misgovernment that the Maharaja has

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a basketful of arms to every negro rascal who lands on our shores, but takes good care that we poor cultivators who need them to protect our subsistence from wild animals are practically debarred from any. We had such simple liquor as our people absolutely need at the cost of making it. But now a grand system has been introduced, which, while it makes the population drunken, involves considerable expenditure, and that for a hurtful mixture, to provide what our cultivators, in the damp, low-lying lands of Ratnagiri, really require for their health in the way of stimulant. We could borrow money on reasonable terms, for the land and the crops could not run away, and people were willing to trust us. There was a profit in those days in the land, and we could get what we wanted for seed or what not. But now, when the next turn of the screw may so reduce the value of the land that the surplus may be, as it already is in many places, *nil*, no one will give credit except for very short periods at very high interest. The usurers care nothing for the welfare of the people; all they care for is to exact interest at a penal rate. And yet, gentlemen, Mr. Francis's assessment, which was a fair one, and one that men could pay and live, when all these advantages were ours, has now been largely enhanced when not one of them remains to us. The Deccan Agricultural Relief Act, the reports of Collectors, of the Agricultural Department, all show what the real position of our cultivators is. Why do the cultivators not abandon the hopeless task? Because, unfortunately, they must either cultivate on, they and their families half-starving, or die themselves at once with their wives and little ones. Every one here knows that outside the Presidency towns, where the mills and other works give some relief, our cultivators and labouring classes can barely provide sustenance for themselves and families, even in the most hand-to-mouth fashion.—*Speech delivered by Rao Sahab Janaidin Raghanath Nimi Kar, of the Deccan, at the Indian National Congress, Dec. 28, 1889.* Every sentence nearly was heartily cheered, thus showing how clearly the speaker was expressing the general sentiment.



been removed. 'Misgovernment,' as Colonel Malleon has remarked,<sup>1</sup> 'is a relative term.' He proceeds to say: 'There can be no question but that in the English sense of the term there had been no good government in Oudh. But a kind of administrative system had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the Sipahis, after the term of their service under the British flag had expired, to settle in their native country. More than that, after the natives of Oudh had had one year's experience of British government, as administered by Mr. Coverley Jackson and Mr. Martin Gubbins, they, one and all, evinced a strong preference for the native government which had been superseded.' There can be little doubt that the one year's experience of Colonel Nisbet's rule, if the opinion of the people were ascertained, would be followed by a like expression of condemnation.

Again, British rule in India has not unfrequently been marked by such incidents as the following—described by Sir H. S. Cunningham, K.C.S.I., a member of the Famine Commission—to be placed to its discredit. The Lieutenant-Governor for the North-Western Provinces in 1878 described the state of certain districts in Jhansi, as one of overwhelming 'indebtedness and ruin.' His Honor enumerated among the causes the following, which are given in Sir H. S. Cunningham's own words, he, as a member of the Famine Commission, having written a Memorandum on the subject:—

(1.) The British Government obliged the

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<sup>1</sup> Vol. v., p. 287, Kaye and Malleon's History of the Indian Mutiny. Edition 1889.

people to pay a second time the revenue which had already been exacted from them by the Orchha State during the Mutiny.

(2) A series of bad seasons combined with unrelaxed revenue demand:—‘The crops of 1867 were a failure. The year 1868-69 was one of famine; one-fourth of the whole stock of cattle in the district died, and the poorer classes emigrated to Gwalior or Malwa, or perished from starvation or disease. *In the midst of this distress the British officials were inexorable in demanding payment of the revenue, and, in order to pay it, the people were obliged to commit themselves to written contracts of the most one-sided and ruinous character. They thus fell an easy prey to the money lender, whose exactions the Civil Courts have not been slow in supporting. The famine and the injudicious action of the Revenue authorities had reduced the people to a state of absolute poverty.*’<sup>1</sup>

This poverty is summarised thus—The ascertained debts of the revenue-paying proprietors in three pergunnahs are reported as  $16\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs, and their annual profits fall short of their annual liabilities by some Rs. 80,000 a year, which is running on at compound interest. A specimen of the way in which debt accumulates is given in the case of some zemindars, who ten years ago borrowed Rs. 3,600 of ‘the most respectable firm in the district.’ They have since paid Rs. 6,999, and the account, when last balanced, showed the debt to be Rs. 9,766.

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<sup>1</sup> The italics are *not* mine; they are Sir H. S. Cunningham’s.

‘The Zemindars, it is needless to add, “are quite destitute;” population is diminishing, cultivation has decreased from 258,000 to 231,000, and an area of 37,800 acres is infected with a weed (kans) which only capital can eradicate.’

‘What,’ continues Sir H. Cunningham, ‘seems to be wanted is some machinery for bringing the best ability of the Government to bear forthwith upon these acknowledged failures, which the Government of India has described, in the case of Jhansi, “as a blot upon the administration.” The state of things in Jhansi, apparently, has been known for many years, yet the machinery for improving it is extraordinary slow in getting into motion; the Senior Member is six months before he can write his Minute upon the Report; the Junior Member takes another six months with his; the North-Western Provinces Government takes another six or seven months to frame its letter to the Government of India; meanwhile the compound interest debt, which increases at the rate of Rs. 80,000 per annum, is running on, and the condition of the patient becoming hourly more desperate, while the doctors at their leisure are discussing the most appropriate remedy.’

Yet once again. On the unimpeachable authority of the *Times of India* it may be stated that the revision of Indapoor taluk enhanced rates by 53 per cent., of Sholapoor by 77, of Medeh 77, of Bhimthuree 69, of Punderpoor 67, of Barsee 66, of Heveli 66, of Pabul 48, of Soopa 36, and of Tharmal 32 per cent. These enhancements of rates were considered moderate at the time they were announced. As, however, they were made at a time when the reaction in prices had set in in full

force, Government was compelled, in sheer justice to the complaints of the peasantry, though against the inclination of survey officers, to offer a concession of rates in a resolution dated the 29th October, 1874, in which it was laid down that in no case was the increase of revenue by the re-assessment of a taluk or a group of villages to exceed 33 per cent. : that in case of an individual village the enhancement was not to go beyond 66 per cent.; and in case of a single holding beyond 100 per cent.

To this may be added one piece more of evidence. The *Times*, on August 23, 1885, published a letter in which it was remarked :—‘As a rule in India, rents, on estates where the Government is or represents the landlord, are not moderate but the reverse. When the Durbhunga estates were under Government management, some 5,000 ryots, unable to pay the increased rents demanded of them, abandoned their farms and homesteads and fled into Nepaul. In Madras, where the bulk of the land belongs to the State, evictions and sales in realizing the Government demand on land have been increasing in an alarming ratio since 1865. In Bombay, Sir Auckland Colvin’s Minute, embodied in the report of the Deccan Riots Commission, states that the excessive enhancements made, in the Government demand on the land held by the cultivators, were among the special causes of the distress and serious disturbances of 1874-75. Many other instances of a similar nature might be cited, the most recent being the cases of the Midnapore ryots, which came up last year on appeal before the High Court of Bengal, and from which it appeared that 75,000 ryots complained of excessive and

illegal enhancements having been made in their rents—a complaint which the Court found to be well-grounded in the case selected for the trial.’

Things *may* have been as bad in Kashmir, but no proof has been vouchsafed by the prosecutor that such is the case; there is nothing beyond bare assertion unaccompanied with evidence. And if deposition from power is to follow for such misconduct as that of which the Maharaja is assumed to have been guilty, where will the Government of India itself stand?

Delay in carrying out urgent land reforms in Kashmir is regarded as the worst of crimes as, in fact, justifying the deposition of a ruler. Again, I ask, what then shall be done to the Government of India itself? More than two years have elapsed—eight months only elapsed in the matter of Maharaja Pertab Singh—since the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces informed the Viceroy that indebtedness was everywhere increasing in the districts under his rule, and that, unless a measure like that of the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879, or the Jhansi Encumbered Estates Act of 1882, were speedily passed, the inevitable result would be the transfer to the money-lending classes of a very large portion of the land of those provinces. Notwithstanding that the memory of the Government of India was refreshed by action taken in Parliament by Mr. Bradlaugh on August 23 in last year, the late legislative session in Calcutta was allowed to pass without anything being done. It does not appear that legislation of an important character in connection with Indian affairs prevented attention being directed to this matter in the cold season

of last year. Were the British Parliament, which is the supreme ruler of India, as much wanting in consideration for the Government of India as that Government was for the Maharaja Pertab Singh, his fate would have been their fate also.

Much more might be said on this point, but enough has been cited to prove the untenableness of the official charge. At the same time it has been shown that even if the charges were true it did not lie with the Government of India, *on the grounds stated*, to take such drastic action. The *tu quoque* argument is not a dignified one, and is often offensive. From the time, however, when the man who having a beam in his own eye was exhorted not to be rude to him who had only a mote in his eye, it has often been found necessary to use the argument.

The next charge against the Maharaja runs thus:—

(b.) ‘The finances of the State were in disorder,’ ‘a disorder which, there could be no doubt, was increased by your own extravagance,’ ‘squandering of the revenues of the State in a most reckless and improvident manner.’

So far as the published documents go there is not one word to show that the Treasury at Srinagar was empty, or that, if it were empty, the Maharaja was in any degree to blame. But there is much evidence available which should make the Government of India ashamed of its conduct in bringing such a charge. What, if—notwithstanding the alleged emptiness of the Treasury—the Government of India should itself have been instrumental in draining the Treasury of an ‘independent’ prince?

*First*, as to the Maharaja’s own alleged extravagance. Mr. Jogendra Chundra Bose is a competent witness. At pages 46-48 of his pamphlet already referred to, he says:—

‘I shall now take up the third charge, namely, that of extravagance. If by this charge is meant waste of public money, it is utterly groundless. In respect of public funds, far from being extravagant, the Maharaja is rather cautious and economical. Following his father’s practice he, from the commencement of his

reign, fixed a monthly allowance for his private and domestic expenses, and latterly reduced the amount of that allowance. Of course, this allowance, which, in itself, is not a very big sum for a prince of his dignity and position, being only Rs.43,000, or less than £3,000 per month, he spends in any way he thinks proper, but no one can possibly object to his doing so. Then, since his accession, he has incurred six or seven big items of expenditure. The first of these was on the occasion of the late Maharaja's *shradh*<sup>1</sup>; the second was in undertaking a trip to Calcutta to meet Lord Dufferin; the third was to pay off arrears due to the civil and military establishments; the fourth was on the occasion of the formal installation of His Highness; the fifth was for the purpose of paying some debts which the Maharaja had incurred as heir-apparent; the sixth was for performing the first annual *shradh* of the late Maharaja; and the seventh for celebrating the re-marriage of Raja Amar Singh on the demise of his first wife.

‘No reasonable mind can raise any objections with regard to the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth of these items. These were spent for necessary State ceremonies or State purposes, and should be allowed to pass perfectly unchallenged. The fifth item may admit of some question, and much discussion took place between His Highness and his Ministers at the time it was disbursed. If the Maharaja had been inclined to defraud his creditors, he could have easily done so. The only courts where they could sue him were his own, and he might have, if so minded, influenced his courts in his own

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<sup>1</sup> Religious ceremonies necessary, under the Hindu religion, to ensure the salvation of the departed.



favour, thereby rendering it impossible for his creditors to obtain decrees or to execute the same. But his instincts are too generous for such a subterfuge. He spurned the idea of depriving his creditors of their just dues. He argued with his Ministers, he expostulated with them, he assured them that the debts had been really incurred, he laid stress upon the iniquity that would rest upon his head if he withheld payment, he portrayed the consequent uneasiness to which he would be subject, and he quoted the authority of the *shastras* to show that it was his bounden duty to discharge these debts in order to escape infamy in this world and retribution in the next. His Ministers were overpowered, and His Highness satisfied his conscience and his keen sense of honour by keeping his promises with his creditors. The seventh item was unavoidable, though its amount might have been somewhat less than what it is reported to have been. It is not customary to perform re-mariages with extraordinary *éclat*, but Raja Amar Singh was quite young, and, besides, the Maharaja was at that time very fond of him and wanted to show that he looked upon him as his son. This item also, therefore, cannot be regarded as very heinous. The expenditure was not altogether unwarranted, and to base upon it the charge of extravagance is to lay the foundations of a stone bridge upon a floating straw.\*

So much for a ruling monarch's personal extravagance!

*Next*, the Treasury was empty. If it were, who had a large part in emptying it? I reply, the Government of India. Items which were incurred under the direct influence of the Indian authorities, follow:—

Items.	Rs.
1. Loan to the Government of India ...	25,00,000
2. Annual expenditure on the Jhelum Valley cart road ... ..	6,00,000
3. Jammu - Sialkote Railway, one year's payment only ... ..	13,00,000
4. Jammu waterworks ... ..	3,00,000

Worst of all, at the very time when the Viceroy (Lord Dufferin) was warning the Maharaja to look better after the finances of his State,

‘The Lady Dufferin Medical Fund Committee received Rs. 50,000 from Kashmir, while Rs. 25,000 was accepted as a contribution to the Aitchison College at Lahore.’

If the Kashmir Treasury was in an enfeebled condition, why did Lord Dufferin permit so large an amount to be paid to a fund under the control of his wife? Here are more samples of a like kind:—‘Last winter (1888-89), about Rs. 50,000 were lavished upon a European pig-sticking party near Sialkote. A new Residency is being built at Gulmarg and another new one at Jammu, for which last alone the estimate is Rs. 1,00,000, besides Rs. 25,000 for furniture, though the Resident stays there little now and will stay less when the railway line to Sialkote is completed. Was the Maharaja anxious for all this heavy expenditure? Was not, on the contrary, all this expenditure incurred at the instance of the British Government and of its agent at His Highness’ Court, and are not they alone answerable for it? At a time when the treasury, to use Lord Lansdowne’s own expression, “was empty,” was it proper and opportune to lay

out thirteen lakhs of rupees on a railway which is not a necessity, and which will serve very little to enhance the prosperity of the people of Jammu? The trade of the place is not considerable and is not susceptible of much development—so the line will prove but an expensive luxury after all. . . . There is another big item I have omitted to mention. It is the lakh of rupees spent on the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Forces to the Happy Valley. Every man who accompanied His Excellency, from the Aide-de-Camp down to the grass-cutter, was treated at the State expense. The Maharaja of Kuppurthala's recent sojourn cost the State more than Rs. 50,000. Did Maharaja Pertab Singh invite him to Kashmir? Last year (1888) Lord Dufferin intended to travel in the State, and the preparations for His Lordship's reception cost a lakh of rupees. He gave up his intended tour, and so a couple of lakhs more were saved. But these are only the bigger items, and the list, too, as given here, is far from exhaustive. If a detail of the smaller items were attempted, it would occupy pages. So, considering the limited space at my command, it is better to refrain from the attempt. What I have said above will give some idea of the reckless extravagance that is going on under the auspices of the British Government and the British Resident.

'But that is not all. I ought to give here a few samples of the Council's work, which, the Government of India may be under the impression, has been managing affairs very economically. (1.) The *Vakil* with the Resident used to get Rs. 66 a month; the present man, a *confidant* of Raja Amar Singh's, is paid Rs. 400 a month. (2.) The monthly pay of the officer over the *Toshakhana*

(Treasure-house) used to be Rs. 200. Raja Amar Singh's private servant's father has been appointed on Rs. 600. (3.) A photographer, who has no public duty so far as one can ascertain, but who constantly dances attendance upon Raja Amar Singh, has been employed on Rs. 500 per month. (4.) Dhunjibho, a favourite of Colonel Nisbet's, gets a monthly payment of Rs. 500, because he is said to have established a Tonga *Dak* along the Murree Route, though he has nothing whatever to do with the carrying of the mails, which come *via* Jammu. (5.) A headman for the reception of European visitors has been appointed on Rs. 500 per month. (6.) Formerly there was a Native doctor on the Murree Road on a pay of Rs. 50 or thereabouts, but a European has now been retained on Rs. 300 a month. (7.) Spedding & Co. have got a contract on the whole of the Murree Road at double the rates formerly allowed to Native contractors. (8.) It is in contemplation to lay out a few lakhs on Water Works at Srinagar, where there is already a plentiful supply of wholesome water, while the conservancy of the city is in a lamentably neglected condition. (9.) Lands are being measured for European settlements at Gupkar near Srinagar, and at Gulmarg, and also plans are being made for gardens, pleasure walks, &c. All this will entail a vast expenditure, besides other things, in the payment of compensation to those poor men who will have to be turned out of their holdings. (10.) A continual round of festivities, including racing, picnics, &c., is going on in Kashmir at the expense of the State. This has been costing large sums of money.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Pp. 72, 73 of Jogendra Chandra Bose's pamphlet.

The same game is still being merrily carried on. "Nunky" pays for all,' as the Indian byeword of two generations ago was apt to put it. From a copy of the *Statesman* (Calcutta), published in April last, I quote the following :—

'A correspondent, whose information is unquestionable, writes to say that on the departure of Colonel Nisbet, the Resident, for Srinagar, all his baggage was sent by the Maharaja's private route at State expense, though that gentleman himself went *via* Murree. Now, when we come to consider that the *begar* system<sup>1</sup> flourishes in Kashmir in its worst form, and that the carriage of a whole houseful of furniture means the impressing of hundreds of poor unoffending peasants all along the route, not for a day or two, but for weeks together, it is, to say the least, inexplicable how an officer of Colonel Nisbet's standing could be induced to accept such assistance. That he should draw any help at all is contrary to the best traditions of English rule, but that he should do so at the expense of a lot of miserable villagers—for State expense virtually resolves itself into that—is scandalous. Were the people employed on Colonel Nisbet's work paid by him? Nor is this the only point on which Colonel Nisbet's doings in Kashmir are challenged—doings which, though not without precedent, are none the less regrettable. It has often been a reproach to the British administration that political officers of high merit and integrity should place themselves under indirect pecuniary obligations to the Princes whose interests they are supposed to watch. Thus it is well

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<sup>1</sup> Impressment of country people as carriers, etc., without pay.

known that at Sialkote—for he never resides at the Maharaja's capital, where there is a residency—our gallant Colonel lives in a house belonging to the State; the whole of this is furnished at State expense, and certainly a quarter of the expenditure is defrayed from the selfsame source. Even in distant Lahore he is provided with a finely furnished house and carriages, while at Srinagar it is impossible to estimate the amount expended for residency purposes. Not that Colonel Nisbet is alone to blame in this matter. His predecessors have all more or less been guilty of it; but, as he is said to be a man of high spirit, and as moreover his appointment to Kashmir was accompanied by trumpet blasts of applause, he might have been more careful in thus risking exposure.' That so far Colonel Nisbet has not been a success we shall see later on.

I ask you, sir, whether it is not unnecessary to produce more facts on this point. An empty Treasury? Yes; emptied by those who make its emptiness an excuse for what, if done by others than Englishmen, would lead Englishmen to stigmatize it as brutal high-handedness, accompanied with robbery of a neighbour's territory. Probably the worry and anxiety to which he has been wantonly subjected will kill the Maharaja. If they do, the parallel with King Ahab's acquisition of Naboth's vineyard will be complete. Already the parallel is uncomfortably close, so close that it is a marvel that the men of high spirit and tender conscience who constitute the Government of India are not alive to the stain upon character which the transaction is causing.

c. Neglect to act upon the advice given by Lord Dufferin to carry out reforms.

Lord Dufferin himself may be cited to appear in the witness-box in this connection. I observe that Mr Munro-Ferguson voted against Mr. Bradlaugh's motion. Probably, in the passage I am about to cite, he may find reason for regret that he should have taken part in a denial of justice. In July, 1888, Lord Dufferin, as Viceroy of India, had under examination a scheme of government propounded by the Maharaja, in respect to which he sought the advice of the Government of India. Having expressed himself upon these various proposals (Appendix A), Lord Dufferin proceeded to remark:—

‘In making these observations I do not overlook the fact that, since the appointment of the Council of which Diwan Lachman Das was a member, *considerable progress has been made in the direction of reform; useful work has been done with regard to the revenue administration, and in the reorganization of the Public Works and Medical Departments.* But much remains to be done, and it is because I am deeply conscious of the importance of the Kashmir State, and of the responsibilities of the British Government in regard to it, that I

have so carefully examined the proposals which your Highness has put forward.'

Clearly, Lord Dufferin's memory must have failed him when he so ostentatiously approved, in the city of London, the course which his successor had taken. Further, the production of Lord Dufferin as a witness in this instance is surely a mistake. He has become even as Balaam the son of Peor, when that prophet was called to testify for Balak, King of Moab, against his enemies.



d. Certain treasonable letters alleged to have been written by the Maharaja.

Two witnesses may be called to testify as to this point. They are Lord Lansdowne himself and Sir John Gorst.

*Lord Lansdowne to the Secretary of State:* 'We were not disposed to attach any excessive importance to these letters.'

*Sir John Gorst, in the House of Commons, March and April, 1889:* 'The Government of India attach very little importance to the intercepted letters.'

e. 'The discovery of the letters was immediately followed by a voluntary resignation of power on the part of the Maharaja.'

The so-called 'voluntary resignation' is contained in the following document, namely :—

Dear younger brother, possessed of much good manners, Raja Amar Singhji.

Whereas for the good of the State, its better administration on the model of the great British Government is desired by us, we do hereby entrust all the administrative matters of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Members of Council, detailed below, for a period of five years—

Raja Ram Singh.

Raja Amar Singh.

An experienced European to be appointed in consultation with the Government of India on a salary of Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000 per month, who shall be a servant of the State.

Rai Bahadur Pundit Suraj Koul.

Rai Bahadur Pundit Bhag Ram.

The above-mentioned Council shall exercise administrative powers in all departments of the State for a period of five years. In case of any vacancy occurring within the said period of five years in the post of the above-mentioned last three members only, the vacancy will be filled up at our desire by the Government of India.

After the expiry of the said period of five years, we shall have power to adopt such administration for the State as may to us appear proper. The said period of five years will commence from the date of this *purwana*. All matters, great or small, 'private'

or connected with 'private', and the Mahalat (the palace), both inner and outer, shall not be liable to interference of any sort by the Council, nor shall the Council have any concern with them.

Such cash and kind for our own expenses, and for those of the Mahalat (the palace) or connected with 'private,' as are fixed and allowed up to this, and are taken from the State, shall, in future, be received as heretofore. The Council shall on no account have the power of causing any reduction in the same.

Such Jagirs and properties, movable and immovable, as are attached to the Mahalat (the palace) or are 'private,' shall not also be subject to interference by the Council. These shall be entirely under the personal control of ourselves.

Such expenses as will be incurred on occasions of marriage and death, and in the observance of other temporal and religious rites, shall be defrayed by the State.

The President of the Council shall be appointed by the order of ourselves from among our full-brothers.

For the period of the above-mentioned five years we shall not interfere in the management of the State. But in other respects the honour and freedom due to our rank shall rest with ourselves.

The above-mentioned Council shall not have the power, without our sanction, to enter into any new treaty or agreement with any State, or the Government of India, or to modify, rescind, or renew any treaty or agreement of our ancestors or our own.

The Council shall not have the power of granting or giving, without the sanction of ourselves, any Jagir, or proprietary rights and *pottas* of land, or of selling any immovable property of the State or public, or alienating any movable property or any other beneficial rights of the State.

Dated the 27th Falgun, Sambat 1945.

The Maharaja himself, in a letter addressed to the Viceroy, declared that he was, against his will, compelled to sign this document. 'With the information of these letters and with the full confidence and strength of being supported by my own brother and his now strong party,' says the Maharaja, 'Colonel R. P. Nisbet dashed into my room at a fixed time and brought such

great and many-sided pressures in all solemnity and seriousness that I was obliged to write what was desired by him in order to relieve myself for the moment—having full faith that your Excellency's Government would never accept such one-sided view of the case, and that opportunity will be given to me of defending myself.'

The story as to how the so-called letter of abdication was extracted from the Maharaja is worth telling with somewhat of detail. I will, therefore, quote particulars placed in my hands by parties residing in Kashmir, who were in a position to know intimately what actually transpired. This narrative, I may add, has been in my possession for more than twelve months. It was written at my request, while the circumstances were fresh in the minds of all concerned. Pandit Soorajkole, the Revenue Member of Council, says my informant, arrived at Jammu on 1st January, 1889, but did not do anything of practical importance, as the Judicial Member had not arrived. Whatever proposals were made by the Revenue Member to His Highness were promptly sanctioned, and the man was so well pleased with his situation that more than once he expressed his great satisfaction to His Highness. Prince Amar Singh, Prime Minister, was in secret communication with the Resident. The Judicial Member arrived and took charge of his office on 16th February. The Council, however, did not commence its sittings formally, because the rules of business had not been framed. It appears there was a hint from the Resident to delay their preparations; His Highness himself asked twice or thrice

why the rules were not ready, but the Prime Minister satisfied him by saying that they would be ready soon. A fortnight passed, when, all of a sudden, the Revenue Member was summoned to Sialkote and kept there for eight days. What happened at Sialkote can be easily imagined. He was called to advise what use could be made of the incriminating letters which had been sent to the Resident with his knowledge and that of the Prince (Prime Minister).

His Highness made inquiries from Pandit Surajkole on his return from Sialkote, but the Pandit did not warn him of the trap prepared for him.

When the plot was matured between the Resident, the Revenue Member, and the Prince, His Highness was asked to send down the Prince to Sialkote. He readily assented. The Prince remained there for two days, and, leaving his baggage behind, came up to Jammu and presented a letter from the Resident asking his Highness to permit him to accompany the Resident to Calcutta. His Highness asked why the Resident was going to Calcutta, to which the Prince replied, 'The honour of our house is at stake; we are ruined. Certain letters have been found which prove the Jammu family to be in league with Russia and Dhulip Singh;' and, with tears in his eyes, he begged the Maharaja to let him go with the Resident. The Maharaja, being surprised at this mysterious business, refused to let him go, and made a formal request to the Resident to see him at Jammu. The Resident did not give a reply for two days, and, to add to the extreme embarrassment of His Highness, his councillors, including the Prince, depicted in horrible colours his future fate; some said he would be sent to Rangoon

as a close prisoner, another that he would be tried for mutiny and hanged, a third that he would be kept a close political prisoner and his State would be confiscated by the Government. He solemnly denied the genuineness of the letters, but this was to no purpose. The Prince told him to his face that he had already told the Resident that the writing appeared to be that of his Highness, though the signature was doubtful. On this the Maharaja, with great composure of mind, declared that, if his own brothers were determined to ruin him with false accusations, he would submit to his fate. His Highness did not take his meals for two days, he was so much overpowered; and in his frenzy he saw no room for escape except to give his consent to such arrangements as were proposed to him. Not favoured by the Resident with a reply to his call, in his despair he said, 'Let them locate a cantonment and take any portion of my territory; but why do they trouble me in this way and put me to all sorts of disgrace?' The triumph was complete, and there could be no doubt that the Resident was apprised of it. Without giving previous notice he went to Jammu, and, before favouring His Highness with a visit, had a long talk with the Prime Minister at the Residency. Thus armed with the necessary weapons, he visited His Highness and was most offensive to him. He distinctly told him that the Viceroy was very much displeased, and that if His Highness's life was saved, he might consider himself lucky.

The Maharaja swore that the letters were forgeries, and begged to have a look at them. The Resident replied imperiously that he was satisfied they were genuine, and would not hear anything more about them.

He further said that he had told the Prime Minister how the matter could be squared, and that, if His Highness was anxious to save himself from the indignity of a prosecution, he must act as he was told. The Resident left a draft of an 'edict' written by the Resident himself. This was laid before His Highness by the Prime Minister, and pressure was put on him from all sides to prepare an 'irsad'<sup>1</sup> on its terms. His Highness persistently refused to do so. Meetings of the Council were held three or four times that day. The members lent from India distinctly refused to have anything to say in the matter; while their other colleagues, who were all Raja Amar Singh's creatures, were trying to induce His Highness by threats and menaces to sign the document. The Resident was still at Jammu, waiting for the documents; and the Prime Minister, finding that the Maharaja did not yield, threatened His Highness with a report to the Resident if the document was not executed. Next morning a vernacular translation of the Resident's draft was made out, and His Highness's signature obtained; it was then delivered to the Resident, who paid the Maharaja a visit and promised to do all he could to save him from the danger that awaited him.

There does not seem much of voluntary resignation in this incident.

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<sup>1</sup> Edict.

I now come to a part of the subject where I can, with one notable exception, no longer rely upon the papers presented to Parliament, thanks to the care with which those papers have been edited. I have to deal with what seems to be the underlying reason for the cruel, unjust, and wholly unjudicial and arbitrary, proceedings taken against the Maharaja of Kashmir. As I have already shown, in the first Paper published by Government a reference is made to 'the increasing importance to the Government of India, of watching events beyond the North-Western frontier of Kashmir.' If the Government of India had been really honest with themselves, if Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues had not persuaded themselves that they were actuated by a deep sympathy for the people of Kashmir, this object would have been stated in so many words. Such a course would have commanded respect for its honesty, however little the reason might have been approved in itself. Indian diplomacy, however, is not often afflicted with a desire to run a straightforward and candid course, especially when feudatories or neighbouring kingdoms are concerned.

In October last, on the eve of the Durga Poojah holidays, a newspaper published in Calcutta, known as the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, printed an official document, the appearance of which caused intense excitement



throughout India. The *Patrika* has an honourable record for its devotion to the interests of the Indian people and the Indian princes, combined with a sincere and deep-rooted loyalty to the maintenance of the British connection with India. The editorial paragraphs in the *Patrika* to which I have referred are as follows :

‘To-day we shall publish a document which will startle India—probably Lord Lansdowne himself. Lord Lansdowne, we are credibly informed, has been very much disgusted with the Kashmir business. We have a very high authority for stating that His Excellency was actuated by the best of motives in accepting what he calls the Edict of Resignation by the Maharaja. But when he accepted this responsibility of governing Kashmir through a Resident, he had no notion that there was so much intrigue, to put the matter mildly, surrounding the business. His Excellency’s heart now recoils at what he is obliged to do to defend a measure which is wholly untenable. A noble Englishman of high principles, His Excellency is not willing to stick to a measure which his conscience does not justify. And therefore he is only seeking an opportunity to restore Kashmir to its legitimate owner. Our information, incredible as it may appear, is derived from such a high source that we cannot help putting faith in it.

‘In the following document, the original of which His Excellency will find in the Foreign Office, the Viceroy will find the real reason why the Maharaja of Kashmir has been deposed. It will be seen that His Highness was deposed not because he resigned, or oppressed his people, but because Gilgit was wanted for strategical purposes by the British Government. Mr. Plowden proposed that the principalities of Gilgit should be occupied by the British Government at once, and this proposal of Mr. Plowden was the main cause of his downfall. Sir H. M. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, however, condemned Mr. Plowden’s proposal, and him

as Resident, in the following memorandum which was submitted to the then Viceroy, Lord Dufferin :—

‘OPINION OF FOREIGN SECRETARY ABOUT THE OCCUPATION  
OF GILGIT.

‘To His Excellency.

‘I do not agree with Mr. Plowden, the Resident in Kashmir, in this matter. He is too much inclined to set Kashmir aside in all ways, and to assume that if we want a thing done we must do it ourselves.

‘The more I think of this scheme the more clear it seems to me that we should limit our overt interference as far as possible to the organization of a responsible military force in Gilgit. So far we can hope to carry the Durbar thoroughly with us. If we annex Gilgit or put an end to the suzerainty of Kashmir over the petty principalities of the neighbourhood, and, above all, if we put British troops into Kashmir just now, we shall run a risk of turning the Durbar against us and thereby increase the difficulty of the position. I do not think this is necessary. No doubt we must have practically the control of Kashmir relations with those principalities, but this we already have. Indeed, the Durbar has now, since the dismissal of Lachman Das, asked Mr. Plowden to advise the Gilgit authorities direct without reference to them. If we have a quiet and judicious officer at Gilgit, who will get the Kashmir force into thorough order and abstain from unnecessary exercise of his influence, we shall, I hope, in a short time have the whole thing in our hand without hurting any one’s feelings.

‘Altogether, I think our first step should be to send up temporarily and quietly a selected Military Officer (Captain A. Duraud, of the Intelligence Department) and a Junior Medical Officer. Both of them will have the support of the Durbar when and where it will be necessary, and they will not display any indiscretion, so that the Durbar may not have any hint of the work they are about to undertake, and they will have to obtain the consent of the Durbar in matters concerning military difficulties. Once we can establish a belief that our undertaking is nothing but the welfare of the Durbar, we are surely to attain our object. Time will show that my view is not a wrong one. In it lies, I venture to hope, the safe realization of that object which was once contemplated in Lord Canning’s time, and afterwards was abandoned after deliberation.

‘Eventually Major Mellis should go to Kashmir on the part of the Durbar and submit a mature scheme for the better administration of the State, which is at present very badly managed indeed. This scheme should include the outline of our arrangements for strengthening the Government policy.

‘After the expiry of six months we will be in a position to decide whether the permanent location of a Political Agency at Gilgit, also a contingent of troops for the defence of the frontier,

for which the Durbar have already agreed to put their resources and troops at the disposal of the British Government.

