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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 3 (1912)": Cd. 6104.]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 2, 1911.

FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz :—

"I have received telegrams from Manchester and Bombay begging protection for agents of certain British firms ; also from Armenian archbishop recommending to me Christian community.

"Except in case of those who can thoroughly establish their right, granting of flags seems to involve too heavy responsibility, and if Persian soldiers are provided for any but Europeans they would be first to pillage.

"I am writing, as only measure offering some prospect of success, to all Arab chiefs informing them in detail what houses are inhabited by British subjects or protégés, and urging them, in the event of fighting in neighbourhood of these, to ensure that they be respected and to do all in their power to safeguard non-Mussulman population. I am also obtaining from Kawam instructions to same effect. This step, inadequate as it is, seems only one possible, and I fear that I am unable to give more than vaguest comfort to those applicants as well as to British subjects, whose interests I am by no means in a position to protect."

I have replied as follows :—

"British subjects and *bonâ fide* agents of British firms who have British-owned goods on their premises may fly flag, but no others.

"I approve your communication to Arab chiefs."

No. 2.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 2, 1911.

SITUATION at Shiraz.

Mr. Acting Consul Knox telegraphs as follows to-day :—

"The gravity of the situation is increasing. The Arabs, who have known no control for the last twelve months, are fast comprehending that they have nothing to gain or to lose from a Government whose every decision is revoked in a few hours, and are quite capable of settling matters to their own satisfaction by a general pillage of the town. Even Kawam reluctantly acknowledges this possibility.

"A state of panic prevails among all Persian merchants. Shortage of cash places the Imperial Bank in a most serious position, while Europeans generally are becoming hourly more nervous, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the town is in the hands of some 5,000 armed savages.

"I have constantly endeavoured in the course of the last few weeks to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the gravity of the state of affairs prevailing here, and I am unable, now that the property and lives of British subjects are certainly threatened with danger, to afford any semblance of adequate protection,

"I believe that were I to be authorised to warn Soulet in the terms suggested in my telegram of the 19th September* before this evening, and at the same time to impress the extent of their responsibilities in respect to British lives and property equally strongly upon the Arab chiefs, tension might in a certain measure still be relaxed. It is urgently necessary in any case that 300 men should be dispatched to Shiraz."

Following is my reply :—

"You can tell Soulet from me that unless he immediately removes himself and his men from the neighbourhood I shall recommend my Government to take immediate steps to protect our interests, and to visit the penalty for any damage to these directly upon himself and Nizam.

"You can also warn Arab chiefs that I shall recommend my Government to take steps to exact full reparation for any harm to British lives and property."

I have also again drawn attention of Persian Government to the menacing situation, and urged them to warn the various chiefs of the necessity of preventing harm to British subjects.

No. 3.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 3, 1911.

SITUATION at Shiraz.

In continuation of my telegram of the 2nd October, I have the honour to repeat following personal telegram which Lieutenant Wilson, who is now at Shiraz, has addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire :—

"I fully share acting consul's view of seriousness of situation. We both concur in thinking that matters have now reached a stage when it is doubtful that even the strongest warning would serve any purpose, and I think that Europeans do undoubtedly stand in serious danger.

"There appears to me no possibility of things settling down."

I submit that the 300 men destined, if our scheme is approved, for Shiraz and Ispahan should be dispatched without delay and the fact made public forthwith.

Such a step is justified independently of the roads by the situation at Shiraz.

No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 2nd October : Shiraz.

Your action is approved.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 3, 1911.

SWEDISH chargé d'affaires asks us to let them know as soon as possible whether we should object to seven more officers being sent to Persia for gendarmerie in accordance with vote of Medjliss reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 21st September.

Have Russian Government any objection? We have none.

* See "Persia, No. 8 (1912)," No. 353.

No. 6.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 4, 1911.

MY telegram of 2nd October.
Following from Shiraz :—

“I delivered both warnings at 9 A.M., but up to 6 P.M. no reply has been received from Soulet. If this is not forthcoming to-night, I will request immediate answer in the morning. Arab chiefs have returned satisfactory verbal reply, and state that they are writing.

“There is a very strong rumour that Nizam will leave to-night, and town is quieter.”

No. 7.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 3rd October : Swedish officers for Persia.
Russian Government have no objection.

No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 4, 1911.

SOWARS for Shiraz and Ispahan.

Telegram sent to Viceroy yesterday to send 300 sowars to Shiraz as soon as possible, using reasonable discretion if he considers number should be modified. You may inform Persian Government as soon as he replies.

Tell consul at Shiraz to arrange for accommodation there, and send 100 of them to Ispahan, if you think proper.

No. 9.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

MY telegram of 2nd October : Shiraz.

Soulet and Nizam have not yet replied to my warning, but they are apparently preparing to leave. Their baggage left yesterday morning in a southerly direction under strong escort.

Arab chiefs have replied that they will do their utmost to protect European life and property and will leave Shiraz as soon as the Kashgais have gone. They enclose a telegram from the Prime Minister instructing them to remain for the present to assist the Government.

No. 10.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

MR. O'BEIRNE'S telegram of 26th September.*

What Shuster needs is advice and assistance of Stokes in capital, and he most emphatically rejects the idea of localising him at Ispahan as “out of the question, of course, both on principle and as matter of practicability.”

* See “Persia, No. 3 (1912),” No. 376,

Shuster is most anxious for reply "stating plainly whether two Governments intend to continue opposing appointment of Stokes on lines which he has mentioned or not."

No. 11.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.) Tehran, October 5, 1911.
ACTING consul reports Kashgais leaving Shiraz in great numbers.

No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October 5, 1911.
PRÉPARATIONS are being made in India for dispatching a cavalry regiment to Persia immediately. In view of your telegram of to-day do you think action should be suspended, or that proposed increase of force is still urgent?

No. 13.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.) Tehran, October 6, 1911.
FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz:—

"Nizam and Soulet left at noon and are encamped now some 6 miles away. Latter before leaving openly declared his intention of disturbing Bushire road. Behaviour of Arabs is for the moment exemplary."

No. 14.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.) Tehran, October 6, 1911.
YOUR telegram of yesterday.
I am consulting acting consul, and advise suspending action meanwhile.

No. 15.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.) Tehran, October 7, 1911.
GOVERNMENT forces have occupied Hamadan. Salar-ed-Dowleh, who had retreated thither, has now fled towards Burujird.

No. 16.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.) Tehran, October 7, 1911.
ESCORT reinforcements.
Reference to my telegram of the 6th October.
Acting Consul Knox telegraphs as follows:—

"I venture to urge very strongly that no delay should occur in dispatching reinforcements. Winter sets in after the end of November, and lack of supplies will

then render the road impassable for 200 men. Furthermore, it will be impossible to ensure winter supplies for men and horses here unless local action is taken immediately if, as appears extremely probable, there will shortly be a great scarcity.

"Situation continues to be very strained, and I think general disorders are impending on the roads. This afternoon some inhabitants of suburb fired on Kawam as he was leaving the consulate and killed some of his men. It is not improbable that further trouble in the town may arise out of this incident."

I do not think there should be any delay in dispatch of reinforcements in view of above telegram.

Subject to your approval, I would propose following wording for my communication to the Persian Government :—

In consequence of the general disorder prevailing in Southern Persia, His Majesty's Government have decided to increase the British consular escorts at places where British trade interests require temporary protection.

These escorts will be occasionally employed for the protection of British caravans.

These reinforcements will be withdrawn as soon as a gendarmerie adequate for the protection of the southern trade routes has been organised by the Persian Government.

I would propose to make this communication to Persian Government as soon as I receive your authorisation to do so. Persian Government have already learnt that our scheme has appeared in the press from their Minister in London.

No. 17.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 7, 1911.

PERSIAN Government have now appointed Ala-ed-Dowleh Governor-General of Fars in the place of Farman Farma, who made difficulties about proceeding to Shiraz. Deputy governorship has been entrusted to Kawam, who has left the consulate. Acting consul is assured by Kawam that he will forthwith send the more unruly tribesmen in charge of his son to a distance of 50 miles from the town, and that he will keep only those in whom he has confidence.

Colonel Cox, who I gather has been consulted by the Government of India respecting the immediate need for British troops, has replied urging their immediate dispatch in the interests of security of British subjects and merchandise as well in Shiraz as on the roads. Adverting to Kawam's departure from the consulate, he says that this relieves anxiety on the score of the safety of the consulate, but there is no ground for supposing that it will lead to a restoration of order and security in Shiraz. He adds :—

"Nizam and Soulet have withdrawn a few miles solely in consequence of our definite threat and of the rumours of our preparations to carry it out. Latter, however, is unlikely, even were Nizam to leave Fars willingly, to retire from an active rôle in the province, and if we fail to carry out our decision, which is now generally known, forces of disorder will gain a new impetus, and the damaging impression that there is no fear of our carrying our decision into effect will be revived. The state of the roads is worse than ever hitherto."

No. 18.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 7, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 7th October :—

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the receipt of your telegram of the 25th ultimo* I handed an *aide-mémoire* to M. Nératof informing his Excellency that His

* See "Persia, No. 3 (1912)," No. 372.

Majesty's Government might find it necessary to establish a vice-consulate at Bam and to strengthen various consular escorts in Persia. I now have the honour to transmit copy of the reply which I have received from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Mr. O'Beirne by M. Nératof.

PAR son aide-mémoire daté du 13 (26) courant, l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu communiquer au Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères le projet du Cabinet de Londres de créer un vice-consulat à Bam et d'augmenter l'effectif des escortes des consulats britanniques à Bouchir, Chiraz, Kerman et Bender-Abbas, ainsi que du consulat anglais à Ispahan, si toutefois le Gouvernement russe n'y avait pas d'objections, étant donné que cette dernière ville se trouve dans la sphère d'influence russe.

Le Gouvernement Impérial apprécie à leur juste valeur les considérations qui ont amené le Cabinet de Londres à recourir à la mesure dont il s'agit et déclare n'avoir aucune objection au renforcement de l'escorte consulaire anglaise à Ispahan.

De son côté, le Gouvernement Impérial est également préoccupé de l'état d'insécurité générale qui règne non seulement dans la région entre Ispahan et Téhéran, qui a été tout dernièrement encore le théâtre d'agressions réitérées de la part de bandes de brigands, mais encore dans les provinces du nord de la Perse, où les troubles, qui avaient commencé à se calmer en présence des troupes russes, reprennent leur essor. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement russe ne voudrait en aucun cas recourir, sans y être absolument forcé par les circonstances, à l'envoi de nouvelles troupes en Perse, ainsi que cela avait lieu en 1909 ; mais, si les troubles continuent à se propager, il se verra probablement obligé de renforcer également les escortes de quelques-uns de ses consulats du nord de la Perse, ainsi que celle d'Ispahan, afin d'assurer les communications et le commerce russe entre cette ville, d'un côté, et Téhéran et Chiraz, de l'autre.

Le Gouvernement Impérial aime à espérer que le Cabinet de Londres voudra bien le tenir au courant des démarches ultérieures qu'il compte entreprendre dans la présente affaire.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 23 septembre, 1911.

(Translation.)

IN a memorandum dated the 13th (26th) instant the British Embassy was good enough to communicate to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs the proposal of the Cabinet of London to establish a vice-consulate at Bam and to increase the strength of the escorts of the British consulats at Bushire, Shiraz, Kerman, and Bunder Abbas, and also of the British consulate at Ispahan, if the Russian Government had no objection, in view of the fact that this last town is situated in the Russian sphere.

The Imperial Government fully appreciate the considerations which have led the Cabinet of London to resort to the measures in question and state that they have no objection to the reinforcement of the English consular escort at Ispahan.

On their side, the Imperial Government are equally concerned at the general state of insecurity reigning not only in the region between Ispahan and Tehran, which has been quite lately the scene of repeated attacks by bands of brigands, but also in the provinces of North Persia, where the disturbances, which had begun to die down owing to the presence of Russian troops, are breaking out again. Nevertheless the Russian Government would not wish, unless they were absolutely compelled by circumstances, to resort to the dispatch of fresh troops to Persia, as in 1909 ; but if the disturbances continue to spread they also will probably be obliged to reinforce the escorts of some of their consulats in North Persia, as well as that at Ispahan, in order to secure communications and Russian trade between that town on the one side and Tehran and Shiraz on the other.

The Imperial Government hope that the Cabinet of London will be good enough to keep them informed of any further steps which they intend to take in the matter.

St. Petersburg, September 23, 1911.

No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 8, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 7th October; Indian troops for Shiraz.

You should confine your announcement to the Persian Government to a simple statement that, owing to possible danger to British lives and properties at Shiraz and elsewhere, His Majesty's Government are compelled to strengthen the consular guards at Shiraz and possibly also at Ispahan and Bushire.

You should say nothing as to patrolling roads or escorting caravans.

No. 20.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 8, 1911.

ESCORT reinforcements.

A member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited me yesterday, and urgently begged me on behalf of the Minister to advise His Majesty's Government to abandon intention of increasing consular escorts at Bushire, Shiraz, Ispahan, Bunder Abbas, and Kerman, which had been reported in the British press. He urged that since my note of the 14th October last year Persian Government had made every effort to improve matters, but their energies had been diverted to the suppression of the insurrection. He begged us still to have patience, more especially in view of the improvement of the situation at Shiraz and the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars.

I replied that the state of the southern roads had been, even before the ex-Shah's return, more insecure than ever, that the three main channels of our trade with Persia had been for some time practically closed, and that, though I believed no decision had been taken, I had recommended a scheme for increasing certain British consular escorts with a view to protecting British lives and trade independently of the situation at Shiraz. Scheme was now under consideration. He asked me how the escorts could protect trade, and I replied that they might occasionally be used to escort caravans.

Your telegram of the 8th October reached me after I had drafted above. Am I now authorised to make official communication to Persian Government on the lines indicated in your instructions? I await announcement that dispatch of troops has been definitely decided upon before doing so.

No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 9, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 5th October.

Unless some arrangement satisfactory to the Russian Government can be arrived at we cannot approve of Stokes's appointment,

No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 9, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at the Foreign Office on the 4th instant and questioned Sir A. Nicolson as to the announcement in the "Times" of that morning in respect to the dispatch of Indian cavalry regiments to Persia. Sir A. Nicolson replied that for some weeks past the situation at Shiraz had been going from bad to worse, while the condition of the whole of southern Persia approached very closely to anarchy. During the last two or three days the position at Shiraz had become really critical, and there appeared to be real danger to the lives of British subjects. We

were, therefore, contemplating a considerable and immediate increase to our consular guard at Shiraz and possibly at one or two other places. We had abstained from taking any such steps as long as possible in the hope that the situation might possibly improve, but our last telegrams were of so alarming a character that we could no longer defer taking measures to protect our own people.

Mirza Mehdi Khan asked if we could not give the Persian Government a little more time wherein to organise some protective measures. Sir A. Nicolson replied that we really could not wait longer, as we might be endangering the lives of our subjects; that he did not wish to blame the Persian Government, who doubtless had had to contend with great difficulties, but the case of our people was urgent and pressing, and it would be wrong for us to abstain from giving them such protection as was possible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 9, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 8th October.

Persian Minister called here to express hope that His Majesty's Government would not send increased escort to Shiraz, but leave Persian Government to re-establish order, which they had been hitherto prevented from doing by ex-Shah and other agitators. He was told that His Majesty's Government appreciated Persian Government's difficulties, but that latter's measures in this respect could not be efficacious for some time, and if, in the meanwhile, untoward incidents occurred affecting British lives and property, responsibility of Persian Government would be great, and British public opinion would compel His Majesty's Government to exact all kinds of reparations and compensations, and His Majesty's Government would itself be blamed for confiding in Persian assurances. It was therefore in interest of Persian Government that His Majesty's Government should take steps to accord necessary protection to British lives and property. We had no desire to occupy and no intention of retaining increased consular guards longer than was absolutely necessary.

Persian Minister then said his Government's troubles were due to encouragement and support of ex-Shah by Russians. He was told that if Russians had really done so Persian Government would have found ex-Shah more difficult to deal with than had actually been the case.

You should now make official announcement as instructed in my telegram of 8th October.

No. 24.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 10, 1911.

ACTING consul at Shiraz reports that the town is fairly quiet and that some of the disorderly Arabs have left, but good behaviour of the rest cannot be counted upon.

Kawam has issued proclamation that his only wish is to see order restored, and that there will be no reprisals for the past.

Whereabouts of Nizam and of Soulet unknown.

No. 25.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 11, 1911.

FOLLOWING from consul at Shiraz:—

“Disorders on roads are increasing. Telegraph gholam was robbed of horse and instruments 4 miles from Shiraz on the road to Bushire, and a second, accompanied by

Government sowar, is surrounded by Kashgais 8 miles north of Shiraz. Up post from Bushire robbed on 7th October. There is every probability that the Bushire road will be as completely closed in a day or two as that to Ispahan has been for the last month and will undoubtedly continue to remain."

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister here states that Ala-ed-Dowleh will proceed to Shiraz with a considerable force, and that Soulet and Kawam have settled their differences and have promised to assist Government in restoring order at once. I should like to have your opinion as to whether any satisfactory and immediate improvement in situation is likely to result if above facts are true.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 12, 1911.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day that I recognised the natural objection of Russia to the employment of a British officer to command gendarmerie in the north of Persia, but I pointed out to him that, as the organisation of the gendarmerie would remedy the injury to British trade in Persia, our action in supporting the Russian objection to the employment of Major Stokes ought to be recognised as extremely loyal to the *entente*.

Count Benckendorff admitted the force of this, but told me he gathered from what he heard that M. Kokovtsoff felt that the *tout ensemble* in Northern Persia was becoming increasingly British. Mr. Shuster seemed to select British people, and an Englishman had been appointed to control the Posts and Telegraphs. The general tendency seemed to be towards an increase of British influence in Northern Persia.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 28.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 13, 1911.

I REGRET to report that Miss Ross, an English lady doctor, has been attacked and severely beaten by Kuhgeluis in the neighbourhood of Abadeh, on her way to Shiraz from Ispahan. She has arrived at Abadeh on foot, having escaped alone.

Miss Ross was travelling with a large caravan of merchandise which was captured by the Kuhgeluis.

No. 29.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 13, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 14th October:—

Sir,

With reference to your telegram of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herein copy of the note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th instant, stating that His Majesty's Government had decided to increase the guard at His Majesty's consulate at Shiraz.

I also enclose a translation of his Excellency's reply.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, under instructions from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, owing to possible danger to British lives and property at Shiraz and elsewhere, His Majesty's Government are compelled to strengthen the consular guard at Shiraz, and possibly also the consular guards at Ispahan and Bushire.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 11, 1911.

I HAVE taken note of the contents of your Excellency's note of the 10th instant respecting the increase of the consular guard at Shiraz. In reply, I have the honour to state that, as your Excellency is aware, the maintenance of order in the southern provinces and the improvement of affairs in Fars, being the principal matters of concern to the Persian Government, were receiving special consideration. When the Government were taking fresh measures, and were about to succeed in bringing about the improvements in view, the Kawam incident and the taking of refuge by him in the British consulate frustrated this intention. Immediately afterwards, the insurrection of the deposed Shah, Salar-ed-Dowleh, and their followers broke out, and the Government's efforts had to be directed towards their extermination and the reparation of the mischief caused by them, which was indispensable for public security. The Government were therefore unable to direct their energy, as they wished, towards the settlement of affairs in the south. The money which had been prepared for fundamental reforms, and should have been expended on necessary undertakings, has been misspent. Furthermore, the moral assistance of the British Government, which might have given support to the measures taken by the Persian Government against the deposed Shah, was not forthcoming.

Now that the Government are free from embarrassments in the north and west, and are about to direct their attention to the south by employing their whole efforts to restore order and security, the step contemplated by the British Government, which might form a precedent for others, would be extremely unexpected and unwelcome on the part of a friendly Power.

The steps contemplated by the Persian Government in regard to Fars, which are communicated for your Excellency's information, are as follows :—

Firstly, order will be given to the Cossack detachment, numbering 350 men (horse, foot, and artillery), now on their way to Kashan, and who left Kum yesterday, to proceed at once to Shiraz after accomplishing their task at Kashan.

Secondly, Ala-ed-Dowleh, the new Governor-General of Fars, will shortly leave Tehran for his post, with the necessary force.

Thirdly, the Swedish officers, who have been specially engaged by the Persian Government for the organisation of the gendarmerie and the maintenance of security on the roads, are busily engaged, and the result of their work will soon be apparent. A sufficient force for the protection of the southern roads will be sent.

Fourthly, the Persian Government have taken steps to bring about a reconciliation between Kawam-ul-Mulk, Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and their followers, whose animosities were chiefly responsible for the complications in Fars, and these steps have now proved entirely successful. The two persons above named and their followers have resolved to make up their differences, and in accordance with a written agreement, sealed by Mirza Ibrahim Mujtehed, they have undertaken in future to absolutely obey the orders of the Government, and to take no measures tending to complicate the affairs of the country.

In view of the steps which have been and are being taken, I feel confident that within a very short time the defects still existing in the south will be entirely removed, and that perfect security will be established. In the meantime, every measure will be

taken for the protection of British lives and property and those of other foreign subjects.

Under these circumstances, it is expected that your Excellency, who represents a friendly Power in whose friendship the Persian Government have complete reliance, will dissuade the British Government from taking the step contemplated, so that the Persian Government may have time to complete the measures they have undertaken, and that an uncalled-for step on the part of the British Government may not delay the achievement of their plans.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 30.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 14, 1911.

SHIRAZ and southern roads.

Reference to your telegram dated 12th October.

Ala-ed-Dowleh informs me that if the proposal to dispatch British troops to Shiraz is carried out he will not proceed to take up his post at that place. Although he assures me that he will go if His Majesty's Government cancel their decision, I am rather doubtful whether, in that case, he would not discover some other excuse for refusing the appointment.

The considerable force to which Persian Minister referred is composed partly of the Cossacks who, as I reported in my telegram of 13th October, are now operating against Naib Hussein at Kashan, and I do not believe that the Russian colonel will permit them to go so far unaccompanied by the two Russian officers who are with them at present. In addition to the Cossacks, I believe it has been arranged to send a force of ordinary Persian troops with Ala-ed-Dowleh, but it has been proved in the past that such soldiery melts away at Shiraz.

In their representations to me, Persian Government have laid great emphasis on agreement concluded between Kawam and Soulet. Such a reconciliation is, however, scoffed at by Ala-ed-Dowleh, and, in reply to my enquiry, acting consul at Shiraz telegraphed as follows on the 13th October:—

“About ten days ago a document was sealed by Kawam, which had previously been sealed by Soulet, and which was subsequently sealed by Mirza Ibrahim, the chief stipulations of which were, that the ruling of the Persian Government in the matter of the Governor-General and the immediate dismissal of their forces should be accepted by both parties, that Soulet should protect traffic on the Bushire road, and that looted property should be returned by both sides. No importance was attached to document by Kawam, who signed it without oath and without keeping a copy—both parties intending signature merely to be a demonstration of public spirit. It is unnecessary to add that all its conditions have remained unfulfilled, and the general situation cannot conceivably be affected by it.

“It did not previously occur to me that this document could be contemplated in the light of a settlement, seeing the little importance attached to it at the time.”

Mr. Knox also informs me that Kawam is constantly telegraphing to the Premier, urging dismissal of Soulet from the ilkhaniship of the Kashgais, and that Soulet is, on his side, engaged in active intrigues against Kawam. In view of these reports, I am forced to regard any real settlement with some scepticism.

It cannot, however, be denied that situation in the town has shown momentary improvement since the time when the decision was come to to send British troops. If, therefore, this step has been decided on solely on account of the situation in Shiraz itself, the improvement already noted and the prospect, which it seems justifiable to entertain, that if Ala-ed-Dowleh proceeds a further amelioration will occur, perhaps warrant our holding our hand. In these circumstances, if, as I infer from your telegram of 8th October, the state of the roads is to be left out of consideration, Persian Government might be informed that we will postpone the dispatch of troops for a week, but that, unless Ala-ed-Dowleh is on his way to Shiraz when that period has elapsed, they will then leave for that town.

The roads, however, are in a truly desperate state, and pending the organisation

of an efficient gendarmerie, which is remote, there is no likelihood of any real improvement on them. In addition to the assault on Miss Ross, of which I informed you yesterday, a large robbery of British goods has occurred near Bunder Abbas, and latest reports from His Majesty's consul at Kerman show that no road between that town and Bunder Abbas is passable, and that conditions are worse than consul has yet known them. I append two telegrams which reached me yesterday from acting consul at Shiraz and His Majesty's consul-general, Bushire.

Shiraz telegram of 13th October :—

“All telegraph lines to Bushire have been totally interrupted for last forty hours. Another gholam sent out to investigate was robbed of everything and severely beaten. Loss of tools and telephones in these robberies is causing much inconvenience to department. So far as can yet be ascertained, damage already done is most serious, line being cut in several places and large quantities of wire carried off. It is at present impossible to obtain guards for working parties, and there is consequently little hope of prompt repair.”

Bushire telegram of 13th October :—

“Ala-ed-Dowleh telegraphs to Governor of Gulf Ports that Nizam and Soulet, who are in rebellion against the Government, are on their way to Kazerun to raise money; he continues that governor must at all costs oppose them, and should raise the khans on the road and in Tangistan against them, and that Nizam's estates are forfeited to the Government and should be taken possession of. Action on above lines can only result in continued and violent disorder on road.”

Cox's telegram then recapitulates a series of outrages on telegraph employés.

No. 31.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 14, 1911.

PERSIAN Government inform me that Soulet-ed-Dowleh has been dismissed and Zaigham appointed Ilkhani of Kashgais.

No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 14, 1911.

INCREASE of escorts in South Persia.

Telegram from Calcutta states that arrangements for transport of two cavalry squadrons and their transport mules can be made by Indian Marine. This detachment to land on 27th October at Bushire. By that date there will also be a half-company of infantry at Bushire; this could act as baggage-guard for the cavalry. Force thus constituted could start as soon as landed for Shiraz, provided country is, in the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, sufficiently open. Two squadrons would remain, and will be sent a few days subsequently.

Decision as to whether the force should proceed simultaneously or in two different detachments is left to you and Lieutenant-Colonel Cox; you should consult on this point with His Majesty's consul at Shiraz.

No. 33.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 9th October.

The Russian Minister is to-day informing Shuster that, as it is unfortunately found impossible to restrict Stokes's services to the south, the Russian Government must adhere to their protest to his engagement to organise Treasury gendarmerie.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 31st October :—

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the Bill passed by the Medjliss on the 10th October, empowering the Government to engage three staff, fourteen regimental, and three non-commissioned officers from the Swedish army. The three staff officers are to be employed as administrative staff officers, one at head-quarters, one in charge of the infantry administrative department, and one in charge of the administrative departments of the cavalry and artillery.

Five of the regimental officers are to be employed as general staff officers, three at army head-quarters, and one at the higher military college and one at the subalterns' military college.

I understand that the remaining nine officers are, in the first instance, to be employed as commandants and adjutants of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.

The scheme includes both organisation and command.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Bill passed by the Medjliss on October 10, 1911, empowering the Government to engage Twenty Swedish Officers.

THE National Assembly approves the following Bill, and his Highness the Regent commands its execution :—

Article 1. The Persian Government's Ministry of War is empowered to engage twenty Swedish officers, in accordance with the following seven articles, for administrative organisation, military instruction, and scientific tuition.

Art. 2. The number of Swedish officers, who will be engaged for three years, will be fourteen regimental officers and three staff officers.

Art. 3. Three other non-commissioned Swedish officers will be engaged for three years to assist the officers mentioned in the foregoing article to form an army cadre and to instruct subalterns and individual privates.

Art. 4. The fourteen regimental officers will be divided in the army as follows :—

The Ministry of War	3 officers
„ infantry	6 „
„ cavalry	2 „
„ artillery	1 officer
„ military college	2 officers

Art. 5. The three staff officers will be divided as follows :—

The Ministry of War	1 officer
„ infantry	1 „
„ cavalry and artillery	1 „

Art. 6. The three non-commissioned officers will be divided as follows :—

The cavalry	1 officer
„ artillery	1 „
„ military college of subalterns	1 „

Art. 7. For the employment of the fourteen regimental officers, the three staff officers, and the three non-commissioned officers the Ministry of War is given a credit of 583,730 krans.

Art. 8. The division of the high and subordinate officers will be in accordance with the following table :—

The Ministry of War—							
The chief of the army employés, with the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel	1
Captain for the infantry	1
Captain for the artillery	1
Captain for the army administrative department	1

The infantry—							
Captains for the infantry	3
First lieutenants	3
Captain for the infantry administrative department	1
							<u>7</u>
The cavalry—							
Captain for the cavalry	1
First lieutenant	1
Non-commissioned officer	1
							<u>3</u>
The artillery—							
First lieutenant for the artillery	1
Non-commissioned officer	1
							<u>2</u>
For the administrative departments of the artillery and cavalry—							
First lieutenant	1
Officers' military college—							
Captain for the infantry	1
Subalterns' military college—							
Infantry lieutenant	1
Non-commissioned officer	1
							<u>2</u>
Total							<u>20</u>

No. 35.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 15, 1911.

ATTACK on Miss Ross.

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with my usual custom in important robbery cases, I brought the facts to the notice of Persian Government, stating that if the claim which would be presented at Shiraz by His Majesty's consular officer were not settled locally, I should be compelled to claim from the central authorities.

I am now addressing a further note to Persian Government, as I hear this morning that all Miss Ross's surgical instruments have been stolen, pointing out the urgency of a restitution of the articles carried off or payment of their value.

I can, however, hold out no hope of any early settlement, except in the event of our accepting some payment as an act of grace, and such a step would, I fear, preclude the hope of obtaining any compensation over and above the value of the property stolen.

No. 36.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

Sir,

Stockholm, October 12, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Baron Ramel stated to me on the 10th instant that the Swedish Government had received a request for the appointment of seven more officers for service in Persia, in order to organise the gendarmerie, in addition to those already sent to Tehran. Besides these officers a request had also been received, through the Persian Minister in Paris, for the loan of an officer of superior rank, in order to hold the chief command. He had, he added, no knowledge of any intention on the part of Persia to ask for the loan of Swedish officers in order to organise a small army, as stated in the press. I have since ascertained that as many as fifty officers have volunteered for service, and these are for the most part men of good standing in their profession. Baron Ramel thought that, although the army authorities had not been averse to the employment of a few officers in Persia, as this would afford them useful experience and training, there might be some difficulty in sparing a large number. He could, however, say nothing definite. As I have remarked before, I believe

the type of officer who is volunteering is one likely to be of considerable service to Persia under present circumstances. Count Ehrensward expressed his satisfaction at the friendly attitude adopted in this matter by the Governments of Great Britain and Russia.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

No. 37.

Mirza Mehdi Khan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

THE Persian Minister has the honour to refer the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to his conversations with Sir Arthur Nicolson on the 4th, 7th, and 12th instant regarding the intention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to strengthen their consular guards in Shiraz and possibly elsewhere. When on the 4th instant Sir Arthur Nicolson informed the Persian Minister of the intention of His Britannic Majesty's Government, Mirza Mehdi Khan stated that, in his opinion, such an action at the present moment was most undesirable and unnecessary. The Persian Government had, before the recent lamentable events (viz., the return of the ex-Shah under the circumstances already well known, and the activities of Salar-ed-Dowleh) taken elaborate measures to keep the province of Fars and the trade routes secure.

As His Britannic Majesty's Government well know, the efforts of the Persian Government had not remained fruitless; order and security was maintained, and this fact was recognised by His Britannic Majesty's Government. The recent deplorable and serious events, however, diverted the attention of the Persian Government to the northern and western districts. Just at the time when they were busy initiating reforms and putting things in order, when they had, on the one hand, contracted a loan and on the other brought foreign experts to assist them in the reorganisation of the Departments of State, the events referred to took place; the Persian Government had therefore to devote attention, energy, and money to save the country from so great a danger which was threatening it. Now that they had done so, they would concentrate their whole attention to the province of Fars and to the southern districts and the trade routes; the Swedish military officers have been brought to Persia to organise a gendarmerie for this very purpose. The Persian Minister further pointed out to Sir Arthur Nicolson that, in view of the above facts, any action by Great Britain would produce a bad impression, and would be taken as a departure from the generous policy always pursued by His Britannic Majesty's Government. Mirza Mehdi Khan said that in his opinion the situation in Shiraz, however unsatisfactory, was not such as to be of danger to Europeans, and begged that His Britannic Majesty's Government might not take any action.

After reporting this conversation to his Government, Mirza Mehdi Khan received a telegram from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he communicated to Sir Arthur Nicolson on the 7th instant. The Minister for Foreign Affairs approved what Mirza Mehdi Khan had said in his conversation of the 4th instant, but asked him to add that, had His Britannic Majesty's Government given Persia their moral support, the Persian Government would have been able to devote their whole attention to the south. The Persian Government therefore begged that now, instead of increasing their consular guards, His Britannic Majesty's Government might give them this so-much-needed moral support which it is their right and obligation to give. The Persian Government are daily harassed by most serious interferences of the Russian authorities—interferences to which the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government has every time been drawn. The Persian Government needs the support of Great Britain to put a stop to these interferences, which encourage malefactors and lower the prestige of the Government.

On the 12th instant the Persian Minister communicated to Sir Arthur Nicolson another telegram from his Government. In view of the communications made through Mirza Mehdi Khan to the Foreign Office, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had been surprised to receive a note from Sir George Barclay saying that it was intended to increase the consular guards in Shiraz and possibly in Ispahan and Bushire. The Persian Government had taken measures to restore order immediately. The Ala-ed-Dowleh had been appointed Governor-General of Fars and was on the point of leaving Tehran with a strong military force. A detachment of Cossacks, which had been sent to Kashan, had orders to proceed to Shiraz. The Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the Kawam-ul-

Mulk had made peace and had undertaken to act in perfect unison in assisting the Central Government to keep order. They had further solemnly promised to obey the Central Government in every matter, and had sent out of Shiraz all their armed followers. The Soulet-ed-Dowleh had further undertaken to keep the Shiraz-Bushire road secure. Moreover, the Swedish officers who have been engaged by the Persian Government for the purpose of organising a gendarmerie and protecting the trade routes arrived in Persia some time ago and are well advanced in their work.

Under the circumstances the Persian Government do not see the need of any action on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The sole cause of unrest in Shiraz was the dissension between the Kashgais and the Kawamis; this has been put right by the fact that the Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the Kawam-ul-Mulk have made peace and are working in unison. European subjects are not exposed to any danger, and their safety is, as it has always been, the special care of the Persian Government. But Shiraz is already quiet, and, in view of the measures taken by the Persian Government and the fact that they are now able to devote their whole attention to the south, there is not the least cause for anxiety as to the future.

The Persian Minister therefore, on behalf of his Government, begs to repeat the request that His Britannic Majesty's Government might not take the contemplated action.

Persian Legation, London, October 13, 1911.

No. 38.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 14th October.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general, Bushire:—

“Dispatch of cavalry. I have understood all along that three squadrons of cavalry only were going to Shiraz and one remaining at Bushire. If this is so I consider force should move up in one body. Knox only questions feasibility of this course on account of supply difficulties at the Shiraz end, but these can be surmounted from Bushire. But if, however, four squadrons are to be sent up, I see no objection to their proceeding in two detachments unless any untoward development occurs between now and 27th October.”

I conclude that four squadrons are intended for eventual distribution between Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan, and on this assumption I would propose that three squadrons should move up to Shiraz simultaneously, fourth squadron remaining at Bushire.

No. 39.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 16, 1911.

ATTACK on Miss Ross. See your telegram of yesterday.

If you can obtain value of property stolen you should accept it, but reserve the right to insist later on the Persian Government paying an indemnity to Miss Ross.

No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at the Foreign Office to-day to renew the request of his Government that the dispatch of reinforcements to the consular guards should be postponed. Sir A. Nicolson went over all the old ground again with him and read to him the substance of most of the telegrams which we had received, and pointed out to him the extremely critical situation at Shiraz about a fortnight ago, and the

deplorable condition of the roads at the present moment. Although Shiraz was for the moment fairly tranquil, this temporary improvement was largely owing, we understood, to the knowledge that we were dispatching additional escorts, and there was no guarantee whatever that a recrudescence of the former critical state of things would not take place if we were to postpone sending our detachments. We really could not wait till some indefinite day for the Persian Government to take necessary and, above all, efficient measures themselves. The presence of our increased escorts would in reality be of assistance to the Persian authorities, and we could not admit that they would diminish the prestige of the Ala-ed-Dowleh or any other Governor-General, as the Persian Minister asserted. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was afraid that the Minister must inform his Government that, with every possible desire to show our good-will to them, we could not postpone measures undertaken for the protection of British lives and property. We had allowed a very long period to elapse before deciding on these steps in the hope that the situation would improve.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 41.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 18th October :—

Sir,

With reference to my telegram of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit herein copy of a further note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against the dispatch of reinforcements for the consular guard at Shiraz.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

WITH reference to my note of the 11th October in answer to your Excellency's respecting the increase of the consular guard at Shiraz, I have the honour to inform you that the situation in Fars has improved on account of the appointment of his Excellency Ala-ed-Dowleh to the post of Governor-General, and at present the town is quiet and there is no disturbance in the neighbourhood. As you have already been informed, the Cossack force at Kashan has been ordered to proceed to Shiraz with the guns and ammunition now with it, and another force consisting of 3,000 men will be sent by degrees. The Swedish officers are at present making plans for the formation of a gendarmerie for Fars, so that after preliminary arrangements two of the new Swedish officers, who will arrive on the 1st December, will be sent there with a staff of Persian officers. In order to hasten the execution of this plan, instructions will be sent that before the arrival of the Swedish officers the men required for the gendarmerie shall be enlisted, so that when the officers arrive at Shiraz they will be able to begin their effective duties without delay. Orders have been given to some companies of soldiers who have arrived at Shiraz from Behbahan to guard the foreign consulates.

Although the Persian Government was not entirely free from its embarrassments in the north and west, and had, without delay, turned its attention to the south with the object of establishing full security in that region, the news of the proposed dispatch of 500 Indian troops from Bombay on the 24th October is contrary to the expectation of the Persian Government and inconsistent with the friendship existing between the two States. The confidence of the Persian Government in its success in the task of restoring order in the south will be replaced by a feeling of disappointment, and Ala-ed-Dowleh, who is considered by the Persian Government to be the only person who can restore order in Fars, would be prevented from taking up his appointment.

I hoped that, in view of the explanations contained in my note of the 11th instant, your Excellency would dissuade your Government from sending the Indian troops

in question. Now that the news of their intended dispatch has been received, it is obvious to what extent the Persian Government's plans will be hampered. Ala-ed-Dowleh, for instance, on hearing the news, gave up the intention of going to Fars, saying that he could not admit of the taking of such a measure during his governorship.

It is obvious that the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh, the dispatch of the forces mentioned, and the measures contemplated by the Persian Government, the preliminaries of which are already in hand, are better means for the restoration of order in Fars than the dispatch of Indian troops, which may possibly bring about consequences contrary to those intended, and render the measures of the Persian Government ineffective.

Therefore I earnestly hope that your Excellency will inform your Government without delay of the measures taken and in contemplation by the Persian Government, and that you will dissuade your Government from dispatching the Indian troops so that Ala-ed-Dowleh should start as early as possible and put affairs in Fars in order.

In the hope of receiving a favourable reply, I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Telegram continues :—

Your telegram of 14th October leads me to assume that it has been decided to dispatch as many as 400 British troops, and that, consequently, the impression I had received from your telegram of 8th October (please see my telegram of 14th October) that the condition of the roads was to be left out of consideration was incorrect, and that the troops are intended as part of our scheme for the roads. In these circumstances I venture to submit that it might be politic to inform Persian Government of the possibility of British caravans being escorted by the reinforced escorts, and further, that these reinforcements will be withdrawn as soon as effective results have been obtained from measures taken by Persian Government to restore security on the roads, and to maintain order in Shiraz.

No. 42.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

I am informed by Persian Government that they suspect Mohamed Ali Mirza to be at present staying in governor's house at Ashkabad and to be planning a descent upon Meshed.

My Russian colleague doubts His Majesty being at former place. From the last information that he had received it would appear that Mohamed Ali Mirza was proceeding to Bujnurd from the Astrabad district, possibly *en route* for Meshed.

No. 43.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day's date.

Major Sykes telegraphs that the Governor of Bujnurd expects Mohamed Ali Mirza shortly to arrive at that town.

No. 44.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 18, 1911.

SITUATION at Shiraz.

Reference to my telegram of 14th October,

Mr. Acting Consul Knox telegraphs as follows, dated 17th October :—

“There seems no indication at present of Kashgais quieting down. Ilkhaniship of the tribe is already being claimed by Soulet-es-Sultaneh, the brother of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and it is reliably stated that the latter has written to the chief mullahs in Shiraz to the effect that he is impelled by the rumours reaching him from the town to stir up general disorders in the south. A telegram has also been received from Zaigham-es-Sultaneh stating that he will delay his departure until a force of Arabs is sent to meet him on the road, Principal Arab chiefs quitted Shiraz this morning, presumably with this intention.”

No. 45.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 19, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 20th October :—

Sir,

I have the honour to state that I called yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said that he wished to speak to me about a very pessimistic telegram which he had received from M. Poklewsky. It seemed from M. Poklewsky's report that the outlook in Persia was exceedingly dark; things were going from bad to worse; disorders were increasing, and he (M. Nératof) did not think that the Russian Government could much longer refrain from taking “measures of extreme rigour,” and, in fact, proceeding to an “occupation” of Persian territory. In answer to various questions which I put to him, his Excellency said that the disorders were particularly serious in the Ardebil region, where the Shahsevans were on the move, and there had been frequent attacks on Russian convoys. Another element of disorder was that Yeprem, who had at least maintained the outward semblance of a police force, was now reported to be quarrelling with the Persian Government and leaving his post. Speaking of the pending Cabinet crisis, M. Nératof said that if the “extremists” obtained control at Tehran there would be no authority left in Persia with which to deal. He then went on to speak of Mr. Shuster. He complained strongly of that gentleman's attempt to obtain a control over the whole Persian administration such as was quite incompatible with Russian interests, and referred particularly to Mr. Shuster's declared intention of obtaining a free hand from the Medjliss in regard to railway concessions and loans.

I said that his Excellency already knew what were the views of His Majesty's Government regarding an occupation of Persia. If Russia occupied North Persia, I thought it would be a matter of extreme difficulty for you to defend such a step before British public opinion. I was therefore certain that His Majesty's Government would do everything in their power to remove the causes which, in the opinion of the Russian Government, called for Russian intervention. I reminded M. Nératof that Russia had recently vetoed the various proposals put forward with the object of enabling the Persian Government to restore order in the country—proposals which, for our part, we had welcomed as affording some hope of an improvement in the state of things in the south. Russia had objected to these proposals, but she had suggested nothing to take their place. I begged his Excellency to tell me frankly what it was that the Russian Government wished done.

M. Nératof replied that the first thing necessary was that Mr. Shuster should understand that he must act in concert with, and in accordance with the interests of, Russia, and of course, his Excellency added, of Great Britain also. The Persian reforms must be proceeded with gradually and in such a manner as to take Russian interests into account. It must be remembered that the question was not merely one of the good of Persia, but also of the special position of Russia. If Mr. Shuster obtained a free hand from the Medjliss in regard to railway concessions and loans, it would be necessary that he should give an undertaking, in such a way as to inspire confidence that he would keep it, to the effect that he would act entirely according to the wishes of the two Powers. Mr. Shuster, however, was hardly the man to give an undertaking of that kind. His Excellency regretted that Russia should play an “obstructive rôle” in Persia, but it had been forced upon her against her will.

I left his Excellency, saying that I would report his remarks to you. This morning, fearing that the Russian Government might possibly take some immediate

action, I addressed a private letter to M. Nératof, saying that I thought I had understood from him that the Russian Government had not yet taken a definite decision with regard to the proposed measures in Persia, but begging him, in the contrary case, to give me the earliest possible notice. His Excellency replied that the Russian Government were at present only considering the necessity of a military expedition, and that they counted on the assistance of His Majesty's Government in endeavouring to avoid active intervention on a large scale.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 46.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 20, 1911.

OWING to a dictatorial letter from Shuster in which he complained of the settlement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of an unimportant Russian claim without reference to himself, Minister for Foreign Affairs resigned, but has withdrawn his resignation in view of the serious crisis which it threatened to produce.

No. 47.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 20, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

Major Sykes telegraphs that Mohamed Ali Mirza has apparently betaken himself to Tashkend in Transcaspia.

My Russian colleague has no confirmation of this rumour.

No. 48.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 21, 1911.

MY telegram of 20th October.

Our agent at Astrabad reports that ex-Shah is in neighbourhood of Gumesch Tepe.

No. 49.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 22, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please refer to Mr. O'Beirne's telegram dated 19th October.

The principal feature of the situation in Tehran is the manner in which the extremists and the treasurer-general are co-operating. There is very great tension between Shuster and the Cabinet. A threatened ministerial crisis was avoided by a proposal to induce the Medjliss to curtail treasurer-general's powers, but this idea appears for the time being to have been tacitly abandoned, in consequence of the opposition of the Medjliss, who feared it would cause Shuster to resign office.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whom I saw yesterday, expressed himself very bitterly in regard to treasurer-general. His Excellency gave me to understand that the Cabinet greatly resent the firm control Shuster is exercising over Government funds, and that they are alive to the danger which his defiant attitude towards the two Powers involves.

I see no reason to suppose that Persian Government are responsible for treasurer-general's recent utterances in the British press, which I hear will be followed by a more detailed indictment of the policy of Great Britain and Russia in Persia.

Apart, however, from these publications, Shuster has taken no specific step, such as could justify action on the lines indicated in Mr. O'Beirne's telegram of 19th October. Russian Government must, however, find the general trend of his policy obnoxious.

No. 50.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 22, 1911.

RECENT incidents on southern roads.

Three hundred soldiers Hamadan Regiment accompanying post encountered 200 Kuhgeluis near Yezdikhast on Shiraz-Ispahan road, and were routed by them after severe conflict. Four bales piece-goods, property of Messrs. Ziegler, robbed on Shiraz-Bushire road 13th October. Messrs. Dixon notify loss of goods value 1,400*l.* on the same occasion as attack on Miss Ross. 400*l.* worth of property of Messrs. Weir robbed 3rd October near Kamarij on Shiraz-Bushire road.

No. 51.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 23, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 11th September,* I have the honour to transmit herein extract of a letter from the British vice-consul at Sultanabad respecting the situation in that district after the defeat of Amir Mufakham.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Vice-Consul Strauss to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Sultanabad, September 16, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my yesterday's wire running thus:—

“Royalists took Sultanabad on the 14th September.”

On the 10th September Amir Mufakham departed with his people, marching via Gulpeighan and Khonsar to the Bakhtiari country, and the same day Sardar Zaffar Bakhtiari left towards Kum. Both together had about 1,500 well-armed men, and it made an unfavourable impression in the town that they gave up their position here without firing a shot in defence of it. The Sultanabad people then wrote to Salar-ed-Dowleh for protection. They got the reply that, if their letter had not reached him the very same day, he would have started for Sultanabad with 30,000 men and 22 guns to destroy the place entirely. Two days later he sent about 400 men to take possession of the town. Most of them were people of the well-known robber Abbas Khan Chenari.

During his short stay in Sultanabad Sardar Zaffar collected about 50,000 tomans of taxes (“malat”). The poor peasants of our province have suffered great losses; they were robbed by Salar-ed-Dowleh's men as well as by the Bakhtiaris.

The news is spread that Salar-ed-Dowleh has appointed Hajji Seif-ed-Dowleh, the brother of Ain-ed-Dowleh, Governor of Sultanabad. People say he will be here in about two days. His park and castle were looted and destroyed by Amir Mufakham.

I have, &c.

T. L. STRAUSS.

No. 52.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Kerman describing the deplorable condition of the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road.

Since the date of this despatch there has been, as reported in my telegram of the 2nd September, a further large robbery, in which Messrs. Castelli lost heavily, and there have also been other robberies in which British Indians have suffered.

With regard to other trade routes in Persia, I regret to have to report that no improvement in the state of affairs described in my despatch of the 5th September* can be said to have shown itself, and the political chaos prevailing at Shiraz, as reported in my recent telegrams, naturally prevents any organised attempt on the part of the local authorities to restore order on the trade routes leading to that city.

Further north the dislocation caused by the advance of the rebellious Salar-ed-Dowleh, and the organisation of the military expedition sent to meet him, has rendered the safe conduct of travellers and caravans even more precarious than formerly. The Bakhtiari, however, seem convinced of the necessity of restoring order on their road, and are contemplating measures which may fructify as soon as the khans can turn their undivided attention to them.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *October 3.*—Since writing the above I have been informed by the Persian Government that the Government of Behbahan has been entrusted to the Bakhtiari khans. As you will remember it was the appointment of a governor inimical to Bakhtiari interests which was the signal for an outbreak of disorders on the Bakhtiari road.

G. B.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Consul Haig to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Kerman, August 24, 1911.

WITH reference to the question asked in the House of Commons on the 10th July, 1911, regarding the trade routes between Kerman and Bunder Abbas, I have the honour to inform you that I have received no report of the robbery of any carpets subsequent to the robbery of those belonging to Messrs. Nearco, Castelli et Frères in April last, but owing to the insecurity of the road a large caravan conveying carpets has been delayed for several weeks past between Kerman and Baft, and has not yet been able to proceed on its way.

2. There are three roads between Kerman and Bunder Abbas ordinarily used by caravans: (1) by Jiruft and Rudbar, (2) by Baft and Daulatabad, and (3) by Sirjan, and the condition of all three during the past three months has been deplorable. The sufferers have been Hindu traders in Kerman and Bunder Abbas, British-Indian subjects, whose caravans were robbed on the 2nd July, at Tizirk (near Sirjan), when property to the value 1,898.50 krans was stolen, on an unascertained date early in July, when property worth 11,007.75 krans was stolen by Bashakirdis in Rudbar, and on the 20th July, when property worth 9,735.50 krans was stolen at the Gudar-i-Surkh, on the Jiruft road. The value of the property stolen amounts to 22,647.55 krans, or about 453l., and the freight paid on it to about 262l., the direct and immediate loss of the Hindu merchants being thus about 715l. To this sum must be added the interest charged by their vendors, and the loss caused by their missing their market. Loss under these two heads is incurred not only on goods actually stolen, but also on those delayed owing to the insecurity of the road.

3. Not only is there no prospect of any improvement in the condition of the roads, but on the contrary every probability that matters will become worse. There is no governor in Rudbar, and the Bashakirdis, who inhabit this district, are not even

* See "Persia, No. 3 (1912)," No. 369.

nominally under control. On the Baft road two sections of the Afshar tribe have taken the field against each other, and the whole of this road between Kerman and Daulatabad is insecure. I have just been informed that 3,000 of the Baharlu tribe from Fars, with two guns, are marching to plunder the villages in the Sirjan district, in order to avenge a defeat suffered by them there last year, and that 350 robbers of the Baharlu and Ainarlu tribes are raiding the villages of the Rafsinjan district. On the other hand, it is commonly reported that the acting governor is wilfully exaggerating the numbers of the robbers for the purpose of filling his own pockets by obtaining sanction from Tehran to military expenditure on an extravagant scale. I am unable at present to say whether the estimates of the strength of the robbers or the rumours of the acting governor's dishonesty are more likely to be true, but whichever be true the prospect is sufficiently lamentable. Until lately, I should have hesitated to suspect the present acting governor of wilfully magnifying the woes of his country, but I have recently been reluctantly compelled to accept the view that this official regards his position merely as means of filling his own pockets. If the robbers are, indeed, so numerous as is reported there is very little chance of any effective action being taken against them, for the present acting governor, who also holds the appointment of commander of the provincial forces, is the Sardar-i-Nusrat, who recently retreated from Persian Baluchistan before Saïd Khan and Bahram Khan, and his lack of prowess in the field is not counterbalanced by any administrative ability. Most of the provincial troops are inferior in courage, mobility, and other soldierly qualities to the robbers against whom they may have to serve, their pay is in arrears, and their strength is short of the sanctioned establishment. I would add, to their credit, that I believe they are as willing to fight as their leader is.

4. Since my arrival in Kerman, on the 31st May, 1910, I have failed to recover from the local government any compensation for highway robberies, and my failure has not been due to lack of importunity. The local government has not been sufficiently strong to compel robbers to disgorge and the general revenues have not sufficed for the settlement of claims. Baluchistan has paid no revenue for the past four years, excepting an insignificant sum plundered by the Sardar-i-Nusrat during the recent expedition. The collections in other parts of the province have been imperfect and irregular and a large part of the money collected has gone into the pockets of rapacious governors, of whom Kerman has had five during the past year, and of the heads of departments established by the constitutional government, which in this province is neither understood nor appreciated except by those who hope to enrich themselves by the tenure of some office in the administration. I see no prospect of being able to obtain satisfaction of any of the claims which I have put forward and am constantly pressing on the local government, and the disproportion between the amount of these claims and the available resources of the Government has rendered the local officials hopeless and apathetic so that they no longer regard the satisfaction of claims as being within the range of practical politics.

I am, &c.

T. W. HAIG, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

No. 53.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 4, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 4th ultimo,* I have the honour to report that the total defeat of Arshad-ed-Dowleh and the rout of Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces have broken the back of the insurrection. Each was completely decisive as regards the danger threatening the capital from the east and west respectively. In the former fight a mixed Government force, 1,000 strong, of Armenians and Bakhtiaris, under Yeprim and the Bakhtiari Khans, Sardar Mohtashem, Sardar Bahadur, Amir Mujahid, and Zaigham-es-Sultaneh, assisted by a former German non-commissioned officer Herr Haase, who has long been in Persian service, routed the insurgents, who numbered about 2,000, at Imam Zadeh Jaafer, in the district of Veramin, on the 5th ultimo, capturing Arshad-ed-Dowleh, who was afterwards shot. As a result of this engagement and of a smaller victory of the Government troops under Sardar Mohiy, in the Saved Kuh district, two

See "Persia, No. 3 (1912)," No. 367.

or three days later, the Turkomans, who formed the bulk of Arshad-ed-Dowleh's force, made the best of their way back to their own country, the movement on behalf of the ex-Shah in Mazanderan collapsed, and His Majesty left Savad Kuh, took boat at Kara Tepe on the Caspian, and arrived at Gumesh Tepe with only seven followers. When last heard of he was reported to be near Astrabad with a following of some 400 Turkomans.

Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces, after defeating Amir-i-Mufakham in the Malayir district on or about the 6th ultimo, occupied Sultanabad, the Bakhtiaris who were in that town under Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang retiring to Kum. Salar-ed-Dowleh himself skirting Sultanabad advanced to Noberan with a force of some 4,000 men with the intention of proceeding either via Saveh or Zarand to Tehran. His telegrams to Tehran showed that he was now playing for his own hand. In them he used a Persian expression equivalent to the use of the first person plural by sovereigns. As soon as it became known that he was taking the Zarand route a well-equipped Government force of some 1,200 Armenians and Bakhtiaris under Yeprim, Sardars Mohtashem and Bahadur, was dispatched to deal with him. The encounter which ensued and in which the Bakhtiaris from Kum under Sardar Zaffar and Sardar Jang took part, took place on the 27th ultimo in the neighbourhood of a village named Bagh-i-Shah, 8 miles from Saveh. The combined Government forces must have numbered some 2,000 men. The insurgent force was a horde of miscellaneous tribesmen—Kalhurs, Lurs, and others—4,000 strong, commanded by Daoud Khan chief of the Kalhurs, and other tribal chieftains. The fighting resulted in the rout of the insurgents with the loss of 500 killed, the loss on the Government side being trifling. The defeated insurgents fled westwards, and Salar-ed-Dowleh, who appears to have taken no part in the fighting and to have awaited the issue at Noberan, is now reported to be in the neighbourhood of Hamadan closely pursued by the Government troops.

The only undefeated force on the ex-Shah's side which now remains is that of Shuja-ed-Dowleh in Azerbaijan. This force has been successful in several petty combats in the near neighbourhood of Tabreez, capturing Basminch, a village some thirty minutes east of Tabreez, and even occupying the suburb of Karamalik, ten minutes west of that town. Except for the Julfa road which still remains open, Tabreez is completely invested but for a fortnight there has hardly been any fighting. The defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh appears to have discouraged Shuja-ed-Dowleh's followers as defections from his force are reported, and His Majesty's consul at Tabreez states that the opinion is gaining ground that he is only holding out in the hope of making terms for himself.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 54.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 4, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the monthly summary of events in Persia up to date.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Monthly Summary of Events for September 4 to October 3.

Tehran.

The Medjliss.—At the sittings of the 17th and 26th September, the renewal of the contracts of eight Belgian customs officials was discussed and agreed upon. The salaries are as follows:—

	First Year.	Second Year.	Third Year.
	Fr.	Fr.	Fr.
Director at Enzeli	17,000	18,000	19,000
„ Bushire	17,000	18,000	19,000
„ Julfa	15,000	16,000	17,000
Deputy Director at Urmia ..	9,000	9,500	10,000
Director at Astará	14,000	15,000	16,000
„ Bunder Abbas	13,000	14,000	15,000
„ Meshed-i-Ser	13,000	14,000	15,000
Inspector in Azerbaijan ..	9,000	9,500	10,000

At the sitting of the 19th September a report presented by the educational committee dealing with the proposed institution of five primary schools was read and passed. One school is for Tehran and the others for the provinces. The Government is to subsidise the Tehran school at the rate of 600*l.* a-year and the provincial schools at 480*l.* a-year each. Half the pupils will have to pay fees and the other half will receive tuition free.

At the same sitting the Minister of the Interior presented a project for the engagement of seven more Swedish officers, *i.e.*, one captain and six lieutenants. The captain is to organise the supply departments of the gendarmerie and police, while the lieutenants are required to form a gendarmerie training college. For this purpose a credit of 28,000 tomans was asked for and agreed upon without any debate.

The re-engagement of Mr. George New, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, by the Persian Telegraph Administration, a step which is strongly supported by Mr. Shuster, has lately been before the Medjliss. When the question was first raised, the Medjliss refused to agree to the proposal, but Mr. New's engagement for three years at 800*l.* a-year was sanctioned on the 3rd October.

On the 26th September the Electoral Law was sent by the Medjliss to the Cabinet for revision.

Yeprim has been granted a life pension of 3,600 tomans a-year.

The Press.—The “Medjliss” is the only newspaper which now appears, and it contains nothing of much interest.

Tabreez.

Early in September, Shuja-ed-Dowleh, working in the interests of the ex-Shah, moved to within a few miles of Tabreez, and threatened to attack the town if not recognised as Governor-General on behalf of Mohamed Ali. Since then Shuja-ed-Dowleh has invested the town and only the Julfa road has remained open. There has been little real fighting between the force defending the city and Shuja's irregulars, and in view of events elsewhere it seems that Shuja is now anxious to make terms.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

The province of Ghilan has remained quiet, and Mazanderan is now again under the authority of the central Government. Several Mazanderan chieftains who joined the ex-Shah have been captured and brought to Tehran. Amir Mukarrem has taken refuge with the Russian consular agent at Barfrush. There is as yet no real Persian authority at Astrabad, and it is only through the action of Russian consular officers there that order is maintained. There have been several outrages on Russian subjects in the district.

Meshed.

The province of Khorassan has remained normal under an acting governor. The appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General was announced on the 27th September, but he is now being urged to go to Fez instead.

Ispahan.

All the roads leading to Ispahan have been unsafe, and robberies are reported on nearly all of them. Several posts from and to Tehran have been robbed, the caravan-serais have been plundered on the Ahwaz road and goods carried off on other roads.

The Kashan district has been the scene of fighting between the Bakhtiaris and Naib Hussein's followers. On the 22nd September, Naib Hussein attacked Kashan and succeeded in capturing the town after two days' fighting with the Bakhtiari defenders. Ten Russian Cossacks travelling up to Tehran were held up by the naib, who robbed them of their horses, arms, and other equipments. He apparently thought better of this later and released the prisoners, returning their effects to them. A detachment of the Persian Cossack Brigade under two Russian officers is being sent from Tehran against the naib.

Yezd.

The state of affairs at Yezd is deplorable. There appears to be no authority whatever, and the town and district is dominated by roughs. The new Governor of Kerman was ordered by the Government to restore order at Yezd on his way to his post, but he has been unable as yet to enter the city. Some of the Government officials have taken refuge at the telegraph office. Absolute anarchy prevails in the district.

Seistan.

The roads all round Seistan continue to be unsafe. The Kainat is still quiet.

Kerman.

Amir Azam has not yet reached his post, and Sardar-i-Nosret is acting in the interim.

The state of the roads, especially that to Bunder Abbas, is extremely unsatisfactory, and robberies are of constant occurrence, and British trade is greatly suffering in consequence. The matter is reported upon in a separate despatch of the 2nd instant.

Kermanshah.

Since the departure of Salar-ed-Dowleh, the town has been fairly quiet, as all the bad characters left with the army. Kerim Khan at Kasr-i-Shirin is reported to be in a state of panic, being on bad terms with everyone on both sides of the border. Two cases of cholera were reported on the 16th September from Kasr.

Hamadan.

After his defeat on the 27th September, Salar-ed-Dowleh retreated towards Hamadan, hotly pursued by the Government forces. It is reported that he reached Hamadan at the beginning of October, and prepared to defend himself there. The telegraph line having been cut, the only communication with Tehran is over the Russian telephone via Kazvin. Accurate information is at present unavailable.

No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

YOU may assure Persian Government that, if they will devise an effective scheme to restore security or protect the roads, the British escorts will be used solely as consular guards to protect consulates and British lives and property in the towns where they are located, and will not patrol roads or make expeditions pending the execution of Persian scheme. When Persian scheme is in operation and effective, increased escorts will be withdrawn.

The escorts have already started, and their distribution between Ispahan, Shiraz, and Bushire is left to your discretion.

No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1911.

YOUR telegram of the 19th October.

I saw Count Benckendorff, and urged upon him that I could see nothing which necessitated an occupation of North Persia.

Count Benckendorff replied that M. Nératof had been rendered most anxious by the prospect that the control of affairs in Persia was falling into Shuster's hands. It was impossible for his Government to allow the predominance in Persia of a power which took no account whatever of them. He had, however, not heard that a military expedition was contemplated.

To this I replied that, although I quite understood that Russia must protect her own interests if they were being undermined, I thought the danger was over-estimated.

Please speak to M. Nératof in sense of the above.

No. 57.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

I HAVE made communication to Persian Government indicated in your telegram of yesterday, and have authorised British consul-general at Bushire to send 200 men to Shiraz and 100 to Ispahan as soon as possible.

No. 58.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 24, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 25th October :—

Sir,

I called yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and communicated to him your views, as expressed in your telegram of the 23rd instant, on the subject of the threatened Russian action in North Persia.

M. Nératof said that Russia desired the independence of Persia as much as you did, but the dispatch of a military expedition would not destroy it. The dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin did not have any such effect, and the presence of Russian troops at Tabreez had, on the contrary, undoubtedly saved that town from falling into the hands of the ex-Shah's supporters. I reminded his Excellency that he had spoken to me of an "occupation," and he said that "occupation" was perhaps too strong a word. M. Nératof's tone on this occasion was in marked contrast to that which he used at my conversation with him of the 19th instant. He appeared quite to appreciate the force of your observation that Mr. Shuster had been able to effect nothing to which the Russian Government objected, and he said that so long as that was the case Russia would take no action of the kind contemplated.

I endeavoured, but without much success, to induce his Excellency to indicate more precisely what were the arrangements with regard to existing difficulties in Persia which he would consider satisfactory, and which would remove all cause for strong measures on the part of Russia. He reiterated that Mr. Shuster should be made to understand that he must act in consultation with the two Powers.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1911.

INCREASE of consular escorts.

See your telegram of the 24th October.

Two squadrons sailed from India on the 20th and 21st October. You should discuss with Colonel Cox the advisability of these two squadrons being sent to Shiraz immediately.

I have agreed with the Viceroy of India's proposal that the transports used for conveying the first two should return to Bombay for the two remaining squadrons. They will thus not arrive until November.

No. 60.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

INCREASE in consular escort.

I have requested Ala-ed-Dowleh to send instructions to the local khans between Bushire and Shiraz to do everything in their power to facilitate the passage of our troops. His Excellency readily consented to do so.

Apparently he has determined to proceed to Shiraz to take up his post.

No. 61.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

PLEASE see your telegram of the 16th instant.

I can, I think, obtain 255*l.* forthwith as a compassionate grant in settlement of Miss Ross's claim.

The matter will be considerably, possibly indefinitely, delayed if any reservation is made as regards an additional indemnity for the beating. If I can obtain the sum of 255*l.* I would strongly recommend her accepting it.

Do you approve provided she consents?

No. 62.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 25, 1911.

SOUTHERN roads.

British merchants at Shiraz are most anxious to forward goods to Ispahan and Bushire, and have approached His Majesty's acting consul on the subject. The roads are very insecure, and it would be better that caravans should await the arrival of the British troops if the latter might be used as escorts. The communication which I made to the Persian Government yesterday presumably, however, precludes this, at any rate until the Persian Government have been given reasonable time to elaborate an effective scheme and to put it into execution.

As soon as the cavalry reaches Shiraz the sepoy guard should be leaving that place: their connection with the consulate will then have been severed, and they will be travelling to Bushire in the ordinary course of events.

Do you think it would be too inconsistent with the spirit of my communication to the Persian Government if the opportunity, which is certainly a tempting one, were taken to send a commercial caravan to Bushire under British escort?

No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

SECRETARY Sir E. Grey has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mirza Mehdi Khan's memorandum of the 13th October respecting the state of affairs in Southern Persia and the decision of His Majesty's Government to strengthen their consular escorts there.

Sir E. Grey has the honour to state, in reply, that, as Mirza Mehdi Khan has already been informed verbally, the reinforcement is now under orders, and that it is too late to counterorder it. The escorts will be allocated to certain specified towns in Persia for the protection of the consulates and British life and property. His Majesty's Government will welcome any measure which the Persian Government may take for restoring security and for reopening the roads to peaceable trade intercourse, and when these ends have been attained the reinforcements will be withdrawn from Persia. Sir E. Grey would remind Mirza Mehdi Khan that His Majesty's Government have already on many occasions received assurances of the Persian Government's ability to restore order, and that these assurances have so far not resulted in any satisfactory action. His Majesty's Government do not, therefore, feel justified in accepting them at the present juncture, when, owing to the powerlessness of the Central Government, a state of practical anarchy exists in the province of Fars and elsewhere. This anarchy culminated in a situation at Shiraz which threatened the gravest danger to British life and property, and which is apparently liable to recur at any moment. The nomination of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars, and the reconciliation between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Kawam-ul-Mulk, to which Mirza Mehdi Khan alludes in his memorandum, scarcely seem likely to have the pacifying effect which Mirza Mehdi Khan anticipates. Indeed, His Majesty's Government have received recent information to the effect that an English lady doctor has been robbed and badly beaten near Abadeh, on which occasion Messrs. Dixon lost goods to the value of 1,400*l.*; that a telegraph gholam has been robbed of his instruments and his horse within 4 miles of Shiraz; that a second gholam, accompanied by a Government sowar, is surrounded by tribesmen at 8 miles distance from that town. The post from Bushire has been robbed, the road south from Shiraz is so dangerous as to be practically impassable, while that leading to the north has been completely closed for the past month. Soulet-ed-Dowleh, so far from assisting the Central Government to keep order, as Mirza Mehdi Khan states that he has promised to do, has, according to His Majesty's Government's information, openly threatened to renew trouble. His Majesty's Government are further informed that 300 soldiers of the Hamadan regiment were recently worsted by a large band of Kuhgeluis, near Yezdikhast, after a severe conflict; that on the 13th October four bales of piece-goods, the property of Messrs. Ziegler, were seized by robbers on the Shiraz-Bushire road; and that earlier in the month Messrs. Weir were robbed of goods to the value of 400*l.* near Kamarij.

In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government cannot consider the state of Southern Persia in general, and of Shiraz in particular, as being other than menacing to British life and property, and it has become incumbent upon them to provide British subjects with that adequate protection which is at present beyond the power of the Persian Government. As soon as security is established in the disturbed region, His Majesty's Government will withdraw the additional escorts which they have now been reluctantly compelled to dispatch from India.

Foreign Office, October 25, 1911.

No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphiĉ.)

Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 7th October.

You should inform Russian Government that we have for the present abandoned the proposals respecting Bunder Abbas, Kerman, and Bam, and that we are only sending 400 men for distribution between Bushire, Shiraz, and Ispahan at the discretion of Sir G. Barclay in consultation with local consular authorities. The first portion

November. You should also say we have informed the Persian Government that decision to send increased escorts has only been taken owing to danger to British life and property at Shiraz and elsewhere, that we shall welcome any measures which Persian Government may take to restore security and reopen roads to peaceable trade, and that when these ends have been attained reinforcements will be withdrawn from Persia.

No. 65.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.

YOUR telegram of the 24th October.

Persia's independence cannot, I agree, be allowed to be marked by unfriendliness either to Great Britain or to Russia, and it is obvious that, in view of the geographical situation, no Government which refused to respect interests of Russia could be tolerated by the latter at Tehran. This we shall certainly impress on Shuster when the occasion arises, and I need hardly point out that our refusal to let Major Stokes resign was already practically a declaration in this sense.