(Sd.) H. M. DURAND.

'Very well.

'6th May.'

(Sd.) DUFFERIN.

'10th May.'

'All the suggestions contained in the above have been carried out. Captain A. Durand is just now in the neighbourhood of Gilgit, with "a junior medical officer"; the political agency has been established; and "eventually" Major Mellis has gone to Kashmir on the "part of the Durbar... to submit a scheme... for strengthening the Government policy." Sir H. Durand's suggestions have been disregarded only on one point, and that, we believe, by himself. He says, "We already have the control over the Gilgit principalities," and we can "have the whole thing without hurting anyone's feelings". Being one of the wisest men in India, why did not Sir H. Durand stick to this wise suggestion of his own, of controlling the affairs of Kashmir without hurting anyone's feelings? So it will be seen that, when Sir John Gorst said that he would not be surprised if a feeble-minded man like Pertab Singh would withdraw his resignation; or when Lord Cross declared that the Maharaja cruelly oppresses his subjects; or when Lord Lansdowne wrote to the Maharaja that His Highness was an extravagant and bad ruler, they were not aware of the real reason of the Maharaja's deposition. It was Gilgit that the Government wanted.

'One of the rumours very current in India is that, when the Viceroy comes to Lahore, the Foreign Office will invite the Maharaja to meet his Excellency there. The Maharaja would, of course, come, and then he would be persuaded to pen a real Edict of Resignation. We notice this rumour at all to show how people are prone to attribute all sorts of motives to the Government. We have, however, very little doubt that there will be a meeting at Lahore, and we hope everything will be satisfactorily settled. If there be any talk of Gilgit, of

course the Maharaja should cordially co-operate with the Government for the defence of the Empire.”

The key of the whole situation was felt to be in the pregnant words: ‘It was Gilgit the Government wanted.’

For a time the journals in India—Anglo-Indian and Indian alike—could not bring themselves to believe the document was authentic. The authenticity of the more important portions of it was not long left in doubt. At the time the publication occurred the Government of India had before the Legislative Council, sitting in Simla without the non-official members,<sup>1</sup> a Bill intended to make penal the publication of official secrets. During the progress of the measure Lord Lansdowne referred to the publication in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of a document alleged to refer to the occupation of Gilgit and the virtual annexation of Kashmir. Lord Lansdowne’s remarks were as follows:—

I may, perhaps, be permitted to enforce what I have said by referring to a recent case in which a particularly scandalous disclosure of official information has taken place. A Calcutta journal, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, in a recent issue, published what professed to be the text of a document described as one ‘the original of which his Excellency will find in the Foreign Office,’ and as containing ‘the real reason why the Maharaja of Kashmir has been deposed’.

The document purports to be a memorandum submitted to the then Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, by Sir H. M. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, in May 1888, and runs as follows:—

‘To his Excellency,—I do not agree with Mr. Plowden, the Resident in Kashmir, in this matter. He is too much inclined to

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<sup>1</sup> A too frequent practice in India, leading to evils which will be obvious on a moment’s thought. Half the Acts passed in India during the last twenty-four years have been carried in the seclusion of Simla, far away from the influence of even the feeble public opinion which exists in India.

set Kashmir aside in all ways, and to assume that if we want a thing done we must do it ourselves.

The more I think of this scheme the more clear it seems to me that we should limit our over-interference as far as possible to the organization of a responsible military force in Gilgit. So far we can hope to carry the Durbar thoroughly with us. If we annex Gilgit, or put an end to the suzerainty of Kashmir over the petty principalities of the neighbourhood, and above all, if we put British troops into Kashmir just now, we shall run a risk of turning the Durbar against us, and thereby increase the difficulty of the position. I do not think this is necessary. No doubt we must have practically the control of Kashmir relations with those principalities, but this we already have. Indeed, the Durbar has now, since the dismissal of Lachman Das, asked Mr. Plowden to advise the Gilgit authorities direct without reference to them. If we have a quiet and judicious officer at Gilgit, who will get the Kashmir force into thorough order and abstain from unnecessary exercise of his influence, we shall, I hope in a short time, have the whole thing in our hand without hurting any one's feelings.

Up to this the document is a substantially accurate reproduction of a Minute actually written upon the above date by Sir Mortimer Durand, so much so that there can be no doubt whatever that it must have been communicated to the press by a person who had had an opportunity of copying or committing to memory a part, at all events, of Sir Mortimer Durand's Minute. A few words only have been mis-quoted, but they are not of material importance. I think the Council will agree with me in considering that there is nothing in the passage which I have read which could be legitimately construed as revealing iniquitous designs upon the State of Kashmir on the part of the Government of India. It will no doubt be within the recollection of hon. members that, at the time when the Minute was written, there had been considerable disturbances on the Gilgit frontier, that the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar were in revolt against Kashmir, that Chaprot had been captured, and other places within the territories of the Maharaja threatened by the insurgents, who had defied the Kashmir authorities.

These events had shown in so striking a manner the insufficiency and weakness of the frontier administration of the Kashmir Durbar, that proposals were submitted by the then Resident for the purpose of coming to its assistance. With this object, Mr. Plowden advised the appointment of an English Political Agent at Gilgit, and he was further of opinion that it might be desirable to send British troops into Kashmir. These were the proposals to

which the Foreign Secretary, in the document of which I have just read a part, took exception, and in the passages which follow in the original Minute, which I have lately examined, I find that his objections to the Resident's proposals were throughout based upon the reason which he assigned at the outset, namely, that Mr. Plowden was disposed to rely too much upon British intervention, and not enough upon the efforts of the Durbar. Sir Mortimer expresses his belief that we should 'be able to improve and strengthen the position of the Kashmir authorities'; that any officer whom we send up 'should act with the consent and assistance of the Durbar'; that 'he should not take command of the Kashmir troops or get up any military expeditions'; and he was to 'give advice to the Governor in his present military difficulties' only 'if the Durbar wishes it'.

Will it be believed that the whole of the portion of the Minute from which I have taken these extracts has been omitted, or suppressed, and that in lieu of it has been inserted the passage which I shall now proceed to read?—

'Altogether, I think our first step should be to send up temporarily and quietly a selected military officer (Captain A. Durand, of the Intelligence Department) and a junior medical officer. Both of them will have the support of the Durbar when and where it will be necessary, and they will not display any indiscretion, so that the Durbar may not have any hint of the work they are about to undertake, and they will have to obtain the consent of the Durbar in matters concerning military difficulties. Once we can establish a belief that our undertaking is nothing but the welfare of the Durbar, we are surely to attain our object. Time will show that my view is not a wrong one. In it lies, I venture to hope, the safe realization of that object which was once contemplated in Lord Canning's time, and afterwards it was abandoned after deliberation.'

This extract, with the exception of the first line and a-half, in which it is recommended that an officer should be sent up temporarily to Gilgit, is a sheer and impudent fabrication. Not only is it not to be found in Sir Mortimer Durand's Minute, but it misrepresents him in all the most essential particulars. It has thus come to pass that, on the one hand, important passages of Sir Mortimer Durand's Minute have been altogether suppressed, and, on the other, words have been ascribed to him which he not only never used, but which convey a meaning absolutely inconsistent with those which he actually wrote.

I have already called attention to the suppression of those parts of the Minute which most strikingly illustrate the moderation of the policy which found favour with the Foreign Secretary, and which was approved by the Viceroy. When we come to the passages for which the writer has drawn upon his own imagination, we find a series of unfounded statements expressed in language which those who are familiar with Sir Mortimer Durand's style would not for a moment mistake for his, and abounding in suggestions to the effect that our policy in regard to Kashmir was governed by motives of the most sinister kind. Of such a description are the passages in which it is said that the officers sent to Gilgit are to conduct themselves 'so that the Durbar may not have any hint of the work they are about to undertake,' and the statement that, 'once we can establish a belief that our undertaking is nothing but the welfare of the Durbar, we are surely to attain our object'—an object which is subsequently described as that 'which was contemplated in Lord Canning's time, and afterwards it was abandoned after deliberation'.

The newspaper version of the Minute ends with the following words:—

'Eventually Major Mellis should go to Kashmir on the part of the Durbar, and submit a mature scheme for the better administration of the State, which is at present very badly managed indeed. This scheme should include the outline of our arrangements for strengthening the Government policy.

'After the expiry of six months we shall be in a position to decide whether the permanent location of a Political Agency at Gilgit [is necessary], also a contingent of troops for the defence of the frontier for which the Durbar have already agreed to put their resources and troops at the disposal of the British Government.

(Sd.) H. M. DURAND, 6th May.'

'Very well.—(Sd.) DUFFERIN, 10th May.'

Upon these passages I have only to observe that the earlier portion is rendered with complete inaccuracy, Sir M. Durand never having recommended that Major Mellis should submit a scheme for the administration of the State, but merely that that officer should at a later date go to Kashmir in order to confer with the Durbar in regard to its offer of aid for the defence of the frontier. The concluding sentence is a pure fabrication, none of the words after 'policy' appearing in the original Minute. The latter, I

may add, received the Viceroy's approval, although not in the terms mentioned in the fabricated version.

I have shown already what were the objects with which the Government of India proposed, in 1888, to intervene in the affairs of Kashmir, and within what narrow limits Sir Mortimer Durand, with the Viceroy's approval, was prepared to restrict that intervention; and it is unnecessary for me to point out how full of mischievous and misleading suggestion are the passages which I have quoted from the spurious portions of his supposed Minute.

The responsibility which rests upon those who are ready not only to give to the public documents which they are well aware could not have been obtained except by a distinct and criminal breach of trust, but who are not even at the pains to satisfy themselves that these documents are genuine, is a very serious one.

In the present instance the spurious information can have been published with no other object than that of persuading the people of this country that the recent action of the Government of India in Kashmir has been prompted by motives which have been repudiated in official documents of the first importance, as well as by the public statements of the Secretary of State in the British Parliament. Not content with persistently misrepresenting the Government of India, the publishers of the article have not scrupled to present to the public a garbled version of a confidential note, written more than a year ago, in order to give an entirely distorted account of the then views and actions of the Government. Neither then nor at the present time has it been the desire of the Government of India to promote its own interests at the expense of those of the Kashmir State; then, as now, it was our desire to see that State well and wisely governed, with a minimum of intervention on our part, and without any ulterior designs upon its independence. I am not without hopes that the sincerity of our motives will in process of time come to be understood even by those who have been misled by the persistent misrepresentation which has taken place in connection with these matters, and I believe that an exposure of the practices to which our critics have not scrupled to resort in the present instance may have the effect of, in some degree, opening the eyes of the public as to the



methods which have been adopted for the purpose of prejudicing its judgment in regard to this important case.<sup>1</sup>

No one can read the words spoken with so much of honest conviction and sincerity by Lord Lansdowne without feeling that, to his mind, the action taken was inevitable, and was justified by the circumstances reported to him. I most cheerfully and most readily admit

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<sup>1</sup> The *Statesman*, alluding to this speech, remarks: 'Since the receipt of the full text of the Viceroy's speech on the Official Secrets Bill, which we publish in another column, we have been at some pains to compare carefully what is therein stated with the suggestions contained in Sir M. Durand's alleged minute as published by the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* three weeks ago. As the result of this comparison we feel bound to say that the Viceroy's repudiation of the authenticity of all but the first two paragraphs of that document, as it appeared in the columns of the *Patrika*, is scarcely borne out by the admissions in His Excellency's own speech. As regards the first two paragraphs, Lord Lansdowne says: "Up to this the document is substantially an accurate reproduction of a minute actually written by Sir M. Durand. . . . A few words only have been misquoted, but they are not of material importance." The inference to be drawn from this admission is that the remaining paragraphs of the minute are not 'substantially accurate.' But it will be presently seen that, however much their wording may vary in respect to details, the substance of two at least of the subsequent paragraphs has been correctly retained in the copy published by the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*. Thus as regards Captain Durand's deputation to Gilgit, which is suggested in the third paragraph, the Viceroy remarks: 'This extract with the exception of the first line and a half, in which it is recommended that an officer should be sent up temporarily to Gilgit, is a sheer and impudent fabrication.' It can not be denied, however, that this recommendation was subsequently carried into effect, and that Captain Durand did go to Gilgit. Again, as to the paragraph referring to Major Mellis's proposed employment in Kashmir, the Viceroy remarks: 'Upon these passages I have only to observe that the earlier portion is inaccurately rendered, Sir M. Durand never having recommended that Major Mellis should submit a scheme for the administration of the State, but merely that that officer should at a later date go to Kashmir in order to confer with the Durbar in regard to its offer of aid for the defence of the frontier. The concluding sentence is a pure fabrication, none of the words after "policy" appearing in the original minute.' The main allegations of the *Patrika* are thus practically admitted, and it seems to us only fair to say that the inaccuracies which have been found in the published version of Sir M. Durand's minute must be due rather to the circumstances under which, apparently, the copy was made, than to any wilful garbling or manipulation of the document on the part of the *Patrika*, for the purposes of misrepresenting the motives and intentions of the Government, as the Viceroy's speech would seem to imply.'

that the Viceroy acted with perfect sincerity and fully in the spirit of the words he used. But a belief in the good faith of Lord Lansdowne is not sufficient. Complete trust in his *bona fides* does not close the incident. In India, especially in dealings with the feudatory States of the Empire, there must not only be a sense of right in the mind of the Viceroy, there must also be so much of the appearance of right-doing in the course adopted as to command the acquiescence of those affected and of all who are in a similar position. Lord Dalhousie both felt and spoke, in 1856, of what he, during the six years of his Governor-Generalship, had done, as Lord Lansdowne felt and spoke in October last. But Lord Dalhousie's consciousness of rectitude, and firm belief in his own powers of statesmanship, did not prevent the dreadful deeds of 1857. Nor has this viceregal consciousness of rectitude, certainty of meaning to do well and belief that well had been done, prevented the historian connecting the outbreak of 1857 with certain of the actions upon which Lord Dalhousie greatly prided himself.<sup>1</sup> So, in like manner, while yielding to Lord Lansdowne the fullest respect due to his position and to his known most estimable qualities of mind and heart, it must be urged that his

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<sup>1</sup> 'The real cause of the Mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words—bad faith. It was bad faith to our Sipahis which made their minds prone to suspicion; it was our policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindu chiefs the permission to adopt, with them, a necessary religious rite; of suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex rules to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the Sagur and Narbadá territory, and in Bundelkhand, and our breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, which aroused the large landowners and the rural population against the British rule.'—'History of the Indian Mutiny,' by Kaye and Mallett, vol. v., p. 282.

claim for good faith does not dispose of the question. It is perfectly safe to say that there is not an Indian Prince who did not feel his throne shake when the Maharaja of Kashmir was deprived of all power and authority in his State. The arbitrariness of the act made itself felt as a presage of woe everywhere. It is equally safe to say that there are uneasiness and sorrow in the minds of at least nine-tenths of the Indian people at what has been done in Kashmir. And, after all, though Indians have no votes, and are not able to make their feelings known to the authorities in any constitutional manner, account ought to be taken of their feelings; it is only by the contented acquiescence of the Indian people that satisfactory British rule can be continued in our Indian Empire. A policy carried out in face of the discontent and dissatisfaction of the majority of a people is not a safe policy. There is something wrong somewhere when an act which is capable of being described in the tone and language adopted by Lord Lansdowne is universally condemned and distrusted, and becomes occasion for growing distrust. It is not difficult to see what the 'something wrong' is in this instance, or to ascertain the reason why it should create suspicion. Until the Maharaja of Kashmir is once more in power, and the British Resident is relegated to the position which such a functionary ought to occupy in a feudatory State, but never does occupy, the distinct danger which has been created will not be removed.

It is, again, no sufficient answer to say that the 'permanent persons' in the Calcutta Foreign Office advised the course which was taken. These estimable

persons are bureaucrats; they are not statesmen. One great reason why such noblemen as Lord Lansdowne are appointed to supreme rule in India is that they may at one and the same time bring a fresh and unprejudiced mind to the consideration of great questions and supply the needed measure of statesmanship which Indian modes of rule are not likely to educe. India has produced some of the finest administrators the world has known. Of statesmen—even of the third and fourth class—she has produced none. The most complete failures in English public life are the Anglo-Indians who find their way to Parliament or the School Board. And, yet, those who do get into public life are men who have achieved the highest reputation as Indian administrators. Lord Lansdowne's duty is not done by simply writing 'Very well' at the foot of a minute, or by accepting what the Foreign Office puts before him. His duty, above all else, is to put the statements of the experts in the crucible of a widely-matured and experienced mind, and, having taken heed of all the circumstances—circumstances not stated as well as those stated—then to take action. There is not a bureaucrat in India who, on the Parry-Nisbet fussy visit to Calcutta and the imbroglio which followed, could not have done what Lord Lansdowne did. Something vastly more high-minded, more statesmanlike was expected, and rightly expected, from one of His Excellency's experience and from one occupying his exalted and responsible position. Foresight and wide-sight having been carefully avoided, the Viceroy need not be surprised if his stroke of policy is not regarded by others as he himself regarded it.

The *Patrika's* own justification of the publication of

the Memorandum which so greatly incensed the Viceroy is thus stated:—‘The object of the publication of the document was to put before the Viceroy, who is a new-comer, the real facts of the Kashmir case. The Viceroy has brought certain charges against the Maharaja of Kashmir, upon the strength of secret and *ex parte* reports from Mr. Plowden and the Foreign Secretary. Our object in publishing the document was to show that those who had persuaded him to believe in the guilt of the Maharaja and to cause his deposition, were, even before the advent of His Excellency, hankering after “the whole thing”.’

An attempt has been made in the House of Commons to procure the publication of an authentic copy of the document, but its production has been refused. Material information, to enable hon. members to judge of the conduct of the Government of India in this matter, has, therefore, been withheld.

The fact is now accepted in India that the reasons announced for the conduct pursued towards the Maharaja of Kashmir were not the whole of the reasons—were not, in fact, the real reasons. Unpleasant similes are used by publicists in discussing these matters, as, for example (see Appendix C), one in which Khiva and Kashmir are connected, and the British Indian and Russian Governments are contrasted. It is made clear that the conduct which most Anglo-Indians and some home-staying Englishmen are never tired of condemning in Central-Asian Russians finds its parallel nearer home.

The Indian Government has had its way. Captain Durand is at Gilgit. The Maharaja, whose deposition was considered necessary, is living a life of seclusion and of utter misery. He is permitted to see no one without leave of the Resident. Lord Cross and his Under-Secretary indulge in utterly meaningless talk about their desire to restore the Maharaja as soon as he gives proof of his willingness to rule his subjects justly and wisely. Meanwhile, he remains degraded. He is suffering for no proven fault, so far as can be seen for no committed fault, but only because it was necessary he should be set aside for more pliable creatures. It is declared he is in his present position as the result of his own voluntary act.

Whether pressure was used, as he asserts it was, or not, his signature was obtained to a paper in which he resigned to the State Council, as approved by the Government of India, for five years, certain only of the powers that rightfully belonged to himself alone. The Maharaja may have wished to give the Council full powers, with limitation of his sovereign rights—and he did, doubtless, hope to improve the administration in this way—but he cannot have intended to efface himself by this consent, or to be absolutely ignored as head of the State. He hoped to have been consulted upon, and

to have control over, the Council's proceedings, more especially as three out of the five members were foreigners, ignorant of the language as well as of the wants of his subjects. But the Maharaja has now no power or control; he is an absentee, living almost alone in his palace, moping and brooding despondingly over his position, 'cabined, cribbed, confined,' as though he were to be preserved in this half-demented condition for the day, more distant perhaps than the stipulated five years, when the Viceroy may think proper to restore him to the exercise of his inherited position.

The strained position that the Maharaja fills has been forced upon him. Considerations of importance are involved: first, because a milder and better treatment might have been substituted; and next, because the Government of India is now open to the suspicion of intentionally degrading the Maharaja with the object of maintaining permanently the control it has voluntarily assumed. That a milder treatment could have been adopted must, of course, be admitted. The meaning put upon the resignation by the Maharaja to the Council of certain powers he legitimately holds might, and should have been, that the advice and control of His Highness would be accepted; in this way his rank and position would have been maintained. The humiliation now imposed on him is needless for the furtherance of any rightful claims of the British Government, or for the improvement of the administration.

Is it surprising that in such a condition of things unpleasant surmises should be entertained of what is going on in the Kashmir State? It is supposed that, in order

to make the annexation of Kashmir not only an easy matter but a necessity, the obvious plan is to make the world believe that the Kashmirian mode of administration was so hopelessly bad that by annexation alone could it be remedied. One's feeling revolts at such a Machiavellian policy. But how is an objector to satisfy himself as to the honesty and sincerity of the intentions of the Government of India? Lord Dufferin, on October 30 last, in a speech addressed to the London Chamber of Commerce, clearly stated that he had thought, when Viceroy of India, that it might be needful to restrain the powers of the Maharaja of Kashmir. Nevertheless, he did not take any action. Lord Lansdowne, however, before he had had time to become himself acquainted with the true condition of affairs, directed that the Maharaja should be treated as he now is. It is well understood in India that the policy pursued by every Foreign Secretary, since the time when Lord Lytton was appointed Viceroy, is to put a check upon the supposed movements of Russia towards India. The late Afghan war, and all that has been done since to subsidize the Ameer of Afghanistan with the object of purchasing his friendship; the Penjdeh Commission; the frontier railways and fortifications: have all been undertaken with the single object named. The Kashmir State alone remained on the frontier, entirely disconnected with schemes for frontier defence. What has recently happened has been told in these pages. The policy of the Foreign Office in India is shortsighted; it originates in groundless fears, and is opposed to the true interests alike of the Government of India and of the avowed policy of the Home Government, not only as far as regards the people of India, but



as to the foreign relations also of the British people. Let it be understood that the Maharaja is not responsible for the misrule which he found when he was put on the *gadi*. Undoubtedly a certain amount of misrule existed; how much has never been proved. Maharaja Pertab Singh has not had the freedom required to introduce permanent changes and reforms; he is a quiet, confiding, simple-minded man, who deserves that paternal consideration for the welfare of the people which the Government of India has the credit of displaying throughout India; but, instead, he is not permitted to exercise the powers conferred on him by the British Government; he is treated with ignominy and left to circumstances which cannot fail to exercise a painful influence upon him.

By way of furnishing you with independent testimony by an eyewitness of the condition of the Kashmirians, and of the treatment meted out to the Maharaja, I may here quote a communication sent to the *Times*. It was written by a gentleman who describes himself as having worked in that country for nearly ten years, and who has had the honour of an intimate acquaintance with the Maharaja and his brothers. He says :—

I feel sure, if not now, it will be admitted in time to come, that great credit is due to Mr. Bradlaugh for his very able address on behalf of H.H. the Maharaja. The Under Secretary of State said it was a curious illustration of the irony of fate to find Mr. Bradlaugh advocating the rights of a Prince; but, instead of its being an irony, does it not give proof of his praiseworthy efforts to advocate the cause of the oppressed be they Prince or people? I may not be credited, but it is true nevertheless, that no case could be cited in the history of British India where greater misunderstanding or

perversion of facts has been exhibited than in the present crisis in Kashmir. The recent speeches of honourable members, including the Under Secretary of State, I beg to say, with due deference, are full of errors. Sir John Gorst spoke of the poor Moslem cultivators of Jammu. No such people exist. The inhabitants of Jammu and its district consist almost entirely of Hindus. They are nearly all of the same caste as the Maharaja, and what is more, if they could possibly express their wishes without fear, would to a man declare in favour of their deposed king.

That talented Indian statesman, Sir Richard Temple, was heard to say that the 'sovereignty was transferred from one brother to another'. Is this correct? The brother is as much the Sovereign of Kashmir as is Sir Richard himself. Why, it is due entirely to the failure of the other brother to become king that all this trouble has been brought on Kashmir. The country has been rent asunder for years by the rival claims and factions of the three brothers, all hungry for the crown. The present arrangement is no solution of the difficulty, simply a continuation of the complication in another form, with the addition of disgrace and exile inflicted on His Highness in his own house and his own kingdom.

Then, it is said by honourable members that the Government of Kashmir is now invested in certain capable Indians as Members of Council. Is that a fact? Is it known to the British Government that the so-called Council of Kashmir (all strangers to the country except the brothers) has as much power as a parcel of schoolboys to dictate to their tutor? All that has been done is to transfer the government of Kashmir from one autocrat to another. In the very constitution of the Council, that is, rules made for its guidance, it is ordered that their deliberations can be vetoed by the Resident in Kashmir. They are, hence, careful to pass only such resolutions as shall meet with his approval beforehand. I have heard from *their own lips*, in as emphatic manner as could be expressed, that their independence is a farce and their power barely nominal. Why, sir, the proceedings of the Council are published in English, while the majority scarcely know a word of the language. And, if anybody desires it, I can show original documents issued to me, from which it will be seen that the

Government of Kashmir by the present Council is nothing short of a myth and delusion.

It is further stated, as matter for congratulation, that there is not even a single European member in the Council, and the Government is carried on entirely by natives of India. Will it be believed that the Maharaja in his letter to the Viceroy, of his own accord, *asked* for a European member to be nominated to his Council? He very wisely saw that a set of native subordinates appointed by the Government could only be the tool of the Resident. The fact is well known: the government of the country is vested to all practical purposes in the Resident alone. Indeed, it is not possible for anybody to set foot in that country without a written permission from him. His will is law, he is king, and has surrounded himself with his own friends and *protégés*, and turned out many an old and faithful servant of the State. Nobody dare open his mouth in that country, and, if any one is so bold as to raise the most feeble protest, he is threatened with the 'most serious consequences'—such as were inflicted on me; and, were it not for the kindness and sense of justice of those who surround the Viceroy, I might have been utterly ruined.

As for oppression of his subjects, of which so much has been made, no doubt there has been much misgovernment by incompetent and corrupt officials. But what could the distracted Maharaja do? One change followed another in rapid succession after his father's death. The brothers were in continual feud with themselves and their own ministers. Two of the ablest political officers in India were transferred from Kashmir one after another, the Prime Minister was disgraced, spoliated, and turned out. Affairs became hopelessly entangled. Then came the real 'irony of fate'; in Sir John Gorst's own words, 'a personal friend of the Maharaja, and in whom he had implicit confidence, was sent'. To do what? Why, to depose, disgrace, and very probably ruin, the Maharaja for life.

Is it possible that in a country visited by six to eight hundred Europeans annually, by the Viceroy (the Marquis of Ripon) by the Duke of Connaught, by commanders-in-chief, and other celebrities who have travelled from one end of the country to the other, that grave oppression or misery could exist to any serious or

visible extent? Has there not always been an able British Resident with the Maharaja, ready to take serious notice of any misdemeanour? Ask the hundreds of tourists, who visit Kashmir from all parts of the globe, if they have not found the Kashmirians sleek and fat, and as well off as any other Indians of similar position. Has not the second brother, perhaps the most honest-minded man in Kashmir, heaps of documents in his possession from the people of the country in favour of the rule of the Maharaja or his family?

On my works I employed thousands of labourers, yet I had the greatest difficulty in getting local labour or inhabitants of the country to work for me; they were too independent and too well off. And, if it were not for large importations of outside labour, I could never have got through the extensive works I carried out in the last nine years.

Then, it is said Kashmir is of no military importance, that the British Government do not cast 'greedy eyes' on it. Blame me as you will, but record it for yourself, unless there is a decided change of policy before long, Kashmir will soon be as much British India as is now Burma.

And is the country of no military importance? I think the military authorities in India consider otherwise. Why, the first instructions issued to me ten years ago, were to make a 'gun carriage road' through the mountains. Is there not a road being projected now to the utmost corner of the kingdom, with vast sums of money being spent on it, solely for military purposes? Has the Maharaja not been repeatedly threatened with a military cantonment, to be placed in the most favourable situation in the valley?

There is no doubt of the pureness of the motives of the Government either here or in India. Nobody in his senses could doubt for a moment that the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has any other desire than the welfare and prosperity of the kingdom. But is the information given him correct? Are the means employed fair and just to the rightful owner? In a country where false stories are proverbial, where those who know are afraid to speak, what correct information is it possible could reach the Government of India?

By all means make railways, roads, waterworks, and what not

Everybody knows these are essential for the advancement of any country. But will you go so far as to make that country hopelessly bankrupt? Will you use the savings of a monarch's ancestors, cut up his land and change the very face of the country, and not consult him? Is he to have neither voice nor wish in the matter?

What other means, it may be asked, could be adopted? Why, give him an ultimatum. Lay down distinctly what you want done; give him reasonable time. Let him choose his own officers; help him to procure them. Give him a constitution the same as other Indian Princes possess. At the same time avoid petty interference. Protect him from his enemies and the rivalries of his brothers. If His Highness does not then succeed, let the British Government take a plebiscite and govern the country according to the unanimous voice of the people.

I hope I may be permitted to say that it would have been far better for the Government to have taken the country straight off than created a makeshift as now. The President of the Council has printed on his papers, 'Prime Minister to H.H. the Maharaja'. Which Maharaja? The one deposed and locked up in his private apartments? There is no finality in such an arrangement. It cannot last. It leads to up and down, hope and despair, both in Prince and people.

There is no necessity for the Government here to appoint any committee of inquiry. The Government of India are the best authority to make the required investigation. Let this be done openly, and by competent judges, and I promise you some curious revelations.

The Indians are a humble race; with hands folded they have submitted to the edict of the Viceroy. But justice and humanity cry for redress. The Proclamation of Her Most Gracious Majesty declares equal justice to white and black, and that the rights of her feudatories shall be respected. This is in the mouth of every Indian; they know well what it means, and, if you will infringe it in the case of Kashmir, you may sow such seeds of discontent as will bear fruit when least expected.

I have only to add I have not the honour of acquaintance with Mr Bradlaugh, and that this has not been written at the instigation of H. H. the Maharaja or his agents.

Such is the story of the degradation, the cruel and unmerited degradation, of a loyal and sincere feudatory.

What can be done, and who can do what needs to be done?

As matters stand, a Select Committee of the House of Commons, or a Commission with judicial powers and enabled to take evidence in India, alone can ascertain the facts, and procure, through the Imperial Parliament, to whom its Report should be presented, that justice which has been so conspicuously wanting throughout this unhappy business. Will the House appoint such a Committee or Commission? The division on July 3 is not promising, so far at least as this Parliament is concerned. What a new House, fresh from the constituencies, and with more zeal for righteousness than the present moribund assembly possesses, may do, remains to be seen. The direct result of the intervention of the House, in the sense I have named, would be great; the indirect effect, upon the princes and peoples of India, cannot be fully set forth. British justice would become a reality to Indians of all races, and our connection with that great Empire made strong and lasting.

I pray you, sir, to reconsider the papers laid before you in the light of the facts I have presumed, in the interests of a greatly-wronged Prince and of outraged

millions of our fellow-subjects, to lay before you. I have done this with the hope that you, and many of your fellow-members of the House of Commons, will, on a full consideration of the whole circumstances, see that His Highness the Maharaja Pertab Singh of Kashmir is at least entitled to an opportunity to prove his innocence of the charges insinuated, rather than plainly expressed, against him.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Wm Digby.

----- POLITICAL AGENCY,  
25, CRAVEN STREET, CHARING CROSS, LONDON,  
*July, 1890.*

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P.S.—Since I concluded my letter I have had the opportunity of reading a verbatim report, taken by the Hansard staff, of the debate. This verbatim report I include among my Appendices. My surprise at the course you felt it your duty to take has hitherto been of a mild character; it is now one of utter amazement. That you should have been influenced by the sophistries of

the able gentleman who represents the India Office in the House of Commons is surprising. The air of judicial reserve which your official experience would have led one to expect would characterize your observations are, permit me regretfully to say, wholly wanting in your short speech. This feature was, fortunately, not absent from the debate. But it marked the statements of Sir William Plowden, and not those of Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth. What Sir William Plowden with much dignity advanced is, I repeat, precisely what members of the Liberal Party had a right to expect from the official representative of the late Liberal Government when he intervened in such a debate, and was, in a sense, charged with the fate of the accused Prince. As I show on a previous page (p. 88), that very system of forced labour which called forth Sir John Gorst's sympathy and aroused his indignation has, within the past few months, been made use of by the British Resident himself. As for another complaint of the Under-Secretary of State, namely, that relating to a Moslem population under a Hindu ruler requiring special consideration at the hands of the Government of India, Sir John Gorst at least knows that this is not the only instance in India of alien rule. He will not need reminding that the opposite holds good in the Deccan to a sixfold greater extent. In the Nizam's dominions a Muhammadan Prince rules over a Hindu population. Beyond writing a sensational and inaccurate article for the *Fortnightly Review* in 1884, Sir John Gorst has done nothing to remedy a condition of things analogous to that which, on July 3, moved him to pity. Eight days after, on July 11, refer-



ring to some remarks made by Sir John Gorst in the debate, Mr. Bradlaugh asked a question. This is what occurred:—

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, if he will state the number of cultivating ryots in Jammu: And, how many of them are, respectively, Moslems and Hindus.

Sir J. GORST: I am extremely sorry that I cannot answer this question. The last return was received in 1873, and no record has been preserved [? received] since.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Does the right hon. gentleman mean to say that he has less information now than he had the other night when he made a statement on the subject?

The question was not answered.

One word more on the debate, and this long epistle to you will come to an end. Sir Richard Temple interposed in the debate. That is a pity. It is more than a pity. It is a calamity—for the reputation of ex-Anglo-Indian officials. Sir Richard, among other things, said that the rule of Kashmir had been transferred from the Maharaja Pertab Singh to his brother. This is entirely incorrect. Yet it was on the side of a cause supported with such knowledge and wisdom as this that you threw the weight not only of your own blameless Parliamentary career, but that of the members of Mr. Gladstone's late Administration, who may be considered to be committed by your action to an adverse view of Maharaja Pertab Singh's case. It is with no little concern I remind you of this, to you, not wholly creditable fact.

W. D.

# A P P E N D I X .

## A.

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### GOVERNMENT PAPERS.

#### EAST INDIES.

#### PAPERS RELATING TO KASHMIR.

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##### No. 1.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (EARL OF KIMBERLEY), dated Simla, April 7, 1884.

##### EXTRACT.

WE have the honour to address your Lordship on the subject of the Kashmir State.

The three principal facts which it is necessary to notice are that the death of the Maharaja Ranbir Singh is apparently near at hand; that the administration of the Kashmir State is so thoroughly disorganised as to threaten a complete breakdown; and that the heir-apparent to the Chiefship is said to be unfitted in character and habits to govern the State. The first two of these facts we have unfortunately been in a position to anticipate for a long time past. The Maharaja has been suffering for years from a mortal disease; while the recent famine afforded convincing proof of the corruptness and inefficiency of the administration of Kashmir. We have also heard from time to time unsatisfactory accounts of the heir-apparent, and it has of late been reported that his father entertained some idea of setting him aside by a testamentary disposition. In our judgment, the time has now come for determining the course which the British Government should adopt on the death of the Maharaja; and we therefore proceed to lay our views before your Lordship.

Turning first to the question of the succession to the present Chief, we are of opinion that the eldest son, Mian Pertab Singh, should be proclaimed at once when his father dies. We do not consider that we can take cognizance of the vices attributed to Pertab Singh unless they have reduced him to a condition of actual incapacity, which does not appear to be the case; nor do we think that in this matter we should be justified in attaching any

weight even to the wishes of His Highness Ranbir Singh. For the general interests of peace and good order among the Native States, no encouragement should be given to the idea that an eldest son can be set aside at the will of his father; and we hold that in practice nothing but the clearest evidence of actual incapacity to rule should be allowed to stand in the way of a regular succession by order of primogeniture. Further, we are entirely opposed to permitting any partition of the Kashmir State, by will or otherwise, among the three sons of the present Chief. Feeling confident that our opinion upon these points are in accord with established policy, we have anticipated your Lordship's orders by issuing the instructions necessary for the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Oliver St. John, K.C.S.I., the Officer on Special Duty, in case of an emergency arising. In the meanwhile we do not think it desirable formally to announce to the Maharaja that a will affecting the succession could not be recognised, because this course might raise unpleasant discussions. But the Officer on Special Duty will avail himself of any good opportunity for intimating to His Highness that such a will would not be expedient.

On the succession of the new Chief, it will not, in our opinion, be proper to postpone any longer a representation of our views upon the necessity for introducing substantial reforms into the administration of Kashmir. The misgovernment to which the people of that country have long been subjected was some time since prominently brought to our notice by Mr. Henvey. We did not take action at once, conceiving that a more favourable opportunity would present itself on the occurrence of a fresh succession—an event which seemed unlikely to be long postponed. When that event takes place, we consider that it will be our duty to impress upon the Kashmir Government its obligations to its own subjects, and to see that the reforms which are so urgently needed are no longer postponed. With this view we would propose, immediately on the occurrence of the next succession, to inform the Maharaja that we regard the present state of affairs as most unsatisfactory, and that substantial reforms are required. We would if possible lead the new Government to propose the measures necessary to give effect to this altered policy, but we should require that their execution should be entrusted to competent hands. While firmly insisting upon the necessity for a change, we should avoid any direct interference with administrative details.

We are, however, sensible that, if our advice is to be effectual, it may be necessary to alter the present arrangement under which our representative remains in the Maharaja's territory for a portion only of the year. Such a change would probably be welcomed by the people of Kashmir; and as it would not be introduced until after the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, his feelings in the matter would be fully respected. It is a measure which may be called for, not merely by the need for assisting and supervising administrative reforms, but also by the increasing importance to the Government of India of watching events beyond the North-

Western frontier of Kashmir. Any disturbances which continued misgovernment might create in Kashmir would be acutely felt on the frontiers of Afghanistan; the connection between Kashmir and its dependent Chiefships would in all probability be severed; and grave political complications might easily ensue. We have therefore to consider the necessity for providing for efficient political supervision, not merely in the interests of the people of Kashmir, but also in the interests of the people of India. Under these circumstances we are anxious to obtain from Her Majesty's Government authority to appoint, if it should appear to us necessary, at any time after the death of the present Maharaja, a Resident Political Officer, who will exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the Kashmir State. We do not propose that this officer, if appointed by us, should hold any actual position in the government of the State, nor do we think that it would be necessary to give him special powers in the Province of Kashmir. It will suffice if he occupies, with regard to Jammu and Kashmir, the position and powers ordinarily given to a British Resident in a feudatory State.

The British Government are not debarred by any engagement, express or tacit, from posting a Political Officer permanently in Kashmir; and we see no reason why an arrangement which has been accepted without demur by such a State as Hyderabad should not be adopted in regard to the Kashmir State. If this view is correct, the only question which arises is, whether existing circumstances do not render it desirable to give us the authority we seek.

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No. 2.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

India Office, May 23, 1884.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of your Excellency's Government, dated the 7th April, relating to Kashmir affairs.

2. In anticipation of the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, which is believed to be near at hand, your Excellency in Council has had under consideration (1) the course to be adopted in regard to the succession; (2) the measures which should be taken on the commencement of a new reign, in order to secure reforms in the administration of the State; and (3) the expediency of a change in the existing arrangements for the representation of the British Government at the Maharaja's Court.

3. Your Excellency in Council is of opinion that any attempt on the part of the Maharaja to exclude his eldest son from the succes-

sion should be discouraged, and that Mian Pertab Singh should be proclaimed immediately on his father's death; you propose to require from the new ruler substantial reforms in the administration, and to insist upon their execution being entrusted to competent hands; and you request from Her Majesty's Government discretionary authority to appoint, at any time after the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, a British Resident in Kashmir, with the position and powers ordinarily given to such an officer in a feudatory State.

4. While I regret to receive so unfavourable an account of the character of the Maharaja's heir, I agree with your Excellency's Government in regarding as inexpedient any deviation in the case of Kashmir from the regular succession by order of primogeniture, or any partition of the State, by will or otherwise, among the three sons of the present Chief. I approve, therefore, of the instructions in accordance with this view, which I understand to have been sent to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir.

5. As to the urgent need of reforms in the administration of the State, there is, unfortunately, no room for doubt. It may, indeed, be a question whether, having regard to the circumstances under which the sovereignty of the country was entrusted to the present Hindu ruling family, the intervention of the British Government on behalf of the Muhammadan population has not already been too long delayed; but, however this may be, Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, upon a fresh succession, no time should be lost in taking whatever steps may be requisite in order to place the administration upon a sound footing.

6. The same occasion would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be a suitable one for introducing a change in the present arrangement under which your Excellency's representative remains in Kashmir for a portion only of the year.

7. In 1846 it was decided not to appoint a political officer to reside permanently at the Maharaja's Court, whilst in 1873, when the measure was recommended by Lord Northbrook's Government, the necessity for it did not seem to Her Majesty's Government to be so clearly established as to justify them in disregarding objections which were expressed by authorities entitled to respect. But in the interval which has since elapsed, circumstances have greatly changed; and whether regard be had to the condition of the country, to the character of the Prince into whose hands the Government will shortly pass, or to the course of events beyond the border, which has materially increased the political importance of Kashmir, the appointment which you request a discretionary authority to make appears to be not only desirable but necessary. Your Excellency in Council is, therefore, at liberty to proceed in the matter as you may think proper at any time after the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, taking care meanwhile that strict secrecy is observed as to your intentions.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

## No. 3.

The GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL), dated Simla, October 19, 1885.

## EXTRACT.

WE have the honour to forward correspondence relative to affairs in the Kashmir State.

The demise of the late Maharaja Ranbir Singh was announced to your Lordship by telegram on the 12th September; and the papers now enclosed will acquaint Her Majesty's Government with the steps we have taken to carry out the policy approved by Lord Kimberley's despatch, dated the 23rd May, 1884. The succession of Pertab Singh, the eldest son of the deceased Maharaja, to the undivided Chiefship of Jammu and Kashmir has been recognised and confirmed. The position of the Political Officer in Kashmir has been placed on the same footing with that of Residents in other Indian States in subordinate alliance with the British Government. The attention of the new ruler has been drawn to certain measures of reform which we consider essential to remedy the long-standing misrule in His Highness's territories. At the same time the Maharaja has been assured that we desire to leave the initiation of these measures in his hands, to abstain from unnecessary interference in his affairs, and to allow him all legitimate discretion and a liberal period of time for the execution of a work which is as difficult as it is necessary.

Your Lordship will perceive that the change in the Political Officer's appointment has evoked a remonstrance from the Maharaja Pertab Singh. We were prepared for some opposition in this matter on the part of the Durbar, and, as the question has been fully considered and finally settled, we have declined to enter into any further discussion on the subject.

We trust that our proceedings may meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

## Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

From the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, to the OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY IN KASHMIR, dated Simla, August 1, 1884.

## EXTRACT.

I am directed to convey to you the instructions of the Governor-General in Council upon the condition of affairs in Kashmir.

In case of Maharaja Ranbir Singh's death, his eldest son, Mian Pertab Singh, will succeed to the undivided Chiefship; the new Maharaja will be called upon to introduce such reforms as may seem to be necessary; and a Resident political officer will be stationed in Kashmir. It remains to inform you of the precise steps which the Governor-General in Council desires you to adopt for carrying out these arrangements.

So long as Maharaja Ranbir Singh is alive, the Government of India do not propose to make any change in their existing policy. His Highness should be quietly dissuaded, if he refers to you on the subject, from executing any testament in favour of the partition of his territories; but it will not be necessary for you to make any formal communication to His Highness upon this matter; or to travel beyond existing practice in recommending to him administrative reforms, or other desirable measures. You should abstain from any allusions to the subject of changes in the existing position of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, and you should avoid as much as possible anything which is calculated in the Maharaja's present state of health unnecessarily to disturb his mind. It is of course desirable that you should use your influence, as far as you can, even during the life of the Maharaja, for the improvement of the condition of Kashmir; but the Governor-General in Council wishes to treat His Highness with the utmost consideration; and, as any substantial reform would probably involve a very unpalatable degree of interference with his proceedings, it will be sufficient if, during the remainder of his life, you can preserve the administration of the State from any material change for the worse.

If at any time the Maharaja's death should appear to be very near at hand, you should make arrangements to join His Highness at Jammu, or wherever he may then be, and to prevent any disorder occurring. If his illness should unfortunately terminate fatally, you should take the earliest opportunity of announcing that the Viceroy is pleased to recognize the succession of Mian Pertab Singh to the Chiefship, and you should formally instal the new Chief on the *gaddi* of Jammu and Kashmir.

At the same time you should inform His Highness, and the members of his Durbar, of the views and intentions of the British Government in regard to the future administration of the State. You should give them clearly to understand that His Excellency the Viceroy regards the existing condition of affairs in Kashmir as most unsatisfactory; and you should warn His Highness and those about him that substantial reforms must be introduced without delay. You should then announce that, with the view of aiding His Highness in the introduction and maintenance of those reforms, the Viceroy has decided to give His Highness the assistance of a resident English officer, and that for the future the British representative in Kashmir will have the same status and duties as the Political Residents in other Indian States in subordinate alliance with the British Government.

It is important, in order to avoid uncertainty and the risk of disorder, that this announcement of the intentions of the Government should take place without delay, and that they should be clearly and fully understood both by the Maharaja and by all others concerned when he is installed. The recognition and installation of the new Chief should be as prompt and formal as possible, and nothing should be omitted that can have the effect of securing His Highness of the good-will of the British Government; but, while treating the Maharaja with the utmost friendliness, and

courtesy, you cannot speak too plainly in regard to the Viceroy's views and intentions.

Immediately after the news of Maharaja Ranbir Singh's death reaches the Government of India, a letter addressed by His Excellency the Viceroy to the new chief will be sent to you for delivery. A draft of this letter is enclosed for your information. When you receive the signed copy of this draft or before you receive it, if the ceremonies connected with the change of rulers should afford you an opportunity of speaking earlier, you should invite the Maharaja to indicate the reforms which he may consider it necessary or desirable to introduce; and you should ask His Highness to inform you of his views with regard to the persons whom he would propose to place in charge of the administration. It will not be expedient to bring in a Minister from elsewhere if a sufficiently well qualified local candidate can be found; and as far as possible the Governor-General in Council would wish to leave the Maharaja free to form his own Government. Any proposals, therefore, which His Highness may put forward on this subject will be tentatively accepted, unless you should see decided reason to object to them as holding out no prospect of success.

You will notice that the draft letter to the Maharaja impresses upon him the necessity for consulting you fully at all times, and following your advice. You should therefore not hesitate to offer your advice freely whenever you may think it desirable to do so; the more particularly because, owing to the peculiar conditions under which the Maharaja will succeed to the Chiefship, it will be necessary that his administration should for a time at least be closely supervised; the condition of Kashmir must be thoroughly reformed; and the Governor-General in Council cannot allow this object to be frustrated by any obstruction or procrastination on the part of the Durbar.

I am now to enumerate, for your information and guidance, the principal measures of reform which appear to the Governor-General in Council to be necessary after any arrangements required for the immediate alleviation of distress, if distress exist, have been adopted and carried out. In the opinion of the Governor-General in Council those measures are: the introduction of a reasonably light assessment of land revenue, collections being made in cash if on examination this seems to be a suitable arrangement; the construction of good roads; the cessation of State monopolies; the revision of existing taxes and dues, especially transit dues and the numerous taxes upon trades and professions; the abolition of the system of farming the revenue, wherever this system is in force; the appointment of respectable officials, if such exist, and their regular payment in coin; the establishment of a careful system of financial control; the removal of all restrictions upon emigration; the reorganisation and regular payment of the army; and the improvement of the judicial administration. In order to afford the Maharaja all possible help in the introduction of such reforms, the Governor-General in Council will if necessary grant His Highness a loan from Imperial revenues, and will also be willing to place at



his disposal, for a time, the services of any officers of the British Government who may seem specially qualified to assist the new administration in carrying out the measures contemplated. Such assistance seems to be more particularly required with regard to the revision of the settlement and the construction of roads. The pay of any officers transferred must, however, be found by the Kashmir State.

With reference to the relations existing between Kashmir and the States upon her northern border, the Governor-General in Council does not think it necessary at present to issue any detailed instructions. The question is an important one, and will require your close and constant attention. You should be kept accurately informed of all movements of troops and other noteworthy occurrences in the direction of the frontier; and you should be prepared to advise Maharaja Pertab Singh freely on all matters of frontier policy. But at present the Governor-General in Council has no special instructions to give you on this subject.

I am to add that if the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh occurs during the Kashmir season, and you find yourself obliged in consequence to leave Srinagar for Jammu, you should on starting hand over the charge of your current duties to the Agency Surgeon or other qualified officer. The Governor-General in Council is willing to leave to your discretion the question of the route by which you should go to Jammu; but he desires me to suggest to you that your passing down by the direct route through Kashmir territory might have a good effect in maintaining quiet and order. And I am to say that it is very desirable not to move any British troops across the border if this can possibly be avoided. If it becomes absolutely necessary to do so, the special sanction of the Government of India should be obtained before any movement is made.

I have only to remark in conclusion that circumstances may evidently occur to which the terms of this letter will not be strictly applicable. The Maharaja Ranbir Singh may die suddenly in your absence, or his life may be unexpectedly prolonged. Mian Pertab Singh may be absent from Jammu at the time of his father's decease, and it is even possible that before that event occurs he may become actually incapacitated for rule. These or similar circumstances may render some departure necessary from the letter of the instructions now given to you. But the Governor-General in Council relies with confidence upon your judgment in the event of any such contingency, and has no doubt that the instructions now given to you will suffice for your guidance in all matters of practical importance. If necessity arises they can hereafter be modified.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

FROM RESIDENT in Kashmir to SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department. Jammu, 16 September, 1885.

EXTRACT.

I have the honour to report my arrival here yesterday morning,

my journey having been much delayed by the bad state of the road. At Vernag, late at night on the 12th, I received a telegram from Mian Pertab Singh, the heir-apparent, informing me of the death of his father, Maharaja Ranbir Singh, at 4.30 p.m. that day.

From conversation with Dr. Gopal Chander, His Highness's medical attendant, and others, I learn that, about the 29th August, the Maharaja, who was still weak from the effects of the fever from which he had suffered two months ago, had an attack of dysentery, which the medicines given him failed to relieve. He grew rapidly worse, but was under no apprehension of a fatal result till 24 hours before his death, when, finding that the forgiveness and return of a Brahmin whom he had exiled many years ago, and under whose curse he was persuaded by a seer he was labouring, failed to give him any relief, he made up his mind that his end was at hand. He then enjoined his sons to live in peace with one another, and told Pertab Singh, the eldest, to complete the good works he had begun. He also ordered that the contract for the sale of liquor in Jammu, recently sold for 40,000 rupees, should be cancelled, and the sale of spirits forbidden as heretofore; and further directed that the toll levied on persons crossing the Tavi river by ford should be discontinued, and that fire-wood and vegetables should for the future be allowed to enter Jammu free of duty. At four in the afternoon he became insensible, and according to Hindu custom was removed from his bed to the floor, where he breathed his last shortly afterwards.

The next day, the 13th, the Maharaja's body was burned on the bank of the Tavi river with great ceremony in the presence of a large multitude. The corpse is said to have been enveloped originally in forty coverings of shawl and other rich stuffs, interspersed with gold coins and jewels of great value placed there by the women of his harem; but I am told that all but thirteen of the wrappers were taken off by the attendant Brahmins before the body was placed on the pile. The whole of the Maharaja's wardrobe, jewels, riding horses, with seven elephants, and a number of cattle, besides a very large sum in cash, the whole estimated at from five to ten lakhs of rupees, were set aside for distribution among the Brahmins or to be sent to holy men in the neighbourhood. All business was suspended, and all shops ordered to be closed; but the next day this order was so far relaxed as to allow provision dealers to carry on their trade through one leaf of their shop doors. All Government employés, including the soldiers shaved their heads and faces, excepting only Sikhs, Mussulmans, Brahmins, and those Rajputs connected with the Maharaja by marriage. White garments are worn by all, and ornaments of every description laid aside.

The period of mourning extends over thirteen days, and the Minister, Diwan Anant Ram, whom I saw immediately after my arrival, made some difficulty about my seeing the new Maharaja Pertab Singh before its expiry. The duties of religion, he declared, absolutely debarred the chief mourner from touching or even sit-

ting on the same carpet with any other human being, till its close. Thus my reception in Durbar would be impossible. Under these circumstances it became impracticable to carry out to the letter the instructions conveyed in your letter of the 1st August, 1884, a formal installation of the new Maharaja on the *gaddi* being incompatible with the earliest possible announcement of his recognition, and the delivery of his Excellency's message as to the views and intentions of the British Government. It seemed to me, however, all-important that there should be no delay in these last, and I therefore told the Diwan that it was imperatively necessary that I should see the Maharaja at once. He replied that if I would consent to forego the usual ceremonies of reception, and had no objection to sitting on the floor (it being impossible to admit any article of furniture into the room with the Maharaja), His Highness would be glad to see me.

Accordingly, at five in the afternoon I went to the Palace, where I was received by Mian Amar Sing, the late Maharaja's youngest son. In an inner room opening from the Durbar Hall I found the Maharaja sitting on a small square carpet covered with white cotton. A similar one was placed by its side for my accommodation. After I was seated all present left the room, entirely contrary to custom (I have never had an interview with the late Maharaja without two at least of his Council being present). After a few sentences of compliment and condolence, I told Pertab Singh that I had a message for him from the Viceroy, to be delivered in the presence of his Council. He replied that he had not yet appointed a Council, to which I answered that it was to the members of late Maharaja's Council that I referred. He then called in Diwan Anant Ram alone. It was clear that an unpalatable communication was anticipated, and that it was hoped to confine it to as small a circle of hearers as possible. I therefore said that the message I had to deliver was not private and confidential though very important. On the contrary I had hoped to deliver it to His Highness in Durbar, but this being impossible I begged that he would call in at least Babu Nilambar and Diwan Gobind Sahai, who I knew were waiting outside. On this Pertab Singh ordered them to come in. On their seating themselves I told His Highness that His Excellency the Viceroy had ordered me in the first place to lose no time in announcing that His Excellency is pleased to recognise his succession to the Chiefship. This was received with expressions of gratitude and loyalty, the Maharaja rising and bowing his thanks. I then gave him the message contained in your letter, translating it sentence by sentence into Hindustani, only using the words "Kashmir and Jammu" instead of "Kashmir" only, as it might have been asserted afterwards that the message referred to Kashmir only, and not to the whole State.

The first part of the message referring to the introduction of reforms was received without any mark of surprise by my auditors, but the announcement of the immediate appointment of a Resident was evidently an unexpected blow.

I then took leave of the Maharaja. In the evening Babu Nilambar called on me with reference to another subject, and asked that I would explain, for the Maharaja's information, what was meant by the 'assistance of a Resident'. Did it imply that the Resident would take an active part in the administration of the country? I told him that I could not undertake to define the exact duties of a Resident, but that he would certainly leave all the active work of administration to the Durbar, while claiming the right to be made acquainted, should he require it, with all its details. He would give advice if asked for, and on any point he thought proper unasked; and in this latter case would expect his advice to be followed.

To-day Babu Nilambar called on me again, accompanied by Diwan Anant Ram. They brought a message from the Maharaja, begging me to use my influence to obtain for him a short delay before the appointment of a Resident, in order that he might get the credit for the reforms he had long made up his mind to introduce if ever he got the opportunity. It is unnecessary to detail the long conversation that ensued. Babu Nilambar finally acknowledged that the main objection was to the name 'Resident'. To this I replied that at the present juncture, putting aside other arguments, the name was all-important. The Maharaja and his councillors appeared to me to underrate vastly the difficulty of the task before them. It was one thing to order reforms and another to carry them out. In remedying the abuses which were ruining the country, they would have opposed to them the entire army of employés, high and low, who had been fattening on the land for years. The public appointment of a Resident would show these officials that there was something beyond caprice or the zeal of a new ruler in the reforms initiated at Jammu, and they would soon recognise that they must be carried out. At the same time the people at large would welcome the appointment of a Resident as an assurance of substantial reforms to come. Under these circumstances, while anxious to do all in my power to meet the Maharaja's wishes, I regretted that I could not recommend to his Excellency any delay in the formal appointment of a Resident.

The state of affairs seems to be somewhat as follows:—The death of Wazir Punnu (who fell down dead in Durbar on the 6th instant) was a stroke of extraordinary good fortune for the opposite party, represented by Diwan Anant Ram and Babu Nilambar. It not only removed their most powerful adversary, and the man who had the greatest influence with the present as with the late Maharaja, but it also keeps the country quiet without any effort on their part. The name of Punnu was a bye-word and a reproach among the people, and all the tyranny and oppression from which they suffered was invariably laid to his door, not always with justice. Had he survived his old master, he would have been the leading spirit in the Councils of the new Chief, and the people, hopeless of improvement, would probably have made rebellious demonstrations, which, with an army eighteen months in arrears of pay, would not have been easy to suppress. But Punnu died

six days before Pertab Singh succeeded to the Chiefship, and the people, overjoyed at their deliverance from the man whom they believed their sole tyrant, are probably indifferent to the change of rulers, and will remain quite in confident anticipation of early relief from their burdens.

Another fortunate circumstance for the new Chief is the general prosperity of the country, as far as it can be prosperous under such a Government. The late spring rains caused some loss in the low country and the outer hills, as did the summer floods in Kashmir, but the agricultural out-turn for the last year has everywhere been exceptionally high, and the prospects of the crops now in the ground are excellent. Commerce is shown by the Punjab trade reports to be steadily improving in spite of the vexatious restrictions placed on it. Thus, as far as the country itself is concerned, Maharaja Pertab Singh and his councillors have everything in their favour. At present he is looking for advice to Babu Nilambar and Diwan Anant Ram. The first is clever and well-intentioned, but without practical experience of administration and deficient in force of character. The Diwan is perhaps well meaning, but his bringing up inclines him to lean to the old way of managing the country, and he is weak and cunning. They are, I fear, wholly unable to cope with the difficulties which will meet them in improving the administration, should they make any real effort to do so. Certain simple reforms, such as the abolition of obnoxious imposts and export dues and the more regular payment of officials, they may effect, but it will, I fear, be hopeless to look for any serious improvement in the administration generally, without constant and heavy pressure, and material interference in details.

A probable early source of trouble will be the influence possessed over the new Maharaja by his personal followers. These, who are mostly men of the lowest class, are already beginning to assert themselves, and to offer to help their friends to lucrative employment. It can hardly be long before they and the party of Nilambar and Anant Ram come into conflict. The latter will not have the courage to lean on the Resident, and govern as Salar Jang did in Hyderabad in spite of the Chief, but will try to trim with the usual consequences. On these points I will write more fully as the situation develops itself. For the present I have only pointed out to Anant Ram and Nilambar the urgent necessity for paying the troops, and for relieving the export trade of the country from its burdens. They will not, or cannot, give me any information of the actual state of the finances, except that the public treasury is practically empty. I have every reason to believe, however, that the late Maharaja regularly diverted the revenue of certain districts to his private chest. Some of this was devoted to religious purposes, but popular report has it that he has left large sums hoarded in obscure forts in different parts of the country. It is also said that he solemnly enjoined that this money should never be used to meet the current expenditure of the State, and no doubt, if it exists, every effort will be made to keep it

intact, or at all events to spend it on no useful object. The annual customs contract expires in the course of a month or two, and this will be a favourable opportunity for a revision of the tariff, which should entirely free the woollen and metal trades of Kashmir from the heavy export duties to which they are now subject. This will give an impulse to production in Srinagar, which should tide the artisan class over the winter, of which the prospects are exceptionally bad owing to the final collapse of the shawl trade in Europe, and the paucity of visitors in the valley this year.

The Maharaja ends his mourning on the 26th, when he will take his seat in the Durbar. This will be the proper opportunity for the delivery of the *khariṭa* from his Excellency the Viceroy, of which a copy was enclosed with your letter of the 1st August, 1884.

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KHARITA, dated Simla, the 14th September 1885, referred to in last paragraph of above Enclosure.

From His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to the MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR.

I have received with deep regret the news of the death of your father, Maharaja Ranbir Sing: and I wish to assure you without delay of my most sincere sympathy.

Maharaja Ranbir Sing rendered valuable service to the British Government. I feel that his loss is the loss of a friend; and I wish that it had not fallen to me, during the period of my Viceroyalty, to consider the measures rendered necessary by this unfortunate event.

It is now my duty to inform you, on behalf of the Queen-Empress of India, that I recognise and confirm your succession to the Chiefship of Jammu and Kashmir. I trust that Your Highness's life may be long and prosperous; and that, in all difficulties, of whatsoever kind, you will rely with confidence upon the good-will of the British Government, which will never fail you so long as you are loyal to the Crown and earnest in the desire to rule your State with justice and moderation.

Your Highness has before you a difficult task. During the illness of your father the administration of the State became seriously disorganised, and it will be necessary for you to introduce many reforms. But my Agent, Sir Oliver St. John, will remain with you and help you to the utmost of his ability; and I feel confident that with his aid all your difficulties will be successfully met and overcome. I request your Highness to refer to him for a more detailed explanation of my views regarding the future administration of the Kashmir State; and I hope that your Highness will not fail to consult him freely at all times, and to be guided by his advice in carrying those views into execution.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

FROM MIAN PERTAB SINGH to His Excellency the VICEROY  
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Jammu, September 18, 1865.

YOUR MOST ESTEEMED EXCELLENCY,

I beg to offer my heartfelt thanks for your Excellency's kind message of condolence on the demise of my father, whose devoted loyalty to the British Crown won for him those assurances of personal friendship from your Excellency which he valued so highly, and of which he felt so very proud.

I have also to present my grateful thanks to your Excellency for the most welcome message conveyed to me on the 15th instant by Colonel Sir Oliver St. John, the officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, that your Excellency has been pleased to recognise my succession to the *gaddi* of this State, and I hope by the blessing of God to let your Excellency have the satisfaction of learning before long that I am as fully alive to the undoubted and immense importance of conscientiously discharging my duties towards my subjects by doing all in my power to secure their best happiness, as I am awake to the supremely important duty of giving renewed proofs of loyalty to the British Government by following in the footsteps of my father and grandfather.

I do not hesitate to admit that the existing state of affairs in Kashmir and Jammu urgently requires immediate introduction of substantial reforms into the administration of the country, and now that I have power commensurate with my responsibilities, I beg to assure your Excellency that nothing shall be spared on my part, and no time will be lost to prove beyond any possibility of doubt that it is my ambition to succeed in making my country a model of a well-governed State in alliance with the Government of India.

It has, however, pained me extremely to learn that exactly at the time when I have made up my mind to deserve and win your Excellency's approbation and encouragement by proving myself equal to the onerous and responsible duties of a good ruler, your Excellency has been thinking of changing the status of the British Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir to that of a Political Resident, and thus lowering me in the eyes of my subjects and in the estimation of the public. It is fully known to your Excellency that I have only just now acquired the power of showing to the world that, without any interference from any quarter or any, the smallest, diminution of long-enjoyed rights and dignity of this State, I am able and willing of my own accord to introduce and maintain such reforms as are calculated to entitle a ruler to the lasting gratitude of his subjects, and encouraging approbation of the paramount power as well as the public at large.

I may submit to your Excellency that I am fully aware of the wise and benevolent principles which guide the Supreme Government of India in its relations with the Native States, and I have not the least doubt that your Excellency will estimate me not by

the splendour of my Court, nor by the pomp of my retinue, but by my conduct towards my subjects and by the only standard of good government combined with sincere and active loyalty.

I am confident, also, that I have only to convince your Excellency of the purity of my intentions, the earnestness of my purpose, and the firmness of my determination to govern well, to win your Excellency's sympathy with me in my desire to see the position of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir unaltered in his relations with this State.

I have sufficient confidence in the unbiassed justice of your Excellency's Government to hope that your Excellency will not form any unfavourable opinion of my abilities, intentions, and character, till the result of my administration for a sufficient length of time should justify a definite conclusion, and that your Excellency will see no necessity for altering the status of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, and that, therefore, there will be no occasion now for my waiting personally on your Excellency at Simla, to give your Excellency the trouble of taking into serious consideration the sanads of Her Imperial Majesty's Government, securing to the Chiefship the full enjoyment of all the rights of my father and grandfather, and to submit to your Excellency the grounds on which I attach so much importance to the credit of earning the reputation of a just and benevolent ruler without any meddling<sup>1</sup> from any quarter, and of preserving intact in all its relations the integrity of the State as inherited from my father as well as of endeavouring to exalt its dignity in the estimation of the paramount power by doing exactly what the ruler of a large and important State should do.

Requesting your Excellency to excuse the trouble I have given you, I beg to subscribe myself, etc.

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

FROM RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, to SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, dated Jammu, Sept. 27, 1885.

EXTRACT.

In continuation of my letter of the 16th, I have the honour to report that Mian Pertab Singh, eldest son of the late Maharaja Ranbir Singh, formally took his seat in the Durbar on the afternoon of the 25th instant.

The previous day and the morning of the 25th had been occupied in distributing gifts to Brahmins by the river side, at the place where the late Maharaja's body was burnt. In addition to a large sum of money, these gifts consisted of 13 sets of everything that had been used by the Maharaja in this world, including horses, cows, and other domestic animals, but only one elephant. The total value is estimated by public opinion at two lakhs of rupees, but was probably less. The remainder of the Maharaja's

<sup>1</sup> The Persian version renders this word by "dastandazi".—J. A. C.



effects, with a sum of five lakhs from his private treasury, are retained to be added to the fund consecrated by him to the perpetual use of the temples, which fund last year already amounted to 15 lakhs.

On concluding the distribution of the gifts destined to facilitate his father's passage to Paradise, Maharaja Pertab Singh returned to the Palace, and performed the ceremony of "dastarbandi," *i.e.*, tying on of the turban, which marks the close of the period of acute grief.