Unless Persian Government are provided with funds the southern roads will continue to be impassable, and our trade will suffer. It is therefore important to give Persia financial assistance at an early date.

As soon as you have a favourable opportunity, you should speak in the above sense to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 66.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.

YOUR telegram of the 25th October.

I approve if Miss Ross consents.

No. 67.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, October 25, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a private letter which I have received from M. Nératof on the subject of the increase of the Russian consular guards at Ispahan and Resht.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 67.

M. Nératof to Mr. O'Beirne.

Cher Mr. O'Beirne,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 11 (24) octobre, 1911.

JE vous ai fait savoir par mon aide-mémoire du 23 septembre (6 octobre) dernier qu'il était possible que le Gouvernement Impérial se vît obligé de recourir au renforcement de quelques-unes de nos escortes consulaires en Perse, vu l'état de choses peu satisfaisant dans ce pays.

Mes prévisions se sont réalisées ; nous avons décidé maintenant de renforcer les escortes de nos consulats à Ispahan et à Recht, la première de 150 hommes et la deuxième de 100. Les contingents en question vont être expédiés sous peu.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

A. NERATOF.

(Translation.)

Dear Mr. O'Beirne,

St. Petersburg, October 11 (24), 1911.

I INFORMED you in my memorandum of the 23rd September (6th October) last that it was possible that the Imperial Government would be obliged to reinforce some of our consular escorts in Persia in view of the unsatisfactory state of things in that country.

My anticipations have been realised ; we have now decided to reinforce the escorts of our consulates at Ispahan and Resht, the first by 150 men, the second by 100. The detachments in question will be dispatched shortly.

Yours sincerely,
A. NÉRATOF.

No. 68.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that Messrs. E. C. Haycock and Schindler, British subjects, have been appointed by treasurer-general at Ispahan and Shiraz respectively as his agents.

It is possible that appointment of Mr. Haycock may lead to objections on the part of the Russian Government, as His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan reports that his Russian colleague has openly expressed his surprise at the appointment of a British subject in the Russian zone of interest.

I understand that Mr. Haycock, who is married to an Armenian, has been since 1897 in Ispahan, where he has been engaged in business. I have no reason to believe that he is in any degree Russophobe.

M. Poklewski quite understands that the appointment was made entirely without my knowledge, and that I could not have stopped a private individual from accepting a post offered to him by treasurer-general.

No. 69.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

ESCORT reinforcements.

I venture to suggest that Lieutenant Wilson may be authorised to remain at Shiraz in order to accompany to Ispahan the squadron destined for His Majesty's consulate-general at that town. Troops would greatly benefit during their march up by his knowledge of Persia.

It would not be necessary to retain him for very long, as one of the squadrons now being disembarked at Bushire will proceed to Ispahan.

No. 70.

Consul-General Grahame to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Ispahan, October 28, 1911.

* MISS ROSS left Abadeh for Shiraz 27th October under escort of local authorities.

No. 71.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 29, 1911.

EX-SHAH.

It would appear, from information which has reached my Russian colleague, that

Mohamed Ali Mirza has still a sufficient number of supporters, to cause trouble to Persian Government.

Two or three engagements have been fought lately between His Majesty's troops and Government forces near Bender Gez, on the Caspian. A Government force of 1,500 men is reported to have been defeated in the last of these.

No. 72.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey --(Received October 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

INCREASE in Russian consular guards.

Please see telegram from St. Petersburg of the 7th instant.

I am informed by the Russian Minister that 100 Russian troops have been disembarked at Enzeli, the objective being to increase the consular guard at Resht. I am under the impression that he is expecting another 200 for the increase of his consular escort at Ispahan.

The Russian Minister has read the terms of my announcement of the 24th instant to the Persian Government, and is asking his Government for instructions as to the terms of any announcement he should himself make to the Persian Government.

No. 73.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey --(Received October 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

MISS ROSS telegraphs that she has been again attacked by robbers; her escort fled on seeing robbers, who numbered 400. Her money and some of the clothes she was wearing were taken, and several shots narrowly missed her. She telegraphs from Abadeh, to which place she was apparently obliged to return.

No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 30, 1911.

REFER to your telegram of 25th October.

You must not allow sepoy guard to be employed to escort caravans.

You have no doubt instructed our consuls that troops just dispatched must not be used for this purpose.

No. 75.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey --(Received October 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

DISSEMBARKATION of first contingent of cavalry was completed yesterday. No casualties.

No. 76.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey --(Received November 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

I HAVE to report that the Russian consul-general has intervened by force with the seizure of certain properties of the ex-Shah's brothers, which had been confiscated in consequence of the part their owners had taken in the insurrection.

The circumstances were briefly reported to the "Times" in telegrams from Tehran, dated the 9th October and the 10th October, as follows:—

(1.)

"Tehran, October 9."

"The treasurer-general, in accordance with an order of the Cabinet, to-day sent an official of his department with five Treasury gendarmes to make an inventory of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's Tehran property, which the Government has confiscated to the Crown. Two members of the Russian consulate in uniform, with ten Russian Cossacks, ordered them to retire, threatening to fire. The party retired.

"The incident so far is unexplained, as Shoa-es-Sultaneh claims Turkish, not Russian, protection. The matter has now been referred to the Russian Minister."

(2.)

"Tehran, October 10."

"Two further incidents took place yesterday in connection with the confiscation of the various properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh. Russian Cossacks with consular officials were present at each property. They arrested five Treasury gendarmes who were sent with a Treasury official to make the inventory, and took them on mules to the Russian consulate.

"To-day a strong body of Treasury gendarmerie marched to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's principal property, where they found a small guard of Persian Cossacks only. They evicted the guard and took possession. The Russian Cossacks are now said to have withdrawn from all the properties.

"All these proceedings appear to have been due to the initiative of M. Pokhitonoff, the Russian consul-general. The Russian Minister has rectified the matter, and the incident now seems to be closed, except that the Persian Government is addressing a protest against the action of the consul-general."

As you will see from these telegrams, the action of the Russian consul-general was directed against the seizure of certain properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, who is not a Russian subject.

Russian Minister is to-day demanding, in accordance with orders from St. Petersburg, the withdrawal from the Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties of Shuster's gendarmes, who are now in possession. These properties being mortgaged to the Russian bank, and one of them being leased to a Russian subject, the Russian Minister had made all proper reserves with the Persian Government as to Russian rights, but the Russian Government bases its demand on the fact that Shuster's gendarmes were sent to take possession without previous notice having been given to the Russian consulate-general.

M. Poklewsky is further to demand a formal apology for an incident alleged to have occurred on the 10th October at the principal property in question, when the gendarmes in possession are said to have pointed their rifles at two passing officials of the consulate-general and at the consulate-general itself, which is close to the property. This story is disputed by the officer commanding the gendarmes, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had offered the Russian Minister reparation for this incident in the event of confirmation of the story of the Russian consular officials after a joint enquiry. The Russian Government reject this proposal, and demand an apology forthwith.

No. 77.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

MR. LECOFFRE, a British subject and a man with strong sympathies for the Persian Nationalist party, has been appointed by Shuster as a treasury agent at Tabreez.

For the last two years Lecoffre has been employed by the Persian Government, but before that he was in the Imperial Bank's service.

No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 3, 1911.*
 THE Persian Minister called this afternoon and complained that the Russian consul at Astrabad was encouraging and assisting the ex-Shah, and that several Russian Turkomans were in the following of the latter.

He also complained that the ex-Shah had ordered arms and ammunition in France and Germany, and that these consignments would have to pass through Russian territory.

In regard to the first complaint the Russians had denied that their authorities were in any way encouraging the ex-Shah, and in regard to the second, they had promised to give orders to their customs officials to prevent the transit of the munitions, though they could not guarantee that the articles might not be smuggled through.

Sir A. Nicolson asked the Minister what he wished us to do. We could not intervene in the matter, and we could not go to the Russians and say that we disbelieved all they said and gave credence to all the reports which reached the Persian Government.

The Minister said there were Russian Turkomans with the ex-Shah.

Sir A. Nicolson regretted not to be able to give him anything to console him; but we had no ground for intervening.

I am, &c.
 E. GREY.

No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 4, 1911.*
 EX-SHAH.

I have received a complaint from Persian Minister that troops have been landed west of Astrabad by a Russian gun-boat, which has assisted Turkomans who were fighting on ex-Shah's side.

Please ascertain and report if there is any confirmation of this.

No. 80.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 5, 1911.*

ALLEGED Russian support for ex-Shah.

A story has been current here that Russian troops landed and took part in the fighting reported in my telegram of the 29th October. The statement made to you by the Persian Minister (see your telegram of yesterday's date) is probably a version of this story.

No confirmation of the story has reached me. My only reliable source of information for events in the Astrabad district is the Russian Minister, who states that the story has no foundation.

A few bluejackets were landed at Bender Gez after the fighting was over, because the Turkomans showed signs of looting. The Naval station at Asurade gave medical assistance to the wounded. Some of the wounded Government troops were taken to the hospital for treatment, and are now there.

A few of the Government troops are still in the shelter of the Russian agency at Bender Gez, where a large number took bast after the fighting.

No. 81.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 5, 1911.*

CONFISCATED properties and Russo-Persian incident.

I see no sign yet of the Persian Government yielding to the demands which I

reported in my telegram of the 2nd November as being made by the Russian Minister.

A message reached me this morning from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which his Excellency urged me to use my influence with the Russian Minister for moderation.

I replied that the Persian Government would do well to comply with the demands, and I pointed out that the Russian Minister could not modify demands which his Government had formulated after careful deliberation.

No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 6, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of Mr. Lecoffre : see your telegram of 2nd November.

Russian Government are sure to be annoyed at this appointment, and it is not unlikely that they will defend their interests by energetic measures, which might even go as far as an occupation of Northern Persia. You should advise Shuster most strongly to do all in his power to conciliate the Russian Legation, and point out the probable result of continued provocation on his part. He should be made to understand clearly that Russian Government have it in their power to employ means which would seriously impede the discharge of his duties, and which it would be impossible for him to withstand. He must be made to see that the Russians are sure to take measures for the protection of their own interests if administrative posts in their sphere of interest are filled by British subjects, and that His Majesty's Government cannot deprecate such measures, as it would be contrary to the spirit of the convention of 1907.

His Majesty's Government are pledged to avoid any displacement of Russian influence by British in the north, and the Russians are gaining the impression that under cover of Shuster's administration this is being done.

No. 83.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 6, 1911.

MY telegram of 2nd November.

I am informed by M. Poklewski that Russian Government expect that I will join in the protest which he has been instructed to make against the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre at Tabreez.

Please inform me what should be my attitude.

No. 84.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 6, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident with regard to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property. The Persian reply to the Russian demands is dignified and temperate in tone, but it formally rejects the demands, stating that they are inconsistent with the dignity of Persia and with the friendly relations existing between Russia and Persia.

The Persian Government maintain their innocence and declare that the Russian Government cannot have fully grasped the facts of the case when forming their judgment. They invite a full elucidation of all the circumstances and declare themselves ready to hold an enquiry.

As the Russian Government formulated their demands after long deliberation they can hardly be expected to draw back.

No. 85.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 6, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 7th November :—

Sir,

The Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me yesterday that he was constantly receiving reports from Persia of a most unsatisfactory character, that the situation was becoming impossible, and that if matters did not improve it would really be necessary for Russia to do something.

His Excellency referred particularly to two subjects of conflict which had arisen between the Russian and Persian Governments—certain recent appointments made by Mr. Shuster, and an incident between Persian Cossacks and Mr. Shuster's gendarmes in which the Russian consul-general was concerned.

The second of these matters has been referred to in recent press telegrams from Tehran. According to the very brief account of it which M. Nératof gave me, the Persian authorities (for whose action his Excellency thought that Mr. Shuster was responsible) desired to take possession of certain property belonging to adherents of the ex-Shah in which the Russian bank had an interest. The Russian Government did not object to the sequestration of the property, but they were bound to safeguard the interests of their bank. The Russian consul-general had placed Cossacks as guards over the property, and there had been a conflict of some sort between the Cossacks and Mr. Shuster's gendarmes. Thereupon, the Persian Government had gone so far as to demand the recall of the consul-general, and also, I think, of some subordinate officials of the consulate who had been involved in the dispute. The Russian Minister had of course returned the Persian note, and there had been a lively explanation between M. Poklewski and the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Everything now depended on the further action of the Persian Government. If they persisted in the attitude which they had taken up the matter would become excessively serious, and he did not know what action the Russian Government would have to take. The relations between the two Governments were, as I could see, extremely strained.

As regards the question of appointments, M. Nératof stated that Mr. Shuster had nominated three Treasury agents at Shiraz, Ispahan, and Tabreez respectively, who were, his Excellency said positively (though this I questioned), all Englishmen. The Russian Government did not object to the first two appointments (they had received favourable accounts of the nominee at Ispahan), but the person appointed to Tabreez, a Mr. Lecoffre, was known to them as being violently antagonistic to Russia. This appointment could not be maintained.

I said that his Excellency could be certain that the appointments in question had been made without the knowledge of Sir G. Barclay, and this assurance M. Nératof readily accepted. As to the tension which had come about in Russo-Persian relations, I said that it would be a pity if the proceedings of an American citizen should lead Russia to take measures in North Persia to which she would otherwise not have resorted. The thing was to prevent Mr. Shuster from doing what was obnoxious to Russia, and it seemed to me personally that the two representatives at Tehran, if instructed in that sense, would find means to make it clear that Mr. Shuster must cease from his present course of action, or must go. M. Nératof discussed the subject for some time, but did not seem to think that any action on the part of the representatives at the present moment would help matters. It was true, he said, that the Persian Government were themselves not very pleased with Mr. Shuster, but he had strong support in the Medjliss. Moreover, there was his contract with the Persian Government, which his Excellency thought would make it difficult to dispense with his services until his term of employment had expired.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 86.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 7, 1911.

MISS ROSS.

The Governor-General has instructed the deputy governor at Shiraz to send

100 men to escort Miss Ross to Shiraz from Abadeh, where she is now detained. I doubt, however, whether the deputy governor will be able to provide the guard.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz is of opinion that Miss Ross's health will probably suffer from her enforced stay at Abadeh. He also reports that she is most anxious to proceed to Shiraz, and he asks to be allowed to dispatch a suitable detachment of the Indian troops, when available, to escort her to Shiraz, provided of course that the commanding officer concurs. Mr. Knox does not think that the local authorities would raise the slightest objection to this course.

An objection to this, however, is that if we use the consular guard in the case of Miss Ross we shall probably be obliged to do so in other cases. But if a suitable Persian escort is not forthcoming, it would appear to be the only safe way of bringing the lady to Shiraz.

Mr. Knox states that the lawless element is watching the case of Miss Ross with great interest, and doubtless our treatment of the question will have great local significance.

Please see your telegram of the 26th ultimo. Miss Ross acquiesced in the proposed manner of settlement, and I have accepted as full settlement of the first robbery the promised and immediate payment by the Persian Government of the value of the property then lost. I shall present them with a claim for the second robbery, and am now considering the amount to be claimed.

No. 87.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 7, 1911.

I GAVE M. Nératof to-day the general sense of the instructions sent to Sir G. Barclay in your telegram of the 6th November to Tehran. In expressing his thanks for your action, M. Nératof said that he had told M. Poklewski, in instructing him to protest against M. Lecoffre's appointment to Tabreez, that he could count on Sir G. Barclay adopting a sympathetic attitude in the matter.

No. 88.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 8, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident in connection with Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.

Please see telegram from St. Petersburg of the 6th November and my telegram to you of the same date.

The Russian Minister addressed at the time a suitable reply to the Persian Government's note demanding the recall of the Russian consul-general. The only comment which the Persian Government has made on the return of this note has been an expression of regret that it should have been returned. The matter might therefore be considered closed if the acquiescence of the Persian Government in the return of the note were all that was required. The great difficulty is, however, the demand for an apology and for the withdrawal of the gendarmes from the property in question.

No. 89.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 8, 1911.

APPOINTMENT of Englishman as Treasury agent at Tabreez.

I spoke to Shuster this afternoon, as instructed in your telegram of the 6th instant. The latter declared that he was most anxious to conciliate the Russian Legation, and that he had always been desirous of doing so, but he was not prepared to allow all progress in Persian reforms to be nullified. He thought that His Majesty's Government would see convincing proof that this was the aim of the Russian

Government in the specific instances of obstruction cited in the open letter which he has written for publication.

He said that Azerbaijan finance was in a deplorable condition, for instead of revenue coming in to the Central Government, the latter had to remit money to the province. Lecoffre was an expert in Azerbaijan finance. His appointment to Tabreez had been decided upon four months ago, and he was quite determined that he should proceed to the post. He had had no idea when making the appointment that Lecoffre was a Russophobe, and he was compelled to select his instruments from the scanty material at his disposal.

I laid strong emphasis on the danger which the Persian Government would incur by defying Russia, and I enquired what he thought the attitude of the Persians would be in the face of the Russian protest. He replied that he presumed they would "wait like a condemned man until he was hanged by someone stronger than him," which was what they were already doing in the case of the demands referred to in my telegram of the 6th instant.

No. 90.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 8, 1911.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that a battalion in full strength is being sent to Tabreez. It is to take the place of the battalion now there, which has been much reduced by departure of time-expired men, and its dispatch does not import any change in situation.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 8, 1911.

THE Persian Minister asked Sir A. Nicolson to-day if we would not support his Government in the question of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh and the difficulty which had arisen with Russia. Sir A. Nicolson told him that we were aware of the facts, but that it was very difficult for His Majesty's Government to intervene in a difference between the Persian Government and Russia. Sir G. Barclay, he said, was well acquainted with all the facts and was in intimate relations with the Russian Minister, and it seemed to him that such questions had better be settled locally.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 92.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 10, 1911.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, dated 9th November:—

"Last night caravanserai of Chenar Rahdar, 8 miles west of Shiraz, where supplies for troops are stored under guard of three sepoys, was attacked by sorkhis. These were driven off by local tufangchis, with one man wounded and a horse killed. Sepoys, who did not take part, have asked for reinforcement, expecting attack to be renewed. I do not think it desirable to reinforce them with British troops, and I have informed local authorities of the incident, and arranged for a strong Persian guard to be supplied."

I have approved acting consul's action.

No. 93.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 10, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 8th instant.

The Russian Government have instructed M. Poklewsky to inform the Persian Government to-morrow that unless they comply with the Russian demands within forty-eight hours, he will break off relations with the Cabinet, and to warn them that in that case the Russian Government will take such measures to protect their interests as may appear to them to be necessary.

No. 94.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 10, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 11th November:—

Sir,

I called yesterday on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to ascertain how matters stood with regard to the latest Russo-Persian incident. At our conversation of the 6th instant, which is reported in my telegram of that date, M. Nératof had said nothing about a demand on the part of the Russian Minister for an apology for insults offered to Russian consular officials, and I was yesterday not yet aware of the contents of Sir G. Barclay's recent telegrams on the subject. I had, however, seen some press telegrams, which seemed to show that the difference between the two Governments had reached a critical point.

M. Nératof now informed me that M. Poklewski had made the following three demands verbally of the Persian Government: That they should acquiesce in the return of their note asking for the recall of the consul-general; that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should express his regrets for insulting conduct of which the Persian gendarmes had been guilty towards certain Russian consular officials; and, lastly, that the gendarmes should be withdrawn from the house of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, which had been the scene of the dispute, and should be replaced by Persian Cossacks. The Persian Government had apparently acquiesced in the return of their note, though they stated that they regretted M. Poklewski's action in returning it. They had declined the other two demands, asking that in the first place a joint enquiry should be held into the facts.

On this point M. Nératof explained to me that the insults which the Russian Government complained of consisted in the gendarmes having pointed their rifles at two officials of the Russian consulate, who, as I understood, were passing Shoa-es-Sultaneh's house. The facts were vouched for, his Excellency said, by the two officials, and also by a Russian officer who was present. The only other witnesses who could be questioned were the gendarmes themselves, and the statements of the consular officials must be accepted.

Proceeding, M. Nératof said that M. Poklewski had reported to the Imperial Government the attitude taken by the Persian Government in regard to his demands, and that he had thereupon been instructed to present the same demands to the Persian Government in writing, and to ask for an immediate reply. He was probably carrying out these instructions on the day of our conversation (yesterday). He was further instructed that if he did not receive a satisfactory reply within two days he was to inform the Persian Government that relations were broken off, and that the Russian Government would take the measures which they thought necessary. M. Nératof added that he would tell me in confidence that the measure which the Russian Government had determined upon was the dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin as on a previous occasion. It should be of sufficient strength to permit of a detachment being summoned by M. Poklewski to Tehran which would remove the gendarmes from Shoa-es-Sultaneh's house and instal Persian Cossacks in their place, after which it would return to Kazvin.

I made no comment on what his Excellency told me beyond saying that I supposed the Persian Government would give way.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 10, 1911.

REFER to your telegram of the 8th November.

It is probable that, if Shuster were to co-operate with the Russian Legation instead of working against it, he would not find it obstructive.

As regards Mr. Lecoffre, if the Russian Government request the Persian Government not to ratify his appointment, you may advise the Persian Government to comply with their demand. To do so would be in their own interests, as, if they refused, Russia might be induced to take action with a view to protecting her interests in Persia.

No. 96.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 11, 1911.

REINFORCEMENTS for consulates.

Consul-general at Bushire reports that second detachment of cavalry from India is now disembarking.

No. 97.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

STOKES begs that you will be so kind as to forward the following telegram to the Secretary of State for India :—

“Refusal of my resignation by the Government of India has been communicated to me. It places me in the position of having to choose between disregarding the orders of His Majesty’s Government and breaking my faith pledged on conditions officially formulated by His Majesty’s Government themselves (see Foreign Office telegram of the 21st July). I most respectfully and most earnestly request His Majesty’s Government to reconsider their decision and to permit me to resign. I have throughout acted in entire good faith, and the difficulty of my position is not in any sense of my own making.”

A telegram reached me from the Government of India on the 5th November to the effect that they were unable to accept Stokes’s resignation, as His Majesty’s Government could not advise His Majesty to accept the resignation of an officer who handed it in solely in order to take service under a foreign Power in circumstances which, in their judgment, made his action detrimental to British interests. I informed Stokes on the same day of this decision, and added, as requested by the Government of India, that he was to proceed to Simla as soon as possible to join the general staff branch there.

I have urged him repeatedly since then to leave Tehran, but I doubt whether my words will have any effect. In view of the possibility of the forcible removal of Shuster’s gendarmes, if the Persian Government do not yield to the Russian demands the matter may prove very serious, for if Stokes persists in his hesitation to obey our orders, he would probably become involved in any conflict between Russian Cossacks and Treasury gendarmes.

No. 98.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

MINISTER of the Interior has resigned. Remnant of Cabinet consists now only of Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 99.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

REGENT told Medjliss to-day that he was about to take two months' leave.

No. 100.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

YESTERDAY Medjliss authorised Shuster to engage ten additional Americans as "financial employés."

No. 101.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 13, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 14th November:—

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of an official communiqué issued to the press yesterday in regard to the recent Russo-Persian incident at Tehran and the steps taken in the matter by the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 101.

Official Communiqué to Russian Press.

(Translation.)

October 31 (November 13), 1911.

WITH regard to the conflict with the Persian Government, the official information bureau makes the following communication:—

This conflict arose from the measures taken by the Persian Government for the confiscation of the property of certain partisans of the former Shah Mohamed Ali and especially of his brother, Prince Shoa-es-Sultaneh. The Persian Government informed the Russian Legation of their intention to confiscate the property of certain persons who had taken part in the struggle of the ex-Shah against the Government, whereupon the legation on its side, without protesting in any way against this principle, held it necessary to remark that the interests of Russian subjects, which might be connected in one way or another with the property owner's name, must be safeguarded in a proper manner.

Some days afterwards, on the order of the Financial Adviser, Morgan Shuster, a party of the gendarmerie just organised by him occupied the house of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, which was guarded by some Cossacks of the Persian Cossack brigade, who were posted there at the wish of the Turkish Ambassador in Tehran. This last circumstance is explained by Shoa-es-Sultaneh being a Turkish subject. Several officials entered with the gendarmes to make an inventory in the house of the Prince's possessions. The Government had not held it necessary to inform in due time our consul-general in Tehran, whose direct duty it is to protect the interests of Russian subjects. The consul-general learned by chance of the conduct of the Persian gendarmerie. He knew that the Prince had obligations to the Russian Discount Bank, which are secured on the real estate of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, and saw himself compelled to send his officials to the house and to the country estate of the Prince to protect the interests of Russian subjects and of the bank, and to charge them to insist on the removal of the gendarmes until the receipt of the required guarantees from the Persian Government. At the instance of the consular officials, who were accompanied to the spot by a small convoy of Russian Cossacks, Shuster's gendarmes

were removed from the house and the country estate, whereupon the former was occupied again by Cossacks of the Persian brigade.

Shuster, who saw that he had been guilty of an incorrectness in this matter in his relations to the Russian Minister, sent his assistant to the consul-general, and only then presented to him the confiscation order, on which occasion this official, according to the opinion of the consul-general, behaved very arrogantly.

Yet before the end of his conversation with Shuster's representative, State Councillor Pokhitonoff learnt that over a hundred Persian gendarmes had again occupied the house and the garden of the Prince, having got there over a fence and forcibly disarmed and sent off the Cossacks of the Persian brigade. When afterwards the officials of the consulate-general, Petroff and Hildebrant, returned to their quarters, which are opposite the house of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, they saw in a room over the entrance gate a number of Persian gendarmes, who dared to point their rifles with the evident intention of firing at both officials, but thanks to the accidental presence and intervention of a native officer of the Persian Cossack brigade this was prevented. (The officials heard clearly the order: "ready!" and the clacking of the charging of the rifle magazines.) The assumption that the gendarmes did not know on whom they aimed is unpermissible as both officials wore uniform and are well known at the place.

Hereupon the Persian Government, departing from all traditions, made a claim on the Imperial Legation to recall Consul-General Pokhitonoff and the two above-named officials of the consulate-general from Tehran, and indeed this claim was made in writing in two notes following one another.

On examining the incident the Russian Government confirmed the correct behaviour, suitable to the circumstances, of the consul-general in Tehran and his officials. On the other hand, it marked the openly provocative behaviour, contrary to the traditional friendly relations of both Powers, not only of the Persian gendarmerie under Shuster's orders, but of the Persian Government itself. It suffices in this connection to point to the sending of a hundred gendarmes to Shoa-es-Sultaneh's house before the conclusion of the negotiations with the consul-general (as if foreseeing a collision with the convoy of our consul), the forcible removal of the Cossacks of the Persian brigade from the said house, which had been entrusted by officials of our consulate to them to guard, but especially the fact that the gendarmes aimed their rifles at our officials, and the sending of the two above-named notes by the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Russian Government regarded this behaviour of the Persian authorities and their Government as wholly unpermissible from the standpoint of Russia's dignity, and instructed the Imperial Minister to take up the matter verbally in a friendly way with the Persian Foreign Minister, to give him back both notes and to require:—

1. The replacing of the gendarmes in the house and on the estate of Shoa-es-Sultaneh by Cossacks of the brigade until the interests of our bank and of Russian subjects connected with the property of the Prince are fully secured; and
2. An apology for the insulting conduct of the Persians towards the officials of the consulate-general.

The Persian Government, however, rejected the explanations of the Minister and put forward a plan for a mutual enquiry into the behaviour of the officials of the consulate-general, which was naturally absolutely unacceptable, as the Imperial Government alone can judge of the correctness or incorrectness of the orders or proceedings of their officials.

In view of this the Russian Minister received instructions to present again to the Persian Government the same demand for satisfaction, this time in writing and with the warning, that, in case the Persians do not yield forthwith, the Ambassador will break off relations with the Tehran Cabinet and the Russian Government will prepare to resort to the measures which seem needful for the protection of their interests.

According to a telegram received from State Councillor Poklewski-Koziell a note in this sense was handed on the 29th October (11th November) to the Persian Foreign Minister together with a warning in the sense indicated.

No. 102.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 13, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 14th November:—

Sir,

At a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday his Excellency, after dwelling on the most recent misdeeds of Mr. Shuster, said that he could see no issue from the difficulties of the situation in Persia.

The latest proceedings on Mr. Shuster's part, to which his Excellency referred, were his refusal, notwithstanding Sir G. Barclay's remonstrances, to rescind the nomination of Mr. Lecoffre as Treasury agent at Tabreez and the course which he had taken in regard to Russian lease-holders in Persia. So far as I gathered from M. Nératof, the treasurer-general had quite recently addressed a circular direct to Russian holders of property under lease, whether from the Persian Government or from private individuals, calling upon them to notify their claims to him, failing which they would not be recognised by the Persian Government. In thus ignoring the Russian consulate-general Mr. Shuster had, M. Nératof said, acted contrary to all established usage in Persia.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 13, 1911.

M. DE ETTER communicated to-day to Sir A. Nicolson the Russian ultimatum to Persia. We had already received its terms. The only remark Sir A. Nicolson made was that he was sorry such a step had been deemed necessary, and that he hoped that the Russian detachment would remain at Kazvin, and that no troops would proceed to Tehran.

M. de Etter said that no troops would go to Tehran unless the Russian Minister considered their presence "absolutely necessary" for the protection of the legation. The period given to the Persian Government expires to-night.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 104.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

MY telegram of 12th November: Persian Cabinet.

Prime-Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs have resigned, but are carrying on.

Situation is more than usually confused, and efforts to reconstruct Cabinet have made no progress.

No. 105.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident.

Please see my telegram of the 10th instant.

No reply from the Persian Government had been received at the Russian Legation last night when the forty-eight hours expired, but the Russian Minister had not specified the exact time allowed them in his communication to the Persian Government.

I have again urged compliance with the Russian demands, but any disposition to yield as regards the withdrawal of the Treasury gendarmes is likely to be counteracted by the influence of Shuster, while, as regards the other demand, I gather that it will be difficult to find a Minister who will consent to tender an apology.

No. 106.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

FIRST two squadrons of Indian cavalry have arrived at Shiraz without incident.

No. 107.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 14, 1911.

RELIEVED sepoy detachment at Shiraz.

Please see my telegram of the 25th October.

In view of the state of the road between Kazerun and Bushire, the acting British consul-general at Bushire does not consider it advisable for the small detachment of sepoys to travel between Kazerun and Bushire alone. He suggests sending a detachment of cavalry to meet sepoys at Kazerun, and to accompany them to Bushire.

I have authorised him to send as large a detachment of cavalry as he may consider necessary.

No. 108.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 15th November:—

I have the honour to report in continuation of my telegram of the 10th instant that I called on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening the 14th, to enquire whether any answer had been received to the note handed by M. Poklewski to the Persian Government on the 11th instant. M. Nératof said that he had heard nothing as yet from M. Poklewski, and that if he did not receive satisfactory communication next morning the Russian Government would act.

I had seen a telegram in that day's papers reporting that the Regent and the Persian Ministers had resigned in consequence of the Russian note. I referred to this report, and I said to M. Nératof that, while I fully realised that the present question was the concern of Russia, it was one which indirectly interested His Majesty's Government (to which his Excellency cordially assented), and therefore I felt justified in suggesting to him that, if owing to the resignation of the Persian Government, it was materially impossible for Persia to comply immediately with the Russian demands, it might be more generous for the Russian Government, instead of taking measure forthwith, to name a definite time—a week for instance—within which the demand must be fulfilled.

M. Nératof replied, that he was perfectly convinced that nothing would be gained by this delay; it was evident that the resignation of the Persian Ministers was merely a device to avoid compliance with Russia's demands, and whatever Ministers held office at the expiry of the week's grace would resign for the same purpose.

He went on to say that, if Russia should take the measures contemplated, she maintained (as things now stood) the undertakings which she had given to His Majesty's Government with regard to Persia, and she would give you through the Russian Ambassador assurances similar to those which she gave on the former occasion when Russian troops went to Kazvin.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 109.

Sir Eduard Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 14, 1911.

RUSSIAN complaints against Shuster's action, as reported in your telegram of yesterday, seem to be better founded than dispute about Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property, as regards which I am inclined, judging by the version of facts in my possession, to consider that there has been some misunderstanding.

You might tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that I fully realise that the Russian Government cannot abandon the standpoint they have taken up in this matter, but the real and more substantial difficulty seems to be Shuster's anti-Russian policy in Northern Persia, and the Russian Government should, I think, make public their own case against that. Could they not formulate their complaints against Shuster and make a formal demand respecting them?

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is my sincere hope that the Russian Government will not go further than the assurances given me by Count Benckendorff regarding their intentions, that is, to restrict dispatch of detachment to Kazvin and not to send any men to Tehran unless required by Russian Minister for protection of legation. It would be deplorable if a crisis were precipitated which led to a Russian occupation and the fall of Persian Government.

No. 110.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN incident.

Instructions were received at the Russian Legation last night to break off relations with the Cabinet if one existed; a detachment of Russian troops would then be dispatched to Kazvin.

M. Poklewski has telegraphed to his Government this morning to the effect that no Cabinet has yet been formed, but that if when formed the new one does not immediately satisfy Russian demands he will break off relations. He has also telegraphed his opinion that if compliance with the Russian demands does not result from the dispatch of troops to Kazvin it will be necessary to send 2,000 men to Tehran in order to make certain of attaining the object in view, and that in order to keep open communications 2,000 more will be needed as a reserve at Kazvin. The Treasury gendarmerie could muster 350 men if necessary, but I fear that the force sent in the event of the Persian Government's refusal of satisfaction must be so large as to make resistance hopeless if all possibility of bloodshed is to be avoided.

No. 111.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 15, 1911.

HIS MAJESTY'S acting consul at Shiraz reports that Colonel Douglas proposes to march to Abadeh with about 220 men; 120 of these will then proceed to Ispahan, the rest returning to Shiraz as an escort for Miss Ross.

I have approved Colonel Douglas's proposal.

No. 112.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 15, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 15th November:—

I had another interview with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. He informed me that M. Poklewski had reported that the Persian Prime Minister

and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had resigned, and that there was no present likelihood of a compliance with the Russian demands. Under these circumstances M. Nératof said it was his personal opinion that Russia must take action forthwith. I then made a strong appeal to his Excellency in favour of allowing Persia a short further period of grace. I suggested that the Russian Government might declare that, in view of the resignation of the Persian Ministry, they would not take the immediate action on which they had determined, but they would allow, say, three days, in which Persia could give the required satisfaction. I urged, that if the Russian Government acted in this way they would be in a better position to defend subsequent strong measures, should these be forced upon them. Otherwise, they would be accused of taking advantage of the temporary absence of a Persian Government to intervene by force in that country.

M. Nératof on this occasion did not altogether decline to entertain my plea for a further delay. Without giving me a definite answer he held out some hopes that he might take the course suggested, but he said very positively that five days having already elapsed since the presentation of the Russian note, it would be necessary if Russia accorded a further delay that she should also increase her demands. It occurred to him that he might put forward a demand for the dismissal of the officials responsible for the action of the gendarmerie, including Mr. Shuster, under whose orders that body stood. This was an idea which, he said, he must consider further.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

No. 113.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 15, 1911.

I SPOKE to M. Nératof as instructed in your telegram of the 14th November.

His Excellency explained to me that the Russian Government considered it absolutely essential that the house in dispute should be evacuated by the gendarmerie force. In taking possession of the property the gendarmes had disarmed the men of the Cossack brigade, and they had subsequently insulted Russian consular officials. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary for the Russian Government to effect their withdrawal. With this object in view, a detachment would, if necessary, be sent up to Tehran from Kazvin.

With regard to your suggestion that the Russian Government might formulate their complaints against Shuster, M. Nératof pointed out that, from a formal point of view, it would be difficult for them to protest against appointments such as that of M. Lecoffre to Tabreez, since such a protest would constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Persia. His Excellency, however, is now considering whether he might not base a demand for the dismissal of Shuster on the ground that the treasurer-general must be held responsible for the action of his own gendarmes (see my preceding telegram of to-day).

It is evident that the Russian Government consider that Russian prestige is gravely involved in the dispute over Shoa-es-Sultaneh's sequestered property, inasmuch as it developed into a conflict between Shuster and his gendarmes on the one side and the Russian consul-general and the Cossack brigade on the other.

No. 114.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 12, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the increase of the Russian consular escort at Astrabad, and also respecting the presentation of a note to the Persian Government by the Russian Minister on the subject of the recent incident at Tehran.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

Enclosure in No. 114.

M. Nératof to Mr. O'Beirne.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 30 octobre.
(12 novembre), 1911.

Mon cher Mr. O'Beirne,

JE crois devoir vous prévenir que, vu les pillages auxquels se livrent les Turcomans dans les environs d'Astrabad depuis la victoire remportée par Mohammed Ali Schah sur le détachement des troupes du Gouvernement persan, et en présence du fait que la vie et les biens des sujets russes sur les lieux, ainsi que la ville même, sont sérieusement menacés par ces hordes de nomades, nous renforçons l'escorte de notre consul à Astrabad de 200 cosaques, avec deux mitrailleuses.

Je viens de recevoir un télégramme de Poklewsky m'informant que la note officielle relative à la liquidation de l'incident du conflit que vous connaissez a été remise au Gouvernement persan hier le 29 octobre (11 novembre).

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

A. NÉRATOF.

(Translation.)

My dear Mr. O'Beirne,

St. Petersburg, October 30 (November 12), 1911.

I THINK I ought to inform you that, as the Turkomans have been pillaging in the neighbourhood of Astrabad since Mohamed Ali Shah's victory over a body of the Persian Government's troops, and in view of the fact that the lives and property of Russian subjects on the spot and also the town itself are seriously threatened by these hordes of nomads, we are reinforcing the escort of our consul at Astrabad by 200 Cossacks and two quick-firing guns.

I have just received a telegram from Poklewsky informing me that the official note respecting the settlement of the incident of the dispute was handed to the Persian Government yesterday, the 29th October (11th November).

Yours sincerely,

A. NÉRATOF.

No. 115.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 16, 1911.

I AM informed that before resigning office the Prime Minister sent instructions to Shuster to withdraw his gendarmes from the property in dispute, and that Shuster replied that, as the order on which he had acted when taking possession of the property was signed by all the Ministers, he must decline to withdraw his men until the order to do so was signed in a similar way.

No. 116.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 16, 1911.

RUSSO-PERSIAN relations.

Please see my preceding telegram of this morning.

I learn that the Prime Minister has repeated his order to Shuster to withdraw the Treasury gendarmes. The order is given under the fiction that the Prime Minister is still in office and on the ground that, in default of a Cabinet, his sole instructions should be sufficient.

No. 117.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 16, 1911.

MY telegram of the 15th November.

If the Russian Government adds to its other demands a fresh one for Shuster's

dismissal, I fear that the chances of Persia refusing to comply and of the consequent dispatch of Russian troops may be greatly increased. I have therefore written to M. Nératof to say that, in my personal opinion, it would be better, at the present stage, not to put forward such a demand.

No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram of the 12th November.

You should tell Stokes that, as his appointment will clearly precipitate a conflict between Russia and Persia, and as we cannot consistently with the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention promote the employment of British subjects in the north of Persia, we cannot facilitate his appointment by accepting his resignation. He had therefore better comply with the orders of the Government of India without delay.

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

PLEASE communicate to Russian Government our hope that, in view of the Tehran telegram of the 15th November, Russian Government will see its way to exhausting every other alternative before deciding on the dispatch of troops to Tehran.

No. 120.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

SEE your telegram of yesterday.

Please speak in following sense to M. Nératof:—

Although His Majesty's Government quite agree that the decision and formulation of her own demands must rest with Russia, they feel considerable anxiety as to the ulterior consequences which her action may have. In my opinion, it would have been possible for Russia to wait until the detachment had reached Kazvin and then formulate her demands, and, before taking any further action, to allow more time to elapse.

We ourselves, if we had had to secure redress of a grievance, would probably in the first instance seize a custom-house. I see no reason why Russia should not, if necessary, do this, and await the effect of her action before bringing further pressure to bear.

No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

IN conversation to-day the Councillor of the Russian Embassy referred to some remarks that I had made to Count Benckendorff about the conversation which the Russian Ambassador in Vienna was reported in Mr. Shuster's letters to the "Times" to have had with the ex-Shah. The Councillor informed me that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna stated positively that he had never seen the ex-Shah or made to him any declaration whatever.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1911.

I TOLD the Councillor of the Russian Embassy to-day that I was seriously concerned about Persia.

If the Russian Government were satisfied that they had grievances which demanded redress, they must, of course, formulate their own demands for redress. That was no concern of mine. If they thought that no satisfactory settlement could be reached without the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, I could urge no objection. I did not wish to suggest the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, but I mentioned it lest there should be an impression in St. Petersburg that I was prepossessed in his favour. As a matter of fact, he had given me endless trouble by his inconvenient appointments of British subjects in spite of all I could say to him.

We were, however, deeply concerned as to the possible consequences of the action which the Russian Government might take, not so much the direct consequences as the ulterior consequences. The Russian Government intended to send troops to Kazvin. They contemplated sending on from there some force to Tehran. I heard from Sir George Barclay that M. Poklevsky said that, if a force were sent to Tehran it must be a large one—some 2,000 men. This would mean an occupation of the capital of Persia. It was sure to have an effect upon the Mahometan world, and it was a most serious thing. I would therefore suggest that, when the Russian Government had sent the troops to Kazvin, they should pause, and formulate their demands upon the Persian Government. If further pressure became necessary, why should the Russian Government not seize some of the customs, or even impound the revenues of Tabreez? This was the sort of pressure that was relevant to Mr. Shuster's action. An occupation of the capital was bound to excite Mahometan feeling, and might react most unfavourably in India, especially if it were thought that we were in any way a consenting party to it.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 123.

Note communicated by M. de Etter, November 17, 1911.

LE Gouvernement britannique n'ignore pas que le Gouvernement persan avait revêtu ces derniers temps, dans ses rapports avec la Russie, un caractère notoirement inamical et que la responsabilité de cette attitude doit retomber principalement sur le conseiller financier, Mr. Morgan Shuster, qui, depuis son arrivée en Perse, s'est plu systématiquement à ignorer les intérêts de la Russie.

Le Gouvernement persan a perdu du terrain et s'est trouvé, en grande partie, impuissant vis-à-vis de Mr. Shuster par suite de l'appui dont il s'est assuré auprès du Medjliss et du parti nationaliste.

Un incident regrettable a surgi dernièrement à Téhéran, provoqué par l'intention du Gouvernement persan de confisquer les propriétés des partisans de l'ancien Chah Mohamed Ali, et, entre autres, celles du Prince Shao-es-Saltaneh, dans lesquelles des intérêts russes se trouvent engagés.

Mr. Shuster, chargé d'exécuter cette mesure, y a encore procédé d'une façon provocante vis-à-vis de nous. Les gendarmes placés sous ses ordres ne se sont pas seulement permis d'occuper de force l'immeuble du Prince avant que les pourparlers à ce propos entre les représentants de Mr. Shuster et le consul général de Russie aient pris fin, et de déloger les Cosaques persans auxquels était confiée la garde de la maison, ils ont de plus visé les représentants du consulat général avec l'intention évidente de décharger contre eux leurs fusils.

De son côté, le Gouvernement persan—contrairement à toutes les traditions—s'est cru autorisé à nous adresser deux notes exigeant le rappel du consul général et du personnel du consulat général de Russie.

Jugeant ces actes inadmissibles tant au point de vue du prestige que des intérêts de la Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial a chargé le Ministre à Téhéran, premièrement, de renvoyer au Gouvernement persan les deux notes précitées et de lui notifier verbalement l'exigence de remplacer les gendarmes financiers par les Cosaques persans

jusqu'à ce qu'il soit établi dans quelle mesure les intérêts des sujets russes se trouvent engagés dans les propriétés de Shoa-es-Saltaneh; et, secondement, d'exiger que le Gouvernement persan fasse des excuses, par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, pour le façon de procéder des gendarmes persans.

Contrairement à notre attente, ces exigences modérées ont été rejetées par le Gouvernement persan, et, par suite, le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé de charger M. Poklewski de renouveler ses représentations par écrit, en ajoutant que nous nous attendons à ce que nos demandes soient exécutées sans le moindre retard, et que dans le cas contraire il cesserait tous rapports avec le Gouvernement persan, et que la Russie se réserverait de prendre telles mesures qu'elle jugera nécessaires.

Aucune réponse n'ayant été reçue jusqu'ici du Gouvernement persan, notre Ministre a reçu l'ordre de cesser tous rapports avec ce dernier. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial, considérant que ses intérêts ont été sérieusement lésés et que, par suite, une pression de sa part sur le Gouvernement persan s'imposait, a décidé d'envoyer dès maintenant à Kazvine un détachement se composant de différentes armes, en laissant au Ministre la faculté d'appeler à Téhéran une force suffisante pour éloigner les gendarmes persans occupant actuellement la maison et la propriété de Shoa-es-Saltaneh.

Ces mesures, nécessitées par les circonstances susindiquées, revêtent certainement un caractère purement provisoire. Aussitôt que l'incident sera clos et que des garanties quant à l'attitude correcte ultérieure vis-à-vis de nous du Gouvernement persan seront assurées, notre détachement sera rappelé en Russie.

Le compte rendu télégraphique sur la réponse, faite par Sir E. Grey à l'interpellation au Parlement à cet effet, a été très favorablement accueilli par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Nous considérons, de notre côté, que les mesures prises par nous ne sont nullement en contradiction avec le principe de notre entente avec l'Angleterre pour les affaires de Perse, et nous sommes décidés à ne pas dévier de la ligne de conduite poursuivie jusqu'ici basée sur l'esprit de solidarité complète et de coopération avec l'Angleterre.

*Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 4 (17) novembre, 1911.*

(Translation.)

THE British Government are aware that the Persian Government have lately assumed a notoriously unfriendly attitude in their relations with Russia and that the responsibility for this attitude must fall principally on the financial adviser, Mr. Morgan Shuster, who since his arrival in Persia has been pleased systematically to ignore Russian interests.

The Persian Government have lost ground and have found themselves to a great extent powerless against Mr. Shuster on account of the support which he has secured from the Medjliss and the Nationalist party.

A regrettable incident has recently occurred at Tehran, caused by the intention of the Persian Government to confiscate the properties of the supporters of the ex-Shah Mohamed Ali, and amongst others that of Prince Shoa-es-Sultaneh, in which Russian interests are involved.

Mr. Shuster, who was entrusted with the execution of this measure, proceeded in this case also in a fashion provocative to us. The gendarmes under his orders not only ventured forcibly to occupy the Prince's property before the discussions on the subject between Mr. Shuster's representatives and the Russian consul-general had terminated and to dislodge the Persian Cossacks who had been told off to guard the house, but they took aim at the representatives of the consulate-general with the evident intention of firing their rifles at them.

The Persian Government on their part, contrary to all traditions, thought themselves justified in addressing two notes to us demanding the recall of the Russian consul-general and of the staff of the consulate-general.

Judging these acts to be inadmissible from the point of view both of the prestige and of the interests of Russia, the Imperial Government have instructed the Minister at Tehran, firstly, to return to the Persian Government the two notes above mentioned and to notify to them verbally the necessity of replacing the financial gendarmes by Persian Cossacks until it has been established to what extent the interests of Russian subjects are involved in the property of Shoa-es-Sultaneh; and, secondly, to demand an

apology from the Persian Government through the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the proceedings of the Persian gendarmes.

Contrary to our expectation, these moderate demands have been rejected by the Persian Government, and accordingly the Imperial Government have been obliged to instruct M. Poklewsky to renew his representations in writing, adding that we expect our demands to be carried out without the least delay, and that failing this he would break off all relations with the Persian Government, and that Russia would reserve to herself the right to take such measures as she judged necessary.

No reply having yet been received from the Persian Government, our Minister has received instructions to break off all relations with them. At the same time the Imperial Government, considering that their interests had been seriously injured and that accordingly it was necessary to exercise pressure on the Persian Government, decided to send at once to Kazvin a detachment of different arms, leaving the Minister the power to summon to Tehran a force sufficient to expel the Persian gendarmes now in occupation of the house and property of Shoa-es-Sultaneh.

These measures, which have been rendered necessary by the circumstances above referred to, are certainly of a purely provisional character. As soon as the incident is closed and guarantees have been secured for the correct attitude of the Persian Government towards us in the future, our detachment will be recalled to Russia.

The telegraphic report of the answer given by Sir E. Grey to a question in Parliament on this subject has been cordially welcomed by the Imperial Government.

We consider, on our part, that the measures we have taken in no way conflict with the principle of our *entente* with England respecting the affairs of Persia, and we are resolved not to deviate from the line of conduct pursued hitherto, which is based on a spirit of complete solidarity and co-operation with England.

Russian Embassy, London, November 4 (17), 1911.

No. 124.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 17, 1911.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative at Kermanshah :—

“The situation critical. Serious disorder probable. All communications with the interior stopped.”

No. 125.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 17, 1911.

INSTRUCTIONS have to-day reached the Russian Minister to break off relations with the Cabinet. M. Poklewsky informs me that his Government have also instructed the military authorities in the Caucasus to dispatch a detachment of troops to Kazvin immediately, this detachment to be reinforced ultimately up to 4,000 strong.

No Cabinet has yet been formed.

No. 126.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 17, 1911.

MY telegram of 15th November.

Letter received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states that after careful reflection he has come to the conclusion that Russian Government cannot wait further for an answer from the Persian Government. They have sufficiently shown their spirit of conciliation by waiting so long. They must take into account Russian public opinion, which is much excited against Persia.

Orders have therefore been given for immediate departure of troops for Kazvin. Some days must elapse before they arrive there, which will give Persians further time to consider the necessity of submitting to Russian demand.

No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 17, 1911.

WE have no desire to favour Shuster, and, although I do not suggest it, it is possible that the Russian Government have formed a mistaken view of our attitude towards him. You can, therefore, make it quite clear to M. Nératof that any demand on Russia's part for Shuster's dismissal will be met with no objections by His Majesty's Government.

No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 17, 1911.

YOUR telegram of the 14th November.

I suppose it may be stated here that we have received assurances from the Russian Government that the troops sent to Kazvin are proceeding there subject to the same conditions as before.

No. 129.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, November 18, 1911.

LE 29 octobre (11 novembre), année courante, le Ministre de Russie à Téhéran a remis au Gouvernement persan une note demandant satisfaction pour l'attitude des autorités persanes envers des fonctionnaires du consulat général à Téhéran et leurs procédés provocants dans l'affaire de la confiscation dans cette ville des propriétés du Prince Shoa-us-Saltaneh—affaire dont les détails se trouvent exposés dans la communication officielle publiée à ce sujet.

La note en question est restée sans réponse de la part du Gouvernement persan, ce qui témoigne de son intention manifeste de se soustraire à l'exécution de notre demande.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a, en conséquence, prescrit au Ministre de Russie d'interrompre ses relations avec le Cabinet de Téhéran et a pris des mesures pour l'envoi en Perse d'un détachement de troupes, qui doit se concentrer à Kazvine, sur la route de Téhéran.

Les mesures ci-dessus ont un caractère absolument provisoire et le détachement sera rappelé sans retard aussitôt que l'incident en question aura été réglé et les rapports avec la Perse dûment rétablis.

*Ambassade Impériale de Russie,
Londres, le 18 novembre, 1911.*

(Translation.)

ON the 29th October (the 11th November) of this year the Russian Minister at Tehran presented to the Persian Government a note demanding satisfaction for the attitude of the Persian authorities towards officials of the consulate-general at Tehran and their provocative action in the incident of the confiscation of the properties of Prince Shoa-ès-Sultaneh in that town, the details of which incident are given in the official communication published on the subject.

The note in question has remained without a reply from the Persian Government, which shows their clear intention to avoid compliance with our demand.

The Imperial Government have consequently ordered the Russian Minister to break off relations with the Cabinet of Tehran, and have taken steps to send to Persia a detachment of troops which is to concentrate at Kazvin, on the road to Tehran.

The above measures are of an absolutely provisional character, and the detachment will be recalled without delay as soon as the incident in question has been settled and relations with Persia duly re-established.

*Imperial Russian Embassy,
London, November 18, 1911.*

No. 130.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 18, 1911.

THE "chef de cabinet" of the late Minister for Foreign Affairs (who is still discharging the duties of his ministry) has visited me, and I gather from him that a favourable reply will probably be returned to the Russian note, the Persian Cabinet having no alternative but to yield to *force majeure*.

He brought me a message from the late Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Cabinet crisis, which he assured me would soon be over, was entirely responsible for the failure of the Persian Government to reply to the Russian note for so long.

As soon as a new Cabinet was formed, it would at once proceed to draw up a reply to the Russian note. If this reply were unsatisfactory to Russia the measures she contemplated would have to take their course. But if a favourable reply were to be given, there would no longer be any justification for Russia to take such action.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs would therefore be grateful if I would appeal to His Majesty's Government, on behalf of the Persian Government, to approach the Russian Government with the object of securing the suspension of the contemplated Russian action, to which, he pointed out, no term was specified in the Russian note.

Diplomatic relations between M. Poklewski and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were broken off this afternoon.

No. 131.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 18, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November :—

I called on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 18th instant, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 16th instant, I spoke to his Excellency very seriously of the consequences which might result from a Russian occupation of Tehran. I urged him not to issue orders for an advance from Kazvin till all other means of exercising pressure on the Persian Government, such as the seizure of custom-houses, had been exhausted, and until sufficient time had elapsed to allow the occupation of Kazvin to produce its effect. I further reminded him how, in your desire to maintain the Anglo-Russian understanding intact, you had always tried to meet Russia's wishes, and how you had repeatedly defended her action when it was criticised in Parliament. There was, however, an English public opinion of which you had to take account; and as, in spite of the provocation which Russia might have received, the fact remained that the Persian Cossacks had endeavoured to prevent the seizure of a property belonging to one of the leaders of the late insurrection, it would not be easy for you to justify an armed occupation of the capital on account of this incident.

In the course of his reply, M. Nératof gave me the positive assurance that the principle on which the Anglo-Russian understanding was founded would be maintained intact, and that nothing which the Russian Government might do would strike at the integrity of Persia. He dismissed, however, the idea of exercising pressure by the seizure of custom-houses as being quite inadequate, and declined to grant the Persian Government any further delay after the arrival of the troops at Kazvin. He based this refusal on the grounds that the Russian Minister at Tehran had broken off diplomatic relations with the Persian Government, and that Russia could not without loss of prestige address any further communication to that Government. He rejected a proposal which I had made, that he should send a last warning message through the Persian chargé d'affaires here, but raised no objection when I put forward the personal suggestion that Sir George Barclay might, perhaps, warn the Persian Government that we had been told that unless satisfaction was at once given to Russia, not only would Tehran be occupied, but that Russia's demands would, as his Excellency had already informed me, be increased the further she advanced into the country.

In referring to the incident to which the seizure of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property had given rise, M. Nératof said that the Russian Government had never disputed the right of the Persian Government to confiscate the property of persons who had taken part

in the late rebellion. They had acquiesced in principle in such a procedure, but in this particular case the Persian Government had failed to notify the Russian consulate-general that it was Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property that was about to be seized, while the gendarmerie sent to take possession of it had carried off various implements belonging to the Russian farmers who had leased the property. This incident, however, was but one of a series of provocative measures that had been inspired by Mr. Shuster; and it was the cumulative effect of these acts that had forced the Russian Government to take action. I told his Excellency that if the occupation of Tehran by Russian troops were to lead to the overturn of the present régime, there was one thing to which His Majesty's Government would never agree, namely, the return of the ex-Shah. His Excellency replied that the measures that Russia was taking were of a purely provisional character, and their sole object was to secure the redress of her grievances; and on my enquiring what satisfaction the Persian Government could give to induce her to withdraw her troops, M. Nératof replied that she would recall them if she were notified of Mr. Shuster's dismissal, and that were he to go, she would even abandon her demand with regard to the replacing of the Treasury gendarmes by Persian Cossacks on Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 132.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 19, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of 7th October.

Salar-ed-Dowleh is reported to have been again defeated by Government troops in the neighbourhood of Burujird.

No. 133.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that on receipt of your telegram in which you asked for my view on the suggestion of the Russian Government that Major Stokes might be employed to organise a gendarmerie at or near Ispahan, I enquired of Mr. Shuster what he thought of the idea. I enclose a copy of his reply the substance of which I reported in my telegram of the 5th October.

I acquainted my Russian colleague with Mr. Shuster's answer, and on the 15th instant he informed Mr. Shuster, under instructions from his Government, that as it was unfortunately found impossible to restrict Major Stokes's services to the south, the Russian Government must adhere to their protest against his engagement to organise a Treasury gendarmerie.

Mr. Shuster had previously threatened to publish a statement of his case against the two Governments in the event of his being prevented from securing Major Stokes's services, and on receipt of M. Poklewski's communication of the 15th instant, he lost no time in communicating to Reuter's correspondent a brief statement which I understand duly appeared in the London press. He has since, I am told, posted a more detailed indictment, which will presumably appear in the London press in a few days. Meanwhile Major Stokes stays on in Tehran, though I have urged him in a friendly manner to leave. His continued presence here may prove very inconvenient as he is staying with Mr. Shuster, and it can hardly be doubted that he is assisting him in the organisation of the Treasury gendarmerie. As I have already reported I should not be surprised if at any moment you were approached by the Russian Government with the request that he may be recalled.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 133.

Mr. Shuster to Sir G. Barclay.

Dear Sir George,

Tehran, October 5, 1911.

REGARDING your note of the 3rd, to which I was about to reply, let me say that the suggestion as to localising Stokes at Ispahan, is, of course, out of the question, both on principle and as a matter of practicability.

I hope some day the British and Russian Foreign Offices will come to believe that when I said I wanted Stokes here in Tehran to assist me by his advice and peculiar knowledge in the formation of a Treasury gendarmerie, I meant just that and nothing more; no *arrière-pensée*, no military expeditions, no intrigues, nothing but what I said.

It seems impossible at times for one to gain any credence for a frank open statement of facts or intentions, but it is equally true that it was neither within the letter nor the spirit of my statement to go through the truly absurd performance of marooning him at Ispahan or anywhere else in order that he might advise and assist me here.

• Is it not about time, dear Sir George, that two big Governments stop playing at this matter, and state plainly whether they intend to continue to oppose the employment of Stokes along the lines which I have mentioned, or not?

With, &c.

W. MORGAN SHUSTER,
Treasurer-General of Persia.

No. 134.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report the Persian Government recently issued a decree confiscating the properties of the rebellious Princes Shoa-es-Sultaneh and Salar-ed-Dowleh.

In execution of the decree, Mr. Shuster, the treasurer-general, on the 9th October, sent five of his gendarmerie to each of the six properties in Tehran and the suburbs affected by the decree. The gendarmes were instructed to take possession of the properties, and to draw special attention, if necessary, to an undertaking of the Persian Government that all rights of foreigners arising from contracts in connection with these properties would be wholly respected.

One of the properties of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh is situated in the vicinity of the Russian consulate-general in the town. There the gendarmes found some Persian Cossacks in occupation. These had apparently been posted there by the Turkish Embassy (though this is not quite clear)—Shoa-es-Sultaneh being claimed by the Turkish Embassy as a Turkish subject. The Persian Cossacks objected to the entry of the gendarmes, who, however, proceeded into the house and commenced an inventory of its contents. Soon after, two officials of the Russian consulate-general, sent by M. Pokhitonow, the Russian consul-general, arrived and told the gendarmes they had no business to enter the property. The latter explained their mission, but the officials began to threaten them, and the gendarmes, not having instructions to meet such an eventuality, withdrew from the premises, chased up the street by the Russian Cossacks.

Mr. Shuster at once wrote a letter to the Russian Minister, who was still at Zerguendeh, protesting against the action of the Russian consulate-general in regard to this incident, and in regard to others of a similar nature which occurred on the same day in connection with the seizure of other properties of Shoa-es-Sultaneh.

On the following morning, the 10th October, Mr. Shuster sent his assistant, Mr. Cairns, accompanied by a force of fifty fiscal gendarmes with five officers and fifty mounted national gendarmes with three officers, under the command of Mr. Merrell, of the fiscal gendarmerie, with stringent instructions to take possession of the property in town by peaceful methods, if possible. If, however, violence were offered, the gendarmes were to wait for their opponents to fire the first shot, but in any case they were to accomplish their mission and take possession of the garden and the house.

When the expedition arrived at the gate of the property, Messrs. Cairns and Merrell went round to the Russian consulate, and were received by M. Pokhitonow,

the Russian consul-general. They read to him the order of confiscation, explained the instructions they had received, and while assuring him that the rights of foreign subjects would be respected, begged him to withdraw the force he had placed in the garden. According to the report of Mr. Merrell, M. Pokhitonow refused, but as far as I can ascertain it was the Turkish Embassy, and not M. Pokhitonow, which was responsible for the presence of the force in question, which consisted of Persian Cossacks only.

Mr. Merrell went back to the gate, the six Persian Cossacks on guard refused him entrance. Mr. Merrell, however, found a way in by a side door, and his men disarmed the Cossacks, and the gendarmes remained quietly in possession. An attempt was made by the Cossacks to summon reinforcements from the brigade to their assistance, but Prince Vadbolski, the Russian commanding officer, refused to comply without the consent of the Minister of War or the Russian Minister.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 135.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 28, 1911.

SINCE my last despatch of the 4th instant respecting the insurrection, there has been little definite to report.

The whereabouts of the ex-Shah have been the subject of many rumours. At one time it was confidently believed by the Persian Government that he was in Russian territory at Askhabad, where he was believed to be staying with the governor. There appears to have been no more truth in this story than in the rumour telegraphed by His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed that the ex-Shah had gone to Tashkent. I do not know that he has, since his flight to Gumesh Tepe, ever left the district of Astrabad. At any rate, he is there now, and some of his followers are reported to have gained a success quite recently over some Government troops near Bender Gez.

Salar-ed-Dowleh, after the rout of his forces on the 27th ultimo, fled to the neighbourhood of Hamadan, and thence, on the approach of the Government troops, to Burujird. The tribesmen who composed his army have dispersed to their homes. Azad-es-Suttan, another brother of Mohamed Ali, whom Salar-ed-Dowleh had appointed governor of Kermanshah, took bast at the Turkish consulate in that town on learning the defeat of his brother, and has since left Kermanshah on his way, it is believed, to Kerbela. Yeprim and his Armenians have returned to Tehran; the Bakhtiaris who were with him and who formed the bulk of the victorious army are now in Hamadan and its neighbourhood with the object of dealing with the aftermath of the insurrection, or, as is confidently asserted by those not friendly to them, for the purpose of unrestrained looting.

There is talk of sending Yeprim against Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabreez. That chieftain still threatens the town, and though no fighting has been reported for some time Tabreez is still almost completely invested, a state of things which is producing a serious situation, and prices of provisions are reported to be rising to a famine level.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 136.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 2nd October respecting the state of insecurity on the southern roads, I have had the honour to keep you informed in my recent telegrams respecting the reinforcement of the consular escorts of the desperate state in which the channels of communication between the Persian Gulf and Central Persia continue to remain.

Besides the concrete instances of robberies of British goods reported in my telegrams of the 14th and of the 22nd October, I still continue to receive the same reports from His Majesty's consuls in the places affected of caravans held up or compelled to follow devious routes at ruinous rates for transport fodder and protection,

while the telegraph gholams are being constantly stripped and beaten, and the telegraph *matériel* destroyed or stolen. Villages in all directions are pillaged by first one tribe and then by another set of bandits, until the inhabitants of the country in their turn have nothing left to them to live on except the pillaging of passing trade or travellers.

Now that His Majesty's Government have shown their sense of the seriousness of the prevalent disorder by the significant increase in the consular guards, it may be hoped that a temporary moral effect will be produced on at least those marauders who are under more or less responsible leaders, such as the Kashgais, the Kuhgeluis, and the Bakhtiariis, and that a diminution of disorder on the roads may have to be noted while the Persian Government are devising the effective scheme on which they have been told the inaction of our troops as regards the policing of the roads will depend.

His Majesty's consul at Kerman, however, expresses the fear that effective measures on the Bushire-Ispahan road will lead to the robbers transferring their activity to the already unsafe Kerman-Bunder Abbas route.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

No. 137.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a statement showing the numbers of Russian troops at present in Persia.

I obtained this statement through the courtesy of my Russian colleague.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Statement respecting Russian Troops in Persia, October 30, 1911.

Ardebil	2,000
Tabreez	1,000
Gumbad-i-Kabus	400
Meshed	200
Resht	150
Kazvin	52
Tehran	32
Ispahan	17*
Kermanshah	11
Kerman	4
Bushire	10
Urmia	12
Astrabad	12
Seistan	10
Turbat-i-Haidai	12
Total	3,922

* At Ispahan the escort is to be increased to 200.

No. 138.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 1, 1911.

THE course of the Cabinet has been by no means smooth during the past few weeks owing to the severe tension between the Ministers and the treasurer-general. A sharp letter was addressed by Mr. Shuster to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he complained of Vosuk-ed-Dowleh's action in settling two trifling Russian claims without his consent. Vosuk-ed-Dowleh considered the letter so offensive that he immediately tendered his resignation, which was followed by that of two of his colleagues. Realising, however, that his action was likely to lead to the upset

of the whole Ministry, and that he was thus playing into the hands of Mr. Shuster's extremist supporters, he resumed office, and his example was followed by his two colleagues.

Since then there have been further resignations, amongst them that of Hakim-ul-Mulk, Minister of Finance, who it appears was compelled to take this course by the difficulties of his position between the clamours of his colleagues for money on the one side and Mr. Shuster's tight hold of the purse-strings on the other. Hakim-ul-Mulk's place has not yet been filled, and, indeed, the post of a Minister of Finance, controlled by Mr. Shuster in a Ministry which cannot reconcile itself to the wholesome restrictions placed by Mr. Shuster on expenditure, is a very difficult one, and it may well not be easy to find anyone willing to undertake it. The Prime Minister is said to be seeking someone who can stand up to Mr. Shuster. Such a one will be hard to find. There has been much talk of curtailing by a vote of the Medjliss the powers conferred upon Mr. Shuster by the law of the 13th June. It was, indeed, decided to have a discussion in the Medjliss as to the means of diminishing his powers, but the discussion never took place, for when at the sitting of the 23rd instant the Ministers proposed that the Medjliss should go into secret session to discuss matters of importance, the democrats, seeing what was coming, left the House in a body, so that there was no quorum. Since then as a result of several meetings between Mr. Shuster and the Cabinet, the idea of curtailing the treasurer-general's powers has been abandoned, and a *modus vivendi* seems to have been arrived at, though it is idle to hope that the tension between Mr. Shuster and the present Cabinet will disappear. It must, indeed, I fear, be chronic except in the unpleasant and even dangerous contingency of the advent to power of a Cabinet of ultra-Nationalists, who, however troublesome and dangerous they may be, are the only section of public men in Persia imbued with any real spirit of reform.

The vacant posts in the Cabinet can doubtless be filled, but I fear that a strong Ministry is an impossibility unless it has the backing of Mr. Shuster, and unfortunately to find a Cabinet which could really work in harmony with him recourse would have to be had to the extremists, and such a Cabinet would probably soon provoke Russia beyond endurance.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 139.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 139.

Summary of Events in Persia for October.

Tehran.

Military Operations.—The defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh on the 27th September forms the subject of a separate despatch. Amir Mufakham, Sardar Jang and Moin Humayun have since returned to Tehran, while Sardar Mohtashem, Sardar Zafar, and Sardar Bahadur remained in the vicinity of Hamadan. Yeprem, who has received the title of "Sardar," returned to Tehran on the 22nd October.

The Medjliss.—The electoral law has at last been passed by the Medjliss. It provides for direct elections and 136 deputies instead of 120.

On the 5th October a motion, signed by forty-one deputies asking the Government to lay before the House all documents in their possession relating to reactionary intrigues and plots, was read, but so far the demand has not been responded to by the Ministers.

On the 15th October a telegram was read which had been addressed by Mullah

Mohamed Kazim Khorassani, the chief of the Ulema of Nejef, to the Regent and the Medjliss, protesting against the alleged disregard at Tehran of religious interdictions. The telegram has apparently not received much attention.

Tabreez.

At the end of September two English employes of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, who, at the request of the Russian consul-general, were a short distance from Tabreez repairing the line, were fired upon by some rebels. No one was injured, and the incident is now closed.

The investment of the town by Shuja-ed-Dowleh continues, and in the middle of October some serious fighting occurred, when the Nationalists attacked the Karamalik suburb, which was held by the rebels, and lost twenty-five killed and thirty wounded.

It is reported by His Majesty's consul that, according to trustworthy information, Rahim Khan, the notorious Royalist outlaw, has been secretly executed in prison at Tabreez.

Mujallal-es-Sultan, the ex-Shah's chamberlain, who landed in Persia at the same time as the late Arshad-ed-Dowleh, has been sent to Maragha as a prisoner by Shuja-ed-Dowleh in consequence of dissensions in camp.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

On the 20th October a telegram was received from the British consular agent at Astrabad, reporting that the ex-Shah was at Khoja Nafas, which is a few miles south of Gumesh Tepe. On the 30th October he telegraphed the news of the defeat of a Government force consisting of 200 men under Sardar Mohy, by the ex-Shah's Turkomans. Sardar Mohy is said to have fled, and Astrabad is reported to be in danger of an attack by the Turkomans.

Zahir-ed-Dowleh, the new governor for Ghilan, has left Tehran for his post.

At the end of October a little over 100 Russian Cossacks were landed at Enzeli to increase the consular guard.