At 5 p.m. I paid the Maharaja a formal visit to congratulate him on his accession. The *kharita* of his Excellency the Viceroy had already been delivered to him privately, to put an end to further useless argument on the question of the "Resident," and to avoid mention of the topic in Durbar, which would have been very distasteful to the Chief. Instead therefore of reading the *kharita*, I made a short speech in Urdu, of which a translation is attached (Enclosure A.).

Babu Nilambara Mukerji then read a manifesto in English, a translation<sup>1</sup> of which in Urdu was subsequently read by Diwan Anant Ram, followed by the proclamation alluded to.

The imposts and customs mitigated or abolished are as follows:—

- (1.) The custom of "khodkasht." This is a system by which the State farms a part of the village lands itself. Advances are annually made to the persons employed for the purpose, but it is notorious they they embezzle the money, and cultivate the land with forced labour, and seed extorted from the villagers.
- (2.) The custom of "leri." This is a system of paying sepoy and others by remission of rent, instead of in coin, and, for some reason not easily explained, is much disliked.
- (3.) Each group of ten houses in Jammu territory will no longer, as before, be obliged to supply one Sepoy or other Government servant; forcible enlistment generally is abolished; and the rule of obliging families to provide substitutes for deserters is done away with.
- (4.) The customs duty on rice and other provisions brought into Srinagar for sale is reduced from two annas in the rupee to half an anna, in other words from 12½ to 3½ per cent.

To understand the severity of this tax it must be explained that Government itself is the principal grain dealer, and fixes a permanent rate at which grain is sold. Thus the rate for unhusked rice is Rs. 1-4 (English) per kharwar, equivalent to about 10 annas a man. If a Zemindar sends rice to market, he can ask no more for it than 10 annas a man, and has in addition to pay the customs contractor 1½ anna before he can offer it for sale. Under these conditions it is clear that the remission of three-fourths of this tax will benefit the producer, and not the consumer, who will pay the same price for his rice as before.

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<sup>1</sup> Enclosure B.

- (5.) The next impost remitted is also in favour of the Zemindar. Every large village community in Kashmir comprises a "Zillahdah," or "Harkara," whose business it is to report the misdeeds of his fellows. The Durbar affect to look on these officials as rural police; but as they are occasionally women, and have no powers beyond reporting, spies would be a better name for them. They are paid by a cess of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the gross produce of the land. Some years ago it occurred to Wazir Punnu that the Zillahdars were making too much money, and he therefore made their chief, the Harkara-Bashi (head-bringer of news) pay an annual sum to the treasury. This has been raised till it now amounts to 60,000 Chilki rupees (37,500 English), a great deal more than the estimated total value of the cess from which it is supposed to be paid. This most obnoxious impost is now abolished, but the Zillahdars are warned that they must continue to send in reports, and that if found extorting anything beyond the legitimate  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. they will be punished.
- (6.) The tax on the sale of horses in Kashmir, called "Zar-inakas", which at one time amounted to 50 per cent. of the purchase money, is abolished.
- (7.) The tax on "Ekhas" plying for hire to Sialkot, which amounted to Rs. 1-11 on a total of Rs. 2-10, is abolished, and some other minor dues are remitted.

On the whole the above constitute a valuable boon to the people, especially to the cultivating classes of Jammu, whose main grievances are now removed. Sensible relief is also given to the Kashmir peasant; but the artizan of the towns, whose needs are greater, gets nothing but a slight possible reduction in the price of fruit and vegetables.

Yesterday afternoon I had a private interview with the Maharaja, at which only Diwan Anant Ram and Babu Nilambara Mukerji were present. According to my instructions I asked him to let me know what reforms he proposed to initiate, and to what persons he proposed to entrust their execution. As regards reforms he would only refer me to the manifesto (Enclosure B), repeatedly declaring with reference to both reforms and ministers that he required time to reflect. At last he said that he entrusted Babu Nilambara with all business connected with finance, while Diwan Anant Ram would continue as before to conduct foreign affairs, which he defined to be those of Ladak and Leh, and correspondence with myself. I told the Maharaja that I was going back to Kashmir for the present, but that I should return before long, and hoped that by that time he would have matured his schemes for reform. I could not, however, leave without doing my utmost to impress on him the imperative necessity of relieving the manufacturing classes of Kashmir from the present burdens on trade. I then tried to explain the question to him, but the only answer to be

obtained was that he would think it over. I should here remark that I had previously discussed the question with Babu Nilambara, who tried to argue that the Government of India should do something in return for concessions on this point. Of course I replied that our only object was to benefit the Kashmir Government and the people, who are the only sufferers from the insane policy of imposing crushing duties on their own manufactures. I fear that much pressure will be required to bring about this most essential reform.

As mentioned in my former letter, Maharaja Ranbir Singh is said to have left considerable private wealth. Babu Nilambara tells me that this is certain, but that neither he nor anyone outside the household have any idea of the amount. The public treasury, or rather treasuries, for there are many in Jammu itself, are empty, but money has been produced from the Palace (2½ lakhs) to pay the troops up to the end of the last Hindu year, for which they had as yet received nothing. This leaves them only five months in arrear. The troops in Kashmir have already been paid.

My impression as regards the new Maharaja is that, though entirely wanting in the quick wit of his father, he has inherited a full share of his obstinacy and cunning. He will consent to certain surface reforms, but on the cardinal points of delegating real power to his ministers, freeing trade, improving communications, and making a proper land settlement, he will, I fear, offer as much opposition as he dares.

Babu Nilambara and Diwan Anant Ram, freed from the fear of Wazir Punnu, seem to think themselves strong enough to go on alone without the support of a Resident, which they formerly declared to be essentially necessary. They will soon find themselves mistaken, but in the meantime had better be left to themselves. On this account I am glad to return to Kashmir, for which I start to-morrow, inspecting the cart-road *en route*. On this work, the completion of which is an essential preliminary to the greatest of the reforms required in Kashmir, a proper land revenue settlement, I will submit a full report at the earliest opportunity. I will also, while in Kashmir, ascertain the exact burdens now imposed on the export trade which are constantly varying.

I have seen with regret that His Highness keeps his younger brothers, Ram Singh and Amar Singh, and his cousin, Raja Moti Singh, of Poonal, at a distance. I have let him know that I think this a mistake, and have exchanged visits with them for the first time. During the late Maharaja's reign overtures to this effect met with no response.

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ENCLOSURE A.

Your Highness! I beg to offer you my congratulations on your accession to the place occupied by your father and grandfather, whose loyalty and devotion to the British Crown you will, I feel sure, do your utmost to emulate.

No Chief in India has ever succeeded to the *gaddi* with more opportunities for doing good. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has fallen behind the majority of the States of India in that progress which is necessary to the welfare of the people and the good name of their rulers.

It is your Highness' good fortune to have it in your power to remedy these shortcomings; and, though the task will be a difficult one, I feel assured that you will address all your energies to it. The Government of India will take the warmest interests in your efforts to improve the administration of your State and the condition of your subjects of every class; and the eyes of all enlightened persons in India will be fixed on you to see how you perform the duties for which you are now responsible.

It is my earnest hope to be able before long to congratulate you on ruling over a country foremost in India for good government and happy subjects as it is for loyalty and devotion. May your Highness' reign be long and prosperous, and may your name be handed down to posterity as the Nowshirwan of Jammu and Kashmir.

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ENCLOSURE B.

SIR OLIVER ST. JOHN, SARDARS, AND GENTLEMEN,

My hearty and cordial thanks are due to his Excellency the Viceroy, and his worthy representative and my sincere friend, Sir Oliver St. John, for the *kharita*, recognising my succession to the Chiefship of this large and important State, and I take this fitting opportunity to declare publicly, that of the many arduous and responsible duties which I shall have to perform as the ruler of this State, the foremost under all circumstances will be the duty of following in the footsteps of my illustrious grandfather and his lamented Highness, in giving substantial proofs of unswerving and devoted loyalty to Her Imperial Majesty's Government, and, when the necessity will arise, of placing all the resources of my country at the disposal of his Excellency the Viceroy, and of personally joining the British army with the whole of my military force.

2. Next in importance to my obligations to the paramount power, but next to those only, will be the duty of governing my country with justice and moderation. The responsibilities which I am going to undertake will be high and heavy indeed, but I believe God will grant me firmness and strength enough to discharge them with credit to the family of my renowned ancestors, and benefit to the lakhs of subjects, whom it has pleased Providence to place under my care.

3. I have before me the difficult task of introducing substantial reforms in the administration of the country, but I believe I have only to look the difficulties boldly in the face and show a determined front, to achieve complete success and earn the reputation of a just and good ruler. Armed with purity of intentions and firmness of purpose, I may reasonably entertain the hope of being able to clear

the administrative agency of all corruption and incompetency, and impart to it the maximum of honesty and efficiency. I now warn my officials of all ranks that I have fully made up my mind to put down corruption and intrigue wherever they may be found, and I hope they will do all in their power to help me in making my administration a blessing and a source of unmixed good to my people.

4. I know that the paramount power as well as the public will watch with interest the progress and development of my measures of reform, and I am fully alive to the fact that they will estimate me not by the pomp and splendour of my court and retinue, but by the amount of happiness that I may secure to my subjects.

5. I need not trouble you now with minute details of what I intend to do, but I think I can declare without committing myself to any particular measure the policy and the general principles that will guide me in the conduct of my affairs. I shall adopt such measures only as are calculated to secure to my subjects their greatest good and the fullest enjoyment of their rights and privileges, and shall conduct my administration so that the tiller of the soil will enjoy a fair share of the produce of his labour, and the manufacturer the fruit of his skill and industry, that every facility will be given to commerce by improving the means of communication and removing unnecessary and vexatious restrictions, that every encouragement will be offered to get all the resources of the country properly developed, that adequate measures will be taken to give my subjects the benefits of sound and useful education, that ample provision will be made for the relief of the sick and the suffering, and that real merit and worth in my subjects will be recognised and fostered without any distinction of race or rank, creed or colour.

6. To commemorate this auspicious accession with a few acts pointing to the character of the policy I am going to follow, I do now abolish and reduce certain duties and taxes, and remove certain restrictions detailed in the proclamation<sup>1</sup> which my Diwan will read out to you.

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No. 4.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

India Office, London, 27th November, 1885.

MY LORD,

Para. 1. I have to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of your Excellency's Government, dated the 19th ultimo, reporting the measures which have been taken in reference to the State of Kashmir, in consequence of the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh on the 12th September.

2. When in the spring of the year 1884 the death of the

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<sup>1</sup> This proclamation was not received from India.

Maharaja was supposed to be imminent, Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with recommendations submitted by the Government of your Excellency's predecessor, decided that, upon the occurrence of that event, His Highness's eldest son should be recognised as successor to the undivided State, but that he should be required to introduce substantial reforms into the administration, and to entrust their execution to competent hands. The Government of India was also authorised, at its discretion, to substitute for an Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir a Resident with the same position and duties as Political Residents in other Native States in subordinate alliance with the British Government.

3. The papers now received from your Excellency's Government show that, the contingency contemplated in 1884 having arisen, the utmost consideration has been shown to the susceptibilities of Maharaja Pertab Singh in giving effect to the policy then determined upon. His Highness has been informed that, within reasonable limits, he will be allowed full scope and ample time to introduce the requisite administrative reforms, and will get the full credit for initiating them, while it has properly been pointed out to him, in reply to his objections to the proposed change in the status of the representative of the Government of India at his court, that an arrangement, which is considered suitable in the cases of the other great Princes and Chiefs of India, cannot be regarded either as derogatory to the dignity of the Kashmir State, or as indicating a desire on the part of the paramount power to interfere unnecessarily in its internal affairs.

4. I have to express my full approval of the proceedings of your Excellency's Government in this matter. Having regard to the condition of the country, to the character of the new ruler, and to the aspect of affairs beyond the frontier, in reference to which Kashmir occupies so important a position, I entertain no doubt as to the necessity for the measures now reported, which will, I trust, conduce to the material well-being of the people of the State, and tend to the better security of imperial interests.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

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No. 5.

The GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE, dated Simla, August 18, 1888.

EXTRACT.

In March last Mr. Plowden thought the time had come when, for the sake of the State, it was essential to effect some reduction of the Maharaja's authority. There is no doubt some justification for Mr. Plowden's estimate of His Highness's capacity for rule; but, on the other hand, the condition of the State does not seem to de-

mand at present such decided action as Mr. Plowden has suggested. We have, therefore, determined not to resort to measures which would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of taking the power out of the Maharaja's hands, and His Highness will now have another opportunity of showing under favourable circumstances whether he is capable of carrying on the administration.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

REPORT on the Affairs of the STATE of JUMMU and KASHMIR by  
the RESIDENT in KASHMIR, dated Sialkot, March 5, 1888.

EXTRACT.

I have had more opportunities of studying the Maharaja's character than perhaps any other officer in the country. My intercourse with him, official, private, and social, has been frequent; my relations with him have been always friendly; there has never been any friction or tension between us. He has never failed in personal courtesy to me, nor ever refused to see me at any time or on any occasion; therefore, I can fairly say that I am not actuated by any feelings of personal dislike towards His Highness.

I think, however, that the Government of India should be under no illusion as regards Maharaja Pertab Singh. From first to last I have failed to discover in him any sustained capacity for governing his country, or any genuine desire to ameliorate its condition, or to introduce those reforms which he has acknowledged to be necessary. More than two years have passed since his accession, but not only has he achieved nothing, but he has opposed beneficial measures proposed by others. The progress made has been in spite of him. I do not believe he is loyal, but fortunately he is powerless to carry his country with him. And I am convinced that the Government will commit a serious mistake if it believes that the reforms which the country urgently needs will ever be effected by Maharaja Pertab Singh. He will never, of his own free will, establish a capable and honest administration; nor, if any power of interference is left him, will he permit any administration appointed by the Government of India to carry on the business of the country. He will thwart and oppose it in every way he dares; the only restraint will be the limit of his powers and his fears; therefore I do most earnestly advise that the Maharaja be made plainly to understand that he has had his chance, and that he will not be allowed any longer to stand in the way. I would assign him a liberal income, to be placed at his absolute disposal, and treat him with full honour as titular Chief; but I would exclude him from all real power. He may reign, but not govern. A great danger with the Maharaja is that his notorious weakness of character and purpose render him an easy tool in the hands of an unscrupulous adviser, and therefore it is essential that he should be controlled by some agency upon which the Government of India can place confidence. I consider that a reduction of the Maharaja's authority on these lines is an essential condition precedent to all other necessary measures.

Next, as to the form of Government. One plan is to appoint Raja Amar Singh Prime Minister, on condition of his undertaking to carry out in all respects the policy of the Government of India. He has not got sufficient experience or solidity of character to execute a task of this magnitude without the aid of a resolute and experienced adviser, and it would be necessary to constitute some such office as "Secretary to Government," and to nominate to it a suitable British Officer—Native or European. I have great doubts whether Raja Amar Singh can be trusted, and, unless he has a strong officer at his elbow to keep him straight, I do not think it would be safe to employ him. He has never forgotten his father's intentions on his behalf, and the object he is working for is to become Maharaja of Kashmir. Once he gets power into his own hands, he will use it without scruple to attain this end. At present the Maharaja is friendly to Raja Amar Singh, because he wishes to break the bond which unites the two younger brothers and Diwan Lachman Das, but there is no genuine affection or confidence between them; and the well-known fact that the late Maharaja would have liked to supersede Pertab Singh in favour of his youngest brother is a special cause of jealousy. And I should expect that, after a short time, all the influence which the Maharaja possesses, especially Zenana influence, would be brought to bear against Amar Singh. Another probable result of his elevation would be a feud between him and his brother Ram Singh, thereby raising against him another hostile party.

Another plan is to bring in a Prime Minister from elsewhere. There is no one in the Maharaja's employ fit for the post, and the selection would need particular care. The situation is this: no Native could administer the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir unless he is not only of exceptionally strong character but also exceptionally honest; and, in any case, he would require besides the full support of the Government of India. If a weak man is chosen he will succumb to local intrigue, notwithstanding all the support which the Government may give him; and, if he is not honest, he will yield to the temptations with which the place abounds, and go with the swim. But, if a Native Minister is brought in from outside, I recommend precautionary measures being adopted with the young Rajas. I should order each of them to take up his residence in his own jigar, and so occupy the same position as Raja Moti Singh, of Punch. It is not right that these young men should be given large jigers which they never visit. It ought to be a condition of the grant that they reside on their property and be personally responsible for its administration. They might pay yearly visits to Jammu just as Moti Singh does. Another good result of this measure would be to lay the foundation of a class of Sardars such as exist in the Rajput States. As long as Raja Ram Singh continues to command the State Army there is no hope of any serious re-organisation; and, if Raja Amar Singh were to remain at Jammu, he would not leave a stone unturned to render the Prime Minister's position untenable.

A third plan is to continue the existing Council, making the



Resident its temporary head, and strengthening it by the addition of two selected Natives. An administration so constituted would probably be strong enough to introduce all needful reforms, and to set the country in order. Three years would suffice to set things straight, and the Resident might then withdraw from the headship of the Council, and an administration be established on ordinary Native lines.

I believe that, sooner or later, the Government will have to choose one or other of these three plans or some modification of them. But, whatever plan is adopted, there is one measure which must under any circumstances be prescribed. This is, first, the immediate removal of the band of incompetent, corrupt, and mischievous men who are at the bottom of most of the intrigues by which this unfortunate State is torn; and, secondly, the appointment of an adequate number of trained native officials on reasonable salaries who can be trusted to carry out the orders given to them. Until the entire Kashmir establishment has been recast, and honest and competent servants substituted for the fraudulent and incapable men now employed, no reforms can be carried out, nor can any mere alteration of the form of Government be of any use.

I will endeavour to anticipate an objection which I foresee is likely to be raised. The action suggested in this report brings forward the question of the amount of interference in the affairs of a Native State which may be rightfully and expediently exercised by the paramount Power. It is the settled purpose of the British Government to avoid unnecessary and improper interference in the affairs of Native States. And the basis of this policy is respect for the rights of others, because our treaties with the principal Native States are founded upon their general independence in internal affairs. But, notwithstanding these treaties, cases must from time to time occur in which the Government of India as paramount power is forced to interfere in a radical manner, and it does habitually interfere in a lesser degree. A reluctant interference which circumstances have rendered unavoidable does not, however, infringe the general principle of non-intervention. The question is whether in the case of Kashmir an instance of unavoidable interference has arisen. I submit it has. First, because mis-government producing evil consequences to the people has admittedly existed for many years, and, though a wide margin of time and opportunity has been allowed, there seems no hope whatever that the State, unaided, will be able to settle its own affairs. Secondly, the condition of Kashmir affects countries on its northern border beyond its limits, and thus becomes an injurious and disturbing element in the Imperial scheme of frontier defence. I advocate interference only so far as is indispensable for the accomplishment of the object aimed at, but I would interfere decidedly and effectually for this purpose. A strict adherence to the principle of non-interference implies that Government must also tolerate the local disorder and mal-administration which are bound to ensue.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

FROM RESIDENT IN KASHMIR TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Foreign Department, dated April 21, 1888.

## EXTRACT.

I have the honour to enclose a kharita from His Highness the Maharaja to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy. I am not aware of the contents of the kharita, but I understand that it gives cover to a scheme for the reorganisation of the State Council.

I should be glad to be informed what is the rule in other native States in respect to the transmission of kharitas, *i.e.*, whether or not the Resident is entitled to be furnished with a copy of the kharita or to be informed of its contents. The precedents in this State appear to show that the Resident is not informed in the first instance, but that the Government of India furnishes him with a copy together with the reply. But so short a time has elapsed since a Resident was first appointed in Kashmir that it can hardly be said that any binding usage has yet been established.

In the present instance I have asked His Highness to give me a copy of the kharita not only because the Maharaja expressed his intention of informing me of his proposals and of availing himself of my assistance, but because that both under the instructions of August 1884 and under subsequent instructions the Resident is bound to offer his advice on all important matters, while on his part the Maharaja is required (kharita of 14th September, 1885) "to consult the Resident freely at all times and to be guided by his advice in carrying his views into execution".

KHARITA, dated Srinagar, the 13th April 1888.

FROM HIS HIGHNESS PERTAB SINGH, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, to his Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Your Excellency is already aware that circumstances obliged me to dismiss Diwan Lachman Das, Prime Minister and President of the Council. As I think that the Council which was formed with your kind advice should be continued, I have prepared a scheme for its reorganisation which I beg to forward herewith to your Excellency.

I beg to express the high consideration and esteem I entertain for your Excellency and to subscribe myself, etc.

## JAMMU AND KASHMIR COUNCIL.

## Constitution.

1. The Council shall consist of a President, a Vice-President, three Members, and a Secretary.
2. His Highness the Maharaja shall be the President.
3. His Highness shall appoint a Vice-President, Members, and a Secretary.
4. Three shall form a quorum.

5. The Vice-President, Members, and the Secretary may be removed and substituted by majority of votes of the Members of the Council, for reasons to be recorded.

6. The Council shall be a consultative one.

#### APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS.

7. Raja Amar Singh is hereby appointed Vice-President, and Raja Ram Singh and Babu Nilambar Mukerji, Members, with Diwan Janki Prasad, Member and Secretary.

8. The Members shall represent the following branches of administration :—

1. Military.—Raja Ram Singh.

2. Judicial and Foreign Department.—Raja Amar Singh.

3. Revenue.—Babu Nilambar Mukerji.

4. Miscellaneous.—Diwan Janki Prasad.

9. The Vice-President shall also be the Prime Minister with executive powers.

10. The Vice-President and Members shall take the following oath :—

“ I solemnly declare that in giving my opinion as a Member of Council, I shall keep in view the best interests of the State, and shall freely express my honest convictions, without fear or favour, and I shall not divulge any secrets of the State.”

#### BUSINESS.

11. The Council shall sit three days in the week, authorised holidays excepted, and any extraordinary meeting shall be held, on the requisition of the Prime Minister.

12. It shall be the duty of the Council to legislate and hear and pass opinion on all subjects that may be brought forward by the Members.

13. The Council shall, on meeting, frame rules for its guidance, which may be removed or modified by it only.

14. All matters shall be decided on majority of votes.

15. Besides the matters which may be brought forward in the Council by the Members, the Prime Minister, who is the head of the Executive Government under His Highness, may refer to the Council for opinion all important questions affecting the administration in all its branches.

16. The respective opinions of the several Members shall be recorded and signed.

17. When a Member brings forward, or the Prime Minister refers, any special matter to the Council, it shall be the duty of the Secretary to furnish all the Members with a written statement of the subject-matter.

18. The office establishment shall be considered and settled by the Council or meeting.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 5.

From the SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the RESIDENT  
IN KASHMIR, dated Simla, July 25, 1888.

## EXTRACT.

THE Government of India have decided to accept in principle the scheme which His Highness has put forward, and your own alternative proposals have for the present been set aside. In coming to this conclusion the Governor-General in Council has not overlooked the fact that the Maharaja's scheme is open to many objections, and that partly on account of His Highness's personal character and partly for other reasons, it is not unlikely to prove a failure. But before sanctioning any measures which would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of taking all power out of the Maharaja's hands, the Government of India have felt that it would be just and right to allow the Maharaja a further opportunity of showing whether he is competent to discharge the duties of a responsible ruler. If after full and fair trial it becomes evident that he is wholly incapable of conducting the administration of the State the proposals which you have submitted will be reconsidered.

In the meantime I am to ask you to afford the Maharaja every assistance in your power with regard to the reorganisation of his Council and all other matters upon which he may consult you. The Governor-General in Council does not desire you to press upon him your own views as to these matters. You should understand that the responsibility for the success or failure of the present experiment will rest upon the Maharaja; and your aim should be to meet his wishes in every possible manner, not refusing your advice when His Highness asks for it, but avoiding any course of action which might prevent him from feeling that the Government of India desire to allow him the fullest opportunity of proving his fitness. You should help His Highness as much as possible in doing this, but you should not insist upon the advantage of any measure which he disapproves, however desirable it may seem to be in his own interests.

You will notice that the Government of India have declined to permit the employment of Babu Nilambar Mukerji as member of council in charge of the revenue administration. If the Maharaja should raise the question of employing him in any other capacity, you may inform His Highness that the Government of India do not consider it desirable that the Babu should return to Kashmir. With reference to the question of principle whether the Maharaja is at liberty to employ Native British subjects without the consent of the British Government, you should give His Highness to understand that the interpretation of the treaty of 1846 with regard to this point is no longer open to discussion. The Government of India desire to give the Maharaja all possible assistance, and he will always find them willing to place at his disposal the services of competent British officials; but they must maintain their right to

be consulted before any British subjects receive employment within the State.

The enclosed kharita points out to the Maharaja the urgent necessity for a thorough examination into the condition of the Kashmir finances. This is evidently a point of the greatest importance, and you should use your influence to bring it to the special notice of His Highness and his advisers.

The Governor-General in Council does not consider it necessary to give you more detailed instructions with regard to the course which you should pursue. He has no doubt that a consideration of this letter, and of the terms of the enclosed kharita, will suffice to show you the principles upon which he desires you to act, and he hopes that with the aid of judicious and sympathetic advice on your part the Maharaja may, before you leave Kashmir, have succeeded at least in laying the foundations of an efficient scheme of Government.

KHARITA, dated SIMLA, the 25th July, 1888, enclosed in above.

FROM His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA to His Highness the MAHARAJA OF KASHMIR.

I HAVE received your Highness's letter of the 13th of April, informing me of the dismissal of Diwan Lachman Das, and forwarding, for my consideration, a scheme which you have prepared for the re-organization of your Council.

Your Highness's letter has received my most careful attention, and I have now to inform you of the conclusions at which I have arrived with regard to the very important questions which you have been good enough to refer to me.

In the first place, I cannot avoid informing your Highness that the news of the sudden removal of Diwan Lachman Das was received by me with some surprise. Your Highness appointed him to your council after consulting me, and I hoped that your Highness would, before making another change of Government, give me some previous intimation of your views. However, this point has already been brought to your notice by Mr. Plowden, and I do not now desire to dwell upon it any further.

With regard to your Highness's scheme for the future administration of Kashmir, I would ask you to consider the following observations.

Your Highness proposes that the administration should be conducted or assisted by a council consisting of a president, a vice-president, three other members, and a secretary. The presidency you would retain in your own hands. You would appoint your brother Raja Amar Singh to be vice-president, and you would also make him Prime Minister with executive powers. The other three members of the Council would be Raja Rama Singh, Babu Nilambar Mukerji, and Diwan Janki Prasad; and they would be charged respectively with the control of affairs in the military, revenue, and miscellaneous departments. The Prime Minister would have special charge of the judicial and foreign departments.

Diwan Janki Prasad would be secretary in addition to his other duties. It is proposed that the Council should be consultative.

It appears to me that a Government constituted in this manner is open to some criticism. In the first place, I am inclined to doubt whether it is altogether in accordance with your Highness's dignity to be president of the Council. Secondly, your Highness's brothers are still young, and have had little opportunity of acquiring practical experience in administrative work. Babu Nilambar Mukerji has no knowledge of revenue matters, and is altogether unfit to take charge of so important a department of the administration. Of Diwan Janki Prasad I know little, but I understand that he is not a man of marked character and ability. Under these circumstances your Highness's scheme does not appear to me to hold out any certain promise of success.

Nevertheless, I do not desire to raise any objection to the principle of the proposed arrangements. I regard your Highness as the responsible ruler of the State, and I wish to meet your views as far as possible, and to afford you every assistance in carrying them out. If, therefore, your Highness prefers to maintain a Council and to assume the presidency yourself, I am ready to assent to your views in this matter, and also with regard to the nomination of your brothers and Dewan Janki Prasad. On one point only I feel that in your Highness's interests I must ask you to modify your proposals. I cannot think that the appointment of Babu Nilambar Mukerji as revenue minister would be desirable. I am of opinion that for the charge of revenue affairs, your Highness should secure the services of some thoroughly competent official with practical experience of administration. I also think that at least one other official of similar qualifications should be appointed to direct, either as member of Council or in some other capacity, the judicial and executive branches of your Government. If your Highness can name any Native officials in the British service who seem to me to possess the requisite qualifications I shall be glad to place them at your disposal. If your Highness cannot suggest any names I shall be ready and willing to make inquiries, and to supply you with the best men available either in the Punjab or elsewhere. I have learnt with pleasure that your Highness has already asked for the services of some four or five officers to be employed in the accounts and forest departments. But your Highness's government seems to require something more than the loan of a few subordinate officials. What is wanted is that you should associate with your principal officers two or three thoroughly trained and capable persons, who will be able to give your Highness effective aid in directing and controlling the main branches of the administration. I trust that your Highness will consider these suggestions and will take such steps as may have the effect of strengthening your government from an administrative point of view. I need hardly add that, with regard to this question and to all other questions of importance, Your Highness should freely consult the Resident, who will give you every assistance in his power.

In making these observations I do not overlook the fact that, since the appointment of the Council of which Diwan Lachman Das was a member, considerable progress has been made in the direction of reform; useful work has been done with regard to the revenue administration, and in the reorganization of the Public Works and Medical Departments. But much remains to be done, and it is because I am deeply conscious of the importance of the Kashmir State, and of the responsibilities of the British Government in regard to it, that I have so carefully examined the proposals which your Highness has put forward.

I would particularly urge upon your Highness's attention the necessity for a careful investigation into the condition of your Highness's finances, and of the executive and judicial services. Until these are placed upon a thoroughly sound footing it will be impossible to hope for any material increase in the prosperity of the State.

I desire to express the high consideration which I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness's sincere friend.

(Signed) DUFFERIN,  
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

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No. 6.

The SECRETARY of STATE to the GOVERNMENT  
of INDIA.

India Office, London, October 12, 1888.

MY LORD,

I HAVE perused with deep interest the papers regarding Kashmir affairs which accompanied your Excellency's letter of the 18th August, 1888. From them I learn that the instability of the several administrations to which Maharaja Pertab Singh had entrusted the management of the affairs of his State since his accession in 1855 has much retarded the execution of the various reforms which have been repeatedly pressed on the attention of the Maharaja, and that, after the abrupt dismissal of the President of the Council, Diwan Lachman Das, in March last, by the Maharaja, His Highness submitted for the consideration of your Excellency a scheme for the reconstitution of the State Council, in which the Maharaja proposed to assume the post of President.

2. Though this scheme of administration is open to many objections, partly on account of the Maharaja's personal character, and for other reasons, and is not unlikely to prove a failure, your Excellency's Government have determined to allow His Highness a further opportunity of showing whether he is competent to discharge the duties of a responsible ruler.

3. Judging from the reports of the Residents in Kashmir, I

can have little expectation myself that the experiment of a Council presided over by the Maharaja will be successful; but, on the other hand, the objections to any radical change in the government of the province at the present juncture are such that I am willing to sanction your proposal to give the Maharaja another occasion of proving whether His Highness possesses either the capacity or the will to introduce and carry into effect those administrative measures which are essential to the prosperity and security of the Kashmir State.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CROSS.

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No. 7.

The GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR INDIA, dated Fort William, April 3, 1889.

EXTRACT.

In 1888 the condition of Kashmir was by no means satisfactory; and the Resident, Mr. Plowden, had come to the conclusion that so long as the present Maharaja was maintained in power there could be no hope of better things. He therefore urged the Government of India to interfere and exclude His Highness from all concern with the administration. There was much to support Mr. Plowden's view, and we were by no means confident as to the result of any further abstention from interference; but on the whole we decided that the Maharaja should have another opportunity of showing, under favourable circumstances, whether he was capable of ruling the State. He was accordingly continued in power; and Mr. Plowden, who soon afterwards left Kashmir on promotion, was succeeded by Colonel Parry Nisbet, C.I.E., a personal friend of the Maharaja, and an officer of large administrative experience. It was hoped that Colonel Nisbet might succeed in establishing a strong influence over His Highness's mind, in freeing him from the domination of certain unprincipled persons about him, who took advantage of his timidity and superstition, and in gradually bringing him to a proper sense of his position and its responsibilities.

This hope was disappointed, and, after four months in the Kashmir Residency, Colonel Nisbet has come to the same conclusion as his predecessor. The immediate cause which led him to re-submit the matter for our orders was the discovery of some letters, said to have been written by the Maharaja, which were of such a nature as to present his character and conduct in a very unfavourable light. We were not disposed to attach any excessive importance to these letters, because we had received a number of very similar documents a year before, and were not ignorant of the Maharaja's failings. But in this instance the discovery of the letters was immediately followed by a voluntary resignation of power on the part of the Maharaja; and, taking into consideration this and all the other circumstances of the case,



we felt that the time had come when some measure of interference could be no longer deferred. We have, therefore, determined that the Maharaja's resignation shall be accepted, and that we should avail ourselves of the opportunity in order to effect a thorough re-organisation of the Kashmir Government.

The form in which our interference is to be exercised will be seen from the terms of our instructions to Colonel Nesbit. To sum these up in a few words, the administration of the State will be handed over to a Council, consisting of the Maharaja's brothers and certain selected officials in the British service. This Council will have full powers, subject to the condition that they will take no important step without consulting the Resident, and that they will act upon the Resident's advice whenever it may be offered. This is the arrangement established in Gwalior, where it is working well. The Maharaja will be excluded from all interference with public affairs, but will retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State, and will receive from the State revenues an adequate, but not extravagant, allowance for the maintenance of his household and any other necessary expenditure.

These arrangements will not be exclusively based upon the Maharaja's edict of resignation, which was an attempt to save his dignity and secure better terms than he could otherwise expect. This edict contains some inconvenient stipulations, and it would be embarrassing to agree to it as it stands. We prefer to treat it as a confession of incapacity for the rule of the State, and to base our further proceedings upon general grounds.

Your Lordship will observe that our instructions to Colonel Nesbit deprecate any interference in the affairs of the State beyond what is necessary for the reform of the administration. We greatly regret the necessity for any interference at all. But we are now convinced that in the interests of the people of Kashmir, and of the ruling family itself, it is no longer right or possible to leave the affairs in the hands of the Maharaja; and we trust that Her Majesty's Government will concur in this opinion.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

From Colonel R. PARRY NISBET to Sir H. M. DURAND, dated Sialkot, February 27, 1889.

EXTRACT.

The day before yesterday I had placed in my hands such reliable evidence as I have said invariably to those who have talked to me, would alone satisfy me of the disloyalty or utter imbecility of the present Ruler of Jammu.

This consists of a batch of thirty-four letters, in the Maharaja's own handwriting, some of which are so compromising as to leave, I submit, no course open save his removal from the State, unless the alternative theory be accepted of his being a half-witted individual, irresponsible for his own acts.

Of their authenticity I have, myself, no doubt, and they are

admitted to be in the Maharaja's own handwriting by his brother, Raja Amar Singh; besides, a mass of letters like this are not likely to be forgeries in the way one or two might be.

But, side by side with these treasonable letters in this packet, there are others in an utterly foolish strain, thereby confirming me in the conclusion I have unwillingly come to, that, though with lucid intervals of good sense and propriety, the Maharaja is utterly incapable of being left in charge of his own affairs. The gist of these other letters is that the Maharaja offers large sums of money to certain individuals on condition that they will murder, or cause to be removed, Plowden, the late Resident, his own two brothers, Ram Singh and Amar Singh, and one of the Maharanis, who, for some reason, is personally objectionable to him.

These acts are not those of a man in such possession of his intellect as would justify Government in leaving him in uncontrolled charge of the most important frontier State.

The conclusions the letters lead me to are, confirmed by certain rather extraordinary acts of the Maharaja in appointing unworthy and incapable persons to important offices of the State, even since I took over charge, without consulting the proper counsellor, or, in fact, any one at all. The thing is the Maharaja is a timid and very superstitious man at the entire mercy of a set of unscrupulous scoundrels who take advantage of his fears and imbecility to plunder the State to any extent, and there appear to me weighty reasons for advising the practical setting aside of the Maharaja's authority.

It surely is politically dangerous to leave the actual administration of this great State in the hands of an individual who may play us false at any moment, without, perhaps, appreciating the disaster that would follow, and, I believe, any steps Government may take short of annexation will be right and necessary, and generally approved by the Princes and Chiefs of India.

Under the circumstances stated I think it is necessary for me to come to Calcutta at once on hearing from you, to talk the matter fully over with you, so that you may be in a position definitely to settle the future policy of Government towards the State.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

From the RESIDENT IN KASHMIR, Sialkot, to the FOREIGN  
SECRETARY, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM.

March 8, 1889.

I start to-morrow for Calcutta. I have been last two days at Jammu, and Maharaja has himself proposed what will, I think, solve the difficulty of the existing situation of affairs. He asked to be allowed to form a new Council of State, constituted of his two brothers, with Pandits Suraj Kaul and Bhag Ram, and an English officer selected by the Government of India, the Maharaja surrendering entire control of public affairs to such Council for five years.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

From Colonel R. PARRY NISBET to Sir H. M. DURAND.

Kashmir, March 13, 1889.

I send you the original edict (with translation) and the official letter handed to me by the Maharaja of Kashmir containing His Highness's application to be relieved of the management for a time of State affairs in order to redeem the past.

I trust this voluntary offer on his part may afford, with perhaps further conditions, an acceptable way out of no doubt a very acute difficulty.

As the Government of India have carefully refrained as long as was possible from any sort of interference in the direct management in the affairs of the Kashmir State, so I think now a direct appeal to do so cannot be ignored, and that there should be no hesitation in adopting the best and most complete measure likely to bring about the reforms necessary.

Sub-enclosure.

From RAJA AMAR SINGH, President of Council and Prime Minister to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, to Colonel R. PARRY NISBET, C.I.E., Resident in Kashmir, Jammu.

March 8, 1889.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for information of yourself and the Government of India, the original Irshad of His Highness the Maharaja by which he abandons his direct management of the Jammu and Kashmir State for a term of five years, and desires that it may be performed by a Council of State consisting of his brothers, Raja Ram Singh and Raja Amar Singh, and three other members, one of whom to whom to be an English officer of special experience and qualifications selected by the Government, and other two members will be

Pandit Suraj Kaul and Pandit Bhag Ram.

2. I am directed to request that you will kindly furnish me with a certified copy of the Irshad, if you want to keep the original in your office.

3. I am further directed to request that you will move the Government of India for early nomination of an English officer to serve on the Council of State as proposed in the Irshad.

Sub-enclosure.

MY DEAR BROTHER RAJA AMAR SINGH,

In the interests of the 'State' and for better administration of the country, and with a view to remodel it, as near as possible on the English system, I hereby authorise a Council, the members of which, for period of five years, will conduct all the public affairs of the State as they think best. The members will be as follows:—

Raja Ram Singh and Raja Amar Singh,

An English member, specially selected by the Government of India on a salary Rs. 2,000 or 3,000 per month.

Rai Bahadur Suraj Kaul and Rai Bahadur Bhag Ram.

This Council will have full and sole powers in all the Public Departments of the State for a period of five years.

In the event of a vacancy occurring among the three last members during the prescribed period of five years, the Government of India will be asked to nominate a new member.

After the expiration of the said period of five years the Maharaja will have the power of re-organising the administration if he finds it necessary to do so.

This period of five years will count from the date of this edict.

The Council will not interfere in any way with the private affairs of the Maharaja.

The Maharaja will continue to draw his monthly allowance for his privy purse as hitherto, no change whatever being made.

The jagirs and other grants of immovable, movable property hitherto made by the Maharaja will hold good and the Council will not interfere.

All usual expenses connected with marriages and other family customs will be provided by the 'State'.

Of my two brothers I will myself appoint one as President of the Council.

During the said period of five years the Maharaja will not interfere and will have no voice in the administration of the public affairs of the State, but he will continue to enjoy the honorary rights and position of Maharaja.

The Council have no power to alter existing treaties without the previous approval of the Maharaja.

The Council will have no power to assign jagirs or immovable property of the State or to make new rules on such subjects without the consent of the Maharaja.

Signed and sealed by His Highness the Maharaja  
on 27th Bhagan, 1945=8th March, 1889.

Seal of the 'State'.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

INSTRUCTIONS from GOVERNMENT of INDIA to RESIDENT in  
KASHMIR, dated April 1, 1889.

EXTRACT.

I am to request you to inform the Maharaja that for a time at least he will be expected to refrain from all interference in the administration. He will retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State; but full powers of government will be vested in a Council consisting of the Maharaja's brothers and three or four officials selected by the Government of India. It is not thought desirable that one of these officials should be an Englishman. The President of the Council will be Raja Amar Singh. Besides retaining his rank and dignity the Maharaja will receive from the revenues of the State an annual sum sufficient to maintain his household in due comfort, and to defray any expenditure which may rightly devolve upon him; but he will have no power of

alienating the State revenues, and the sum placed at his disposal, though adequate, must not be extravagantly large.

I am further to request you to make the Maharaja and the Members of Council thoroughly understand that, although the Council will have full powers of administration, they will be expected to exercise those powers under the guidance of the Resident. They will take no steps of importance without consulting him, and they will follow his advice whenever it may be offered.

In communicating to the Maharaja and others concerned the decision of the Government of India, you should be careful to avoid basing that decision exclusively either upon the letters or upon the Maharaja's resignation. The letters are repudiated by the Maharaja, and as I have said before they are not of a very novel character; while on the other hand the Government of India are by no means prepared to make the present settlement a matter of compact with the Maharaja, and to accept all the conditions laid down by his edict of the 8th March, for example the five years' limit. You should therefore base the decision of the Government upon a full consideration of all the circumstances, the letters and the Maharaja's wish to retire from the control of affairs being considered amongst other things, but only as portions of a difficult and complicated case, which it has been necessary to settle on broader grounds of general policy.

You should now proceed to work out fresh proposals upon the lines I have indicated. It will be necessary in the first place to define exactly the future position of the Maharaja, the amount of his annual allowance, the expenses which it is intended to cover, the extent of his powers over his own household, and generally the conditions which he will have to conform. It will also be necessary to show the proposed constitution of the Council, the duties falling upon each of its members, and the method of transacting business. You should also ascertain the requirements of the State in the manner of subordinate officials, and should submit for the approval of the Government your view as to the steps to be taken for re-organising the administrative services. In forming those views you should remember that the Government of India has no desire to turn Kashmir into the semblance of a British district, or to place all administrative posts in the hands of Punjabi foreigners. The want of good native officials makes it necessary to import some trained men from the outside, but the number so imported should be kept as low as possible, and your object should be to form with their help a class of Kashmiri officials who will be capable hereafter of administering the State themselves. It is altogether against the wishes and policy of the Government to interfere unnecessarily with the customs and traditions of a Native State, or to force upon it the precise methods of administration obtaining in British territory. Administrative efficiency is not the only object to be attained in such cases, nor, indeed, the principal object.

The Government of India will be glad to know, as soon as possible, the true facts as to the financial position of Kashmir. A

separate report should be submitted on this point, and in submitting it you should inquire into the question of the jagirs and allowances given by the Maharaja, and should make proposals as to the manner in which such grants should be treated.

Finally, I am to request that the new arrangements may be introduced as quietly as possible. There should be no ceremonial, and nothing that can be regarded as the public degradation of the Maharaja, who should simply retire from the conduct of affairs. It is desirable that the change should attract no more attention than necessary, and above all, that it should not be regarded as the punishment of a great native Chief for proved disloyalty to the Crown. Rumours to the effect that the Maharaja has been convicted of treasonable practices have already been in circulation, and such rumours do harm both in India and elsewhere.

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No. 8.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA to the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

MY LORD MARQUIS, India Office, London, May 24, 1889.

From the papers transmitted with your Excellency's letter, dated 3rd April, 1889, I learn that the further opportunity which was given to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir of proving whether he was capable of conducting the administration of his State has once more established his unfitness for the position of ruler.

2. You have, therefore, decided to accept the Maharaja's voluntary resignation, and to effect a thorough re-organisation of the Kashmir Government.

3. In accordance with this determination, the administration will be entrusted to a Council, consisting of the Maharaja's brothers and certain selected Native officials in the British service. This Council will have full powers, subject to the condition that they will take no important step without consulting the Resident, and that they will act upon the Resident's advice whenever it may be offered. The Maharaja will be excluded from all interference with public affairs, but will retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State, and will receive from the State revenues an adequate, but not extravagant, allowance for the maintenance of his household and any other necessary expenditure.

4. Her Majesty's Government fully approve your proceedings, and share your conviction that in the interests of the people of Kashmir, and of the ruling family itself, it has become impossible to leave the control of affairs in the hands of the Maharaja.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) CROSS.

From the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA to the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, dated Simla, July 26, 1889.

## EXTRACT.

In continuation of our despatch of the 3rd April, and in further reference to the condition of affairs in Kashmir, we have the honour to enclose copies of

Demi-official letter from Colonel Nisbet, dated the 19th April, 1889, and enclosure.	
From His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, dated the 14th May, 1889.	
To His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, dated the 28th June, 1889.	
Report of the Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu by Mr. A. Wingate, C.I.E.	

the papers noted in the margin.

We take this opportunity of expressing the satisfaction which it has given to us to be made aware that the course which has been adopted in dealing with this question has met with your Lordship's approval. The events which have taken place since our decision was arrived at have not led us to modify in any way the opinions which we formed at the time. The Maharaja's allegation that the edict of the 8th March last was signed by him under compulsion is, we believe, entirely unjustified by the facts of the case. The circumstances under which His Highness requested that he might be relieved from active participation in the duties of government are set forth in detail in paragraph 8 of the Viceroy's letter of the 28th June, 1889.

We have, on the other hand, no doubt that His Highness's action in requesting the permission of the Resident to retire from the management of public affairs for a term of years, may have been due to fear of the consequences which he, at that time, apprehended from the discovery of the correspondence, of which copies have been already laid before your Lordship.

Now that His Highness has ascertained that the action of the Government of India has been justified upon other grounds, and that the correspondence in question has been treated with comparative indifference, it is quite possible that His Highness regrets the somewhat precipitate proposal which he made to the Resident. The fact that he should have preferred such a request, and immediately receded from it, affords, in our opinion, further proof of the slight amount of reliance which can be placed upon his character as a ruler.

We are glad to report that we are receiving from the Resident satisfactory accounts of the progress which is being made by the new Council in improving the administration of the State. A large portion of the arrears due to the army have already been paid. We need scarcely dwell on the danger which was likely to arise to the public safety from the existence of a large and ill-disciplined military force, which had, for some months past, been allowed to remain without the pay which was due to it.

We learn that, in the same way, heavy arrears of salaries have been made good in all the departments, a condition indispensable to honest and diligent service of a kind which for many years past

has, we fear, been too rarely rendered by Kashmir officials. Public works, the progress of which was seriously threatened owing to want of funds, are being actively pushed on. Much unnecessary expenditure has been curtailed, and the Resident expresses his belief that if the next harvest should prove to be a good one, and suitable measures be taken for the recovery of the land revenue, the close of the year will see the establishment of a financial equilibrium in the accounts of the State.

It is in our opinion scarcely possible to overrate the importance of the results likely to be produced by a period of upright and efficient administration in a country circumstanced as is Kashmir, and with its antecedents. It has been the painful duty of the Government of India from time to time to call the attention of the Secretary of State to the chronic misgovernment to which the people of Kashmir have been subjected by the present Maharaja and his predecessors. It had become evident before the accession of the present Maharaja that the only hope for the State lay in a vigorous attempt to remove the most flagrant of the abuses under which, in spite of the great natural resources of the country, its population had steadily dwindled, and its people had become impoverished to the point of chronic scarcity. At the time when the death of the late Maharaja was imminent, the Government of India entertained the gravest doubts whether the present Maharaja, then heir-apparent to the throne, was fit to succeed to it.

The circumstances under which it was determined to give him an opportunity of proving his fitness are within your Lordship's knowledge. Our experience of him has shown that neither his abilities nor his inclinations are likely to bring about any appreciable improvement in the condition of the people committed to his charge.

In this connection we may refer your Lordship to the report of the Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu, submitted by Mr. A. Wingate, C.I.E., C.S., Settlement Officer, to the Maharaja in 1888. This report, of which a copy is attached to this despatch, contains abundant evidence to show that most of the abuses continued to prevail unchecked. Under the system of assessment in force the cultivator of the soil had, as Mr. Wingate points out, been pressed down to the condition of a coolie cultivating the State property at a bare subsistence allowance, while the population continued to diminish, and the former occupants of the land were being steadily ousted from its possession, which was passing into that of the official classes, who have been enriched at the public expense. This transference of the land from the cultivating to the non-cultivating classes had, in Mr. Wingate's opinion, been proceeding with increased rapidity since the death of the late Maharaja, from which date the central authority appears to have become weaker. The artisan classes, whose skill and industry are well known, appear to have shared the ruin of the cultivating classes.

We have thought it our duty to dwell briefly upon this subject, because the supersession of the Maharaja appears to have been regarded in many quarters as the result of a selfish desire on the



part of the Government of India to extend its influence in Kashmir, and possibly to prepare the way for the ultimate annexation of the State. We have, we trust, said enough to satisfy your Lordship that the consideration which has had most weight with us has been the responsibility, from which we cannot divest ourselves, of securing for the people of Kashmir a form of government less intolerable than that to which they have been subjected for many years past. The circumstances under which the destinies of Kashmir were handed over by the British Government for political considerations to an alien dynasty, increase, in our opinion, our responsibility for the condition of the country, and impose upon us an obligation, which we cannot ignore, of taking effectual steps in order to terminate the long period of suffering, mismanagement, and wasted opportunities through which the State has passed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

From Colonel PARRY NISBET to Sir H. M. DURAND.

(Demi-Official.)

Kashmir Residency, Srinagar,

April 19, 1889.

After arrival here on the 13th, I paid a visit of ceremony on the 15th to His Highness the Maharaja, which he returned on the 16th, but I refrained from discussing any business at these interviews.

On the 17th instant, accompanied by Captain Ramsay, I proceeded to the palace at 11 a.m., and met His Highness the Maharaja in private Durbar. Those present besides the Maharaja were his brothers, Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh, the two members of Council, Pandit Suraj Kaul and Pandit Bhag Ram, Diwan Janki Prasad, an old official of the State, and Sardar Bup Singh, Governor of Kashmir. I informed His Highness the Maharaja without comment of the orders of the Government of India, dated 1st April, 1889, and that he might be under no misapprehension, I, at the same time, handed to his Prime Minister, Raja Amar Singh, these orders in writing in the form of a letter, copy of which is annexed, as an answer to his No. 159, dated 8th March, 1882, which is in the correspondence.

His Highness the Maharaja said—'I will consider the letter and return an answer.' After some few minutes conversation the interview closed. In leading me down the Durbar room the Maharaja again said—'I will think it over and give you an answer to what you have told me.' I replied kindly 'an answer is not required, as what I have communicated to you are the orders of the Government. I will always come and give you any further explanation you may wish,' and we parted. I subsequently repeated to the brothers of the Maharaja that they should let him thoroughly understand that the communications made to him were the definite orders of the Government of India, which it was not necessary for him to answer.

On the 18th instant there was a first meeting of the new Council.

## Sub-enclosure.

From the RESIDENT in Kashmir to RAJA AMAR SINGH,  
Prime Minister, Kashmir.

April 17, 1889.

WITH reference to your No. 159, dated 8th March, 1889, I beg to inform you that the letter with its enclosure was laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, who, after full consideration of the circumstances and the general condition of affairs in the Kashmir State for a long time past, has ordered me to inform His Highness the Maharaja that for a time at least he will be expected to refrain from all interference in the administration. He will retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State, but full powers of government will be vested in a Council consisting of the Maharaja's brothers and three or four officials selected by the Government of India. It is not thought desirable that one of these officials should be an Englishman. Besides retaining his rank and dignity, the Maharaja will receive from the revenues of the State an annual sum sufficient to maintain his household in due comfort and to defray any expenditure that may rightly devolve upon him, but he will have no power of alienating the State revenues, and the sum placed at his disposal, though adequate, will not be extravagantly large.

His Highness the Maharaja and the Members of Council should thoroughly understand that, although the Council will have full powers of administration, they will be expected to exercise those powers under the guidance of the British Resident. They will take no step of importance without consulting him, and they will follow his advice whenever it may be offered.

Such are the orders of the Government of India, and, on my own part, I beg you will assure His Highness that it will be my endeavour to assist in carrying them out in the way I trust that may be most conducive to the happiness and benefit of His Highness and the State.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9:

From His Highness the MAHARAJA OF KASHMIR to the MARQUESS  
OF LANDSDOWNE.

Kashmir, May 14, 1889.

It is after great suffering and distress, and undergoing greatest contempt and taunt at the hands of my inferiors, that I have, with fear, decided to send the special message to your Excellency per bearer. Necessity and feelings of loyalty have obliged me to seek advice from your Excellency and take shelter under your Lordship's fatherly care. As advised by my late-lamented father from my very childhood, my heart is full of loyalty to the paramount power, and I am always ready to do all that can be desired by the blessed Government. Your Excellency is authorised to consider me as one of your Lordship's most faithful and humble servants. When my late father always considered it an honour to serve the Government

loyally and faithfully, I should, and I do, consider it greater honour still to follow his example. All my country, treasury, army, even my life and blood, are at the disposal of the British Government and our Mother-Sovereign, the Queen-Empress.

I know very well that I have been extremely misrepresented before the Government of India through sources which had a show of reliableness, but this, alas! I have come too late to know, when my internal enemies, who are envious of my position, have succeeded to drive me to a very mean and pitiable position, and I implore your Excellency to release and save me from it, taking my de-titute position in consideration. The recent allegations brought against me about secret correspondence with Russia, conspiring with Dalip Singh, attempt to poison the British Resident, Mr. T. C. Plowden, and lots of stupid stories, did not affect my mind in the least, for I was under the impression that some special officer will be deputed by your Excellency's Government to inquire fully into the false charges, and thus I shall get the best opportunity of disclosing everything fully, and, through this source, be able to bring all facts to the notice of your Excellency, and have my secret enemies brought to book through your Excellency's kind sympathy. But to my greatest pleasure no notice was taken of those false letters, and all other stupid stories were taken as nonsense by the supreme power. After this was over, the following communication was sent by Colonel R. Parry Nesbit, Resident in Kashmir, to Raja Amar Singh, Prime Minister :—

'From the RESIDENT in KASHMIR to RAJA AMAR SINGH,  
'Prime Minister.

'Kashmir, April 17, 1889.

'SIR,

'WITH reference to your number 159, dated 8th March, 1889, I beg to inform you that the letter, with its enclosure, was laid before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, who, after full consideration of the circumstances and the general condition of affairs in the Kashmir State for a long time past, has ordered me to inform His Highness the Maharaja that, for a time at least, he will be expected to refrain from all interference in the administration. He will retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State; but full powers of government will be vested in a Council consisting of the Maharaja's brothers and three or four officials selected by the Government of India. It is not thought desirable that one of these officials should be an Englishman. Besides retaining his rank and dignity, the Maharaja will receive from the revenue of the State an annual sum sufficient to maintain his household in due comfort and to defray any expenditure that may rightly devolve upon him, but he will have no power of alienating the State revenues, and the sum placed at his disposal, though adequate, will not be extravagantly large.

'2. His Highness the Maharajah and the Members of the Council should thoroughly understand that, although the Council will have full powers of administration, they will be expected

to exercise these powers under the guidance of the British Resident. They will take no step of importance without consulting him; they will follow his advice whenever it may be offered.

'3. Such are the orders of the Government of India, and, on my own part, I beg you will assure His Highness that it will be my endeavour to assist in carrying them out in the way I trust that may be most conducive to the happiness and benefit of His Highness and the State.

'I remain,

'Yours truly,

'(Signed) R. PARRY NISBET.'

And now your Excellency can judge what my position at present is, and how much I am slighted in the Durbar, my enemies staring with pride and triumph into my eyes very often and showing all possible contempt.

My chief enemy, and in the present circumstances enemy of the State, who has taken a fancy to become the ruler of the Kashmir State, and who envies my position since long time, is, I am sorry to say, my own youngest brother, Raja Amar Singh. It is only now that I have found him out in his true colours, and all doubts as to his ill-motive have been removed. Since the very day I succeeded to the throne, he caused to set afloat all sorts of rumours against me about my incapacity, insanity, &c., &c.

Many a time he was directly caught in conspiring against me. He encouraged, pecuniarily and otherwise, people connected with the press with the only object of their writing against my person, vilifying me, and causing to circulate the worst rumours against me. Having convenient access to Europeans, &c., &c., and the Residents, to which I never objected, having no suspicion regarding his doings, he filled their ears, as often as possible, with such black stories about me, directly and indirectly, thinking very well that his doing so will, in the long run, set the Government of India against me, and he will be proclaimed Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir territories in that case. To almost every Resident, and specially to Colonel R. Parry Nisbet, he appeared to be the most reliable and intimately connected informant, and all should have believed in what he said; and I have every reason to believe that all rumours which reached the Government against me must have been through this, and this source alone.

Being disgusted with this unworthy conduct, and having ample proofs to silence him in his very face, I twice resolved to order him to remove himself to his jagir, and have nothing to do in the capital. On both these occasions, being informed of my resolution against him, he entered my room, where was no one except him and myself, shedding childish tears, throwing his turban on my feet, imploring for mercy, promising all goodwill and hearty loyalty for the future, and asking for pardon as my dear brother, humblest slave. After all, he was my youngest brother, very dear to me; his lovely young face is still liked by me, and on both these occasions my blood was naturally warm for him, and I was completely moved by his entreaties, and pardoned him after all. To prove to him that my

heart was quite in sympathy with him—and I truly loved him as my dear brother—I, at his request, bestowed upon him the rich jagir of Bhadderwa, in exchange to the comparatively poor Bisoli which he had got during the time of my late father, and again made him Prime Minister of all. But, as was known afterwards, he was never slow in conspiring against me, even then. Regaining my confidence twice, and knowing I was quite confident and entirely at ease from his side, he possessed redoubled power and influence in the State, which is natural, and every State official was made to believe and look upon him as my powerful assistant and adviser. All these advantages he brought in force against me for the gain of his one sole object in view above mentioned, and he was able enough to create a strong party of his own among my officials, giving them all hopes of future success and prosperity, in case they remained faithful only to him and join with him in overthrowing me and mine. This promise he has fulfilled now in promoting those who joined him, and degrading those, my sincerely faithful servants, who stood by me amidst all temptations.

Colonel R. Parry Nisbet, as soon as he was installed as British Resident at my Court, I looked upon him as my safe friend, and thought that my difficulties were at an end, because I knew him to be one of the sincere friends of my father and good supporter to myself. I must also confess that for some little time in the beginning he was my sympathiser to some extent, but it is very difficult to say what made him entirely change his motives towards me and to fall in the very clutches of the very same secret and powerful enemy of mine, Raja Amar Singh. This sudden change must be as astonishing to all others as it was to me, so it is the most difficult task to investigate fully into the cause of this sudden change of his policy.

To overcome such difficulties as I was labouring under, at the hands of powerful intriguers who were using all sorts of influence within and without, I asked for the loan of two well-experienced officers from the Government of India to act as my councillors, and I must express my deep and heart-felt gratitude for the kindness with which the Government of India conceded to my request. But excellent men as these were, they also changed their former attitude at once as soon as the Resident changed his, and I believe that they must have done so naturally, as they are more dependent upon the good-will of the Representative of the British Government, under whose employment they have spent almost all their life, and to whom they owe all they have got, than myself, whom they are only lent to, so I was soon being made powerless.

At this juncture the brewing plot of the much-talked-of-letters, alleged to have been written by me, was brought into force. Almost all the rumours about the source from which they are purported to have reached the Resident are false, and without any foundation whatever. Solely Raja Amar Singh was at the bottom of the whole thing. These letters are nothing but most daring forgeries, and there was none more daring than my blood relation,

the Raja Amar Singh. I have every reason to thank heartily your Excellency's Government for considering and treating them beneath notice, &c. This news, when it reached Jammu, gave much joy to all but to my brother Raja Amar Singh, and his party fellows, as, for instance, Sardar Roop Singh, the present Governor of Hakim-ila of Kashmir, Diwan Janki Prasad, his Secretary, ex-Governor of Hakimala, Wazir Shibsaran, and Diwan Shibsaran, his own Prime Minister, and who has full power to do anything in the State, and many others to whom it gave excessive pain. I am sure, if the Government of India would have required witnesses, Raja Amar Singh had been the first to swear against me. He was even ready to accompany Colonel Nisbet to Calcutta to complete my disaster for ever. When he came to inform me of his intention, made according to order of Colonel Nisbet, to leave for Calcutta with the Resident at his desire, I questioned him as to what opinion he expressed about the letters before the Resident. In reply he admitted to have said only that the etymological letters resemble those of the Maharaja's handwriting, but the signatures are not quite so. Being startled and heartily pained at this his reply, I simply told him, "All right, Raja Amar Singhjee. You can go to Calcutta with the Resident, if you like, but this was not expected from you. In your admitted deposition you have left nothing to destroy me." On the other day he, I believe, with the consultation of the Resident, decided not to go, and told me—"As your Highness is not favourable to the proposal I won't go, not to displease your Highness".

With the information of these letters, and with the full confidence and strength of being supported by my own brother and his now strong party, Colonel R. Parry Nisbet dashed into my room at a fixed time and brought such a great and many-sided pressure in all solemnity and seriousness that I was obliged to write what was desired, rather demanded by him, in order to relieve myself for the moment, having full faith that your Excellency's Government will not accept such a one-sided view of the case, and that full opportunity will be given to me of defending myself. I never admitted the genuineness of these letters, and even an ordinary sense can find out that I could never write such nonsense as the letters are purported to contain. Do I not know the dangers of the change of Government? Do I not understand the value of a peaceful Government presiding over us all? Do I not know what security all the Native Princes of India now are enjoying from internal and external dangers? Do I not understand that my dominions are most safe under the benign British Government? Do I not understand that what then on earth can induce me to correspond with Russia? Who is in Russia to read Dogra Vernacular? Having been in possession of high honours and all regards from the British Government, and having got everything from being loyal to it, what more can I expect, or aspire to get, from a foreign power, where tyranny and despotism are well known to all? As to Dalip Singh (God forbid), if he ever happens to come here, who is in a more dangerous position to suffer from his wrath? That I would conspire

with him, is to hit the axe at the very foot of my own existence. About the attempt to poison Mr. T. C. Plowden, I think Mr. Plowden himself must be the best witness. My administration in those days was vested in the Council composed of Diwan Lachman Das, President, Raja Ram Singh, Military Member, Raja Amar Singh, member of all the civil affairs; and let them all sincerely say if they know anything about it. Raja Amar Singh, who was the chief adviser and general controller of all affairs, and under whose cunning guidance Diwan Lachman Das used to act unknowingly, may support this charge—I cannot say but none other, not even one single soul in the whole State will ever stand a witness to this charge. Moreover, who is the fool in the world to commit such base conspiracies to writing? Suppose there was such foul conspiracy on my part, would not the whole thing have been managed orally? But I assure your Excellency with all sacredness that such an idea never occurred to me, in dream even. Although your Excellency's Government treated the letters as *beneath notice*, my cruel enemies have got the fullest advantage that they expected. They are now full conquerors over my head, and under their feet trample me. What is my position now? Simply that of a dead body: even worse than that, for I am taunted every moment by some sort of disgrace and disregard or other. These inferiors and traitors, who only yesterday showed me every respect and bowed down before me, pass me now with contemptuous smile, and I constantly bear the destruction and degradation of all those, my faithful and old hereditary servants, who stood by me. Of course a dead body is unconscious of all these troubles, of which I am unfortunately not.

In his communication, dated 17th April, 1889, to Raja Amar Singh, above quoted in full, the Resident says: "His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, after full consideration of the circumstances and the general condition of affairs in the Kashmir State for a long time past, has ordered me to inform His Highness the Maharaja that, for a time at least, he will be expected to refrain from all interference in the administration. He will retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State, &c., &c." Now, to put it very plainly, I have never, up to this time, enjoyed complete independence of action in State affairs. Under such circumstances it has been very cruel indeed to hold me personally responsible for any maladministration and to punish me severely as a criminal. By the above order of your Excellency it is plain enough to understand that matters have been so represented as to prove that only *my* interference has brought about the state of affairs for which the Government of India has been obliged to pass such strictures upon me; whereas the case is quite the contrary. The man whose disloyal interference is the chief cause of all mismanagement, and who should have been severely punished, has got not only scot-free, but has been placed over my head, enjoying perfect satisfaction of having been successful in his wicked design. Had there been any other loyal and faithful Prime Minister of mine than Raja Amar Singh, he would have been expected to send in a suitable reply to

the Resident's communication and saved me from the deadly disgrace which I have been subjected to; but my brother, Raja Amar Singh, quietly submitted to it, and was extremely satisfied to see me thus disgraced, as it was really his own hearty intention to see me so.

What rank and dignity can I retain under such circumstances? My condition is worse than a deposed ruler, inasmuch as he is taken out to some other place where he does not witness the most insulting scenes. And as regards the stipend that I am allowed at the mercy of the Council and the Resident, such is given even to the treacherous enemies of the British, who massacred their regiments and are now imprisoned or kept safe as political prisoners in the hills. Certainly, if the alleged letters had been proved genuine still no worse fate would have befallen me. The present Council, not content with reducing me to such a state of distress, have now fallen upon all those who remained faithful to me. Not to go into full details, I will only say that Pandit Mahanandjee, Governor of Jammu, Pundit Zankak, Assistant Governor of Kashmir, Pundit Shikak, Officer of Timber Department, Dussoundhiram, an honest Chief Judge of Jammu, and Pundit Paralal, officer of deciding the old balance accounts, and many others, have all been dismissed, with exception of Dussoundhiram, by one stroke of pen, on one plea and pretence or other, but really simply because they were sore in the eyes of Raja Amar Singh, and did not bear to his illegal recommendation and stood on my side. Their places are now being filled with such men who are notorious for their show of contempt to me.