Meshed.

Prince Rukn-ed-Dowleh has been definitely appointed Governor-General of Khorassan, and proposes to leave Tehran for Meshed shortly.

The state of the province has continued quiet, the town of Meshed has not been disturbed, but the roads are, as usual, infested with robbers.

Nishapur has been placed under Khorassan, but Prince Nayer-ed-Dowleh, who is the principal landed proprietor of the district, is endeavouring to separate it again and to obtain the governorship as before.

Ispahan.

Some caravans have actually attempted to do the journey between Ispahan and Shiraz and *vice versa*. One caravan of about 400 animals reached Ispahan in the middle of September, having taken the Sarhad route and was not molested anywhere. There are constant reports of robberies on the road between Ispahan and Kunisheh attributed to Kuhgeluis. A large camel caravan arrived safely on the 2nd October with piece-goods from Hamadan. Traffic has been suspended for some time on the Ispahan-Ahwaz (Bakhtiari) road, and on the 7th October there were 2,174 packages awaiting downward dispatch from Ispahan. A caravan of over 800 camels carrying pipe tobacco actually left Ispahan, but hearing reports of robbers on the road, the camelmen dropped their loads and returned to Ispahan.

The governor, Sardar Ashja Bakhtiari, is said to leave most of the cares of State to his subordinates, who are greedy and unprincipled. The local anjuman ceased to sit after the arrival of the present governor in May last.

Hayder Khan, the Caucasian terrorist, returned from Shiraz on his way to Tehran at the end of September with a band of armed followers. He and his companions were disarmed at Ispahan.

Miss Ross, a lady doctor, was attacked by robbers while travelling from Ispahan to Shiraz, robbed of all her effects, and subjected to personal violence.

On the 20th October it was reported that the post from Shiraz to Ispahan accompanied by 300 soldiers of the Hamadan regiment encountered 200 Kuhgeluis, near Yezdikhast, and were routed by them after a severe conflict.

Various robberies of British merchandise are reported, and the usual claims have been presented to the local authorities.

The Boir Ahmedis attacked a village in the vicinity of Abadeh in the middle of October, and completely looted it.

The detachments of Persian Cossacks under two Russian officers, which was sent from Tehran against Naib Hussein at Kashan, arrived at its destination on the 13th October, and after bombarding the town entered it the following day to find that Naib Hussein had again managed to get away. Ten days later Naib Hussein was reported to be in the vicinity of Kum plundering the villages as usual.

The Bakhtiaris who are returning to their homes from Tehran are reported to be robbing travellers and posts on the road.

Yezd.

Prince Amir Azam, the Governor of Kerman, succeeded in entering Yezd at the beginning of October, in spite of the resistance of the mob. Some executions followed, and the acting British vice-consul reported that the town was quiet.

Sultanabad.

The British vice-consul reported on the 11th October that the state of the district was unsettled, and that in some parts taxes were still being collected for the Salar-ed-Dowleh, who was then on his way to Luristan via Malair and Nehavend with from 5,000 to 6,000 followers. Haji Seif-ed-Dowleh, a brother of Ain-ed-Dowleh, who had been nominated Governor of Sultanabad by Salar-ed-Dowleh, took refuge at the British vice-consulate after the defeat of the Prince, but subsequently left for Tehran.

Shiraz.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Soulet-ed-Dowleh left Shiraz on their way south on the 5th October, and Kawam-ul-Mulk left His Majesty's consulate the following day. It was generally thought that Nizam and Soulet left the town in consequence of the warning conveyed to them by His Majesty's Minister. The situation in the town of Shiraz was at once relieved, and Kawam-ul-Mulk took over the administration of the province on behalf of Ala-ed-Dowleh, whose appointment as Governor-General of Fars and the Gulf ports was publicly announced at Shiraz on the 10th October. Soulet-ed-Dowleh, before leaving Shiraz, openly declared his intention of disturbing the Bushire road, and this threat he carried out. The accounts of the depredations of his followers are too numerous to report. The telegraph lines have been much damaged by the Kashgais and other tribesmen both to the north and to the south of Shiraz, and men sent out to repair them have been robbed and ill-treated. The robberies of British goods on the southern roads are too numerous to catalogue. Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Soulet-ed-Dowleh parted company after leaving Shiraz. The former went as far as Daliki, and then returned to Konartakhteh, while the latter remained in the vicinity of Jerreh. The Persian Government have issued a proclamation proscribing Nizam-es-Sultaneh and forfeiting his estates. It is their intention to capture him if possible. Soulet-ed-Dowleh has been dismissed from the post of Ilkhani of the Kashgais, and his brother, Zaigham-ed-Dowleh, has been appointed to succeed him. He left Tehran on the 26th October for Shiraz. Ala-ed-Dowleh has not yet left Tehran, but says he will go as soon as the treasurer-general transfers a sum of money to Shiraz which is required for the payment of the Arab forces there. This Mr. Shuster has, so far, refused to do, fearing that the money will be squandered. The treasurer-general has engaged Mr. Alexander Schindler, formerly of the staff of the Imperial Bank, and proposes to send him as his representative to Shiraz to supervise the expenditure of money transferred in this way. It is announced by the Persian Government that a large force will accompany Ala-ed-Dowleh to Shiraz, and that they will include the Cossack detachment now at Kashan. The garrison of 5,000 troops stationed there last March have melted away unpaid, with the exception of some 300, who clamour fitfully for nine months' arrears of pay and have now taken "bast" outside the British consulate.

Seistan.

The roads which continue to be unsafe all round Seistan are now also reported unsafe in southern and western Kainat.

Baluchi raiders have been active on the western borders of the Kainat, but the new Government delegate, Nassir-es-Sultaneh, is taking steps to deal with them.

Kerman.

His Majesty's consul writes on the 7th September that the condition of the province of Kerman is worse than at any time since his arrival in May 1910. The local government has hardly any power in the town and practically none in the province. The prices of bread and meat are rising, and the people are growing uneasy. The new governor is still at Yezd. Three robberies occurred in September on the Bunder Abbas road and the property of some Hindu merchants was robbed. The post is constantly being robbed on the Yezd, Bunder Abbas, and other roads.

Kermanshah and Hamadan.

On the 8th October a telegram arrived from Hamadan, addressed by the Bakhtiari khans, Sardar Zafar and Sardar Jang, to the clergy and merchants of Kermanshah, announcing their arrival there, and instructing them to detain Azad-es-Sultan, the governor nominated by Salar-ed-Dowleh. The Prince having been warned fled to the Turkish consulate. On the telegram becoming known, the populace robbed any Kalhurs whom they found in the streets. Azad-es-Sultan eventually left the town and proceeded in the direction of Bagdad. Salar-ed-Dowleh left Hamadan by the Tusirkan road on the 3rd October with a small following, which looted the villages on the way. On the 4th the Government forces arrived at Showarin, near Hamadan, and looted the houses of Amir Afkham and his sons, Ehtesham-ed-Dowleh and Hissam-ul-Mulk. Sardar Zafar assumed the post of Governor of Hamadan. On the 15th Sardar Mozaffar (Daoud Khan, chief of the Kalhurs) left the vicinity of Kermanshah for his tribal quarters. Letters were received from Salar-ed-Dowleh on the 13th October, written from Luristan, directing that forces should be collected and sent to join him. In answer he was invited to come himself to Kermanshah.

Bushire.

The Indian cavalry for Shiraz arrived on the 27th October, and the disembarkation was completed by the 30th without casualty. An attempt was made by some of the clergy of Bushire to cause a boycott by intimidating the boatmen and others, but this was eventually overcome.

The governor of the Gulf ports, Muvakkar-ed-Dowleh, has telegraphed to Ala-ed-Dowleh that the inclusion of his governorship in the Fars appointment is very detrimental to his prestige and usefulness. He has declared that he will resign if the arrangement is not reversed. If Ala-ed-Dowleh actually goes to Shiraz he will probably reappoint Darya Beggi to the Gulf ports.

Bunder Abbas.

The road to Kerman has been closed to caravans owing to the appearance of robbers on it.

No. 140.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 3, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two notes which I addressed to the Persian Government on the receipt of your telegram of the 23rd ultimo and of subsequent correspondence on the subject of the increase of the consular escorts at Bushire, Ispahan, and Shiraz.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

REFERRING to my note of the 10th October and to your Excellency's notes of the 11th and 18th October, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the reinforcements for the consular escorts have now started from India, and are now due to arrive shortly at Bushire. I shall have the honour to inform your Excellency in due course how these reinforcements will be distributed, and, in the meantime, I am to assure your Excellency that if the Persian Government will devise an effective scheme to restore security and protect the roads the British consular escorts will be used solely as consular guards to protect the consulates and British lives and property in the towns where they are located, and will not patrol the roads or make expeditions during the putting into execution of the Persian scheme.

When such scheme is in operation and is effective the reinforcements of the escorts will be withdrawn.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 24, 1911.

WITH reference to my note of to-day, announcing the impending arrival at Bushire of reinforcements of the British consular escorts, I have the honour to request that the necessary orders may be given for the usual customs facilities for these troops.

I also request your Excellency to be so good as to cause the necessary instructions to be sent to the governor of the Gulf ports to afford his full co-operation to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in connection with the landing of these troops and for the dispatch northwards of such of them as are intended for Shiraz and Ispahan.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 140.

Sir G. Barclay to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, October 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my two notes of the 24th instant respecting the arrival at Bushire of reinforcements of the consular escorts at the consulate-general at that port and at the British consulates at Shiraz and Ispahan, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the governor of the Gulf ports has informed His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire that, though he has asked for instructions, he has not received them, and that he is therefore unable to co-operate with the consul-general in connection with the landing of reinforcements.

I learn, too, that boatmen and others have been intimidated, and that endeavours are being made to provoke an agitation against the landing of British troops.

I need not point out to your Excellency the serious consequences of any opposition to the landing of the British troops, but I must request your Excellency to be good enough to send immediate instructions to the governor of the Gulf ports to afford his full co-operation to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire and to do his utmost to prevent any agitation against the troops.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 4 in No. 140.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

I HAVE taken note of the contents of your Excellency's communication of the 24th October respecting the arrival of reinforcements for the consular guard, and I have

the honour to say that the Persian Government maintain their protest against this measure, as made to your Excellency in my notes of the 11th and 18th instant. The Persian Government continue to consider the presence of these reinforcements as the greatest obstacle to the execution of the scheme which they had elaborated for the maintenance of order in Fars. Therefore, I have the honour to point out that, in spite of the disorder caused by the conflict between the inhabitants, the continuance of which was only due to the fact that the Government were occupied in dealing with unusual events in the north and west, the Persian Government do not see any justification for the dispatch of a military force by His Britannic Majesty's Government for the protection of their consulates. As I have already often stated to your Excellency, the Persian Government consider that the scheme they have formulated for the maintenance of order and for the protection of the lives and property of British subjects in those parts is sufficient, and they consider their former protest to be in full force.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 140.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, October 30, 1911.

I HAVE received your Excellency's note of the 26th instant respecting the arrival at Bushire of reinforcements for the consular guards, and I have the honour to inform you that the necessary telegrams on the subject have been sent to the Governor of Bushire.

With regard, however, to the agitation amongst the inhabitants which your Excellency had asked me to prevent, I may point out that no Government can stop public feelings, and it is impossible for the Government to do so in the present case. When it was pointed out in my notes of the 11th and 18th instant that the arrival of the consular guards would interfere with the execution of the proposed organisation, it was not only considered that it would weaken the Government's scheme, but public excitement, which might lead to new difficulties, had also been foreseen. Now that indications of public excitement have become evident the Persian Government will do their utmost to prevent public opposition, but your Excellency will surely admit that public disgust and similar feelings cannot be prevented, as they are the manifestation of personal sentiment.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 141.

Mirza Mehdi Khan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

THE Persian Minister presents his compliments to Sir Edward Grey, and, with reference to his calls at the Foreign Office regarding the recent policy of Russia towards Persia, has the honour to enclose the translation of a telegram, which he has just received from his Government, regarding the decision of the Russian Government to dispatch troops to Persia. The Persian Minister begs most earnestly to recommend this matter to Sir Edward Grey's immediate attention. He will call at the Foreign Office to-morrow (Monday) morning. In order that there should be no loss of time he has at once sent to Sir Edward Grey the telegram from his Government.

Persian Legation, London, November 19, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 141.

Persian Government to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

November 19, 1911.

THE interpreter of the Russian Legation called yesterday at 5 o'clock at the Foreign Office, and announced the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the

legation and this Foreign Office and the dispatch of troops to Persia. I have informed Sir George Barclay that the reply to the Russian Minister has not been put off; the delay in replying was due solely to the crisis in the Cabinet. The new Cabinet will be formed to-night, or, at the latest, to-morrow morning, when the reply to the note will be sent. The Russian Government should therefore refrain from taking any measures until the reply of the note is sent. When the Cabinet is formed and the demands of the Russian Government are accepted, under *force majeure*, there can no longer be any cause for the breaking off of diplomatic relations and for dispatch of troops. We depend strongly on His Britannic Majesty's Government to prove at this hour their ancient and traditional friendship.

No. 142.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 19, 1911.*
 MY telegram of 15th November: Escort for Miss Ross.
 Force left Shiraz yesterday.

No. 143.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 19, 1911.*
 MY telegram of the 18th November.
 Hope of Minister for Foreign Affairs as to speedy solution of crisis has not been fulfilled, Medjliss objecting in a session late last night to proposed new Cabinet.
 Medjliss does not at present appear disposed to ratify any Ministry prepared to yield to Russian demands.

No. 144.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, November 20, 1911.*
 YOUR telegram of the 30th October.
 Sepoy guard left Shiraz on the 18th November. Acting consul reports that two Japanese subjects who had been informed that sepoys could not be responsible for their safety, and who were travelling ahead of the guard, were completely stripped yesterday by a large party of Boir Ahmedis near Dastarjin. Acting consul has ordered sepoys not to advance until a local Persian force, dispatch of which he is endeavouring to arrange for, has occupied neighbouring hills, and to return to Zinian if there is any doubt as to their getting through safely.
 I have approved.

No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 20, 1911.*
 WE have every reason to believe that if Persian Government comply with Russian demands Russian troops will be withdrawn.
 You should let Persian Government know of this and point out that no time should be lost in complying with Russian demands.

No. 146.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 20, 1911.

IN a conversation which I had this afternoon with M. Nératof, I made to his Excellency the communication about Mr. Shuster, as instructed in your telegram of the 17th November.

M. Nératof expressed great satisfaction at this communication. In discussing the question when the Russian troops would eventually be withdrawn, M. Nératof gave me to understand that they would be withdrawn without Russia presenting any further demands if the demands already formulated were complied with by the time that the Russian force reached Persian territory. If, on the other hand, the troops had to proceed beyond the frontier, then it might be necessary for Russia to increase her demands, and she would then probably insist on Shuster being dismissed.

No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 20, 1911.

THE Persian Minister came to see me to-day and spoke at length regarding the advance of Russian troops.

With regard to the merits of the case, I told him that I could not discuss the subject since the interest in the property involved was Russian and not British; Shuster's attitude, however, has generally been so regardless of Russia, I might even say, so provocative, that one could hardly expect Russia to regard the incident leniently.

The Persian Minister then asked me for my advice. I told him that Persian Government had no choice but to comply with two Russian demands for a formal apology and substitution of Persian Cossacks for Treasury gendarmes. I added that such compliance should be made at once, as time was lost by making conditions. He answered that the Persian Government would instantly comply with these two demands, and that he was in a position to promise that compliance would be carried out if they received an assurance that Russian troops would not advance further, and if we would intervene for the purpose. He pointed out that his Government's position would be untenable if they complied and troops were not withdrawn.

I said that I could not give any assurance on Russia's behalf regarding Russian troops, and that I did not suppose she would admit official intervention on a point in which, as I understood, she considered her honour to be involved; all I could do was to make known at St. Petersburg what the Persian Minister had said.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I was left with the impression that a settlement can be effected, and that, if Russian Government desire it, I am ready to communicate their views formally. You may use your discretion as to suggesting to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, having heard through me that Persian Government are ready to comply with the Russian demands, he should allow M. Poklewski to arrange the matter either informally at Tehran or formally by a renewal of diplomatic relations.

No. 148.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

Sir,

Stockholm, November 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to state that the press publishes to-day the names of the seven officers who have been designated by the War Office to proceed to Persia in order to reorganise the gendarmerie. It is added that no further nominations will take place, and it is understood that, in consequence of complications which are likely to occur in Persia in the immediate future, it is not proposed to send any officers to

organise the Persian army. It may therefore be concluded that the proposal to that effect has fallen through.

The names of the officers are as follows :—

Captain Glimstedt, Gota Life Guards. Born 1871, entered the army 1893, entered the service of the Congo Free State 1894, returned 1898, captain 1908.

Captain Folke, Varmlands regiment. Born 1879, captain this year.

Rittmeister Siefvert, Scania Dragoons. Born 1875.

Lieutenant Count Lewenhaupt, Scania Hussars. Born 1877, lieutenant 1903 ; son of the late Minister in London and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Lieutenant Borell, Gothland infantry regiment. Born 1882, lieutenant 1907.

Intendent Nicolin, Army Service Corps. Born 1878.

Lieutenant Norén Brandel, Jonkoping regiment. Born 1880, lieutenant 1906.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

No. 149.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

MY telegram of 20th November.

Sepoys have continued journey unmolested.

No. 150.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

I HAVE communicated your message to Stokes, as instructed in your telegram of the 16th instant. I fear, however, that I cannot persuade him to decide on departure.

He declares that he pledged himself to Shuster to accept the appointment at the moment when we notified Shuster that before taking up the appointment Stokes must resign his commission. He therefore asks that the "question" which he requested me to convey through you to the Secretary of State for India (see my telegram of the 12th instant) may receive a direct answer, which would, at least, show that it was only *force majeure* which had obliged him to break his pledge.

No. 151.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 21, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 20th November.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh has formed a Cabinet, and was only prevented by indisposition from presenting it to Medjliss to-day. I am assured that it will be presented to-morrow.

Orders signed by all the Ministers have been sent to Shuster to withdraw gendarmes and hand over properties to delegates of Persian Government, and Cossack Brigade has been ordered to furnish guards.

Sounded as to whether an apology from Persian chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg would satisfy Russia, I have replied that I had no assurance that it would, and that to enquire would waste valuable time. I am now assured that Minister for Foreign Affairs will apologise as soon as Cabinet has been presented to Medjliss. Minister for Foreign Affairs begs me to express his gratitude for your good offices.

No. 152.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 21, 1911.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November:—

On the receipt of your telegram of the 20th instant I called on M. Nératof, and communicated to him what you had said to the Persian Minister, adding that the latter had given you the impression that a settlement could be effected, and that you were ready, if the Imperial Government desired it, to communicate their views formally to the Persian Government.

M. Nératof said that the Persian Minister's communication was very important, as showing the disposition of his Government, and desired me to thank you for your offer to act as intermediary. If the Russian troops had not disembarked before satisfaction had been given to Russia's demands it might be possible, he thought, to give the Persian Government the assurance which they had asked for; but this was a question on which he would have to consult the President of the Council. It would nevertheless be to the interests of both our Governments were the present incident to be used for the purpose of establishing a normal state of affairs at Tehran. The constitution was at present being worked in a one-sided manner, and the Medjliss had arrogated to itself executive powers to which it had no right. It was necessary, in his opinion, to restrict the rôle of that Chamber to that of a purely legislative assembly, to constitute a Senate, and to increase the powers of the Regent. It would, moreover, be most desirable to procure the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, as, so long as he remained at Tehran, pending questions like that of the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre would never be settled, while even were that appointment now to be cancelled there was no guarantee that similar ones would not be made in the future.

I replied that if the Russian troops were to be retained in Persia till this programme had been carried through, they would have to remain there for months, and I suggested that when M. Poklewski received the visit of apology from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, he might state that the troops had been recalled in the hope that the Persian Government would now come to an arrangement with them for the settlement of all outstanding questions and for placing relations on a friendly and stable basis. I added that in such a case I was sure that you would give him all the support you could.

M. Nératof replied that he was as anxious as you were for the recall of the troops, but that when once this step was taken there would be no guarantee against the recurrence of other incidents entailing the dispatch of further troops.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 153.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

YOUR telegram of the 20th November reached me yesterday, and I at once acted on the instructions it conveyed, and left a *pro-memoriâ* at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the morning.

The announcement made to me last night by the Persian Government (see my telegram of the 21st November) was doubtless due to my message, which I know was discussed by the members of the new Cabinet and by prominent deputies of the Medjliss.

No. 154.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 22, 1911.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November:—

M. Nératof informed me on the 22nd instant that he had communicated to the President of the Council all that I had told him, but that, as a portion of the troops had already arrived at Enzeli, it had been decided at a Cabinet Council held on the preceding evening that it was impossible to recall them till some guarantee had been obtained with regard to the future. M. Nératof explained that it had never been intended to exclude a discussion with the Persian Government for the purpose of arriving at a settlement of all outstanding questions. His Excellency also observed that the dispatch of troops had not only been very inconvenient to the Russian Government, but had involved great expense, and they would have to raise the question of the cost of the expedition. I subsequently pressed M. Nératof at any rate to prevent the troops advancing beyond Resht; but though he gave me a vague and conditional assurance on the subject, it was clear from his subsequent language that the Russian Government are determined not to withdraw their troops till they have got rid of Mr. Shuster, even if they must send their troops to Tehran to expel him.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

YOU should without delay communicate substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegrams of yesterday and to-day to Minister for Foreign Affairs, so as to endeavour to render unnecessary the disembarkation of troops, since the Persian Government have apparently agreed to one of Russian demands. It is of the utmost importance that if Russian demands are complied with troops should not be landed, or if disembarked should at once be re-shipped. I am quite ready to discuss with Russian Government any proposals they may have to make in regard to promoting a more stable condition of affairs in Persia, and for the avoidance of any further acute differences.

Language as reported in your telegram of the 21st November is approved.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 18th instant, and asked for confirmation of the reported advance on Kazvin.

Mr. Mallet told him the facts, and said that the only hope of averting the occupation of Tehran and further demands was prompt acceptance of the Russian conditions; he added that it appeared that Mr. Shuster's removal was one of the principal objects of the move.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 157.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

HIS Majesty's consul at Resht reports 500 Russian infantry arrived 21st November.

No. 158.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 23, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 21st November.

At yesterday's session of the Medjliss a letter was read from the Prime Minister introducing an incomplete Cabinet: the late Minister for Foreign Affairs resumes his portfolio. He was too unwell to be present at the sitting: I am, however, assured that as soon as he is well enough, which he hopes will be to-day, he will tender an apology to the Russian Legation.

Persian Government inform me that the formalities for checking the inventory of movables will take four days, or possibly longer: the gendarmes cannot therefore be withdrawn from the property at once.

I have on repeated occasions impressed on the Persian Government that the chance of a withdrawal of the Russian troops becomes smaller with every moment's delay.

No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 23, 1911.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November:—

On the evening of the 23rd instant, M. Nératof sent for me and told me that, according to a telegram which he had received from M. Poklewski, the new Persian Government consisted of only three Ministers, and had only a provisional mandate; that the Persian Cossacks were not to replace the Treasury gendarmes for another four or five days, and that until this change had been effected, M. Poklewski could not receive the visit of apology that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was to pay him. Finally, Mr. Shuster had, his Excellency said, caused a Persian pamphlet dealing with the recent incident to be circulated broadcast for the purpose of stirring up an anti-Russian agitation. This was a proceeding which the Russian Government could not tolerate, and instructions would be sent to M. Poklewski, after a Council of Ministers to be held the next evening, to demand his dismissal. Such a demand, when once presented, must, his Excellency added, be enforced at all costs. M. Poklewski would also be instructed to demand the cancelling of Mr. Lecoffre's appointment, as well as a declaration to the effect that in future no subject of any of the Great Powers would be appointed to any important post in the Persian service, and that no foreigner of any nationality would be employed in such a capacity without previous consultation with the two legations.

I endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to induce his Excellency to delay the dispatch of these instructions till I was in receipt of your views with regard to them.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

SEE your telegram of yesterday.

You should urge on Russian Government that the troops which are already in Persia should at all events not be allowed to advance when once Persian Government have agreed to Russian demands, that diplomatic relations at Tehran should be resumed, and that no further troops should be dispatched.

If the above requests were agreed to, a discussion might take place between ourselves and Russia as to what changes are required at Tehran in order to give better security to Russian interests.

No. 161.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 12, 1911.

AS reported in my telegram of the 2nd November, Russian Minister, under instructions from his Government, demanded on that day from the Persian Government that the Treasury gendarmes should be withdrawn from the town property and replaced by Persian Cossacks, and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should formally apologise for an incident which had occurred after the gendarmes had taken possession. The Russian Minister also returned the note in which the Persian Government had demanded the recall of Pokhitonow, as well as a rejoinder which the Persian Government had made to M. Poklewski's reply to the note in question.

On the 5th instant a Cabinet Council was held to consider the reply to the Russian demands and it was decided, practically unanimously as I understand, to reject them. The demands had been made verbally, and the reply, which was given on the 6th instant, was also verbal. I enclose a copy of it as taken down at the Russian Legation. You will observe that it is implied in the Persian Government's reply that the Russian Legation had had due notice of the seizures, and it is stated that they had been assured that Russian rights would be respected. I believe this is so far accurate that the Persian Government had informally intimated to the Russian Minister that the estates of certain reactionaries were to be confiscated, and assurances were given that any proper Russian claim would be met, but Shoa-es-Sultaneh's name was not specifically mentioned by the Persian Government, and it would, no doubt, have been more regular, had the Persian Government known that there were any Russian rights involved, that they should have given notice of the date and hour at which the seizure was to be effected, and should have invited the co-operation of the Russian consulate-general.

Yesterday the Russian Minister, under orders from St. Petersburg, demanded, in writing, satisfaction of the Russian demands, and intimated to the Persian Government, verbally, that unless this were given without delay he would break off relations with the present Cabinet, and Russia would take such measures as might be necessary to protect her own interests.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 161.

Reply of Persian Government to Russian Demands made verbally on November 2.

THE Imperial Government of Persia, desirous as ever of maintaining the most friendly relations with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor, after a most careful consideration of the proposals made by your Excellency, in effect that the Government's agents now occupying certain properties recently confiscated from the rebellious Persian subject Shoa-es-Sultaneh, should be removed and should be replaced by the former guard of Persian Cossacks, and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should, in person, present himself at the Russian Legation, and tender an apology for an offence alleged to have been given to officers of the Russian consulate-general in Tehran, make, in reply thereto, the following observations: Whereas, the Persian authorities had taken care to notify beforehand the Russian Legation that the interests of Russian subjects would be safeguarded, and, moreover, on the second day of the incident, reiterated the Government's decree to the Russian consul-general, requesting, as they had a right to do, that no hindrance or intervention on the part of any member of the consulate-general should be tolerated, and further, seeing that the policy of this Government is one of friendship and conciliation towards Russia, in which sense they are endeavouring to direct the course of public opinion; and whereas, on the other hand, compliance with your Excellency's verbal proposition, in spite of the innocence of the Imperial Government's agents, would not only violate the dignity and honour of the country, but would also be incompatible with the said policy of friendship and co-operation, the Imperial Government of Persia find it impossible to acquiesce in the above proposals.

Apprehending, however, that a misunderstanding as to the real facts of the case still clings to the mind of the Imperial Government of Russia, and with a view to completely demonstrating their good will, the Persian Government court a full and

impartial investigation of the facts in order that all possible ground for misapprehension might be removed.

I am to state, in conclusion, that the Imperial Government of Persia cannot fail to express regret at the action taken by your Excellency's Government in returning the protest heretofore lodged by the Persian Government with your Excellency.

November 6, 1911.

No. 162.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant.

The "chef de cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent me a private letter yesterday afternoon to the effect that the Persian Government had lost no time in acting on the advice given them by His Majesty's Government as regards compliance with the Russian demands, on the express understanding that the Russian troops would then be withdrawn. He stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared to tender a formal apology to the Russian Legation, and that Persian Cossacks would replace the Treasury gendarmes this evening in the property in question.

I pointed out to him at once that there was no express understanding. I reminded him of the wording of your telegram of the 20th instant, and added that when I used your words on the morning of the 22nd November, they correctly expressed the state of the case as it then stood.

No. 163.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

THE Russian Minister received the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Russian Legation this afternoon, when his Excellency tendered the formal apology demanded by the Russian Government.

Persian Cossacks have replaced the Treasury gendarmes on the principal property, and they will also replace Treasury gendarmes on the other properties this evening.

As soon as the Minister for Foreign Affairs had apologised, M. Poklewski informed his Excellency that his Government had authorised him to resume diplomatic relations, but he added his personal opinion that his Government would not be entirely satisfied with the compliance with their two original demands. He reminded his Excellency of the great delay shown by the Persian Government in giving satisfaction, in consequence of which Russian troops had already been landed; and he added that, since the original demands had been presented, Shuster had had translations of his recent letter to the press made, and had distributed them broadcast among the people. He thought the Russian Government would formulate some further demands and present them to the Persian Government.

No. 164.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

REFERENCE to last paragraph of your telegram of the 23rd November to Sir G. Buchanan.

M. Poklewski informs me that his Government having enquired his views as to means of procuring the dismissal of the treasurer-general, he replied on the 21st November that he did not think that diplomatic pressure would be likely to effect this object. Russian Minister added that if Russian Government decided to formulate fresh demands and to employ troops to enforce their acceptance, he believed that the course most likely to put relations between Russia and Persian Government on a more stable basis, whatever might be the decision of the Russian Government with regard to

Shuster, would be to utilise the presence of the troops to force Persian Government to recognise Anglo-Russian Convention in a formula previously agreed upon by Great Britain and Russia.

The comprehensive demand suggested by my Russian colleague is, I think, preferable, if troops are to be employed to secure compliance to the pressing of several particular demands.

No. 165.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 24, 1911.

MY telegram of the 23rd November.

I have to-day written privately to M. Nératof pointing out that the Russian proposal that the Persian Government should be required to make a declaration with regard to the employment of foreigners might be held to engage His Majesty's Government. I have accordingly begged him to postpone presenting such a demand until I have ascertained your views on the subject and communicated them to him.

No. 166.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 24, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November:—

ON receiving your telegram of the 23rd instant I again pressed M. Nératof to stop the further advance of the troops, giving him to understand that you had been greatly disappointed to hear that the troops were not to be withdrawn immediately on the Russian Government complying with the Persian demands. I further expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would do nothing to add to the difficulties with which you would be confronted when foreign affairs came up for discussion in the House of Commons next Monday.

M. Nératof said that he was insisting in the Council of Ministers that for the present at any rate the troops should be retained at Resht; but that he could not give me an assurance that they would not advance beyond it, as were he to do so, the Persian Government would never yield. As regarded the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations, M. Poklewski would be instructed to warn the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he announced his intention of paying a visit of apology, that further demands were about to be presented, and that if, in spite of this warning, the apologies were presented, his Excellency supposed that diplomatic relations would be resumed.

M. Nératof then said that as the meeting of the Council of Ministers had been postponed for twenty-four hours he could not give me an authoritative statement with regard to the new demands, of which he had spoken to me yesterday. They would, however, he thought, deal with the question of Mr. Shuster's dismissal, the employment of foreigners in important posts in the Persian administration, and the settlement of all outstanding litigious matters in a conciliatory spirit. The question of Mr. Lecoffre's appointment was a matter of secondary importance; but it might be well to take this opportunity of obtaining the recognition of the Anglo-Russian agreement; while a proposal which would be more in the nature of a wish than of a demand would be put forward for the constitution of a Senate.

I pressed his Excellency strongly to limit the number of these demands to the strictest minimum, and remarked that I did not know how far you would approve of the mention of our legation in the matter of the employment of foreigners, when the demand about to be presented was virtually an ultimatum that might have to be imposed by force. I added that in my opinion the same objection held good with regard to a demand for the recognition of the Anglo-Russian understanding. His Excellency admitted that this might be awkward for us, and said that he would try to find a formula that would show that Russia was acting entirely on her own responsibility. In reply to some objections which I had raised, his Excellency gave me

the assurance that he would not insist on the immediate settlement of all pending questions; that the troops would not remain in Persia till such a settlement had been effected; and that the Russian Government would be content with a declaration in the sense that those questions would be settled in a conciliatory spirit.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 24, 1911.

SEE your telegram of yesterday.

His Majesty's Government consider it impossible for them to object to formulation of Russian demands as proposed. We nevertheless consider it essential that as soon as Persian Government has complied with Russia's two original demands the movements of Russian troops should be stopped, and that, as regards the new Russian demands, time should be given to allow diplomatic pressure to be brought to bear at Tehran to ensure their acceptance. Of course presentation of further Russian demands at Tehran must take place before His Majesty's Government can do anything there.

I take it for granted that M. Poklewski will be instructed to resume diplomatic relations as soon as Persian Government has agreed to the two original demands of his Government, and when that has been done, concerted action between His Majesty's representative and M. Poklewski will be possible.

No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 24, 1911.

EMPLOYMENT of foreigners in Persia

I see no objection to our supporting Russian demand (see your telegram of to-day), which does not seem to differ much from what has hitherto been the practice.

I consider, however, in the first instance, that Russian Government should act on their own responsibility in putting forward demands.

No. 169.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1911.

I RECEIVED a visit yesterday from the Persian chargé d'affaires, who asked me what was the nature of the further demands which the Russian Government proposed to present. He added that after the communication which Sir G. Barclay had made to his Government, the latter had hoped that when they had complied with the two original Russian demands the troops would be withdrawn.

To this I replied that the order for withdrawal would have been given if the Persian Government had at once given the satisfaction demanded and had not waited till the troops had landed on Persian soil. I informed him that the council of Ministers was to meet this evening and would then formulate the further demands, and I said that Mr. Shuster's action in publishing his pamphlet had greatly incensed the Russian Government.

He asked whether Russia would demand the dismissal of Mr. Shuster, and I said that I thought such a demand was most probable, adding that, in my opinion, it was of far greater moment to Persia to re-establish good relations with Russia than to keep Mr. Shuster in her service, and that the responsibility for the estrangement between the two countries lay chiefly at his door.

No. 170.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November :—

On the receipt of your two telegrams of the 24th instant I again pressed on M. Nératof the importance of retaining the troops at Resht, now that the two original demands had been complied with, and that the resumption of diplomatic relations would enable our two representatives to act together. I did not conceal from him the disappointment which the decision taken by the Russian Government not to withdraw their troops had caused you, and urged him to drop the demand for an indemnity of 150,000 roubles, of which he had just spoken to me. I also told him that any demand that the Russian Government might present respecting foreign employés must be made in the first instance on their own responsibility.

M. Nératof said that he proposed suggesting that a delay of five or six days should be accorded the Persian Government; but that, as regarded the question of an indemnity, he considered that its payment would exercise a salutary effect, and render the Persians less disposed to provoke armed intervention in the future.

M. Nératof repeated his assurance that no annexation of Persian territory was contemplated, and handed me the accompanying memorandum, which, he said, fully explained the Russian position.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

 Enclosure in No. 170.

Memorandum communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Nératof on November 25, 1911.

LE conflit actuel entre la Russie et la Perse, dont la cause immédiate a été l'incident survenu pendant la confiscation des biens du Prince Schoa-es-Sultaneh, doit être envisagé comme la suite d'une série d'événements qui ont provoqué le mécontentement bien fondé de la Russie et qui avaient pour cause principale l'attitude irréconciliable envers elle du parti radical persan, ainsi que les procédés arbitraires de Mr. Morgan Shuster. Ce dernier, dès son arrivée en Perse, s'est toujours refusé à prendre en considération les légitimes réclamations de la Russie au sujet des nombreux intérêts qu'elle possède dans ce pays. En effet, la tentative de Mr. Shuster de s'ingérer dans la compétence des administrateurs belges des douanes persanes, en violation du contrat passé entre la Banque russe et le Gouvernement persan, son refus opiniâtre de renoncer à employer Mr. Stokes dans l'administration de la gendarmerie financière, la nomination de Mr. Lecoffre, &c., fournissent une preuve suffisante de l'attitude hostile prise par cet étranger à l'égard de la Russie. Enfin, le dernier incident, au cours duquel les ordres donnés par Mr. Shuster à ses gendarmes avaient eu un caractère visiblement provocateur envers le consulat général de Russie, a épuisé la patience du Gouvernement russe, qui s'est justement vu outragé par ces procédés et s'est trouvé forcé d'abord de demander une réparation et ensuite, lorsque cette dernière ne lui a pas été donnée, d'avoir recours à des moyens de rigueur.

Tout dernièrement encore Mr. Shuster a commis un acte inadmissible de la part d'un fonctionnaire au service de l'État en publiant dans le "Times" sa lettre contenant des accusations arbitraires contre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et surtout en distribuant en Perse une traduction persane de cette lettre, augmentée de nouveaux détails, dans le but manifeste d'exciter le peuple persan contre la Russie.

Le but que se propose le Gouvernement russe est d'établir des relations normales et stables avec le Gouvernement persan et d'écarter les éléments de discorde qui nuisent au développement des rapports amicaux des deux pays. C'est à ces fins que la Russie compte formuler certaines nouvelles demandes.

Dans son action entreprise en ce moment en Perse le Gouvernement russe ne poursuit que la défense de ses intérêts légitimes dans ce pays, dans la zone qui lui est réservée en vertu de la convention de 1907; son activité n'est nullement en contradiction avec les dispositions de cette convention, puisqu'il ne poursuit aucun but pouvant porter atteinte à l'intégrité ou à l'indépendance de la Perse. Il tient en outre à

constater d'une façon catégorique que les mesures militaires prises par lui sur le territoire persan n'ont qu'un caractère purement provisoire et qu'il n'a aucunement l'intention d'enfreindre les principes qui régissent l'accord existant entre la Russie et l'Angleterre relativement à la Perse.

Résumé de causes qui ont provoqué les premières exigences de la Russie.

Laissant de côté la question de la confiscation des biens du Prince Schoa-es-Sultaneh, contre laquelle les représentants russes à Téhéran n'ont jamais protesté en principe, il faut noter que le mécontentement du Gouvernement Impérial a été provoqué d'abord par la manière de laquelle cette mesure a été mise à exécution par la gendarmerie financière persane, agissant conformément aux ordres de son chef, le conseiller financier Morgan Shuster et ensuite par la démarche du Gouvernement persan tendant à approuver la façon d'agir de ses employés et à rejeter la responsabilité sur les fonctionnaires russes.

Il appartient évidemment au Gouvernement Impérial seul de juger des procédés de ses agents sur les lieux, et après un examen attentif le Gouvernement Impérial est arrivé à la conclusion que ces procédés ont été conformes aux droits du Gouvernement russe et aux usages locaux. D'autre part, le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg a constaté que l'attitude du conseiller financier et de ses agents dans la présente affaire était visiblement hostile et outrageante à l'égard des employés russes. A ce propos on peut appuyer surtout sur les faits suivants :—

1. La réoccupation par force de la maison du Prince effectuée avant la fin des pourparlers entre le consul général de Russie et les agents de Mr. Shuster.
2. L'envoi dans ce but d'une force de plus d'une centaine de gendarmes, comme si Mr. Shuster prévoyait la possibilité d'une collision entre cette force et l'escorte du consul général.
3. Le point culminant de l'affaire—le fait que les gendarmes persans se sont permis de viser de leurs fusils les employés du consulat général avec l'intention manifeste de tirer sur eux.
4. L'envoi par le Gouvernement persan, contrairement à toute tradition, de deux notes consécutives exigeant le rappel du consul général russe et d'un de ses subordonnés, malgré la réponse donnée verbalement par M. Poklewski à la première note qu'il considérait cette demande comme non-avenue.
5. Cette affaire doit être mise en rapport avec les procédés antérieurs de Mr. Morgan Shuster, qui bien des fois déjà avaient suscité le mécontentement du Gouvernement russe.
6. L'effet défavorable à Téhéran même pour le prestige des autorités russes qui s'est produit à la suite de la manière d'agir outrageante des autorités persanes et dont la colonie russe à Téhéran se ressent.

Les raisons pour lesquelles le Gouvernement russe trouve nécessaire de poser au Gouvernement persan de nouvelles exigences.

1. Le Gouvernement persan n'a pas donné dans un délai raisonnable une réponse à la note contenant les premières exigences, ce qui a forcé le Gouvernement russe d'envoyer des troupes en Perse.
2. L'explication que la réponse à cette note n'avait pu être donnée, vu l'absence d'un Cabinet ne saurait être acceptée, étant donné que l'ancien Ministère n'avait démissionné que quelques jours après la présentation de la note, et que sa démission elle-même témoignait à nos yeux de l'intention de se soustraire à la nécessité de satisfaire aux exigences russes.
3. *Le point principal.*—La lettre adressée par Mr. Morgan Shuster au "Times" contenant des assertions fausses et des accusations arbitraires contre la Russie, et surtout la distribution par lui à la population indigène d'une traduction persane de cette lettre augmentée de nouveaux détails, dont le but manifeste est d'exciter le peuple persan contre la Russie.
4. Le Gouvernement russe, désireux d'établir des relations normales et stables avec le Gouvernement persan, juge nécessaire d'obtenir de ce dernier des garanties réelles de ce que les éléments de discorde qui nuisent au développement des rapports amicaux entre les deux pays seront écartés.

(Translation.)

THE present conflict between Russia and Persia, the immediate cause of which was the incident which arose during the confiscation of Prince Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties, should be regarded as the continuation of a series of events which have justly aroused Russia's displeasure, and which were caused principally by the irreconcilable attitude of the Persian Radical party towards Russia, as also by Mr. Morgan Shuster's arbitrary proceedings. Mr. Shuster has always, ever since his arrival in Persia, refused to take into consideration Russia's legitimate claims in respect of the numerous interests she has in that country. Mr. Shuster's attempt to interfere in matters which lay within the competence of the Belgian administrators of the Persian customs, in violation of the contract between the Russian Bank and the Persian Government, his obstinate refusal to give up the idea of employing Mr. Stokes in the administration of the Treasury gendarmerie, the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre, &c., are sufficient proof of the hostile attitude taken up by this foreigner towards Russia. But the final incident, when the orders given by Mr. Shuster to his gendarmes were of an evidently provocative character towards the Russian consul-general, exhausted the patience of the Russian Government, who justly considered themselves outraged by these proceedings, and found themselves forced, first of all to demand reparation, and then, when this was not made to them, to have recourse to strong measures.

Again, quite lately, Mr. Shuster has committed an act inadmissible on the part of an official in the service of the State by publishing in the "Times" his letter containing arbitrary charges against Russia and England, and, above all, by distributing in Persia a Persian translation of this letter with fresh details, with the manifest intention of stirring up the Persians against Russia.

The object which the Russian Government have in view is to establish normal and stable relations with the Persian Government, and to remove the elements of discord which are harmful to the development of friendly intercourse between the two countries. It is for this purpose that Russia intends to formulate certain fresh demands.

In the action which they are now taking in Persia the Russian Government are only pursuing the defence of their legitimate interests in that country, in the sphere reserved to them by the convention of 1907; their proceedings are in no way in contradiction to the provisions of that convention, since they are not pursuing any object which could assail the integrity or independence of Persia. Further, they desire to state categorically that the military measures which they are taking in Persian territory are only of a purely provisional character, and that they in no wise intend to infringe the principles governing the agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia.

Summary of the Reasons which provoked Russia's first demands.

Leaving on one side the question of the confiscation of Prince Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties, against which the Russian representatives at Tehran have never protested in principle, it should be observed that the Imperial Government's displeasure was provoked firstly by the manner in which this measure was carried out by the Persian Treasury gendarmerie, who were acting in conformity to the orders of their chief, Mr. Morgan Shuster, the financial adviser, and next by the action of the Persian Government in approving the conduct of their employés and throwing the responsibility on the Russian officials.

It is clear that the Imperial Government can alone judge of the proceedings of their agents on the spot, and after a close examination the Imperial Government have arrived at the conclusion that these proceedings were in conformity with the rights of the Russian Government and with the local usage. On the other hand, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg have convinced themselves that the attitude of the financial adviser and of his agents in the incident under discussion was clearly hostile and offensive towards the Russian officials. In this connection special stress may be laid on the following facts:—

1. The reoccupation by force of the Prince's house, carried out before the end of the conversations between the Russian consul-general and Mr. Shuster's agents.
2. The dispatch of a force of more than 100 gendarmes with this object, as though Mr. Shuster foresaw the possibility of a collision between this force and the consul-general's escort.
3. The culminating point of the incident—the fact that the Persian gendarmes

ventured to aim their rifles at the employés of the consulate-general with the manifest intention of firing on them.

4. The dispatch by the Persian Government, contrary to all tradition, of two consecutive notes demanding the recall of the Russian consul-general and of one of his subordinates, in spite of M. Poklewsky's verbal reply to the first note to the effect that he considered this demand as *non-avenu*.

5. This incident should be considered in connection with Mr. Morgan Shuster's previous proceedings, which had often before roused the displeasure of the Russian Government.

6. The unfavourable effect produced even at Tehran on the prestige of the Russian authorities in consequence of the insulting behaviour of the Persian authorities, an effect which is felt by the Russian colony at Tehran.

Reasons for which the Russian Government find it necessary to make new demands of the Persian Government.

1. The Persian Government failed to give within a reasonable term a reply to the note containing the first demands, a fact which forced the Russian Government to send troops into Persia.

2. The explanation given that a reply to this note could not be sent owing to the non-existence of a Cabinet cannot be accepted, considering that the former Ministry had only resigned a few days after the presentation of the note and that their very resignation showed us their intention of avoiding the necessity of satisfying the Russian demands.

3. *The Principal Point.*—The letter addressed by Mr. Morgan Shuster to the "Times," containing false assertions and arbitrary accusations against Russia, and, above all, the distribution by him to the native population of a Persian translation of that letter with new details added, the manifest object of this being to stir up the Persian people against Russia.

4. The Russian Government, desiring to establish normal and stable relations with the Persian Government, consider it necessary to obtain from the latter real guarantees for the removal of the elements of discord which are harmful to the development of friendly intercourse between the two countries.

No. 171.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1911.

MY preceding telegram of to-day.

I have just received a private letter from M. Nératof, informing me that it was decided at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held yesterday that the following demands should be presented at Tehran :—

1. Both Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre to be dismissed, and the engagement to be given by the Persian Government in accordance with demand No. 2 to apply to all other foreign officials already appointed by Mr. Shuster.

2. The Persian Government must give an engagement that they will obtain the consent of the Russian and British Legations before offering any post in the Persian service to persons of foreign nationality.

3. Expenses incurred by the present military expedition to be reimbursed by the Persian Government.

The demands will be presented at Tehran on the 28th instant in the form of an ultimatum, granting a delay of only forty-eight hours for their acceptance. During that delay the Russian troops will not be moved beyond Resht.

On the previous occasion when troops were sent to Kazvin in 1909, M. Iswolsky took up the position that it was impossible for Russia to keep sending troops backwards and forwards to Persia and so rendering herself ridiculous, and the same feeling is strongly held here on the present occasion.

No. 172.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

FOLLOWING from British vice-consul, Resht, 26th November:—

“Exact figures of Russian troops at Resht: 200 Cossacks, 780 infantry, and 7 guns. On 25th November 240 artillery and commissariat arrived. By yesterday's mail-boat some infantry and, by special steamer, cavalry arrived at Enzeli, numbers unknown, rumoured 1,100, but this is probably exaggerated.”

No. 173.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

MY telegram of 14th November: Indian escorts.

Second detachment reached Shiraz to-day without incident.

No. 174.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

RUSSIAN troops in Persia.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports that 700 infantry and artillery and 100 Cossacks arrived at Enzeli on Friday and Saturday, and not 1,100, as reported by him previously (see my telegram of this morning).

No. 175.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 27, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 29th November:—

In a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 27th instant, I told his Excellency that I was much disappointed at the shortness of the time allowed the Persian Government for returning an answer to this ultimatum, and urged that a further delay would be accorded on the arrival of the troops at Kazvin.

His Excellency replied that the Council of Ministers had decided that, in order to satisfy public opinion in Russia, it was necessary that this second ultimatum should be couched in much sharper language than the first. The ultimatum, moreover, was not to be presented till the 28th instant, and, as the Persian Government must have been aware from the language held to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by M. Poklewski on the 24th instant, that Mr. Shuster's dismissal would be insisted on, they would have had sufficient time for reflection. The new demands were, his Excellency contended, most moderate, and had been purposely restricted to matters connected with the incident that had provoked the presentation of an ultimatum. In reply to an enquiry which I had addressed to him respecting the second half of the first demand, his Excellency explained that it was intended more especially to apply to the ten new Americans, whose appointment had already been sanctioned by the Medjliss, but that it would be left to M. Poklewski to decide whether any action should be taken with regard to any other foreigners holding appointments in the Persian service. He also said that, should the Russian demands not have been accepted before the troops reached Kazvin, he thought that they would probably make a few days' halt in that town before advancing on Tehran.

I expressed the hope that, even should they have to occupy the capital, the Russian

demands would not be further increased, and his Excellency gave me to understand that in that case all that would be asked for would be a larger indemnity.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 22nd instant to announce that orders have been given for the withdrawal of the Treasury gendarmes from the Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property, and that, after the presentation of the Cabinet to the Medjliss on the 22nd, the desired apology would be tendered to the Russian Minister.

He expressed the strong hope that His Majesty's Government would inform the Russian Government, and obtain the recall of the Russian forces, 250 of whom had landed on the 21st instant at Enzeli.

He said that he felt that his personal position was at stake, as he had led the Persian Government to believe, after his interview with me, that all would end well if they apologised.

Mr. Mallet reminded him that I had made no engagements, and indeed could not have done so, and he agreed to this, but pointed out that he had told me that if the demands were complied with and nevertheless the troops advanced, his Government would be placed in a most serious position. He hoped, therefore, that I should act as mediator. I had said that I could not do that, but had advised that the demands should be complied with immediately, as this would facilitate negotiations.

The Persian Minister asked whether the Russian Government had replied to my telegram of 20th November, and Mr. Mallet replied that we had as yet not had any final answer. The Persian Minister urged that we should make a further representation and appeal to the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 177.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 23rd instant and asked Mr. Mallet whether His Majesty's Government had heard if the Russian troops had been recalled.

Mr. Mallet replied in the negative, and said that His Majesty's Government had no definite information yet as to what the Russian Government would do. His Majesty's Government had also not yet heard that the Persian Government had complied with the Russian demands.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 178.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office to-day and asked Sir A. Nicolson whether His Majesty's Government were aware if Russia intended to present further demands now that the Persian Government had conceded the two original ones. As Sir A. Nicolson thought it undesirable to anticipate what Russia would ask, he merely said that he believed that the Russian Council of Ministers was discussing the situation, and that no doubt we should hear very shortly what line they proposed to adopt.

Mehdi Khan said that the Persian Government were anxious to be guided by the advice of His Majesty's Government. Sir A. Nicolson remarked to him that, as I had told him, it was difficult for His Majesty's Government to intervene between Russia and Persia. Mehdi Khan replied that perhaps I would consent to instruct you to confer with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir A. Nicolson promised to consult me on this point.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 28, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 27th November.

Persian Minister here has asked our advice, and requested that British Minister at Tehran should be instructed to confer with Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am ready to use what influence I can to induce Persian Government to comply with Russian demands, if they are as stated in your telegram of 26th November, but it is essential that more time should be given. I have in reply to criticism here of Russian action as being harsh and unfair to Persia stated the Russian case, but there is a strong and natural feeling that failure to prevent return of ex-Shah and inherent weakness of Persian Government afford a valid plea for some consideration.

His Majesty's Government had hoped that the Russian troops would have been withdrawn when once the two demands, as originally formulated, had been complied with; and they would therefore be much disappointed were those troops now to advance to Tehran, or, indeed, beyond Resht. They, moreover, fail to see that the situation is of sufficient urgency to justify the presentation of an ultimatum with so short a time limit.

You should urge strongly that Russian demands should be put forward without time limit simply as condition of withdrawal of troops; that Russia should then, if there is delay in complying, come to an agreement with us as to what changes are required at Tehran to secure her interests. My public statements here have shown how clearly we feel that those interests must not be prejudiced.

You should represent all this in strongest manner both to President of Council and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 180.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1911.

I SPOKE to the Russian Ambassador to-day very seriously about the prospect in Persia.

I explained that the dispute between Russia and Persia did not concern us directly; but that the consequences of the Russian action might be very serious. I said that, whether the things in Mr. Shuster's pamphlet were right or wrong, the situation certainly became intolerable when the official of one Government distributed attacks upon another Government; but this would hardly justify a precipitate occupation of Tehran. I then used all the arguments contained in my telegram to you of to-day.

The Russian Ambassador said that Russian opinion was very much stirred, and felt that there must be an outright settlement with Persia; but he did not deprecate any of the suggestions which I made.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 181.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

MY telegrams of 22nd and 24th November.

In reply to my *aide-mémoire* I have now received memorandum thanking His Majesty's Government for their good offices.

Memorandum states that on His Majesty's Government's friendly advice and on the strength of the understanding that Russian troops would be withdrawn, Persian Government have lost no time in fully complying with Russian demands.

Troops landed before the receipt of my *aide-mémoire* have hitherto not been withdrawn and disembarkations are occurring daily at Enzeli, and the force at Resht is now nearly 2,000.*Aide-mémoire* concludes expressing confidence that His Majesty's Government will continue to lend their good offices for fulfilment of the terms of my *aide-mémoire*, "which was the determining factor in attitude adopted by Persian Government towards Russian desiderata."

No. 182.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 1st December :—

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit a translation of the ultimatum which was presented to the Persian Government by the Russian Minister at noon on the 29th ultimo.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 182.

M. Poklewski to Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

IN our interview of Friday last (the 24th November) I had the honour to draw your attention to the reasons for which the Imperial Government would have to make some further demands, and in this connection I was awaiting further instructions from my Government, which I have now received.

I now have the honour to make the following demands on behalf of the Imperial Government :—

Firstly, the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre ; and the status of other persons invited by Mr. Shuster to serve the Persian Government will come under the second item of these demands.

Secondly, an undertaking on the part of the Persian Government not to invite any foreigners to join their service without the previous consent of the British and Russian Legations.

Thirdly, payment by the Persian Government of the expenses of the present Russian military expedition to Persia ; the sum payable to the Imperial Government and the manner of its payment will be fixed after the receipt of the Persian Government's reply.

I consider it my duty to explain that the reason for these measures is firstly the absolute necessity of obtaining compensation for the movement of troops which the Imperial Government has been forced to send to Persia, and for Mr. Shuster's recent offensive actions towards Russia, and furthermore the sincere desire of Russia now to remove the principal source of the differences which have arisen, and for the future to lay the foundations upon which the two Governments can build up friendly and stable relations, and to give a prompt and satisfactory solution to all Russian matters and pending questions.

Furthermore, it is necessary for me to warn you that the Imperial Government cannot wait more than forty-eight hours for the fulfilment of these conditions, during which time the Russian troops will remain at Resht; but if, before the expiration of this term, no answer is received or if the answer is unsatisfactory, the troops will advance, and this will of course increase the sum payable by the Persian Government to the Russian Government.

I avail, &c.

S. POKLEWSKI-KOZIELL.

No. 183.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 29, 1911.

MY preceding telegram of to-day.

Ultimatum contains no promise to withdraw troops on compliance with demands.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent his "chef de cabinet" again to appeal to our good offices to obtain some mitigation of demands, or at any rate an extension of the period of grace. Demands came to Persian Government as a complete surprise, and term allowed gives them no time to deliberate.

He asked me for advice. I replied that I had no instructions, but that I personally thought that the Persian Government had better yield without delay.

No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan..

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister has again asked advice, and I have told him that I can say nothing definite till I know exactly how Russian demands are formulated and can say for certain that compliance will secure withdrawal of Russian troops. I have, however, told him definitely that Shuster makes things impossible.

It is obvious that Persia cannot pay an indemnity, and I assume Russian troops will not remain till actual payment has been made if everything else is settled. To exact indemnity before Persia has obtained a loan would be fatal to any prospect of improvement of southern roads, and would thereby further intensify damage to British trade.

It is important that I should know text of Russian demands, and whether it can be said definitely that compliance will secure withdrawal of troops.

Persian Minister represents to me that he desires advice as to how new Persian Cabinet must act generally to secure friendly relations with Russia, and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs may be able to say something on this point also. Impression made on me by Persian Minister is that Persian Government realise how serious situation is.

No. 185.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 29, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 30th November:—

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I called yesterday afternoon on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency greeted me by expressing the great satisfaction which your speech in the House of Commons had caused him, adding that he had instructed Count Benckendorff to convey to you his thanks and acknowledgments. I replied that I had been charged by you to deliver a message of a rather different character, as you had learnt with much regret that a second ultimatum had been presented to the Persian Government that required an answer within forty-eight hours. I repeated to him what I had said in previous conversations with regard to the shortness of the time limit, and urged on his Excellency the importance

of allowing you sufficient time to use your influence with the Persian Government in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement of this incident. An occupation of Tehra by Russian troops would, I said, tend to estrange English public opinion. In order moreover, that he might realise how strongly you felt on the subject I read to him in French translation, your telegrams of the 28th and 29th instant.

M. Nératof, in the course of a long conversation, once more explained the reasons which had forced the Russian Government to give a more peremptory character to this second ultimatum. The ultimatum had, he believed, been presented that morning, but, as he had not yet received confirmation of this from M. Poklewski, he could not give me its actual text. The three points, however, recorded in my telegram of the 26th instant exactly reproduced the instructions sent to Tehran, though a few words had been added to the effect that the amount of the indemnity and the mode of its payment would be settled when the three demands had been complied with and the actual cost of the expedition established. The Russian Government would not press for an immediate payment, nor would they, he believed, increase their demands. He declined to accede to my request to do away with the time limit altogether, or even to extend it, and could not give me an assurance that the troops should make a halt of a week or ten days at Kazvin. On my urging that such an extension might be granted, were the Persian Government to inform M. Poklewski of their readiness to take the three demands into consideration if only the Russian Government would allow them more time for their examination, M. Nératof declared that this was impossible. Eventually, however, he said that, if the Persian Government would give a definite assurance in writing that they would comply with the three demands, he would allow them another fifteen days to arrange the various details connected with Mr. Shuster's dismissal, such as the question of the indemnity to be paid him, &c. He also promised to wait till Saturday before sending telegraphic instructions for an advance of the troops from Resht to Kazvin.

His Excellency, at my request, then telephoned to the President of the Council, who replied that he would receive me at once.

I repeated to M. Kokovtsoff what I had said to M. Nératof, using almost precisely similar language, and urging him, in the interest of the Anglo-Russian understanding, to meet your wishes in a more generous spirit, as I considered that the assurances which I had received from M. Nératof did not go nearly far enough.

His Excellency said that His Majesty's Government could naturally take a calmer view of the incidents which had recently occurred in Persia, as they had not been directly touched by them. This was not the case with Russia, whose dignity had been offended. The only way to make the Persians understand that Russia would not be trifled with was to present an ultimatum, requiring an immediate answer and holding out no hope of a possible compromise. The Russian Government had gained nothing by adopting a less drastic form in presenting their two original demands, but had had to wait for an answer till their troops had arrived at Resht. On my remarking that the satisfaction which they had now received with regard to the first incident ought to make them adopt a more lenient attitude as regarded the second, M. Kokovtsoff said that, at the Council of Ministers at which the second ultimatum had been drafted, the demands to be presented had been reduced to a minimum. He could assure me that Russia had no desire to occupy Tehran, and, if you could induce the Persian Government to yield, and thus save her the necessity of ordering the troops to advance, he would be most grateful. He understood from all that I had told him that it was not the demands themselves to which you took exception, but the form in which they had been presented, and the manner in which they were to be imposed on the Persian Government. It might give rise to a possible misunderstanding were he to give me any definite assurances with regard to the various points touched on in your telegrams without first consulting his colleagues, and he would, therefore, ask me to send him copies of those telegrams. He would then submit them to a Council of Ministers to be held on the following afternoon, and let me know their decision through M. Nératof.

In the course of our conversation, M. Kokovtsoff said that as regarded the indemnity, public opinion in Russia demanded that, if Persia wantonly provoked military intervention, she should pay for the cost of the expedition. He would be satisfied with a definite assurance from the Persian Government that the indemnity would be paid, and would not be too hard on them with regard to the term in which payment must be made. Though his Excellency received my remarks with regard to an extension of the time limit and a halt of a week or ten days at Kazvin in a conciliatory spirit, he declined to pledge himself in any way.

I have this morning forwarded to M. Kokovtsoff copies in French of your two

telegrams above referred to, and have, in the covering private letter, expressed the hope that he will use his powerful influence to induce the Council of Ministers to decide this question in a manner conformable to your wishes.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 186.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

BRITISH vice-consul at Resht reports that there are now at Resht about 1,900 Russian troops. He understands that 700 more left Enzeli yesterday, and that two further transports have since arrived.

No. 187.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of yesterday.

A message has just reached me from the Persian Government to the effect that they attach less importance to the far-reaching demands in the ultimatum than to the explanations (see penultimate paragraph of M. Poklewski's note), as they fear that these latter leave the door open for any further claims that Russia may desire to formulate, and even for a demand that Persia adopt any particular form of Government that it may suit Russia to see established here.

No. 188.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

RUSSIAN Government have now authorised their Minister to announce to the Persian Government that they will withdraw their troops as soon as (1) the first part of the first condition has been *de facto* fulfilled; and (2) the Persian Government have undertaken to fulfil the second part of the first condition and also condition two, and have promised to pay an indemnity. The mode of settlement and the actual amount of the indemnity may be left over for discussion at a later date.

No. 189.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister has just informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the three conditions are satisfied, as indicated in my immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently visited me, and spoke of the explanations contained in the Russian note, which had caused the Persian Government such anxiety. He said that he had received assurances from the Russian Minister; in view of these he appeared no longer anxious on that point. He laid, however, great stress on the fact that it was impossible to comply with the demands in the time allowed. The opinion in the Medjliss was strongly against compliance, and it was a physical impossibility for him to win over by to-morrow a majority to his way of thinking. He added that he had always been most sincerely anxious to smooth relations with Russia.

He hopes that the Russian Government will not utilise this delay as a pretext for putting forward other demands than those already presented.

No. 190.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1911.

M. NERATOF is still at the meeting of the Council of Ministers (which is still sitting at 7 P.M.), but M. Klemm has just sent me the following message:—

“Russian Minister at Tehran has been informed that Persian reply will be considered satisfactory if within forty-eight hours Persian Government state in writing that the three demands are formally accepted and that dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre is an accomplished fact. Since, however, formalities connected with Shuster’s dismissal may require some time, Russian Minister is authorised to allow Persian Government delay which he judges necessary for complete regulation of position of that official. As to cost of expedition, it will be sufficient that Persian Government should now agree to settle that matter when amount shall have been fixed.

“If a satisfactory answer is received, detachment will not advance beyond Resht, but its recall to Russia can only take place when Shuster affair is completely settled.”

No. 191.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1911.

MY preceding telegram of to-day.

As Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs could not receive me, I wrote privately, pointing out that letter sent to me made no mention of further delay at Kazvin and was not as satisfactory as I could have wished respecting recall of troops.

Following is his answer:—

“As regards halt of troops at Kazvin, it was decided that it would be necessary to order troops to rest there for a few days, without fixing exactly length of their stay.

“We have, I think, time enough before us to discuss this question, should it arise.

“As regards question of recall of our troops, it is difficult for me to give you categorical answer, as all will depend on circumstances under which march into the interior will take place. At present moment it is not our intention to formulate other demands beyond those already known, but if we are obliged to employ force in order to carry business through, our demands may be increased.”

No. 192.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 30, 1911.

I HAVE told Persian Minister that we are discussing situation with Russian Government, but there can be no question of Russia withdrawing the three demands; that if these are complied with at once details may be arranged favourably afterwards, but that delay in complying will inevitably mean advance of Russian troops.

You may inform your Russian colleague and Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 193.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 30, 1911.

YOU may inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Barclay of to-day.

I have made a statement to-day in Parliament admitting that situation is serious, and must be discussed with the Russian Government. After Persian Government submit to three demands, it will be essential that Russian Government should co-operate in facilitating appointment of such foreign advisers as are necessary, and in enabling Persian Government to obtain a loan.

No. 194.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

ALA-ED-DOWLEH was assassinated this morning. There appears to be some excitement in the town on account of this occurrence, and also in connection with Russian ultimatum.

No. 195.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

MEDJLISS this morning voted rejection of Russian demands practically unanimously.

No. 196.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

THERE has been much excitement throughout day, and several anti-Russian demonstrations.

There seems no doubt that Ala-ed-Dowleh was assassinated owing to his Russian sympathies.

No. 197.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 1, 1911.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs resigned after rejection by the Medjliss of the Russian demands.

No. 198.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 1, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 4th December :—

I saw M. Nératof on the 1st instant, and received from him the assurance that the Russian Government would, in conformity with the wish which you had expressed in your telegram of the 30th November, do all they could to facilitate the appointment of new foreign advisers. His Excellency then proceeded to inform me that the Medjliss had categorically refused to comply with Russia's demands. He had hardly expected that they would accept them straight away, but he had hoped that they would have contented themselves with leaving them without an answer, instead of shutting the door on all further conversation. The order for an advance from Resht would not, as he had promised me, be dispatched till the following afternoon, and a halt of a few days would be made at Kazvin. There was, however, now no prospect of a compliance on the part of the Persian Government unless the Medjliss could be sent about their business. He was not, however, sure whether the constitution conferred on the Regent the power to dissolve them.

In the conversation which ensued I once more endeavoured to impress on his Excellency that the occupation of Tehran would inevitably cause serious complications and give rise to fresh incidents, which would in their turn occasion the presentation of fresh demands. The Russians would on their arrival there find no regular Government

with which to treat, while the ex-Shah would probably try to profit by the confusion to re-establish himself on the throne. To this, as I had once before told his Excellency, His Majesty's Government would under no circumstances consent. His Excellency assured me that the Imperial Government would give the ex-Shah no support whatsoever.

I subsequently reminded him of the difficult position in which His Majesty's Government would be placed were Russia to press matters too far, and begged him to take that position into account. M. Nératof replied that Russia's prestige must be upheld. The Government, he added, were being constantly attacked in the press for not showing sufficient firmness in dealing with the situation, but they would confine their action to what was absolutely necessary to accomplish the object which he had just mentioned.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 199.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

REFERENCE to your telegram of 30th November.

I much regret that the Persian Government has not been allowed a longer delay by Russia. With this reservation, M. Poklewski's instructions seem to me satisfactory. They will presumably be communicated to the Persian Government. In view of the importance of my being able to make a definite statement in Parliament on Russian action and on the conditions on which the Russian Government will withdraw their troops, you should ask whether I may state generally what these instructions are.

You should also ask for very definite assurances in writing, stating the purpose with which Russian Government are acting, and the limits of their action, as such assurances are needed to allay the great anxiety concerning the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 1, 1911.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of the 26th ultimo, reporting a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the Russian demands on Persia and the dispatch of troops to enforce them.

I approve the language used by your Excellency to M. Nératof on this occasion, and take note with satisfaction of the assurance which he conveyed to you that Russia contemplates no annexation of Persian territory.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 201.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

TWO further attempts on the lives of reactionaries were made yesterday; one resulted only in the death of the coachman of the intended victim, but the other proved successful.

The leading baker, who was suspected of cornering grain, was also killed yesterday. Prices are rising, and fears are expressed of an outbreak of bread riots. Shuster's energetic action in collecting maliat in kind for the needs of the capital has hitherto averted these.

No. 202.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

BRITISH consul at Resht reports that the total number of Russian troops in that town is now 3,500, and that houses at Resht and Enzeli are being leased for troops and officers for one year and over.

No. 203.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

REJECTION by Medjliss of Russian demand was communicated verbally by Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Minister yesterday, but I understand that the Persian Government are preparing a note.

No. 204.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

RUSSIAN ultimatum.
Please see my telegram of the 30th ultimo.
Russian Minister does not exclude possibility of further demands. He tells me that the assurances to the Minister for Foreign Affairs only held provided that the Persian Government complied with the demands within forty-eight hours.

No. 205.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

FOLLOWING received from His Majesty's consul at Resht to-day:—
“About 100 men reached here last night from Enzeli; 800 men left last night for Kazvin.”

No. 206.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

SARDAR ASSAD arrived at Enzeli from Europe last night.

No. 207.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

IN a letter addressed by Shuster to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which I saw to-day, the former declares that the pamphlet containing his letter to the “Times” was neither published nor circulated in Tehran by him.

Copies, in English, of the letter were shown to a number of his friends (I myself asked him to let me have a copy), and a dozen or more copies, in Persian, were sent to certain Persian friends. He replied to some of the latter, who enquired if he would object to its being published in Persian, that he certainly had no objection to the public knowing the contents of an open letter to the “Times.”

No. 208.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 2, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 4th December:—

I called on M. Nératof on the 2nd instant and spoke to him in the terms of your telegram of the 1st instant. I enquired whether you might use for a statement in Parliament the two letters which I had received from him and M. Klemm on the 30th of last month (see my two telegrams of that date), as well as the *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy was forwarded to you in my despatch of the 29th November.* I drew his Excellency's special attention to the third and fourth paragraphs of the last-mentioned document, in which the most categorical assurances are given that the Imperial Government do not propose to violate the integrity or independence of Persia, that the military measures which they are taking are of a purely provisional character, and that they have no intention of infringing the principles which govern the Anglo-Russian agreement with regard to Persia.