If your Excellency really wants to make me responsible for the administration of the State (and I am very glad and quite ready to take such responsibility over my head), I would ask to be made responsible ruler. In spite of what has been represented against me about my incapacity, etc., etc., I would ask your Excellency to give me a fair trial in order to see what I am capable of doing for the furtherance of the interests of the Supreme Government and prosperity of my State. From three to five years' time, as I think it quite sufficient for me to put everything into order from the date of holding responsibility, provided I am allowed full strength and independence to choose my own councillors and ministers, and British Resident, instead of throwing obstacles in my way like Colonel R. Parry Nisbet, supports and strengthens my hands. This just Resident should be chosen by the Government of India. I shall always be glad and ready to seek his advice and sympathy, but in all matters concerning the State, &c., the Resident will have to consult me solely. For the present I would like to take Raja Ram Singh, Pundit Suraj Kaul, and Pundit Bhag Ram as my councillors (and remove Raja Amar Singh to his jagir), with full powers to add or diminish any one. If after a fair trial being given to me, I do not see everything (excepting the Settlement Department, which is under the guidance of Mr. Lawrence, and which will not be settled within five years) right, and am found not to rule to the satisfaction of the Supreme Government, and my people within the prescribed time, your Excellency's Government is at liberty to do anything



that may be considered advisable. In case this liberty is not allowed to me by the Supreme Government, and I have to remain in my present most miserable condition, I would most humbly ask your Excellency to summon me before you—and I will be most happy to obey such summons—and shoot me through the heart with your Excellency's hands, and thus at once relieve an unfortunate prince from unbearable misery, contempt, and disgrace for ever.

Awaiting your Excellency's commands, &c.

*P.S.*—The papers on which I write do not bear my official seal, and the reason is that my English Office is in the hands of the Prime Minister, Raja Amar Singh. The English clerks have been detained by him, by the advice of the Resident, to write for me, and thus I write in my own handwriting, and do not think it advisable to use the sealed papers. I hope your Excellency will excuse me for my bad handwriting. The bearer of this petition is authorized to answer any inquiries or refer them to me.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

From His Excellency the VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA  
to His Highness the MAHARAJA OF KASHMIR.

Simla, June 28, 1889.

I have received your Highness's letter of the 14th May. It was brought to Simla by a person, deputed by your Highness for that purpose, who appears to have taken advantage of your confidence in order to publish in the newspapers part of a confidential document which should not have been made known to the public at such a moment. I shall always be glad to hear from you should you desire to make me aware of your views, and I hope that you will, in future, forward your letters to me by the ordinary post, through which they will be safely delivered without the risk of any such indiscretion as that which has taken place in the present instance.

It is satisfactory to me to learn from your Highness that you are loyally disposed towards the paramount power, and that it is your desire to be guided by my advice. I shall give it to you frankly, and without any attempt to conceal my thoughts.

Your Highness has stated in your letter that your conduct has lately been completely misrepresented by your secret enemies; that Colonel Parry Nisbet, the British Resident in Kashmir, has dealt unjustly with you, and that your chief enemy has been your youngest brother, Raja Amar Singh. You suggest that the letter to Raja Amar Singh, signed and sealed by your Highness on the 8th March of this year, was written without due consideration, and in consequence of pressure put upon you by the Resident; you urge that you have never enjoyed sufficient independence of action in regard to the affairs of your State to enable you to give satisfactory evidence of your ability as a ruler; you beg that you may now be given a further trial, and, with this object, you virtually recede from the proposals contained in the letter to Raja Amar

express, in the strongest language, your inability to submit patiently to the position in which you now find yourself.

I must point out to your Highness that the decision of the Government of India to relieve you of an active share in the government of your State was arrived at not only in consequence of recent events, but of circumstances which must be within your Highness's recollection, and which occurred some time before my arrival in this country. During the last years of the administration of my predecessor, the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, extremely unfavourable reports had been received by the Government of India of the manner in which the affairs of Kashmir were administered by your Highness. The finances of the State were in disorder, a disorder which, there could be little doubt, was increased by your own extravagance, while your Highness had surrounded yourself by persons of the worst reputation, whose influence over you had produced the most unfortunate results. These complaints, which were made not only by the then Resident, but also by certain of the Princes and Sardars of the Kashmir State, were borne out by papers which were placed in the hands of the Government of India. These contained, amongst other matters, ample evidence to show that you were squandering the resources of your State in a most reckless and improvident manner, and in the encouragement of the most unworthy persons.

At this time the Government of India anxiously considered the course which it should adopt in reference to your Highness, and its decision was conveyed to you in the kharita of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, dated the 25th July of last year. In this letter Lord Dufferin pointed out to you the impropriety of your dismissal of your Prime Minister, Diwan Lachman Das, who had been appointed after consultation with the Government of India without reference to that Government. He strongly urged upon your Highness the necessity of a careful investigation of the condition of the finances of Kashmir, and of the executive and judicial services, and he intimated to you that he was prepared to accept, with certain modifications, a scheme which had been proposed on behalf of your Highness for the formation of a reformed Council, of which you were to be the President. The constitution of this Council appeared to Lord Dufferin to be open to certain objections, but, in deference to your Highness's wishes, he determined not to press these. He, moreover, expressed his readiness to supply you with a certain number of trained native officials who might be of assistance to you in strengthening your administration.

About this time, in order to meet your Highness's wishes, advantage was taken of the appointment of Mr. Plowden to another post, in order to appoint, as Resident in Kashmir, a gentleman well known to you, and regarded by you with feelings of friendship and confidence.

Looking back at these events, it is surely not too much to say

trial, such as that for which you now so earnestly ask. I am, however, constrained to tell your Highness distinctly that the results of that trial appear to have been of a most unsatisfactory kind. In the spring of this year my attention was called to the documents referred to in your Highness's letter; many of these had every appearance of being genuine, and they have, moreover, a striking resemblance to those other papers, of which I have already spoken, and which came into the possession of the Government of India at a previous time. Your Highness is correct in expressing your belief that the action subsequently taken by my Government was not justified merely by the disclosures contained in these letters. Even if the whole of these had been unquestionably genuine, I could not bring myself to believe that they had been written deliberately, or with a full appreciation of their meaning. There were, however, other circumstances which the Government of India could not do otherwise than take into consideration. The reports from the new Resident of the manner in which your Highness had administered the State had been not less unfavourable than those submitted, from time to time, by Mr. Plowden. Notwithstanding the ample resources of your State, your treasury was empty; corruption and disorder prevailed in every department and every office; your Highness was still surrounded by low and unworthy favourites, and the continued misgovernment of your State was becoming, every day, a more serious source of anxiety.

This however was not all. A meeting had taken place between your Highness and Colonel Parry Nisbet at Jammu on the 7th March, and upon that occasion your Highness had distinctly stated that it was your wish to have no more to do with public affairs, and had asked the Resident whether he was prepared to assume, in conjunction with a Council, the management of the State. You repeated several times to the Resident that you were tired of the trouble which had been occasioned to you by official affairs, and that you would prefer to go away and to live in peace privately. At the termination of the interview you stated that you would send your brother, the Prime Minister, Raja Amar Singh, to discuss the matter further with Colonel Parry Nisbet, and Raja Amar Singh, on the following morning, assured the Resident that you had made up your mind to give up interference with public affairs during the next few years. A further conference between yourself and the Resident took place on the following day. You still adhered to the language which you had used on the previous day, only stipulating that the Council was not to interfere with your private affairs. In the afternoon the Prime Minister brought to Colonel Parry Nesbit your edict constituting a Council of State, which was to include an English member, and which was to have 'full and sole powers in all the public departments of the State for a period of five years,' during which it was provided that 'the Maharaja will not interfere, and will have no voice in the administration of the public affairs of the State, but he will continue to enjoy the honorary

rights and position of Maharaja.' This proposal, emanating directly from your Highness, could not be treated by my Government otherwise than as embodying your deliberate intentions and wishes; nor can I admit that you are now justified in describing the edict to which I have referred as having been hurriedly written under pressure from Colonel Parry Nisbet, who, your Highness will remember, throughout these conversations, expressly pointed out to you that it would not be practicable for him to undertake the management of the State in the manner which you had suggested.

When your letter to Raja Amar Singh was laid before the Government of India, I felt that, in view of the circumstances which I have recapitulated, no other course was open to me than to accept in substance the proposal which you had made. In so doing, however, some important modifications were made in the original scheme. Amongst these I may mention my refusal to take advantage of your suggestion that an Englishman should be appointed to serve upon the new Council; such a step seemed to me to be unnecessary, and I determined not to take it. Again, instead of requiring that the new arrangement should last for at least five years, it was stipulated that it should continue for a time, of which the length was not specified. I may also remind you of the consideration shown to your Highness by the stipulation that your Highness should receive a suitable income from the State revenues, and that your rank and dignity should be reserved to you. That this has been done, has been amply proved by the respect shown to you by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the occasion of his recent visit to your State.

What I have written will show to your Highness how it has come to pass that the Government of India felt itself obliged to introduce these changes for a time into the Government of Kashmir. The arrangement was arrived at after careful consideration, and with a full knowledge of facts, of which your Highness is well aware. I may add that, by last week's mail from England, I have received a letter from the Secretary of State for India, informing me that Her Majesty's Government fully approve the measures taken by the Government of India in April last, and share their conviction that, in the interests of the people of Kashmir, and of the ruling family itself, it has become impossible to leave the control of affairs in your Highness's hands.

It is idle to contend that all this has been the result of a conspiracy against you, in which the Resident, your brother, and the officials of the State, have all had a part. In your letter to me, you admit that you knew the Resident to be "one of the sincere friends of my father, and a good supporter of myself". You had yourself designated your brother, Raja Amar Singh, towards whom you felt the greatest affection, for the office of Prime Minister. The officers lent to you by the Government of India were, you tell me, excellent men, and they were supplied to you at your own request. If, however, I am to accept the statements

now made by your Highness, it would be necessary for me to believe that Colonel Parry Nisbet, Raja Amar Singh, and the officers referred to, must all of them have changed their nature as well as their disposition towards your Highness within a few months. All these men were, I believe, ready to be your friends, but they have found that your conduct in public and private life was such as to render it impossible for them to co-operate cordially with you.

What I have said has reference to the past. For the future, let me earnestly entreat your Highness to show to the people of Kashmir, as well as to the Government of India, by bearing in a dignified manner the loss of power which you have sustained, and above all, by not associating yourself with local intrigues and conspiracies, or attempts to obstruct the Government, that you have not entirely lost the qualities of a wise and prudent ruler. The settlement announced in Colonel Parry Nisbet's letter of the 17th April to the Prime Minister is, as I have already pointed out to you, not necessarily a permanent one. Time will, however, be necessary if the finances of the State are to be restored to order, and the results of past maladministration effectually removed. Until this has been done, the present arrangement must certainly remain in force. When these good results have been achieved, it may be possible to give your Highness a larger share in the control of the public affairs of Kashmir. Much would, in such a case, depend upon your own conduct in the meanwhile. You cannot, therefore, govern yourself too cautiously, or be too careful in selecting your associates and confidants.

I would also ask you to inform Raja Ram Singh, who has, I understand, accompanied your Highness to Jammu, that the Government of India cannot regard with indifference his continued absence from the Council of State. He holds the important post of Commander-in-Chief in charge of the Military Department, and his failure to attend to the business of this cannot do otherwise than produce the most serious results. Unless therefore, he returns shortly to Srinagar and resumes the discharge of his duties, it will be necessary to make some arrangement for the transfer of those duties to other hands.

I will add only one word to what I have said above. Should your Highness at any time desire to address me in connection with this, or other matters, it will always be agreeable to me to learn your wishes, or your opinions; and should you, at the present time, seek an opportunity of hearing from my own lips my views in regard to these questions, I shall at any convenient time be ready to receive you and to converse with you in a friendly and confidential spirit.

## Enclosure 4 in No. 9.

PRELIMINARY REPORT of SETTLEMENT OPERATIONS in KASHMIR and  
JAMMU by A. WINGATE, Esq., C.S., SETTLEMENT OFFICER.

From A. WINGATE, Esq., C.S., Settlement Officer, Kashmir, to His  
Highness the MAHARAJA OF KASHMIR AND JAMMU.

Srinagar, August 1, 1888.

- Para. 1.—History of Appointment.  
 " 2.—Preliminary arrangements.  
 " 3.—Character of former survey.  
 " 4.—Rejection of the previous measurement.  
 " 5.—System of measurement adopted.  
 " 6.—Area measured in first month.  
 " 7.—Local Weights and measures.  
 " 8.—Forms of Settlement Records.  
 " 9.—Details of Establishment.  
 " 10.— " " Expenditure.  
 " 11.—Budget estimate of current season.  
 " 12.—Remarks on the above.  
 " 13.—Estimated cost of measuring the Kashmir Valley.  
 " 14.—Probable maximum area of Kashmir Valley.  
 " 15.— " minimum area of Kashmir Valley.  
 " 16.— " area of measurement.  
 " 17.— " average out-turn per measurer.  
 " 18.— " out-turn and work each season.  
 " 19.—Estimated cost of the settlement.  
 " 20 and 21.—Classification of lands.  
 " 22.—Remarks on the grouping of villages.  
 " 23.—Difficulty of ascertaining current rates of assessment.  
 " 24.—Crop experiments.  
 " 25.—Rice cultivation.  
 " 26.—Famines, etc.—Variations in the season affect the harvest; for example, a wet spring would injure the young crop, or insufficient snows would diminish the water supply, but famine appears only to be caused by heavy rain and cold at the time of ripening or reaping, and fortunately this is a rare occurrence. It is, however, always important that the *shali* crop should be cut and garnered with the utmost expedition, and any revenue system which tends to delay that operation must in critical season seriously aggravate the disaster. The *rabi* crops not infrequently suffer from insufficient spring showers, but, from a famine standpoint, wheat, barley, and the like are of little importance.

in the following history of the seasons only those calamities are noticed which seriously affect the population :—

A.D.	Samwat.	
1815 ..	1872 ..	Population estimated at 8,00,000.
1824 ..	1881 ..	} Severe earthquake, followed by cholera.
1828 ..	1885 ..	
1831 } ..	{ 1838	} Severe famine, caused by heavy rain in the autumn.
1833 } ..	{ to ..	
1835 ..	1892 ..	Population estimated at 2,00,000.
1838 ..	1895 ..	Floods.
1842 } ..	{ 1899	} Cholera.
1843 } ..	{ or ..	
1857 ..	1914 ..	Ditto.
1859 } ..	{ 1916	} Scarcity owing to short water-supply.
1860 } ..	{ to ..	
1865 ..	1922 ..	Floods.
1869 ..	1926 ..	Ditto.
1871 ..	1928 ..	Ditto.
1872 ..	1929 ..	Cholera.
1873 ..	1930 ..	Population estimated at 5,00,000.
1875 ..	1932 ..	Poor harvest.
1877 } ..	{ 1934	} Severe famine, caused by heavy rain from the end of September, 1877, followed by cholera.
1879 } ..	{ to ..	
1879 ..	1936 ..	Good rich harvest.
1880 ..	1937 ..	Very good ditto.
1881 ..	1938 ..	Good harvest.
1882 ..	1939 ..	Good ditto.
1883 ..	1940 ..	Poor ditto, too little rain.
1884 ..	1941 ..	Very good harvest.
1885 ..	1942 ..	} Poor harvest, spring rains too heavy, and sowings retarded.
1886 ..	1943 ..	Fairly good harvest.
1887 ..	1944 ..	Good harvest.
		Population estimated at { 3,00,000 to
		{ 4,00,000.

Para. 27.—Decrease of Population (See p. 67)

„ 28.—Chronic Scarcity of Food (See p. 68).

„ 29.—Profits on the sale of Cleaned Rice.

„ 30.—System of Revenue Collection under the Sikhs.—

Coming now to the mode of collecting the *shahi* and the revenue generally, I premise that my remarks are based on inquiries made in two tehsils only. The tehsils of Phák and Lál are called cash-assessed, and that was one of the reasons why I commenced there. Under the Sikhs the State took a half-share of the kharif crop,

and in addition four traks per kharwár, and on account of the rice straw and the vegetable-produce of the "*Sagasár*" plots, the whole of which were kept by the Asámi and were supposed to be free of assessment, Rs. 1-9-0 per cent. was added to the total. The patwári and kánungo got  $\frac{1}{2}$  a trak per kharwár between them. Inferior village servants got something. Nazaráná was levied four times a year, and "*tambol*" (about two per cent.) was taken on occasions of marriages in the ruler's family, &c., &c. The villagers had also to feed the State watchers of the grain, called "*Shakdár*". Non-resident cultivators paid a little less, and Pandits and Pirzádás only paid two extra traks instead of four. For the rabi and kimiti crops all classes of cultivators were taxed alike, and in addition to the half-share, three traks per kharwár were taken under the names of extra cesses. The "*kimiti*" crops appear to be those that have always had a money-value and are til-gogal, sarson, tobacco, cotton, linseed, saffron, and the like. The distinction is said to date back to the time of Todar Mal, and for these crops money was always required, the assessment being calculated in rupees after division of the produce and the produce being returned to the cultivator. For other crops, whether kharif or rabi, the collection might be in kind, or the villages might be farmed out. But I can find no trace so far of any crop rates. Walnut oil, fruit trees, and honey, have also always been taxed. Under the above the State share was not less than three-fifths of the gross produce, and what the cultivator actually retained was certainly less than two-fifths and probably only about one-third. The abundance of fruits, berries, and nuts, the extensive grazing area, and forest produce, enabled the cultivators to live, but an assessment so heavy as this would extinguish all rights in land, would render land valueless, and would reduce a population forcibly confined within the valley to the condition of tenants-at-will.

Para. 31.—Effects of a Crushing Assessment.—Accordingly, we find that pressure has from time to time been exercised to keep the land in cultivation, and to such an abject condition have the cultivators—naturally a fine race—been reduced that I have been told by the highest and most trusted officials in Srinagar that the Kashmiri cannot be trusted with *sháhi* because he would eat the whole of it, that he will not plough unless the tehsildar gives him the seed and makes him, and that without this fostering-care of Government he would become extinct. The truth being that he has been pressed down to the condition of a coolie cultivating at subsistence allowance the State property. The Kashmiris are called cowardly, because they have lost the rights belonging to the peasantry elsewhere and tamely submit to be driven like sheep before a sepoy. But it is useless to expect that a small population forming an isolated state that looked only to its hills for protection could withstand powerful neighbours like Afghans or Sikhs, or that so distant and inaccessible a province would not be ruthlessly ground down under the endless succession of governors that have enriched themselves in this valley. The Kashmiri is strong and



hardworking, but his spirit is dormant; and he is grudging the quantity of food the climate makes necessary, but which a shortsighted policy considers glutinous; and consequently he is being closer pressed every harvest. With fair treatment the peasantry would make a great advance in numbers and in prosperity; and if their claim to consideration, which I am now advancing, is met, the happy days when Zain-ul-abdin passed his jubilee among a contented people may be repeated. If that claim is denied, the State, as I shall presently show, will soon have no land left to legislate for, and will have to beg for its revenue from its present servants. These servants foresee that a land settlement must come some day, and meanwhile they are buying up or otherwise getting possession of the land, and to secure a little temporary rest the cultivators are only too ready to take shelter behind any sufficiently influential pandit.

Para. 32.—Revenue Management since A.D. 1846.—Since the times of the Sikhs, the pressure has been undoubtedly relaxed; but it must still be pretty severe when cultivators are found ready to sell whole villages for no other equivalent than the protection of a powerful name. Many of the *Mukaddams*, or heads of the villages, are very intelligent, but when it comes to seeing their children stinted of food, with hearts sickened by deferred hope, they sign away fatuously day by day such rights as they possess. During Maharaja Goláb Singh's rule (A.D. 1846 to 1857) the Sikh procedure was followed, but some slight relaxations were made in favour of land newly cultivated, for large areas were lying waste. His Highness was fond of horses, and a number of grass-rakhs were reserved from cultivation. Under Maharaja Ranbhir Singh, circles of villages were annually farmed out to contractors called *kardars*. About 1865 (S. 1922) the extra traks per *kharwár* were reduced for all *Pandits* and *Pirzáds* for a time to only one trak. From about 1869 (S. 1926) the practice of contracting with the *Mukaddams* or with the *Zemindars* gradually established itself in place of the farming system, and only two extra traks came to be levied instead of four. In 1873-4 (S. 1930-1) the village contracts seem to have been divided up into "*asamiwar khevats*", or cultivators' accounts, and either produce or cash was taken from each man. In 1875 (S. 1932) the harvest was a bad one, and the State took two shares of the produce and left one only to the cultivators. Next year fresh contracts were entered into either with *Mukaddams*, *Kardars*, or cultivators, and two traks per *kharwár* were again added to the assessment, besides an aggregate tax of Rs. 9-12-0 per cent. if paid in cash, or 9 *kharwárs* 12 traks per 100 *kharwárs* if paid in kind. This tax included a number of items, such as support of the palace-temple, the abolished *káungo's* share, and so on. In 1877 (S. 1934) the scarcity began, and the new contracts broke down, and so the State collected in kind only; and this practically continued till 1880 (S. 1937), when a new "*asamiwar khevats*" was made, based upon previous years' collections, as estimated in cash, but payable either in produce or cash as the cultivator was able. This "*khevats*" or cash settlement is supposed

still to be valid, but after the good harvests of S. 1937 and 1938 the settlement was thought to have been too easy, and so it was raised by Rs. 8-9-0 per cent., the chief item of the increment being Rs. 6-13-0 for a pony tax, which might be paid in ponies instead of money, and in place of the Rs. 1-9-0 per cent. formerly levied for fodder, the cultivators were required to give five *kurus* of rice straw per 100 threshed. This settlement includes all cesses except the "*tambol*" and "*nazarána*". In 1885 (S. 1942) the Rs. 8-9-0 per cent. tax was remitted, and so now the "*khevat*" of S. 1937 is supposed to have been reverted to, with the exception of the five *kurus* of rice straw, which are still taken. In 1886 (S. 1943) one seer per kharwár, formerly payable to the zillahdars, was made payable to the State, who appointed paid chowkidars. If this revenue history is not very correct, it must be remembered that access to the revenue records has been denied me.

Para. 33.—The so-called Cash Settlement of 1880.

„ 34.—Hap-hazard way in which the Settlement was immediately increased.—To find out the mechanism of the winding-up process would be tedious if not impossible, but as an example I cite another village. In S. 1937, the "*khevat*" was fixed at Rs. 617-12-0. In S. 1939, when the villages were practically going by auction,<sup>1</sup> a bidder offered Rs. 107-4-0 increase, and this village was knocked down to him at Rs. 725 per annum.

To this extra taxes, namely:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Dharmarth .. .. .	3	10	0
Shafakhana .. .. .	7	4	0
Nazarána .. .. .	0	14	6
Palace Temple .. .. .	0	14	6
Pony-tax .. .. .	69	5	0
Tambol .. .. .	2	0	0

Rs. A. P.

Outstanding balance .. .. . 1 2 0

Total .. .. . 85 2 0

were added, making the total Rs. 810-2-0 for S. 1941. In S. 1942, the extra taxes were remitted, as already stated, and so the account stands—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Assessment .. .. .	725	0	0
Add for cotton supplied for spinning and weaving soldiers' clothing—			
2 Kharwárs at Rs. 14 = Rs. 28 + a fine of Rs. 4 for failing to supply the clothing within the year.. .. .	32	0	0
Outstanding balance .. .. .	39	3	0
Total .. .. .	796	3	0

<sup>1</sup> N.B.—For a crushing example, see Asham village, para. 47.

For S. 1943 the assessment is Rs. 725, and with outstanding balance the total is Rs. 741-11-9.

These are the village accounts showing collections. The tehsil accounts showing demands, give for S. 1941 Rs. 787, for S. 1942 Rs. 752, and for S. 1943 Rs. 733. It is difficult to deduce from accounts such as these what proportion of the gross produce the State takes, and more difficult still to find out what a village really does pay, as I have now to show. I enter into this detail because it is absolutely necessary it should be understood that any intelligible comparison between the results of the proposed settlement and either the previous *khevat* or the present demand, or the actual collections, will be impossible.

Para. 35.—How the Revenue is Collected.—It might be thought actual collections could be compared with the results of the settlement, but the custom of applying arbitrary prices to the portion of the revenue collected in kind, and which forms a large percentage of the whole, and the want of certainty either as to the proportion collected in kind or as to the share of each crop which is taken to make up that proportion, will effectually prevent any comparison with anything whatsoever. The *khevat*, or so-called cash settlement, so far from being a boon to the people, has been used as a means for getting rid of the restrictions which are imposed by a division of produce, and is accordingly equally detested by the villagers. This is how it is worked. An order is annually issued from Srinagar for the collection of a certain quantity, say nine lakhs of kharwárs of *sháli*, the demand being based upon the general aspect of the ripening crop, and pitched 20 to 30 per cent. above what there is a likelihood of getting. Each tehsildar is then informed of the amount he is expected to contribute to this total. He finds this amount, converted at Rs. 2 *chilki* (Rs. 1½ imperial) per kharwár, comes to, say, 10 annas in the rupee of his total revenue. He accordingly gives instructions to collect so many kharwárs from each village, the total collections coming up to the amount named from headquarters, or probably rather more, but varying from 16 annas to nothing, according to the amount of *sháli* he thinks can be secured from any particular village. As soon as the villagers learn they have to pay their *khevat*, say, 10 annas in *sháli*, two annas in cotton, mung, &c., and four annas in cash, bargaining and bribery begin; the village, if a fairly well-to-do one, eventually securing enough *sháli* to live upon; if a poor one, having to look forward to some other means of eking out a livelihood for the winter.

Perhaps an instance will make the system clearer. It is a village I happened to examine; the accounts are for the year S. 1939, and the rupees are *chilki*, or worth 10 annas each.

Amount of Demand.		Amount Collected.	
In Cash . . . . .	Rs. 384-7-3	In Cash . . . . .	Rs. 369-10-9
In Kind . . . . .	Kh. 191-6½	In Kind . . . . .	Kh. 182-2-0

The meaning of the division of the demand into "cash" and "kind" merely signifies that there must be so much *sháli* or *makki*, and that for the rest collections may be in cash or in any other produce. In the following details gross produce is shown for most things in 16-trak kharwárs, and the Government share in 15-trak kharwárs :—

## DETAILS OF COLLECTIONS.

*Rabi Harvest*, Rs. 209-2-6.

	Gross Produce.		Government Share.	Standard Price per Kharwár.	Assessment.
	Kh. Trak.	Kh. Trak.	Kh. Trak.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Jaw .. .. .	79 0	42 0		2 1 3	88 10 0
Wheat .. .. .	43 0	23 6		5 2 6	120 8 6
				Total	209 2 6

*Kimiti Harvest*, Rs. 108-8-3.

	Gross Produce.		Government Share.	Standard Price per Kharwár.	Assessment.
	Kh. Trak.	Kh. Trak.	Kh. Trak.	Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.
Alsí .. .. .	13 10	6 13		8 0 0	54 13 3
Kapás .. .. .	7 2	3 5 $\frac{1}{4}$		14 0 0	49 14 0
Mung .. .. .	0 14 $\frac{1}{2}$	0 7 $\frac{1}{2}$		7 14 0	3 13 0
				Total	108 8 3
				Add Akrot Tel (walnut oil) 14 manwatas .. .. .	7 10 6
				Grand Total ..	325 5 3 cash

*Kharif Harvest.*

Sháli .. .. .	305 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	152 12 $\frac{1}{2}$
Makki .. .. .	26 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 7 $\frac{3}{4}$
		at 2-5th Division.

Total = 163 4

Add extra .. .. . 10 14

Grand Total—*Kh.* .. .. . 174 2 in kind.

<i>Extra Items.</i>		Rs.	s.	c.
Rasadát (for Sagnzár plots, &c.) .. .. .		5	0	0
Contributions to pay of tehsil establishment..		3	8	0
Fodder, &c. .. .. .		3	0	0
		<hr/>		
		11	8	0
Add cash.. .. .		325	5	3 as above.
		<hr/>		
		336	13	3
Add taxes at Rs. 9-12-0 per cent. .. .. .		32	13	6
		<hr/>		
Total .. .. .		369	10	9

Thus we have Rs.369-10-9 set down as collected in cash, but which may have been paid partly in kind, and 174 kharwárs 2 traks compulsorily levied in kind, which, at the standard price of Rs.2 per kharwár, would amount to Rs. 348-4-0. This account would show that the total collections were valued at Rs. 717-14-9.

The tehsil accounts state the demand was Rs.699. This village rose from Rs. 449 in S. 1937, the year of the *khevat*. In S. 1940 and 1941 there was a further increase to Rs. 758, and notwithstanding the remission of taxes in S. 1942, the demand still is over Rs. 700. If it is asked why the district officers should maintain complicated weighments and accounts when the cash demand has been fixed at, say, Rs. 700 and they might take Rs. 350 in cash and 175 kharwárs in *sháli*, the answer is that no one can tell me.

Para. 36.—Fixed prices for produce enable a Tehsildar to manipulate the incident of the Assessment.

Para. 37.—Why the price of *Sháli* is fixed so low.

” 38.—How Cotton is dealt with.

” 39.—Cost of Transport to Srinagar is borne by the Villagers.

Para. 40.—Introduction of a Landlord class.

” 41.—Chakdars.

” 42.—Mukarridars.

” 43.—Evasion of conditions on which Land was granted.

” 44.—Instances of Lands held in excess of the Grants.

” 45.—Chakdars ousting the old Cultivators.

” 46.—Claudestine possession of Villages.

” 47.—Instances of Villages ruined by Over-assessment.

” 48.—The Law Improvement Department.

” 49.—How Proprietary Titles are manufactured.

” 50.—Impossibility of annihilating all rights in Land.

” 51.—Official utterance differs from official practice.

” 52.—Proposals for dealing with the Land.

” 53.—” with regard to Cultivators.

” 54.—” ” Chakdars, &c.

” 55.—” ” Waste Lands.

” 56.—Importance of regulating the distribution of water for irrigation.

Para. 57.—Self-preservation requires that the Darbar should confer rights upon the peasantry.

Para. 58.—Serious opposition anticipated.

„ 59.—Outstanding Balances.

„ 60.—Forced Labour.—Another matter urgently demanding attention is the manner in which *begar*, or forced labour, is managed. I am not prepared to say that it can be got rid of all at once. For example, for the Gilgit-expedition-transport resort to compulsion is probably necessary. But, were your Highness aware of how orders are carried out, many abuses might cease. At present chakdars' lands, jaghir and other specially assigned villages, villages secretly bought or in possession of officials or influential persons, are all exempt. I rode through a particularly nice village with a little bazaar, and the women and children looking to the trained observer in many little ways better off than the average. I said this village is doing very well, but was answered at once it belongs to so and so, mentioning a well-known official. No coolie can be seized in villages so protected, and that is one of the main reasons that the khalsa cultivators seek to transfer themselves to some nearer shelter. Consequently the whole burden of providing coolies falls upon the khalsa villagees and mostly on those too small and poor to attract anybody's care. Further, the way of collecting coolies occasions more discontent than is necessary. A requisition is made, say, for 500 coolies. The tehsildar doubles the number. His emissaries quadruple it, and so a village that ought to supply, perhaps, five coolies, is asked for twenty. Fifteen men have to buy themselves off. It is notorious that this year large sums have been illegitimately collected in this way, to the prejudice of the good name of the Darbar. Just as I ventured to recommend that the amount of *shili* to be taken from each village should be fixed once for all and published, so I would suggest that one coolie per so many rupees of assessment be required to be furnished by each village. A roll would then be made showing how many coolies each village ought to furnish, and this simple expedient would in a great measure stop the oppression and bribery now going on. Eventually, in the Settlement Rules, I should propose to define for what purposes and to what extent, and by whose orders, *begar*, or forced labour, may be required, and to regulate its remuneration. At present an order to collect coolies sends most of the able-bodied population of a tehsil into hiding for a week or two, to the great detriment of agricultural operations, and a settlement could not exist side by side with such disorganization of revenue-paying families.

#### JAMMU.

Para. 61.—Depredations of Game animals.

„ 62.—Out-turn of Work.

„ 63.—Classification of Lands and Soils.

„ 64.— „ „ „ „

„ 65.—Difficulty of getting Information.

Para. 67.—Previous Settlements.

„ 68.—Obstacles to increased Cultivation.

„ 69.—Necessity of reorganizing the rights of Proprietors.

„ 70.—Proposals for dealing with Cultivators.