After perusing the several documents, M. Nératof said that you were at liberty to use them. He pointed out, however, that the instructions to M. Poklewski which formed the subject of M. Klemm's letter had ceased to have any practical interest now that the Russian demands had been rejected, and that as regarded the halt of the troops at Kazvin, which was referred to in the letter which he had written to me, he could tell me that the commander of the troops had been ordered not to advance beyond that town without further instructions from St. Petersburg or from the Russian Legation at Tehran. He could not, however, guarantee that the troops would stop at Kazvin, as should disorders break out at Tehran it might be necessary to order them to proceed at once to the capital for the protection of the legation.

I then enquired if he could not give me some more precise assurances with regard to the eventual demands which Russia might possibly put forward, and after some further conversation he approved the following statement, which I wrote down and showed to him:—

“Should circumstances arise to render necessary the presentation of further demands, those demands will not go beyond questions having a particular interest for Russia, such as the settlement of outstanding matters in dispute or other matters having an exclusive interest for Russia in the zone that has been reserved to her, and will not touch questions of a general political interest.”

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

MAJOR STOKES'S appointment.

The following telegram has been sent to the Government of India, dated the 22nd ultimo:—

“An appeal has been made by Stokes to His Majesty's Government begging them to reconsider their decision. His Majesty's Government would therefore be glad if you could inform Stokes that His Majesty's Government consider that his first duty as an officer in His Majesty's service is to obey the orders given him, and thus to withdraw his acceptance of the post in the service of the Persian Government. His Majesty's Government consider that it is necessary for him to withdraw, and take upon themselves the full responsibility for such action. The reasons which determined them to refuse his resignation have already been explained to him at length.”

Reference to your telegram of 21st November.

* See No. 170.

No. 210.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

CONSIDERING the way in which the ex-Shah has behaved in the past His Majesty's Government could in no circumstances recognise him again.

No. 211.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

THE language you held about the ex-Shah (see your telegram of the 1st December) has my approval. I am glad to note that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed to it.

I feel strongly that Tehran should not be occupied by the Russians except in the last resort, and that new and more extensive demands should not be put forward by them. This is very important, and I hope that if they find it necessary to formulate fresh demands they will first consult His Majesty's Government. The danger which I anticipate is that they may make new demands which, being neither inevitable nor consistent with the Anglo-Russian Agreement, I should be unable to defend.

No. 212.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

I SPOKE very seriously to Count Benckendorff to-day as to my anxiety about Persia.

I said it was unfortunate, in the first instance, that the Russian ultimatum had been based upon the question of the property of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh: for the question was of comparatively slight importance, and the Russian case with regard to it did not seem to be very strong. I also regretted that the Russian troops had not been withdrawn when the Persian Government complied with the two demands in connection with the property. It was true that there had been a delay of a few days in complying with the demands, but nevertheless the circumstances in which the Russian action was taken were not fortunate.

Three demands had now been put forward. With regard to the first two, as to Mr. Shuster and the future appointment of foreign advisers, I could not object. Mr. Shuster had rejected the advice which we had given him through our Minister in Tehran; he had placed us in a most embarrassing position; and some arrangement with the Persian Government respecting foreign advisers was necessary even from the British point of view, to prevent our being placed in such a position again. It would have been better, I thought, if the Persian Government had been asked to promise not to appoint foreign advisers without consultation with the Russian and British Legations instead of being bound to obtain consent; but this was rather a matter of form.

I regretted that an indemnity had been asked for. British trade had suffered much more than Russian trade: in fact, Russian trade in the north might even have gained by the stoppage of British trade in the south. Money was essential for the restoration of order in the south, and the Russian demand for an indemnity would be felt here as injurious to the prospect of the restoration of order in the south that was necessary for British trade. As the demand had been put forward, the Persian Government must say "Yes" to it; but I trusted that payment would either not be pressed for, or in some way be commuted for some other advantage later on.

I then urged strongly upon the Ambassador that the Russian troops should not go to Tehran, except in the very last resort; and that no further demands of a more far-reaching nature should be put forward by the Russian Government without consultation with us. If the Russian Government would restrict themselves to their existing demands, and would not go to Tehran except in the last resort, I thought that we might get through the present difficulties. We might secure a Persian

Government who would realise that they must govern with a good disposition towards Russian interests, instead of in opposition to them. We should be able to assist such a Government with foreign advisers, and facilitate a loan on favourable terms. Things in Persia might then become better than they had yet been.

But, at present, we were passing through a very delicate and difficult time; and I was afraid that the Government in St. Petersburg did not realise what great issues were at stake, and what great care was needed to prevent our drifting apart.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 213.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

ANTI-RUSSIAN demonstrations continued yesterday. Attempts are being made to establish boycott of Russian enterprises and goods.

No. 214.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

MY telegram of 1st December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has withdrawn resignation, being assured that rejection of Russian demands by Medjliss did not imply any want of confidence in him.

No. 215.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 2nd December.

I received telegram in the sense indicated from Government of India yesterday, and communicated it to Stokes.

No. 216.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 3rd December :—

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch of the 1st instant,* I have the honour to transmit a translation of the reply of the Persian Government to the Russian ultimatum, as well as a brief report on the debate on the ultimatum, which took place on the morning of the 1st instant, notwithstanding that that day was a Friday, when all public business is generally at a standstill, and which resulted in the almost unanimous vote to reject the Russian demands.

The message contained in your telegram of the 30th ultimo was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 10 A.M. in the Medjliss during the debate on the ultimatum. It will be observed that he informed the Medjliss of its nature.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

* See No. 182.

Enclosure 1 in No. 216.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh to M. Poklewski.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, December 2, 1911.

IN answer to your Excellency's note No. 158 of the 29th November, I have the honour to say that, after the Imperial (Russian) Government had made certain demands of my Government through your Excellency's note No. 156 respecting the seizure of Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property, and though the Persian Government had already made known to your Excellency, through verbal messages, the true state of the case and their views respecting the matter, and though there had been a Cabinet crisis for some time before the receipt of the above-mentioned note, the Persian Government took the prompt and immediate measures compatible with the necessary friendly relations and the maintenance of good-will on the part of this Government in order to fulfil the demands of the Imperial Government.

This peaceful intention and accommodating spirit on our part was considered to be the means of removing any kind of irritation or annoyance felt by the Russian Government, and it was on this account that we acted as we did. But, as against this accommodating spirit, the Russian Government, in their note No. 156, did not stipulate any specified time for the fulfilment of their demands, while they were aware of the Cabinet crisis. Although in the above-mentioned note and in verbal messages no notice was given as to the dispatch of troops in the event of the conditions referred to above being rejected, suddenly it was announced that relations were severed and that troops were being dispatched; and, after the fulfilment of the conditions, orders were not sent for the return of the troops whose dispatch was known to you to be connected with the non-fulfilment of the demands. Unfortunately, the Russian Government did not limit themselves even to this, and the ancient friendly relations, which have always been apparent and reflected in the notes of your legation, have not been observed and maintained. Now, in your note No. 158 you put forward other demands to the Persian Government. The extraordinary importance of these demands is obvious; some of them are clearly contrary to the independence of the State, while the time (allowed) is so little that it is physically impossible to give them the necessary consideration and examination, and the door is closed to discussion.

What is more astonishing is that your note explains these demands, firstly, by attributing them to the absolute necessity of obtaining compensation, then to the insulting actions of Mr. Shuster, and, finally, to the sincere desire of the Russian Government to remove causes of difference and to establish the basis of an understanding and good relations; whereas in the matter of the dispatch of Russian troops the Persian Government were in no way involved.

There can be no cause of complaint until the real necessity for compensation is shown and until the Persian Government have refused to give satisfaction with respect to the insult referred to, which has not been discussed by the two Governments as to whether it actually occurred, or in what circumstances, and before a preliminary enquiry has been held.

The removal of differences, together with the establishment of the basis of an understanding and unity, are naturally more compatible with peaceful methods.

After the above preamble, while inviting your Excellency and the Imperial Government to consider the true state of the case and the good relations existing between the two Governments and the importance of maintaining them, I beg that the Persian Government may be excused from fulfilling the demands. I have, however, the honour to inform your Excellency of the Persian Government's readiness to discuss alterations in the above-mentioned proposals, and to accept any just proposals which may be made to the Persian Government.

I avail, &c.

VOSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 216.

Proceedings of the Medjliss on December 1, 1911.

THE following Cabinet Ministers were present at the debate:—

Mushir-ed-Dowleh (Education).
 Moazed-es-Sultaneh (Posts and Telegraphs).
 Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh (Justice).
 Vosuk-ed-Dowleh (Foreign Affairs).

The Foreign Minister made the following speech :—

“On Wednesday last, at noon, a note was sent to the Foreign Office by the Russian Legation, as the deputies are aware, and I now read it for the information of the public.”

After reading the note containing Russia's three demands and giving forty-eight hours for their fulfilment, Vosuk-ed-Dowleh said :—

“The Foreign Office having reason to expect that some such demands would be made, serious steps were taken before and after the receipt of the note, but unfortunately with no result. As part of the note is vaguely worded, and we believed that other demands might follow the three contained in this note, explanations were requested, and we are now convinced that no other demands will follow. The Cabinet therefore unanimously recommends the acceptance of these demands. I may add that we also wrote to the British Legation asking for the mediation of Great Britain, and the legation has recommended that the demands should be accepted without delay. Now, of course, we will do as the Medjliss may decide.”

Several speeches followed, and though their tone was moderate, the acceptance of the demands was firmly deprecated as incompatible with the independence of the country.

Matin-es-Sultaneh, acting in pursuance of a plan prearranged with the Cabinet, said he proposed that the Government should be authorised to comply with the first and third demands, but that the second demand should be rejected as incompatible with the independence of the country. This motion was, however, only supported by six votes.

Haji Ez-ul-Mamalek, after opposing the acceptance of the demands, made the following motion, which, it is understood, had been prepared beforehand :—

“After having heard the statement made by the Government, the National Assembly considers that the demands of the Russian Government are incompatible with the independence of the country, and we cannot therefore comply with them. The Government is requested to enter into communications with a view to their modification, and the discussions in the Medjliss on the subject are brought to a close.”

The motion was carried practically unanimously, only six members voting against it.

No. 217.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

REFERENCE to my telegram of to-day's date.

I learn from Major Stokes that he has informed treasurer-general of His Majesty's Government's decision refusing his resignation. Mr. Shuster, although deeply regretting that His Majesty's Government have decided to revoke the permission at first given to Major Stokes to take up the appointment offered to him, now considers himself obliged to release Major Stokes from the engagement which he had contracted with the treasurer-general in consequence of that permission received from His Majesty's Government.

Major Stokes tells me that he intends to leave for India “as soon as ever he can terminate some purely personal affairs.”

No. 218.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

SQUADRON of Indian cavalry on its way to reinforce Ispahan consular escort came into conflict with armed tribesmen, 30th November, near Yezdikasht. One native officer, Major Gholam Mohamed, was wounded in thigh, but is doing well and quite out of danger.

No. 219.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister tells me he has sent for 25 Cossacks from the Kazvin guard as an increase for the legation escort. The legation and consulate-general have now about 50 Cossacks between them. In view of present conditions this is certainly not excessive.

No. 220.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report, compiled by Mr. Churchill, of the debate held in the Medjliss on the 13th instant, at which the Medjliss voted a prolongation of its session by forty-six votes to six.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 220.

Report by Mr. Churchill respecting Debate in the Medjliss, November 13, 1911.

I ATTENDED at the first part of the sitting and heard the arguments for and against the proposal to prolong the session until just over half the deputies of the new Medjliss arrive in Tehran.

It was quite clear from the outset that the general feeling of the House was strongly in favour of prolonging the session, but nevertheless several members (notably Haji Imam Jumah, of Khoi), though admitting the desirability of the prolongation, pointed out the illegality of such a measure.

Against the proposal it was urged that the Medjliss could not legally pass an Act contrary to the constitution without a referendum, and in support of this contention the case of the Electoral Law of July, 1909 was cited. On that occasion it was found necessary to modify four articles of the constitution of December 1906 (namely articles 4, 5, 6, and 49), and for this purpose the matter was referred to the provincial Anjumans, which eventually empowered the committee charged with the framing of the Electoral Law to modify those articles of the constitution. Telegrams having been received from certain provinces urging the Medjliss to continue its sittings, and these telegrams having been quoted as justification for the contemplated measure, those opposing it pointed out that they did not in themselves constitute a referendum, or show that the constituencies were really in favour of the prolongation. It was further stated that the course now contemplated had scarcely ever had a precedent in European countries, and *Matin-es-Sultaneh*, after referring to the precedent of the Long Parliament in England, and its ultimate dissolution by Cromwell, quoted the words of a great British statesman to the effect that nothing could be more disgraceful than that a Parliament should prolong its own life.

These arguments however, had very little effect, and those supporting the proposed measure, dwelt on the danger with which the country is at this moment confronted, and the paramount necessity for the representatives of the people to supervise the Government at this critical juncture. It was pointed out that if all the provinces had not expressed their wishes, it was because some of them were prevented from doing so by reactionary forces, and that if the Medjliss were to dissolve and wait for fresh elections, the enemies of the constitution would find means to prevent elections from taking place, and thereby to put off the reassembling of Parliament indefinitely.

Eventually the committee's report was put to the vote and agreed to by forty-six votes to six. The law, as passed, was briefly as follows:—

That the Medjliss shall continue to sit until one more than half of the members of the new Medjliss shall have arrived in Tehran, and that the Government shall take measures to bring about elections as soon as possible.

No. 221.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

THERE was a continuance of patriotic demonstrations here throughout the day yesterday.

Though the crowds appear to be orderly so far, the fact that Yeprim, the chief of police, has resigned may affect the situation, as there are signs of possible trouble between his followers and the Bakhtiariis.

Public feeling is so excited that the possibility of danger to foreigners cannot be excluded, but as far as I can judge the danger is not imminent.

No. 222.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegram of 2nd December.

Following from His Majesty's representative at Resht 3rd December:—

“800 men who left on night of 2nd December ordered back to Resht three hours later.

“1,000 infantry and 600 Cossacks left this morning for Tehran.”

No. 223.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

Please see your telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of the 2nd instant and my telegram of to-day.

If the Persian Government could be told that the presence of Russian troops would not be used to press further demands so long as the Persian Government maintain order in Tehran, and that as soon as the present demands are satisfied the troops will be withdrawn, the public excitement here might, perhaps, subside somewhat.

No. 224.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegram of 3rd December: Attack on Indian cavalry.

It appears that conflict was occasioned by attack by 30 or 40 tribesmen on a caravan of 600 camels and mules, which cannot be prevented from attaching itself to British troops, and was travelling at a short distance in front of latter. Eckford, officer commanding troops, on being informed of attack, moved troops forward to endeavour to cut off robbers.

No. 225.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1911.

MY telegrams of 28th October and 2nd November.

Shuster has now revoked appointments of Lecoffre, Haycock, and Schindler.

No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 2nd December.

Do you apprehend danger to legation?

No. 227.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 3rd December.

Do you think it necessary to increase His Majesty's Legation escort? If so, some men from the reinforcements sent to the south might go to Tehran.

No. 228.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 4, 1911.

AFTER what Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has said, I do not think that Russian Government could be embarrassed if I were to make a statement here to the effect that, whatever other changes may take place at Tehran as result of pending events, His Majesty's Government cannot again recognise ex-Shah. I feel that some such statement is essential, and in informing Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of this, you might add that a favourable impression would be produced if I might add that we are in agreement with Russian Government on this point.

No. 229.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

REFERENCE to my telegram of the 3rd December.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs last night. His Excellency informed me that he had done everything possible to induce the Medjliss to consider the Russian demands. He went on to say that after the vote of the Medjliss, rejecting these demands, the Cabinet had resigned, but owing to the representations of the Regent and the entreaty of the Medjliss, it had been persuaded to continue in office. His Excellency was now anxious to enter into negotiations with Russia on lines that would not conflict so directly with Persian independence as did the demands that Russian Government were now putting forward. Even were the Medjliss to be induced to accept the present demands, a lasting feeling of rancour would be aroused in the country, which would produce a result contrary to the object desired by Russia and expressed in the ultimatum of laying the foundations of friendly and stable relations between the two countries.

His Excellency enquired whether I thought there was any possibility of Russian Minister advising his Government to soften the demands in some manner. In reply I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I could give him no hope of his doing so, but I promised to communicate what he had said to M. Poklewski, whom I was to see that evening.

I have now, after consultation with my Russian colleague, informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that I fear it would be useless for him to attempt to persuade M. Poklewski to advise his Government to make any modification.

No. 230.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

MY telegram of 4th December.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that further troops left Resht for Tehran yesterday.

Up to date 2,000 infantry and 300 Cossacks have left.

No. 231.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

YOUR two telegrams of 4th December.

I apprehend no danger to the legation, and no increase of escort is needed.

No. 232.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 5, 1911.

MY telegram of 4th December.

There was less manifestation of excitement yesterday. In order to avoid conflict with Bakhtiariis, Yeprim has sent his men out of the town.

No. 233.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 5, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 9th December :—

On the receipt of your telegram of the 2nd instant I addressed a private letter to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing the hope that he would not present any more far-reaching demands to the Persian Government without first consulting you; and in a conversation which I had with him on the 5th instant I reverted to the subject.

M. Nératof said that he had not replied to my letter at once, as he wished to ask me whether some misunderstanding had by any chance arisen, for he could not otherwise understand why you should, after all the assurances which he had given me, take so serious a view of the situation.

I replied that we placed entire confidence in his Excellency's good faith and in all that he had told me with regard to the intentions of the Imperial Government; but circumstances might arise which might so alter the situation that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Imperial Government to give effect to their assurances. This was the reason why you were urging that the occupation of Tehran should only take place in the very last resort. The march of Russian troops on the capital would be sure to give rise to regrettable incidents, while it was more than likely that there would be a series of assassinations at Tehran itself. We might then be told that the Imperial Government had found it necessary, in consequence of some fresh provocation, to demand satisfaction of a more exemplary character. Then there was the further danger that what was now intended to be a mere temporary occupation might, by the force of circumstances, be converted into an indefinite one.

His Excellency replied that there were only two grounds on which an advance to Tehran would be ordered, namely, if no satisfaction had been received before the troops had left Kazvin, or if M. Poklewski should consider their presence necessary for the protection of the lives of foreigners. The main body of the troops would not reach

Kazvin for eight days, as it would be necessary to provide for the maintenance of communications with Enzeli, and they would probably have to rest there two or three days. We had thus got nearly a fortnight before they would reach Tehran, always supposing that M. Poklewski did not ask for a detachment of Cossacks to be dispatched at all speed for his protection. It seemed from the reports which had reached him that a small body of men, with a couple of guns, was being organised at Tehran to oppose the advance of the Russian troops. This was unfortunate, as, though the resistance which it might offer would be of no account, it was very desirable to avoid a regular conflict on account of the complications to which it might lead. The conduct of the military operations would naturally, his Excellency added, be in the hands of the general in command; and he would have to decide, if the occasion arose, as to which parts of the town it would be advisable to occupy.

On my turning the conversation to the question of the possible presentation of further demands, M. Nératof said that he would not put forward any that touched the political future of Persia without first consulting you and obtaining your consent.

I then proceeded to speak in the terms of your telegram of the 4th instant, on the subject of the ex-Shah. If, I said, his Excellency would authorise you to state in Parliament that the two Governments had agreed not to recognise His Majesty under any circumstances, such a statement would go far to abate the opposition to Russia's recent action, and would, at the same time, serve as a pledge for our future co-operation in Persia.

M. Nératof told me, in reply, that he had only a few days ago caused a message to be sent to Mohamed Ali, warning him that he must not count on Russia's support. He did not, however, quite see the object of such a statement as you had proposed at the present moment. It went, moreover, too far, and would have the effect of binding the two Governments never to recognise the ex-Shah should he be recalled to Persia in a few years' time.

I said that the decision which you had taken was an irrevocable one, and that it was essential that publicity should be given to it at the present moment. It was generally believed in Persia, and even in certain quarters in England, that Russian agents were preparing the way for Mohamed Ali's return, and that Russian troops were about to replace him on the throne. It was necessary, therefore, to undeceive public opinion, and to show that there was no truth in these reports. I reminded M. Nératof that when the ex-Shah landed in Persia last summer, he had declined to join us in notifying to His Majesty that we would not recognise him on the plea that such a procedure would be contrary to the principle on which we had always acted, of never intervening in these internal conflicts. The situation now was entirely different. Mohamed Ali had made his attempt and had failed; he had undergone defeat after defeat at the hands of the Government troops, and his cause was a hopeless one. If he now succeeded in regaining the throne it would be solely due to the fact that Russian troops were on their way to Tehran, and that, in consequence, the Persian Government was powerless. If we now kept silence, the whole blame for what might happen would be laid at the door of the Russian Government.

His Excellency admitted that there was much truth in what I had said, but again contended that if there was a popular movement in his favour in a few years' time, we might be compelled to recognise him. I observed that when a few months ago there was a question of the ex-Shah again seeking asylum in Russia, his Excellency had himself told me that we might be quite easy as regarded the future, as His Majesty had been so bitterly disappointed with the reception which he had met with in Persia that he would never show his face there again.

M. Nératof then put forward several suggestions that he thought would meet the requirements of the case, of which one was that the Russian Government should give an assurance that the ex-Shah should not be recognised so long as the Russian troops remained in occupation, and another that they would not recognise him without the consent of His Majesty's Government. I pointed out that a declaration to which a time limit was attached would amount to an invitation to His Majesty to return when the time specified had expired, and I finally appealed to him to act as you suggested out of regard for the difficult position in which you were placed, as well as in the interest of the Anglo-Russian understanding. The ex-Shah, I remarked, had never displayed any qualities that rendered him desirable as a ruler, and if only his Excellency would meet your wishes on this point, I was sure that you would co-operate with him to secure the constitution of a Government at Tehran that would be friendly disposed towards Russia. The object which both Governments had in view was the same. They both desired to see a stable régime established in Persia, and they were only at variance

on the question of the means to be employed to accomplish this end. I was, however, firmly convinced that concerted action by our two representatives would be found more effectual than the presentation of demands at the point of the bayonet.

M. Nératof replied that he sincerely desired to see the co-operation of the two Governments maintained, adding that he would endeavour to find a formula that would give you satisfaction.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 234.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.

THE restoration of the ex-Shah cannot, in my opinion, be the only solution of the problem of securing a Government in Persia which would have due regard for Russian interests, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as of real importance to Russia, while, at the same time, it makes things difficult for us.

In my opinion, it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to recognise the ex-Shah after his flagrant breach of faith in returning to Persia.

No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.

TREASURER-GENERAL has revoked Mr. Lecoffre's appointment to post at Tabreez. You might ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether Russian Government, in demanding Lecoffre's dismissal, meant thereby his dismissal from Persian service. He has now been in this service two years, and I conclude that cancellation of his appointment to the Tabreez post was all that Russia desired.

No. 236.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY telegram of 5th December.

Yeprim has been reinstated as chief of police, and he and his men are apparently reconciled with Bakhtiaris.

No. 237.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY telegram of 4th December.

Squadron arrived at Ispahan without further incident; wounded officer progressing favourably.

Douglas telegraphs officer commanding was in no way escorting caravan. On hearing that caravan in front of him was attacked, he galloped up and drove off robbers. Douglas thinks no other course open to him.

No. 238.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY telegram of 5th December.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that a further Russian detachment of 900 infantry left for Kazvin on 4th December.

No. 239.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

SARDAR ASSAD arrived in Tehran yesterday.

No. 240.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs earnestly hopes that as he is doing everything in his power to persuade the Medjliss to find some possible basis of agreement with Russia, Russian troops will not advance beyond Kazvin without some delay, as, should they do so, matters would be precipitated.

No. 241.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 6, 1911.

MY telegram of 17th November.

Both post and telegraph offices refuse communications for Kermanshah. Last telegram from British consul dispatched from Hamadan pressing by a runner, and received yesterday, stated that communications with Bagdad were closed. Telegram foreshadowed pillaging of town.

No. 242.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 6, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 5th December.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to employment of Lecoffre by Persian Government outside Russian zone.

No. 243.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 6, 1911.

IN a conversation which I had with him on the 6th instant, M. Nératof, while expressing the confident hope that we should eventually find a solution that would suit both Governments, still maintained his objection to any statement respecting the return of the ex-Shah that would bind the two Governments irrevocably in the future. In support of his contention he remarked that some of the Bakhtiari were said to be in favour of recalling Mahomed Ali, and asked what would be our position after making such a statement, supposing that they placed him once more on the throne. I replied that you had considered this, as well as other possible eventualities, and that nothing could now alter your fixed determination. The Bakhtiari, I observed, were not so enamoured of the ex-Shah as to insist on restoring him, were they informed beforehand that we would not recognise him.

I informed M. Nératof of the language held by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir G. Barclay (see the latter's telegram of the 5th December). His Excellency observed that in the Russian demands the only point that might wound Persian susceptibilities was the engagement as to foreign advisers required in demand No. 2. Any concession on this point, however, would expose us to the risk of the Persians appointing another foreigner, who would act precisely as Shuster had

done, and he did not see how he could make any. The Russian demand, moreover, was only the expression of the principle on which both Powers had always insisted, and which had been observed in practice. With regard to the demand for an indemnity, if the Persian Government would only consent to give the required engagements the Russian Government would be willing to give them any possible facilities.

No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

You should discuss with M. Poklewski the urgency of replacing Shuster with the least possible delay the moment the Russian demands have been complied with, and also the question of who would be the most acceptable and suitable nominee.

No. 245.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister tells me that 400 Russian troops have reached Kazvin.

No. 245 A.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

MR. SHUSTER'S successor.

Please see your telegram of yesterday's date.

My Russian colleague is in favour of Mornard as successor to Shuster. Mornard has been administrator-general of the Persian Customs since Naus' departure. I have always found him satisfactory, and I think that in view of his long experience of Persia and of the harmonious manner in which he has hitherto worked with the two legations, his appointment would be the most practical in the circumstances.

No. 246.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 7, 1911.

SARDAR ASSAD has been using his influence for moderation, and his return to Persia seems therefore to have relieved the situation.

The general feeling appears to be more reasonable. All parties in the Medjliss, including the Democrats, are inclining towards submission, and it is hoped that the Cabinet will be able to persuade the Medjliss to comply with the Russian demands.

No. 247.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 7, 1911

I THINK it is well that I should now explicitly put on record the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to certain matters of importance, so that all risk of possible difference between the two Governments may be avoided, and that the lines of future co-operation may be indicated.

You should hand M. Nératof a memorandum in the sense of the following paragraphs, and express the hope that the Russian Government will accept it as representing their views also. You should, however, explain that I do not desire to

increase M. Nératof's difficulties during the present crisis by pressing him as regards details, and I admit that the question of Mr. Shuster's successor is the only one which can at once be taken in hand:—

1. The solution of the present crisis must be such as to secure a Government in Persia which will conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian agreement, and not disregard the special interests which the two Powers respectively have in that country.

2. I trust that the Russian Government will not allow any solution which would entail the return of the ex-Shah. Such a restoration could only embarrass an already complicated situation, and is not essential to the object above indicated. It would be inconsistent with our dignity to recognise him now, after his recent disregard of the warnings of both Governments not to return. His restoration would, moreover, give rise to apprehension of vindictive measures on his part against persons who were instrumental in expelling him.

3. As soon as Mr. Shuster goes, it is of the greatest importance that a foreigner, whom both Powers could accept, should be appointed to succeed him. This point should be discussed by the two Ministers, and they should recommend a suitable candidate.

4. When Persian Government have complied with Russian demands they should be placed in a position to restore order in the country. They will require money for this purpose, and the two Governments should therefore assist them to obtain a loan.

5. The Persian Government would be seriously hampered in this connection were the Russian Government to insist on payment of an indemnity. I hope, therefore, that when the crisis is over some way of avoiding this difficulty may be found.

6. It is understood that occupation of Persian territory by Russia and the military measures now in progress are not permanent, but provisional, and that they will cease as soon as Persian Government have carried out Russian demands and have re-established order in Northern Persia.

No. 248.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.

YOU should give to M. Sazonow, for his information, either direct or through Count Benckendorff, a memorandum setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government as explained in my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day.

No. 249.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

REFER to St. Petersburg telegram of the 6th December.

Mr. Lecoffre has for two years been employed in a subordinate position at the Ministry of Finance here, and has done useful work. The Russian Government had not previously objected. Do they really mean to insist on his giving up this post now?

No. 250.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 8, 1911.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs paid a visit to the Russian Legation yesterday afternoon and spoke about the Russian demands. He said that the second was the one which presented the greatest difficulty, as it attacked Persian independence. Supposing that Persia undertook that she would take into consideration and would not harm the interests of the two Powers when engaging foreigners; his Excellency thought that this form of wording would, in practice, achieve the desired result and would not so clearly attack Persia's independence. It might also be acceptable to the Medjliss, who might also be induced to accept the other two demands.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs hoped that the Russian Government would then recall the troops, and he added that as it was generally believed that the real object of the dispatch of troops was to restore the ex-Shah, it would be an excellent way of showing that friendly relations had been restored between Russia and Persia were His Majesty to be got rid of. His Excellency also remarked that Persia would be in great need of a loan or an advance, and that they would require Russia's assistance in procuring one.

No. 251.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 8, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 9th December:—

I called again on M. Nératof yesterday and handed him an *aide-mémoire* embodying the six points laid down in your telegram of the preceding day. I explained that you had thought it right, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, to record the lines of policy that would enable the two Governments to continue to work together, and I further expressed the hope that the Russian Government would be able to say that the views held by His Majesty's Government were in accordance with their own. After promising to give these six points his careful consideration, M. Nératof remarked that, as regarded Mr. Shuster's successor, it was, in his opinion, essential that no foreign advisers should again be engaged from among the subjects or citizens of any of the Great Powers, and that the attributions of the future financial adviser should be carefully defined, so that it would be impossible for him to usurp dictatorial powers.

I subsequently discussed with M. Nératof the proposed parliamentary statement with regard to the ex-Shah, and his Excellency finally accepted the following text as open to no objections, though he added that he must first submit it to M. Sazonow, who was now at Paris:—

“His Majesty's Government have informed the Russian Government that they would be unable to recognise the ex-Shah were he now to re-establish himself on the throne. The Russian Government have, on their side, assured them that, were the ex-Shah now to attempt to regain the throne, they would equally not recognise him, and that so long as the Russian troops remain in occupation, they will do nothing either to encourage or facilitate His Majesty's return to the throne.”

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 252.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 8, 1911.

MY telegram of yesterday.

You should supplement memorandum given to Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs by an explanation to the effect that point 6 was intended to mean that as soon as order was re-established all Russian troops, including those at Tabreez and Ardebil, should be withdrawn from Northern Persia.

No. 253.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

Sir,

Paris, December 8, 1911.

THE Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is now in Paris, called on me this afternoon in order to discuss with me the situation in Persia and to explain to me, for your information, his views on the present situation in that country.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie, *mutatis mutandis*.

I began the conversation by referring to the anxiety which you felt at the situation created in Persia by the demands made on the Government of that country by the Russian Government and the presence there of Russian troops. In case the Russian Ambassador in London had omitted from his account to his Excellency of the conversation which he had with you on the 2nd instant any observations of importance which you had made to the Ambassador on that occasion in regard to the question of Persia, I gave to M. Sazonow for perusal the despatch to Sir George Buchanan in which you recorded the conversation. I afterwards handed to his Excellency a memorandum, of which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy, giving your views as described in your telegram of yesterday to Sir G. Buchanan.

M. Sazonow said that, so far as he was personally concerned, he concurred in and accepted your views. He could not answer, however, for the acquiescence of the Russian Minister of Finance in your view in regard to the indemnity. He would, however, on reaching St. Petersburg on the 13th instant do his best to bring about either the dropping of the demand for a money payment or a compromise of some sort the effect of which would be to mitigate the burden of it, and he would discuss the whole question of Persia with His Majesty's Ambassador after he had examined the situation at St. Petersburg. M. Sazonow then referred to the grievances of Russia against the Persian Government. They were many, he said, and had become more accentuated owing, he feared, to what was Russian consideration for Persian weakness, but had been interpreted as Russian weakness by the Persian Government, viz., the premature withdrawal of the Russian troops when on a previous occasion they were marching towards Tehran. The Persian Government had traded on the patience of Russia. M. Sazonow said that he fully appreciated the importance of not allowing the Persian question to assume dimensions that might react on the general relations between Russia and England, and you might depend upon his doing his best to bring about a settlement to avoid such a result. He thought there was unnecessary nervousness in England in regard to Russian policy in Persia. The Russian Government had no desire to occupy Tehran unless absolutely necessary to obtain satisfaction, nor to see a restoration of the ex-Shah. His Majesty was entirely discredited in Persia, and he could not be of any service to Russian designs against the integrity of Persia if such designs existed, which they certainly did not.

M. Sazonow leaves Paris on the evening of the 10th instant.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 253.

Memorandum communicated to M. Sazonow.

THE question of Persia is the source of great anxiety to Sir Edward Grey. He has spoken seriously on the subject to Count Benckendorff, who will no doubt have reported to M. Sazonow the conversation which Sir Edward Grey had with the Ambassador on the 2nd instant.

Sir Edward Grey desires to put on record now his views on certain points in order to avoid the risk of a possible difference between the Russian and British Governments, and to indicate the lines on which, in his opinion, they may continue to co-operate; and in doing so he considers it desirable that he should be explicit on certain matters of importance, viz. :—

1. He recognises that the outcome of the present situation must be to secure the establishment of a Government in Persia that will conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian agreement and pay proper regard to the special interests of Great Britain and Russia respectively.

2. It would not be consistent with the dignity of England to recognise a restoration of the ex-Shah after the manner in which he has disregarded the warnings given to him by both the Russian and the British Governments not to return to Persia. His restoration cannot be essential to the object described in point 1. It would, moreover, give rise to apprehension in Persia of vindictive measures on his part against those who were instrumental in expelling him from the country. Sir Edward Grey therefore trusts that the Russian Government will not add to the embarrassments of the situation by permitting the restoration of the ex-Shah to be the outcome of the present crisis.

3. The Russian and British Ministers at Tehran should at once confer together as

to the selection of a foreign financial adviser to be recommended as successor to M. Shuster, for it is most important that one should be found who would be acceptable to both England and Russia.

4. As soon as the Russian demands on the Persian Government have been conceded, the British and Russian Governments should together consider and co-operate in measures, a loan being one of them, for preventing chaos, and for putting the Persian Government into a position to restore order.

5. The demand for an indemnity, put forward by Russia, would, if exacted, materially impair the object set forth in point 4. Sir E. Grey hopes that when the present crisis is past the Russian Government will find means of avoiding the difficulty which would be caused by an insistence on the payment of an indemnity.

6. Sir E. Grey understands that, as soon as the Russian demands have been complied with and order in Northern Persia has been restored, the military measures and occupation of Persian territory, which are now in progress and are stated to be provisional and not permanent, will cease.

Sir Edward has directed Sir Francis Bertie, when communicating his views to M. Sazonow, to state that the only point on which it seems possible to take immediate action is the consideration by the British and Russian representatives at Tehran of the question of a successor to Mr. Shuster, but Sir E. Grey trusts that M. Sazonow will concur with him that the policy which he has outlined accords with the views of the Russian Government.

Paris, December 8, 1911.

No. 254.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of the 8th December.

I spoke to-day to M. Nératof in the sense of the above telegram.

He replied that the employment of Mr. Lecoffre in the Ministry of Finance at Tehran would not be agreeable to the Russian Government, both because of Lecoffre's well-known anti-Russian sentiments and of the intimate relations in which he had stood to Shuster and Stokes. It ought not to be difficult, he said, to find an appointment elsewhere for Mr. Lecoffre.

No. 255.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 13th December:—

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 8th December, I addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th instant a supplementary *aide-mémoire*, explaining that paragraph 6 of my *aide-mémoire* of the 8th instant was intended to mean that all the Russian troops in Persia, including those at Ardebil and Tabreez, would be withdrawn when order was re-established.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 26th November (9th December), referring to stipulation 3 of my *aide-mémoire* of the 8th instant, and stating that his Excellency sees no objection to the two representatives at Tehran being instructed to consult together as to the choice of a foreigner to replace Mr. Morgan Shuster without delay. M. Nératof adds that the functions of the official selected should be limited strictly to those of Adviser to the Persian Financial Administration.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 255.

*M. Nératof to Sir G. Buchanan.**Saint-Pétersbourg, le 26 novembre
(9 décembre), 1911.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE m'empresse de vous informer que je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à ce que les Ministres de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne à Téhéran soient invités à s'entendre sur le choix d'un fonctionnaire étranger pour remplacer sans délai Mr. Shuster Morgan, ainsi que vous le proposez au point 3 de l'aide-mémoire que vous m'avez remis hier. Il va sans dire que, selon le principe établi, le fonctionnaire en question doit être choisi parmi les sujets des Puissances secondaires.

Je télégraphie en ce sens à M. Poklewski, en le priant de me faire connaître sans délai le résultat de son échange de vues avec Sir George Barclay à ce sujet.

Il y a cependant un point essentiel sur lequel je dois attirer votre attention—c'est la nécessité de poser préalablement certaines limites à l'activité du futur conseiller financier, dont le rôle doit être strictement réduit à celui d'un conseiller pour l'Administration des Finances. Il s'agit, par conséquent, d'obtenir une réduction considérable des droits que le Medjliss avait déferés à Mr. Shuster et à la suite desquels ce dernier jouissait d'un pouvoir presque dictatorial. La situation se trouverait sans doute peu améliorée si le successeur de Mr. Shuster pouvait continuer à exercer une influence pareille à celle de son prédécesseur.

Je demande à M. Poklewski son avis sur la meilleure manière d'arriver à ce résultat.

A. NÉRATOF.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, November 26
(December 9), 1911.*

My dear Ambassador,

WITH reference to the proposal contained in point 3 of your *aide-mémoire* of yesterday, I hasten to inform you that I see no reason why the Ministers of Russia and Great Britain at Tehran should not be instructed to consult as to the selection of a foreigner to replace Mr. Shuster without delay. The official in question should of course, in accordance with the established principle, be chosen from among the subjects of one of the minor Powers.

I am telegraphing in this sense to M. Poklewsky, and am requesting him to inform me without delay of the result of his exchange of views with Sir G. Barclay on this subject.

There is, however, one essential point to which I must draw your attention, that is the necessity of laying down beforehand certain limits to the functions of the financial adviser, whose duties must be strictly confined to those of Adviser to the Financial Administration. This will involve a substantial diminution of the powers conferred by the Medjliss upon Mr. Shuster, in consequence of which he possessed almost dictatorial powers. It is certain that the situation would be very little improved if Mr. Shuster's successor were in a position to exercise the same influence as his predecessor.

I am enquiring of M. Poklewsky his opinion as to the best manner of arriving at this result.

A. NÉRATOF.

No. 256.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 9, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 13th December :—

I have the honour to report that, in a conversation which I had with M. Nératof on the 9th instant, I once more tried to bring home to him the gravity of the present situation. The action recently taken by the Imperial Government in Persia had, I said, evoked numerous expressions of disapproval in the House of Commons, and His Majesty's Government were even being taken to task for having tolerated it. I told his Excellency that, according to the latest telegram from Sir G. Barclay, the Persian Government

seemed now more disposed to comply with the Russian demands. If, however, any hopes that we might entertain of their speedy submission were to be realised, it was absolutely necessary that the Imperial Government should at once give a definite assurance that the Russian troops would be recalled as soon as the Persian Government had accepted the three demands.

M. Nératof, in reply, contended that the action to which Russia had had recourse had been forced on her by Persia, and that the demands themselves were most moderate. He could not, at the present moment, take upon himself the responsibility of giving me such an assurance as I had suggested, as he was in rather a delicate position owing to the fact that M. Sazonow was expected back next Wednesday. He would, however, talk the matter over with the president of the Council. He personally thought that the Imperial Government might give an assurance that the troops would not advance beyond Kazvin before the 21st of this month, and that, if the three demands were complied with by that date, the expeditionary force would be recalled, provided that, in the meanwhile, no fresh incident occurred, such as an attack on a Russian consulate, &c. As regarded the withdrawal of the troops from Tabreez, to which I had previously called his attention, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram of the 8th December, M. Nératof said that this would have to be made the subject of a special arrangement with the Persian Government in return for the creation of a force to maintain order in the north.

M. Nératof then proceeded to enquire whether the Russian Government could count on your support, should they wish to put forward any particular candidate for the post of Prime Minister. I replied that this was a question which I could not answer, but that I knew that you had, in a recent conversation with Count Benckendorff, spoken of the possibility of the two Governments securing a Persian Government that would be well-disposed towards Russia. His Excellency expressed his concurrence when I suggested that it would perhaps be best that M. Poklewski should submit to Sir George Barclay any proposals which the Russian Government might think it desirable to make for the purpose of placing Perso-Russian relations on a more stable and friendly basis. Sir George Barclay would then be able, after discussing them with M. Poklewski, to furnish you with his views with regard to them.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 257.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 10, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 13th December :—

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a private letter which I have received from M. Nératof enclosing a statement of the views of the Russian Government on the subject of the ex-Shah.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 257.

M. Nératof to Sir G. Buchanan.

*Saint-Petersbourg, le 27 novembre
(10 décembre), 1911.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

JE vous transmets, sous ce pli, un exposé de notre manière de voir au sujet de l'ex-Schah, qui correspond en général au projet que vous m'avez laissé vendredi. J'ai cru devoir y ajouter notre point de vue sur les mouvements éventuels de notre détachement de Kazvine.

J'aime à croire que cet exposé fournira à Sir Edward Grey la matière nécessaire pour une déclaration au Parlement au sujet de la politique russe en Perse, ainsi qu'il en avait exprimé le désir.

A. NÉRATOF.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, November 27
(December 10), 1911.*

My dear Ambassador,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a statement of our views concerning the ex-Shah, which in general outline corresponds with the draft which you left with me on Friday. I considered it advisable to add to it an expression of our views regarding the future movements of the Russian detachment stationed at Kazvin.

I trust that this communication will provide Sir E. Grey with all the material he requires for his statement in Parliament concerning Russian policy in Persia, in accordance with the desire expressed by him.

A. NERATOF.

Enclosure 2 in No. 257.

Aide-mémoire.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ayant déclaré à plusieurs reprises que les mesures militaires auxquelles il a été forcé d'avoir recours en Perse n'ont absolument aucun rapport avec les aspirations de Mohammed Ali Schah au trône persan, il tient à confirmer à nouveau cette déclaration de la manière la plus catégorique. Il ne voudrait en aucun cas qu'on pût lui attribuer l'intention d'imposer un Souverain à la Perse et de déroger au principe de non-intervention dans la lutte de l'ex-Schah avec le Gouvernement actuel—principe qu'il avait proclamé dès le début.

Par conséquent, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare que si l'ex-Schah profitait actuellement de la présence en Perse du corps d'expédition russe pour réaliser ses desseins, le Gouvernement russe ne le reconnaîtrait pas comme Souverain du pays, sans un accord préalable avec le Gouvernement britannique.

Le Gouvernement russe a pris connaissance avec plaisir de la communication de Sir G. Buchanan annonçant que le Cabinet de Londres, à son tour, lui promet son appui le plus énergique pour l'établissement de rapports normaux entre la Russie et la Perse, ainsi que pour la formation et le maintien d'un Cabinet bien disposé envers la Russie.

Le Ministère Impérial est en mesure d'affirmer que le détachement russe concentré à Kazvine ne continuera pas sa marche sur Téhéran avant le 8 (21) décembre si toutefois le Ministre de Russie ne se voit pas forcé, dans le cas où la situation deviendrait menaçante, d'appeler les troupes dans la capitale avant cette date.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est animé du désir de faire retirer ledit détachement de Kazvine aussitôt que possible, et il compte mettre à exécution ce dessein dès que le Gouvernement persan se sera soumis aux exigences qui lui ont été formulées. Le Gouvernement russe aime à espérer qu'aucun nouvel incident ne viendra à se produire, tel que des actes de violence sur la personne d'un agent russe, une attaque contre les institutions russes ou nos troupes, des actes de provocation envers la Russie, des troubles en général, &c. De pareils faits rendraient évidemment impossible le rappel du détachement.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 27 novembre (10 décembre), 1911.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government, having repeatedly declared that the military measures to which they have been forced to have recourse in Persia have absolutely no connection with Mohamed Ali Shah's aspirations to the Persian throne, desire once more to confirm that declaration in the most categorical manner. They would not on any account wish that the intention could possibly be attributed to them of imposing a Sovereign on Persia and of acting contrary to the principle of non-intervention in the struggle between the ex-Shah and the present Government—a principle which they had proclaimed from the beginning.

The Imperial Government consequently declare that if the ex-Shah were now to take advantage of the presence in Persia of the Russian expeditionary corps to realise his designs, the Russian Government would not recognise him as Sovereign in the country without a previous arrangement with His Majesty's Government.

The Russian Government have taken note with pleasure of Sir G. Buchanan's communication announcing that the Cabinet of London on their part promise

their most energetic support for the establishment of normal relations between Russia and Persia, as well as for the formation and maintenance of a Cabinet well disposed towards Russia.

The Imperial Ministry is in a position to declare that the Russian detachment concentrated at Kazvin will not continue its march on Tehran before the 8th (21st) December, unless the Russian Minister is obliged, in the event of the situation becoming threatening, to call up troops to the capital before that date.

The Imperial Government are animated by the desire to recall the said detachment from Kazvin as soon as possible, and they intend to put this design into execution as soon as the Persian Government shall have submitted to the demands which have been presented to them. The Russian Government trust that no new incident will intervene, such as acts of violence against the person of a Russian agent, an attack against Russian institutions or our troops, acts of provocation against Russia, disorders in general, &c. Acts of such a character would obviously render the recall of the detachment impossible.

St. Petersburg, November 27 (December 10), 1911.

No. 258.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister informed me that Russian troops will be concentrated at Kazvin by to-morrow or the day after.

No. 259.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

REFERENCE to my telegram dated the 8th December.

In a private letter yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I expressed the hope that the efforts which are being made to induce the Medjliss to accept the Russian demands would be successful, and I reiterated the views expressed in your telegram of the 30th November.

In conversation this morning, Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that Cabinet had undergone certain changes, and that it would be presented to Medjliss to-day in its new form. His Excellency assured me that the changes that have been made were such as inspired the full confidence of the Medjliss, adding that the Medjliss intended to invest the Cabinet with full powers to come to terms with Russia on lines which would not conflict with the independence of Persia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added that the Cabinet had decided to make the immense sacrifice of dismissing the treasurer-general, and would agree to second demand in the Russian ultimatum if it were modified as follows: "In engaging foreigners in Persian service, Persian Government will try to avoid any difficulties which might injure the interests of the Powers." In reply, I remarked that this formula differed from that which he had proposed to Russian Minister (please refer to my telegram of the 8th December), but Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained the wording cited above.

Minister for Foreign Affairs further stated that third demand would be complied with on the condition that Persian Government were assured that Russia would not press for a large indemnity, but would only ask for such sum as could be paid by Persia in her extreme penury.

In conclusion, his Excellency begged that His Majesty's Government would use their good offices to bring about the retention of the troops at Kazvin while negotiations were proceeding.

No. 260.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that he was instructing the Persian Minister in London to express to you the desire of the Persian Government

to take part in the conversations which he had heard were now proceeding between His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government as to a programme to regulate the relations between the two Powers and Persia. The Persian Government also desired to be a party to any tripartite agreement which might be the outcome of these conversations.

The Persian Government, his Excellency said, were very desirous of being freed from the many preoccupations which had hitherto prevented them from dealing with the internal situation; they were in consequence most anxious to secure a stable basis of good relations with Russia; it would be easier to achieve this end were the Persian Government to participate in the present conversations, as they would be thus enabled to make their views known and to prepare the ground in Persia for the acceptance of an eventual agreement should any be reached. The Persian Government might otherwise be confronted with some agreement concluded between Great Britain and Russia which they would find it impossible to accept.

No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 8th December.

Your language approved.

We will accept amended text if M. Sazonow confirms it.

No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister informs me that dismissal of Shuster is practically agreed to. He represented very earnestly that some formula should be found about foreign advisers, and asked my intervention for this. I replied that I could promise nothing: Russia having announced demands, it was not consistent with her dignity to waive them. I should be very glad if formula could be found which, while giving sufficient assurance about future foreign advisers, would be easier in form for Persian Government to accept, but this I thought could best be discussed direct with Russian Minister at Tehran.

You should inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say that, if Russian Government think any concession can be made in point of form without sacrificing substance, Sir G. Barclay will be instructed to co-operate at Tehran in getting Persians to accept it.

Persian Minister asked me to-day that if any changes other than those affected by the three fundamental Russian demands were required, they should be settled quietly in consultation with Persian Government, and that no public demands should be put forward.

I replied that I would be ready to use all my influence in this direction when once the three demands had been complied with, provided I was assured of real desire of Persian Government to co-operate with the two Powers.

No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called on the 5th instant to ask unofficially whether His Majesty's Government would be disposed to take steps towards requesting the Russian Government to refrain from advancing their troops further than Kazvin, so as to give time to the Persian Government to discuss in what manner they could best meet the wishes of the Russian Government.

Sir A. Nicolson told Mehdi Khan that he thought that the best and most direct plan would be for the Persian Government to converse with the Russian Minister at

Tehran—as His Majesty's Government could hardly, as matters now stand, act in the manner proposed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 11, 1911.*
THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 8th instant. He was especially anxious that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to induce the Russian Government to modify the second of their demands on the Persian Government.
Sir A. Nicolson told Mehdi Khan that some time back, before the present crisis, both legations had made a similar request to the Persian Government on two occasions. It was not done with the object of curtailing in any way Persian independence, but for the simple motive of avoiding any subsequent friction and complications.
Mehdi Khan said that the Persian chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg had telegraphed to him that he thought the Russian Government might be disposed to compromise on the question.
Sir A. Nicolson replied that if Russia were ready to subscribe to any formula which might, so to say, save the face of the Persian Government, no difficulty would be raised here.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 265.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 12, 1911.*
NEWS that the Persian Government were entertaining hopes that some modification might be effected in the terms of the Russian demands having reached the Russian Legation, my Russian colleague informed the Persian Government last night, that his Government had not empowered him to negotiate in any way respecting the ultimatum, and that when negotiating with the Medjliss with a view to inducing them to yield the Cabinet must work on the basis of the original wording of the three demands of the ultimatum.

No. 266.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 12, 1911.*
PLEASE see my telegram of yesterday.
A secret sitting of the Medjliss was held yesterday afternoon at which the Cabinet foreshadowed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs attended. The sitting was, I am told, stormy. There was no public sitting of the Medjliss, nor was the Cabinet presented publicly to it.

No. 267.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 12, 1911.*
REFER to my telegram of 6th December.
I learn from Minister for Foreign Affairs that the force sent by the Government to Kermanshah has now reached that town.

No. 268.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—Received December 12.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 12, 1911.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs' assurance to me yesterday as to the extent of confidence placed in the new Cabinet by the Medjliss has not been fulfilled.

I have just learnt that the reason why the new Cabinet was not formally presented to the Medjliss was that the latter would not consent to authorise the Cabinet to effect a settlement of the present dispute with Russia.

The attitude of the Medjliss had left my informant without any hope that there was a chance of their proving complaisant; he hinted, however, that the Cabinet was determined to settle with Russia, and that they would find some other means than the consent of the Medjliss.

No. 269.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 12, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 13th December:—

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof on the 12th instant, I told him that I had been rather disappointed to find that the language of his *aide-mémoire* (see my telegram of the 10th December) was not quite so precise as he had led me to hope. His Excellency, however, would not admit this, and maintained that the assurances which it recorded both with regard to the ex-Shah and to the eventual withdrawal of the Russian troops were quite explicit.

I subsequently urged his Excellency to try to find some formula for the presentation of the second demand that would render it more acceptable to the Persian Government, and suggested that this might be done by substituting the word "consultation" for "consent." M. Nératof, however, replied that this was impossible, and also declined to consider several other suggestions which I submitted to him. He could not, he said, make any concession as regarded the tenour of the demand in question, though he was willing to admit a modification of its text. He had already authorised M. Poklewski to try and find a formula that would take more account of Persian susceptibilities, and he would not insist on the retention of the words "consent" and "engages to" if suitable equivalents could be found. He would, for example, be satisfied were the Persian Government to declare that they would not in future engage foreign advisers without a previous *entente* or "accord" with the two legations.

On my communicating to him the substance of your conversation with the Persian Minister, reported in your telegram of the 11th December, M. Nératof said that he was very glad that you had held such language to his Excellency. He thanked me for the assurance which you had authorised me to give him that Sir G. Barclay would be instructed to discuss with M. Poklewski any proposals which the latter might submit for the purpose of placing Russo-Persian relations on a more friendly and stable footing, and that you would approach all such proposals with a sincere desire to meet as far as possible the wishes of the Imperial Government. His Excellency added that M. Poklewski would not fail to communicate to Sir G. Barclay any proposals that the Imperial Government might think it advisable to make with regard to the general political situation; but I gathered that he did not think that it would be necessary to do so with regard to matters which concerned Russian interests exclusively.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 270.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

ALTHOUGH we cannot object to Russian Government's attitude, yet we must stipulate that another post be found for Mr. Lecoffre outside Russian sphere. We hope

that Russian Government will agree to his being allowed to wait for the new appointment before being dismissed.

Reference is to your telegram of the 9th December.

No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

MY telegram of 11th December, second paragraph.

Russian Ambassador informs me that it is possible some concession of this kind may be made, but, if so, it should only be on initiative of Russian Minister at Tehran. I have said that if informed when any concession of this kind has been offered by Russian Minister we shall, if Persians ask our advice, advise them to accept it.

No. 272.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF told me to-day that M. Sazonow had said to him in Paris that he was determined to maintain not only the Anglo-Russian Convention, but also the *entente* between Great Britain and Russia that depended on it. After reading the general lines of policy with regard to Persia that I had laid down, M. Sazonow had said that he saw nothing to object to in them, but the Russian troops in Tabreez and Ardebil could be withdrawn only when order was made very secure.

I explained to Count Benckendorff that I had been bound to add the stipulation as to Russian troops in Tabreez and Ardebil, because otherwise my memorandum might have seemed to imply that the original conditions on which they had been sent there had disappeared, and that the occupation was to be regarded as permanent as far as those troops were concerned.

I went on to say that, when the three Russian demands had been complied with, we ought to co-operate to put the Persian Government on their feet. We had suggested, some time ago, that British officers might be employed by the Persian Government to organise a Persian force to protect the southern roads. In the same way, eventually, a Persian police force might be organised under Russian officers to give protection in the north. If that was done, we might find some time hence that order was more secure in northern Persia than it had ever been during recent years, and then all Russian troops might be withdrawn. The outcome of the present difficulties might thus be a more favourable situation than there had yet been.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 273.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

MY telegram of 12th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Russian Minister last evening and proposed another formula for second demand as follows:—

“As regards engagement of foreign officials or officers needed by Persia for the organisation of the public services, Persia, animated by the desire to maintain on all occasions the best relations with Great Britain and Russia, will see to it that the choice of these persons shall not be such as to injure the legitimate interests of the two Powers in Persia. Consequently the Persian Government will be ready, as regards these officers and officials, to enter into an exchange of views with the two legations.”

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured the Russian Minister that, if the Russian Government would accept this formula, the Persian Government would accept the other two demands. If Medjliss refused consent it would be dissolved.

Russian Minister is submitting the above to his Government.

No. 274.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative, Meshed, 8th December, received yesterday:—

“Situation serious, as population arming. My Russian colleague, after consulting with me, summoned reinforcements.”

Russian consul has asked for large reinforcements both for Meshed and Kuchan, but Russian Minister has advised dispatch of only 100 Cossacks for present.

No. 275.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 13, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of this morning.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a message to the Russian Minister, after a Cabinet Council last night, to the effect that the assurances given as regards compliance with the Russian demands were conditional on an assurance from Russia that the troops would be recalled from Kazvin immediately after the demands had been accepted.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expects that compliance with the demands will render the Ministers the objects of an outburst of popular indignation, and he tells me that it will be impossible for the Cabinet to take the very grave step of dissolving the Medjliss—which is a necessary preliminary to the acceptance of the demands—unless they are assured that the troops will be withdrawn; the Cabinet will then have some argument with which they may hope to pacify the popular indignation.

In order to make it clear that the legations must be consulted in the case of every appointment, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has amended his formula for the second demand by inserting the words “engagement of” in the final sentence between “as regards” and “these officers.”

No. 276.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

STOKES left this morning.

No. 277.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 13th instant.

The Cabinet have devised a new way of solving the situation. As the resignation of some twenty deputies would leave the Medjliss without a quorum, they are endeavouring to persuade the Moderate deputies to resign their seats. The acceptance of the Russian demands would thus be facilitated. I am told that the resignation of the requisite number of deputies is assured.

No. 278.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

MY telegram of 13th December.

Russian Minister made a communication yesterday to the Persian Government in the sense of the last two paragraphs of the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement reported in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of 10th December.

No. 279.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

ACTING consul reports that chief mullah at Shiraz has published order forbidding Moslems to have any dealings with British troops, and that priests are actively preventing shopkeepers from selling to them, and are molesting builders and other Persians employed by troops. Question of supplies threatens to become acute. I am bringing to notice of Persian Government and urging them to stop this boycott.

No. 280.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

MY telegram of 29th October.

A Government force is reported to have been defeated at Damgham by ex-Shah's Turkomans on Meshed road.

No. 281.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 14, 1911.

FOR a few days past, owing to mischievous agitation of mullahs, there has been a run on Imperial Bank at Shiraz, and acting consul now reports that notes are being presented at daily rate of 15,000 tomans. This is more serious as a specie caravan for Shiraz branch is held up at Kazerun for want of guard.

No. 282.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 14, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 19th December:—

Sir,

I have the honour to report that M. Sazonow returned to St. Petersburg on the 13th of this month, and resumed the direction of foreign affairs. On the following evening I was received by his Excellency, and after congratulating him on his restoration to health, I proceeded to speak of the present situation in Persia, and of the grave preoccupation which it was causing you, dwelling more especially on the serious consequences that might follow an occupation of Tehran by Russian troops.

M. Sazonow said that Count Benckendorff, when he had been in Paris, had also spoken to him in much the same sense, but that he trusted that the misapprehensions and suspicions with which Russia's recent action in Persia had been regarded in certain quarters in England had now been dissipated. In any case he begged that I would assure you that he had not the smallest wish to order an advance on Tehran, and that he hoped that all necessity for such a step would be removed by a speedy compliance with the Russian demands.

Proceeding next to discuss these demands one by one, M. Sazonow explained that, as regarded the first, a simple engagement to dismiss Mr. Shuster would not suffice, and that the Russian troops would not be withdrawn until that gentleman's appointment in the Persian service had been formally cancelled. In reply to my question as to whether he meant by this that Mr. Shuster must have actually left Tehran, his Excellency said that if it was absolutely necessary that he should remain on there for a short time, it must be on the distinct understanding that he took no part whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, in the affairs of the Government.

The second demand, respecting the engagement of foreign advisers, was, M. Sazonow remarked, the one which the Persian Government apparently found the

most difficulty in accepting. They had now professed their readiness to accept a formula to the following effect:—

“The Persian Government, animated by the desire to maintain on all occasions the best relations with Great Britain and Russia, will see to it that the choice of these persons shall not be such as to injure the legitimate interests of the two Powers in Persia. The Persian Government will consequently be ready, as regards these officers and officials, to enter into an exchange of views with the two legations.”

He on his part would be disposed to meet their wishes on this point, provided that the words “to arrive at an understanding” were substituted for the words “to enter into an exchange of views,” as the latter were far too vague and constituted no real engagement. I remarked that the amendment proposed by his Excellency seemed to me to take away all the value of the new formula from the Persian point of view, as an exchange of views left the door open for discussion and was not so binding as an engagement to come to an understanding. After some further discussion I suggested a compromise between the two, according to which the Persian Government would engage “to enter into an exchange of views for the purpose of (or with a view to) arriving at an understanding with the two legations.” M. Sazonow accepted this suggestion favourably, but said that he could not take a final decision until the text had been submitted to the Emperor for approval.

With regard to the question of an indemnity, M. Sazonow gave me the assurance that he had no intention of being hard on the Persian Government or of endeavouring to extort some large sum from them.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 283.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 14, 1911.

MR. LECOFFRE'S appointment.

M. Sazonow, to whom I spoke to-day in the sense of your telegram of the 12th December, is obviously very unwilling that Mr. Lecoffre should remain for any length of time at the Ministry of Finance at Tehran. The most that he would concede was that Mr. Lecoffre might perhaps be allowed to remain there for a fortnight or three weeks. He said that a post for Mr. Lecoffre in the British sphere ought not to be difficult to find.

No. 284.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

THE manager of the Imperial Bank has just been to see me: he affirms that the Shiraz branch will no longer be able to finance our troops in view of the shortage of cash.

There is a caravan of specie detained at Borasjun for lack of escort; but I see no prospect of a Persian guard being provided, and until it reaches Shiraz there seems no prospect of any relief to the bank's situation.

I am strongly tempted to allow the specie caravan to attach itself to the escort which will accompany Smart, who will soon be starting from Bushire, but unless you sanction this step I cannot myself authorise it.

No. 285.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

MY telegram of 15th December.

Guard for specie caravan has been obtained locally, and caravan is now proceeding.

No. 286.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1911.

SHIRAZ boycott.

Please see my telegram of the 14th instant.

I have received the following telegram dated to-day from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz :—

“The question of supplies is becoming very grave. Purchase is now practically impossible, and we have only enough in hand of many necessary articles for one day more. Some energetic local action will be forced upon us, unless the central Government can be induced to take immediately effective measures to stop this scandalous state of things.

“The attitude of the local authorities is excessively obstructive. The karguzar clearly indicates his own approval of the action of the mullahs by writing to me officially that the local authorities cannot interfere with the mullahs.

“I shall warn the karguzar when I call on him this afternoon that the local authorities are incurring very serious responsibility in not attempting to check the hostile agitation. I have as yet no indication that the instructions which the Minister of Foreign Affairs states he has sent have been received here. I will try to discover from the karguzar this afternoon whether this is so or not.”

No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 15, 1911.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 14th December.

It is important that a post outside Russian sphere be found for Lecoffre. Is anything available? If not, could he go on leave of absence for a short time until something be found for him?

No. 288.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of 14th December.

The Russian Minister again told the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that as soon as the Persian Government complied with the three demands the Russian Government would begin to withdraw the troops from Kazvin. This assurance is, of course, subject to the conditions referred to at the end of the *aide-mémoire* handed to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg by M. Nératof (see Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of 10th December), and the Russian Government may possibly construe as acts of provocation the anti-Russian agitation throughout Persia in which the clergy with the Ulema of Nejez have now joined.

The Russian Minister also informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he would accept, with a slight amendment, the latter's formula for the second demand (see my telegram of 13th December).

The submission of the Persian Government thus seems to be facilitated, but even though a sufficient number of deputies have, as I understand, resigned their seats so that there will be no quorum in the Medjliss, it is by no means certain whether, in view of the popular indignation which the Cabinet are much afraid of, they will have the courage to comply with the Russian demands. They, doubtless, foresee that if there should be any delay in withdrawing the troops the general indignation will be intensified.

No. 289.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

MY telegram of 2nd December.

Following from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht, 15th December :—

“200 infantry and 400 Cossacks have arrived at Enzeli.”

No. 290.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 16, 1911.

SHIRAZ boycott.

Please see my telegram of last night.

Strong orders were sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the karguzar last night.

I have told acting consul to take no active measures without consulting me. I have also instructed him to inform the karguzar that I shall demand his dismissal unless he bestirs himself to stop the boycott.

No. 291.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

SUPPLIES for Shiraz escort.

See your telegram of yesterday.

You should authorise Shiraz troops to take what measures are absolutely necessary to provide supplies for themselves. Acting consul should consult with commander of troops as to measures which seem to them possible or desirable with force at their disposal. In event of other means failing, force can be resorted to. A receipt for everything taken must be given, so as to secure eventual payment.

Do you think situation at Shiraz would be in any way improved by dispatch of ships to the ports?

No. 292.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 16, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister has again made earnest appeal to me desiring assurances about second Russian demand to be private. I pointed out that Russia, having put forward demand publicly, could not be expected to be satisfied with private assurances thus giving impression in public that demand had been waived. I said I understood a formula had been proposed by Persian Government, which Russian Government were considering sympathetically, though it would require strengthening. When pressed for assurances about withdrawal of troops and other matters I said I would add nothing to assurances given direct by Russian Minister to Persian Government about troops, and generally that I could not assume position of mediator. Russian Government would naturally, after all that had passed, not accept mediation concerning three demands. Till these were complied with there was very little I could do; after they were settled my influence for future measures helpful to Persia would be used as outlined in my speech in Parliament on Thursday. Persian Minister said that public feeling against Russian demands was intense, and beyond control of Persian Government. Unless the demands were made easy in form, and assurance were given regarding immediate withdrawal of newly-arrived troops, the Persian Government were powerless to do anything.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 293.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

SITUATION at Kermanshah.

Please see my telegram of the 12th instant.

I have just received a telegram, dated the 9th December, from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah. The telegram was forwarded by runner to Hamadan, whence it was dispatched yesterday. Fighting was proceeding on the 9th December between Salar-ed-Dowleh's party and Government troops. The telegram states that business was suspended, the streets were unsafe, the Imperial Bank of Persia and the consulate were in the line of fire, and that there was general danger to life and property.

No. 294.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 15th December.

I am told by the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia that the situation at Shiraz will be only partially relieved by the arrival of the specie caravan now on its way up from Bushire. Bank manager urgently begs that another caravan of specie which is waiting to start from Bushire may travel under the protection of the escort which will accompany Smart.

I have told manager that I must obtain your special sanction before authorising such a step, but in the meantime I am endeavouring to stop Smart, who has either just left Bushire or is just leaving for Shiraz.

No. 295.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

SHIRAZ.

Please see your telegram of yesterday.

I have received several further telegrams from acting British consul, from which it appears that the karguzar is taking some steps to check the boycott agitation.

Acting consul has found himself compelled to accept an offer from the deputy governor to obtain a week's supplies, but this arrangement is obviously unsatisfactory.

I fear that the boycott movement might only be aggravated by the dispatch of ships to the ports. I would therefore deprecate any action of this nature.

No. 296.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 17, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of yesterday.

The Russian Minister learns from Sardar Assad that one more effort will be made to pass the Russian demands through the Medjliss. Until the result of this effort is seen the resignations of the Moderate deputies will not become effective. The Medjliss will sit on Tuesday, and if it again refuses to give satisfaction to Russia the above-mentioned resignations will be made effective; it will then be announced that the present Medjliss has ceased to exist.

The real truth is, I believe, that the public agitation has frightened those deputies who had been induced to resign into withdrawing their resignations. Although the patriotic demonstrations which marked the days immediately succeeding the ultimatum have ceased of late the influence of the clergy is having a powerful effect on public

opinion, and the feeling against compliance with the demands is growing. A Russian boycott which has been in operation for some time appears to grow rather than to diminish.

No. 297.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 22, 1911.

THE Electoral Law was passed by the Medjliss on the 22nd October, and was ratified by the Regent on the 4th instant. The wording of His Highness's rescript shows that he desires to make it quite clear that he entirely dissociates himself from the provisions which the law contains, as he says that he passed it on to the Minister of the Interior at once, without having had time even to read it.

The Electoral Law of 1909 provided for 120 members of Parliament and for elections through electoral colleges. The present law, of which I transmit a translation herewith, provides for 136 members and for direct elections in accordance with a schedule which forms an appendix to the Electoral Law. The principal provinces are allotted the following number of representatives:—

Azerbaijan	19
Khorassan	15
Arabistan	4
Kermanshah	4
Kerman and Baluchistan	7
Mazanderan	5
Ispahan	5
Tehran	15
Fars	13
Ghilan	6
Yezd	4

Azerbaijan and Tehran are unchanged as compared to the last Electoral Law, but Fars is allotted 13 members instead of 8, while the remainder show practically no change.

It is, perhaps, not a matter for surprise that although the last Electoral Law provided for the election of 120 representatives there never have been more than 80 present in Tehran, and the divisions usually show an attendance of between 60 and 70 deputies.

The present law provides practically for universal suffrage, the only important qualification being 6 months' residence in the electoral district. Political offenders who have taken action against the Government are now added to the list of persons disqualified both from electoral rights and candidature for election.

The important change, of course, is from indirect to direct elections, and it remains to be seen how this system will prove practicable in a country where no census has ever been taken.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 297.

Electoral Law of November 4, 1911.

SECTION I.

THE number of national representatives and their division according to provinces and departments.

Article 1.—The number of the national representatives for the National Consultative Assembly in the Empire of Persia is 136.

Art. 2.—The distribution of the national representatives proportionally to the estimated population of the provinces is in accordance with the table which is appended to this law,

SECTION II.—*Qualifications of Electors.*

Art. 3.—The electors must possess the following qualifications :—

1. They must be Persian subjects.
2. They must at least be 20 years of age.
3. They must be residents of the electoral district, or they must have been domiciled there at least for 6 months before the election.

Art. 4.—Persons who are deprived of electoral rights :—

1. Women.
2. Persons not within years of discretion, and those who stand in need of a legal guardian.
3. Foreign subjects.
4. Persons whose apostasy from the orthodox religion of Islam has been established in the presence of a duly qualified representative of the Holy Law.
5. Persons under 20 years of age.
6. Fraudulent bankrupts.
7. Mendicants and persons who earn their living by dishonourable means.
8. Murderers, thieves, and other criminals who deserve punishment in accordance with Islamic law.
9. Political offenders who have risen and taken action against the constitutional Government and the independence of the State.

Art. 5.—Persons who are deprived of electoral rights owing to their occupation and position :—

1. Military and naval men, excluding those having honorary posts.
2. Officers and employés of the police and gendarmerie within the district of their employment.

SECTION III.—*Qualifications of Candidates for Election.*

Art. 6.—Candidates for election must possess the following qualifications :—

1. They must profess the faith of His Holiness Mohamed, the son of Abdullah, unless they represent the Christian, Zoroastrian, or Jewish communities.
2. They must be Persian subjects.
3. They must be able to read and write Persian to an adequate degree.
4. They must be well known in the electoral district.
5. Their age must not fall short of 30 nor exceed 70 years.
6. They must have the reputation of being trustworthy and upright.

Art. 7.—Persons who are debarred from being elected :—

1. Princes in the first degree (sons, brothers, and paternal uncles of the King).
2. Women.
3. Foreign subjects.
4. Employés of the gendarmerie and police, as well as naval and military men, excluding officers holding honorary posts.
5. Governors, vice-governors, and their assistants within the district of their employment.

Note.—Other Government employés are eligible for election on condition that they resign their posts for the period of their election.

6. Fraudulent bankrupts.
7. Murderers, thieves, and other criminals who deserve punishment according to Islamic law.
8. Persons reputed to be heretics, or persons whose apostasy from the orthodox faith of Islam shall have been established in the presence of a duly qualified ecclesiastical judge.
9. Political offenders who have risen and taken action against the constitutional Government and the independence of the State.

SECTION IV.—*Formation of the Council of Supervision.*

Arts. 8 to 12.—Provide for a temporary committee to supervise elections under the local governor and some members of the local assembly.

SECTION V.—*Method of Election.*

Art. 13.—The election of representatives for the National Consultative Assembly in the whole Empire of Persia shall be direct and of one degree.

Art. 14.—In the localities where, according to the electoral distribution, they (the electors) have the right to elect one representative, the elections shall be "singular," and in localities where they (the electors) must elect more than one representative, the elections shall be "plural."

Explanation.—The meaning of "plural" election is that every elector will write on the voting paper the names of a number of persons to be elected in that district. The meaning of "singular" election is that every elector will write on the voting paper the name of one person to be elected.

Art. 15.—The election of representatives shall be by a relative majority.

Art. 16.—In case of an equality of votes between two or more persons, if the election of one of them be necessary, that one shall be determined by vote.

Art. 17.—The principal tribes shall, in accordance with the electoral table, each send a representative direct to the National Consultative Assembly. The other tribes not mentioned shall vote in their own districts.

Art. 18.—In every electoral district where several other places have to take part in the election, in case a certain number of those places should not, within the time which the central committee appoints (within the limits of this law), carry out their elections, their right of election shall be forfeited, and the elections in other parts of that district shall hold good.

Art. 19.—No one of the electors has the right to vote more than once save in cases where a new election shall be necessary.

Art. 20.—The electors are not absolutely compelled to elect from those resident in their own quarter.

SECTION VI.—*Issue of the Voting Papers to Determine the Electors.*

Arts. 21 to 24.

SECTION VII.—*Concerning the Taking and Counting of the Votes and the Determination of those Elected.*

Arts. 25 to 43.

SECTION 8.—*On Complaints in Reference to the Elections.*

Arts. 44 to 48.

SECTION IX.—*Miscellaneous.*

Art. 49.—As soon as half the representatives of the people, plus one, shall reach Tehran, the National Consultative Assembly shall be opened, and the decision of a majority of them shall be valid and effective.

Art. 50.—The period of the parliamentary session is two solar years, beginning on the day on which the National Consultative Assembly is opened.

Art. 51.—The travelling expenses of the deputies from the electoral district to Tehran and back shall be paid to them by the Government at the rate of 5 krans a farsakh. The necessary expenses pertaining to the elections shall be paid by the Government, with the knowledge of the local governors.

Art. 52.—If ever a member of the National Consultative Assembly should resign or die, and more than three months remain of the session, the people of the place (his constituency) shall elect (another representative) in his place, but if the people of the place (his constituency) have not elected their own representative within three months from the date of notice, the National Assembly shall elect a person in the place of the representative who has died or resigned.

Art. 53.—Three months before the expiration of every session the Government shall give notice of a general election, and the people may, if they desire, re-elect any of their previous representatives.

The Electoral Law, which is composed of fifty-three articles, was passed by a majority of fifty-two votes at the sitting of the 28th Shaval, 1329 (22nd October, 1911).

HUSSEIN, MOTAMIN-UL-MULK.

President of the National Consultative Assembly.

This Electoral Law of the National Consultative Assembly is brought to my notice by virtue of articles 17 and 33 of the Fundamental Law. On this 12th day (4th November, 1911), at sunset, this law was for the first time brought to me through the Ministry of the Interior, and as there was no time to read it, it was at once given to the Ministry of the Interior in order to cause no delay.

NASR-UL-MULK, NAIB-ES-SULTANEH.

12th of Zikadeh, 1329 (4th November, 1911).

In accordance with the commands of His Highness the Regent, it is put into execution.

KAWAM-ES-SULTANEH,

Minister of the Interior.

12th of Zikadeh, 1329 (4th November, 1911).

SCHEDULE OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS.

Names of Provinces and Districts.	Names of Subsidiary Places in the District.	Number of Representatives.	Centre of Electoral District.
Azerbaijan (19 persons.)	Tabreez, &c.	9	Tabreez.
	Ardebil, &c.	2	Ardebil.
	Karachedagh, &c.	1	Ahar.
	Serab, &c.	1	Serab.
	Maragha, &c.	2	Maragha.
	Soujboulak, &c.	1	Soujboulak.
	Urmia, &c.	1	Urmia.
Astrabad (1 person.)	Khoi, &c.	2	Khoi.
	Astrabad, &c.	1	Astrabad.
Ispahan (5 persons.)	Ispahan, &c.	3	Ispahan.
	Kumishah, &c.	1	Kumishah.
	Fereidun, &c.	1	Nejefabad.
Luristan (4 persons.)	Burujird, &c.	2	Burujird.
	Khoremad, &c.	2	Khoremad.
Khorassan (15 persons.)	Meshed, &c.	4	Meshed.
	Kelat, &c.	1	Derrejez.
	Turshiz, &c.	1	Sultanabad.
	Sabzevar, &c.	2	Sabzevar.
	Turbat, &c.	1	Turbat.
	Nishapur, &c.	1	Nishapur.
	Kuchan, &c.	1	Kuchan.
	Bujnurd, &c.	1	Bujnurd.
	Tabbas, &c.	1	Tun.
	Kainat, &c.	1	Birjand.
Khamsah (3 persons.)	Seistan, &c.	1	Seistan.
	Zenjan, &c.	3	Zenjan.
	Semnan, &c.	1	Semnan.
Saveh and Zarand (1 person.)	Saveh, &c.	1	Saveh.
Shahrud (1 person.)	Shahrud, &c.	1	Shahrud.
Tehran (15 persons.)	Tehran, &c.	12	Tehran.
	Ghar, &c.	1	Shahabdulazim.
	Khar, &c.	1	Aivanikeif.
	Shahriz, &c.	1	Kurdan.

Names of Provinces and Districts.	Names of Subsidiary Places in the District.	Number of Representatives	Centre of Electoral District.
Demavend (1 person.)	Demavend, &c.	1	Demavend.
Irak (2 persons.)	Sultanabad, &c.	2	Sultanabad.
Arabistan (4 persons.)	Dizful, &c.	1	Dizful.
	Shushter, &c.	1	Shushter.
	Mohammerah, &c.	1	Mohammerah.
	Beni Truf, &c.	1	Beni Truf.
Fars (13 persons.)	Shiraz, &c.	5	Shiraz.
	Fassa, &c.	1	Fassa.
	Abadeh, &c.	1	Abadeh.
	Behbahan, &c.	1	Behbahan.
	Bushire, &c.	2	Bushire.
	Lar, &c.	1	Lar.
	Abbasi, &c.	1	Abbasi.
	Jahrum, &c.	1	Jahrum.
	Kazvin, &c.	2	Kazvin.
Kazvin (2 persons.)			
Kashan (2 persons.)	Kashan, &c.	2	Kashan.
Kurdistan (4 persons.)	Senneh, &c.	3	Senneh.
	Sakkis, &c.	1	Sakkis.
Kermanshah (4 persons.)	Kermanshah, &c.	4	Kermanshah.
Gerrus (1 person.)	Bijar, &c... .. .	1	Bijar.
Kerman and Baluchistan (7 persons.)	Kerman, &c.	2	Kerman.
	Rafsinjan, &c.	1	Rafsinjan.
	Sirjan, &c.	1	Sirjan.
	Rayin, &c.	1	Bam.
	Jiruft, &c.	1	Jiruft.
	Baluchistan, &c... .. .	1	Ghohrij.
Gulpaigan (2 persons.)	Gulpaigan, &c.	1	Gulpaigan.
	Kemereh, &c.	1	Mahallat.
Ghilan (6 persons.)	Resht, &c.	2	Resht.
	Enzeli, &c.	1	Enzeli.
	Khamseh, &c.	1	Kergaurud.
	Fomen, &c.	1	Fomen.
	Lahijan, &c.	1	Lahijan.
Mazanderan (5 persons.)	Sari, &c.	2	Sari.
	Barfrush, &c.	3	Barfrush.
Malayir (2 persons.)	Malayir, &c.	2	Dowletabad.
Hamadan (2 persons.)	Hamadan, &c.	2	Hamadan.
Yezd (4 persons.)	Yezd, &c.	3	Yezd.
	Nain, &c... .. .	1	Nain.
Tribes (5 persons.)	Bakhtiari	1	} To be fixed by the Ministry of the Interior.
	Shahsevan	1	
	Turkomans	1	
	Kashgai	1	
	Khamseh	1	
Other religious denomi- ations (4 persons.)	Armenians of Azerbaijan and Chaldæans	1	} Ditto.
	Armenians of the South	1	
	Parsees	1	
	Jews	1	

No. 298.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 24, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that before the expiry of the time allowed by the Russian Government for the satisfaction of their demands in connection with the taking possession of the Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties (*i.e.*, 48 hours, though this period was not expressly mentioned to the Persian Government), the remnant of the Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had resigned. M. Poklewski was

therefore in some doubt as to how to act on his instructions, which he received on the 14th instant, to break off relations with the Cabinet. He telegraphed to his Government that if the new Cabinet when formed did not forthwith satisfy the two demands—*i.e.*, tender a formal apology and substitute Persian Cossacks on the properties in question for the Treasury gendarmes—he would break off relations with it. In reply, he was instructed to break off relations at once. His Government had informed him as to the measures they contemplated in the event of the Persian Government's refusing to satisfy the two demands. These measures were the dispatch of a Russian force to Kazvin to permit of a detachment's being summoned by him to Tehran to remove the Treasury gendarmes from Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties, and M. Poklewski had recommended that, in order to make sure of the attainment of the object in view, a force of 4,000 men should be sent. M. Poklewski was now informed that orders had been given to the Caucasus authorities to dispatch these troops.

On the 18th November the Russian Minister carried out his instructions, sending his chief dragoman to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to say that his relations with the Government were severed, and that for the conduct of current affairs communications were to be addressed to his staff. He added that troops were being dispatched.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh, who though he had resigned was still carrying on the affairs of his Ministry, at once sent his "chef de cabinet," Moin-el-Vezireh, to beg me to convey to you an appeal from the Persian Government to mediate at St. Petersburg with a view to suspending the dispatch of troops. Moin-el-Vezireh stated that a Cabinet was on the eve of formation, and assured me that all indications pointed to the new Ministry's giving prompt satisfaction to Russia's two demands. On the 20th, Moin-el-Vezireh again visited me, and stated that if the Persian Government were assured that the troops would be withdrawn on the satisfaction of the two demands, and that their presence would not be used to put forward other demands, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would apologise as soon as the Cabinet was formed, and the gendarmes would be withdrawn from Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties and be replaced by Persian Cossacks. I notice that a similar communication was on the same day made to you by the Persian Minister in London when he asked, on behalf of his Government, for the advice of His Majesty's Government.

On the receipt of the instructions contained in your telegram of the 20th November, I let the Persian Government know verbally and by *pro-memoriâ* that His Majesty's Government had reason to believe that, if they satisfied the two demands, the Russian troops would be withdrawn, and I added that it would be wiser for the Persian Government to comply without loss of time. I made this communication on the morning of the 21st, and the same evening Vosuk-ed-Dowleh sent me a message that Samsam-es-Sultaneh had at last formed his Cabinet, which would be presented on the following day. Moin-el-Vezireh who brought me the message was to ask me to express to you the gratitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs for your good offices and advice. He was to add that my communication had been discussed by the members of the new Cabinet and by the prominent deputies of the Medjliss, with the result that it had been decided that after the Cabinet had been presented to the Medjliss on the following day, the two demands would be satisfied forthwith.

The Cabinet was introduced to the Medjliss in a somewhat incomplete form on the 22nd November, and Moin-el-Vezireh called in the evening to say that the Vosuk-ed-Dowleh, who had resumed his portfolio but had been, owing to indisposition, unable to attend at the Medjliss, hoped to be well enough to tender the formal apology on the following day, and that the gendarmes would be replaced by Cossacks as soon as possible.

Early on the 24th I received a further letter from Moin-el-Vezireh, asking me when the Russian Minister would receive the formal apology from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and stating that Persian Cossacks had already replaced the Treasury gendarmes on Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property. An appointment for Vosuk-ed-Dowleh's visit was made for the afternoon, and at 2:30 he called on the Russian Minister in his official robes and tendered the desired apology. By this time the Treasury gendarmes on the principal property had already been replaced by Persian Cossacks, and parties of the latter force had been dispatched to take over the properties in the suburbs.

After receiving the apology of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Russian Minister told his Excellency that he was authorised to resume relations with the Cabinet, but that, in view of the delay which had occurred in complying with his Government's two demands and in view of the fact that some of the Russian troops had already landed, he did not think that his Government would be entirely satisfied by the reparation accorded. They would probably present further demands, and this was all the more

likely, seeing that since the presentation of the original demands Mr. Shuster had given further provocation by distributing among the public in Persia translations of his recent open letter to the press.

I enclose a copy of a letter which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd instant, and of his Excellency's reply and my rejoinder.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 298.

Sir G. Barclay to Moin-el-Vezireh.

My dear Moin-el-Vezireh,

Tehran, November 23, 1911.

EVERY moment's delay renders the chance of the withdrawal of the troops less.

I am, therefore, intensely surprised that the gendarmes have not already been replaced by Persian Cossacks.

The indisposition of Vosuk-ed-Dowleh was most unfortunate, and I wish he had been able to apologise yesterday.

Yours, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 298.

Moin-el-Vezireh to Sir G. Barclay.

My dear Minister,

Tehran, November 23, 1911.

I HASTEN to state, in reply to your letter of this morning, that we have lost no time in acting upon the advice of your Government to comply with the Russian demands, on the express understanding that the Russian troops will be withdrawn forthwith.

The real and personal properties will have been taken over this evening and the gendarmes relieved by Persian Cossacks.

Vosuk-ed-Dowleh is still waiting to hear from your Excellency at what time he can execute proposal No. 2. I am glad to say that he is better to-day.

Yours, &c.

HUSSEIN KHAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 298.

Sir G. Barclay to Moin-el-Vezireh.

My dear Moin-el-Vezireh,

Tehran, November 23, 1911.

I MUST, in reply to your note just received, point out that there is no express understanding that the Russian troops will be withdrawn forthwith.

You will remember that the phrase used was "have reason to believe," which exactly expressed the state of the case at mid-day on Tuesday.

As soon as the Russian Minister learns from Colonel Vadbolski that the gendarmes have been replaced by Persian Cossacks, he will be ready to receive the Minister for Foreign Affairs in "khilaat" for the apology.

Yours, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 299.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 25, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the engagement reported in that despatch in the neighbourhood of Bander Gez seems to have been more serious than at first appeared, a Government force of some 600 men having been completely defeated by the ex-Shah's brother Shoa-es-Sultaneh and 700 Turkomans. I have no more recent information on which I can rely,

but the whole district of Astrabad appears to have fallen back into the ex-Shah's hands.

The situation at Tabreez has been somewhat relieved, Shuja-ed-Dowleh having allowed several of the roads leading to the town to be opened for the importation of provisions, in order, it is believed, that the villagers should be enabled to sell their produce, and thus be a more profitable prey to his exactions. A deputation of the townspeople visited him at Basminch to open negotiations a week or two ago, but these have led to nothing, and he still threatens the town with a force of some 1,500 men. There was talk at one time of sending troops from Tehran to deal with him, but, so far, these plans have not materialised.

Salar-ed-Dowleh was pursued into Luristan by the Bakhtiari under Sardar Bahadur, who, according to reports received by the Government, inflicted a second defeat on him in the neighbourhood of Burujird on or about the 16th November. He had with him at the time some 2,000 horsemen, 500 of whom are reported to have been killed or wounded. His present whereabouts is unknown.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 300.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 27, 1911.

IN my despatch of the 31st October I alluded to the possibility of the increase in our consular escorts making its moral effects felt in a diminution of disorder on the southern roads.

So far this seems to have been the case as regards the Shiraz-Bushire road, as, except for the robbery on the 4th November of a small caravan of local produce and telegraph stores at the hands of Kashgais near Kazerun, and the attack on the caravan conveying the two Japanese reported in my telegram of the 20th November, no robberies have been reported to me since the two squadrons of Indian cavalry left Bushire on the 2nd instant, and a telegram received to-day from the acting consul at Shiraz states that ordinary caravans are moving fairly freely, though the authorities profess themselves unable to provide guards for the passage of caravans conveying specie, which is urgently needed by the Imperial Bank of Persia at Shiraz.

At the same time it was thought necessary that the sepoy leaving Ispahan on their return to India should not travel alone between Kazerun and Bushire, in consequence of a report from Mr. Vice-Consul Chick, who accompanied the cavalry as far as Kazerun, and on his way south had an opportunity of gauging the effect on the local tribal chiefs of the passage of our troops. He stated that the chiefs were considerably exercised as regards the question of "rahdari," or illegal road tax, which culminated on one occasion in an imprudent road guard firing off his rifle to intimidate one of the muleteers belonging to the troops' caravan. His rifle and those of the other tufangchis were confiscated. This incident and the inaccurate reports in local newspapers of the future intentions of the British Government as regards the employment of the troops as caravan escorts seems to have put the khans in a dangerous temper.

As regards the Shiraz-Ispahan road there is no improvement to report, His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan reporting on the 11th November that on the Shiraz road there was practically no caravan traffic, and repeating the same remark on the 18th November. One caravan on its way to Kumisheh was attacked near Orchini Pass by Kuhgeluis. On the 8th November the merchants of Ispahan telegraphed to the Minister of the Interior protesting against the insecurity of the roads in general.

The Bakhtiari road continues in a very unsatisfactory condition, but severe cold with a corresponding decrease of robbers is setting in.

Large arrivals of merchandise formerly abandoned on the road are now reported.

An attack on a caravan of 150 camels chartered by Messrs. Lynch occurred at Malamir during the month, and on the 8th instant, near Gav Peeseh, two bags containing the whole of the kit of two sowar reliefs proceeding to the Ispahan consulate were stolen, the value of which I shall claim from the Persian Government as soon as I have received particulars.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 301.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 28, 1911.

THE past few weeks have been a period of protracted crisis, and Samsam-es-Sultaneh is still as far as ever from achieving that desideratum on which the Regent has always laid such stress—a strong Cabinet backed by a stable majority in the Medjliss.

As reported in my telegram of the 14th instant, the remnant of the Cabinet, composed only of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on the 13th instant. For weeks past Samsam-es-Sultaneh had been vainly endeavouring to fill the vacant posts, but he could not induce the Medjliss to accept his candidates. The post over which there was the greatest difficulty was that of Minister of the Interior, which the Medjliss insisted should be resumed by Kawam-es-Sultaneh, who had left the Cabinet owing to dissensions with the Prime Minister. Kawam-es-Sultaneh is an advanced democrat, and is more than ever unacceptable to Samsam-es-Sultaneh as a candidate for the Ministry of the Interior now that the elections are impending. It was, I believe, the difficulties Samsam-es-Sultaneh found in completing his Cabinet more than the Russian ultimatum which led him to resign.

For ten days there was no Cabinet at all, and the Ministry, which Samsam-es-Sultaneh at length on the 22nd instant introduced to the Medjliss, only consisted of four members. It was introduced in this incomplete form in order not further to delay satisfaction of the two Russian demands in connection with the incident at Shoa-es-Sultaneh's properties. Up to now the vacant posts have not been filled, the Medjliss still stubbornly refusing the candidates proposed by Samsam-es-Sultaneh. The artificial moderate majority in that assembly has disappeared, and the democrats, who have been joined by a section of the Medjliss which had hitherto wavered between the two parties, now appear to command a majority.

No. 302.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 302.

*Summary of Events in Persia for the month of November.**Tehran.*

The Cabinet.—After repeated crises, and considerable opposition on the part of a section of the Medjliss to the inclusion of Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh, the Cabinet was completed on the 29th November as follows:—

Premier and Minister of the Interior	...	Samsam-es-Sultaneh.
Minister for Foreign Affairs	...	Vosuk-ed-Dowleh.
Minister for War	...	Sardar Mohtashem.
Minister for Finance	...	Zoka-ul-Mulk.
Minister for Public Instruction	...	Mushir-ed-Dowleh.
Minister for Posts and Telegraphs	...	Moazed-es-Sultaneh.
Minister for Justice	...	Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh.

The Medjliss.—On the 31st October a Bill was passed abolishing the pensions and allowances of those who had risen against the Government since the general amnesty of 1909, and on the 9th November a further Bill was passed abolishing the pensions of

well-known reactionaries to the extent of 18,785 tomans a-year, while certain other pensions were reduced.

On the 2nd November a Bill was passed authorising the employment of ten more American officials for the Ministry of Finance, and a credit of 24,900 dollars a-year for their pay was voted.

At this sitting an important letter addressed to the Medjliss by the Regent was read, in which His Highness threatened to resign if certain conditions were not fulfilled. A translation of this letter is annexed. Telegrams from Tabreez, Resht, Meshed, and some other towns, urging the Medjliss to prolong its session, were read at the same sitting, and after considerable debate on the 12th and 13th, a majority of 46 out of 69 votes decided, on the 13th November, that the session should be prolonged until just over half the members of the new Medjliss are in Tehran. The two years' session of the Medjliss came to an end on the 14th November.

A committee was chosen to discuss matters with the Regent in connection with his proposed resignation, and presented a report to the Medjliss which, however, was not read in public. The committee stated that in view of the Regent's indisposition it was proposed that he should go to Europe on short leave after the formation of a Cabinet.

On the 22nd November Samsam-es-Sultaneh presented three Cabinet Ministers by letter including Vosuk-ed-Dowleh as Foreign Minister, and on the 29th November, after a stormy debate, the Cabinet was completed as reported above, forty-one deputies supporting it and eighteen rejecting it.

Russian Demands.—The Russian demands regarding Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property were first delivered to the Persian Government on the 11th November. On the 23rd November the Treasury guards were removed from the property, and the following day the Foreign Minister tendered the desired apology to the Russian Minister.

On the 29th November the Russian Minister presented Russia's ultimatum demanding Mr. Shuster's dismissal within forty-eight hours.

Miscellaneous.—On the 28th October Sardar Jang arrived at Tehran from Hamadan and Amir Mufakham from Sultanabad.

On the 3rd November Mr. Shuster sent Treasury guards to collect certain taxes from Ala-ed-Dowleh, who at once complained to the Prime Minister. Amir Mujahid and Sardar Jang accompanied Ala-ed-Dowleh back to his house and disarmed the Treasury guards. The Prime Minister eventually apologised to Mr. Shuster, and the incident was closed.

Farman Farma left Tehran for Tabreez as Governor-General on the 4th November.

A translation of Mr. Shuster's letter to the "Times" was circulated largely at Tehran on the 12th November, a few days after it appeared in London.

Prices continue to rise, and bread is very dear.

His Highness the Regent to the President of the Medjliss.

November 11, 1911.

I transmit to you a memorandum which I request you to submit to the careful consideration of the members of the Medjliss. As you are fully aware of the present state of affairs, I am sure you will agree that I am justified in sending this memorandum, and, in requesting you to explain it fully to the deputies, I hope that it will produce a satisfactory result.

To the National Assembly :

As the deputies are fully aware of the present state of affairs, any explanation is superfluous. I need only say that, as you are fully aware, for some time past the Cabinet has been incomplete and practically on the point of dissolution. Although the services rendered by His Highness Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the Premier, are well known to the State and nation, he has been so hampered by repeated crises and want of co-operation that he actually decided to hand in his resignation, which I have prevented him from doing. But it is obvious that without the formation and completion of the Cabinet, as well as the necessary co-operation, he cannot put his good intentions into execution.

As a general election is at hand and troubles are apprehended next spring, it is obvious that if a Cabinet is not formed at once with the necessary co-operation of the

Medjliss and does not put into execution a properly drawn up programme for the maintenance of security in the country—on which the carrying out of the elections greatly depends—and the prevention of trouble in the spring, and if the Medjliss does not approve of the measures proposed for the maintenance of order, it will be extremely difficult at this critical juncture to feel assured that the necessary measures for the prevention of future difficulties will be carried out.

Under these circumstances, I need only point out the importance of the occasion and to express the hope that the Medjliss will give its full support to the Premier in his task of forming and completing the Cabinet and of drawing up a programme.

Furthermore, I consider it necessary to say that, as I stated in my telegrams from Europe, the support of everyone is necessary to a constitutional Regent and that party differences cause obstruction and bring about crises, and that therefore, seeing that tranquillity is absolutely essential under the present circumstances, such crises are detrimental to the interests of the country.

At the time when I went through certain legal formalities at the Medjliss, I stated that if discord should unfortunately bring about further confusion in affairs, I would not be able to continue to witness such an unfortunate state of affairs. But as from three months ago the signs of discord, and even of imputations against the Regency, which should be respected by all, became apparent—as is well known to all the deputies—I at that time decided to resign the Regency. As, however, troubles of a most serious nature supervened, I had patience, and postponed the carrying out of my resolve lest it should be thought that I had been indifferent to my responsibilities. But in order that this matter should not take place unexpectedly without any preparations having been made, I took measures, during the last few days, to ask the deputies to consult with the authorities, and to take such measures as they may consider advisable. I therefore remind the Medjliss that if serious measures are not taken in this matter, I shall find myself forced to carry my decision into effect without any further preliminaries, and to make the matter public. At the time of my going through the legal formalities at the Medjliss, I declared that no conscientious person could hold me responsible for this act, and in trying to put an end to discord, I have made superhuman efforts, but I regret to say that they have proved vain.

In my opinion, the deputies are responsible to the public, and it is incumbent upon them to devote their whole energies to the carrying out of these important affairs. They must not look upon themselves as freed from their responsibilities until they have arrived at a satisfactory solution of these difficulties.

In conclusion, I must again insist on the importance of the occasion—on the essential need of giving effect to the above-mentioned objects, and on the evil consequences of their neglect. I point out my freedom from responsibility, and by doing my duty and drawing your attention to the above matters I liberate my conscience of all further obligation.

Tabreez.

There is no improvement in the situation at Tabreez. The investment of the town by Shuja-ed-Dowleh, at the head of some 2,000 followers, continues.

The state of affairs in the town is very serious, and several of the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages have taken "bast" in the country seat of the Russian consul-general, as a protest against the miseries they are suffering. The townspeople have failed to come to terms with the Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and are powerless to relieve the situation unless the Government at Tehran intervenes. The presence of the Russian troops is, apparently, the only assurance for the maintenance of tranquillity. The Cossack battalion, which has fallen below strength owing to the departure of time-expired men, is to be relieved by a fresh battalion.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

The British consular agent at Astrabad reports that Mohamed Ali is still at Khoja Nafas. Also that the Turkomans attacked the town on the 11th November, killing forty-seven men and capturing thirty-five, and that owing to their presence in the vicinity of Astrabad, large numbers of the inhabitants are taking refuge in the Russian consulate.

The Russian consular guard at Astrabad is to be strengthened by 200 Cossacks with two quick-firing guns, with a view to protecting Russian lives and property.

The following Russian troops had arrived at Resht by the 27th November: 300 Cossacks, 1,720 infantry and artillery; total, 2,020, with 8 guns and 6 machine-guns.

Meshed.

Rukn-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General-elect of Khorassan, has not yet arrived.

Nayer-ed-Dowleh is still endeavouring to induce the Government at Tehran again to separate Nishapur from Khorassan.

Meshed itself is not in a disturbed state, but the roads in the vicinity are infested by robbers.

Ispahan.

The discontent in the town, owing to the dearness of provisions, is increasing. The province is in its normal state of insecurity, owing to the presence of Bakhtiari and Kuhgelui raiders. This state of affairs is adding to the unpopularity of the governor, Sardar Ashja. The chief merchants, who have protested to Tehran against the insecurity of the roads, would probably welcome the advent of even foreign troops for the policing the roads.

The appointment of Mr. E. C. Haycock, a British subject, as agent to the treasurer-general, is giving evident satisfaction to the masses in Ispahan. The Governor-General, the former Treasury agent, and the clergy have failed in their attempts to organise any opposition to Mr. Haycock.

Recruiting for the Treasury gendarmerie has commenced, and by the 11th November twenty-nine men had been enrolled.

One squadron of Indian cavalry left Abadeh for Ispahan on the 27th November.

Yezd.

Amir Azem, the new Governor of Kerman, is failing to restore order and punish the participators in the recent disturbances in a satisfactory manner.

The Taftis and other banditti infest the country, and render the roads unsafe. The telegraph wire has also been wrecked on several occasions.

The Parsees, whose business is being carried on under increasing difficulties and losses, are apparently desirous of foreign intervention.

Shiraz.

Ala-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General-elect of Fars, has not yet left Tehran.

On the 29th October a caravan from Ispahan for Shiraz was looted near Khani-khorreh, and Dr. Ross, who was travelling with it, was ill-treated and lost all her personal effects. She managed to reach Abadeh. On resuming her journey she was robbed a second time, and had to return to Abadeh.

On the 23rd November two squadrons of Indian cavalry reached Abadeh. One proceeds to Ispahan, and one escorts Miss Ross to Shiraz leaving on the 27th instant.

On the night of the 24th-25th November, a band of thieves attacked a garden near the consulate, a brisk fusillade being kept up for some time.

Two squadrons of Indian cavalry arrived at Shiraz on the 12th-13th November. There were no noteworthy incidents on the road.

Several robberies are reported, but on the whole the state of unrest at Shiraz and district seems to be decreasing.

Seistan.

The state of the roads in Seistan and the Kainat is quiet, but caravans cannot travel without strong escorts.

Kerman.

The condition of the province of Kerman remains the same as reported in last month's summary.

The number of Baluchi robber bands is increasing, especially in the neighbourhood of Bam.

One Nifat-i-Nizam, who has great influence with the Baluchis, is attempting to alienate men employed by the telegraph department.

Kermanshah.

His Majesty's consul reports that the situation is growing worse in Kermanshah, and that robberies are so frequent that he is placing British flags on warehouses containing British goods.

Luristan.

Official reports to the Central Government announce the defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh by the Bakhtiari force under Sardar Bahadur on the 15th November, near Burujird. Salar-ed-Dowleh is reported to have lost about 500 killed and wounded and the Bakhtiaris about 50.

Bushire.

Tangistan is the chief centre of unrest where skirmishes between the followers of local headmen are of frequent occurrence.

Ahwaz.

The working of the telegraph line has been very unsatisfactory during the past month, and great inconvenience and loss has been caused to British firms at Ahwaz and Mohammerah. Extensive repairs are necessary.

During the first week in October one caravan left for Ispahan; since then the road has been closed as the Bakhtiari guards have fled owing to the prevalence of cholera. There appears to be no hope of reducing the accumulation of goods at Ahwaz, and Messrs. Lynch Brothers are making arrangements for storing during the rainy season.

Bunder Abbas.

Five large caravans left for Kerman and Lar during the first week in October. Other trade routes are infested by several small parties of robbers, and no serious measures are ever taken against them by the local authorities.

No. 303.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 18, 1911.

RUSSIAN Bank manager at Hamadan, who is also Russian consul, reports that Russian lives and property are in danger. Russian Minister is accordingly sending 100 Russian Cossacks from Kazvin to Hamadan.

No. 304.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 18, 1911.

CONVEYS substance of the following despatch, dated the 19th December:—

Sir,

I had the honour to receive on the 17th instant your telegram of the previous day, informing me of a further appeal made to you by the Persian Minister on the subject of the Russian demands, and of the reply which you had given. I communicated the substance of your telegram to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by a private letter.

Yesterday, as I was prevented by indisposition from leaving the house, Mr. O'Beirne called by appointment on M. Sazonow in my stead and enquired what decision the Russian Government had reached with regard to the second of their demands. M. Sazonow stated that they had decided to accept the formula proposed by the Persian Government with the modification which I had suggested in my conversation with him on the 14th instant; so that the concluding passage of the declaration to be made by the Persian Government would now run, "would enter into an exchange of

views for the purpose of arriving at an understanding," &c.—or would be in terms to that effect. His Excellency added that the necessary instructions on the subject had been sent to M. Poklewski very shortly after my conversation with him.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 305.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 17th December: Imperial Bank, Shiraz.

In the exceptional circumstances, you are authorised to allow caravan to accompany acting consul to Shiraz.

No. 306.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 19, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 17th December.

The Cabinet laid two alternative proposals before the Medjliss yesterday:—

1. That the Medjliss should give the Cabinet full powers to settle the Russo-Persian dispute.
2. That the Cabinet should be assisted in their task by a committee of the Medjliss; no further reference to be made then to the Medjliss.

Only five deputies voted for either of these proposals; twenty-six voted against.

As thirty-four deputies abstained from voting, the proportion of voting members did not constitute a quorum, and the votes on the proposals were therefore non-effective.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then recommended that a new Cabinet be formed to deal with the dangerous situation which had arisen.

I am informed that the president of the Medjliss sent for the democrats at the close of the sitting and gave them a severe lecture.

The Medjliss will, I understand, sit again to-day.

No. 307.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 19, 1911.

SHIRAZ boycott.

Please see my telegram of the 17th December.

Certain supplies being urgently needed, the supply officer went in person yesterday morning to the bazaar to obtain them, but shop-keepers refused to sell. Acting consul and Douglas consulted as to course to pursue, result of which was that supply officer was sent back to the bazaar with another officer and twenty men. Their orders were that, in the event of meeting with another refusal, supplies needed were to be taken quietly and receipts left for the goods taken.

Acting consul now reports that this demonstration was entirely successful; supplies were obtained, no incident occurred, and no protests were made.

No. 308.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

St Petersburg, December 19, 1911.

M. SAZONOW states in a private letter to Mr. O'Beirne that should it be found necessary to move the troops beyond Kazvin, further notice will be given to the Persian Government before orders for the advance are given.

No. 309.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 19, 1911.

I HAVE received the following telegram from the British acting consul-general at Bagdad:—

“Serious loss and the greatest embarrassment are being caused here to British merchants and trade owing to the trade routes from Bagdad into Persia having been practically closed for the last two months.

“A quarter of a million pounds worth of British goods are accumulated here at the present moment, the annual value of British trade representing over 1,000,000*l.* Does your Excellency think that there is any chance of the trade routes being soon opened?”

No. 310.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1911.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 14th instant and communicated to Mr. Mallet the contents of a telegram from his Government to the effect that they had replied to the Russian Government by acceding to the demands of the latter, on condition that (1) some modification were made in the article respecting the engagement of foreign advisers, for which they suggested a formula, which was apparently the one mentioned in your telegram of the 13th December; (2) the amount of the indemnity and the mode of payment were fixed; (3) the Russian troops were withdrawn from Kazvin immediately after the demands had been accepted; (4) no further demands were made; (5) facilities were at once afforded by the Russian and British banks for supplying the Persian Government with money; and (6) the purchase of arms was at once facilitated.

The Minister explained that the last two conditions were necessitated by the situation which would arise if the Russian demands were granted.

Mehdi Khan further expressed the desire to know my views respecting the reply, and whether I would urge the Russian Government to accept the Persian Government's conditions, which were their last word.

He was informed, in reply, that I was not disposed to press the Russian Government further in the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 311.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 20, 1911.

SITUATION at Yezd.

Several members of the British community at Yezd, which is composed principally of women and children, have represented to British vice-consul there that local authorities would be unable to afford adequate protection to foreigners in the event of troubles. He has also been approached by the Parsis with a request for assistance.

Vice-consul, however, is of opinion that the foreign community is not at present in any danger.

I would propose to send a portion of the Ispahan consular guard to Yezd in the event of danger to foreigners becoming imminent. The distance between Ispahan and Yezd would be covered in four days.

No. 312.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 20, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 19th instant.

There was some doubt from the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Medjliss whether the Cabinet had tendered its resignation or not. I am now informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that it has not resigned, as the Medjliss had not been able to elaborate any new combination of Ministers.

No. 313.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 20, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 19th December: Trade routes into Persia from Bagdad.

You may reply that apparently there is no such prospect at present.

No. 314.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 21, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 19th instant.

The Medjliss held a public sitting late last night, at which the second alternative proposal reported in my above-mentioned telegram was voted. Five members will be chosen to act as an advisory committee to the Cabinet.

No. 315.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 21, 1911.

PLEASE see your telegram of the 15th instant.

Lecoffre appears to have no claim on the Persian Government, as he had no contract when employed at the Ministry of Finance prior to his appointment to Tabreez. Nor did Shuster give him a contract.

I am told that Shuster is taking steps on his behalf.

As soon as Lecoffre arrives in Tehran I will consult with him as to his future. I understand that he returns here shortly.

No. 316.

Messrs. Ziegler and Co. to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

Sir,

Manchester, December 21, 1911.

YOU are doubtless aware that a boycott was declared about a fortnight ago in Shiraz against British goods, and our friends informed us at the time by telegram that all business there had come to a standstill. We had hoped that this veto on English trade would not be of long duration, but we are extremely concerned to find, according to a message which we have just received, that the boycott still continues. Our friends add that our customers are very dissatisfied; as native merchants continue selling from their stock there or from goods in course of transit, and they urge us to bring the matter immediately to your notice, stating further that the Persian Government must be held responsible for this further step in the direction of hampering British trade. We sincerely hope that you may see your way to bring such pressure

to bear as shall solve the present deadlock, and trusting that our appeal to you may prevent the threatened extinction of British trade in South Persia.

We have, &c.

PH. ZIEGLER AND Co.

No. 317.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

RUSSIAN Minister tells me that Persian Government yesterday informed him verbally that they accepted the three demands.

No. 318.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

MY telegram of 17th December.

His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah reports that Azam-ed-Dowleh, acting governor, has taken bast at consulate.

A later telegram reports arrival of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

No. 319.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telêgraphic.)

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

I HAVE received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, dated the 21st December :—

“ Russian consul informs me that a party of Russian soldiers were engaged in repairing a telephone line last night, when a member of a police patrol attacked one of them. The Russian fired and killed two of the patrol. Again this morning fedais fired at a Russian patrol and wounded one of them. General firing followed. The citadel, in which about 200 fedais are entrenched, is now being bombarded. When it is taken resistance will, I think, practically be at an end. In the meanwhile there is no danger to British subjects—apart from possible stray shots. Russian commandant has, however, been asked by Russian consul to see that foreigners are protected.

“ I think Russian troops are quite competent to deal with the situation: they received a few days ago a reinforcement of about 550 men from Ardebil.”

No. 320.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

TABREEZ incident.

Please see my telegram of this morning. I have received the following further telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, dated to-day :—

“ The Russians kept up the bombardment of the citadel from their camp at intervals during the whole of yesterday afternoon; the defenders returned the fire vigorously; the Russians made no attempt to capture it by direct assault. A good deal of desultory fighting took place in the streets near the Russian consulate up to about 4 o'clock; these streets were held by a mere handful of Russian troops. There has been no general disorder, in fact, the Persian population has remained perfectly quiet, and no Europeans have been molested so far as I have been able to ascertain at present. The Russians appear, however, to be having more difficulty in their task than might have been expected. Communication with the outlying members of the British

colony has been impossible. There was, however, even in the evening, no sign that Russian soldiers had been told off to protect the quarter which is chiefly occupied by British and German subjects, while the Russian consul-general was, since mid-day, cut off from communication with the Russian camp. Just before evening, however, I was able to assure myself that the Anglo-German quarter had not, so far as I could see, sustained any damage.

“The bombardment of the citadel was renewed early this morning, and is continuing at the present moment. The besieged do not, however, seem to be returning the fire so actively as they did yesterday.”

No. 321.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 22, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of to-day.

The “*chef de cabinet*” of the Minister of Foreign Affairs has just been sent to tell me that, having at length been able to overcome the difficulties in the way of complying with the Russian demands, the Persian Government have informed the Russian Legation that they accept the demands on the assurance that no new ones will be put forward; and that the Russian Government will immediately withdraw the expeditionary force from Persia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs trusts that, now that the Persian Government have accepted the demands, effect will be given to the promises made by His Majesty’s Government to the Persian Minister in London, to the effect that the good offices of the British Government would be lent with a view to bringing about a complete reconciliation between Russia and Persia and the establishment of friendly and normal relations between the two countries.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs states that he and his colleagues are determined not to swerve from the attitude of conciliation which they have shown in this matter, and he declares that the most strenuous efforts are being made to calm popular indignation, though their task is likely to be gravely impeded by the aggressive action of the Russians in Tabreez and Resht.

No. 322.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 23, 1911.

I HAVE received the following account from His Majesty’s vice-consul at Resht of an incident which has occurred there:—

“On the 21st December threats were exchanged between some sowars from Talieh and some Cossacks, who crossed each other in the street. Later on in the day Cossacks came to the Government House, said that shots had been fired from it, and searched the stables: they also searched the post and telegraph offices. Firing started suddenly, and at once became general. The escort of the Russian consul started firing on the Sabzmaidan. The immediate cause of the commotion is at present unascertainable. Three Cossacks and at least eight Persians were killed. The proximity of Moharrem makes the situation dangerous.”

The vice-consul also reports an affray at Enzeli on the 21st December, in which one Russian officer was wounded and ten Persians were killed.

No. 323.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 23, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of yesterday.

I am told by my Russian colleague that he has given no promise regarding presentation of new demands, and that the only assurances regarding the withdrawal of the expeditionary force are those referred to in my telegram of the 16th instant.

No. 324.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 23, 1911.

I ASKED M. Sazonow this afternoon about the fighting at Resht and Tabreez, and his Excellency said that the attacks of the fedais on the Russian troops had been made in the most treacherous manner, and had, moreover, been entirely unprovoked. A detachment of from 500 to 600 men would be sent from Julfa to reinforce the Russian troops at Tabreez.

The decision of the Russian Government would not, M. Sazonow assured me, be influenced in any way by these fresh incidents, but the expeditionary force would be withdrawn as soon as Shuster's dismissal had actually taken place and the Persian Government had confirmed in writing their verbal acceptance of the three Russian demands. His Excellency admitted that with regard to the Tabreez and Resht incidents the attitude of the Persian Government had been correct, and he said that these incidents must be regarded as a distinct question, having no connection with that which had occasioned the dispatch of the expeditionary force.

No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 23, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 20th December: Situation at Yezd.

You may act as proposed in case of real necessity and after consultation with colonel, but we view with misgiving further subdivision of cavalry regiment.

No. 326.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

TABREEZ incident.

Please see my telegram of the 22nd December.

I have received the following further information from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez:—

"Yesterday saw no cessation of the bombardment, and a very sharp fire was kept up for some hours between the roof of the Russian Consulate and a party of fedais posted at some little distance from the consulate. Though the bombardment has ceased on both sides this morning some Russians have been firing near the British Consulate, during which they killed a non-combatant Persian of the poorer class. I have informed my Russian colleague of this in order to prevent a repetition of such occurrences."

No. 327.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of this morning.

Telegraphic communication with Tabreez is interrupted, but the Russian Minister received a telegram late last night, reporting a continuance of the severe fighting. The Russian Consulate had been fired on; two Cossacks of the consular escort had been wounded and one officer killed.

Russian casualties in the general fighting are reported in Persian circles here to have been heavy, but as the Russian consul is unable to get into communication with the troops my Russian colleague has no recent information on this point.

No. 328.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 22nd instant.

The Russian Minister has to-day received a note from the Persian Government stating that they accept the three demands.

As regards the first demand, the note announces that the Government have removed Shuster and Lecoffre from their service.

The note asks that the second demand may be amended in the sense indicated in my telegram of the 13th instant, and in telegram of the 18th December from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

The note expresses the confident hope that now that the Persian Government have complied with the Russian demands, relations between the two countries will improve; that the Russian Government will immediately remove all traces of the measures which they found necessary to take for the execution of the demands and that Persia may in the future count on the support of the Russian Government.

My Russian colleague, in his reply, declares himself satisfied and accepts the amended wording of the second demand.

No. 329.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

A LARGE meeting of all classes was held at the palace this afternoon. The Regent was present, but, being indisposed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the meeting on his behalf. He said that the Government considered that the Medjliss obstructed them in their foreign relations and in the internal administration. He proposed that it should therefore be closed. The proposal was entirely unopposed and the Government have now issued a rescript terminating the present session.

The precincts of the Medjliss were peaceably cleared this afternoon and the gates closed.

So far as I can judge, Yeprem and the Bakhtiaris have the situation entirely in hand and the bazaars were reopened this afternoon, after having been closed for many days.

No. 330.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

SITUATION at Tehran.

An eyewitness informs me that the meeting at the Palace reported in my telegram of yesterday was by no means so large as I had been given to understand.

There was a meeting of protest in the bazaars this afternoon, but the police had no difficulty in dispersing it.

No. 331.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 23rd December.

I have received the following telegram, dated the 25th December, from His Majesty's vice-consul:—

“The strike at Enzeli has been terminated and the bazaar opened yesterday.

“The bazaar here at Resht remains closed. The Russians have searched houses

and mosques. Arms and ammunition have been removed from the arsenal to the Russian quarter, which is situated outside the town. All is quiet now, and I do not anticipate any further disturbance."

No. 332.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

Sir, *Tehran, January 10, 1912.*
I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from the acting British consul at Shiraz reviewing the events in Fars during the months of July and August.

This despatch, which gives an interesting description of the state of affairs at Shiraz during those months, has only just reached me owing to postal interruption.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 332.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Shiraz, September 7, 1911.*
I HAVE the honour to submit a review of events in Fars during the past two months. I regret that I have been led by the vain hope that this period might bring some definite modification in the state of affairs which could serve as a landmark for a clearer narrative, to delay so long the submission of this report, which will, I fear, only detail a monotony of chaos.

On the night of the 26th June the situation was further complicated by the departure of Intizam-el-Mamalek, the only male heir of the Kawami family. On receipt of the first news of this, Kawam-ul-Mulk sent through me a telephone message to the Kedkhoda of Sivend instructing him to detain his son there; two days later the message was delivered to Intizam-el-Mamalek himself, who returned to Shiraz on the night of the 30th June. The object and result of this escapade still remain equally obscure.

This incident was closely followed by another which has kindled an unprecedented conflagration in Fars. In the course of last autumn a party of Bulvardi villagers (a sedentary offshoot of a Kashgai tribe) had lost one of their number in a scuffle with Ali Akbar Dehbozorgi. Shortly after the occurrence Kawam, then acting governor, attempted to arrest Ali Akbar, who fled in the direction of Ispahan, and remained absent until the arrival of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, with whom he subsequently took service. The Bulvardis, after repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction of their blood feud, sent at the beginning of July a large number of women from their village to set their wrongs before the Adliyah, which gave them an assurance in the name of the Governor-General that full reparation would be made in four days' time. The men, however, were not satisfied with this, and on the fourth day came to town, about eighty strong, and installed themselves in the houses of some fellow-villagers near the Saadi (or north-eastern) gate. In the course of the night the Governor-General dispatched a force of police and others to arrest the brother of the murdered man, who was chiefly prosecuting the feud. The Bulvardis, however, refused to surrender him, and, after some ineffectual argument, exchanged shots with the police. On the next day the Bulvardis took possession of the town gate, strengthening their position with sangars, and from there gave out that they would leave as soon as Ali Akbar was handed over to them, but not before. No attempt was made to molest them during the day, but on the following night firing broke out generally through the town. This was, however, of a more or less inoffensive character, the Bulvardis and Governor-General's men merely shooting in the air to denote vigilance, and many of the inhabitants joining in from their roofs in accordance with a time-honoured convention by which the people imply dissatisfaction with their governor, and proclaim that the town is in a state of disorder. On the next morning Nizam-es-Sultaneh attempted to reassert his authority by blowing from a gun an elderly robber who had been in prison for many months, at the same time two of Kawam-ul-Mulk's cooks were led out to be hanged, under the accusation that they had not given the Governor-

General warning of Intizam-ul-Mamalek's intended departure, but were ultimately relieved.

Shortly after this the great majority of the more influential Mullahs took "bast" in a sacred building known as the "Seyyid Ali-ed-Din Hussein," situated in the south-eastern corner of the town. Of these Mullahs a considerable number had taken a prominent part in the anti-Kawami demonstrations of April and May. Their action was probably provoked by a wish to protest in self-defence against the high-handed action of the Governor-General which had recently culminated in the arrest of Zergham-es-Sherieh, the Imam Juma's grandson.

From all my investigations of the origin of these disturbances, I can only draw the conclusion that the outbreak was inspired by the personal grievance of the Bulvardis, who are of Kashgai stock, and in no way connected with Kawam's family. The complaint so frequently made that the Kawamis had called in tribesmen to their assistance is quite unjustifiable, since the only appearance of tribesmen in their quarter which has been noticed up to the present date was a flying visit by two Baharlu chiefs, who sent off a telegram addressed to the Regent, and signed by a number of their compeers, in which they begged assurances that a solution of Shiraz affairs would soon be reached, failing which they declared that they would come in force to restore order themselves.

After some ten days of general unrest, accompanied by incessant firing at night, Nizam-es-Sultaneh sent on the 17th July some of the leading merchants to treat with the Mullahs, who agreed to accept as conditions for their surrender a general amnesty and the exile of Ata-ed-Dowleh, Nasr-ul-Mulk, Beha-es-Sultaneh, and Moghis-ed-Dowleh. A few hours later the Governor-General's force, which had lately been reinforced by a considerable number of Kashgai villagers, made a concerted attack on three points of the eastern quarters, whence they were repulsed with a loss of about thirty killed. Following on this, Nizam-es-Sultaneh dispatched two small forces of cavalry to Servistan, where Kawam owns large estates. Meanwhile the Sorkhis and other Kashgai villagers had been actively employed in the pillage of the immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz, in the intervals of frequent attacks on the eastern quarters, and on the 23rd July a number of tribesmen arrived from Soulet-ed-Dowleh. One body of about sixty of these men even forced their way into a garden, occupied by Messrs. Ziegler's manager, in spite of the protests of the Persian guard, and were only with much difficulty persuaded to leave. After representations to the Governor-General half-a-dozen men were beaten in the presence of the consulate Mirza as satisfaction for this invasion of a British subject's domicile, but I have a strong suspicion that those thus punished were in no way connected with the incident.

About this time, since the lawlessness of the Kashgais showed every sign of increasing, I telegraphed, with your approval, to Soulet-ed-Dowleh pointing out how the Kashgais were behaving in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, requesting him to telegraph immediately to put a stop to this. Some days later I learned that Soulet had sent strong orders to his men not to pillage—which were completely disregarded—and about ten days after dispatch of my telegram I received a letter from him stating that he had done so. Attacks on the eastern quarters of the town still continue at short intervals and with complete insuccess, the Kashgais and their allies having lost, on their own confession, about 200 killed. The other party, remaining entirely on the defensive, have suffered far less severely, and have not as yet yielded a single foot of ground.

Since the outbreak of disorder in Shiraz the completest anarchy has prevailed in most of the outlying districts and particularly in those of Darab and Fesa, where the Baharlu and Mezidi Arabs, having captured a field-gun from a party of Government troops sent to collect taxes, proceeded to besiege the town of Fesa and devastate the neighbourhood, and at the same time gave it to be understood that they were preparing to come to Shiraz in force in order to protect a widow of Nasr-ed-Dowleh who is closely related to their chiefs. The fact of the two chiefs already mentioned actually coming in and dispatching their telegram to the Regent seems to give some support to their boast.

Throughout the course of these disturbances I have been frequently pressed by various parties to act as peacemaker, but I have been obliged to decline any association of the name of His Majesty's consulate with the overtures of any faction in Fars. At the same time, however, I have used as far as possible my influence both with Nizam-es-Sultaneh and Kawam-ul-Mulk in the direction of a peaceful settlement, having, while urging general moderation on the former, pointed out to him privately more than once the objections to his persisting in violent measures only calculated to exasperate a resistance which had already shown that it could not be overcome without the greatest

difficulty and considerable danger to the peaceful part of the population and to European interests, any damage to which could not but react most unpleasantly upon himself. Kawam too I have frequently warned of the prejudice resulting to his own position from any injudicious action of his family and on every occasion when I have requested it he has written to them in the terms I desired, and has also whenever any question of peace has come forward invariably urged upon his dependents to meet any advance in a conciliatory spirit. Since it has appeared to me most inexpedient that we should assume any degree of responsibility in connection with the quarrels of these parties, I have replied to all overtures that I have no authority to associate myself in any way with these negotiations.

In the matter of Kawam-ul-Mulk's departure from the consulate I regret to report that no tangible progress has yet been made. The statement of the Persian Government to the effect that they were satisfied with the assurances given for his safety was communicated to him on the 9th July. Kawam replied to this that the fact that Nizam-es-Sultaneh was then threatening to attack his family without provocation was proof of the worthlessness of his assurances, and added that he would voluntarily leave the consulate only on one of the following conditions:—

That the Persian Government should give an undertaking to farm his estates during his absence from Persia, and should pay his debts and serve him a pension out of the proceeds with the understanding that he should re-enter into possession on his return. That the Persian Government should give to you formal assurances (to be communicated by me to him in writing together with the statement that you were satisfied with their validity) that the lives and freedom of his family and the integrity of his estates will be respected. That if a Governor-General of Fars with no personal animosity towards himself be appointed, he is willing to give through me a written assurance that he will leave Persia for so long as the Government may direct without any guarantees.

Subsequently, when pressed by Nizam-es-Sultaneh for a statement on the subject of the assurances given to you by the Central Government, I told him the substance of the first two of these proposals, adding that I had informed you fully of their nature. After this Nizam-es-Sultaneh himself approached Kawam, promising him every guarantee for his safety. The latter has, however, confined himself to replying that any assurances on this count must reach him through the intermediary of His Majesty's Legation.

No further proposal was made until the 11th August, when Samsam-es-Sultaneh telegraphed to Kawam that the necessary guarantees for his safety would be given through the Regent and His Majesty's consulate; that, on his leaving Fars, he would be appointed Governor of Kerman and his son chief of the "five tribes," and that suitable security would be found for the safety of his estates. To this suggestion Kawam replied that it was indispensable that he should spend at least forty days in his own house before leaving the province, so that he might set in order his own affairs and those of the heirs of Nasr-ed-Dowleh.

From what little I have seen of the attitude of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, it seems tolerably certain that he is still ready to give every support he can to Nizam-es-Sultaneh, but his authority, which has now been waning for some eighteen months, appears this summer to have dwindled more rapidly than before, and quite recently a strong group of the chiefs of various tribes, headed by Mohamed Ali Khan, Kashkuli, Ayyaz Kikha, Darashuli, and Ahmed Khan, Shishbolooki, wrote formally to him declining in future to pay any further "malat," since that of the past three years had only gone to swell his coffers, and pointing out the reproach he had cast on the Kashgais as a whole by abetting Nizam in the murder of Nasr-ed-Dowleh. Taking into consideration the traditional loyalty of these tribesmen to their acknowledged ilkhani, such language can only be considered as most significant.

There seems thus at present no prospect of any improvement in the state of the province. The Governor-General has given every proof of his impotence to make any impression on the revolted quarters. He has consistently shown during his tenure of office here that his word can under no circumstances be relied on, and that the only consideration able to influence him is the direct anticipation of pecuniary gain. Thus it may reasonably be expected that his opponents will continue to remain quietly on the defensive until his dismissal may be successfully undertaken. There cannot, I think, be two opinions as to the urgency of removing a Governor-General whose sole intrigues have led to such formidable chaos, and who makes no secret of his revolutionary intentions; but the Persian Government, with their own more obvious troubles facing them, are no doubt in a most difficult position, and the ultimate

eventuality of their taking a strong line in this matter—which to my mind alone offers any hope of success—seems unfortunately remote. At the beginning of August the Government had, it appears, arrived as near as can reasonably be expected of them to some decision, and they had certainly gone far enough for the karguzar, Nizam himself, and his private secretary all to inform me that he had been officially recalled, and for the Prime Minister to telegraph officially in the same sense to the chief mujtehids and the commander of the forces; yet the inadequate measure of placing in charge of Fars at this juncture so flaccid a deputy governor as Yedullah Mirza could only entail the reinstatement of a Governor-General rendered doubly noxious by his incomplete disgrace.

To sum up this despatch, there are at present some 2,000 armed men, Kashgais, Dashtistanis, and villagers, with Nizam-es-Sultaneh in the western half of the town. In the eastern part there are about 1,000 townsmen and peasants from the neighbouring districts; collisions between these two parties ending in considerable bloodshed are of almost daily occurrence, and sufficient feuds have already resulted to keep the province in a ferment for a whole generation. Added to this the southward migration of the Kashgais is bringing nearer the arrival of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the possible renewal of his policy of last May; there is also a reasonable probability that the still wilder Khamseh tribesmen will take their share in the general medley, which, with a Governor-General approaching perilously near to open revolt, cannot but become more threatening. All these considerations seem to require that we should be prepared, in the absence of any competent Persian authority, to protect isolated British subjects in Shiraz against any possible aggression, which might either be the outcome of the general exasperation resulting from a prolonged faction fight or the desire of some party or individual to save their own life by an act calculated to provoke intervention.

Thus the present situation appears to me not only pregnant with unpleasant possibilities but also full of the widest significance. One cannot in Fars ever lose sight of the deplorable results of the disintegration of the Central Government's authority which has been progressively making itself felt since the commencement of the constitutional movement.

I have, &c.

G. G. KNOX.

No. 333.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 11, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of an able and interesting despatch which I have received from the acting British consul at Shiraz, narrating the closing phase of the acute disorders in Shiraz which marked last summer.

At the close of his despatch, Mr. Knox bears testimony to the services of the sowar and sepoy detachments on duty at Shiraz and to the valuable assistance given him by Mr. Smith, Assistant Superintendent of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and by the consulate munshi.

I trust that his appreciation of the services of the sowars and sepoys and of the help rendered him by Mr. Smith, may be brought to the notice of the proper quarters, and I take this opportunity, now that Mr. Knox's charge is drawing to a close, of expressing my own high appreciation of the assistance rendered to me by Mr. Knox during the time he has been in charge of His Majesty's consulate, the greater part of which was a period of altogether unusual stress and anxiety. His action throughout has merited my entire approval, and his telegrams and despatches contain a valuable record of the complex situation of the past few months.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 333.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Shiraz, October 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that since the date of my despatch of the 7th September, dealing with the general situation in Fars, events here have moved

more quickly, culminating at length in the dismissal of Nizam-es-Sultaneh and the termination of Kawam-ul-Mulk's five months' "bast" in His Majesty's consulate.

The Kashgai pickets which had been posted round the consulate, as mentioned in the despatch referred to, were, about the 7th September, considerably increased, and became most aggressive. Consulate servants were continually molested by them—one, whose identity was sufficiently apparent from the badge in his hat, being severely beaten and robbed, whilst others were detained for some hours—and those of the Telegraph Department and of other European residents in the same quarter were submitted to similar annoyances. At this time I made an energetic protest to Nizam-es-Sultaneh regarding the molestation of servants, and two days later the pickets were withdrawn, apparently under instructions from Tehran. A claim, however, for compensation for the assault, which was laid at the same time, has been completely disregarded.

Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the 7th September, a considerable number of Arab and Baharlu tribesmen had arrived near Shiraz and, after sharp fighting with the Governor-General's Kashgai force, entered the town under the command of nine of their more influential chiefs, who wrote to the consular corps notifying that they were come to avenge the murder of Nasr-ed-Dowleh, and had demanded from the Central Government the surrender of Nizam-es-Sultaneh and other intriguers. They added that if they were obliged to take violent measures to secure this object they would, in that event, ensure the protection of the lives and property of Europeans, provided that all the nationals of each consulate or consular agency were assembled in a single spot. I replied, in conformity with your instructions, that the chiefs must prevent any looting of British houses, and that it was out of the question to entertain their proposal that British subjects should be collected together.

Skirmishes in the immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz were of frequent occurrence until, on the 13th September, Nizam-es-Sultaneh sent out to various positions north of the town all the Government artillery, consisting of four Austrian 75-millim. mountain guns and two antique muzzle-loaders, which for three days continued to bombard the eastern quarters without any appreciable result. At this time, acting on a suggestion of Colonel Cox that the situation might be relieved if he were to hand over Kawam-ul-Mulk to the Khamseh chiefs, after having first obtained from him a telegram to the Persian Government promising that he would remain with these tribesmen out of striking distance of Shiraz until they should themselves come to some decision regarding Fars affairs, I sounded the Governor-General, under your instructions, as to his views on the matter. Nizam-es-Sultaneh unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that Kawam while in "honourable confinement" in His Majesty's consulate was far less dangerous than he would be if at liberty with a large force of wild tribesmen at his back, and that even if such an undertaking as that proposed were given, it could not be expected to remain binding for any length of time.

Shortly after the commencement of the bombardment the Prime Minister had telegraphed the strongest instructions to the local military authorities to prevent any of the Government forces from taking part in the struggle. His orders, however, remained without effect: officers and men of the regular army continuing to serve the guns. During this time an incessant long-range rifle fire was kept up day and night on both sides, and on the 16th September after the bombardment had ceased the two parties came to closer quarters, the Kashgai attempting to rush various points in the town, whence they were on every occasion repelled with considerable loss. The next day, however, a brief lull in the fighting resulted, the local notables having received telegrams from the Persian Government announcing Nizam-es-Sultaneh's recall to Tehran and the appointment of Rukn-ed-Dowleh in his place, pending whose arrival the deputy governorship was placed in the hands of Mirza Habibullah Khan, the local representative of the Ministry of Finance. At the same time Kawam received from the Prime Minister notification of this step and instructions to give all his support to Mirza Habibullah Khan. Nizam-es-Sultaneh on the first receipt of the news, made it clear that he would again resist dismissal, and left no possible doubt of his intentions by sending out to Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who was then at Beza some 25 miles north of Shiraz, a mountain gun accompanied by a strong escort of sowars. On the same day I saw the secretary of the local revenue office, who told me that Mirza Habibullah Khan was ready to take up the deputy governorship, but not without considerable fear of Soulet's enmity, and, indeed, before twelve hours had elapsed a gang of Kashgai led by one of Soulet's body servants had broken in Mirza Habibullah Khan's house, beaten him and carried him off, together with as much of his personal property and official records as they could lay their hands on. He was removed to Beza and subsequently to

Firuzabad, where a large sum of money was extorted from him before he was allowed to return to Shiraz, which he reached on the 19th October, completely broken in health after the rough usage he had suffered on the journey.

By this time the situation had grown more than ever disquieting. The bazaars were closed and remained so till the end of the struggle, all classes of the inhabitants were in fear of imminent pillage and the arrival of Soulet only served to redouble a panic already amply justified by the state of things prevailing; for, with some 1,200 Kashgai strongly entrenched in the commercial part of the town or encamped near by, in hourly conflict with about 2,200 Khamseh tribesmen, armed townspeople, and villagers established in the other quarters, ultimate looting on a very large scale was the first result to be expected.

The one step, to my mind, likely at this point to alleviate, in some degree, the situation was to ensure, if possible, the peaceful withdrawal of the Kashgai from Shiraz, since, with the weakness of Soulet's position fully established, by the evidence of the meagre following he had been able to raise, it was already very plausibly to be anticipated that the Arabs would gain the upper hand, and any effort of theirs to dislodge the Kashgai from their posts in the richest quarters of the town could only end in every kind of excess, from which British merchants would inevitably be the first to suffer.

Moreover, by the fact alone of abducting the deputy governor, Soulet-ed-Dowleh had sufficiently clearly shown himself to be in open revolt against the Persian Government, and his general attitude had given abundant proof that he could be influenced by by nothing short of a direct menace. I therefore ventured to suggest that I should be authorised to warn him that if he did not forthwith remove himself and all his men from the neighbourhood and leave the Central Government a free hand to restore order in Fars as they saw fit, His Majesty's Government would take immediate steps to protect British interests. On the same day I wrote to Soulet that I was instructed by you to inform him that his presence and that of his tribesmen in Shiraz only made for disorder, and that should any harm to British lives or property render intervention necessary, the consequences would be visited on his head. After considerable delay, he replied that he had come to Shiraz with the object of restoring order, and that British subjects would be protected, asking me at the same time to make in future any official communication to him through the karguzar.

Meanwhile, on the 19th September the Prime Minister telegraphed to Kawam, instructing him to do all in his power to put a stop to the intrigues of Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and to publish a notice in the town to this effect. Kawam accordingly, after I had obtained your sanction to his doing so while still in His Majesty's consulate, sent the text of the telegram to his son to be printed and circulated. This was followed by another message in which Samsam-es-Sultaneh enquired whether Kawam felt himself equal to assuming charge of affairs in Fars, and whether Zaigham-ed-Dowleh, if appointed Ilkhani of the Kashgai, could count on the general support of the tribes. He added that, if Kawam did not think this arrangement feasible, Farman Farma would be appointed Governor-General. Kawam replied that the Khamseh tribes could be fully relied on, and that the appointment of Zaigham-ed-Dowleh would be welcomed by the Kashgai. He suggested at the same time that the Persian Government should give a warning to Soulet strong enough to ensure his departure. Shortly after this the appointment of Farman Farma was announced. By this step the Persian Government apparently hoped to use the friendship existing between Soulet and Farman Farma to detach the former from Nizam-es-Sultaneh.

On the 22nd September Soulet issued a proclamation, in which he stated that he was about to drive the Arabs out of Shiraz, that he would attack them through the town, and that any householder who declined to afford the Kashgai free passage through his premises would be held fully responsible for the damage which might result to him from their forcible entry. The only attempt made to follow this up was the invasion by Kashgai of an entirely neutral quarter, in which they pillaged and even destroyed a number of houses. Within a few hours they were attacked there by the Arabs and, after a whole day's serious fighting, driven out with heavy loss. After this the ilkhani, feeling his position weakening, announced to the Persian merchants that he had resigned protection of the Bushire road, wishing apparently by this means to compel the mercantile classes to sue to him again, as so frequently before, for the defence of their interests. On this occasion, however, the plan was not successful; and he finally fell back on the time-honoured expedient of extorting from them by open force telegrams to the central authorities lauding his disinterested services. These messages were immediately cancelled by others dispatched over the British wire, it being by this time

apparent to all that, whatever his wishes might be, Soulet was in no position to do anything to safeguard traffic on the road. At the same time he definitely abandoned a previously consistent attitude of consideration for these classes, and set to work to extort from them, in one case even under the sticks, forced contributions which were nominally intended to serve for the maintenance of the tribesmen he had brought with him, according to his own account, to restore order in Shiraz, and who were at the moment actually busy with the indiscriminate pillage of all properties outside the town.

About the same time Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, until recently in charge of His Majesty's consulate at Mohammerah, was robbed on his way here by a gang of Kashgai within 12 miles of Shiraz. I had received only the shortest notice of his impending arrival; consequently, on account of the universal disorder prevailing, all my efforts to procure an escort or to get into communication with him with a view to stopping his journey until this should be available were fruitless, and at Pul-i-Fesa he fell in with a number of armed men, who robbed him of all his belongings, dragging him from his horse, tearing his clothes, and generally roughly handling him. The tribesmen then detained him in a village near by for some twenty-four hours while they continued their interrupted work of pillage, seizing everything they could lay hands on and brutally ill-treating the peasants. During this time reference was made to Soulet, who eventually ordered that his property should be restored, and himself escorted to the consulate, where he subsequently arrived in safety.