„ 71.—I have now laid before your Highness my proposals for dealing with the land in Kashmir and Jammu. Should these proposals meet with approval they will be embodied in a Code of Settlement Regulations and submitted for final sanction before the introduction of the settlement in the first tehsils. My account of what is in progress under your Highness's authority, but against your Highness's interests, has been long because I stand alone, and my mere assertion that the State treasury was being depleted, and the poor were being turned out of their lands, and the staple food of the people had become a monopoly of the officials, would not be believed. I appeal to your Highness with some confidence, because I have been impressed during my interviews with the belief that your Highness has a ready sympathy for the poor, a keen interest in land questions, and a determination to protect the cultivators against the officials. But my heart fails me when I think that there is no one among those who surround your Highness from whom I can venture to hope for a word in support of my prayer, that one and all will use every argument to persuade your Highness that my proposals will be detrimental to the traditions, the policy, or the dignity of the State; that they are impossible, and that neither the rice nor the land ought to be trusted out of official custody. I remember how carefully your Highness had been prepared to be firm on two points, one, that the "*Ilak malikana*", or proprietorship of the land in Kashmir, belonged to the Maharaja, and second, that no settlement should be announced till the whole country was measured and ready for settlement on one day or the Government could not be responsible for the rice supply. I remember also with what cordial approval your Highness's remarks on these points were invariably received by the high officials present. The first position, they well knew, secured to them the power of terrorizing over the defenceless cultivators, and, continuing their methods of acquiring the proprietorship of the lands for themselves. And the second position would keep my department from interfering with these practices

last were prepared, they knew, that if that condition could only be maintained, the settlement would never come at all. Your Highness, however, was soon convinced that to indefinitely postpone the settlement, however desirable from the point of view of the officials, was a serious danger, and I have since been urged to prepare tehsils for settlement as soon as possible. But the first position is still preserved, and, though your Highness has listened with patience, I cannot hope I have prevailed. Yet, unless the cultivators are guaranteed possession of the lands they till, a cash, or partly cash and partly *sháli*, settlement is impossible. If the cultivators are to work hard, pay punctually, and keep the treasury fuller than it has ever been before, they must not be the hopeless, discontented, depressed class they are now. The State cannot expect to get everything and give nothing. And behind a strong contented peasantry there must be persons ready to lay out capital when necessary. But who will lend money to a cultivator who may be turned out of his fields any day? Your Highness may think an order not to turn anybody out would suffice. It would be useless when the cultivators themselves are ready to transfer all and any rights they have, to accept any position, any field, so long as they get some shelter, and the officials are eager by every device known to educated and clever men in a position of untrammelled power, and all working with one object, to convert themselves into proprietors, to manufacture prescriptive rights to intervene between the State and the cultivator, to finally arrive at the coveted end when the pandits shall be landlords, the cultivators tenants-at-will, or, rather, coolies who cannot escape, and the State demand limited to a nominal sum per *kharwár* which lapse of time and ingenious interlarding of words will combine to make permanent.

Para. 72.—Possibility of Leases.

„ 73.—Renewed Obstructions.

„ 74.—A reason why we are objectionable.

List of Zillahs and Tehsils in the Kashmir Valley in 1887.



## B.

## HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 3.

[*Specially Reported by the Hansard Staff and Revised by the Speakers.*]

Mr. BRADLAUGH said: I beg to ask leave to move the adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing "a definite matter of urgent public importance", viz., the taking away by the Government of India from the Maharaja of Kashmir the Government of his State and part of his revenues whilst refusing to allow any judicial or Parliamentary enquiry into the grounds for such action against a great feudatory prince.

The SPEAKER having appealed to the House, and considerably over forty members having risen in their places,

Mr. BRADLAUGH said: I am obliged to move the adjournment of the House, because it is the only possible way in which any appeal for the Maharaja of Kashmir can be submitted to Parliament. The Government of India have deprived this chief of his authority and of his property under cover of allegations which are emphatically denied by the Maharaja himself. The Maharaja, as I shall show, has applied for a trial in India. That has been denied him. The Secretary of State here has been asked to sanction an enquiry, and has refused; the leader of the House has been asked to appoint a Select Committee of enquiry, and has also refused; so that neither judicial nor Parliamentary nor Governmental enquiry is being allowed, although this gentleman has been subjected to penalties which in the case of the meanest person in this country would entitle him to have the accusations brought before some tribunal and witnesses against him heard. There is no other manner of bringing this matter before the House than by moving the adjournment. Though I can understand that hon. gentlemen opposite may think it unfair that the adjournment should be moved, they must remember that on Indian matters I have

always shown the greatest consideration to the Government; so much so that at the beginning of this Session I did not avail myself, as I might have done, of my right to move an amendment to the Address. and I only now make a motion for the adjournment because there are no Estimates in Supply in which, as in any case affecting any other portion of Her Majesty's dominions, a question of grievance may be raised. It is either in the manner I am raising it to-night that this grievance must be submitted, or not at all. Now on May 14th of last year—that is more than twelve months ago—the Maharaja himself asked the Government of India for a fair trial. I will read to the House presently the touching words in which that appeal for a fair trial was met. From then till now, except in a despatch from which it will be my duty to quote, no kind of answer has been made to that appeal, and the Maharaja has been condemned unheard. I should have pressed this claim for inquiry twelve months ago, but there were then no papers before the House. It would have been open for the Government to say in the fashion in which rumour has said that this unfortunate gentleman had been guilty of crime or was suffering the consequences of vice, because these suggestions could be found embodied in official despatches to which I shall refer, and that there was, therefore, a lack of duty in bringing the matter before the House until the Government had put before it the statements on which they rely. Although this unfortunate gentleman was deprived of his authority and his property at the beginning of last year, the presentation of papers has been delayed until last week. They have been repeatedly pressed for by myself and other members. Until the Government had put their case on the table, any one would have been at a great disadvantage in submitting to this House any matter for its decision. I do not propose to ask the House, in the division I shall challenge, to express any other opinion on the facts I shall submit than that when such a penalty is enforced against a prince with whom we have a treaty—who has recently been regarded as being in the position of a feudatory prince—the man so dealt with is entitled to that which any other subject of Her Majesty, if he be a subject of Her Majesty, is entitled to, viz., a fair trial before condemnation. The Under Secretary must not shelter himself under considerations of State. If considerations of State can justify the Government of India in depriving one man of his authority and property unheard, there is no

protection for any one, be he prince or peasant, throughout the whole of our Asiatic dominions. The other day the question was stated as simply as possible in the language of the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary for India (Sir J. Gorst) in answer to a question put by myself. The right hon. gentleman said, "The action of the Government in Kashmir has been based, not upon grave personal charges made against the Maharaja". I would ask the House to remember that, because this man's character has been rumoured away and lied away with the help of forged letters during the last year and a-half—forged letters used as instruments of political warfare—letters, the authenticity of which has been denied by the Maharaja, letters which have never been produced in his presence and which yet the Government have the face to refer to in their worst fashion in one of the despatches I shall read to the House. I shall be relieved from any question as to the personal conduct of the Maharaja. He may be good or bad. I do not care what he is—he is entitled to justice. If he has been criminal let him be condemned and punished, but do not rob him under cover of a criminality which you dare not bring in evidence against him, and as to which you will allow no inquiry either in India or here. The right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary said the action of the Government was based upon the long-continued misgovernment of Kashmir. Well, this unfortunate gentleman has only been the ruler of Kashmir for about five years, and I will quote, to within a few months of the time he was dispossessed, the testimony of the Government itself that misgovernment did not exist as far as it was in his power to help it. I cannot conceive—I should not be justified in saying before you, Sir, anything more impudent—but I can conceive nothing more cool than the audacity of the confidence that this House would be imposed upon by the statement of the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary that there had been long-continued misgovernment in Ireland such as justified the dethronement of this man. Vague statements there are here, but not one statement of fact. Misgovernment must be made up of something. You may shadow a man, put him unjustly in prison, or take away his property. None of these things are alleged against this unfortunate gentleman. Well, the right hon. gentleman went on to say that the Government of India have never attached any importance to certain treasonable and criminal correspondence attributed to the Maharaja.

It would have been as well not to have so described the character of the correspondence if no importance was attached to it. Why suggest that it was criminal and treasonable if it was not true, as it was not, that he was responsible for it? I do not suggest that the right hon. gentleman has made an inaccurate statement, but I do say he has been ignorant of the facts. I will read the evidence given by the Viceroy himself with regard to this correspondence which the right hon. gentleman dare not lay before this House, which he dare not put in print, but on which the emissaries of the Government have lied away the Maharaja's character during the last year and a-half. I will dispose of this point at once, because fortunately we have the papers on the Table and are able now to deal with them. So far from its being true that the Government have never attached the smallest importance to the correspondence, the Viceroy himself says the Government were justified "not merely by the disclosure of these letters"—so that they consider themselves in part justified by them (Sir J. Gorst indicated dissent)—The right hon. gentleman shakes his head. It is the Viceroy's head that should be shaken here. I admit that the right hon. gentleman dare not rely on the letters. I admit the right hon. gentleman has too much good sense to use in justification of the position assumed by the Government letters which the man himself declares to be forgeries and which the Government have never dared to produce to his face. But in a long despatch, dated "Simla, June 26th, 1889," I say the Viceroy did say these letters were amongst the things on which the Government acted in condemning this unfortunate gentleman. What did the Maharaja himself say about these letters? In a letter, which unfortunately time will not permit me to read fully to the House, he made a plea for justice first to the Government of India, and then through the Government to the English Parliament. He said, "these letters are nothing but most daring forgeries"; and he suggests that one of the forgers, if not the only forger, is his brother, whom the Government of India has placed in the position of authority of which they have deprived this unfortunate gentleman himself. My allegation will be that it was on those letters—for the papers disclosed nothing else, and further negatives everything else—that this action of the Government was based. (Sir J. Gorst again expressed dissent.) The right hon. gentleman shakes his head, but I have read the papers, which he evidently has not done himself, and I shall read extracts to

the House to show that I am within the mark in every statement of this kind I make. Why did the Government of India, twelve months ago, say they did not merely act on these letters? What did that phrase mean if they did not act on them at all? Have the Government since discovered they are forgeries? If so, as they are part of the case on which misgovernment and criminality are alleged against this unfortunate gentleman, the whole story of it does now fall to the ground, at any rate rests on other matters, with reference to which this man demands to be put on his trial, and as to which no evidence has been offered. Lord Cross, speaking last year at Sheffield, used words a little stronger than, and, if I may be allowed to say so, not quite so skillful as the euphemistic language of the First Lord to-night, and of the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary last week. He said, "we did interfere in the matter of the Kashmir, and why? Because the people of Kashmir were so ground down by the tyranny and misgovernment of the Maharaja that we were bound as the paramount power to interfere for the protection of the interests of the inhabitants." Where in these papers is there one instance of this grinding down? If you want to steal Kashmir, as unfortunately we have stolen State after State in India and other parts of the world, then say so at once, and at least have the merit of honest thieves; don't be hypocritical, by saying you set up self-government where self-government has no real existence. What is the position of Kashmir towards this country? Fortunately the history is not long, so far as it affects this unfortunate man, and I will deal with it as briefly as it is possible to do. The history of Kashmir, for the purpose of to-night's discussion, began with the Treaty of 1846, with the grandfather of the gentleman whose cause I am pleading. Then for a considerable money payment, recorded in the third section of the Treaty, the British Government transferred and made over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Golab Singh and the heirs male of his body, the territory which includes Kashmir and Jummoo. This is not a case of an ordinary feudatory State. So little is it regarded as a feudatory State that in the statistical abstract of this very year you have the evidence of its non-inclusion up to 1881 amongst the feudatory States, and there was never anything to suggest that we had a right or duty to send a Resident there until 1835, on the death of the father of the present Maharaja. I won't trouble the House

with what passed until a few days before the commencement of the reign of the present chief. The Maharaja Golab Singh, with whom the Treaty of the 16th of March, 1846, was made, was succeeded by his son about the time of the Indian Mutiny; and Lord Canning, in an official document, gave Maharaja Rumbir Singh, who had succeeded Golab Singh, in 1857, the *Sanad* of adoption, which provided that in case of failure of issue he and his successors would be competent to adopt an heir and thus perpetuate the line. This was given on the ground of the great service rendered by the Maharaja during the Mutiny. The Maharaja Rumbir Singh was ill in 1884, and I am afraid that some fourteen or fifteen years ago, when Jingoism was specially paramount in the making of great military frontiers and things of that kind, we looked with longing eyes upon the property of others, and were disposed to ignore any sense of justice in our dealings with them. It was then said that Rumbir Singh had misgoverned his country. If he had, it was a matter with which, except as being by treaty the paramount power, in which case we might have made remonstrance, we had nothing whatever to do. But, as a matter of fact, we made no remonstrance to him. The Under Secretary of State dissents. Then why is it not in the papers? The papers began in 1884 with a dispatch relating to the alleged misgovernment during the time of the present Maharaja's father. The words of the despatch preclude the possibility of remonstrance having been made. But what happens is that while the Maharaja was dying, the Viceroy of India, looking to the matter, as he says, with a view to his troublesome neighbours on the north-west frontier, suggested certain reforms which on the accession of the son of the then dying man it would be well should be carried out; and I will read to the House in the words of Lord Dufferin himself the admission that many of these reforms had been carried out during the short period that this gentleman sat on the throne. In 1885 the succession of Prapat Singh was formally recognised by the Government. He came to the throne under the treaty which I have read to the House. One new departure there was against which the Maharaja protested, namely, the establishment of a Residency, instead of Kashmir being an independent possession, which under the treaty it was, subject to the supremacy of the Empress Queen. After the appointment of a Resident it is a monstrously unfair thing to spring a mine four or five

years afterwards, and allege as an excuse for confiscating property and power that there had been misgovernment where, if there had been misgovernment, it should have been reported day by day, week by week, month by month, and year by year. There are no such reports. If the Secretary of State has got them he ought to have printed them. I am not asking the House to say that this unfortunate man is guiltless, but I am asking them to say that he is entitled to be tried, and to have an inquiry before he is deprived of his rights. In 1889 the Government deprived this gentleman of his chieftainship. By what right? By no right save the right of force. By what law? By no law save the law of force. Upon what charges? Upon charges of the vaguest description. It is clear these papers are conclusive papers. There must have been reports made to the Viceroy, which reports ought to be in the hands of the House. If it is said that they are of a confidential character; if it is said they cannot be produced, at any rate the witnesses who can prove the occasions of misgovernment ought to be produced in some court. Is it because this man is rich; is it because his property is in a place where you want to have possession because of frontier considerations, that he is to be deprived of the right which you admit to the meanest person accused within this country, or within the Asiatic dominions of the Empress Queen? It is a monstrous thing, and I ask the House to look at it without consideration of party; because you must remember it is not a question only of this man, but of every feudatory prince whose property you may want to take and merge in our dominions. The papers have not been put on the table in a hurry. They have been in the skilled hands of the Under Secretary. We all know how frank the Under Secretary can be if he tries, and I ask him to tell the House how many papers relating to these important dispatches between the Government of India and the Secretary of State have been kept back, and why. It is clear some have—the language shows it. Why are any kept back? They have been kept back because the action of the Government cannot be defended. I do not know what the charges are against the Maharaja, and I am only asking that this Parliament shall say that the Government of India, however powerful, and whatever the State considerations are, has no right to rob this man. On the 14th of September, 1885, the Viceroy sent a dispatch to which I must allude for a moment. It was sent just on the accession of the

present Maharaja to the throne, and I allege to the House it makes a clear bill up to the time, so far as any charges of misgovernment entitled our Government to interfere. The Viceroy says: "I trust that your highness's life may be long and prosperous; and that, in all difficulties, of whatsoever kind, you will rely with confidence upon the goodwill of the British Government, which will never fail you so long as you are loyal to the Crown, and earnest in the desire to rule your State with justice and moderation. Your Highness has before you a difficult task. During the illness of your father the administration of the State became seriously disorganised, and it will be necessary for you to introduce many reforms." I will show you that three years after Lord Dufferin's time reforms had been carried out, and that misgovernment is a pretext for stealing the man's property. The Maharaja wrote in reply protesting against the Residency being placed upon him. He said: "I do not hesitate to admit that the existing state of affairs in Kashmir and Jammu urgently requires immediate introduction of substantial reforms into the administration of the country, and now that I have power commensurate with my responsibilities, I beg to answer your Excellency that nothing shall be spared on my part, and no time will be lost to prove beyond any possibility of doubt that it is my ambition to succeed in making my country a model of a well-governed State in alliance with the Government of India." Having got the Resident at the capital, what do we find? We find that the Resident wants to get rid of the Maharaja, he submits some report to the Government, the particulars of which we do not know, and a report, the particulars of which we do know, dated March 5th, 1888. Let me point out in the first place that in the despatch of the 5th of March, 1888, there is nothing to justify any of the words of Lord Cross at Sheffield, or the words of the Under-Secretary of State last week, as to misgovernment, or the words of the First Lord of the Treasury to-night. Now, what was the decision the Government of India came to in August, 1888? It was that the condition of the State did not seem to demand such action as Mr. Plowden had suggested, and that the Government had therefore determined not to resort to measures which would have the effect directly or indirectly of taking the power out of the Maharaja's hands. Yet no less than seven months after that dispatch power was taken out of his hands, and taken out solely on these letters. Solely, par-



haps, is a strong word to use; but it was immediately after coming into possession of these letters, suggesting the worst of crimes—letters which the Maharaja has always denied, and as to which he is certainly entitled to be heard before a Select Committee of this House or before the Viceroy himself. He had confidence in the British Government, but he had no confidence in the officials who he said misrepresented him. The decision that there should be no interference with the Maharaja directly or indirectly disposes of Mr. Plowden's report of the 8th of March, 1888. I come now to April, 1889, when we had some further action. I will first mention that on the 25th of July, 1888, Lord Dufferin wrote: "I do not overlook the fact that since the appointment of the Council of which Diwan Lachman Dass was a member, considerable progress has been made in the direction of reform; useful work has been done with regard to the revenue administration, and in the reorganisation of the Public Works and Medical Department. But much remains to be done." This is not the language of condemnation of chronic misgovernment and the grinding down of the people. Misgovernment is only an invention—an excuse for having dispossessed this man, and I think I have a right to quote the evidence given by Lord Dufferin in 1888. This unfortunate prince, hampered by the Resident who dictated the policy he should pursue, did make such reforms as entitled him to the praise of Lord Dufferin—a statesman of the greatest eminence, of the keenest judgment, and a man who cannot be charged with being at all partial to the class of man I am defending here this afternoon. Now I come to these forged letters. There is a batch of thirty-four, and the Maharaja says that they are all forgeries. I do not ask you to say whether they are or are not, but I say that if they are used against him he is entitled to go into court and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Other letters on which the Government have relied have been abandoned as forgeries within the memory of many of us in this House. What is the character of these letters as described by the Resident? The character of them is that the Maharaja offered large sums of money to certain individuals on condition that they would murder, or cause to be removed, Mr. Plowden, the late Resident. It is alleged that these letters showed treasonable correspondence with the enemies of England. All these things are denied by the Maharaja. I do not ask you to say whether the Maharaja is right or wrong, but I say that when

letters alleging murder are produced against a prince with whom we have a treaty of alliance, immediately after which we take away his property, the commonest and the merest justice demands that he should have an opportunity of being heard before a Select Committee of this House, or some tribunal competent to deal with his offence, if offence he has committed. The Government are not going to stand by these letters to-night, but the Viceroy has stood by them, and I will read you words in which they are so stood by. The Viceroy said "In the spring of this year"—that is last year—"my attention was called to the documents referred to in your Highness's letter. Many of these had every appearance of being genuine, and they have moreover a striking resemblance to those other papers of which I have already spoken, and which came into the possession of the Government of India at a previous time." "Your Highness is correct in expressing your belief that the action subsequently taken by my Government was not justified merely by the disclosures contained in these letters." Where is the report upon which they acted? The man had a right to be tried. The letters are vague statements. The Viceroy goes on: "Notwithstanding the ample resources of your State, your treasury was empty". Well, if you are going to dethrone every Prince whose treasury becomes empty, I do not know how far you are prepared to carry your policy. Does the Government really mean that? If that be so, how is it they took from this man the advance or deposit or loan of a large sum of money, amounting to twenty-five lakhs of rupees? They had this in their hands when the treasury was empty. Why did they take money for Lady Dufferin's admirable fund? Why, if the treasury was empty, did they not reckon the millions of rupees for railway works in the interest of frontier defence? Treasury empty! Why, you and your Resident helped to empty it, and then you tell this unfortunate man it is a reason why he should be dethroned!

Sir J. GORST: Will the hon. gentleman finish the sentence?

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You put on the table what you please, and I have to make the best I can with the House half empty, because every member feels the difficulty when a motion for adjournment is moved. I have, with such knowledge as is supplied, to make what case I can with this far off matter.

Sir J. GORST: I only interrupted the hon. gentleman to point out

that he had not read the sentence to the end, and I thought to put the case fairly it should be given to the end.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will read it to the end and show that the right hon. gentleman gains nothing by making me read it. "Notwithstanding the ample resources of your State, your treasury was empty; corruption and disorder prevailed in every department and every office; your Highness was still surrounded by low and unworthy favorites; and the continued misgovernment of your State was becoming every day a more serious source of anxiety." Well, there is not a word affecting finance there. I was going to deal with each allegation in turn. "Low and unworthy favourites!" Every prince has these even in his own household; every Oriental prince has such. The whole history of our transactions with native princes shows that when we have bankered to take their money, their land, their position, we have used vices which appeared at the time to suit our purposes and help us to gain our ends. I do not know what the right hon. gentleman means by inviting me to read to the end, as if I had omitted some allusion to the empty treasury. Why, the Indian Government had then twenty-five lakh of rupees of his, and millions of rupees had been laid out in railway works. Who are these low and unworthy people? It is not enough to make a vague statement: where is the evidence? Let the man be tried. A man complains of a burglary in his jeweller's shop, and you say to him, "Oh but you were misusing the jewels". I ask the House to take at least some tone of dignity in this matter. This despotic government of India; as an Indian Secretary once said, has no public opinion to influence it, no Parliament to control it, no Press to criticise it. The Government of India is a despotism that has in many degrees been well for India, it is a despotism which has brought in its train advantages which many of these poor people would not otherwise have obtained; but it cannot be denied that in many respects that despotism in the past has been tainted with fraud and crime, and I hope it is not left to the present Government to revive these evil traditions in obtaining possession of Kashmir. The Empress Queen, the paramount Power, acting as Judge, has condemned this man unheard. No man should be under menace of this injustice. The grandfather of the Prince bought these lands, and we by treaty declared they belonged to him for ever. (Sir John Gorst expressed dissent.)

The right hon. gentleman does not seem to be acquainted with all these facts in the history of India. Shall I ask him to read and tell us the exact sum paid for the Maharaja's dominions? How do the Government justify their action? They say the Maharaja resigned. He says he did nothing of the kind. I am more inclined to believe him than even the Under Secretary, for whose statements I have always the profoundest respect. Officially, there could be nothing better than the way he answers questions in this House; but when history some fifty years hence comes to deal with him, the comment of the historian will be how wickedly the Government deceived the Under Secretary, making him say as truth the things that were not true. It is said the Maharaja voluntarily resigned. It is true that on March 8th, 1889, the Maharaja issued the following document. I will abridge it; if it is said I am incorrect I will read the whole willingly; but I do not think my abridgement will differ from the exact words. The Maharaja appointed a Council who were to govern the country for five years, he reserving to himself all his princely rights and reserving certain powers, but allowing them much the same authority as, allowing for Oriental position, a Cabinet enjoys here. The Government of India do not accept that, yet they say they accepted a voluntary resignation. What he offered they would not have, what they wanted they took from him. The Maharaja says that even in the decree of March 8th he acted under pressure. I do not ask the House to accede to that, but I do say that he is entitled to a Select Committee here—or he would be even content with an inquiry conducted in India, if Lord Lansdowne will give his personal attention to it. The right hon. gentleman is better acquainted with the Government of India than I am. He knows that Residents are not always perfect, that Residents sometimes quarrel with a prince, and that matters are alleged as facts which do not always bear the test and scrutiny of examination. This man through my mouth appeals to this House, not that you should declare that the Government of India is wrong—he simply asks for an inquiry. He has a right to that inquiry. I regret that the appeal has not been made by an abler tongue, by a better informed man. But I am limited to the information that the Parliamentary papers presented to the House, and such records as the history of India, enables me to present, and I say without fear of contradiction that no

case is made out for the action that has been taken. In 1838 the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council at home came to the conclusion there was nothing for which directly or indirectly the Maharaja ought to be deprived of power; and within seven months they take it all away. If you trample on treaties, if your obligations to the Princes of India are to be broken, and the native rulers are not to rely on your word, and English justice in India is a shadow and a delusion, let that be known: but let those who hold a contrary opinion vote for my motion as the means of protest. The government of India is no party question; alike to Liberal or Conservative, Radical or Whig, it is our duty and our interest that our paramount rule in India should be just.

Motion made that this House do now adjourn.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir John Gorst, Chatham): I do not for a moment dispute the right of the hon. member to challenge the action of the Government of India, or to ask the House to order an enquiry, if there is anything to enquire into. If the House will give me its attention for a short time I will tell the House why the Government of India has acted in the manner it has, and why it appears to the Secretary of State this is not a subject which can properly be made matter of inquiry, either by Judicial Commission in India or by Select Committee of the House of Commons. I need not take the House back to the early history of Kashmir. The hon. member for Northampton has, in the little history he has given, indicated to the House that after the Sikh war we, by force of arms, placed a Hindu ruler over the Muhammadan people of Kashmir; and by doing this, we incurred, as it seems to me, the responsibility of seeing that these Muhammadan people, who by the action of the British Government were subjected to an alien dynasty, were at least fairly and properly governed. Now complaints of the misgovernment of Kashmir are not so modern as the hon. member for Northampton seems to suppose. I should like to read to the House the observations which were made by the Government of Lord Ripon in 1834, and Lord Ripon was a Viceroy whose error did not at all events lie in over interference with native chiefs. This was what was said by the Government in 1834. The misgovernment to which the people of this country (Kashmir) have long been subjected.—The hon. member for Northampton asks what the

nature of the misgovernment was, and I will try before I sit down to give the House some faint idea of the nature and results of this misgovernment.—Lord Ripon said “The people of that country have long been subjected to misgovernment, and this was some time since brought prominently into notice by Mr. Henvey; we did not take action at once conceiving that a favourable opportunity would offer on the occasion of a fresh successor”—the Maharaja Rumbir Singh was then suffering from a mortal illness and his death was expected—“when that event takes place we shall consider that it will be our duty to express on the Kashmir Government its obligations to its own subjects, and to see that reforms so urgently needed are no longer postponed.” To those remarks of Lord Ripon’s Government an answer was returned by Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State, under the right hon. gentleman the member for Midlothian, and Lord Kimberley stated in his despatch his doubts whether the Government of India was justified in hesitating so long as it had hesitated, to interfere in the affairs of Kashmir. It may indeed be questioned whether, having regard to the circumstances under which a Hindoo family were settled as rulers, the intervention of the British Government on behalf of the Muhammadan people had not already been too long delayed. Well, the Government of India waited eighteen months, and in 1855 the late Maharaja died, and the present Maharaja came to the throne. The hon. member for Northampton has already read some of the warnings which were addressed to the present Maharaja of Kashmir on the occasion of his ascending the throne, but he said—and I really was surprised when he made the statement to the House—that until quite recently no complaint was made of his administration, and in fact he quoted a few expressions from some of Lord Dufferin’s despatches, which would have left upon the House the impression that upon the whole the Government had been very successfully administered and many reforms had been carried out. Now, what did Mr. Plowden say in March, 1888. He thought it his duty to call the formal attention of the Government of India to the fearful condition of Kashmir under the Maharaja and his associates, whom he calls a band of corrupt and mischievous men. Mr. Plowden says: “I think, however, that the Government of India should be under no illusion as regards Maharaja Pertab Singh. From first to last I have failed to discover in him any sustained

capacity for governing his country or any genuine desire to ameliorate its condition or to introduce those reforms which he has acknowledged to be necessary. More than two years have passed since his accession, but not only has he achieved nothing but he has opposed beneficial measures proposed by others. . . . He will never of his own free will establish a capable and honest administration ; nor if any power of interference is left him will he permit any administration approved by the Government of India to carry on the business of the country. He will thwart and oppose it in every way he dares ; the only restraint will be the limit of his powers and his fears." Well at the same time that Mr. Plowden made this grave report to the Government of India on the condition of the country and the character of the Maharaja, a proposal was made by the Maharaja himself to appoint a council.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: The right hon. gentleman will pardon me. I stated to the House that on the report of Mr. Plowden the Government came to the decision not to take the power from the Maharaja, and that Lord Dufferin contradicted Mr. Plowden by recognising the fact that since the appointment of the council of which Dinan Lachman Dass was a member considerable progress had been made in the direction of reform.

Sir JOHN GORST: The hon. member is impatient. I am coming to that. I shall have something more to say first. At the time that this report was sent home, application was made by the Maharaja to have a Council appointed, upon which the Government of India decided to give him another trial to see whether by his Council he would govern the country better. I must say, speaking by the light of after events, it was unfortunate that the Government of India accepted the proposal, set aside the report of Mr. Plowden, and gave the Maharaja what in vulgar phrase would be called "another chance". I confess if the hon. member for Northampton instead of attacking the Government of India for having at last relieved the Maharaja of the functions of government had attacked the Government for being so weak in 1885 as to give this second chance, I am sure that I as Under Secretary would have found it difficult to make out a good defensive case. But Lord Dufferin decided on this course. He wrote a complimentary letter to the Maharaja, which the hon. member has read, and no doubt he

made use of the expressions the hon. member has quoted as to the success of the Council, since the appointment of Diwan Lachman Dass, under whom considerable progress, he said, had been made in the direction of reform. But will the House believe that the object of that letter, on which the hon. member relies as showing the improvement in the government of the country, was to remonstrate with the Maharaja for dismissing summarily, and without the knowledge of the Government of India, that same Diwan Lachman Dass whose reforms were praised in the passage of Lord Dufferin's letter which the hon. member has quoted as praising the Maharaja for his improvements in the government of his country. The beginning of Lord Dufferin's letter, which the hon. member has not quoted, is as follows: "I cannot avoid informing your Highness that the news of the sudden removal of Diwan Lachman Dass was received by me with some surprise. Your Highness appointed him to your Council after consulting me, and I hoped that your Highness would before making another change of government give me some previous intimation of your views. However this point has already been brought to your notice by Mr. Plowden, and I do not now desire to dwell upon it further." Well, the arrangements for governing the country by means of a Council were made, and in order to give the new scheme the fullest possible chance of success, Mr. Plowden was removed from Kashmir on the occasion of his promotion, and Colonel Nisbet, a personal friend of the Maharaja and in whom the Maharaja placed implicit confidence, was sent to Kashmir. Now I said I would give the House some little idea of the misgovernment which the hon. member for Northampton made so light of, and of which he said no trace was to be found in the papers before the House. Now if hon. members have read the papers, they will see that they close with the report of a certain gentleman of the name of Wingate. Mr. Wingate was a revenue officer of the Bombay Government of nineteen years' experience, and he had also been employed in the revenue settlement of some of the Native States of Rajputana. He was a highly qualified and experienced officer. He was employed by the Maharaja's Government, and his report well deserves the study of anybody who desires to understand the position of Kashmir, although it is full of technicalities and written in a dry business-like technical spirit, but his narrative is enlivened occasionally



by the most horrible statements as to the condition of Kashmir. Let me say this gentleman was eighteen months among the people surveying in Kashmir and Jummoo, and he appears to have gone to work in a dry business-like fashion. In these Oriental States we know that the foundation of the happiness of the people consists in the correct measurement of their land. The first thing Mr. Wingate discovered was that the measurement of the land upon which the ryots paid their rent was altogether measured against the ryots.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Does the right hon. gentleman represent that in any way that this was done under the direction of the Maharaja?

Sir JOHN GORST: The evil existed under the Government of the Maharaja and it was approved by the Maharaja's Government there.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Mr. Wingate's report referred to the existing state of things. Part of the condition of things that existed over Kashmir it was no part of the misgovernment of the Maharaja.

Sir JOHN GORST: It was part of the condition of things in Kashmir under a government of which the Maharaja was the head. I do not know whether the Maharaja shields himself under the allegation that all this had happened in the past and that he was not responsible for the misgovernment which he allowed to exist. I don't think this House will take such a view of the limitations of the Maharaja's duties to his subjects. Besides, we have read Mr. Plowden's report, in which it is stated that the Maharaja opposed those reforms he himself considered necessary. Even the assessment of the ryots is arbitrarily fixed, and a divisional official gets the revenue out of the unhappy cultivators in the best way he can—the result being that from one-half to two-thirds of the gross produce of the land was exacted from these unhappy people, mostly in kind and partly also in cash.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: Does not Mr. Wingate say that began as far back as 1874?

Sir J. GORST: I have been reading the report—

Mr. BRADLAUGH: You have not been reading at all.

Sir J. GORST: The hon. member challenged me to say what the misgovernment was in Kashmir.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I challenged the right hon. gentleman to prove misgovernment on the part of the Maharaja.