Meanwhile, in Shiraz the situation was growing daily more critical; the attitude of Soulet and his followers was most menacing, several of the leading inhabitants receiving open threats of pillage or violence; severe fighting continued without intermission, and warnings constantly reached me from the most various quarters of an impending attack on the consulate, of which the Kashgai were talking freely. At the same time I was approached with frequent appeals for protection from British subjects, from British firms in Manchester and Bombay, on behalf of their native agents, as well as from Persian subjects of every class, including even the Governor of Bushire, who was most anxious as to the safety of his family in Shiraz. The karguzar, in reply to my application for information as to what steps the Persian authorities proposed to take for the protection of British lives and property, had written to me that the ex-Governor-General declined to associate himself in any way with the administration of the province, that the newly appointed deputy governor (Mirza Habibullah Khan, who had just been abducted) had apparently left Shiraz, and that he himself was unable to deal directly with the tribal chiefs in such a matter. Two days, however, after I had apprised you of his reply, he collected a small number of ragged Persian soldiers and distributed them as guards to various British subjects. These, after a short-lived attempt to extort an excessive wage from the householders they were supposed to be protecting, left Shiraz, having received, they declared, no pay for several months past. In the meantime I had distributed flags (or rather such substitutes for these as were locally obtainable) to British subjects, and to those accredited agents of British firms who could satisfy me that they had goods actually belonging to their principals on the premises. This measure was, however, quite inadequate to the requirements of the situation, since it was sufficiently clear that a horde of tribesmen, many of whom had in all probability never seen a European, would not, when once launched on a general pillage, be checked by any considerations of international comity or fear of ultimate reprisals; and, in view of the obvious impotence of the local authorities to make even the most elementary effort to protect the lives and property of foreign subjects, I could see no course open to us if Soulet-ed-Dowleh could not at once be dislodged by some very clearly worded warning from His Majesty's Government, but that some overt measure should be taken to protect our interests.

During these days the fighting, which had continued uninterruptedly, was marked by the invariable repulse of the Kashgai, and on the 29th September a reinforcement of some 1,500 Arabs crossed the passes and attacked the rival posts established on the northern side of the town. Having cleared these without meeting with any substantial resistance, and done great execution among the retreating Kashgai, they entered Shiraz and joined their companions in the eastern quarters, bringing the total of tribesmen there to more than 3,000. At the same time, seeing that the ultimate success of the Khamseh was now assured (and, indeed, Soulet-ed-Dowleh had then reached the point of sending one of his familiars and other emissaries to treat with Kawam); I wrote to their chiefs, giving a list of houses occupied by British subjects and of business premises of British firms, and stating that, in the event of need arising, every precaution must be taken to ensure that these be respected.

On the 3rd October, when the general panic had still further increased, I wrote to Soulet that I was instructed to notify him that, unless he immediately removed himself and his men from the neighbourhood, you would recommend His Majesty's Government to take immediate steps to protect our interests. At the same time I informed the Khamseh chiefs that, in the event of harm befalling the lives or property of British subjects, you would recommend His Majesty's Government to take steps to exact full reparation for it. In reply, these chiefs wrote to me enclosing copy of a telegram addressed to them by the Prime Minister, in which they were instructed to remain in Shiraz at the service of the Government, and stating that they would do all in their power to protect Europeans. From Soulet-ed-Dowleh I received no answer; two days later, however, his baggage, together with that of Nizam, left the town under a large escort.

Kawam-ul-Mulk about this time gave his signature to a document already signed by Soulet, in which it was principally stipulated that the property looted by either side was to be restored, that both parties should immediately dismiss their forces and recognise the ruling of the Central Government on the question of a Governor-General as final, and that Soulet-ed-Dowleh should continue to protect the Bushire road. Needless to say, none of these conditions were fulfilled, and so small was the importance attached by Kawam to this document that he did not even trouble to keep a duplicate, this piece of by-play being designed by Soulet (as his emissaries clearly explained) to silence the ridicule which his discomfiture would call forth from his family and immediate associates, and, in the case of Kawam, to give proof of his public spirit in coming to an arrangement, on the whole disadvantageous to himself, in the interests of the population of Shiraz. On the same evening Kawam received a telegram from Samsam-es-Sultaneh which announced the impending appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General and of Zaigham-ed-Dowleh as Ilkhani of the Kashgai. It stated at the same time that Ala-ed-Dowleh would not accept the post unless he had full assurances of Kawam's co-operation. Kawam, when discussing the question, told me that he could not reply satisfactorily until he had obtained a joint oath from all the Khamseh chiefs that they would give unreserved assistance to the proposed combination and a promise from me that, as deputy governor, he would receive the support of His Majesty's Government. I subsequently answered, as instructed, that if officially appointed deputy governor he could count on our sympathy and support.

On the following day Nizam and Soulet left Shiraz and camped for the night some 6 miles away, the latter declaring publicly that he would raise such disorders on the Bushire road as had not before been seen. No doubt his departure may in part be ascribed to the effect of our warning, but in all probability it was rather inspired by more immediate considerations, such as the fact that his small following were already deserting him in large numbers, and that if he wished to maintain any hold over the tribes, who were then well on their way to their winter quarters, he must follow after them before sedition, already well advanced, had time to spread too widely. On the same evening the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior telegraphed to Kawam, giving him full powers as deputy governor and announcing that 50,000 tomans were being placed to his credit at the Imperial Bank of Persia to serve for the upkeep of a force of Khamseh tribesmen until the arrival of the Governor-General. Kawam, however, was very loath to take up office, and had repeatedly explained to me that no semblance of good order could be maintained without the strongest measures against the sources of intrigue, and that, if he were to take these, it would universally be believed that they were inspired by motives of personal revenge; he had consequently telegraphed to the Persian Government before receipt of these telegrams, urging them to appoint Mudabber-es-Sultaneh, who, though himself a Shirazi, had maintained for the past few months a consistently neutral attitude, and who, being a complete political nonentity, could serve as a suitable mask for Kawam's administration of the province. The next day Kawam decided to quit His Majesty's consulate, and a large crowd of the same townspeople who five months previously had been crying for his blood assembled outside to welcome him. These were shortly joined by some 2,000 Khamseh tribesmen with all their chiefs, Intizam-ul-Mamalek (now Nasr-ed-Dowleh) and Asad-es-Sultaneh, a former Kashgai Ilkhani. The chiefs then came one by one to do homage to Kawam, kneeling in front of him and kissing his hand and knee, whereupon he addressed them at some length, dwelling particularly on the fact that they had never before been known in their history to be thus assembled together in the service of law and order, and that he hoped that after this experience of their complete success in such a cause they would continue orderly and united. His speech was met with every assurance of loyalty to

the Government, to himself, and to anyone who might desire it. Kawam then gave orders for the tribesmen to divide into two parties, his son and himself following different routes. This precaution was well justified by the event, for within a few minutes of his quitting the consulate a heavy fire was opened on him from the sangars of Dehbozoorg, a suburb on the north side of Shiraz, where his old enemy, Ali Akbar Khordul, was entrenched with some eighty men. In the course of this fusillade five of the Arabs were killed and about twelve wounded, one of whom was shot within a yard of Kawam. He himself appears to have kept his head, and was at least successful in his efforts to prevent his escort of some 1,500 men from attacking the Dehbozoorg, a step which could only have ended in the pillage of the main bazaar, with which the village directly communicates. The tribesmen finally consoled themselves by driving off 300 or 400 camels which were grazing in the neighbourhood preparatory to loading up a large quantity of merchandise deposited in the local caravanserai. This was almost entirely British-owned, and, as Ali Akbar fully recognised the possibility that its presence might render him immune from attack, I have had considerable difficulty in assuring its removal from so dangerous a neighbourhood. Of the camels, some have been recovered and restored by Kawam, but nearly 150 are still missing and likely to remain so. Ali Akbar himself has since been allowed to leave in peace to join Soulet-ed-Dowleh in Firuzabad. This incident appears to have been very carefully organised, and I have subsequently learned that two other parties of hostile "tufangchis" were posted near the alternative routes which Kawam might follow from the consulate to his house. On the same day, too, intrigues commenced similar to those of last autumn, which had ended in the pillage of the Jews' quarter, and some of the heads of their community came in great trepidation to tell me that a Mussulman woman had been caught throwing a Koran into a cesspool in their quarter. This they declared had been done at the prompting of Nasr-ul-Mulk. I wrote at once to Kawam that the matter had been brought to my notice, and urged him to take every precaution to prevent any molestation of the non-Mussulman population. He replied that he had already arrested the woman concerned, and assured me that the incident had fortunately transpired early enough to prevent its having any unpleasant result. I learn, however, that considerable sums of money have reached Nasr-ul-Mulk and Ata-ed-Dowleh, and it seems not unlikely that all the intrigue at present in progress beneath the surface may end in some outburst before the new Governor-General's arrival.

Meanwhile, the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh had been officially announced, and was shortly followed by that of Zaigham-ed-Dowleh (under the title of Sardar Ihtesham) as Ilkhani, and of Soulet-es-Sultaneh as Ilbeggi of the Kashgai. Nizam-es-Sultaneh at the same time moved on from the neighbourhood of Shiraz to his own estates at Khesht, and Soulet-ed-Dowleh, after remaining a week to watch events and do what he could to direct them from near Jirreh has now reached Firuzabad. The tribesmen meantime during their southward migration have been more than ever out of hand, and by the 11th October all telegraphic communication with Bushire was cut off. The damage done was of an entirely wanton character, large lengths of wire being dragged from the poles and cut up into small fragments. Four gholams sent out at different times from Shiraz to examine the state of the lines were stripped of everything, including their tools and portable telephones, while still in sight of the town; Soulet-es-Sultaneh, nominally in charge of the passing tribesmen, was either unwilling or unable to provide guards for working parties, and it was only on the 19th October after ten days' total interruption that sufficient rough and ready repairs could be executed to allow of one of the three lines being worked. At the same time the conditions of the roads has been growing worse and worse until they are now quite impracticable. During the past three months several robberies of one or two loads of British goods have occurred on the Bushire road (in one case 400*l.* worth of opium being carried off), and towards the end of September, in view of the acute situation at Shiraz and the complete obscurity of the immediate trend of tribal politics, I have followed a course parallel to that of Persian merchants here, and recommended that our firms in Bushire should be advised to suspend forwardings. On the northern road one large caravan in the space of some ten weeks left for Ispahan by the Serhad route about the 1st September, and arrived there safely, but only after very heavy exactions by the Kashgai guards. Since that date, with the tribes quitting the higher country, this route has become impracticable and the telegraph road has been so disturbed that upward caravans have not ventured to leave Shiraz. This state of things has finally culminated in a formidable robbery on the northern confines of Fars, which occurred on the 12th October, and in which a caravan reported to consist of 700 mules bringing a large quantity of British-owned gum and opium from Ispahan to Shiraz, has been so far as is yet ascertainable totally looted by a

band of Kuhgelus. At the same time a British lady doctor, Miss Ross, who is an independent practitioner unsupported by any religious or other society, was robbed of everything, beaten, and left to make her way as best she could on foot and without shoes or hat to Abadeh. There she still remains awaiting a safe opportunity to continue her journey to Shiraz, where her prospects of setting up a practice will, I fear, have been gravely interfered with by the loss of her drugs and instruments. A few days later near the same spot a body of 300 Persian soldiers, the last of the "Fars expeditionary force" to leave Shiraz, unpaid and half-naked, were attacked, losing, according to such reports as reach me, ten killed and twenty wounded. There is to my mind in these two outrages a particular significance of the degree of unrestrained brutality now reached by these tribesmen. In the case of Miss Ross, her profession is one which hitherto has always been an adequate passport in all parts of the country; while Government troops in the past have consistently owed a real inviolability to the pitying contempt of the well-armed robbers for their abject misery and worthless equipment.

Thus, while the condition of Shiraz itself is far from reassuring, and that of the roads more than ever deplorable, the general anarchy throughout the province has reached a degree which it is difficult fully to realise in Tehran. The general disregard of all authority of the Central Government or its representatives, on which I dwelt so strongly in my last report on the situation, has been still further intensified by recent events. Casualties during this summer's fighting in Shiraz amount, according to the most reliable estimates to 460 killed. During July, August, and September, Dr. Woollatt and his assistants treated more than 200 cases of serious gunshot wounds, and some 300 others, which various circumstances made it impossible for them to attend, were brought to their notice. Such losses as these, which, if my memory serves me right, were more than double those of the whole conflict of 1909 in and around Tehran, seem to indicate the presence of a rottenness in Fars too deep for any but the most drastic measures to cure. Another point to which local opinion attaches the greatest importance is that, after the quite ineffectual bombardment of Shiraz, all the superstitious respect accorded even by tribesmen to artillery as the most formidable emblem of a central authority has entirely disappeared. At the same time, owing to the large quantities of grain that have been looted or destroyed in the surrounding districts and the failure of many crops in the higher country on account of the severity of the past winter, there is every probability that famine will shortly make itself felt. Added to this, the financial question is becoming acute; the 80,000 tomans, frequently stated since last February to have been dispatched by the Central Government for the first year's expenditure on General Maletta's gendarmerie, have not yet reached Shiraz; the sum of 50,000 tomans promised to Kawam-ul-Mulk before his departure from the consulate, for the upkeep of a very necessary force, has not materialised; and the few regular troops who have not yet deserted are owed some nine months' arrears of pay and allowances.

After three months of the completest disorder here, which the Persian Government, so far as could be seen locally, have made no effort to check, they have apparently at length decided, but not before other tentative experiments, to dispatch Ala-ed-Dowleh and Zaigham-ed-Dowleh to Fars. Early last June I ventured to express the opinion that such a step would be the most likely to offer some hope of success. At that time there appeared every prospect that this change could be effected without difficulty; the general population, with the one exception of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his satellites, have long looked on Ala-ed-Dowleh as the one man, in the absence of Zil-es-Sultan, capable of governing Fars. Zaigham-ed-Dowleh was then in Ispahan with the Kashgai tribes near at hand, and, remembering with what alacrity these had flocked to him on Zaffer-es-Sultaneh's appointment a year previously, one could scarcely doubt that, with nothing more than the nominal support of the Persian Government, he could have won over the tribes and appointed to them such kalantars as he considered suitable. Now, however, it will be a very different matter for him to arrive near the tribes, perhaps as much as two months after the dismissal of Soulet, to find the subordinate posts which should be in his gift already filled—some it may be contrary to his wishes—and his rival left all this time free to cajole any waverers and prepare for a struggle. Yet, although this action cannot be expected to have the same effect now as before the outbreak of general disorder, there is still reason to hope that it may end at least in the permanent removal of Soulet-ed-Dowleh from the field of Fars politics, a result which I could only look on as an unmixed blessing. During the past eighteen months my predecessor and I have both had every reason to consider Soulet-ed-Dowleh as the chief source of disorder and unrest in Fars and to believe that his egregious greed and vanity form a very real menace, while his repeated assurances of devotion to His Majesty's Government and solicitude for our trade are utterly hollow. These views, I

venture to believe, have been amply justified by the events of the past summer, which have gradually culminated in his open revolt against the Central Government, the pillage of the entire district, and the wanton destruction of the telegraph lines by his men. It has been, however, urged, on the other hand, that Soulet is helpful to our trade and that his removal would open the way to an undesirable expansion of Bakhtiari influence in the direction of Fars and Arabistan. On the first point it seems to me axiomatic that any chieftain exercising the least control over the Kashgai could adequately safeguard the Bushire road (except against the large Boir Ahmedi raids which usually occur in the early winter and which have been no less noticeable under Soulet's régime than before) without the unnecessary diversion of traffic and other political exploitation of his position so freely indulged in by the late ilkhani. It is also noteworthy that of the goods robbed during his period of responsibility an inappreciable proportion have been recovered by him. There is, too, a certain significance in the fact that the only robbery occurring this summer on the Serhad road, which lies entirely through Kashgai country, was the theft of a case of 1,500 tomans belonging to the Imperial Bank of Persia, which took place within a few hundred yards of Soulet's own tent. The genesis of his reputation as the protector of commerce seems to lie in the simple fact that the Kashgai chief, controlling the roads and being in an even better position to interrupt than to protect trade, can by the least threat of a stoppage of traffic exert a pressure on many of the merchants, which is both financially and politically useful to him.

As regards the question of Soulet's removal leading to a régime under Ala-ed-Dowleh, Zaigham-ed-Dowleh, and Kawam hostile to Kashgai and pledged to support Bakhtiari interests, I believe from all that I have been able to see of tribal affairs in Fars that the assumption on which such a theory is based, namely, that there exists an innate hostility between the Bakhtiari (represented locally by the Kawamis) and the Kashgai, is unfounded. So far as I can see a certain group of the Bakhtiari khans have undoubtedly a very strong personal enmity to Soulet-ed-Dowleh. This hostility, which is by no means unprovoked, is of apparently recent growth, and it is not surprising that the Bakhtiari, with a reputation to keep up as good constitutionalists, should resent their neighbour's somewhat windy pretensions to a dictatorship of Fars. The absence of any feud between the actual tribes seems to my mind incontrovertibly established by the fact that during the past months no appreciable effort was made by the Kashgai from their summer quarters to harry the neighbouring Bakhtiari territory, which one may reasonably suppose had been left to a great extent unprotected, owing to the dispatch of so many fighting men to the north. The differences between the Kawamis and the Kashgai are still more personal, having only come into existence with the appearance of Soulet-ed-Dowleh. Moreover, Kawam himself is on the best of terms with Soulet's three brothers, Zaigham-ed-Dowleh, Soulet-es-Sultaneh, and Ali Khan, Hishmat-es-Sultan, as well as many of the leading khans, such as Mohamed Ali Khan, Kashkuli, and Ahmad Khan, Shishbolooki, and the Kashgai as a whole, have had in general nothing but friendly relations with the Khamseh tribes. It thus seems to me that with the advent of an ilkhani who had not set all his neighbours by the ears a great degree of general appeasement might well have been expected. Unfortunately, however, with the recent break-up of all authority in Fars, one can no longer have so reasonable a presumption that this result will ensue. The heavy losses suffered during the fighting in Shiraz will in all probability have provoked sufficient blood feuds to exercise the best efforts of the tribes for many years; at the same time the influence of the Central Government will no longer be sufficient to win a chieftain the obedience of his tribesmen, while the lesser khans, having seen to what extent personal pre-dominance may reach, are not likely readily to accept another despot.

Thus every indication which I have been able to find in the course of events here during the past six months leads, inevitably I fear, to the conclusion that Persia unaided will not be equal to dealing successfully with a situation so grave as that at present existing in Fars. One cannot easily forget with what blowing of trumpets the Persian Government made, nearly a year ago, their reply to a British announcement regarding the insecurity of the trade routes in Southern Persia by dispatching Nizam-es-Sultaneh, General Maletta and the "Fars expeditionary force" on urgent missions to Shiraz: their Governor-General, after giving up the province to the wearying monotony of rapine, murder, and universal anarchy which it has been my task for the past few months to detail, has now quitted his post, a prescribed fugitive; General Maletta's gendarmerie, of which not one man has yet been raised owing to the obstruction of the local authorities, has apparently dropped out of all recollection; the 5,000 troops stationed here last February have dwindled away,

chiefly by desertion, to some 300 ragged units, who still clamour fitfully for nine months' arrears of pay; while of the guns dispatched with the "expeditionary force," one has been captured by Baharlu brigands and the rest have discharged their ammunition ineffectually into Shiraz itself. It seems then that all these preparations have led to no more than the laying waste of the more orderly parts of the province and the exasperation of the remainder. In almost every village throughout the fertile plains surrounding Shiraz the crops have been either looted or destroyed, and the only visible traces of the Persian Government's action are a greater misery than ever with more lawlessness and discontent. So from all that can be seen in Fars at least there is no apparent ground for thinking that the Persian Government have now any more than last year awakened to a sense of their responsibilities, and no manifest reason why a second similar attempt to repair the existing state of things should not end in equally lamentable failure.

I venture, in conclusion of this inordinately long despatch, to draw your attention to the excellent services of the sowar and sepoy detachments (of the 25th Cavalry and 79th Carnatic Infantry, respectively) on duty here during the five months of Kawam-ul-Mulk's "bast" in His Majesty's consulate. Throughout this period exceptional precautions have been called for, and the men have cheerfully and ably carried on a constant guard duty greatly in excess of that laid down by regulations. I should like also to take this opportunity to express my great gratitude to Mr. J. Smith, assistant superintendent of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, both for the valuable help he has given me in matters connected with the tribes, where his twenty years' experience has been of the greatest service to me, and for his ready kindness in relieving me of much work at times of pressure by himself taking the labour of dispatching confidentially many of my messages. I would venture too, to point out the admirable way in which I have been served by the consulate munshi, Mirza Fazlullah Khan, who, though not a permanent Government employé, and nominally only engaged at the consulate for four hours daily, has willingly sacrificed almost all his free time in order to be at hand whenever I might require him for the urgent Persian work constantly arising during Kawam's presence here, and has served His Majesty's Government, under circumstances that have held for him many temptations, with a loyalty which I cannot too highly praise.

I have, &c.

G. G. KNOX.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

S 2091

RESPECTING THE

2

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 4 (1912)": Cd. 6105.]

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 4 (1912)": Cd. 6105.]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

FOLLOWING from acting consul at Shiraz, dated 24th December :—

"Party going to meet Smart were fired on this afternoon by road guards from hills above Kotal Dokhtar, near Kazerun, and lost one sowar killed. I have as yet no details."

I await further details before suggesting action, but meanwhile am informing Persian Government and drawing their attention to gravity of such attacks.

No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 25, 1911.

PERSIAN Minister states that he is informed that Russian troops in Tabreez have massacred 500 women and children. Is there any truth in this report?

No. 3.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

Acting British consul at Shiraz states that the affair reported in my telegram of this morning was an organised attack by road guards from a tower and neighbouring hill-tops. The road guards belonged to the Governor of Kazerun, Mohamed Ali Khan Kashkuli, who is the official guardian of the road.

With a view to securing a safe passage for Smart's escort, Colonel Douglas is sending out a second party of fifty men to hold the top of the passes.

No. 4.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

Please see my telegram of this evening,
Colonel Douglas reports as follows :—

"The affair yesterday began with a treacherous attack by apparently friendly road guards on an advance party of three sowars. The road guards were outside a tower. One of the sowars was wounded, and before help could arrive the other two were overpowered and their rifles taken away. Tofangchis in the tower and on the surrounding hills then opened fire on the whole party, and before the latter could

proceed, the hills had to be cleared and the enemy driven from the tower. A messenger sent back by the party with news to Mian Kotal was fired on at close range from there and had his horse shot under him. It is thus clear that the affair was prearranged. Our total casualties were one sowar killed and one wounded; we also lost four rifles and two horses killed. Our great difficulty throughout has been the hostile attitude of the road guards.

No. 5.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

MY telegram of 25th December.

Following from acting consul at Shiraz :—

“When Birdwood’s party had joined up with Smart’s and was returning to Kazerun a general attack was made on them, and they had to fight their way for about 12 miles into Kazerun, with fresh fighting men coming out from every village to attack them. Smart is missing. He was last seen about 8 miles from Kazerun, and later his horse galloped by wounded. It was impossible to look for him, as party was in imminent risk of being surrounded. Casualties not yet accurately known beyond one killed and three wounded. Inhabitants of whole Kazerun valley seemed to have joined in attack.”

Birdwood’s party was sent out from Shiraz to meet Smart at Kazerun and to escort him to Shiraz.

No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 26, 1911.

PUBLIC opinion here is much excited by recent events at Tabreez and Resht.

“Novoe Vremya” and the press in general advocate the adoption of stern measures of repression.

I have again received assurances from M. Sazonof that he will not regard the Tabreez incident and the withdrawal of the expeditionary force as having any connection, but will treat them as separate questions. At the same time he appears not to regard the assurances already given by the Persian Government as sufficiently binding to justify the issue of an order for the immediate withdrawal of the force.

No. 7.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 26, 1911.

COLONEL DOUGLAS reports as follows :—

“The only duty performed by the road guards is to blackmail passing caravans, and they have to be watched, if allowed to remain on the road, so as to prevent the muleteers with the troops from being interfered with. The local authorities should, therefore, I consider, be called in to withdraw their men when troops are passing; it might be pointed out to them that otherwise they may be mistaken for enemies. Major Birdwood has some of Mohamed Ali Khan’s men with him, and I have asked Mr. Smart to assist the officer commanding the party moving to-day through Tangi Turkan to distinguish between the natives encountered. Mistakes should therefore not occur. The officer commanding the party which is to assist Major Birdwood on his return was, he reports, fired on near Khaniginian from a distance.”

No. 8.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

ACTING CONSUL at Shiraz reported yesterday that a surgeon was wanted to attend Mr. Smart, who has been wounded in the leg, and is at present with Mohamed Ali Khan. It is, however, believed that Mohamed Ali is desirous of having his own wound attended to, as a sowar asserts that he saw Mr. Smart killed with two shots in the chest. News to this effect was brought to Kazerun.

No. 9.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

THE acting consul at Shiraz reports by telegram that our casualties are 2 killed, 7 wounded, and 3 missing, including Mr. Smart. I have authorised the acting consul at Bushire to give effect to a recommendation he has made, that any available naval forces and the troops at Jask should be landed at Bushire. Colonel Douglas will set out for Kazerun to-day. Kawam has sent most stringent orders to the acting governor of Kazerun by telegram to furnish the troops with all they require and to see that they are not attacked.

No. 10.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

NOTHING definite is known about Mr. Smart. At midday Colonel Douglas leaves Shiraz with 100 men to join the force of 50 men (which I reported in my telegram of the 25th had been sent out by him to hold the passes at Dashtarjin), and to extricate Major Birdwood, who is at the Kazerun caravanserai with 100 men. The latter may at any moment have his supplies cut off, but is unlikely to be attacked while he remains at Kazerun. Before he starts for Shiraz it is essential that the caravanserais and passes should be properly secured, as he is almost sure to be attacked on his way up.

No. 11.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz to-day :—

“Reports from Acting Governor, Kazerun, give some hope that Smart is alive, and will be brought into Kazerun. Indian Medical Service surgeon is there.”

No. 12.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

FOUR guns, 100 Cossacks, and a regiment of Russian infantry arrived at Tabreez yesterday. The Russian consulate-general had five killed and four wounded, but the other consulates are apparently safe. Heavy firing is continuing.

This information was telegraphed to the Russian Minister in the brief period during which communication with Tabreez was restored.

No. 13.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

MR. SHUSTER'S successor as treasurer-general.

I and my Russian colleague have advised the Persian Government to appoint Mornard. The Persian Government desire, however, that, until permanent appointment has been agreed upon, one of Shuster's staff should be designated as provisional treasurer-general. This would have been a convenient solution, since the delay which will be occasioned by waiting for Mornard's appointment, and further by the fact that the system of accounting used by Shuster (as also the English language) is strange to him, would be avoided if the machinery were handed over to a person acquainted with the previous system.

My Russian colleague is unable, however, to consent to this course, as it would, he fears, be difficult to get an American to vacate the post.

No. 14.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

MY telegram of 27th December.

Acting consul at Shiraz reports that a letter has come in from Smart, who is in Mohamed Ali Khan's house, wounded in the thigh. He hopes to be at Kazerun to-day, where there is an Indian Medical Service surgeon.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to express deepest regret of the Regent and of the Persian Government for the incident. His Excellency assures me that the Persian Government have instructed the local authorities to take all possible measures to punish those responsible and to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

No. 15.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 28, 1911.

OFFICIAL communiqué published to-day states that, in consequence of attacks at Tabreez, Resht, and Enzeli, accompanied by brutal mutilation of the wounded and outrages on the dead, and in view of the fact that the Persian Government, though not implicated, is powerless to punish the offenders, the Russian Government have decided to take punitive measures in towns mentioned. Viceroy of the Caucasus was accordingly instructed on the 23rd December to order military commanders, in consultation with Russian consuls, to proceed to severest punitive measures. Measures suggested are arrest and trial by martial law of all Russians and Persians who took part in attacks; disarming of fedais and other turbulent elements; destruction of buildings from which opposition is offered to present measures; and any other necessary steps to restore order and punish offenders.

No. 16.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

I LEARN from acting consul at Shiraz that, apart from the men killed and wounded in the recent attack, there were heavy losses of baggage, including eleven boxes of ammunition; also many horses and mules were lost.

No. 17.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 28, 1911.

I HAVE had a visit from Minister for Foreign Affairs, who begged me to believe that the restoration of friendly and normal relations with Russian Government was his ardent desire.

Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to alleged intention of Russia, as reported in the press, to take vengeance on Tabreez for what has happened there. He was much perturbed and pointed out that such action would cause lasting animosity. He asked that our good offices might be used to stop the execution of the threat, which, he added, was now particularly inopportune, since the Persian Government had just given evidence of their desire for reconciliation by submitting to demands of Russia. According to his Excellency, every effort had been made by the Persian Government to put an end to the fighting, but the authorities on the spot assured them that the Tabreezis were only fighting in self-defence.

The last news which Minister for Foreign Affairs had from Tabreez was that the deputy governor and other local officials were engaged at the Russian consulate in considering, in consultation with acting Russian consul, the best means of stopping the disorders.

Minister for Foreign Affairs would also be grateful if you could obtain from Russian Government the withdrawal of their troops at Kazvin. The departure of 200 of them for Resht cannot be considered as a first step in the withdrawal, as they have only gone to reinforce the troops at that place.

No. 18.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

I AM informed by the Swedish colonel commanding gendarmerie that Lieutenant de Maré has been engaged by him, also two other Swedish officers, who, as their Government refused to second them from the army, have likewise been obliged to resign their commissions.

My Russian colleague does not see any objection to the employment of these young officers, whose services as instructors are urgently required by the colonel. I hope Russian Government will make no difficulty.

There are now ten Swedish officers employed with gendarmerie here. I think they ought to be able to turn out an efficient force in time, if money is forthcoming and they are given a free hand, as they seem to be capable officers. They ought now more than ever to receive support from us, as Shuster's gendarmerie will presumably disappear shortly, he himself having been dismissed.

No. 19.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

His Majesty's consul, telegraphing on the 24th and 25th December, reported that local authorities were endeavouring, in co-operation with Russian consul, to stop fighting, and that no firing took place on the 25th.

It appears that communication between Russian consulate and commander of Russian troops had been cut off, as the troops, having failed to make any headway, had been compelled to concentrate in camp.

In his telegram of the 25th consul states that reinforcements (nearly 5,000 men, he thinks) have left Julfa to join Russian troops at Tabreez. The telegrams from consul only reached me yesterday evening.

No. 20.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

REFER to your telegram of the 25th December.

His Majesty's consul at Tabreez telegraphs as follows, 28th December :—

“Alleged massacre by Russians.

“There is no truth whatever in the report; what happened was quite the reverse. Russian troops took into their camp about twelve or fifteen Persian women and children and treated them there with kindness. While a Russian officer was peacefully superintending their removal he was shot at by the revolutionaries and killed on the spot. Other Persian families have, it appears, asked the Russians for similar protection.

“I hear that Cossacks broke into some wine and provision shops and one or two others. I reported in a previous telegram one case of killing of non-combatants in this quarter of the town without provocation; I am endeavouring to ascertain whether any cases have occurred in other quarters, and will telegraph further. I am also making enquiries as to alleged indiscriminate slaughter, but at present, while it is possible that some women and children were killed during bombardment, I do not believe there is any justification for the accusation of general inhumanity on the part of Russian troops, as to which no evidence has so far been brought forward.”

No. 21.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 29, 1911.

HIS Majesty's consul at Tabreez telegraphs as follows on the 28th instant :—

“The arrival on the 26th December of about 800 Russian troops and four guns—the first batch of reinforcements—has caused an immediate improvement in the situation here. On the morning of the 27th the citadel was entirely evacuated by the revolutionary forces; it is now occupied by Persian Cossacks and Russian troops, and the Russian flag is flying over it. The population is moving freely about the town, and, with their assistance, arms are being collected, no armed men being visible in the streets to-day. Nearly all the leaders of the revolutionaries have fled from the town; the remainder are in hiding, as well as their followers, against whom the Tabreezis are showing much resentment. It is generally hoped that there will be practically no more disturbance.

“Zia-ed-Dowleh, the acting governor, finding himself without anyone whom he could trust, and having no resources to control the disturbances, took bast at His Majesty's consulate late on the 26th, and is still here.”

No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 29, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 26th December.

You should inform Colonel Douglas that his proposal to warn the local authorities, when troops are passing, to withdraw the road guards is approved. Of course, the rule not to use the troops as escorts except in cases of absolute necessity, and after reference to you, should be observed, and nothing in the nature of punitive operations undertaken.

As Mohamed Ali Khan's road guards are to blame for what has occurred, are there no means of holding him responsible? If so, Persian Government should be urged to adopt them.

No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 29, 1911.

SWEDISH officers in Persia.

You should inform M. Sazonof of the views of Sir G. Barclay (see his telegram of 29th December) expressing to his Excellency at the same time the hope of His Majesty's Government that the Russian Government will agree. If their reply is in the affirmative, we would suggest that Swedish Government should be informed accordingly by the two legations.

No. 24.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

SMART arrived safely at Kazerun yesterday afternoon. His wound is apparently very slight.

No. 25.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

IN reply to your telegram of the 29th December, I submit that as I expect to receive further details, both as to the Kotal Dokhtar incidents and as to the more serious attack of which we have since heard, it will be better to postpone for the present consideration of question of responsibility and nature of compensation to be demanded.

No. 26.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 30, 1911.

SWEDISH officers for Persia.

Your telegram of the 29th December.

M. Sazonof informs me that his Government have no objection.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.

YOUR telegram of 27th December.

Your action is approved, as also proposal to land troops, &c., at Bushire if Colonel Douglas thinks their presence will relieve situation.

Detachment of sufficient strength should be left for the protection of Jask.

Admiralty desire to be consulted, if possible, before any naval force is landed, and any steps regarding such landing, other than those already approved by the commander-in-chief, will require sanction of His Majesty's Government unless emergency is very grave.

No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 30, 1911.*
 THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 22nd instant to say that the Persian Government had accepted in principle the three Russian demands, and that they had received verbal assurances from the Russian Minister that the troops would be withdrawn from Kazvin.

The Minister also read to Sir A. Nicolson telegrams as to fighting which was proceeding at Tabreez and at Resht between Russian troops and Persians.

I am, &c.
 E. GREY.

No. 29.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, December 30, 1911.*

IN conversation this afternoon with M. Sazonof, I said that I hoped the Russian force would be withdrawn from Kazvin at an early date.

M. Sazonof replied with an assurance that now that the three Russian demands had been accepted in writing by the Persian Government he did not wish to keep the troops at Kazvin any longer than was necessary. A body of about 1,000 men had already been brought back from Kazvin to Resht, but, so long as there was any risk of further disorders breaking out, it was impossible for Russia to withdraw the whole force. She could not risk a repetition of the surprise attack at Tabreez. It was therefore impossible for him at present to name any definite date for the withdrawal.

The complete restoration of order would doubtless take some time, but the troops now in Northern Persia would have to remain there until this had been accomplished. At the same time, he disclaimed all idea of a permanent Russian occupation. Those guilty of the attack at Tabreez would have to be severely punished as a warning to others.

No. 30.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 30, 1911.*

ESCORT incident.

I have received the following telegram dated to-day from the acting British consul at Shiraz:—

“I have just received a telegram from Smart at Kazerun to the effect that Mohamed Ali Khan promises to give full satisfaction.

“As any demands for reparation which we formulate might be complied with and our hands be therefore tied for future punitive action, I am myself much opposed to formulating any at present.

I have sent the following telegram in reply, dated to-day:—

“Our terms will largely depend on whether another attack is made on our troops while proceeding to Shiraz or not; in any case, we must know more about who is responsible for the attack before formulating any terms. Smart should reply to Mohamed Ali Khan in this sense.”

No. 31.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

ESCORT incident.

The present position of affairs is as follows :—

Colonel Douglas is at Dashtarjin with 150 men. Birdwood's party, with Smart, is still at Kazerun. This latter party, which has nine men severely wounded, must be withdrawn without delay.

A force consisting of 269 native infantry was to be landed at Bushire on the 30th December ; they are to await further orders before proceeding inland.

No. 32.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

HIS Majesty's consul at Tabreez telegraphs as follows on the 29th December :—

“ My Russian colleague yesterday received an emissary of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who entered the town accompanied by thirty horsemen. I saw Miller later in the day ; he said that, out of deference to the unanimous desire of the population, Shuja himself would come to Tabreez, but not before some four or five days. Miller added that as the Russians could not themselves undertake the administration of the town, and in view of this unanimous expression of popular opinion, he would be unable to oppose Shuja's coming, and that he would consider him as governor *de facto*. Shuja would, however, come in entirely at his own risk ; he had given him no guarantee of any kind. I gathered from what Miller subsequently told me that it was improbable that Shuja would bring more than 200 of his men into the town.

“ The feeling in the town is, so far as I can tell, undoubtedly as Miller states, and the opinion of such Europeans as I have been able to consult coincides with my own, namely, that there would be no opposition to Shuja's appointment provided the difficulties of his connection with the ex-Shah can be overcome and if his appointment is sanctioned by the Central Government. It seems in any case to be commonly agreed that no one else here is capable of undertaking successfully the government of the town.”

Unless Shuja is prevented, it is possible that he may proclaim the ex-Shah at Tabreez. He has been besieging the town in the interests of His Majesty.

No. 33.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 31, 1911.

ESCORT incident on Shiraz road.

I have sent the following telegram to the acting British consul at Shiraz to-day :—

“ I am informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that local authorities at Shiraz report that the men responsible for the second attack on Birdwood's party have been pursued by Mohamed Ali Khan and arrested.

“ Do you confirm this ?

“ According to Persian Government, over 100 Persians were killed. I should wish to be informed as to the estimated number of Persian casualties, in order that I may know how extensive and with whom are the blood feuds raised. It is also important that I should know as soon as possible how the fighting began, and other details.

“ Were Maxims used ?

“ Please consult Smart before telegraphing your reply.”

No. 34.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 27, 1911.

I CALLED on the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 23rd instant, and expressed the hope that, now that the Persian Government had announced their intention of complying with the Russian demands, the Russian expeditionary force would be recalled, in spite of the regrettable outburst at Resht and Tabreez.

M. Sazonof replied that so far the Persian Government had only given M. Poklewsky a verbal assurance, but that, when this assurance had been confirmed by a formal written engagement, and when Mr. Shuster's dismissal from the Persian service was an accomplished fact, the troops, which were at present stationed at Kazvin, would be at once recalled. There was, his Excellency proceeded to say, no connection between the question of the recall of these troops and the very serious incidents that had just occurred in the north. On my remarking that in conflicts of this kind it was not always easy to fix the responsibility for their origin, his Excellency declared that the Russian troops had given no provocation whatsoever, and that they had been attacked in the most treacherous manner. Two officers had, he believed, been killed, and this was a very serious matter. A detachment of some 500 or 600 troops were being hurried up to Tabreez from Julfa, and severe retribution would have to be taken on the fedais. He would, he added, let me know as soon as he had any definite news to give me.

Meanwhile, the loss which the Russian troops have sustained during the fighting at Tabreez has deeply moved public opinion here, and the Government are being taken severely to task for their want of foresight in not having dispatched to Persia a force strong enough to render the occurrence of such incidents impossible. The Government are also blamed for having pursued what is termed a vacillating policy in their recent dealings with the Persian Government, and, though the latter are acquitted of all responsibility for the attacks made on the Russian troops, it will, I fear, be very difficult under present circumstances for the Imperial Government to recall the expeditionary force from Kazvin.

M. Sazonof has been too busy to receive me for the last two days, but in a short conversation which I had with him yesterday through the telephone, he once more assured me that he would treat the Tabreez incident as distinct from that of the recall of the expeditionary force. He added, however, that that force could not be recalled till the engagements taken by the Persian Government had assumed a more binding character than they have at present. He also told me, in reply to an enquiry which I had addressed him, that the question of the punishment to be meted out to the fedais, who were still holding out against the Russian troops at Tabreez, would be left to the military authorities on the spot; and I gathered from the way he said this that it will be an exemplary one.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 35.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 1, 1912.

SHUSTER'S successor.

A provisional committee has been appointed by the Persian Government to take over from Shuster. This committee consists of five persons, and includes Mornard.

I had an opportunity last night of sounding my Russian colleague as to the real strength of the objections raised to the candidature of Mornard in Persian official circles. M. Poklewsky does not consider opposition serious and supports Mornard's appointment.

No. 36.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 1, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 10th January :—

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two notes which I addressed to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 27th and 30th ultimo respectively on the subject of the recent attack on Mr. Smart's escort in the south. Copies of his Excellency's notes in reply are also enclosed, together with a copy of an *aide-mémoire* on the same subject left with me by Hussein Khan.

I have told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that unless it is absolutely necessary for the safety of the party at Kazerun that the troops now landed shall proceed inland, they will remain at Bushire. The notes might, I think, remain unanswered until His Majesty's Government decide as to the action to be taken.

 Enclosure 1 in No. 36.
Sir G. Barclay to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, December 27, 1911.

I DEEPLY regret to have to inform your Excellency that the escort accompanying Mr. Consul Smart on his journey from Bushire to his post at Shiraz was yesterday the object of a severe and prolonged attack.

The attack commenced about 12 miles west of Kazerun and continued for the rest of the journey to that place. Each village which the escort passed during this period renewed the attack. Indeed, His Majesty's acting consul reports that the inhabitants of the whole Kazerun valley joined in the attack.

Mr. Smart and others of the party are missing and numerous casualties are reported. The escort, after prolonged fighting, succeeded in reaching Kazerun, where it is now in the caravanserai, where it is in a precarious position, as the acting consul reports that supplies may be cut off at any moment.

I am requesting instructions of my Government, and shall have the honour to address you further on the subject of this grave outrage. In the meanwhile I must request your Excellency to send peremptory orders to all the authorities along the route between Kazerun and Shiraz to refrain from molesting British troops and to satisfy the requirements of the British officers in charge.

A force is being sent from Shiraz to-day to occupy the passes between Kazerun and Shiraz, as it is only when these passes have been occupied by British troops that the force now detained at Kazerun can proceed on its journey with any prospect of safety.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

 Enclosure 2 in No. 36.
Sir G. Barclay to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

IN consequence of the recent attack on Mr. Smart's escort near Kazerun it has been found necessary to land some Indian infantry at Bushire.

I must request your Excellency to instruct the governor at Bushire to co-operate with His Majesty's consulate-general in the arrangements for landing this force, which numbers 269 men.

Instructions should also be sent to the custom-house to allow the passage of the arms brought by this force.

I avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

I HAVE received with much regret your Excellency's note of the 27th instant respecting the attack stated to have been made on Mr. Smart's Indian escort by the inhabitants of the villages in the neighbourhood of Kazerun.

On the evening of the 26th, when Abbas Kuli Khan informed me verbally of the incident, after expressing my regret for the incident, I sent strong telegrams for the investigation into the matter, punishment of the offenders, and for the protection of Mr. Smart and party. I am waiting for the reports of the measures taken by the local authorities, when I will communicate again with you on the subject.

I do not consider it superfluous to refer you to my reply of the 30th October last, in which I had foreseen the difficulties which might arise on the arrival of the Indian troops. I also refer you particularly to the passage in your note of the 24th of the same month, in which you have expressly stated that the force in question will neither patrol the roads nor make expeditions. I have to add that, had the British Government carefully considered my sincere statements at the time, there would have been less chance of the present regrettable incident for which the Persian Government is extremely sorry.

While drawing your Excellency's attention to the opinion all the time expressed by the Persian Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Persian Government will make every possible effort for the punishment of the offenders and for the preservation of suitable respect towards Mr. Smart, and I request the assistance of your Government in the matter in order that the measures taken by the Persian Government may freely and without hitch or hindrance come to a successful issue.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 30th instant regarding the arrival of 269 Indian infantry at Bushire, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram from the Governor of the Gulf ports, stating that the consulate-general informed him on the 29th that the troops would arrive on the 30th. The governor at the same time states that in view of the present public excitement, which is on account of the present incident, the arrival of the troops may in all probability give rise to some unexpected incidents.

I, therefore, have the honour to inform you that at the present moment when the public excitement is not yet allayed, the Persian Government adhere more than ever to the opinion expressed in my note of the 30th October last, on the occasion of the arrival of the Indian sowars.

I feel confident that a friendly Power will not admit that before the difficulties created by the dispatch of the first party of troops are removed (and of these Mr. Smart's regrettable incident is an example), further troubles should be created by the dispatch of fresh troops.

As is evident from the telegraphic reports received from the Shiraz Karguzari, and which were sent to the legation for your information, the measures taken by the Persian Government for the arrest of the perpetrators have been quick in their effect, and the men have been arrested by the Government officials. Of course, after full investigation, they will be punished.

Under these circumstances there will be no necessity for the dispatch of further troops on the part of that friendly Power, as such a measure will increase the present difficulties.

I earnestly hope that your Excellency will take the matter into serious considera-

tion, move your Government to give up their present intention, and oblige the Persian Government by the removal of the causes of the present difficulties.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 36.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Barclay by Persian Government.

ACCORDING to a telegram received this morning from the Movagher-ed-Dowleh, the British consul-general has informed him that a force of 250 Indian soldiers are landing to-day at Bushire.

Contemporaneously with this intimation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning received Sir G. Barclay's note corroborating that statement, and requesting that facilities be afforded for the disembarkation of these troops.

1. Hussein Khan is instructed to inform the British Minister that the Persian Government have taken without loss of time the most stringent measures to deal themselves with the situation; as the Vossuk-ed-Dowleh himself assured Sir George when he expressed deep regret on Thursday, all necessary steps are being taken to ensure Mr. Smart's safe arrival in Shiraz and the exemplary punishment of the offenders. Already, according to a telegram received yesterday and communicating to the British Minister through Abbas Kuli Khan, the culprits, or a number of them, have been apprehended, and they will be dealt with, after an enquiry, with the utmost rigour of the law.

2. Moreover, Sir George Barclay will admit that by the improper use of Maxim guns the sowars have already exacted for these untoward incidents a more than sufficient reparation represented by the loss of over 100 Persian lives.

3. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Russian ultimatum to which Great Britain was a party, has created a widespread anti-foreign feeling in the country, which it will not be so easy to modify. It has intensified the agitation already fostered by the increase of consular guards.

4. Sir G. Barclay will remember that when first, in spite of our protests, these reinforcements arrived it was specifically and officially undertaken by His Britannic Majesty's Legation that they would not be used as escorts or on expeditions. Sir E. Grey even stated in the House of Commons on the 27th ultimo that their action had been limited; they were merely going to increase the consular guards at three places, and they would remain there to protect life and property if danger occurred.

Nevertheless, and without any attention being paid to our remonstrances, these troops have been constantly sent to and fro, without even due notification being given to the local authorities; they have freely moved about the interior with artillery, and, as already pointed out, this action has added fuel to the fire of public feeling.

5. The coincidence of the projected arrival of the new force, mentioned in Sir G. Barclay's note, with the period of religious mourning, when the susceptibilities of the people are awakened in a peculiar degree, make it difficult for the Government—who are quite able themselves to cope with the situation—to take any responsibility for the safety of a foreign armed force.

Hussein Khan is to urge strongly that any contemplated measures be dispensed with, and a free field given to the Persian Government to exercise their legitimate sovereign action.

The situation is a delicate one and requires to be handled with great care; we must guard against all provocation, which might have disastrous consequences. The British Minister knows that the southern tribes are numerous and powerful; they are brave, restive, and well armed. Once their passions are aroused—and such foreign intervention will achieve that end—it will be a gigantic task to bridle them.

An expedition in the present circumstances would not only be a direct infringement of the sovereignty of Persia, but it would defeat the very object it was intended to serve.

Hussein Khan is, finally, to appeal to Sir G. Barclay's feelings of friendship for Persia, his foresight and sagacity, and his desire to facilitate the arduous task of the Cabinet (at a moment when they are hard pressed by so many misfortunes) to urge the British Government, for the above reasons and extenuating circumstances, not to take any drastic measures, but to leave it to the Persian Government to deal themselves effectively with the situation.

December 30, 1911.

No. 37.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 1, 1912.

TABREEZ.

Please see my telegram of the 29th December.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, dated the 31st December :—

"I have to report that General Voredonoff arrived in Tabreez yesterday afternoon. Two more regiments arrived shortly afterwards. With the reinforcements which had already arrived, the Russian force should now consist of at the least 4,000 men. In consequence of a proclamation signed by my Russian colleague, certain of the shops in the bazaars were opened to-day. Certain of the Russian soldiers, principally Cossacks, have been committing thefts of watches and other articles from individuals, and robberies from shops, a certain number of which were broken into. In spite of this, confidence is, I think, being slowly restored. Miller has been doing everything in his power to stop these robberies, and the recently arrived general has confirmed, in a more stringent form, the orders to this effect which had already been issued by the commanding officers.

"The only visible sign now of Persian authority here is the fifty or sixty Persian Cossacks under their Russian commander. The town is completely occupied by the Russians, who have posted detachments at the public offices, the Customs, and the post office. All measures concerning public order and the government of the town are necessarily in their hands.

"The population, however, seem to be only desirous of peace, and I do not anticipate any trouble. They are helping the Russians, as before, in the search for arms. They have also handed Sheikh Salim over to the Russians: he is one of the leading agitators, and it appears that they attribute their present misfortunes to his teaching. Miller tells me that he is to be court-martialled: it will go hard for him if the court find him guilty.

"Search parties have recovered the missing bodies of fourteen Russian soldiers. My Russian colleague informs me that they had been shockingly mutilated. They were buried to-day in the camp."

No. 38.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 1, 1912.

AMENDED list of casualties in fighting near Kazerun is as follows: Killed, 2 followers; missing, 1 follower; wounded, consul, 7 sowars, 1 hospital assistant, and 1 follower.

No. 39.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 1, 1912.

TWO regiments of Russian troops left Kazvin to-day for Resht.

No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 30th December: Attack on Mr. Smart.

I concur.

No. 41.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Kilmarnock.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 30th December: Swedish officers for Persia. When your Russian colleague receives similar instructions you should express to Swedish Government hope of His Majesty's Government that no obstacle will be placed in the way of these three officers.

No. 42.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 1, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 31st December. I hope that Russian Government will convey an intimation to Shuja-ed-Dowleh that, if he becomes Governor of Tabreez, he must not proclaim the ex-Shah.

No. 43.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 2, 1912.

ESCORT incident.

Acting British consul at Shiraz, in a telegram dated the 31st December, gives the following account by Smart of the commencement of the incident:—

“Mohamed Ali Khan informs me that two of the ringleaders who were in the Rahdar caravanserai have been arrested. He adds that it will be easy to arrest one of the culprits of the Dokhtar attack. There are two other culprits whose guilt he denies, and about whom there is some difficulty. Amir-ul-Mulk has just arrived; he is endeavouring to secure the arrest of all the other culprits by means of the Kadkhodas, all of whom he has sent for. I was the first to reach the caravanserai; Birdwood's party arrived a few minutes later accompanied by a mamur from Mohamed Ali Khan. The mamur said that we could halt at the river below for lunch and for watering the horses; he assured me that we had nothing to fear from the caravanserai. While we lunched, mamur went into the caravanserai. When we were on the point of starting again, mamur came up and said he had heard that our caravan would be stopped by force by the caravanserai tofangchis. A message was to be sent to Mohamed Ali Khan at Shahpur for permission for us to proceed; mamur insisted that we should await the reply to this message. Our caravan was already in progress; I asked Birdwood to proceed with it to a less exposed place, while I remained behind with mamur and Persian sowars to argue with the caravanserai riflemen and endeavour to pacify them. Caravanserai tofangchis opened fire, however, before I could do anything; of course our men had to reply. Persian casualties, according to Mohamed Ali, were one killed and seven wounded; I think this is an exaggeration, for Mohamed Ali would, for obvious reasons, endeavour to exaggerate the Persian casualties. Whatever these latter were—if, indeed, there were any at all—they must have been very slight. This account is confirmed by Birdwood.”

No. 44.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 2, 1912.

TABREEZ.

Please see my telegram of yesterday.

I have received the following telegram, dated yesterday, from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez:—

“I have the honour to report that about 4 P.M. to-day the Russians executed in Serbaz Khane eight persons, including Sheikh Salim (see my immediately preceding

telegram) and the Sikat-el-Islam. My Russian colleague states that the execution was carried out 'in accordance with the decision of the court-martial established by order from superior quarters.'

No. 45.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 2, 1912.

I HAVE addressed the following telegram to-day to His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz :—

"I have repeated Smart's report, as telegraphed by you on the 31st December, to the Secretary of State.

"I must have a full and comprehensive report on both the incident at Kotal Dokhtar and fighting near Kazerun before I can make any definite recommendation to His Majesty's Government.

"Your telegram of the 31st December is inadequate, and I should wish to be furnished with two full telegraphic reports dealing comprehensively with each incident respectively. These should be sent as soon as Birdwood and Smart reach Shiraz."

No. 46.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 2, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, dated to-day :—

"Kazerun party has joined up with Colonel Douglas's force at Kotal Dokhtar without incident."

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.

MR. MAILLET saw Count Benckendorff, by my direction, and expressed my satisfaction at the withdrawal of 1,000 men from Kazvin, and my hope that it would now be found possible to proceed with the recall of the Russian troops.

No. 48.

Sir Edward Grey to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, upon the receipt of the memorandum which you communicated to this department on the 25th ultimo, respecting reported massacres by Russian troops at Tabreez, I made enquiries on the subject from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

Sir G. Barclay has informed me, in reply, that according to reports from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, the story mentioned in your memorandum is not borne out by the facts. So far, indeed, does the rumour of a massacre lack foundation, that as a matter of fact some twelve or fifteen Persian women and children went to the Russian camp, where they were received and well treated; moreover, other Persian families are reported to have applied for similar protection. On the other hand, a Russian officer was shot dead by the fedai while he was engaged in superintending the departure of the Persian women and children.

Further, His Majesty's consul states that, though some women and children may

have perished while certain houses were being bombarded, the charge of general inhumanity made against the Russians has been supported by no evidence, and is, in Mr. Shipley's opinion, unfounded.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 49.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 3, 1912.

MY telegram of 1st January.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh entered Tabreez with 200 men yesterday.

No. 50.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 3, 1912.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram, dated 2nd January, from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, in continuation of his telegram which I repeated to you yesterday:—

“I saw Russian consul this morning. He confirmed what I have already reported, that the court-martial had been constituted under direct orders from St. Petersburg. Some of the persons executed had been charged with instigating the recent rising against the Russian troops—others of taking part in the rising. It is reported in the town that further executions are to take place to-day. There are some eighteen prisoners still in the camp, but I could not ascertain from Miller what the fate of these would be.”

No. 51.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 3, 1912.

EX-SHAH.

Your telegram of 1st January.

I wrote privately yesterday to M. Sazonof in the sense of your telegram referred to above, adding that His Majesty's Government could not in any circumstances recognise the ex-Shah, and that his proclamation at Tabreez would therefore gravely complicate the situation.

In a conversation which I had with his Excellency to-day, he said that the Russian assurances already given with regard to Tehran applied with equal force to Tabreez, and that no proclamation of Mohamed Ali would be permitted in that town so long as the Russian troops were in occupation there.

No. 52.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 3, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 4th January:—

Sir,

I took the opportunity of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd instant, to speak to his Excellency on the subject of the execution by the Russian military authorities at Tabreez of Sikat-el-Islam, on which Sir George Barclay had reported in his telegrams of the 2nd January.

I said that the execution of this high-placed ecclesiastic struck me as being a most

unfortunate occurrence as well as a grave blunder. It was almost certain to arouse intense indignation throughout Persia; and one of the first consequences would be that the present Government, who had done so much to conciliate Russia, would be unable to face the storm, and would have to resign. It also seemed probable that the Russian authorities would be represented as having caused Sikat-el-Islam to be executed for the express purpose of provoking popular resentment, and thus bringing about fresh disorders, which would furnish them with the necessary pretext for occupying Tehran.

M. Sazonof replied that the military authorities had had no choice but to inflict capital punishment on Sikat-el-Islam, who had been one of the chief instigators of the recent troubles and of the anti-Russian movement. The fact of his being an ecclesiastic could not shield him from the consequences of his acts. The military authorities moreover were obliged to take account of the temper of the troops, who were incensed at the tortures to which the Russian wounded had been subjected. One, if not more of them, had been actually buried alive, and horrible mutilations inflicted on others. His Excellency also reminded me of the fact that it was only last year that a Greek Bishop had been tortured to death in Macedonia, without any outcry having been raised by Europe.

I said that I quite understood that acts, such as those which he had just mentioned, must be severely punished, but that I still thought that it would have been more politic not to have inflicted the death penalty on Sikat-el-Islam. Russia was, like Great Britain, a great Mussulman Power; and I feared that his execution would shock the feelings of our Mahometan subjects. What, however, preoccupied me most for the moment was the danger of its provoking an outbreak of fresh disorders in Persia, which might in their turn lead to the occupation of Tehran by the Russian troops. His Excellency was, no doubt, aware of the violent opposition which the dispatch of Russian troops to Persia had aroused in the House of Commons and of the very difficult position in which you had consequently been placed. I, therefore, trusted that he would do all that was possible to restrain the Russian military authorities in Persia, as the occupation of Tehran could not fail to put a severe strain on the Anglo-Russian understanding.

His Excellency replied that he trusted that nothing would happen to render such an occupation necessary. It was, he said, impossible for the Government not to reckon with Russian public opinion; and, in view of the state of anarchy reigning in Persia, he could not meet the wishes which Mr. Mallet had expressed to Count Benckendorff in your name, with regard to the withdrawal of the Kazvin force. His Excellency explained that the force of 1,000 men sent from that place to Resht had only been transferred in order to strengthen the garrison at the latter place.

No. 53.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 3, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 1st January: Attack on Mr. Smart.

I concur in view that no answer is required at present to Persian Government's communications.

Persian Minister here has now used similar language, and has been told that, as regards Shiraz, we had been obliged to send additional guards on account of disorders prevailing there, and that it was notorious that roads had been impassable for months past. We were awaiting with anxiety the march from Kazerun to Shiraz, and everything depended on whether Mr. Smart and his party arrived safely. Persian Government were responsible, and we intended to hold them so.

Minister was asked to telegraph this to Persian Government.

No. 54.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 3, 1912.

MR. MALLET, by my instructions, informed the Russian Ambassador on the 1st instant that, as the Persian Government had complied with the Russian

demands, it seemed to be very desirable, as well as reasonable, that a beginning of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin should be made without delay in accordance with the assurance given to your Excellency by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Mallet said that I quite saw the difficulty of an immediate and total withdrawal, but that it was most desirable to do something to encourage the Persian Government after their compliance, especially since recent occurrences at Tabreez had apparently forced Russia to take strong action there, although the present Persian Government were not to blame for what had happened.

On learning, however, of the more recent information contained in your Excellency's telegram of the 30th. ultimo, that about 1,000 men had already been transferred from Kazvin to Resht, of which Mr. Mallet informed Count Benckendorff, his Excellency said that he would telegraph to his Government saying that I had been glad to hear that this step had been taken and hoped that the process of withdrawal would continue.

Mr. Mallet further expressed the hope that discrimination would be used at Tabreez, and Count Benckendorff expressed his entire confidence in the humane disposition of the Viceroy of the Caucasus.

Count Benckendorff expressed gratitude for the publication in the press here of a denial of the reported Russian atrocities at Tabreez.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 55.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 4, 1912.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke yesterday of the execution of Sikat-el-Islam, and emphasised the difficult position of the Cabinet. He urged upon my Russian colleague and myself that the Russian Government should assist the Cabinet in the following ways:—

1. Give assurances to the Persian Government with regard to the duration and nature of the Russian administration at Resht, Enzeli, and Tabreez;
2. Expel Shuja-ed-Dowleh from Tabreez; and
3. Agree to an enquiry being held to establish responsibility for the court-martialling of Sikat-el-Islam, who, according to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was entirely innocent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his confidence that I would lend the Persian Government my offices in obtaining from the Russian Government the assistance asked for.

While the first and second of the above points would appear reasonable, the third attacks the dignity of Russia, and is of course out of the question.

According to reports received from Tabreez by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shuja's friends received him with acclamations for Mohamed Ali.

No. 56.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 4, 1912.

TABREEZ.

Please see my telegram of yesterday.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez, dated the 3rd January:—

“The execution of Sikat-el-Islam does not appear to have had the effect in Tabreez that I expected. So far as I can judge, the feeling of the majority of the population has been, in fact, one of indifference rather than otherwise. Eye witnesses even tell me that the populace reviled, and treated with contumely, the dead body, which, with the others, had been left hanging all yesterday. There is no evidence at present that the

population consider the manner in which a personage of his ecclesiastical standing has been dealt with as an affront to their religion. It is explained to me that people, rightly or wrongly, hold him, with the others, responsible for the disorganisation, and the consequent suffering to themselves, of the past few years, of which they are thoroughly weary."

No. 57.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 4, 1912.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

Please see my telegram of the 1st instant.

One member of the committee has already resigned, and as the Persian Government have appointed a Persian as president and not Mornard, the latter is unwilling to serve.

I fear therefore that the prospects of the committee getting to work are somewhat remote.

No. 58.

Lord Kilbarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Stockholm, January 4, 1912.

SWEDISH officers for Persia.

Similar instructions to those conveyed to me in your telegram of the 1st January only reached the Russian chargé d'affaires to-day, and we made communication simultaneously to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Russian chargé d'affaires added, in accordance with his instructions, that it was intended that this step should be regarded as the first result of the acceptance of the Russian demands by Persia. I intimated that my instructions made no mention of this point.

I may mention that in the course of conversation the day before yesterday the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me whether I thought that the second point of the ultimatum applied to foreigners who were already in the service of Persia. I said that I had no definite information, but that I did not think that this was the case. His Excellency pointed out that, if any demand were made on this ground for the withdrawal of the Swedish officers who are already in Persia, Swedish susceptibilities would be strongly affected. I did not telegraph this enquiry immediately, as Russian chargé d'affaires was expecting his instructions at any moment, and I thought our present action would suffice to dissipate any apprehensions which might be entertained by his Excellency. As, however, the Russian chargé d'affaires made specific mention of the ultimatum, I think a definite assurance on the point would be much appreciated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 59.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 5, 1912.

TABREEZ.

I have sent the following telegram to His Majesty's consul at Tabreez to-day:—

"As I understand the situation, Shuja-ed-Dowleh is in rebellion against the Persian Government, and is not even *de facto* governor of Tabreez. You should therefore receive no call from him.

"You had better call unofficially on the Russian general."

No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.

LORD KILMARNOCK'S telegram of the 4th January.

I would suggest that an assurance should be given to the Swedish Government by the Russian and British Ministers to the effect that the second point of the demands made by Russia does not apply to the case of the Swedish officers already in Persian service.

No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 5, 1912.

THE Persian Minister complained to Mr. Mallet on the 1st instant of the measures taken by the Russian Government in handing over Tabreez and Resht to military government. He especially mentioned the arrest of ecclesiastical dignitaries and other important persons as likely to cause much ill-feeling in Persia.

Mr. Mallet promised that enquiry would be made of you on this point.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 62.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 6, 1912.

SMART'S party reached Shiraz safely last evening.

No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 4th January.

Sir G. Buchanan has already, on my instructions, urged the Russian Government to prevent Shuja-ed-Dowleh from proclaiming the ex-Shah, and has received satisfactory assurances. His Majesty's consul reports that Shuja was not ill received by the inhabitants of Tabreez, and does not think that he will be a bad governor (see your telegram of 31st December).

He has also mentioned to the Russian Government His Majesty's Government's great regret at the execution of Sikat-el-Islam, and has been assured, in reply, that the Sikat was one of the prime instigators of an anti-Russian movement, and that the military authorities had no choice but to inflict capital punishment. Sir G. Buchanan has also expressed the hope of His Majesty's Government that a moderating influence would be brought to bear on the military authorities. You may express to the Persian Government my earnest hope that they will remain in office and continue to pursue a conciliatory policy.

No. 64.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 7, 1912.

TABREEZ.

I have to-day sent the following telegram to His Majesty's consul :—

“You may receive and return Shuja-ed-Dowleh's call, as he appears to be *de facto* governor, but your relations with him cannot be official until the Persian Government recognise him as governor.”

No. 65.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.

SEE Tehran telegram of the 4th January.

I learn that Persian Government object to appointment of Mornard as treasurer-general. They express the hope that this appointment will not be pressed by the two Governments.

Suggest to the Russian Government that if another candidate can be found, the Persian Government should be given the choice between him and Mornard, or that they should appoint a commission consisting of an Englishman, a Russian, and the subject of a minor Power.

No. 66.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 8, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 4th instant.

Mornard has been appointed acting treasurer-general.

Persian Government have also appointed a committee consisting of three Persians to take over the accounts from Shuster.

Mornard tells me that the three members of this committee are suitable men; he thinks they will submit to his supervision. He is therefore satisfied with the arrangement.

No. 67.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 8, 1912.

MY telegram of 13th December*: Situation at Meshed.

I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul, dated the 6th January, to the effect that a Russian force of about 800 men was expected to arrive at Kuchan on that date. He says the town is quiet.

No. 68.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 8, 1912.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah:—

"January 5.—Leading mujtehids of Nejeff sent a telegram to Sheikh of Mohammerah to be communicated to telegraph office, and addressed a threat to nullahs of Persia proclaiming a holy war against Russians and English."

Russian consul at Bagdad reports that two Nejeff ulemas have started for Persia.

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.

YOU should, unless you think it undesirable, inform Persian Government that we shall eventually demand reparation for the attack on Smart's escort, but that we must first obtain more complete information as to the facts. We may have to insist on some form of satisfaction beyond a money payment, but we shall restrict the latter to the smallest possible amount.

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," No. 274.

No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 8, 1912.

THE Persian Minister called at this department on the 2nd instant to represent the serious effect which the summary execution of the Sikat-el-Islam at Tabreez would have throughout Persia. The execution had been most unfortunately timed for the 10th day of Moharrem, which was an additional provocation to religious feeling.

Mr. Mallet asked Mehdi Khan whether the Sikat-el-Islam had taken part in politics, and he replied that he was a strong nationalist.

Mehdi Khan asked whether I could do anything. Mr. Mallet replied that Sir G. Buchanan had begged the Russian Government to exercise discrimination in the punishment which they meted out at Tabreez, and that he had himself spoken in the same sense to the Russian ambassador on the 1st instant.

Mr. Mallet had also mentioned to his Excellency the unfortunate effect which this execution would have.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 71.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 9, 1912.

ESCORT incidents.

Please see my telegram of the 2nd instant.

Colonel Douglas sends the following report, dated the 7th January, of the incidents :—

“I have nothing to add to my previous telegram (repeated in legation telegram of the 25th December) respecting the fight at Kotal Dokhtar on the 24th December. The treacherous attack on advanced scouts was the cause of almost all the casualties.

“Smart has already reported the commencement of the fight on the 26th December. It was not serious for the first mile and a-half. The fire then became hotter, as more men, presumably Kashgais, joined in on Birdwood’s right flank.

“There are several villages and towers along the road ; as the retirement continued numbers of riflemen poured out of each of these and fired on our party. This lasted till within 2 miles of Kazerun, the detachment being pursued and attacked for about 8 miles from both flanks. Our casualties in this fight amount to 2 followers killed, 6 sowars, 3 followers and hospital assistant wounded, 10 regimental mules either killed or stampeded with loads, 10 horses killed or died of wounds. The numbers opposed to Birdwood amounted to several hundreds, including villagers, but it has been impossible to form any accurate estimate. As regards losses incurred by enemy, Birdwood can vouch for five seen to be hit. I cannot give any opinion as to who instigated the attack, but, unless the road guards at the caravanserai had been assured of the support of the villagers along the road, it does not seem probable that they would have commenced the firing. It is possible that the men who first joined in on the right flank were those whom Mohamed Ali is supposed to have sent to stop the fighting ; they naturally joined in when fired on by our men. Smart saw nothing of the later proceedings, as he unfortunately fell behind and was wounded early in the fight. None of the men appear to have seen him fall, and Birdwood thought he was on ahead. I cannot sufficiently express my regret that he should have been left behind.”

No. 72.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Stockholm, January 9, 1912.

SWEDISH officers for Persia.

The Russian chargé d'affaires has already received his instructions. He leaves Stockholm to-night for a week, having obtained unofficial consent of Russian Govern-

ment, and during his absence the Russian Legation will be in charge of a junior secretary, who is not authorised to communicate officially with the Swedish Government. I have therefore ventured to join *chargé d'affaires* in action proposed by you in your telegram to St. Petersburg of the 5th instant.

The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked us for the communication, and declared that it was the firm determination of the Swedish Government not to take any step with regard to Persia without having previously entered into consultation with the Russian and British Governments.

No. 73.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 10, 1912.

I HAVE discussed the situation with my Russian colleague, and we now submit the following identic suggestions :—

We regard prompt termination of insurrection as indispensable preliminary to any useful attempt on the part of the Persian Government to deal with general disorder. Insurrection has already cost the Persian Government 300,000*l.* in actual money, and has resulted in pillage and in destruction of cultivation and of means of transport involving, if not something approaching to famine—wheat and barley have risen 100 per cent. since the summer—at any rate incalculable loss to the country, which must react also on foreign trade. It is of utmost importance that the insurrection should cease, not only because of direct expenses and loss which it is causing, but also because it absorbs the attention of the Persian Government to the exclusion of the chronic disorders which so urgently demand a remedy.

While the two Powers maintain their attitude of non-interference prospect of a termination seems remote, for while the Persian Government are strong enough to prevent the ex-Shah from entering the capital unaided, they are powerless to crush him in the provinces.

Possibly things will continue to drift, and the Persian Government will lose such vestige of authority as still remains.