Sir J. GORST: I am in the recollection of the House. I appeal to

hon. members whether, if the case rested solely on the speech of the hon. member for Northampton, they would not have gone away in the belief that Kashmir was the best-governed country in the world. I am showing what was the state of affairs which compelled the Government of India to take this action. I am going to show the House why the Government in the interests of humanity were peremptorily called upon to take this step. (A laugh.) The hon. member may laugh, but I think it is not a laughing matter. Now let me describe what was done. The assessment was paid at fixed rates in kind: that is to say it was levied on the people in money value and then they were made to give produce at certain fixed and prescribed rates in lieu of paying the assessment in cash. In the case of rice, the main staple which the ryots cultivated, the prescribed rate was extremely unfavourable to the cultivator.—All this is in Mr. Wingate's report, and if I am epitomising it unfairly the hon. member can subsequently correct me. I do not see why he should interrupt me now.—But the prescribed rates for cotton, which is grown by the richer ryots, were very favourable; therefore it came to this: that the officers of the Revenue allowed the rich ryots to pay on the staple bearing the most favourable rate, while the poor ryots had to pay on the staple bearing the most unfavourable rates; and every year, says Mr. Wingate in his report "the bulk of the rice goes into the city", and further he adds, "these poor ryots often have to buy it back at two or three times the price at which it was credited to them in their assessment", and then this dry technical report contains this statement—"In this fertile valley there are women and children actually starving". Further on it says: "It may be easier now to understand why the Kashmiri cares naught for rights in land, why his fields are fallow or full of weeds, and manure and water neglected; why he has, as I can well believe, even to be forced to cultivate. The revenue system is such, that whether he works much or little he is left with barely enough to get along on till next harvest. He is a machine to produce shali for a very large and most idle city population".

Mr. MACNEILL: "Like Ireland!"

Sir J. GORST: A city, the population of which consists of officials, and of Hindoo pundits who have prepared the brief from which the hon. member for Northampton spoke. These men get their rice cheap, while the ryot who grows it and is forbidden to dispose of it for export,

starves. Again, Mr. Wingate says that "the cultivator is compelled to grow rice, and in many years to part with it below the proper market rate in order that the city may be content. If the harvest is too little for both the city must be supplied, and is supplied by any force that may be necessary, and the cultivator and his children must go without. That is the explanation of the angry discontent that filled the valley during the famine. The cultivator is considered to have rights neither to his land nor to his crops. The city population have a right to be well fed whether there is famine or not", and that is not all; the officials of the revenue contractors are gradually in Kashmir converting themselves into landlords. They get grants of waste land, they foreclose upon ryots who are indebted, and they purchase a considerable part of the land, and as Mr. Wingate says: "Since the death of the Maharaja Golab Singh, from which date central authority appears to have been weaker, there has been a steadily, and latterly, rapidly increasing transference of land from the cultivating to the non-cultivating classes, and a landlord element is intruding itself between the cultivator and the state." I earnestly commend this to the attention of some of the hon. members from Ireland. Then, besides this, there exists among the unhappy ryots a system of *begdar*, or forced labour. This scourge which is peculiar to the Government villages, and from which the villages which happen to be in the hands of these landlords are free is imposed upon the people with the utmost severity.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I venture to make an appeal to the right hon. gentleman. I fancy that by the rules of the House I have no right of reply. I wish to ask him, in reference to this forced labour, whether it is not a fact that the system prevailed long before the death of the father of this unfortunate gentleman, and whether the Maharaja did not himself issue a decree abolishing it.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order, order! I may explain that the hon. member will be entitled to reply, and it would be more convenient than to interrupt the right hon. gentleman.

Sir J. GORST: I am glad that the hon. gentleman will have an opportunity of replying, because otherwise he will not wait patiently to hear the end of my argument. He challenged me to show misgovernment in Kashmir. I am telling him what exists there, and presently I will ask him what was the Government of India to do

under the circumstances. This forced labour was so unreasonably enforced on the people, that if twenty coolies were wanted it was customary to requisition a hundred. Eighty would buy themselves off with payments to the officers, and twenty of the poorest would be compelled to do the duty. And it was so serious and formidable that they left their homes and hid themselves for days in order to escape the work. I am speaking of matters which are within the knowledge of many hon. members of this House who have served in India. But I am bound to repeat them, when this House is asked to censure the conduct of the Government of India. Mr. Wingate says that the cultivators, under this Hindoo rule, have been pressed down to the condition of coolies cultivating the State property on a subsistence allowance. This has been going on in Kashmir for years, and what has been the result? The population has been reduced by one half, the ryots are deserting the country wherever they can do so, the villages are ruined, the bridges are broken down, the irrigation channels are abandoned, and a population under the protection of a British Government, which boasts of its Christianity and its civilisation has sunk into a condition which I have tried faintly to describe. This, Mr. Speaker, is a description of the condition of the unhappy people of Kashmir which seems to have moved the laughter of the hon. member opposite. I should have thought he would have treated the subject more seriously. Such was the condition of the people—a condition which weighed upon the Government of India and the Secretary of State, who had hoped almost against hope that the new arrangement of the Maharaja would afford some amelioration in the condition of the people. But no: Colonel Nisbett, appointed resident because he was the Maharaja's friend, arrived at precisely the same conclusion as Mr. Plowden, and his conversion to those views was announced to the Government of India at the time of the discovery of the treasonable criminal letters to which the hon. member for Northampton has alluded. These letters in spite of what the hon. member says have never been treated by the Government of India as serious, nor have they been made the ground for the exclusion of the Maharaja from interference in the public affairs of Kashmir. They might never have been noticed had they not been accompanied by the resignation of his own accord of part of his power. The Government of India at the outset said they were not disposed to attach excessive import-

ance to these letters. They also wrote that they did not exclusively base their action upon the Maharaja's edict of resignation, but that edict gave them an occasion—and they would have been criminal if they had neglected to avail themselves of it—for placing the affairs of Kashmir on a more satisfactory basis. The despatch in which their conclusions were announced to the Secretary of State contains these words :—

“We greatly regret the necessity for any interference at all, but we are now convinced that in the interests of the people of Kashmir and of the ruling family itself it is no longer right or possible to leave the control of affairs in the hands of the Maharaja.”

In the whole of this business the Government of India have carefully avoided acting upon any personal grounds and I must object to the hon. member for Northampton and those who instruct him trying to make out that this is a sort of personal question between the Maharaja and the Government of India. They insist on making out that the Maharaja has been deposed from his throne because of these letters, or because of some personal vices or because of his own resignation. Not one of these is the real ground upon which the Government of India has acted. As I have stated in this House in answer to questions over and over again the Government of India has acted in the interests of the people of Kashmir, and of their right to better Government. I can only say that in my humble opinion these reforms could not longer be delayed and, if anything, both the Government of Mr. Gladstone and the present Government ought to reproach themselves for the long delay. It is a curious example of the irony of fate that the Radical member for Northampton should be pleading in this House the Divine right of an Oriental despot to deal with his people as he pleases and that I a humble but reactionary Tory should be pleading the right of these poor Moslems to cultivate their own land. But we have of late been accustomed in this House to strange sights. I ask the House to look at the papers and see how careful the Government of India has been of the rights of this reigning family. Will the House believe that in the Government of this country, the Government which is the paramount power in Kashmir not an Englishman sits on the Council which is composed exclusively of the natives of the State and includes two members of the reigning family. The Government of India does not and never has

in its policy interfered with the personal rights of the Chiefs of India. It has been most careful of all existing rights, of all rights that affect the chiefs. But there is one right which it regards as more sacred than even the rights of Oriental despots to their thrones and that is the right of the people who live under the protection of the power of Great Britain to just and upright Government. I hope that the House of Commons will not stand in the way of justice being done to the people of Kashmir. I hope that the House of Commons to-night will by a large majority approve the conduct of the Government of India in at last interfering in this unhappy State and in allowing the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Chiefs of India generally to know that although their rights are respected it is on the condition that their people are moderately happy and moderately justly governed.

Mr. BRADLAUGH: I will, sir, at once take advantage of the right of reply which you have ruled rests with me. The point I wish to state is so important that I think it better to put it before the House at once. I say that the report of Mr. Wingate refers to no specific act of misgovernment by the deposed Maharaja. It relates a state of things which obtained long prior to the Maharaja's birth, and which he has himself partially remedied since his accession to power. In September 1885 he actually issued a decree abolishing forced labour both in Kashmir and in Jammu so far as he could. For three years this unfortunate man step by step took up reforms, and in one of his despatches he speaks of the settlement of the land question as a task which it would take five years to deal with. I never said that the Government of Kashmir was perfect, on the contrary, I said that, like all Oriental governments, it had many defects, and that the people of Kashmir were in a state of misery and difficulty from which millions of the population of India were not free. I repeat that no specific act of misgovernment has been even pretended to be proved against the Maharaja, and that so far as Mr. Plowden's report is concerned the decision of the Government of India itself was that it did not justify any interference on their part.

Mr. MACNEILL (Donegal Co.); The Under Secretary for India is always interesting and his great abilities add additional charms to what he says. But on this occasion I think it was scarcely fair in accusing me of smiling at the sufferings of these people. I see too

much suffering to regard it otherwise than with infinite sorrow and sympathy. What I smiled at was this. Knowing as I do the infamous transactions and secret springs which I intend to expose, I smiled that a gentleman representing a Government guilty of such conduct should claim universal benevolence and pretend to be benefiting the people, whereas they are robbing an ancient prince of his inheritance. The right hon. gentleman was careful to put forward the religious question, and to point out that the Maharaja was an Hindu while his subjects were Muhammadans. But I can tell him that if he would take a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Kashmir he would find that three-fourths of the people favoured the restoration of the prince. We know that forty millions of our subjects in India are in a constant state of starvation, and that during the famine in 1877 the number of deaths from famine exceeded the population of London. Surely our efforts at administration in India have not been so successful as to justify our bringing more of the natives under our system? I heard the speech of the right hon. gentleman, and I must confess I thought it a most shifting defence. I think I shall be enabled to prove that the Maharaja has been deprived of his inheritance simply by the pursuance of an annexation policy, which was the approximate cause of the Indian Mutiny. What has happened is what is called in Ireland "land grabbing". The Maharaja, who was placed in his position many years ago, has displayed nothing but kindness and loyalty to the British rule. He was placed on that throne, and it was reserved to him and his heirs, and in the meantime he has acted well towards this country. With regard to the letters on which so much stress has been laid, none of them have been read to the House.

Dr. HUNTER: Mr. Speaker, the defence which has been offered on the part of the Government does not explain the degradation from his rank of the Maharaja of Kashmir, an act of unjustifiable spoliation. One remark with which the Under Secretary of State wound up his remarks, intended to be eloquent, was an appeal to this House on behalf of the poor Moslem cultivators. Why the Moslem cultivator? Surely a Hindu, if he happens to be a cultivator, is as much entitled to sympathy as the Moslem. But the right hon. gentleman laid stress on the word Moslem, in order to excite those unhappy religious prejudices which unfortunately prevail in India.

We know that in India, unhappily, both Moslems and Hindus are animated by strong fanatical opinions on the subject of religion, leading to collisions and breaches of the peace. And here is the Under Secretary for India in this House pointing his moral by the contrast between the Moslem and the Hindu peasants, and trying thus to fan the embers of religious antipathy. What are the reasons which he adduced why the Maharaja should be deposed. Not one of the reasons had the slightest relation to anything that was done by the Maharaja of Kashmir himself. That I pass by. But what is the state of the country upon which he relies. There were three arguments. The first argument was that in consequence of the mismanagement of the revenue derived from the land, there was a great deal of poverty in the country, and that the population had largely diminished. Well, I was amazed to hear a minister sitting on that side of the House, using that as an argument why the Maharaja of Kashmir should be deposed: because the Maharaja has equally good reason for deposing you from the government of Ireland, if that argument has any validity whatever. But that is not the only thing. We are told that the land revenue is extortionate. That is no doubt the reason why you are putting out the Maharaja and putting in yourselves. There is no doubt a margin, a large margin, which excites the cupidity of the British Government, and induces them to take possession of that country. But all this argument simply comes to this point, that according to the view of the Government of India, the ancient, not the recent, mode of collecting the revenue from the land is defective, and that oppressions arise in the exercise of the right; so that, according to the eloquent language of the right hon. gentleman, the people are starving in the midst of plenty. That is precisely the condition of things in Ireland. The case of Ireland is an analogous case. Not a single argument adduced by the right hon. gentleman in reference to Kashmir but is applicable to Ireland, in the eyes of impartial people living outside the latter country. I am afraid the transaction is a very doubtful one, when it has to be supported by such statements as those which have been advanced by the Under Secretary of State.

Sir R. TEMPLE: Mr. Speaker, I feel bound to trouble the House for a very few moments on this subject, because I am one of those members who happen to know this country. I have travelled over



every portion of it repeatedly, and for years I was officially connected with it. And though I never had the pleasure of knowing the Maharaja of Kashmir personally, unless I may have seen him as a child, yet I knew his father well, and I knew his grandfather also, and I may say well. Now, sir, much has been said by the hon. member for Northampton and by the hon. member for South Donegal, and again by the hon. member for Aberdeen, who has just sat down, regarding the ambitious or greedy eye which England has cast upon Kashmir. Indeed, in effect, the language used by hon. members implied the charge that England is attempting a theft of territory. Indeed the hon. member for Northampton exhausted the resources of phraseology in order to accuse his country of appropriating the lands of others. But is the House aware that England gains not one rood by the transactions which are now under consideration? All that happens is the transfer of the sovereignty from one brother to another. The power, the wealth, the property, remain in the same family; it is a mere exchange from one person to another. England remains exactly in the same position as she was before, and is in no wise benefitted. She has acted with entire disinterestedness, and whether she is wrong or whether she is right, her sole object has been to benefit the people of Kashmir. What ground has the hon. member for South Donegal for saying that we want a frontier there. I am afraid the hon. member does not know what our frontiers are. We have no military frontiers in that direction. It is not from there that we should be invaded. No, sir, the mighty mountains of the Himalaya constitute an impassable barrier to any enemy, either from Asia or from Europe. Then, sir, the hon. member for Aberdeen seemed to find fault with my right hon. friend the Under Secretary for saying that the Moslem of Kashmir must be protected. The hon. member entirely misapprehended my right hon. friend's meaning. What my right hon. friend meant was this, that the Maharaja of Kashmir was a Hindu potentate, and that we interfered by force of arms to place him over a Moslem population—a population which was not Hindu at all by allegiance or by tradition. They were therefore placed under an alien prince by the action of the British Government. My right hon. friend meant to say that we were bound to see that the Moslem population suffered nothing at the hands of the Hindu masters whom we had put over them. Then the hon. member for Aberdeen spoke of the gratitude which we owe the

Maharaja of Kashmir. I am not prepared to deny that sovereigns of this house have behaved well. The grandfather co-operated with us during the darkest days of the mutiny. But after all the gratitude was due from him to us rather than from us to him. He was our ally. We had placed him on the throne for political reasons of our own, and he was bound to act for us when we required his services. Something has been said of the several British residents. I was grieved to hear the terms of disparagement in which the hon. member for Northampton spoke of those most able servants of the State. At all events, they have no party purpose to serve; they are above partisan considerations. They may, like all men, be liable to error, but they are completely disinterested, and their action is based on perfect impartiality. In this case it was not one or two, but three residents—men of different ideas, but who all come to the same conclusion respecting the Government of Kashmir. Then, sir, regarding the misgovernment, I quite admit that reforms were at one time introduced and carried out to a considerable extent. I myself in former days have been witness to them. But I am afraid those reforms came to a sudden termination. But, sir, much was said, and with great truth, by my right hon. friend with respect to the mismanagement of the land revenues and the gross oppression which was practised upon the ryots. I quite admit that the abuses are not recent, and the report which has been read to-night is only an enlargement of what I used to hear in former years. But I am afraid that the evils have now reached alarming proportions, perhaps even a monstrous development. The hon. member for Aberdeen speaks of the decrease of population. Of all countries, Kashmir is the most favoured in climate. It may be severely cold in winter, but in summer it is fertile and bountiful as any place in the world. That its population is decreasing is a sign of misgovernment. I quite admit that there may have been outbreaks of cholera and other epidemics, but as for famine it is the last place in the world where such a calamity could be expected. The question comes what is the nature of the misgovernment? Well now, I submit that that is a question which should be left to the responsible government on the spot. I submit it is our duty to see that a good government is set up in that Empire. But when that has been set up do not harass it, or interfere with it, or try to establish committees of inquiry here to investigate the matters, but accept the

advice of the responsible authorities. If you are to have a Government at all we must trust to judge of these questions. There is, we are told, a bad system in this State, that the population is decreasing, property is not secure, that communications are not looked after, that the whole land is going rapidly to ruin, and that all departments are falling to a low level. But how are we to examine into these matters by an inquiry such as is asked for? These are the very things which are within the purview of Government and cannot be tested by judicial process. We all know how that would end. It would end in the acquittal of the charged. All these matters should be left to the Governor-General in Council, and to him we should entrust the responsibility. An inquiry such as is now proposed would have a bad effect in India. The hon. member for Northampton speaks as if this political measure of superseding the Maharaja of Kashmir would have a bad effect; but I can assure him that to have an inquiry of this kind, in which the whole government of Kashmir would be overhauled, would be a measure above all others which would be calculated to alarm and would be repugnant to those very persons whom he proposes to serve.

Sir UGHTRED KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH: In this debate we have been placed under this disadvantage, that the papers relating to Kashmir are not yet in the hands of members. But by the courtesy of the right hon. gentleman (Sir John Gorst), I have had the advantage of perusing these papers for a short time and it is only fair that I should rise to say, that so far as I can judge from a hasty perusal of the papers and following carefully the speech of the right hon. gentleman, he has stated the case as regards the action of successive Viceroys and successive Secretaries of State in their relation to the late Maharaja of Kashmir and the present Maharaja with perfect fairness. I may venture to say one or two words more as to whether the facts which have been laid before us show a necessity for such an inquiry as is asked for. I believe if hon. members will examine these papers they will find that there is nothing in them to call for a review by a Parliamentary Committee of the patient and deliberate action of the Government of India, who seem to have hesitated long before taking any strong step, although the misgovernment of the Maharaja has been, I fear, of a very glaring description. I would only venture to make this one remark. It should be a satisfaction to members

on this side of the House to find with respect to the Government of India that it has not been drawn into the annexation policy, which my hon. friend (Mr. Bradlaugh) deprecates, but that it leaves the government of Kashmir under a council of natives of India, guided by the Resident of India; and in concluding a despatch addressed by the Viceroy of India to the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Viceroy treats him with the greatest consideration and courtesy, and expresses a hope that it may be possible to give greater power to him in the future. At present the Maharaja is put in an ornamental position. He is not deposed but simply relieved of the powers of ruler of the country and these powers are confided to a council. I hope therefore the House will pause before voting for this motion.

Sir WM. PLOWDEN: I will not detain the House for more than a few minutes, but I am not at all satisfied with the statement of the Under Secretary of State for India. The course of the debate has rather taken us from the point we ought to have before us, and I am very much surprised to hear the remarks which have fallen from the hon. member who has just spoken, in face of the glaring case which has been made by the member for Northampton. The member for Northampton is condemning the action of the Government of India, and is asking the House to express its sense of the course taken by the Government of India with respect to the Maharaja of Kashmir, and his complaint is that they have not given this man a chance of clearing himself from the charges which have been brought against him. It is not to a Parliamentary inquiry that this man's chance of clearing himself is to be entrusted. Why should we not have a judicial inquiry, and why is it that the Government are refusing to give this man a real investigation into the charges made against him. From what we have had brought before us there is real reason to believe that not only has considerable misgovernment been going on in Kashmir, now and in previous reigns, but that there has been no reproof administered as to this misgovernment. The right hon. gentleman asks us are we going to stand in the way of justice being done in Kashmir, but is he going to stand in the way of justice being done to the Maharaja? If he asserts that he (the Maharaja) is innocent of the charges brought against him.

Sir JOHN GORST: There are no charges.

Sir W. PLOWDEN: Then if there are no charges why is he

deposed? Evidently there must be some misconduct attributed to this man, in fact we know there is, because the whole defence put up by the Government is that he has been misconducting the government, and because he has been doing so he has been deposed. He says, "I have not misconducted the government. I am not guilty, and I ask to have my case inquired into." If the hon. member for Northampton pressed his motion to a division I shall be bound to support him unless we get a clear assertion from the right hon. gentleman that he will send out instructions to the Government of India to form some judicial Commission which shall inquire into the charges alleged.

The House divided :

Ayes	..	..	..	..	88
Noes	..	..	..	..	226

Majority 138

The motion for the adjournment of the House was therefore lost.

#### DIVISION LIST.

##### Ayes.

W. Abraham (Glamorgan), W. Abraham (Limerick), J. Austin, W. H. W. Ballantine, J. Barran, M. H. Beaufoy, A. Blane, T. D. Bolton (Derbyshire), Henry Campbell (Fermanagh), F. A. Channing, J. J. Clancy, Dr. G. B. Clark (Caithnessshire), H. P. Cobb, W. J. Corbet (Wicklow), D. Crilly, J. J. Dalton, J. Dillon, L. L. Dilwyn, S. Evershed, J. C. Flynn, Dr. J. F. Fox, T. Fry (Darlington), E. T. Gourley, E. Harrington (Kerry), H. Harrison, L. P. Hayden, G. Howell, J. A. Jacoby, J. S. Keay, D. Kilbride,, D. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Rochdale), R. Lalor, Sir W. Lawson (Cumberland), J. Leahy (Kildare), R. Leake, T. P. Lewis, (Anglesey), W. A. Macdonald, J. G. S. MacNeill, Dr. R. M'Donald (Boss), J. R. Maguire, W. Mather, S. Montagu, A. C. Morton, J. Nolan (Louth), J. F. X. O'Brien (Mayo), P. J. O'Brien (Tipperary), W. O'Brien (Cork, N.E.), A. O'Connor (Donegal), J. O'Connor (Tipperary), J. O'Kelly, C. S. Parnell, J. W. Philipps, E. H. Pickersgill, Sir W. O. Plowden, T. P. Price (Monmouthshire), D. Randell, W. H. K. Redmond (Fermanagh), Sir E. J. Reed (Cardiff), J. Roberts (Flint Burghs), T. Robinson (Gloucester), T. Roe, J. Rowlands (Finsbury), W. B. Rowlands (Cardiganshire), J. Rowntree, C. E. Schwann, T. Sexton, T. Shaw

(Halifax), J. D. Sheehan, F. F. Stevenson (Suffolk), J. C. Stevenson (S. Shields), H. Stewart (Lincolnshire), J. Stuart (Shoreditch), D. Sullivan, (Westmeath), T. D. Sullivan (Dublin), A. Sutherland (Sutherlandshire), A. Thomas (Glamorgan E.), D. A. Thomas (Merthyr), J. Tufts, Captain E. H. Verney, S. D. Waddy, H. Wardel, A. Webb, J. S. Will, A. Williams (Glamorgan), S. Williamson (Kilmarnock), J. Wilson (Lanark), J. Woodhead, C. Wright (Lanc. S.W.), Tellers for the Ayes, Mr. Bradlaugh and Mr. Hunter.

## NOES.

W. G. Ainslie, J. Aird, Hon. P. Allsopp (Taunton), W. Ambrose, W. A. T. Amherst, H. T. Anstruther (St. Andrews), Colonel L. Anstruther (Suffolk), E. Ashmead-Bartlett, H. H. Asquith, Sir G. S. Baden-Powell, J. G. A. Baird, Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour (Manchester), T. C. Baring (London), A. Barnes, A. H. S. Barry (Hunts), G. C. T. Bartley, Sir W. B. Barttelot, Sir E. Bates, A. A. Baumann, Rt. Hon. Sir M. H. Beach (Bristol), W. W. B. Beach (Hants.), E. W. Beckett (Yorks., N.R.), W. Beckett (Notts), W. G. C. Bentinck (Penryn), Commander Bethell, J. Bigwood, A. Birrell, Col. H. B. H. Blundell, G. H. Bond, T. W. Board, Sir A. Borthwick, Col. Hon. F. C. Bridgeman, Hon. St. J. Brodrick, A. M. Brookfield, Sir W. C. Brooks, A. H. Brown (Salop), G. Bruce (Finsbury), Lord H. Bruce (Wiltshire), W. Burdett-Coutts, J. Caldwell, Sir G. Campbell (Kirkcaldy), Marquis of Carmarthen, Rt. Hon. J. Chamberlain (Birmingham), R. Chamberlain (Islington), Rt. Hon. H. Chaplin, Sir E. Clarke (Plymouth), D. H. Coghill, J. Collings, Sir J. C. R. Colomb, C. W. R. Cooke, J. Corbett (Worcestershire), F. S. W. Cornwallis, Sir J. P. Corry, Col. E. T. D. Cotton, H. H. Cozens-Hardy, Viscount Cranborne, H. S. Cross (Bolton), Hon. W. H. Cross (Liverpool), Sir S. B. Crossley (Suffolk), General Sir W. Crossman, Rt. Hon. G. Cubitt, Hon. G. N. Curzon (Lanc., S.W.), H. J. C. Cust, M. T. S. Darling (Edinburgh), H. T. Davenport (Staffordshire), E. S. W. De Cobain, Rt. Hon. Baron H. de Worms, Baron R. Dimsdale, F. D. Dixon-Hartland, R. S. Donkin, Sir J. E. Dorington, R. W. Duff, J. S. Dugdale, Rt. Hon. Sir W. H. Dyke, T. C. Edwards-Moss, Hon. Art. R. D. Elliot (Roxburghs), G. W. Elliot (Yorks. N. R.), P. Esslemont, Sir A. O. Ewing, Col. H. Eyre, Lieut.-Gen. Feilden (Lanc. N.), A. E. Fellowes, R. C. M. Ferguson (Leith), Rt. Hon. Sir

J. Fergusson (Manchester), Admiral Field, G. H. Finch, W. H. Fisher, Sir F. Fitz-Wygram, Sir H. Fletcher, C. Flower, A. B. Forwood, Sir R. N. Fowler (London), Gen. C. C. Fraser, L. Fry (Bristol), S. Gedge, J. S. Gilliat, Major-Gen. Goldsworthy, Rt. Hon. Sir J. E. Gorst, Rt. Hon. G. J. Goschen, G. G. L. Gower, Sir E. Green (Wakefield), E. Greene (Suffolk), Viscount Grimston, F. B. Grotrian, R. B. Haldane, Rt. Hon. Lord G. Hamilton (Middlesex), Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley, R. W. Hanbury, E. Hardcastle (Salford), Sir E. J. Harland, Marquis of Hartington, A. R. Heath, Rt. Hon. E. Heneage, Hon. S. Herbert, Lord F. Hervy, Lord A. W. Hill (Down), Col. E. S. Hill (Bristol), E. B. Hoare (Hampstead), Sir W. H. Houldsworth, J. H. C. Hozier, F. S. Hunt, Sir G. Hunter (Hackney), Rt. Hon. W. L. Jackson, Sir R. Jardine, A. W. Jarvis, A. F. Jeffreys, L. J. Jennings, W. Johnston, Rt. Hon. Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir J. H. Kennaway, W. Kenrick, Hon. G. T. Kenyon, Col. W. Kenyon-Slaney, H. Kimber, Sir J. G. S. Kinloch, H. Knatchbull-Hugessen (Kent), L. Knowles, A. Lafone, W. F. Lawrence (Liverpool), E. Lees, T. W. Legh (Lanc.), Lord W. C. G. Lennox, Sir R. Lethbridge, Viscount Lewisham, E. H. Llewellyn, G. W. E. Loder, W. H. Long, J. W. Lowther (Cumberland), Hon. W. Lowther (Westmoreland), L. Ljell, W. G. E. Macartney, C. F. Mackintosh, F. W. Maclean (Oxfordsh.), J. M. Maclean (Oldham), J. W. Maclure, Captain J. M'Calmont, D. H. Madden, W. F. Maitland, Col. J. W. Malcolm, Rt. Hon. E. Marjoribanks, M. H. Story-Maskelyne, Rt. Hon. H. Matthews, Sir H. E. Maxwell, A. R. C. Mayne, F. B. Mildmay, T. Milvain, R. J. More, Hon. F. Morgan (Monmouthshire), Rt. Hon. G. O. Morgan (Denbighshire), W. Morrison, W. G. Mount, R. G. C. Mowbray (Lanc. S.E.), P. A. Muhtz, Viscount Newark, Hon. R. T. O'Neill, Sir R. H. Paget, Hon. F. Parker (Oxfordsh.), Sir L. Pelly, Captain F. T. Penton, Rt. Hon. D. R. Plunket, W. C. Quilter, J. Rankin, Major F. C. Rasch, H. B. Reed (Bradford), T. Richardson, Rt. Hon. C. T. Ritchie, J. B. Roberts (Eifion), Rt. Hon. J. P. B. Robertson (Bute), Baron F. J. de Rothschild, J. Round, T. B. Royden, T. Salt, G. B. Samuelson (Gloucester), Col. E. J. Saunderson, Captain C. W. Selwyn, M. H. Shaw-Stewart (Renfrew), J. W. Sidebotham (Cheshire), T. H. Sidebottom (Stalybridge), W. Sidebottom (Derbyshire), W. P. Sinclair, J. P. Smith (Lanarksh.), Rt. Hon. W.

H. Smith (Strand), J. Somervell, Rt. Hon. E. Stanhope (Lincolnsh.), E. J. Stanley, M. Stewart (Kirkcudbrightsh.), T. Sutherland (Greenock), J. G. Talbot, T. K. Tapling, F. Taylor, Sir R. Temple, J. Theobald, W. Thorburn, W. E. M. Tomlinson, F. Townsend, Sir H. W. Tyler, Hon. A. H. J. Walsh, Sir R. E. Webster (Isle of Wight), W. C. West, Viscount Weymouth, E. Whitley, H. Wiggin, Hon. R. Winn, Viscount Wolmer, N. Wood, H. S. Wright (Nottingham). Tellers for the Noes, Mr. Akers-Douglas and Sir William Walrond.



## C.

CHAPTER XXI.<sup>1</sup>

## KASHMIR AND KHIVA.

THE history of the Russian annexation and absorption of Khiva is one of dissimulation and disgrace, and may be told in few words. On the 8th of January, 1873, Earl Granville, wrote to Lord A. Loftus, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, with reference to the then contemplated Russian expedition against Khiva, that he had had a personal interview with Count Schouvalow, by special request of the Czar, who had informed him, that the sole object of the expedition was to punish certain acts of brigandage by the Khan's subjects. '*Not only,*' writes Lord Granville, '*was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it.* He gave me,' he adds, 'the most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter.' The despatch goes on to state, that Lord Northbrook, then Viceroy of India had "given the strongest advice to the Khan to comply with the reasonable demands of the Emperor, and if the expedition were undertaken with the object and within the limits described by Count Schouvalow, it would meet with no remonstrance from Her Majesty's Government.' Unfortunate Khan of Khiva, with Russia lusting for annexation, and Great Britain (of all Powers!) counselling submission! The result is a matter of history. The Russian troops had a 'walk over' into Khiva, and the Treaty which General Kauffman dictated, literally at the point of the sword, to-day gives the lie to Count Schouvalow's pacific assurances. The Treaty commences in this wise: 'The whole of the right bank of the Amou Darya and the lands adjoining thereunto, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva,

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[\*] "Kashmir Conspiracy; or the truth of the Maharaja's Case." Lahore: Mitra Vilasa Press, 1890.

shall pass over from the Khan into the possession of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping thereon, etc. In the examination of claims between Russians and Khivans, preference shall be given to Russians. Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects shall be referred to the nearest Russian Authorities. A fine is inflicted on the Khanate of Khiva of two million two hundred thousand roubles (about £300,000) in order to cover the expenses incurred by the Russian Exchequer in the prosecution of the late war which was *provoked* (?) by the Government of the Khan.' *Und so weiter*. And thus, poor Khiva has been Russianised, at the expense of the blood and wealth of the children of her soil, while Russia has consequently crept up to within a hundred miles or so nearer of her sole perspective aim and design—the Frontier of British India. All the while, Great Britain, the Power most interested, has, according to the despatch of her Foreign Minister, 'offered no opposition' to this wholesale spoliation of one of the outlying bulwarks of defence against Muscovite aggression. On the contrary, she seems rather to admire Russian diplomacy, with its misleading tactics, its false assurances, and its questionable modes of territorial acquisition, and has tried her hand too, *à la Russe*, that is to say employing the same weapons, in the absorption of Kashmir,—the British Khiva.

Consider we now for a while the *modus operandi* employed to anglicanise poor Kashmir, and the intelligent reader cannot fail to be struck with the similarity of the means used by the Russians in Khiva and and the English in Kashmir, and can also draw his own conclusions from the political parallel. *Imprimus*,—of course it was necessary to throw dust in the eyes of our interested neighbours and especially essential was it that England should blind, or try to blind, Russia as to her real intentions regarding Kashmir. Hence, we find both Lord Cross and Sir John Gofst repeatedly and, it appeared to many, unnecessarily, giving the most emphatic explanatory assurances of England's non-intervention,—assurances every whit as unmistakable as those given by the Czar of Russia regarding Khiva. England, we were informed, has not now, nor has she at any time ever had the slightest intention of 'annexing' Kashmir. True, the British Schouvalow did not define his interpretation of the word 'annexing,' and herein lies the key of the whole matter. England might have sought a quarrel with Kashmir, invaded and conquered that country.