Result of recent *pourparlers* of the two Governments seems to preclude recognition of ex-Shah. If, therefore, they intervene it must be on the side of the present Government, and we would suggest that we should offer the Persian Government, on certain conditions, to inform the ex-Shah that the two Powers will not recognise him and to advise him to return to Europe. Conditions would be the grant to him of a suitable pension, proclamation of a general amnesty, and, the more important one, some form of engagement binding Persian Government to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The present Cabinet shows no disposition other than to conform to those principles, but it may resign, and, moreover, we shall have to count with the *Medjliss*. An express engagement, therefore, that Persian Government will do nothing injurious to our respective interests, or some formula, would be very desirable. At the same time, Persian Government should be urged to dismiss their irregular forces (*fedais*) which, when ex-Shah is gone, will be no longer needed, and will be only a constant source of trouble.

We believe that in the present condition of affairs it would be possible to obtain the above conditions in exchange for our active support.

It is of urgent importance that the Persian Government should obtain money and arms for gendarmerie, and as with the dismissal of Shuster loan negotiations have stopped, the easiest financial operation would be the conversion by the Russian Bank of the Persian Government's debt to it, or some operation by this bank on the same security. The proceeds of this operation would not be large enough to render it advisable to deduct from it our claims. Payment of these should be made from a later loan which might possibly be specially arranged for settlement of foreign claims. The need of money is so urgent that, pending conclusion of the proposed Russian Bank's loan, the two Governments might make advances to be repaid from the loan on condition that proceeds will be spent under supervision of treasurer-general, and a large portion be earmarked for gendarmerie, which now promises well under Swedish officers. (Latter have now taken over treasury gendarmerie.)

Besides the gendarmerie Persian Government will need a small army to garrison the bigger towns. A scheme for such an army could be discussed with the Persian Government by legations according to politico-geographical exigencies.

No. 74.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 10, 1912.

MY telegram of 1st January.

British vice-consul at Resht reports that 400 Cossacks left Resht for Kazvin yesterday, and that 1,600 infantry have arrived at Resht from Kazvin.

No. 75.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 10, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 11th January :—

I spoke to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday about the situation at Tabreez, and was given to understand that the Russian Government do not propose—at any rate, at present—to take over the administration of the town. The military authorities would, however, his Excellency said, continue to exercise a punitive jurisdiction and to maintain order both in the town and along the caravan routes. His Excellency defended those authorities against the charges of undue severity that had been brought against them, and said that the execution of Sikat-el-Islam had not provoked the slightest disorders either at Tabreez or Tehran. He was, he said, a thoroughly bad character. He had acted, on the one hand, as head of the fedais, while, on the other, he was not an orthodox Persian, but the chief of a dissenting sect. This execution, therefore, had been taken quite calmly by the population. In conclusion, his Excellency said that the situation showed considerable signs of improvement.

I observed that, as this was the case, I trusted that the Imperial Government would now find it possible to withdraw their troops from Kazvin, but his Excellency replied that they would hardly be justified in taking this step at the present moment.

No. 76.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 10, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 11th January :—

Sir,

On the receipt of your telegram of the 8th instant, I communicated to M. Sazonof, in a private letter, your views with regard to M. Mornard's appointment, and I reverted to the subject in a conversation which I had with his Excellency yesterday.

M. Sazonof said that M. Mornard was, he believed, the best man for the post. He was a good man of business, and, what was most important, had a thorough knowledge of Persian affairs. The Russian Government had, however, never insisted on M. Mornard's appointment, nor had they imposed it on the Persian Government. M. Poklewski had discussed the matter with Sir George Barclay, and the two Ministers had recommended him as the most suitable candidate. Now that he had been appointed acting treasurer-general it was, he thought, too late for us to suggest the appointment of some other individual or a commission, consisting of an Englishman, a Russian, and a subject of one of the minor Powers. This latter course would, in his opinion, be most objectionable to the Persian Government, as it would probably be regarded in the light of an Anglo-Russian financial condominium. He therefore thought that it would be best to give M. Mornard a trial, and if, later on, the Persian Government could show any good grounds for objecting to him, Russia would not insist on retaining him.

M. Sazonof then proceeded to say that what we ought to do at once was to approach the question of a Persian loan. The best service which we could render the Persian Government was to help them to put their finances on a sound basis. Such material support would, he was convinced, be more appreciated by them than any amount of good words and friendly assurances.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 10, 1912.

IN view of the appointment of a Financial Commission, reported in your telegram of 8th January, it should be possible to secure a suitable post for Mr. Lecoffre in Southern Persia. You should take the necessary steps for this purpose.

No. 78.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 11, 1912.

SHUSTER left this morning.

No. 79.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 11, 1912.

REFER to your telegram of 10th January.

I should prefer to interview Lecoffre before asking Mornard (who would be the proper person to apply to) to find him a post. Lecoffre is believed in some quarters to have taken part in fomenting the disturbances which recently took place at Tabreez, and if he is really very pro-nationalist it might not be advisable to appoint him to a place like Mohammerah or Shiraz. He has not yet arrived at Tehran from Tabreez.

No. 80.

Consul Shipley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tabreez, January 11, 1912.

RUSSIAN consul informs me that Russian casualties in recent disturbances here were as follows: one officer and thirty-nine men killed; five officers and forty-five men wounded. The bodies of only seventeen of the killed have been brought in. The wounds received were chiefly from dum dum bullets.

I have seen photographs of the bodies, which show that they must have received terrible mishandling, the heads especially. The Persians themselves have been remarking on the fact that mutilation has been practised, and one of them even told my dragoman that the corpse of a Russian soldier had been decapitated close to his house.

The Russians declare that four of their men were tortured before their death during the night of 21st December, while Persian music was being played, but for this the only evidence so far appears to consist in the appearance of the four corpses when they were recovered.

It seems that only the Persians actually engaged in the fighting were responsible for these mutilations, not the population in general.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Kilmarnock.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 9th January: Swedish officers in Persia.

Your action is approved.

No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 12, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 10th January: Action by the two Powers in Persia.

His Majesty's Government are willing to act with the Russian Government in the manner suggested by the two representatives at Tehran in order to provide for immediate needs, since it is, in our opinion, absolutely necessary to lose no time in giving Persian Government support.

Please endeavour to obtain views of Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible.

No. 83.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 13, 1912.

I HAVE received the following reply from Smart to my enquiries as to the circumstances in which he was wounded and his subsequent treatment:—

"A young Kashgai deliberately fired at me. I was riding with our rear-guard, and he, with several others, crept up to within 30 yards of us as we were retreating. He could not, of course, have known my identity. The same bullet wounded my horse in the neck. I fell, and was more or less winded. As the enemy passed over me in pursuit of our force one quickly extracted a few valueless objects from my pocket. As our Maxim bullets were whistling over me, I rolled myself down hill. I then waited for the enemy to return. Two came back. I introduced myself, but the only result was that one cleared my pockets while the other covered me with his rifle; they then left me. The next party included the young Kashgai chief, Ardeshir Khan; there was considerable resemblance between him and the man who had shot me. He emphatically denied it, however, and I cannot be certain. He stated that he had been sent by Mohamed Ali Khan to stop the attack on the escort. He was extremely polite, mounted me on his own horse, and brought me back to the caravanserai, where I found Mohamed Ali, who assured me he had come from his camp at Shahpur with the express object of preventing the attack. He expressed his deepest regret and concern. My wound was bandaged as well as possible, and as the caravanserai was lacking in proper accommodation, Mohamed Ali insisted on my accompanying him to Shahpur, where he treated me with almost embarrassing kindness during my stay. A Persian surgeon, at his command, came there to attend to my wound. Mohamed Ali said that the common people were no longer properly under restraint; they had been much excited by the priests against our troops; he had given orders to the tofangchis to let me pass, but the people were out of hand."

No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 11th January: Mr. Lecoffre.

I concur.

No. 85.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 13, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* in

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," No. 333.

which is enclosed a report from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, dealing with the closing phase of the acute disorders which occurred there in the course of last summer.

I am to point out that in the opinion of Sir E. Grey the situation as depicted by Mr. Knox completely justifies the conclusion arrived at by His Majesty's Government from the telegrams received in the autumn that some increase of the consular guards was necessary for the safety of His Majesty's consulate and British subjects in the town of Shiraz itself. It shows, moreover, that the trouble which has now arisen is in no way due to the increase in the escort recently dispatched to Shiraz, and that, even if a rescue of the British colony there has now to be effected, it would certainly have had to be effected, possibly even before now and under greater difficulties, if the increase of guards had not been sent three months ago.

As regards Mr. Knox's appreciation of the services of Mr. Smith, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, of the sepoy and sowars attached to His Majesty's consulate, and of the consulate munshi, I am to express Sir E. Grey's earnest hope that their excellent conduct may be brought to the notice of the proper authorities in India.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 86.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 14, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 17th January:—

Sir,

On the receipt of your telegram of the 12th of this month, I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and informed him that you were prepared to co-operate with the Imperial Government on the lines proposed by M. Poklewsky and Sir George Barclay, as you considered that it was essential to give some solid support to the Persian Government without further delay. I added that you would be glad to learn his views with regard to the programme which the two Ministers had elaborated.

M. Sazonof replied that, while he approved of the programme as a whole, as offering a practical basis of co-operation, there were two points in it which seemed to him open to criticism. The first had reference to the attitude which it was proposed that the two Governments should adopt with regard to the ex-Shah. The Imperial Government, his Excellency said, would be quite willing to join His Majesty's Government in advising Mohamed Ali in a friendly manner to return to Europe; but they could not go so far as to tell him that they would, under no circumstances, ever recognise him. His Excellency then repeated the various reasons which—as M. Nératof had more than once explained to me on former occasions—rendered it impossible for Russia to take this step.

I pointed out that, in view of the fact that the ex-Shah had made his attempt and failed, and that he would never now regain the throne unaided, the Russian Government might, without exposing themselves to a charge of inconsistency, inform him that they could not countenance the perpetuation of the present anarchy which his presence in Persia must entail; that, if he left at once, the two Governments would endeavour to induce the Persian Government to grant him a pension; but that, if he declined to follow their advice, he would have to abandon all hope of ever receiving a pension again. I added that, as his Excellency was aware, His Majesty's Government would never recognise the ex-Shah, and that, as they were meeting the wishes of the Imperial Government in the matter of the proposed constitutional changes, it was but a small thing to ask that that Government should meet their wishes on this one essential point.

M. Sazonof replied that it was by no means so certain that the position of the ex-Shah was as bad as I had made out. He had still a strong backing of Turkomans, and it was always possible that he might attempt to establish his authority in the northern provinces, which had declared for him, even if he had to separate them from the rest of Persia. He begged me to believe, however, that the Russian Government had no desire to take his part. In spite of all that had been said to the contrary, they had done absolutely nothing to facilitate his return, and it was only owing to a false

passport and to a successful disguise that he had been able to pass unhindered through Russian territory. In the telegram which he had received from M. Poklewsky nothing was said on the subject of a pension, but it was evident from Sir George Barclay's telegram that this was due to an oversight. The grant of a pension would greatly facilitate matters, and he would be prepared to tell the ex-Shah that it was useless for him to remain any longer in Persia.

M. Sazonof then proceeded to speak of the second point to which he took exception, namely, the proposed financial operations. This was, he said, a matter on which he could not speak with authority until he had had an opportunity of discussing it with the Minister of Finance. His personal opinion, however, was that it would be a mistake for the two Governments to make small advances to the Persian Government, which would be insufficient to meet their financial requirements. What we ought to do was to arrange at once for a large loan. The Russian Government had no intention of pressing for the immediate payment of the indemnity, which formed the subject of the third demand accepted by the Persian Government, and they would also allow the outstanding claims of Russian subjects, which amounted to some 300,000*l.*, to stand over for the present. They would, however, be forced by Russian public opinion to demand the immediate payment of an indemnity to the families of the Russian soldiers who had been either killed or maimed for life during the course of the recent fighting. He could not say exactly what would be the amount of this indemnity, but at a rough calculation it would come to about 20,000*l.*

I remarked that at a moment like the present, when complete anarchy reigned in Persia, it would be very difficult to find financiers ready to float a large loan, except on very onerous terms. It seemed to me, therefore, advisable to commence by affording the Persian Government some temporary pecuniary assistance, so that they might be in a position to restore order in the country. With the restoration of order and an improvement in the general political situation it would be much easier for them to negotiate a large loan on reasonable terms. As regarded the question of the payment of an indemnity to the families of the Russian soldiers who had been either killed or wounded, it would, I suggested, be sufficient to obtain an engagement from the Persian Government that the sum demanded should eventually be paid out of the proceeds of the new loan, and that meanwhile the Russian Treasury might advance the money necessary to meet any passing claims on the part of these families.

M. Sazonof replied that he did not believe that it would make much difference, as regarded terms, whether the loan were to be raised at once or to be postponed to a later date. In order to obtain a loan of several millions of pounds it would be necessary that the two Governments, without giving an actual guarantee, should reassure its promoters with regard to the political situation, and give them clearly to understand that behind Persia stood Great Britain and Russia. He would, however, repeat what I had said to the Minister of Finance, and discuss the whole question with him.

I then read over to M. Sazonof the remaining points dealt with in Sir George Barclay's telegram of the 10th instant, but his Excellency said that he had no observations to make with regard to them.

No. 87.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 21, 1911.

OWING to the interruption of telegraphic communication between Tehran and both Astrabad and Kermanshah I have no very precise news as to how the insurrection is proceeding either in the east or west. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in the Medjliss on the 18th instant that the ex-Shah's followers had advanced as far as Semnan. I have no confirmation of this from the telegraph department. At all events no rebel force has yet penetrated into the town. Both Shahrud and Damgham appear, however, to be in the hands of the ex-Shah's forces. Beyond Semnan the telegraph line is cut, and the ex-Shah's Turkomans are doubtless not far from that town. The ex-Shah himself is reported to be still in the neighbourhood of Gumeshtepa at Khoja Nefes.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs also stated on the 18th instant that Salar-ed-Dowleh had reoccupied Kermanshah. Reports from His Majesty's consul at that place, dated the 9th December, showed that there was fighting in the town between some

Government forces and the insurgents, but I have so far not learned from him that the town has been taken by Salar-ed-Dowleh.

From Tabreez there is no change in the military situation to report. Early this month an attempt was made by the Tabreezis to come to terms with the Shuja-ed-Dowleh, telegrams having been received by the Anjuman from the Extremists in the Medjliss urging them to make peace, as it behoved all Persians to unite in defence of their country and religion in view of the Russian ultimatum. An influential deputation waited upon Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and urged him to return with them to the town, but the latter declined these overtures, suspecting a trap. The Minister for Foreign Affairs announced in the Medjliss on the 18th instant that Shuja-ed-Dowleh had sent a force to Ardebil, whence it was threatening Resht, but I have no confirmation of this from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 88.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

IT would serve no useful purpose for me to attempt to give a detailed account of the somewhat bewildering phases of the situation since the presentation of the second Russian ultimatum on the 29th November, but a brief review may be of interest.

From the first the Cabinet were unsparing in their efforts to induce the Medjliss to realise the wisdom of submitting, but for three weeks these efforts, counteracted as they were by great clerical and popular agitation, encouraged by the Democrat party, seemed doomed to failure. In the hope of gaining the confidence of the Medjliss sufficiently for it to give the Cabinet full powers to settle with Russia, Samsam-es-Sultaneh had introduced into his Ministry as Ministers of Finance and Interior respectively Hakim-ul-Mulk and Kawam-es-Sultaneh, men of pronounced democratic sympathies; but on the 11th instant, and again on the 18th instant, when the Cabinet sought to obtain the full powers desired, they found the Medjliss as recalcitrant as ever.

Meanwhile, the Russian troops, after stopping for a few days at Resht, had advanced to Kazvin, where between 3,000 and 4,000 were concentrated. The day (the 21st December) on which they were to begin their advance on Tehran, if the Persian Government had not by then submitted, was approaching. On the 19th the Russian chief of the staff had come to Tehran to make arrangements with the Russian Minister for the arrival of the troops.

On the 20th, however, things took a more favourable turn. On that day it became evident that the Medjliss had come to a more reasonable way of thinking. It accepted a proposal which had been put forward by the Cabinet on the 18th as an alternative to the grant of full powers, and which on that occasion had failed to pass owing to the abstention from voting of the greater part of the deputies, who were evidently afraid to put their names to a proposal which they felt was bound to lead to the acceptance of the three Russian demands. These deputies, however, by the 20th seemed to have plucked up their courage, and the Medjliss voted by a majority of 39 to 19 that a committee of five should be appointed and empowered in consultation with the Cabinet to come to a settlement with Russia. The committee was appointed, the principal member being Sardar Assad, and at a meeting with the Cabinet on the 21st instant at the Palace, under the presidency of the Regent, the committee gave their consent to the Government's accepting the Russian demands. M. Poklewski was informed of this verbally on the 22nd.

Some delay occurred in recording the Persian Government's submission in a note. It will be remembered that M. Poklewski had on the 15th instant told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that subject to there being no fresh incident or provocation the withdrawal of the troops would begin as soon as the Persian Government had given way. In the discussions with M. Poklewski as regards the drafting of the note, which extended over two days, the Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed him very hard to consent to its recording a Russian undertaking in unequivocal terms that the troops would be immediately withdrawn and no fresh demands put forward. This M. Poklewski firmly refused to permit, explaining that he was not empowered to say more than he had already said. Finally, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Poklewski were

agreed upon the terms of the note, and it was handed to the Russian Legation this afternoon. M. Poklewski immediately replied, declaring his Government satisfied. Translations of the two notes are enclosed herewith.

It will be noticed that the second demand, as recorded in these two notes, is worded as proposed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th December, with the amendment suggested by Sir G. Buchanan and agreed to by M. Sazonof.

Simultaneously with the exchange of notes the Government have taken what is hoped may prove effectual steps to prevent the outburst of indignation which was to be expected from the Democrat party in the Medjliss. At the moment of writing I learn that a large meeting of all classes was convened at the Palace this afternoon, where the Minister for Foreign Affairs urged the dissolution of the Medjliss, which, he said, had impeded the task of Government both in foreign relations and in internal administration. No opposition was offered. The Regent immediately issued a decree, declaring the present session closed, and I hear that Yeprem, chief of police, has sent a force to occupy the Medjliss. Those in the building were invited to leave. No resistance was offered, and the gates are now closed.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to M. Poklewski.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

IN answer to your Excellency's note of the 29th November, I have the honour to say that the Persian Government have always been desirous of safeguarding their good relations and friendly intercourse with the Russian Government, and have on many occasions proved their good intentions in the prevention of difficulties and incidents which might injure the friendly relations between the two Governments. On this occasion also in order that their former policy and line of conduct should in no way be modified; in order that the historical friendly relations between the two Governments, which date from long years back, and are much prized by both sides, should not be shaken; and so that every kind of cause of complaint and indifference on the part of the Russian Government should be removed as indicated at the end of the note, the Persian Government consequently have accepted the three demands laid down in the note above referred to, and have dismissed Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre from the Persian service.

With regard, however, to the second demand in your note, which required that the Persian Government should undertake "not to invite foreigners to take service under the Persian Government without having previously obtained the consent of the British and Russian Legations," the Persian Government hopes that the Imperial Russian Legation will accept the following wording in place of the above, *i.e.*: "That in view of the sincere desire at all times for maintenance of cordial relations with the Russian and British Governments, the Persian Government in future, when engaging foreign employés and officers whom they consider necessary for the organisation of Government administrations, will take care that their choice will not be such as to injure the just interests of the two Governments in Persia. Consequently, regarding the engagement of foreign employés and officers, the Persian Government will be prepared to effect an exchange of views beforehand with the Russian and British Legations at Tehran in order that an agreement should be arrived at."

It is clear that, as stated in your note, after the acceptance of these demands of the Russian Government, the Persian Government are justified in their certitude that the causes of the principal differences between the two Governments have been removed, and that a basis has been formed upon which to build up cordial relations and a firm friendship. They are also justified in the certainty that, after the acceptance of the above demands, the relations between the two Governments will return to conditions more favourable than heretofore, and before the conditions had been considered. And the result of the steps which the Russian Government thought it necessary to take in order to bring about the fulfilment of those demands will immediately be put an end to, and that the hopes of the Persian Government in regard to the absolute good-will of the Imperial Government will be completely confirmed.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

M. Poklewski to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

December 24, 1911.

I HAVE noted with great satisfaction the contents of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, that the Persian Government, in view of their friendly sentiments towards the Imperial Russian Government, have decided to accept the demands of the Russian Government made in my note.

The Imperial Government are desirous of proving their good-will towards the Persian Government, and are pleased to accept the wording of the second article of their ultimatum as proposed by your Excellency, and consider that they have received satisfaction in all three demands.

Therefore I have the honour, in communicating this to your Excellency, to say that I hope, now the principal differences which had arisen between our two Governments have been removed, that, as stated in your Excellency's note, neighbourly good relations which are advantageous to both countries will be established.

I avail, &c.

POKLEWSKI-KOZIELL.

No. 89.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 89.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending December 24, 1911.

Tehran.

THE past four weeks have been full of incident at Tehran connected chiefly with the Russian ultimatum, delivered to the Persian Government on the 29th ultimo, which was finally accepted by the Persians on the 24th December, on which day the Medjliss was closed.

On the 1st December the Medjliss rejected the Russian demands, as reported in a previous despatch.

The Cabinet underwent partial reconstruction on the 12th December, and is now composed as follows:—

Premier, Samsam-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister of War, Sardar Mohtashem.
 Minister of the Interior, Kawam-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister of Finance, Hakim-ul-Mulk.
 Minister of Education, vacant.
 Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Moazed-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister of Justice, Zoka-ul-Mulk.

On the 18th December the Foreign Minister made a long speech to the Medjliss regarding the Russian demands, and proposed that full powers should be given to the Cabinet to settle the matter, or, as an alternative, that the Medjliss should select a committee to assist the Ministers, without further reference to Parliament, in dealing with the question. Both proposals were rejected. After an unsuccessful attempt had been made to refer the Russian demands to the Regent, the Medjliss again put the Cabinet's second proposal to the vote on the 20th December, when it was agreed to by thirty-nine members as against nineteen who voted against it. A committee of five deputies was chosen with some difficulty, and included Sardar Assad, who is still a

member of the Medjliss. The following day this committee and the Cabinet decided to agree to the Russian demands. The Russian Minister was informed of this decision on the 22nd verbally, and on the 24th December in writing.

On the 24th December a large meeting of all classes of the population, with the exception of the Democratic element, was held at the Palace in the presence of the Regent. Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of the Regent, advocated the dissolution of the Medjliss, which, he said, had impeded the task of Government both in foreign relations and internal administration. No opposition was offered, and the Regent issued a decree declaring the session of the Medjliss to be at an end. Yeprim Khan, the chief of police, sent a force during the course of the afternoon to occupy the Medjliss building, the doors of which were closed without incident.

On the 1st December various acts of terrorism were perpetrated in Tehran, the most serious of which was the assassination of Ala-ed-Dowleh.

Sardar Assad arrived at Tehran on the 5th December, accompanied by Mukhber-es-Sultaneh and Dabir-ul-Mulk. He at once advocated submission to the Russian demands, and did his utmost to quell the public excitement which was being actively fanned by the Democratic party. Various public meetings were held at which inflammatory speeches were delivered, and school-children paraded the streets with banners inscribed with the words "Independence or death." Telegrams were sent to the Parliaments of Europe, the Women's Suffragist Committee in London, and to other bodies in Europe and in Persia, with the object of enlisting sympathy and support against Russia. Sardar Assad's influence did much to stop the public excitement, which probably brought about hostilities with the Russian troops at Tabreez and Resht, as reported elsewhere.

Tabreez.

During the early part of December the situation in Tabreez was so unsatisfactory that the majority of the merchants were ready to accept the appointment of Shuja-ed-Dowleh as governor, in the hopes that the prevailing insecurity would be put an end to.

There had been no disorders in the town itself, but an anti-foreign feeling was prevalent, and, as a precautionary measure, the Russian consul-general considered it necessary to patrol the town and to reinforce the Russian troops by some 500 men from Ardebil. These arrived on the 17th and 18th December.

On the 21st December fighting commenced between the fedais and the Russian troops. On the following day the fedais took up a position in the citadel, and the Russians commenced to bombard it. There was also some firing in the streets. The fighting continued on the 23rd and 24th. At the moment of writing communications with Tabreez are interrupted.

The Russian and Persian accounts of the cause of the fighting vary.

The Russians contend that a soldier repairing the telephone line was attacked by a police patrol, and that in self-defence he killed two Persians.

On the other hand, the Persian Government reports that some Russian soldiers, without previous warning, climbed on to the roof of the police-station to lay a telephone wire, and that when challenged by the gendarme on duty they opened fire, killing two Persians.

His Majesty's consul states that owing to the existing state of affairs he is not able to ascertain the exact facts that led to the outbreak.

He adds that the populace are remaining quiet, and that so far foreigners have not been molested.

During the fighting the Russian consulate-general was attacked, as I am informed by the Russian Legation, and one Russian officer of the consular escort was killed and two Cossacks were wounded.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

The British consular agent at Astrabad reports that the ex-Shah, with 350 followers, is still at Khoja Nefes, and that some 300 Caucasian mercenaries are on their way to join him.

On the 30th November 250 Russian soldiers arrived at Astrabad and took up their quarters there.

Many Mazanderan noblemen, sympathisers of Mohamed Ali, have taken refuge in Ghilan.

At Resht a general boycott of Russian goods has been declared, and the bazaars have been closed, causing much distress among the lower classes. At Enzeli the labourers at the wharf refused to handle goods coming from Russia, and trade is at a standstill in consequence.

The arrival of Russian troops at Enzeli was as follows :—

November 21	240 infantry (including some engineers).
" 22	400 infantry.
" 22	100 Cossacks.
" 22	100 artillery, 4 guns, 6 machine guns.
" 23	100 Cossacks.
" 23	100 artillery, 4 guns.
" 26	700 infantry.
" 27	1,500 infantry.
" 29	100 Cossacks.
December 14	150 infantry.

In addition, several small parties landed on dates His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht has not been able to ascertain, bringing the total to 4,500, with 8 guns and 10 machine-guns.

The infantry belonged to the 2nd Caucasian Shemakhinski and Salianski Regiments, and the Cossacks to the Labneski Regiment.

The departures for Kazvin were as under :—

December 3	Men.	} With 8 guns and 10 machine-guns.
" 4	1,200	
" 5	900	
Date not reported	700	
Total troops at Kazvin	4,000	
Total troops at Resht and Enzeli	500	

At Resht, on the 21st December, an affray broke out between the Russian troops and the Persians, and on the following day fighting occurred at Enzeli. His Majesty's vice-consul reports a Russian officer wounded, three Cossacks killed, ten Persians killed, and about forty wounded.

Meshed.

Rukn-ed-Dowleh, the new Governor-General of Khorassan, arrived on the 15th November, and was given a very good reception by all classes.

The condition of the district is becoming worse. Mohamed Ali's following and nondescript sowars, sent against them from Tehran, have been looting and pillaging the country as they go, and robberies are of frequent occurrence.

On the 23rd November 400 of the ex-Shah's followers took Shahrud, and on the 16th December Damghan was also occupied.

Ninety time-expired men of the Russian consular guard were relieved by a similar number on the 17th November.

The Central Government have decided to separate Nishapur from Khorassan, to which the British and Russian Legations have agreed.

On the 28th December His Majesty's consul-general telegraphed that, owing to the approach of the Moharrem, and to the rumour that Salar-ed-Dowleh had taken Tehran, the population was arming and the situation becoming serious.

The Russian consul-general, after consulting his British colleague, asked for reinforcements. The matter was referred to the Russian Minister at Tehran, who advised the dispatch of 100 Cossacks.

On the 12th December His Majesty's consul-general reported that the situation was better, and a sotnia of Cossacks was due shortly.

Ispahan.

The discontent and distress in the town and environs continue to increase.

The environs are subject to petty raids, which tend to check the transport of grain into the town. Trade is almost at a standstill owing to the increasing insecurity of the roads, and the condition of the province is rapidly becoming worse. His Majesty's consul-general reports that Sardar Ashja's withdrawal is imminent, and the Bakhtiaris say at Tehran that they intend to replace him as governor by his cousin, Sardar Zafar.

A squadron of Indian cavalry under Captain Eckford arrived at Ispahan on the 4th December.

On the 29th November a caravan preceding the squadron of Indian cavalry, *en route* to Ispahan, was attacked by robbers. The robbers were repulsed by the cavalry, the Resaldar Major being wounded.

Yezd.

Reports of general insecurity in the district and ill-treatment of Parsees in the town continue. The state of trade in the district is very unsatisfactory.

Shiraz.

Owing to the presence of the Indian cavalry at Shiraz the Mullahs attempted to stir up anti-foreign feeling, and instigated a boycott of Russian and British goods. They also induced the merchants in the bazaars to refrain from selling food-stuffs to the troops. On the 18th December, the supply officer was met with a definite refusal to sell. The matter was referred to Tehran and the Foreign Office. In pursuance of the instructions of His Majesty's Government the supply officer was directed to use force, if necessary, in order to obtain such provisions as he required. This was done and no incident resulted. The boycott was shortly afterwards put an end to, and since then there has been no trouble in obtaining provisions for the troops.

On the 24th December, news arrived from Shiraz that the Indian cavalry escort going to meet Mr. Smart was fired on by road-guards near Kazerun. One sowar was killed.

Seistan.

His Majesty's consul reports that the advent of the cavalry reinforcements for the southern consulates has had an excellent effect on the local officials, and that the state of the province is quiet.

Kerman.

The new governor, Amir Azam, has arrived at Kerman. Baluchis are still in the neighbourhood of Bam.

Kermanshab.

The ex-Shah's adherents being in the majority at Kermanshab, Mohtashem-ed-Dowleh, the governor, left for Bagdad towards the end of October. Salar-ed-Dowleh appointed Ferrukh Khan to succeed him.

Ferrukh Khan was not able to maintain order, and on the 27th November, His Majesty's consul reported that general pillaging in the town was probable.

Early in December, Azam-ed-Dowleh, the representative of the Persian Government, arrived, and fighting commenced between his followers and those of Ferrukh Khan. On the 14th December, His Majesty's consul reported that the town was quiet.

Salar-ed-Dowleh arrived on the 15th December, with a small force.

Mohammerah.

The sheikh is attempting to bring Nizam-es-Sultaneh to Mohammerah by sea, and is reported to be succeeding in his object.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh's estates were confiscated by the Persian Government on his dismissal last September from his post as Governor-General of Fars.

The sheikh has invoked the good offices of His Majesty's Minister for Nizam-es-Sultaneh to obtain mitigation. His Majesty's Minister is doing what he can.

No. 90.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

Sir, *Tehran, December 24, 1911.*
WITH reference to my despatch of the 27th November* respecting the state of the southern roads, I have the honour to state that the usual weekly reports

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," No. 300.

from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan have not reached me this month, owing no doubt to the disorganised state of the postal service. The Indo-European Telegraph Department received an intimation dated the 8th October from their agent at Shiraz, to the effect that the Dehbid section of the road to Ispahan was being held by robbers, and that the muleteers refused to accompany inspectors of the line. There was little prospect of the condition of the road becoming more satisfactory in the near future.

A robbery on the Ahwaz road of twelve cases of opium was reported as having taken place on the 3rd December, and His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas telegraphed on the 22nd December that a caravan was robbed about 16 miles from Bunder Abbas, and that about 200*l.* worth of British property was carried off.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 91.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegrams of the 3rd and 4th instant,* I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a report addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire by Lieutenant Wilson, who, as you are aware, accompanied the Ispahan consular escort from Shiraz to Ispahan. This report gives the details of the incident which occurred on the 30th November, on the Shiraz-Ispahan road, near Yezdikhast, reported in my above-mentioned telegrams.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Diary from November 6 to December 4, 1911.

ON the 6th November I left again for Kazerun, there to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas and two squadrons of the 39th Central India Horse. I took with me two sowars of the consulate escort, but no baggage at all. His Majesty's consul had asked for two Kashgai sowars to accompany me; they arrived late and would not go beyond Zinian; the road, which had been bristling with armed guards a week before was now entirely deserted, the road guards having fled after the perpetration of a robbery by a band of Surkhi Kashgai. Having ascertained that all supplies were ready at Zinian in charge of the local representative of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, I went on to Dashtarjin (40 miles) arriving after dark, and slept in the telegraph rest-house. Next morning at dawn I left for Kazerun by a short cut over the hills, accompanied by one sowar and four riflemen from Dashtarjin; one of them shot on the way a mountain sheep with the finest head I have ever seen in Persia. I am sending it to the Bombay Natural History Museum. I reached Kazerun at 4 P.M. On the 8th November I accompanied the two squadrons to Mian Kotal, a long march of 21 miles with two steep ascents, one of them the Kotal Dokhtar, up a causeway paved with smooth boulders. The comparative ease with which the horses negotiated these ascents, the last of a very trying series, was remarkable. At Mian Kotal supplies had been laid in through the agency of the telegraph department gholam, and no difficulty was encountered on this score either here or anywhere else on the road. Heavy rain fell during the night.

The next day we pushed on to Dashtarjin (14 miles), moving by two tracks across the Piri Zan Pass.

On the 10th we went on to Zinian (14 miles); some trouble was experienced here with the Kashkuli roadguards, who succeeded in extracting some money as rahdari from our muleteers, who as usual, gave it readily, fearing (not without good reason) reprisals on some subsequent occasion if they made our presence an excuse for refusing. Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas sent for Isfandiar Khan, a minor Kashkuli chief, and insisted on the money being refunded, which was done at once. Rain commenced to fall during the night and continued all next day. It was therefore decided to push on to Shiraz at once with one squadron as the next stage, Chinar Rahdar, afforded shelter

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," Nos. 218 and 224.

for only one squadron at most. Shiraz was reached by the Sikh squadron after a long march, which the wet and cold made very trying for the followers, two of whom died a few days later.

For the next five days, till the 18th November, the force halted at Shiraz to refit, and the question of accommodation was gone into; a month's supplies had already been accumulated, and no anxiety was felt for the moment on this score.

The arrival of the force at Shiraz was marked by no demonstration or ceremony; the weather prevented all but a very few from leaving their houses; next day, however, large crowds visited the camps to gaze quietly on the unaccustomed spectacle. As far as I could gather from the remarks of the crowd, and from enquiries made in various directions, the attitude of the population on the subject of the arrival of the troops was one of general apathy, tempered, in the case of the landowning and commercial classes, with satisfaction at the guarantee of law and order that their presence affords. The only sign of dissatisfaction was the dissemination of a cyclostyled manifesto, in which the arrival of the troops was used by the anonymous scribe as a pretext to revile his political opponents.

On the Kazerun-Shiraz road I received several offers from leading villagers to provide men wherewith to form a local force of roadguards. The offers were made spontaneously, and deserve to be borne in mind, as there can be little doubt that the sedentary tribesmen inhabiting the villages between Kazerun and Shiraz form very promising material for such a purpose; tribesmen could never be relied on, even were their chiefs to permit them to serve, which is unlikely; I also believe that a locally raised force would be effective only as long as the men were employed in the neighbourhood of their homes.

On the 18th two squadrons left Shiraz. I was responsible for all arrangements for supply, &c., as far as Yezdikhast, *i.e.*, to the borders of Fars, in the same way as for the Kazerun-Shiraz road. I made all arrangements through the local staff of the telegraph department, with the best results. All provisions required had been laid in at each stage, and charged for at current rates, which the local knowledge of the staff enabled them to insist on, a matter in which I should otherwise have been to a large extent powerless.

Supplies were not collected without some difficulty owing to the unprecedented depredations of the nomad tribes. Half the villages of the Marvdasht plain had been looted, and 25 per cent. of them had been entirely deserted during the last two years—many of their villages which I had seen and recorded as flourishing five years ago. All along the road meat was scarce, and dairy produce practically unobtainable owing to the wholesale robbery of flocks and herds.

On the 25th Abadeh was reached, and a halt made; we had been accompanied up to this point by some 300 mules, carrying British goods for Ispahan, and 300 disbanded Persian soldiers, the last remnants of the Shiraz expeditionary force; also the assistant or "mawin" to the ex-Governor-General of Fars.

From Abadeh onwards we were accompanied by some 300 camels and a hundred or more mules and donkeys which had been waiting for our arrival. On the 26th the Sikh squadron returned to Shiraz with Miss Ross, the Mohamedan (Tiwana) squadron, under Captain Eckford, continuing northwards.

The cold from Dehbid onwards had been severe, particularly as at least one squadron had always to camp out at nights. Both men and horses, however, stood it very well; it was noteworthy that, though our caravan numbered over 1,000 animals between Abadeh and Ispahan, nowhere was the slightest difficulty experienced in obtaining fodder.

In Yezdikhast there were various rumours of robbers on the next stage, but these were contradicted by the arrival of a mail waggon, the driver of which had seen nothing, and of a local caravan. We left this place at 7.15 A.M., preceded by the merchants' caravan, numbering over 900 animals, a large donkey caravan at Yezdikhast having availed itself of our passage to go to Kumisheb. I was almost at the head of the merchants' caravan, in front of which were the Persian soldiers referred to above, driving along their donkeys, on which were tied most of their rifles.

They were attacked by some thirty tribesmen near a mud tower some 6 miles west of Yezdikhast, but within Fars, one was wounded.

The rest either sought safety in flight, or gave up their rifles and ammunition to the robbers, who thus secured six rifles.

The caravan promptly turned back, and I sent word to Captain Eckford, who at once brought up the squadrons, and charged down upon the tribesmen, who kept up a sharp but apparently ill-aimed fire. Captain Eckford and Lieutenant Wickham, who

were a long way in front, were not hit, but Rissaldar-Major Ghulam Muhammad, Khan Bahadur, who was leading his troop, was shot in the thigh during the charge, and a bullet passed through the waist-cloth of Jamadar Muhammad Bahadur; a horse was also wounded. The robbers unfortunately got into the tower before the cavalry could reach them.

The caravan was meanwhile diverted to the east, covered by part of the squadron, whilst the remainder surrounded the fort and kept up a sharp fire on the loop-holes, and on any men who showed themselves; wounded men were seen being helped into the tower.

After a careful examination of the situation Captain Eckford came to the conclusion that to take the tower by assault would involve heavy loss of life, which the circumstances did not justify.

In this decision I fully concurred, particularly as, for the moment, the official rôle of this squadron does not extend to the protection of caravans.

Aminabad was reached in safety the same day, and on the 1st December a telegraphic report on the incident was made from Yezdikhast.

Ispahan was reached on the 4th, Mr. Grahame meeting us at Kaleh Shur on the previous day; most of the Europeans resident in Ispahan, but comparatively few Persians, witnessed our arrival.

Excellent quarters had been obtained for the squadron in a large serai adjoining the Bagh-i-Shah on the outskirts of the town, with very good stables and ample accommodation for four times as many men as we have.

A. T. WILSON, *Lieutenant I.A.*

No. 92.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15, 1912.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 30, 1911.

AS I was about to close my despatch of the 24th instant, news reached me of the meeting held the same day at the palace, the result of which was the issue by the Regent of a rescript ordering the closure of the Medjliss.

I now have the honour to transmit a translation of the substance of the letter addressed by the Cabinet to the Regent setting forth the reasons for which the Regent's sanction for the closure of the Medjliss was asked.

This statement, to which the Regent drew my particular attention, contains several points of special interest. It is an unequivocal indictment of the Medjliss and its consistent obstruction of the Government, and it states, moreover, that the deputies—and particularly the Democratic party—have incited the public to take up arms, to revolt, to boycott British and Russian goods, and to oppose the Government. It holds them responsible, in fact, for the outbreaks at Tabreez and Resht, which is curiously inconsistent with allegations made to me by the Persian Government that the troubles were due to Russian provocation.

This statement of the Government's case, which was read to the meeting by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who read it in His Highness's name, was followed by the rescript of the Regent ordering the closure of the Medjliss, and by a further edict of the Regent's ordering that fresh elections should at once be held.

It is reported to me that elections are to be commenced forthwith at Tehran, and as soon as possible in the provinces. Copies of the enclosed document and the others referred to have been telegraphed to all the provinces, and I have not so far heard of any particular cases of special excitement in consequence. This is not due to any moderation on the part of the Democratic party, for the Democrats have done their utmost to work up excitement.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Abstract Translation of Letter from the Cabinet to the Regent, dated December 24, 1911.

AS your Highness is aware, ever since the formation of the Cabinet by his Excellency Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the Ministers have used their utmost endeavours, just as your Highness has also constantly done, to impress upon the Medjliss the necessity

of avoiding measures calculated to weaken the Government's authority, but that all these attempts have unfortunately failed owing to the intrigues of certain individuals.

On the 29th November a note was addressed to the Foreign Office by the Russian Legation containing three demands and announcing the dispatch of troops to enforce them. After a Cabinet Council had been held to consider the question and had formed their views as to the gravity of the situation and the seriousness of the advance of the Russian troops in view of the state of the country, the Ministers at once put their views before the Medjliss. The deputies rejected the views of the Cabinet, which replied to the Russian note in conformity with the decision of the Medjliss. The Ministers, foreseeing that under these unfortunate circumstances graver dangers were in store, handed in their resignations to your Highness, but they were not accepted, and at the same time a number of the deputies waited upon your Highness to express the confidence of the Medjliss in the Cabinet and to request that it should continue to hold office. In the hope that the Medjliss had realised the dangers of the situation the Cabinet consented to continue in office and engaged in a further consideration of the Russian ultimatum.

It is quite obvious that if, when on the first occasion the matter was put before the Medjliss by the Cabinet, the deputies had agreed with the Government the Russian troops would have returned from Resht, and that the subsequent misfortunes brought about by the agitation of particular individuals at Tehran who sent exaggerated telegrams to the provinces inciting the people to rise, would not have occurred, and the events at Resht and Tabreez would not have come about. Numerous telegrams were sent by the deputies and the Democratic party to all the provinces and even to foreign countries. The people of Persia were incited to take up arms, to revolt, to boycott British and Russian goods, and to oppose the Government, and instead of going with the Government at such a juncture in order to find a way out of the difficulties they did all they could to put obstacles in their way and the Government was confronted with fierce opposition from them at every turn whether at secret or private sittings. Though time was most valuable we found that they would not even assemble in the Medjliss in order to form a sufficient quorum, or if they did their opposition was not to be overcome.

Eventually on the 18th December the Minister for Foreign Affairs put the ultimatum proposals before the Medjliss; firstly, that the Medjliss should agree with the Cabinet regarding the Russian ultimatum; or secondly, that they should choose a commission to which they would give full powers to deal with the matter; or finally, that they should proceed according to the law with the formation of a new Cabinet. Unfortunately the debate on this occasion produced no result and no decision was reached. As the Medjliss could not form a new Cabinet the present Ministers were obliged to continue in office and to act in accordance with the dictates of their consciences in what they considered to be the truest interests of Persia.

When only two days remained before the advance of the Russians from Kazvin to the capital and a few of the deputies saw that danger was very near, it was decided in secret session by thirty-seven votes to form a committee of the House with full powers, but at the public sitting the childish spectacle was witnessed of this same committee voted for by only thirty-nine members, and after this step had been taken it was announced that not a single member of the Medjliss would consent to sit on the committee. There continued to be great difficulty in forming the committee until the news arrived on the night of the 21st December of the commencement of fighting at Tabreez and Resht, and of the arrival in Khorasan of a number of Russian troops. At the very last moment the committee was formed and decided to agree to the acceptance of the terms of the ultimatum, whereas, if in the beginning the views of the Cabinet had been agreed upon, the incidents at Tabreez and Resht would never have occurred, nor would the Russian troops have come to Kazvin, and the indemnity demanded by the Russian Government would have been unimportant.

Your Highness will observe from the above that the events at Tabreez and Resht are dangers which have been courted by the harmful dissensions and the opposition to the Government, and that these misfortunes have been caused by the telegrams and incitements from the capital. It is obvious that unless the Government is strong, whether constitutional or republican, it is impossible to carry on the affairs of the State satisfactorily, and the paralysis of the Government as witnessed of late can only result in chaos and confusion.

Furthermore, in view of the actual dissension and opposition of the present Medjliss, it is clear that good government and a cessation of the existing chaos is impossible.

Therefore the present Government consider it desirable—and, in order to deal with imminent dangers, even obligatory—that your Highness should issue without delay a rescript ordering the closure of the Medjliss, though the fundamental law does not give the Government the direct right to close the Medjliss. On the other hand, the fundamental law does not empower the representatives of the people, after the lapse of the two years for which they were elected, to prolong their own session indefinitely.

In these circumstances we are forced to ask your Highness to issue a rescript ordering the closure of the Medjliss, and to order, by the same rescript, that fresh elections should be begun.

NEJEF KULI BAKHTIARI SAMSAM-ES-SULTANEH,
Prime Minister.
VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
KAWAM-ES-SULTANEH,
Minister of the Interior.
GHOLAM HUSSEIN BAKHTIARI SARDAR MUHTASHEM,
Minister of War.
HAKIM-UL-MULK,
Minister of Finance.
ZOKA-UL-MULK,
Minister of Justice.
MOAZED-ES-SULTANEH,
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

Rescript of His Highness the Regent.

As the Cabinet find necessary and have approved, it is legally signed. Let it be carried out as desirable, and let the firman and rescript for fresh elections be prepared and published.

ABUL KASSEM, NASR-UL-MULK, NAIB-ES-SULTANEH.

No. 93.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, January 4, 1912.

IN a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 30th of last month I enquired whether he had any news to give me with regard to Persia, and expressed the hope that he would soon see his way to recalling the Russian troops from Kazvin.

M. Sazonof replied that he had no desire to retain them there longer than was necessary, more especially now that the Persian Government had formally complied with the three Russian demands in writing. He could not, however, give me any definite date for their withdrawal at present. Two rifle regiments had, indeed, already been transferred from Kazvin to Resht, but they would be sent back at once to the former place should the slightest indication be given of trouble or disorder at Tehran. Russia had been taken by surprise at Tabreez, and would not run this risk a second time. He could not, therefore, recall the Kazvin expeditionary force till all danger of any fresh outbreaks was passed.

The troops which had been sent to Resht and Tabreez would have to remain there till order had been thoroughly re-established, and until there was some prospect of its being maintained. This, his Excellency remarked, would be a work of time, but, in reply to a question which I had addressed to him, he disclaimed the idea of converting this temporary occupation into a permanent one. On my expressing the hope that, in the punitive measures which it was proposed to take, the innocent would not be punished with the guilty, his Excellency said that he sincerely trusted that this would be avoided, but that severe punishment would have to be meted out as an example and warning to others.

In view of the pressure which is being brought to bear upon them by public opinion, it will, I fear, be very difficult for the Government to recall their troops from Kazvin at the present juncture.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

Sir, *St. Petersburg, January 10, 1912.*
 THE semi-official "Rossia" of to-day publishes an article protesting against the charges of undue severity brought by the foreign press, and especially the British press, against recent Russian action at Tabreez. It refers angrily to the meeting which is to be held in London on the 15th January by "local Persian democrats, with Lord Lamington, Professor Brown, and Messrs. Lynch and Co. at their head." It asks why all this outcry is now being made about Sikat-ul-Islam, whereas no voice was raised in protest when foul outrages were committed on Russian soldiers by the Tabreez fedais, supported by the scum of the Caucasus, under the leadership of this very Sikat-ul-Islam. It states that, according to eyewitnesses, the outrages on the Russian troops were too horrible for description.

The writer declares that the moderation of the Russian court-martial is sufficiently established by the fact that only fifteen men were condemned, while no fewer than twenty-six were released and pardoned. He protests against the capital which is made by slanderers of Russia of the type of Lord Lamington, Professor Brown, and Mr. Lynch out of the fact that Sikat-ul-Islam was a leading ecclesiastic, and maintains that he and his associates, Sheikh Selim, Sadik-ul-Mulk, and Zia-ul-Ulema, were the chief leaders of the whole anarchist and anti-Russian movement in Tabreez, and were the centre round which the local fedais rallied.

The article goes on to state that the charge of having carried out the executions on the Moslem holy day of "Ashura" is as false as the charge of the slaughter of women and children. The festival ended at midday, and the executions did not take place till 5 o'clock in the evening, and were fully approved by the populace, who had long suffered at the hands of the fedais and their leaders. It closes with a warning to the Persians and to "their foolish European instigators" that no one can be allowed to raise a hand against a Russian soldier with impunity, and that Russia is determined to preserve order on her borders.

The above article is evidently inspired, as M. Sazonof held very similar language in the course of the conversation which I had with his Excellency this afternoon.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

Sir, *St. Petersburg, January 11, 1912.*
 ON the receipt of your telegram of the 5th instant I communicated to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs an *aide-mémoire* giving your views on the subject of the Swedish officers in Persia. I now have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the reply which I have received from the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 95.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by Russian Government.

(Translation.)

FULLY sharing the opinion expressed in the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy, that paragraph 2 of the Russian ultimatum to the Persian Government does not apply to Swedish officers who were invited previously to enter the Persian service with the preliminary assent of the Russian and British Governments, the Imperial Government instructed its representatives in Stockholm to notify the Swedish Government in this sense.

*St. Petersburg, December 28, 1911
 (January 10, 1912).*

No. 96.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 15, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that a certain Reshid-es-Sultan has arrived by Russian boat at Enzeli with 150 armed Shahsevans in the interests of the ex-Shah.

No. 97.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 15, 1912.

I HAVE received the following telegram from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz dated yesterday :—

“I am informed by the Kawam, whose son has come back from Fesa, that a mullah called Sheikh Ali Dashti has gone to Borasjun, where he is doing his utmost to create an active anti-foreign league, and that Sheikh Zakerieh, of Laristan, is assembling his men with the avowed intention of advancing on Bunder Abbas. The Kawam states that it has come to his knowledge that telegrams of a very inflammatory nature have been sent to Borasjun from Tehran. Similar telegrams have been addressed to Mohamed Ali Khan, praising the conduct of the Kashkulis in the recent incidents.

Kawam promises to show these telegrams to me if he can get copies of them from the Governor of Kazerun. Though the Kawam states that the return of his son from among the tribes was only due to the lack of money (his own force here is also dribbling away), this move seems to me somewhat disquieting.”

I have made representations to the Persian Government on the subject of Sheikh Ali Dashti's inflammatory activity, and urgent instructions have been sent to the Governor of Bushire to do his utmost to check it.

No. 98.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 15, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram of this morning.

I am informed by the Russian Minister that Russian consul at Resht has direct instructions from St. Petersburg to ship Reshid-es-Sultan and his 150 armed Shahsevans back to Astara, the port whence they came.

No. 99.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 15, 1912.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

Please see my telegram of the 8th instant.

The Persian Committee has been dissolved.

Mornard has taken over the offices of the treasurer-general. The position of the American subordinates awaits settlement, but in the meantime work is now proceeding harmoniously.

No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 15, 1912.

I DULY received your Excellency's despatch of the 27th ultimo, reporting a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd ultimo, in the course of which M. Sazonof informed you that when a formal written engagement respecting the Russian demands had been received from the Persian Government and Mr. Shuster's dismissal from the Persian service was an accomplished fact, the Russian troops, who were at that time stationed at Kazvin, would be at once recalled. His Excellency further stated that there was no connection between the question of the recall of these troops and the very serious incidents that had just occurred in the north.

In view of these remarks on the part of M. Sazonof, it was with some surprise and disappointment that I read in your telegram of the 3rd instant that his Excellency stated that it was quite impossible at present to recall the force from Kazvin, and that the 1,000 men already withdrawn from that town had only been transferred to strengthen the garrison at Resht.

The reasons which have led the Russian Government to decide not to withdraw their troops are doubtless to be found in the disturbances which have occurred in the north and the strong public feeling in St. Petersburg, but Tehran has remained perfectly quiet throughout, the Persian Government are admittedly not to blame, and order has now been restored in Tabreez, so that there does not appear to be any reason why the withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin should not now be proceeded with.

You should take an opportunity of speaking to M. Sazonof in this sense, but in doing so it is desirable that you should explain the considerations that influence His Majesty's Government in the matter. They have recognised that a Persian Government which pursues a policy hostile to Russian interests cannot be strong. Such a policy leads inevitably to friction and conflict with Russia that must weaken the Persian Government and impair or destroy its authority.

All the more is it necessary that a Persian Government, when friendly to Russian interests, should be supported and encouraged. The present Persian Government has complied with the Russian demands and has shown a genuine desire for friendly relations with Russia; unless there is some response to this attitude and some encouragement is given to the Persian Government, it will not be apparent to the latter or to their subjects that they have anything to gain. A withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin would give such encouragement; it would justify to the Persians what their present Government is doing, and would thereby strengthen its position, and enable it to regain the authority that is essential to the restoration of order in Persia.

One result of the weakness of the Central Government has been a state of anarchy in Southern Persia; the trade routes are now completely blocked; it is even doubtful whether inside Shiraz itself foreign lives and property will long be safe. This state of things is very prejudicial to British trade and interests, and makes the re-establishment of Persian authority a matter of great importance to His Majesty's Government. As long as the Persian Government were in conflict with the Russian Government it was recognised that no improvement could be expected, but now that this unfortunate condition of affairs has ceased, His Majesty's Government are most anxious that the Russian Government should facilitate every measure necessary to enable the Persian Government to establish its authority and to restore order.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 101.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 16, 1912.

RECRUITING for ex-Shah at Ashkabad.

According to a report just received from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed, recruits are now being turned back by the Russian authorities.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1912.

ENQUIRE whether Russian Government would agree to approving Mornard's appointment as acting treasurer-general. We think this would be the best plan, leaving question of a definite appointment undecided for the present.

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 17, 1912.

I APPROVE your language as reported in your telegram of the 14th instant. A condition of the renewal of the pension must be that Great Britain and Russia will lend Persian Government their support against Mohamed Ali if he returns to Persia without the consent of the two Powers.

No. 104.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 18, 1912.

AFTER suitable arrangements had been made for the grant to Zia-ed-Dowleh (whom I reported in my telegram of the 29th December to have taken bast at His Majesty's consulate at Tabreez) of a safe-conduct through Russia to Tehran, I expressed the hope to the Russian Minister that Russia would not demand any punishment affecting the basti's life or liberty on his arrival in Tehran. My Russian colleague thereupon advised his Government to demand merely that his title should be cancelled. The Russian Government were informed that, unless I received authorisation from you, I could not acquiesce in any punishment affecting basti's life or liberty. The tone of the reply of the Russian Government shows some annoyance with me, and they threaten to cancel the safe-conduct already accorded to the basti if I persist in my attitude; they would thus be free to deal with him as they please whenever he quits His Majesty's consulate. The basti would, in consequence, probably prolong his stay at the consulate indefinitely.

The following is my view, and I should be glad to know if you concur in it: The basti should not be discouraged from leaving the consulate and taking his chances at Tehran if, though knowing the attitude of the Russian Government, he is willing to avail himself of the safe-conduct still open to him. In this case our responsibility is at an end when he leaves the consulate; but we cannot encourage the basti to leave unless we obtain assurances from Russia that no punishment affecting life or liberty will be demanded without a fair trial. I am satisfied that if the cases were reversed, and we had a charge against someone in bast at a Russian consulate, the attitude of the Russian Government would not be more amenable than that which I am adopting in the present case.

I understand that the charge which the Russians are bringing against Zia-ed-Dowleh is that he falsely reported indiscriminate slaughter by Russian troops of women and children.

No. 105.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 18, 1912.

MY telegram of 8th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Persian consul-general at Bagdad has succeeded in persuading two ulemas not to enter Persia.

No. 106.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 18, 1912.

PLEASE see your telegram of yesterday to St. Petersburg.

After all that has happened, I think a suitable pension for the ex-Shah would be 50,000 tomans. I would deprecate renewal of the full pension, and I hope that the Russian Government will not insist on it.

No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 18, 1912.

TELL M. Sazonof, when you next see him, that I did not mean to suggest that the full amount of the ex-Shah's pension should be renewed, and that I agree with the view expressed in Sir G. Barclay's telegram of to-day.

No. 108.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 6, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 30th December last, I now have the honour to transmit translation of the Regent's firman of the 23rd December, ordering a general election "as soon as possible."

It will be seen that the Regent refers in his firman to article 2 of the programme presented to the Medjliss by Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet and passed by the House on the 2nd September (see my despatch of the 5th September, 1911*), in which the Cabinet urge that the deputies of the next Medjliss should be given a mandate by the country for the revision of the constitution. A species of "referendum" on this point is therefore being made, but it is hard to imagine how it will be possible, under existing conditions in this country, to determine whether the majority of the electors are for or against the proposed modification of the fundamental laws of 1906 and 1907.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Firman for the New Elections.

(Translation.)

IN the name of his Most Powerful and Exalted Majesty the King of Kings, Sultan Ahmad Shah Kajar (may God make luminous his State and kingdom).

Whereas the parliamentary session of the National Consultative Assembly terminated on the 23rd Zighedeh (15th November, 1911), in order that no lapse should occur between its expiration and the order for the new elections, with the issue of this firman we notify all those who are entitled to election rights, in accordance with the new law dated the 4th November, 1911, to be prepared to take steps for the election of new deputies. We have also, in conformity with our decree of the 23rd December, 1911, given ample instructions to the Ministry of the Interior to take all necessary steps for the good management and execution of the elections and compliance with the important legal points.

On this occasion, we deem it necessary to remind the people of the protected provinces that it is of the positive duties of those entitled to vote to thoroughly peruse and study the electoral law, and in giving assistance to each other in comprehending its meaning and points, to refer to their wisdom and conscience, and to know that by means of the votes they give they commit to the charge of their representatives

* See "Persia, No. 3 (1912)," No. 368.

for the two new parliamentary years the ease and welfare of their own persons as well as the fate and prosperity of the country.

Those who can be truly worthy of such important powers will have to be honest persons cognisant with the needs of the nation, competent to perform this ponderous duty, and whose political notions ought to have been made public to, and known by, the electors.

In view of the discussions which on the initiative of the Ministers took place in the National Consultative Assembly on the 2nd September, 1911, the Ministers and members deemed it necessary that, by a power to be vested in the members by the nation, they (members) should revise the constitution in the new Medjliss for the organisation of the country; we, therefore, having regard to this question, in accordance with the usage of the fundamental rule of a constitutional Government—namely, the referendum to the people—notify to all the individuals of the nation, and to those who are to be elected, to have this point in view, that for the deputies of this session this especial power is also observed, so that after the opening of the new Medjliss they should with freedom of decision and with exhaustive study of the question take what steps they may deem advisable.

Although in constitutional countries it is an ordinary custom that the date of the beginning of the elections and the date for the opening of the Medjliss are previously appointed and notified by the Government, yet as the elections for this session are in accordance with the law which has been passed by the Medjliss, and as there had been no time to arrange the necessary preliminaries, we have urgently commanded the Ministry of the Interior to take the necessary measures, so that in the electoral centres the preliminaries for the matter should be arranged as soon as possible, and the elections be begun; and that as soon as the result of the elections should become approximately known, to advise us accordingly of the appointment of the opening day of the new Medjliss. We also direct the deputies who will be elected to leave (may it please God) for Tehran as soon as possible.

On this occasion we beseech God Almighty and Most High to bestow beneficent concord and to enlighten the minds of the people by His inspiration.

ABUL KASSEM, NASR-UL-MULK.

No. 109.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 19, 1912.

BAST of deputy governor at Tabreez.

I agree with the view of the situation expressed by Sir G. Barclay.

Unless the Russian Government are willing to give us the necessary assurances as suggested in his telegram of 18th January, we cannot possibly urge Zia to leave the consulate. You should make this clear to M. Sazonof.

No. 110.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 19th January.

Russian Government cannot consent to Zia-ed-Dowleh escaping without any punishment at all, though they have no desire that he should be condemned to death. They claim that he ought to be deprived of his office, degraded from his rank, and that his salary should be taken from him, as they maintain that he was one of the chief promoters of the recent troubles at Tabreez. In informing me of the above, M. Sazonof said that he did not know whether this punishment could best be administered by bringing Zia-ed-Dowleh to trial or directly by the Persian Government themselves by administrative act.

No. 111.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 20, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 23rd-January:—

Sir,

I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th instant and spoke to him on the affairs of Persia.

I commenced the conversation by saying that order could never be re-established in that country so long as Mohamed Ali remained there, and by urging the necessity of our at once taking action to induce him to retire. Should he consent to do so, you would be prepared to join the Russian Government in recommending the Persian Government to grant him a pension of 50,000 tomans, but you could not support his claim to the full pension, which he had received prior to his return to Persia. Were, however, the pension, which you proposed, to be granted him it must be on the understanding that, if he again returned to Persia without the consent of the two Governments, the latter should support the Persian Government in opposing him.

M. Sazonof replied that he would raise no difficulties with regard to the amount at which you had suggested that his pension should be fixed, and that he was ready to make a communication to the ex-Shah in the terms reported in my telegram of the 14th instant. He must, however, beg you not to ask him to give an undertaking that the Russian Government would support the Persian Government against Mohamed Ali should the latter ever again attempt to regain the throne. This would, for the reasons which he had already given me, be going further than the Imperial Government could go; but he would always be ready to address a serious warning to Mohamed Ali, and to impress on him the folly of renewing an attempt that was foredoomed to failure, seeing that His Majesty's Government would never consent to recognise him.

We then proceeded to discuss the question of a loan which M. Sazonow agreed in thinking was one of primary importance. His Excellency was, however, unable to say anything definite on this point until he had talked the matter over with the Minister of Finance.

I next proceeded to speak on the subject of the recall of the Kazvin troops, reminding his Excellency of the assurances which he had formerly given me, and urging on him the necessity of the two Governments uniting their efforts to restore order by giving the Persian Government some tangible proof of their support and confidence. I dwelt on the grave situation with which His Majesty's Government were confronted in the south, and on the serious prejudice that was being caused to our trade there in consequence of the prevailing disorders, which would never have become so acute had it not been for the state of unrest and excitement produced by Russia's action in the north. I then read to his Excellency your despatch of the 15th instant.

M. Sazonof admitted that he had given me the assurances of which I had reminded him, and said that he had no wish to retain the troops at Kazvin a day longer than was necessary, more especially now that there was no question of an advance on Tehran. There had been a decided improvement in the situation, but he could not guarantee that fresh disorders would not break out at one point or another. Only the other day some Russian soldiers had been fired on at Resht; and as long as this danger existed Russian public opinion would not condone the recall of the troops. I suggested that, as everything was quiet at Tehran and Kazvin, they might at any rate be withdrawn to Resht or Tabreez as a first step towards their complete withdrawal when there was no longer any reason to fear the outbreak of fresh disturbances in the north. M. Sazonof seemed to think that it might soon be possible to do this, but said that he could take no decision without first consulting the military authorities. He then went on to say that it would be much easier to explain the recall of the troops to the Russian public if he could at the same time announce that the Persian Government had engaged to indemnify the families of the Russian soldiers who had been killed or seriously wounded during the recent troubles, as soon as the state of their finances permitted of their doing so.

I carried away from this conversation the impression that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is most anxious to work loyally with us and to re-establish normal and correct relations with Persia.

No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 20, 1912.

MY telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of 16th January : Treasurer-general.

If M. Poklewski receives similar instructions, you should make a communication to the Persian Government, stating that until the three Governments have exchanged views regarding a definite successor to Mr. Shuster, M. Mornard's appointment to the position of acting treasurer-general is approved by His Majesty's Government.

No. 113.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)

Sir,

India Office, January 20, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant forwarding a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated 11th December last, regarding the recent disorders at Shiraz, and to say that he concurs in the views expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter I am to say that the Secretary of State has read with much pleasure of the good services rendered by Mr. Smith and by the Indian troops, and he will not fail to bring them to notice in the proper quarter.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

No. 114.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd January, 1912, relative to the position at Shiraz.

India Office, January 23, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.)

January 23, 1912.

WE recommend that negotiations should be opened with a view to satisfaction being exacted from those responsible for past incident, and to opening the road by levies of headmen. As a means of associating Persian Government with the scheme, the Swedish officers now reported to be starting for Shiraz might be employed to supervise such levies with assistance of British officers.

It is necessary, however, that present Khan of Borasjun should be punished before there can be a commencement of negotiations. Persian Government should, we suggest, be at once called upon to depose him formally from Borasjun governorship; if they fail to do this, it will be necessary for us to deal with him ourselves, a course of action in which, owing to khan's accessibility from the coast, no serious difficulty is involved.

Restriction of the present free import of arms and ammunition to the tribes is a primary essential to their good behaviour and control in future. It is of imperative necessity, in order to effect this, that Persian littoral should be placed under a strict blockade, on the same lines as that of the coast of Mekran. Arrangements for increasing the stringency of this blockade are already being made by us.

The vindication of our position *vis-à-vis* Persian Government, in regard to recent incidents, has still to be considered. Desire not to increase Persian Government's

difficulties, and not to create a situation from which withdrawal would be difficult, is to a large extent the basis of our abstention from sending more troops to Shiraz and Shiraz road, or even to Bushire; it is for consideration, however, whether we should not take steps to exact reparation for recent incidents and cost of measures now proposed from Persian Government.

No. 115.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)

Sir,

Admiralty, January 23, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, dated the 20th instant.

A copy has been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Calcutta, January 20, 1912.

IT has been ascertained that large supplies of arms and ammunition reach Albida from Muscat, partly by sea and partly by land, and thence come into the hands of the tribes of Luristan and Fars. This accounts to a great extent for the unruliness of these tribes.

While the tribes farther to the east and north purchase old rifles, the ammunition for which can be refilled several times with black powder, the Luristan and Fars tribes now chiefly use small-bore rifles of a modern type, and cannot refill their cartridge cases.

The ammunition can only reach them by one of the following routes :—

1. Through Turkey, viâ Bagdad ;
2. Through Russia ; and
3. Across the Persian Gulf.

It is not at present possible to send large quantities by either of the first two routes, so that by stopping the supply by the third we ought soon to bring the disturbances by the tribes to an end.

The question of the general policy to be adopted was discussed at a conference to-day, and we decided to render blockade as stringent as we are able.

No. 116.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 23, 1912.

THE Cabinet are in great anxiety in consequence of information which they have received that the forces of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and of other agents of the ex-Shah at Ardebil and other places in Azerbaijan, are contemplating a combined movement on Tehran.

The Persian Government, who surmise that our joint programme will include some proposal for dealing with the ex-Shah, both urge that we should lose no time in making our programme known to the Persian Government. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs reminds me of your promise to use your influence for future

measures helpful to Persia as soon as the Persian Government had complied with the Russian demands as formulated in the second ultimatum (see your telegram to St. Petersburg of the 16th December).*

No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 23, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 20th January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

In the circumstance, Zia-ed-Dowleh must, I suppose, remain at the consulate for the present.

No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 23, 1912.

EX-SHAH.

Your telegram of 20th January.

I approve the language which you held to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is important that the two Governments should lose no time in submitting proposals to the Persian Government, and I should therefore be glad to receive from M. Sazonof a definite answer regarding the suggestions made by the two legations (see telegram from Tehran of 10th January).

It should not be forgotten, in considering the position of the ex-Shah, that he no longer has any right to claim a pension at all, and I am of opinion that if the two Governments decide to grant him one they should only do so on obtaining from him some fuller guarantee that he will not return to Persia. He has weakened the Persian Government by his incursion, which cost them considerable sums to check, and has thus made them less able to deal with the disorders in the south, which have consequently increased. As a result British trade has suffered severely.

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1912.

I SPOKE to Count Benckendorff in the sense of my telegram of to-day's date about the ex-Shah's pension, emphasising the damage which the ex-Shah's incursion into Persia had done incidentally to British interests in Southern Persia. Count Benckendorff said the important thing was to get the ex-Shah out of Persia. He did not deprecate a written undertaking such as I had suggested being required, but it might be that the ex-Shah would refuse to come out of Persia with such a condition. Would it be wise to insist on the condition if his withdrawal from Persia could be obtained by waiving it? I said if the ex-Shah did come out of Persia without any condition I thought the Russian Government should put him under surveillance.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 120.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 20th January: Treasurer-general.

Russian Minister has not received any instructions.

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," No. 292.

No. 121.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 24, 1912.

BASTI at Tabreez.

Please see your telegram of yesterday.

Provided that basti be given a safe-conduct to Tehran, and that proper assurances are given by the Russian Government that they will not demand further punishment than that indicated in telegram of 20th January from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, I see no objection, provided you approve, to urging basti to leave His Majesty's consulate.

No. 122.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 24, 1912.

PLEASE see your telegram of the 13th January.

I have asked Mornard to give Lecoffre a post in the south of Persia. Mornard is urging the Persian Government to appoint him to Shiraz. I shall give him my support if necessary.

No. 123.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 24, 1912.

TREASURY-GENERAL.

Nearly all the American assistants wish to leave, and Mornard has, in consequence, asked the permission of the Persian Government to engage eight Belgians as assistants for the Treasury.

He asks me to support his application, but I have replied that I must obtain your sanction before doing so. The engagement of these Belgians will naturally tend to consolidate Mornard's position as treasurer-general. My Russian colleague will certainly support the application unless he receives instructions to the contrary.

It is, of course, essential to engage Europeans in the place of the resigning Americans.

No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 24, 1912.

REFER to telegram from Tehran of yesterday.

Express to M. Sazonof my earnest hope that, in view of his assurances as reported in your telegram of the 3rd January, steps may be taken to discourage every sign of activity on the part of Shuja-ed-Dowleh. This should be quite possible for the Russian Government.

It is very desirable that a warning should without delay be conveyed to the ex-Shah. You should urge M. Sazonof to cause to be made to him at once the communication alluded to in your telegram of 20th January.

We understood that Reshid-es-Sultan was being sent back to Astara by the Russian authorities, but I now hear from the Persian Minister that he is in the neighbourhood of Resht, and intends to lead his force to join that of Shuja.

No. 125.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 24, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 1st February:—

Sir,

In a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th of last month I spoke to his Excellency in the terms of your telegram of the 23rd ultimo, and impressed on him the importance of placing some proposals before the Persian Government without undue delay. I at the same time informed his Excellency of the report which had reached us that Reshid-es-Sultan was contemplating joining hands with Shuja-ed-Dowleh in making an advance on Tehran.

M. Sazonof promised to telegraph at once to the Russian consul-general at Tabreez, instructing him to do all he could to discourage Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and to warn him that if he attempted to advance on Tehran Russia would have nothing more to do with him.

Proceeding next to discuss the various points raised in the identic telegram addressed to their respective Governments by Sir G. Barclay and M. Poklewsky, M. Sazonof said that he was quite ready to join His Majesty's Government in making a communication to the Persian Government on the lines which they had proposed. He had already explained the attitude which he was prepared to adopt with regard to the ex-Shah, and would agree that the grant of a pension should be conditional on his giving an engagement that he would not return to Persia without the consent of the Russian Government. The Russian Government, his Excellency added, would moreover refuse to allow the ex-Shah to establish himself again on Russian territory. It would be better, however, he thought, to leave it to the Persian Government to fix the exact amount of his pension, as they might not be prepared to go to so high a figure as 50,000 tomans.

No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 24, 1912.

REFER to telegram from Government of India dated 23rd January and repeated to you.

These proposals should be carried out without delay.

No. 127.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 25, 1912.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH and the ex-Shah.

Please see your telegram of the 24th January to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

According to reports received by Persian Government, a force consisting of 2,000 Shahsevans with six guns is *en route* for Mianeh and Zendjan by order of Shuja. The latter is sending Reshid-ul-Mulk to take command of the force.

No. 128.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 26, 1912.

MY telegram of 25th January.

Russian Minister informs me that his Government have instructed the Russian consul-general at Tabreez to tell Shuja that, as Russia has declared that so long as

Russian troops are near Tehran ex-Shah will not be recognised, His Majesty's cause is hopeless, and expeditions in his name are aimless and are disapproved by the Russian Government.

No. 129.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 26, 1912.

SOUTHERN PERSIA.

Please see telegram of the 23rd January from the Government of India.

I think we might limit our demands to a moderate compensation based on the scale of pension given by the Government of India to families of the killed and to the wounded, the value of the munitions, &c., stolen and of the horses killed, and say a sum of 1,000*l.* for Mr. Smart.

It will probably be possible to persuade the Persian Government to give an undertaking to pay this sum out of the next loan without our being obliged to take any measures of a coercive nature. I will inform you later of the total amount so soon as Colonel Douglas has worked out the figures on the above-mentioned basis.

As regards the Khan of Borasjun, I would propose to make a separate demand for his dismissal.

No. 130.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 26, 1912.

RESHID-ES-SULTAN.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to repeat the following telegram which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht dated yesterday :—

“Reshid left Enzeli yesterday for Astara ; his men left by the overland route a few days ago. Before leaving, the arms which had been taken from them were returned to them.

“The Russian consul has released Aga Khalil and Seyed Abd-ul-Wahab.”

No. 131.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 26, 1912.

SOUTHERN PERSIA.

According to reports from His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, Mohamed Ali Khan states that he has arrested some of the aggressors. Kawam has sent one of his own men to Kazerun to bring them back to Shiraz. Mohamed Ali cannot, however, at present be persuaded to surrender them. His Majesty's acting consul adds that, beyond Mohamed Ali's bare statement, there is no proof whatever that the arrest of any of the culprits has been effected.

I have brought this to the notice of the Persian Government, and have urged them to send orders to Mohamed Ali to surrender the arrested men as a step towards reparation.

The desire of the Persian Government to effect improvement of Shiraz and Shiraz road is indicated by the impending departure of four Swedish officers for Shiraz, but it is very doubtful whether they will be able to reach that place, and whether, on their arrival, they will be able to cope with the prevailing anarchy.

No. 132.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 27, 1912.

MY telegram of 24th January.

Lecoffre has been appointed financial agent for province of Fars at a salary of 4,000 tomans.

No. 133.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 27, 1912.

AS reported in my telegram of the 23rd January, I had already spoken to M. Sazonof in the sense of the first paragraph of your telegram of the 24th January. As soon as I received the latter telegram I embodied the two remaining paragraphs in a private letter to his Excellency.

In a few minutes' conversation which I had with M. Sazonof last night his Excellency told me that he would now take steps to convey to the ex-Shah the warning which he had promised.

No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 24th January: Persian Treasury.

If unavoidable vacancies in the staff occur, we cannot object to their being filled by Belgian subjects. It would, however, be desirable that as many as possible of the present assistants should be retained by Mornard, if they are capable men.

No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 27, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 24th January: Bast of deputy governor at Tabreez.

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that if his Excellency will give safe-conduct and not demand further punishment than is mentioned in your telegram of 20th January the basti will be urged to leave His Majesty's consulate.

No. 136.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 27, 1912.

YOU should communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum embodying the proposals of the fourth paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 10th January. You should at the same time propose that, pending negotiations for a large loan to the Persian Government, the British and Russian Governments should each advance 200,000*l.* on the conditions suggested by the two Ministers. We should have to require that the British share of the advance should be devoted to the restoration of security in the south.

I think we might leave it to the Persian Government to fix the amount of the pension to be granted to the ex-Shah.

No. 137.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 28, 1912.

MY telegram of the 10th January.

I learn from M. Mornard that no taxes are coming in to the Treasury; that he is continually receiving applications for arrears of pay; and that an advance of 200,000*l.* is absolutely necessary to enable the Government to carry on until a large loan can be arranged.

I think an advance of this amount should, if possible, be made without delay. As a condition, we should insist on the execution of a programme of expenditure, to be drawn up by Mornard, in which a considerable sum would be set apart for the financing of the gendarmerie.

In my opinion and in that of Russian Minister, we ought also, without further delay, to acquaint the Persian Government with the conditions on which the British and Russian Governments are willing to advise Mohamed Ali to return to Europe. There is no necessity to postpone this communication until the question of a loan is settled.

No. 138.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 28, 1912.

KERMANSHAH.

Please see my telegram of the 22nd December last.*

I have just received the following telegram, dated the 17th January, from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah:—

“Many shots were fired at the consulate on the evening of the 15th January. The Prince denies any complicity in this. I have forty rifles in the consulate, and Azam-ed-Dowleh could obtain more guards. What am I to do in the event of the Persian Government taking no steps?”

“The Prince was joined on the 16th January by Sardar Mozaffir with 250 horse: total force is thus about 1,400. Others will follow. Tribes will join Prince unless Persian Government's forces arrive.”

I have telegraphed as follows in reply:—

“It seems likely that further attacks would be provoked if you obtained guards through your basti. It would be wiser to adopt some other course.”

No. 139.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 28, 1912.

ESCORT incidents.

Please see my telegram of the 26th instant.

Colonel Douglas informs me that the total value of the property stolen and the animals killed in these two incidents is about 934*l.*

The casualties were three killed, ten wounded, exclusive of Smart, and one missing. Of the ten wounded, three are severely so, and three will probably be permanently disabled.

I would propose that we should claim 4,734*l.*, composed as follows: 1,000*l.* for Smart, 300*l.* for each of the killed, missing, or permanently disabled, and 100*l.* for each of the other wounded. When forming this estimate I have had in mind to reduce our demand as far as possible.

* See “Persia, No. 4 (1912),” No. 318.

The total amount, exclusive of compensation for Smart and stolen property, seems to be on the same scale as that which the Russian Government propose to demand for the casualties at Tabreez (see telegram of the 20th January from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg).

Our claim should be considered as a first charge on the next loan.

No. 140.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 28, 1912.

ON the receipt of Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 24th January I addressed a private letter to M. Sazonof, and received a reply in which his Excellency stated that as Mornard had already assumed office it was too late to express our acquiescence in his acting appointment. He added that should M. Mornard prove fitted for the post, he did not propose to raise any objection to the appointment being made a permanent one.

In reply to this letter I pointed out that, in taking no notice of the acting appointment of M. Mornard we should be neglecting the principle which the Russian Government had themselves laid down in article 3 of their ultimatum to Persia.

In a letter which I have now received, M. Sazonof says that he cannot depart from what he said in his previous letter, as the position of M. Mornard *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government would inevitably be weakened by any action such as we propose.

His Excellency adds that his attitude in this matter does not constitute any infringement of the principle laid down in the Russian ultimatum, since the two legations at Tehran had themselves put forward M. Mornard's name.

No. 141.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 27th January: Persian treasury.

All but two of the Americans intend to leave Persia as soon as they have come to terms with the Government in regard to certain payments to which they consider themselves entitled. The two who propose to remain were officers of the treasury gendarmerie who have placed themselves under the Swedish officers, now that the national gendarmerie has absorbed the other force.

No. 142.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 27th January.

M. Sazonof is willing that a safe-conduct as far as Tehran should be given to Zia-ed-Dowleh, now in bast at Tabreez. He agrees, moreover, not to demand that Zia should be subjected to any punishments in excess of those enumerated in my telegram of the 20th January.

No. 143.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 31, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 1st February:—

I called on M. Sazonof yesterday to discuss with him the *aide-mémoire* which I had sent him in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 27th ultimo.

After reading over with me this *aide-mémoire*, of which a copy is enclosed, M. Sazonof said that he was to see the President of the Council on Friday and would then discuss with him the question of a temporary advance being made to the Persian Government by Great Britain and Russia. In the meanwhile, however, our two Ministers at Tehran should advise the Persian Government to enter at once into negotiations with the ex-Shah with regard to his pension. They might at the same time draw up together the text of the communication which the two Governments were to make to the Persian Government on the subject, and might take as a basis for discussion the first paragraph of my *aide-mémoire* down to the words "principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention." He was, his Excellency said, quite ready to act in conformity with the principles which you had laid down; but there were certain slight modifications which he would like to see introduced into the text of the *aide-mémoire*. He objected, for example, to such phrases as "seems to preclude the recognition of the ex-Shah" and "they would not recognise him"; but it would be quite easy to alter the text without compromising the attainment of the object which you had in view. The two Ministers would communicate the text to the Persian Government as soon as it was agreed upon, and might at the same time inform them that the two Governments were consulting together as to the best means of affording them financial assistance. In addition to this official communication to the Government at Tehran, we might tell Mohamed Ali privately that his cause was hopeless, that His Majesty's Government would never recognise him, and that he must therefore leave the country.

In the subsequent course of our conversation M. Sazonof informed me that he was about to address me a note, which was only awaiting the approval of the President of the Council, laying down the conditions on which the Russian Government were ready to co-operate with and to support the Persian Government, and giving a general outline of their policy with regard to Persia. In addition to the conditions referred to in the identic telegrams of Sir George Barclay and M. Poklewsky, his Excellency mentioned two others, namely, the strengthening of the Cossack Brigade and its employment at any point in North Persia where its services might be required; and the postponement of the meeting of the Medjliss till it had been possible to constitute a Senate which should assemble at the same time as the Medjliss. The object of the first of these two conditions was, M. Sazonof explained, to enable the Russian Government eventually to withdraw their troops from Tabreez.

Enclosure in No. 143.

Aide-mémoire.

HIS Majesty's Government agree with the view recently expressed by the representatives of the two Powers at Tehran to the effect that the result of the pourparlers which have taken place between the Imperial Government and the British Government seems to preclude the recognition of the ex-Shah, and that therefore, if the two Powers intervene, it must be on the side of the Persian Government. His Majesty's Government would accordingly propose to adopt the suggestion of the two Ministers that the two Governments should offer to the Persian Government on certain conditions to inform the ex-Shah that they would not recognise him and to advise him to return to Europe. The conditions would be the grant to the ex-Shah of a suitable pension (the amount of which could be left to the Persian Government to fix), the proclamation of a general amnesty, and the more important condition of some form of engagement on the part of the Persian Government binding them to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Although the present Persian Cabinet seems disposed to conform to those principles, the contingency of its resigning must be reckoned with, and, moreover, the two Powers will eventually have to count with the Medjliss. It would therefore be very desirable to obtain an express engagement that the Persian Government will do nothing to injure British or Russian interests, or an engagement to such effect. The Persian Government should at the same time be urged to dismiss their irregular forces (*fedais*) which, when the ex-Shah has left Persia, will be no longer needed and will merely be a source of trouble. His Majesty's Government is further of opinion that, pending discussions as to a loan to the Persian Government and as to the financial institutions to which the negotiation of such a loan should be entrusted, it would be of advantage that the two Governments should make an advance of 200,000*l.* each on the condition suggested by the two representatives that the proceeds

will be spent under the supervision of the Persian treasurer-general, and that a large portion thereof be earmarked for the expenses of the gendarmerie. The sum of 200,000*l.* advanced by the British Government would have to be used by the Persian Government for the purpose of restoring order on the southern roads of Persia.

St. Petersburg, January 16 (29), 1912.

No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 23th January: Ministers' joint proposals.

Would an advance of 100,000*l.* by each of the two Governments be sufficient for the present? If so, it would be better to limit it to that sum.

No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 31, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of the 28th January.

It is desirable that the two representatives at Tehran should be authorised to communicate to the Persian Government without further delay the proposals given in their joint telegram. I hope Russian Government will now agree to instruct M. Poklewsky accordingly.

No. 146.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 1, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Please see your telegram of the 31st January.

The Persian Government should, in the opinion of the acting treasurer-general, be able to carry on for two months with 200,000*l.* Whether a larger advance is required must depend on when a loan is likely to be forthcoming. Would it not be possible to leave the question of a further advance open for the present and for each Government to advance the sum of 100,000*l.* at once?

No. 147.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 1, 1912.

HIS Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports that the chief of police and four other persons were hanged yesterday.

No. 148.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 1, 1912.

MY telegram of 10th January.

British vice-consul at Resht reports the arrival at Resht yesterday of 400 Russian infantry.

I understand that these are to replace time-expired men.

No. 149.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 1, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 31st January: Proposed communication to Persian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs will not be able to see me till 3rd February; but I am writing to express the hope that the Russian Minister at Tehran will already have received instructions to act with Sir G. Barclay in the manner reported in my telegram of 31st January.

No. 150.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 1, 1912.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram of the 29th January.
Zia-ed-Dowleh may now be urged to leave the consulate at Tabreez.

No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 1, 1912.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

If the Persian Government formally notify you that they object to the permanent appointment of M. Mornard you may inform them that His Majesty's Government would not object to their putting forward another candidate to take his place in a permanent capacity on the condition that the British and Russian Legations are consulted beforehand, and that the candidate selected is a subject of a minor European Power.

No. 152.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 2, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 14th February:—

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith a proposed scheme of organisation for the Persian Government gendarmerie, which I have received from Colonel Hjalmarson.

Colonel Hjalmarson has also communicated to me various proposals in regard to the financing and distribution of the gendarmerie, of which the following are the more important:—

The estimate for the first twelve months amounts to 55,000*l.*, and for the succeeding nine months to 70,000*l.*

The budget only provides for the establishment of permanent posts along the following main roads:—

In the north, (a) Enzeli-Kazvin-Tehran-Kum; (b) Kazvin-Zinjan-Serehend.
In the south, Bushire-Shiraz-Yezdikhast.

In Fars it is proposed to raise a battalion, 1,500 strong, with head-quarters at Shiraz, for the protection of the Bushire-Shiraz-Yezdikhast road. It is hoped that by the end of the first twelve months posts will have been established from Shiraz as far as Kunar Takhteh (35 miles south-west of Kazerun) to the south, and Bagh-i-Khan (12 miles north of Shiraz) to the north.

During the succeeding nine months the intention is to extend these posts southward to Bushire and northward to Yezdikhast.

The sums allotted for the gendarmerie in Fars are, approximately, for the first twelve months, 20,700*l.* ; for the second period of nine months, 25,000*l.*

Major Petersen, an officer of the Swedish gendarmerie mission, left Tehran for Shiraz early in February to commence the organisation of the Fars battalion.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 152.

Principes de l'Organisation de la Gendarmerie gouvernementale.

ARTICLE 1^{er}. La gendarmerie gouvernementale sera organisée—

- (a.) En groupes formant un réseau fixe de gendarmerie, et
- (b.) En corps mobiles.

Art. 2. La gendarmerie s'attache aux provinces et à leurs subdivisions. Dans quelques provinces toute la gendarmerie à pied et à cheval constitue un seul régiment ; dans d'autres provinces il y en a plusieurs. Dans les petites provinces la gendarmerie ne constitue qu'un bataillon.

(Même dans les grandes provinces la gendarmerie ne constitue qu'un bataillon au commencement, mais, plus tard, elle formera un régiment.)

Art. 3. Le réseau fixe se compose des groupes plus grands ou plus petits des gendarmes, distribués le long des routes et étant en correspondance permanente l'un avec l'autre. Pour l'organisation de ce réseau les routes sont divisées en secteurs.

Chaque secteur sera surveillé par une section ou par une demi-section, dont la force se partage parmi un chef-lieu et un certain nombre de petits postes.

La force de la section (demi-section) a trois degrés. En considérant les difficultés que l'on s'attend dans les différentes provinces, on emploie de différents degrés.

Plusieurs sections et demi-sections sont réunies à un district de compagnie ; un des chefs-lieux de section, habituellement celui de la section centrale, est en même temps le chef-lieu de la compagnie. Plusieurs districts de compagnie établissent un district de bataillon ayant un chef-lieu de bataillon.

Des districts de bataillons forment des régiments mentionnés ci-dessus. Lorsque tous les bataillons d'une province forment un seul régiment le chef-lieu du régiment se trouve habituellement dans la ville de résidence du gouverneur de la province.

Lorsque les bataillons de la province forment plusieurs régiments, les chefs-lieux des régiments seront répartis dans la province.

Art. 4. Le nombre des sections et demi-sections est variable, et dépend de l'importance de la compagnie, de l'étendue de son territoire, &c.

Le nombre des compagnies d'un bataillon, de même que celui des bataillons, est aussi variable, et dépend des mêmes conditions que celles qui décident le nombre des sections et demi-sections d'une compagnie.

La disposition des sections et demi-sections en petits postes est la base même de toute l'organisation du réseau fixe, puisque c'est sur l'institution de ces postes que repose tout le service d'une bonne gendarmerie.

Art. 5. Les corps mobiles seront employés pour faire des expéditions dans les endroits où le réseau fixe ne peut produire l'ordre et la tranquillité. Les corps mobiles se composent—

(a.) Des gendarmes (y compris des officiers et des gradés) d'un district ou de plusieurs districts réunis en corps mobiles provisoires ; ou

(b.) Des corps mobiles permanents de gendarmerie, organisés et exercés tout à fait militairement.

Les corps mobiles provisoires ne peuvent sortir de leur province qu'en cas exceptionnels et sur l'ordre du Gouvernement de l'Empire. En organisant ces corps provisoires, on laissera toujours une force suffisante pour que le service ordinaire puisse continuer passablement ; ainsi ni les chefs-lieux ni les petits postes ne doivent être tout à fait dépourvus de toute leur force de gendarmerie.

Les corps mobiles permanents de la gendarmerie seront garnisonnés aux points centraux. Ils ne sortent de leurs provinces que sur l'ordre du Gouvernement de l'Empire.

Il dépend des circonstances (l'étendue de l'entreprise, le but de l'expédition, les distances, &c.) si l'on doit employer les corps provisoires ou les corps permanents. Or, tant que possible le réseau fixe doit rester intact.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1. The gendarmerie will be organised—

- (a.) Into groups forming a stationary force of gendarmerie, and
- (b.) Into mobile corps.

Art. 2. The gendarmerie is attached to the provinces and to their sub-divisions. In certain provinces the entire gendarmerie, mounted and unmounted, constitutes a single regiment; in others there are several regiments. In the small provinces the gendarmerie only constitutes a battalion.

(Even in the large provinces the gendarmerie only constitutes a battalion at first, but latter it will form a regiment.)

Art. 3. The stationary force is composed of groups of gendarmes, of varying strength, stationed along the roads and maintaining permanent communication with each other. For the purpose of the organisation of this force the roads are divided into sectors.

Each sector will be watched by a section or a half section, the strength of which is divided between a head-quarters and a certain number of small posts.

The strength of the section (half section) is of three degrees. Different degrees are utilised in accordance with the difficulties expected in the various provinces.

Several sections or half sections are combined into a company-district; one of the section head-quarters, generally that of the central section, is also the head-quarters of the company. Several company-districts form a battalion-district having a battalion head-quarters.

Battalion-districts form the regiments mentioned above. Where all the battalions of a province form a single regiment, the regimental head-quarters is generally situated in the town in which the governor of the province resides.

Where the provincial battalions form several regiments, the regimental head-quarters will be in different parts of the province.

Art. 4. The number of sections and half sections is variable, and depends on the size of the company, the extent of its district, &c.

The number of companies in a battalion, and the number of battalions, are also variable, and depend on the same conditions as those which determine the number of sections and half sections in a company.

The arrangement of the sections and half sections in small posts is the basis of the whole organisation of the stationary force, since the entire service of an efficient gendarmerie rests on the institution of these posts.

Art. 5. The mobile corps will be employed in making expeditions to the localities in which the stationary force is unable to bring about order and tranquillity.

The mobile corps are composed of—

- (a.) Gendarmes (including officers and non-commission officers) taken from one or more districts to form provisional mobile corps; or,
- (b.) Permanent mobile corps of gendarmerie, organised and trained just like soldiers.

The provisional mobile corps may serve outside their province only in exceptional cases and by the order of the Imperial Government. In organising these provisional corps a sufficient force will always be left to ensure the adequate performance of ordinary duties; thus neither the head-quarters nor the small posts must be entirely deprived of their whole strength.

The permanent mobile corps of the gendarmerie will be quartered at central points. They will not serve outside their province except by order of the Imperial Government.

It depends on circumstances (the extent of the undertaking, the object of the expedition, the distance, &c.) whether the provisional or permanent corps are to be employed. The stationary force must, as far as possible, be left intact.

No. 153.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 2, 1912.

ZIA-ED-DOWLEH.

On the receipt of your telegram of yesterday's date I instructed His Majesty's consul at Tabreez to urge Zia to leave the consulate. I now learn, however, that the Russian Government have instructed M. Poklewsky to demand his deportation to a far corner of Persia. This is in addition to the punishment indicated in the telegram of the 20th January from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

Unless the Russian Government will waive this new demand I think we must continue to keep the basti at His Majesty's consulate. I have therefore instructed His Majesty's consul to defer action on my telegram of this morning.

No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 2, 1912.

JOINT proposals.

Your telegram of 31st January.

The state of affairs in Persia makes it very important that no time should be lost by the two Governments in authorising their respective Ministers at Tehran to submit to the Persian Government proposals as follows:—

1. The two Governments will together advance 200,000*l.* (100,000*l.* from each Government) to the Persian Government. Of this sum, which is designed to meet the most pressing needs, the 100,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government is to be assigned to the organisation of the gendarmerie force in Southern Persia. The treasurer-general is to supervise the expenditure of the whole advance. His Majesty's Government have no objection to each Government advancing 200,000*l.* instead of 100,000*l.* if the two Ministers consider it advisable.

2. A communication, the wording of which may be arranged by the two Ministers as proposed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, will be addressed to the Persian Government informing them that neither Government will in any way assist or encourage the ex-Shah or any of his followers, and that the ex-Shah himself will be asked to leave Persia. His pension is to be of the amount already decided upon, and its grant is conditional on his undertaking never to re-enter Persian territory unless the Russian Government first give their consent.

3. The two Ministers will suggest the proclamation of a general amnesty and the dismissal by the Persian Government of the fedais as soon as Mohamed Ali is out of Persia.

4. The question of the formation of a small Persian army may be discussed with the Persian Government by the two Ministers.

5. The Persian Government to be asked to undertake to make their policy conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention. A formula to be drawn up to this effect, the wording of which is left to the two Ministers.

If all the further questions relating to Cossack brigade, large loan, and Senate are discussed before the Persian Government receive any help, the state of Persia will, in the meantime, deteriorate even further, so I hope you will be able to persuade M. Sazonof to instruct M. Poklewsky at once to proceed on the lines above indicated.

No. 155.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 3, 1912.

EX-SHAH.

Please see my despatch of the 17th January.*

The latest report from the Russian consul at Astrabad to his Minister is to

* See No. 189.

the effect that the ex-Shah's forces in the vicinity of Astrabad now amount to some 3,000 men: this includes a body of Caucasians. They are said to be confident of success, and to be planning an attack on Shahrud.

No. 156.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 3, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram of this morning.

Information has reached me from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed of demonstrations in favour of the ex-Shah which are likely to cause disorders.

A large body of Turkomans and Kurds are reported to be raiding near Shahrud and the province to be generally disturbed.

Persian Government complained to my Russian colleague and myself yesterday that Yusuf Khan Herati, who is in bast at the Russian consulate-general, and a certain Akber Boland, a Persian employé of the consulate-general, were encouraging the agitation at Meshed in favour of the ex-Shah. M. Poklewsky instructed the Russian consul-general by telegraph last night to do his utmost to put a stop to this agitation.

No. 157.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 3, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Please see your telegram of yesterday to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

M. Mornard thinks that 140,000 tomans should be assigned for arms for the whole gendarmerie, and 280,000 tomans for the upkeep of the whole gendarmerie for six months. (In this connection please see my telegram of the 2nd instant.) I therefore question whether it would be wise to insist on 100,000*l.* being allocated for the gendarmerie in the south.

I would suggest that the Russian Minister and myself should be allowed to decide on the allocation of the advance in consultation with the Acting Treasurer-General.

No. 158.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 3, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to refer to previous correspondence relative to the proposed advance to the Persian Government by His Majesty's and the Russian Governments of a sum of 400,000*l.*, and particularly to the last paragraph of your letter of the 29th July, 1907, stating that there would be no difficulty, should occasion arise, in providing at a very few days' notice any sums which it may be decided to advance on this account in pursuance of the agreement with the Russian Government.

The Marquess of Crewe is aware, from telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Minister at Tehran, that the present financial situation of the Persian Government and the state of affairs in the country generally, have once more brought this question prominently forward, and that the advisability of an immediate advance to Persia is under the consideration of both Governments.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram* which Sir E. Grey has addressed to Sir G. Buchanan on this subject, and to inform you that, as soon as the assent of the Russian Government is received to the suggestions therein contained, a further letter will be addressed to you asking that half of the British share of the

* No. 154.

advance, which may amount to 200,000*l.* in all, or to 100,000*l.* only, may be accepted as a charge on Indian revenues in accordance with the arrangement already arrived at.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 159.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 4, 1912.

MY telegram of 26th January.

Following from British consul at Shiraz:—

“Kawam informs me that he has received a telegram from Mohamed Ali Khan to the effect that the latter has dispatched the culprits of the recent incidents to Shiraz.”

No. 160.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 4, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the 7th February:—

Sir,

On the receipt of your telegram of the 2nd instant I called by appointment on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but as his Excellency was too pressed for time to be able to discuss in detail the various points to be comprised in the joint communication to be addressed to the Persian Government, I left with him an *aide-mémoire* embodying your proposals, of which a copy is enclosed.

M. Sazonof, however, told me that he had already instructed M. Poklewsky to concert with Sir G. Barclay the text of a joint communication to be addressed to the Persian Government, advising them to enter into negotiations with the ex-Shah with the object of inducing him to leave Persia in return for the grant of a pension and the proclamation of a general amnesty. He could not, he said, accept the condition which you proposed to attach to the grant of a pension, namely, that the ex-Shah should promise not to return to Persia without Russia's consent. On my reminding his Excellency that he had already (as reported in my telegram of the 24th January) accepted this condition, M. Sazonof replied that as the Russian Government were not going to allow the ex-Shah to settle in Russia they could not assume the responsibility which such a condition would entail, more especially as they did not wish to expose themselves a second time to being accused of conniving at his return.

Referring next to the question of the proposed advance, M. Sazonof informed me that the Minister of Finance had refused to advance so large a sum as 200,000*l.* to the Persian Government. M. Kokovtsof, his Excellency said, contended that he was not empowered by law to authorise advances of this nature. The Russian Bank at Tehran had, moreover, been losing money, and M. Kokovtsof was averse to running any further financial risk. I urged on M. Sazonof the necessity of our coming to the assistance of the Persian Government, who were absolutely penniless, and reminded him of the agreement arrived at between the two Governments in the year 1910 to make a joint advance of 400,000*l.* to the Persian Government. His Excellency assured me that he was most anxious to do all that he could to help them. He had, he said, already instructed M. Isvolsky to sound the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas as to whether they would be prepared at an early date to make any advances to the Persian Government in connection with the projected large loan; as, were they to give a satisfactory assurance on this point, M. Kokovtsof would consider it a sufficient guarantee, and would agree to advance the sum required temporarily. I pressed M. Sazonof to write at once to M. Kokovtsof, and to endeavour to obtain his consent to an advance of at any rate 100,000*l.* to meet the immediate requirements of the Persian Government; and this his Excellency promised to do.

M. Sazonof was at first inclined to insist that no advance should be made to the

Persian Government until the latter had accepted the various conditions which the Russian Government propose to attach to their future co-operation with and support of that Government. I pointed out that the discussion of all these conditions would occupy weeks or months, and that something ought to be done at once to ease the financial embarrassments of the Persian Government; and his Excellency finally agreed not to make the first advance dependent on the acceptance of these conditions. He would, however, he declared, have to insist that an agreement should be arrived at with regard to them before any further advances were made, and before the arrangements for a large loan should be carried through.

Enclosure in No. 160.

Aide-mémoire.

IN view of the present situation in Persia, His Britannic Majesty's Government consider it of great importance that the Russian and British Ministers at Tehran should be authorised without delay to make the following proposals to the Persian Government:—

1. In order to meet the immediate requirements of the Persian Government, Russia and Great Britain will advance conjointly the sum of 200,000*l.*, the expenditure of this sum to be supervised by the Treasurer-General, and the British share of 100,000*l.* to be devoted to the organisation of a gendarmerie in South Persia. His Britannic Majesty's Government would not object to an advance of 200,000*l.* by each Power, should the two representatives at Tehran consider this necessary.

2. That the two Ministers should inform the Persian Government that Mohamed Ali will be requested to remove himself from Persia, and that neither Russia nor Great Britain will afford any encouragement or support to His Majesty or to any of his adherents. His Britannic Majesty's Government agree to his Excellency M. Sazonof's suggestion that the drafting of the text of the communication on this point might be left to the two representatives at Tehran, the amount of the pension to be fixed by arrangement between the Persian Government and the ex-Shah, and the condition on which it was granted being, as already arranged, that His Majesty should promise not to enter Persian territory without the consent of the Russian Government.

3. That the two Ministers should propose to the Persian Government the proclamation of a general amnesty and that the Persian Government should dismiss their irregular forces when Mohamed Ali has left Persian territory.

4. That the two Ministers should express to the Persian Government their readiness to discuss with them a scheme for the creation of a small Persian army.

5. That the two Ministers should request the Persian Government to give an engagement to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. The form of this request should be left to the discretion of the two Ministers.

His Britannic Majesty's Government are of opinion that the situation will go from bad to worse unless support is given to the Persian Government without further delay. They therefore earnestly trust that the Imperial Government will consent to send instructions to M. Poklewsky, explaining that all other questions, such as that of the Cossack Brigade, the Senate, and the conclusion of a loan should be left for consideration later on.

St. Petersburg, January 21 (February 3), 1912.

No. 161.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 4, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of the 2nd February.

Last night M. Sazonof told me that he must insist that Zia-ed-Dowleh should not be allowed to establish himself at Tehran. M. Poklewsky, however, appeared to have interpreted his instructions on this point in a wider sense than had been intended. M. Sazonof promised to send fresh instructions to him.

No. 162.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 4, 1912.

AGITATION at Meshed.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 3rd February.

In a conversation which I had last night with M. Sazonof I informed his Excellency of the Persian Government's complaints. I said that I hoped he would see his way to instructing the Russian consul-general at Meshed to do everything he could to discourage local agitation in favour of Mohamed Ali.

I am to-day sending to M. Sazonof, at his own request, an *aide-mémoire* on the subject, giving the names of the persons of whom the Persian Government complained.

No. 163.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 5, 1912.

REFERENCE to your telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of the 2nd February.

The Russian Government have instructed M. Poklewsky to urge the Persian Government, in concert with me, to open negotiations with Mohamed Ali Mirza, with a view to inducing His Majesty to leave Persia, on the understanding that his pension will be renewed and that his adherents will be granted full amnesty. Russian Minister is authorised to inform the Persian Government that these negotiations will, if they so desire it, be carried on through the Russian consul at Astrabad, who will be instructed to advise the ex-Shah to agree to the terms proposed, pointing out to His Majesty that his cause is hopeless, and that he will never be recognised by His Majesty's Government, and that both England and Russia will afford the Persian Government their material and moral support. Should these arguments not prove sufficient, Russian consul would endeavour to remove the Caucasians in the service of Mohamed Ali, and to persuade the Turkomans to accept the amnesty and submit to the Central Government.

As it is very important that some pronouncement should be made as soon as possible, I venture to hope that I may be authorised, should any delay occur in obtaining the acquiescence of the Russian Government to the proposals set forth in your above-mentioned telegram, to concert with Russian Minister in the communication he has been instructed to make to the Persian Government.

M. Poklewsky's instructions, however, contain no mention of any undertaking on the part of the ex-Shah not to re-enter Persia without the consent of the Russian Government. I understand that the amount of the pension would be settled by negotiation between the Persian Government and Mohamed Ali Mirza.

No. 164.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 5, 1912.

SWEDISH colonel of gendarmerie desires to engage four more Swedish officers for gendarmerie.

I presume that there is no objection; Russian Minister sees none, but has referred the matter to St. Petersburg.

No. 165.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 3rd February: Proposed communication to Persian Government. I agree to suggestion in last paragraph.

No. 166.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.

EX-SHAH.

It is absolutely necessary that the ex-Shah should leave Persia, where his presence is causing serious disturbances, and that the Persian Government should receive immediate support, and I therefore authorise you to join your Russian colleague in acting as suggested in your telegram of to-day.

No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.

THE Russian Ambassador called on the 30th ultimo to enquire on behalf of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the proposed loan to Persia.

Sir A. Nicolson said that discussions as to a large loan could very well be deferred for the moment; what was really pressing was that the two Ministers at Tehran should be authorised to place before the Persian Government this modest programme of urgent reforms, and especially the warning to the ex-Shah. Moreover, it was urgently necessary that the Persian Government should be provided with some funds, and for that object His Majesty's Government had suggested the revival of the original joint offer of an advance of 200,000*l.* from each Government. These advances could be repaid out of a future loan, but Sir A. Nicolson trusted that the Russian Government would agree to the two Ministers at Tehran setting to work without delay on the above lines, and that the Russian President of the Council would sanction the advance of 200,000*l.* on the part of the Russian Government.

Count Benckendorff said that he would telegraph to M. Sazonof.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 168.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 6, 1912.

I HAVE received following telegram dated to-day from His Majesty's consul at Tabreez:—

"As Zia-ed-Dowleh did not make his appearance at the usual hour this morning I entered his bedroom, Stevens and a servant accompanying me. We found him lying dead at full length on his back on the floor with a bullet wound over the region of the heart. He was fully dressed, but with coat and shirt unbuttoned. There was no disorder in the room and everything points to suicide.

"I have sent for doctors and have invited representatives of the karguzar to be present at the proceedings. The deceased has left letters: one is addressed to myself and I shall open it at the proceedings."

No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 5th February: Swedish gendarmerie officers.
We have no objection.

No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 4th February: Proposed communication to Persian Government.

Inform Russian Government that, as they do not object in principle to joint advance of 200,000L., we propose to advance our share, amounting to 100,000L., at once and without waiting for them to advance their share, as unless funds are put at the immediate disposal of the Persian Government we shall be faced with a most serious situation at Shiraz.

No. 171.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 7, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 5th February: Communication to Persian Government as to ex-Shah.

Russian Minister and I made yesterday to the Regent and the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggestion indicated in my telegram of 5th February, leaving *aide-mémoire* with Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Highness and his Excellency expressed the gratitude of the Persian Government for the suggestion, and accepted the intervention of the Russian consul at Astrabad.

Minister for Foreign Affairs at first proposed 36,000 tomans as amount of pension, but we pointed out that a more generous offer would facilitate negotiations. Finally it was decided to offer a maximum of 50,000 tomans, and Russian Minister is instructing consul to negotiate on basis of this amount and of a full amnesty, and to act as generally indicated in my telegram of 5th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs pressed hard for a guarantee from the two Powers that they would never recognise the ex-Shah, but, finding that we were not authorised to give this, and realising that reference to our Governments on this point would entail delay, he refrained from insisting on it as a *sine quâ non* for negotiations, while expressing the earnest hope that the two Governments would consent to give such a guarantee.

The treatment of Shoa-es-Sultaneh and Salar-ed-Dowleh was also discussed. Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to maintain the confiscation of the former's estates, and to give him a small pension. But we pointed out that this would not accord with grant of a full amnesty, and, moreover, that as Shoa-es-Sultaneh was with the ex-Shah, and had great influence, it would be well to treat him generously. His Excellency agreed to revoke confiscations of his estates instead of small pension.

It was decided to negotiate with Salar-ed-Dowleh, offering him revocation of confiscation of his estates, and, as he is very poor, to grant him and his family pension of 12,000 tomans, provided that he maintains order at Kermanshah till the governor arrives, and then hands over to the latter and leaves Persia. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked that our consuls might negotiate for Persian Government on these lines. Have I your sanction for instructing British consul accordingly when Russian Minister is similarly authorised?

No. 172.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 7, 1912.

MY telegram of 6th February: Zia-ed-Dowleh.

Letter of Zia to British consul shows clearly that it was a case of suicide.

No. 173.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, February 7, 1912.*
 YOUR telegram of 6th February to Tehran: Swedish officers.
 Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection.

No. 174.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, February 7, 1912.*
 CONVEYS the substance of the following extract from a despatch dated the
 7th February:—

On my calling on M. Sazonof this afternoon to execute the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram of the 6th instant, his Excellency informed me that he had obtained M. Kokovtsov's consent to a joint advance of 200,000*l.* on the condition that the Russian share of 100,000*l.* should not be paid in until His Majesty's Government had advanced their share. He would, he said, attach no conditions to this advance beyond those included in the five proposals recorded in my *aide-mémoire* of the 3rd February; and he had already informed M. Poklewsky by telegraph that he considered those proposals quite acceptable, though he had requested his views with regard to them as a matter of form. It must, however, he said, be understood that an agreement would have to be come to with regard to those conditions which Russia still wished to put forward before the arrangements for a large loan were completed.

In the course of our conversation M. Sazonof informed me that orders had been already sent to withdraw the Russian troops from Kazvin to Resht.

No. 175.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 8.)

Sir,

India Office, February 7, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd February, 1912, regarding a proposed Anglo-Russian advance to the Persian Government, amounting to 400,000*l.*, or 200,000*l.*, as may hereafter be settled with the Russian Government.

In reply I am to inform you that in view of the undertakings given in the past in somewhat similar circumstances the Secretary of State in Council is prepared to participate in the moiety of the advance to be made by His Majesty's Government which, as he observes, is of a temporary character and to be repaid as soon as a larger loan is arranged by the Persian Government. The main object of this moiety of the advance is stated to be to put the Persian Government in a better position for maintaining security on the roads of Southern Persia.

On learning that the sum of 100,000*l.*, or 50,000*l.*, as the case may be, has been paid by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Secretary of State will cause a like amount to be transferred to the Imperial Bank of Persia, through whose agency, he presumes, the advance will be made as on former occasions.

In view of the exceptional circumstances on account of which the advance is proposed, the Secretary of State in Council is willing that the questions of security and interest shall be postponed until His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government have had the opportunity of considering them further.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

No. 176.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 8, 1912.

TREASURY-GENERAL.

I made a communication on the 2nd February to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as authorised in your telegram of the 1st instant.

Persian Government have not only not formulated officially any objections to Mornard as Shuster's successor, but they now inform me that, being restricted to the nationals of minor Powers when choosing foreign assistants, they have signified their approval of the engagement of the eight Belgians to fill the places of the retiring Americans.

No. 177.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 8, 1912.

MY telegram of 3rd February: Ex-Shah movement.

Russian consul-general at Meshed has written to His Majesty's consul-general that he will do all he can to calm the mob, and that he has ceased to protect Yussuf Khan Herati.

No. 178.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 8, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 8th February:—

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a communiqué from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as published in the "Official Messenger" to-day, stating that it has been found necessary to send troops to Astrabad, Barfrush, and Meshedesser to protect the lives and property of Russian subjects in these districts.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 178.

Communiqué.

THE Russian consul at Astrabad has notified an outbreak of serious disorder in the province of Mazanderan, which has given rise to the committal of murders and acts of pillaging. The local authorities appeared to be helpless and unable to take any measures, and absolute anarchy commenced in the district, being further increased by the locality in question being the arena of the struggle between the ex-Shah Mohamed Ali and the supporters of the Government. Much disorder and indiscipline prevails amongst the forces of the Shah, and the Turkomans and other adherents of the Shah are only with difficulty restrained from pillaging the towns of Barfrush and Sari.

The result of this state of affairs has been a complete cessation of local trade and wholesale bust by merchants, in fear of their lives, at the consular agency in Barfrush. In view of the evident danger for the lives and property of Russian subjects, and also for the interests of our institutions there, the consul, considering the troops at his disposal (two sotnias of Cossacks with two machine guns) insufficient, begged the urgent dispatch of reinforcements. Simultaneously, representatives of several large Moscow firms carrying on trade with Mazanderan telegraphed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs soliciting the defence of their interests. In view of the above, the necessary instructions have been given for the dispatch to Astrabad of two companies of infantry with two machine guns and two mountain guns, of one company with two machine guns to Barfrush, and one company to Meshedesser.

No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 7th February.

I agree to proposal to negotiate with Salar-ed-Dowleh through consuls at Kermanshah.

No. 180.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF told me to-day that the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Kazvin would soon be accomplished—half of them would be returned to Russia and the other half would go to Ardebil and Resht.

I said that I was very glad to hear this. It was also a relief that a warning was to be given to the ex-Shah to leave Persia. His incursion had drawn away the Bakhtiari forces from the south; the whole resources of the Persian Government had been taken up by the struggle against him, owing to the fear that his return to the throne would be followed by a series of reprisals; and one result had been the blocking of the southern roads and the stopping of British trade. We therefore had good reason to resent the action of the ex-Shah. As long as there had been in Tehran a Government not favourable to Russian interests in the north, I had felt that I could not support that Government, or expect Russia to do so. But now that this obstacle had been removed, and there was a Government who realised that they must respect Russian interests in the north and accept advice, the Government ought to be encouraged and supported. It was only by showing that such a Government could keep upon their feet, and would receive goodwill and support, that their authority could be maintained in Persia.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 181.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 9, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Please see telegram of the 7th February from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

Russian Government have informed my colleague that they have no objection to a joint advance of 200,000*l.* on the conditions indicated in the five paragraphs of your telegram of the 2nd February to St. Petersburg, but they insist that the advance shall be made in portions, according to the requirements of the Persian Government. I understand that they also insist that no portion of the Russian share of the advance shall be paid until the corresponding British share has been paid. They also look to obtaining 8 per cent. interest.

The method of payment of the advance in small doles *pari passu* by the two Governments appears to me to be a clumsy arrangement.

Russian Government also insist that the expenditure of the advance be controlled; they do not say, however, who is to exercise this control. Their intention presumably is that the two legations should do so, but my own view is that it would be sufficient if the treasurer-general supervised the expenditure on the lines of a programme elaborated by himself in consultation with the two legations.

No. 182.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 9, 1912.

MY telegram of the 8th February.

I told M. Sazonof that I regretted that it had been thought necessary to dispatch another Russian force to North Persia, and his Excellency replied that the Government had been forced to take this step in consequence of the urgent appeals of Russian subjects. Incidents such as those which had occurred at Tabreez must be prevented at all hazards, as in the event of any disturbances of a serious nature occurring he would be powerless to resist the pressure in favour of a permanent Russian occupation of certain districts. The maintenance of order must somehow be secured, and the best way to secure it was to send small bodies of Russian troops to the places where trouble threatened, and to withdraw them as soon as there was no longer any necessity for their presence. He did not know exactly the number of men that was being sent to Mazanderan, but he believed that it did not much exceed 300. The figures given in my telegram of yesterday were much exaggerated, as the companies sent were not at war strength.

No. 183.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 9, 1912.

I SAW the Persian Minister yesterday. He asked whether it would not be possible for me to urge the Russian Government to join His Majesty's Government in giving a guarantee that, in the event of the ex-Shah returning to Persia, neither Government would recognise him. He considered it most important that His Majesty should be discouraged from making any attempt to return. I explained to the Minister that M. Sazonof had already refused more than once to give any such guarantee, and had even declined to attach to the grant of a pension to the ex-Shah the condition that His Majesty should give a written engagement that he would not return to Persia without the Russian Government's consent. I said that the Russian Government might view the matter in a different light if the Persian Government were themselves to extract from the ex-Shah an undertaking not to return without the consent of Russia and Great Britain. At the same time I pointed out that an engagement of the nature indicated was scarcely likely to prevent His Majesty from breaking his word again.

I saw M. Sazonof this morning and repeated to him the substance of the above conversation. He said that he would have no objection to the ex-Shah giving such a promise, but that it must be clearly shown that the Russian Government had not intervened in the matter, and that the Persian Government had induced His Majesty to give it by their own unaided efforts.

No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of the 7th February.

A sum of 100,000*l.* is being placed to your credit by His Majesty's Government to-day at the Imperial Bank. This sum forms the British half of the joint advance, and so much of it as can reasonably be spared should be assigned directly to the organisation of the gendarmerie in South Persia.

I propose, subject to the concurrence of the Russian Government, that interest on the whole 200,000*l.* should be at 5 per cent. The advance should be secured as an additional charge on the southern customs or on any other revenues available. It should eventually be repaid out of the first proceeds of the large loan which it is proposed to arrange.

The Russian Government having now signified their agreement with the five points of my telegram of the 2nd February to St. Petersburg, you may, in conjunction with M. Poklewsky, proceed to draw up the communication to be made to the Persian Government.

No. 185.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 9, 1912.

INFORM Russian Government of instructions sent to Sir G. Barclay in my telegram of to-day in regard to the proposed joint advance to the Persian Government.

No. 186.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 10, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Please see your telegram of the 9th instant.

My telegram of last night will show you that the making of an advance is regarded by the Russian Government as conditional on the points indicated in the five paragraphs of your telegram of the 2nd February to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg; we may have some difficulty in obtaining compliance with the fifth.

The wording of our communication to the Persian Government must depend on whether this view is maintained, or whether it is intended to treat the questions of dismissal of fedais, army, and recognition of the convention as separate from the advance, and to make the advance subject only to conditions regarding security, interest, and proper expenditure.

My Russian colleague and I propose, as regards the formula for point five, to request the Persian Government "to undertake to conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention," and I think that we ought at least to make this or some other undertaking in the same sense a precedent condition, although there may be difficulty in obtaining it.

No. 187.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 10, 1912.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 8th instant.

My Russian colleague having informed me that his consul-general at Meshed reported that 90 per cent. of the province were in favour of the ex-Shah, and that very serious disorders would probably ensue from the change of the two Governments from neutrality to opposition, I requested Major Sykes to telegraph his view on the matter.

I have just received his answer, which is as follows:—

"There is an undoubted general disgust with the present situation; this is only natural. But there is no strong feeling in favour of either party.

"The town is gradually becoming quiet."

No. 188.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 9th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me in a private letter that he will enquire what rate of interest Minister of Finance proposes to ask for Russian share of advance,

but that he believes he had intention of fixing it at 7½ or 8 per cent. This, his Excellency adds, was rate fixed with regard to an advance to Persian Government for payment of American officials engaged by Shuster.

No. 189.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 17, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to report that the force of the ex-Shah, which was stated in that despatch to have advanced as far as Semnan, has been compelled to retire. It was defeated at Damghan on the 2nd January by a force of Mujaheds under Momtasser-ed-Dowleh, who are now reported to have reoccupied Shahrud.

From the west the news is confirmed that Salar-ed-Dowleh has reoccupied Kermanshah. His Majesty's consul reports that he has about a thousand men with him, and that he intends in the spring to collect further forces and to make another attempt to reach the capital.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh has taken advantage of the Russian occupation to enter Tabreez. He made his entry on the 2nd January with 200 men, and is now apparently *de facto* governor.

It is satisfactory to note that Shuja-ed-Dowleh has been prevented by the Russian consul from proclaiming Mohamed Ali. Russia seems to be loyally acting up to her assurances that her military measures in Persia have no connection with Mohamed Ali's aspirations to the throne. In my despatch above referred to I reported that the Persian Government had information that Shuja-ed-Dowleh had sent a force to Ardebil whence it was threatening Resht. That force, consisting of 150 Shahsevans, arrived at Enzeli on the 13th instant under a certain Reshid-es-Sultan, but the Russian consul at Resht, under orders from St. Petersburg, caused them to be disarmed and shipped back to Astara, whence they had come. Reports, too, from Meshed show that recruits enrolled by Mohamed Ali's agents at Askabad are now being stopped by the Russian authorities from entering Persia.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 190.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 19, 1912.

EXCEPT for one or two trifling demonstrations immediately following the dissolution of the Medjliss on the 14th ultimo, the past four weeks have been a period of unusual calm in Tehran. My apprehensions and those of the Cabinet as to the effect of the execution at Tabreez of Sikat-ul-Islam on the 10th of Moharrem—the Good Friday of the Mahometan year—have proved to have been exaggerated. The Government appears to have the situation in Tehran well in hand, and no particular effervescence as a consequence of this prelate's execution has made itself felt in the provinces, a fact due doubtless to the rigorous fashion in which the Government have recently suppressed inflammatory telegrams.

I gather that the Government intend to postpone the elections for the new Medjliss as long as possible, and indeed now that Tabreez, the centre of nationalism, is so completely in Russian hands, there seems little likelihood of any irresistible pressure being put upon the Government to facilitate the meeting of Parliament.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 191.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 21, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a French translation of the decree of the 6th January appointing M. Mornard acting treasurer-general.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Decree dated January 6, 1912.

Au nom de Sa Majesté Impériale Soltan Ahmad, Schah de Perse.

STATUANT dans le sens du projet formulé par le Conseil des Ministres,

Nous décidons :

Article 1^{er}. Vu la décision prise par le Conseil des Ministres, conforme à l'avis de la Commission spéciale formée par les membres élus du Parlement, Mr. Morgan Shuster, ayant été déchargé des fonctions de Trésorier général, M. J. Mornard, Administrateur général des Douanes, est nommé, provisoirement, à la gérance de la Trésorerie générale.

Art. 2. A cet effet et à partir de la date du présent décret, M. Mornard, sous les ordres du Ministre des Finances, s'occupera des fonctions inhérentes de la Trésorerie générale; à partir de cette même date, les ordres de paiement, ainsi que les documents de Trésorerie, devront être revêtus de sa signature, faute de quoi ils n'auront aucune valeur.

Art. 3. La réception des comptes de l'ex-trésorier et la remise de ces comptes au nouveau gérant seront effectuées par une commission, dont la formation est autorisée par le Conseil des Ministres.

Art. 4. Le Ministre des Finances a la responsabilité du fonctionnement des attributions du Trésorier général; les instructions nécessaires, après avoir été approuvées par le Conseil des Ministres, seront communiquées par lui au gérant provisoire de l'Administration du Trésor.

Art. 5. Le Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

ABOL GASSEM, NASSER-OL-MOLK,
Régent.

NADJAF GOULI,
Président du Conseil.

VOSSOUGH-ED-DOWLEH,
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

GAVAM-ES-SALTANEH,
Ministre de l'Intérieur.

ZOKA-EL-MOULK,
Ministre de la Justice.

MOAZED-ES-SALTANEH,
Ministre des Postes et Télégraphes.

GOLAM HOSSEIN,
Ministre de la Guerre.

HAKIM-OL-MOULK,
Ministre des Finances.

15 Muharrem, Tangouz-il, 1330.

(Translation.)

In the name of His Imperial Majesty Soltan Ahmad, Shah of Persia.

IN accordance with the proposal drafted by the Council of Ministers,

We enact as follows:—

Article 1. Having regard to the decision of the Council of Ministers, in conformity with the opinion of the special commission formed by the elected members of Parliament,

Mr. Morgan Shuster having been relieved of the office of treasurer-general, M. J. Mornard, administrator-general of Customs, is appointed provisionally to the administration of the general Treasury.

Article 2. M. Mornard will accordingly, as from the date of this decree, take charge, under the orders of the Minister of Finance, of the business of the general Treasury; from the same date orders to pay, as well as Treasury papers, must be signed by him, failing which they will have no validity.

Article 3. A commission, the appointment of which is authorised by the Council of Ministers, will take over the accounts of the ex-treasurer and deliver them to the new acting-treasurer.

Article 4. The Minister of Finance is responsible for the manner in which the functions of the treasurer-general are performed; the necessary instructions, after being approved by the Council of Ministers, will be communicated by him to the provisional administrator of the Treasury.

Article 5. The Minister of Finance is charged with the execution of this decree.

ABUL KASSEM, NASR-UL-MULK,
Regent.

NEJEF KULI,
President of the Council.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

KAWAM-ES-SULTANEH,
Minister of the Interior.

ZOKA-UL-MULK,
Minister of Justice.

MOAZED-ES-SULTANEH,
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.

GHOLAM HUSSEIN,
Minister of War.

HAKIM-UL-MULK,
Minister of Finance.

15 Moharrem, Tanguz-il, 1330.

No. 192.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 22, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that an account has just been issued by M. Mornard, administrator of the Persian Customs, of his administration of the Customs revenue for the four years ending the 20th March, 1911.

It has in some quarters been made a reproach to the Belgian Customs employés in Persia that their accounts have never been subjected to an audit. It will be observed that in the accompanying letter to the Minister of Finance M. Mornard invites the verification of the account of his administration.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 192.

Administrator-General of Customs to Persian Minister of Finance.

A son Excellence Hakim-ul-Mulk,
Ministre des Finances à Téhéran.

Téhéran, le janvier, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence le compte résumé de ma gestion en qualité d'Administrateur général des Douanes, pendant les années Gou-il, Pitch-il, Takagou-il et It-il (1907-11).

Ce compte divisé en quatre tableaux présente :—

(a.) Les recettes, par branche de revenus, effectuées par tous les bureaux des Douanes du pays et centralisées à Téhéran.

- (b.) Les dépenses d'administration divisées par catégorie.
 (c.) Les paiements et versements effectués pour compte du Gouvernement, sur les produits nets des douanes.
 (d.) Le solde restant disponible à l'expiration de la quatrième année d'exercice (It-il).

Les comptes détaillés se rapportant à la même période de quatre années, c'est-à-dire les comptes des différents bureaux de perception de la Perse, ainsi que les comptes de l'administration centrale, sont gardés dans un coffre-fort, avec les pièces justificatives des dépenses, telles que havalehs, quittances, factures, &c., et y attendent, d'année en année, que le Gouvernement daigne en ordonner la vérification par les services compétents.

Ainsi que votre Excellence le remarquera, j'ai fait imprimer le compte résumé de ma gestion. C'est en vue d'en communiquer un exemplaire à toutes les personnes qui s'intéressent aux finances du pays, et qui désireraient particulièrement apprécier la gestion des douanes en connaissance de cause.

Je me permets de prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien me communiquer toutes les observations que pourrait suggérer au Gouvernement l'examen des tableaux que j'ai l'honneur de placer sous ses yeux et qui ont été établis avec le plus grand soin et un souci particulier de clarté et d'exactitude.

Je prie, &c.

L'administrateur général des Douanes,

(Translation.)

To His Excellency Hakim-ul-Mulk,

Minister of Finance, Tehran.

Tehran, January , 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency a summarised account of my administration in the capacity of administrator-general of Customs, during the years Gou-il, Pitch-il, Takagou-il, and It-il (1907-11).

This account, divided into four tables, shows:—

- (a.) The receipts in revenue taken at all of the customs offices in the country, and centralised at Tehran.
 (b.) The expenses of administration, under various heads.
 (c.) The payments and deposits made on the Government account on the net produce of the customs.
 (d.) The balance in hand at the expiration of the fourth annual period (It-il).

The detailed accounts covering the same period of four years, *i.e.*, the accounts of the various collecting offices in Persia, as well as the accounts of the Central Administration, are kept in a safe, with the vouchers for the disbursements, such as havalehs, receipts, invoices, &c., and there await, from year to year, the time when the Government shall be pleased to order their verification by the proper authorities.

As your Excellency will observe, I have caused the summary of my administration to be printed. This is with a view to communicate a copy to all persons interested in the finances of the country who particularly wish to form an opinion of the administration of the customs based upon full knowledge of the facts.

I venture to beg your Excellency to be good enough to communicate to me any observations which may be suggested to the Government by the examination of the tables which I have the honour to submit to you, and which have been prepared with the greatest care and with a special regard for clearness and accuracy.

I beg, &c.

The Administrator-General of Customs.

No. 193.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 22, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 193.

Summary of Events in Persia for the four weeks ending January 22, 1912.

Tehran.

Treasurer-General.

MR. SHUSTER was informed by the Cabinet on the 26th December that the Persian Government having accepted the Russian ultimatum his services were no longer required. Mr. Shuster left Tehran on the 11th January, and M. Mornard, the administrator-general of customs, was appointed as acting treasurer-general, to date from the 6th January, though he did not actually take over until the 11th January.

The treasury gendarmerie was transferred to the Swedish officers on the 9th January.

Mr. Cairns and the other American officials formerly under Mr. Shuster are still in Tehran, but they are not likely to stay.

The Cabinet.

The Cabinet, which is so far unchanged, seems to have the situation well in hand. The news of the execution of the chief priest of Tabreez by the Russians on the 1st January seemed at one moment to threaten the resignation of the Cabinet and a recrudescence of disorders in the capital, coinciding as it did with the 10th of Moharrem, the great Moslem day of mourning, but nothing of the kind occurred.

The Press.

The local press has practically all disappeared since the closure of the Medjliss. The democratic organs were suppressed owing to their criticism of the Government, and eventually the "Medjliss" newspaper was suppressed for reproducing an inflammatory telegram from the ulema of Nejef, urging the tribes to resist foreign aggression. An official organ called the "Aftab" has now appeared.

Tabreez.

During the fighting from the 21st to the 24th December the Russians made little headway against the revolutionaries, who had taken up a position in the citadel. The Russian consulate-general was practically isolated throughout, and was frequently attacked.

There was no firing on the 25th, and communication was established between the Russian consulate and the military commander.

On the 26th December Russian reinforcements, strength about 800 men with four guns, arrived, with the result that on the following day the fedais evacuated the citadel and dispersed.

General Voredonof arrived with two regiments of infantry on the 30th December and took possession of the town.

On the 1st January seven leading nationalists and the Sikat-ul-Islam, a greatly revered Mujtehed, were tried by court-martial and executed, and on the 20th January a prominent Armenian, Petros Melik Audressian, of Tabreez, met with similar treatment.

At the time of writing the Russians are in complete possession of the town, the bazaars are open, and the population who took no part in the recent fighting are showing a general desire for peace.

The Russian consul-general reports one officer and thirty-nine men killed, and five officers and forty-five men wounded, and accuses the fedais of mutilating the dead and torturing the wounded.

The charges of general inhumanity brought against the Russian troops by the Persian authorities are false.

To avoid further responsibility, Zia-ed-Dowleh, the acting governor, has taken refuge in the British consulate.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh arrived in the town on the 2nd January with some 200 followers.

The inhabitants welcomed his arrival as there was no one else capable of carrying out the duties of governor.

The approximate strength of the Russian troops in Azerbaijan is as under :—

At Tabreez	3,000 men with 14 guns.
„ Marand	1,000 „ 4 „
„ Ardebil	1,000 men.
Total	5,000 men with 18 guns.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

Since the 21st December there have been no further disturbances at Resht.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports that the ex-Shah, with a following of 350 men, is still at Khoja Nafas.

At Resht the bazaars are gradually opening, but all Government offices, excepting the post and telegraph offices, are closed.

The search for arms and for persons wanted by the Russian authorities continues. About a dozen Persian notables were arrested and deported to Russia, but the Russian authorities sent them back to Resht to be tried by court-martial.

Reshid-es-Sultan, an adherent of the ex-Shah, arrived at Enzeli on the 13th January with 153 Shahsevan sowars. They were disarmed by the Russians and subsequently sent back to Astara, whence they had come.

The Russian troops at Enzeli and Resht have been reinforced from Kazvin, and now number about 2,000 men with fourteen machine guns. At Kazvin there are 2,500 men with eight guns.

Meshed.

The town is reported to be quiet, but the feeling against the Russians and ourselves still continues.

The ex-Shah's followers were defeated at Damghan on the 3rd January by a force of 900 nondescript sowars, and fell back to an entrenched position midway between Damghan and Shahrud. The Government troops advanced from Damghan towards Shahrud on the 9th January.

Recruiting for the ex-Shah has been proceeding at Askhabad. He also has agents at Krasnovodsk, but according to latest information the Russians are turning back recruits.

In addition to consular guards, there are some 2,500 Russian troops with eight guns and fifteen machine guns in Khorassan.

Ispahan.

The anti-foreign demonstrations have had little or no effect on foreign trade.

Several robberies are reported in the environs and district. The number of villagers who have been driven by their misfortunes to take to the road is increasing.

Sardar Zafar has been appointed Governor-General of Ispahan, but has not yet left Tehran.

Sardar Ashja, the retiring governor, left Ispahan on the 14th January for Chaharmahak.

Sardar Fateh (Moin-i-Homayun), Sardar Ashja's brother, arrived on the 25th December with 200 men and two mountain guns. He informed His Majesty's consul-general that he had failed in his efforts to catch Naib Hussein, who had escaped to Biabanek, where he could not pursue him.

Sardar Fateh left Ispahan with his brother on the 14th January.

Yezd.

Amir Azam, the Governor of Kerman, proceeded to Taft at the end of December to punish the "lootis" who have been responsible for so many robberies in his district. He inflicted some loss on them and pillaged their quarters in Taft, but the "looti" leaders managed to escape.

The financial situation is most unsatisfactory. Owing to the insecurity of the roads the Imperial Bank of Persia has been unable to obtain cash from outside for some months, and its reserve has fallen so low that it has been obliged to restrict business.

Shiraz.

On the 24th December a party of fifty men of the Central India Horse, under Major Birdwood, proceeding from Shiraz to Kazerun to meet a similar party escorting Mr. Smart from Bushire, was attacked near Kotal Dokhtar and lost one man killed and one man wounded.

On the 26th December these parties met near Rahdar caravanserai, and were leaving the precincts of that place when the caravanserai tofangchis opened fire on them. The troops had to fight their way into Kazerun, armed men coming out of the villages *en route* and joining in the attack.

Mr. Smart was wounded early in the engagement, and it was only discovered that he was missing when his horse came galloping in to join the convoy. A hospital assistant who was wounded was also left behind.

Mohamed Ali Khan Kashkuli, in charge of the Kazerun section of the road, had Mr. Smart and the wounded hospital assistant taken to his camp at Shahpur and attended to by a Persian surgeon. He brought them into Kazerun on the 29th December.

The casualties in this action were: killed, two followers; missing, one follower; wounded, Mr. Smart, the hospital assistant, seven sowars, and one follower.

On receipt of the news of the first affair Colonel Douglas dispatched a party of fifty men to Dashtarjin, and on hearing of the second attack he himself left Shiraz on the 27th December with 100 men for Dashtarjin and Kotal Dokhtar.

On the 2nd January Major Birdwood's party, with all its wounded, joined Colonel Douglas at Kotal Dokhtar, and the whole force returned to Shiraz without any further incident, arriving on the 5th January.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has been appointed Governor-General of Fars, but has not yet left Tehran. In the meantime Kawam-ul-Mulk continues to be deputy governor, and order has been maintained at Shiraz.

Seistan.

The crisis in Northern Persia has not affected Seistan and Kain.

According to latest reports the roads were safe as far as British merchandise was concerned.

Kerman.

The town of Kerman is reported quiet.

Rifat-i-Nizam continues in his attempts to alienate men employed by the telegraph department.

Recent reports state that the roads are in an unsatisfactory condition, and that officials of the telegraph department are frequently robbed when on tours of inspection.

Kermanshah.

There has been no fighting in the town since the arrival of Salar-ed-Dowleh on the 15th December, and the town is now quiet.

Since Salar-ed-Dowleh's arrival, Azem-ed-Dowleh, the representative of the Central Government, has been a refugee in the British consulate.

Ahwaz.

Reports state that unrest in the district continues.

Although caravans arrive from and leave for Ispahan, the Bakhtiari road cannot be said to be satisfactorily guarded. The Bakhtiaris have arranged for the appointment of Amir Mujahid as Governor of Behbahan, which should tend to ensure the safety of the road. The present inactivity of the robber bands is said to be due the severity of the weather.

Lingah.

Some 400 merchants and others, with their families, came into Lingah during November from Lar. They say that as trade has been at a standstill for some time past at Lar they have left the place for good and intend settling at Lingah and Debai.

No. 194.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 23, 1912.

SINCE writing my despatch of the 24th December, respecting the state of the southern roads, I have received no reports of any robberies of British goods between Shiraz and Ispahan, though certain sections of the road were considered too unsafe for the inspections of the telegraph employés, and brigands still infested the neighbourhood of Abadeh. The cold weather, however, appears, as usual, to have driven off the larger number of the robbers, and several caravans at the beginning of December took advantage of the passage northwards of the squadron of British Indian troops to Ispahan to hurry through their journey.

Except for the attack on our troops at Kazerun, I have no information as to the state of the Bushire-Shiraz road beyond a report from the telegraph agent that it was fairly safe, but that the road guards were exacting very heavy dues.

The road between Ispahan and Tehran is in a most deplorable state, owing to the operations of Naib Hussein and the depredations of wandering Bakhtiaris. All postal communication between the capital and the south and central portions of Persia was suspended on account of the refusal of the contractor to continue the service in face of the continued losses he sustained in horses, &c., and of the reluctance of the Government to indemnify him. The service has lately been resumed, but the Belgian director of the posts tells me he fears it will again fall through unless he succeeds in coming to a direct pecuniary arrangement with Naib Hussein.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 195.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 12, 1912.

RUSSIAN troops at Kazvin.

Russian Minister informs me that he has heard nothing of any recent orders for the withdrawal to Resht of the troops at Kazvin (see last paragraph of Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 7th February).

It is possible that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was alluding to the reported to me since then have been rather from Resht to Kazvin than *vice versa*. Movement of troops reported in my telegram of the 1st ultimo. Movements of troops

Now that the ex-Shah has been advised to leave Persia, one objection to the presence of the troops—that they encourage hopes of his restoration—has disappeared. I doubt whether it would be wise to press the Russian Government to withdraw the troops from Kazvin for the moment, and think that we had better wait until the fedai have been removed.

No. 196.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

JOINT advance to Persian Government. Your telegram of the 9th February.

You may advance our share whenever you think fit.

As regards control of the expenditure, the method suggested in your telegram would be sufficient. The rate of interest, which should not exceed 7 per cent. or be under 5 per cent., should be settled by you in conjunction with your Russian colleague.

No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

PLEASE let M. Sazonof know of the instructions sent to Sir G. Barclay to-day, and state that we should be very glad if he would take similar action as regards the Russian share of the advance to the Persian Government.

No. 198.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.

I PRESUME that the dispatch of the further troops to Northern Persia, referred to in your telegram of the 9th February, must be considered as necessitated either directly or indirectly by the disorders caused by the presence of Mohamed Ali. I am sorry that this step has been forced on the Russian Government, but, on the other hand, I welcome the withdrawal of the troops from Kazvin as showing clearly that the Russian Government are anxious that order should be maintained and the authority of the Persian Government upheld without the intervention of Russian troops wherever this is possible, provided that the Persian Government show a disposition friendly to Russian interests in the north.

You may speak to M. Sazonof in this sense.

No. 199.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 13, 1912.

KERMANSHAH.

Please see my telegram of the 22nd December last.*

According to a telegram just received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, Salar-ed-Dowleh had fled on the arrival of a Government force there on the 8th February.

The late acting governor, Azem-ed-Dowleh, has left His Majesty's consulate, where he was in bast.

No. 200.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 14, 1912.

I WAS informed to-day by M. Sazonof that instructions had been sent to the Russian consul at Astrabad to impress upon the ex-Shah that his cause was quite hopeless, and to tell him that if he would leave Persia at once the Russian Government would do their best to secure a pension for him, and that the only advice which they could give him was to accept these terms and go.

At the same time M. Sazonof told me that the Russian Government had agreed that Sipahdar should replace Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabreez, and that the latter should be given another post.

No. 201.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 12th February.

I communicated to M. Sazonof to-day the contents of your above telegram, and asked whether any active measures had yet been taken for the withdrawal of the troops.

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," No. 318.

M. Sazonof replied that he believed that withdrawal had actually begun; at any rate the necessary orders had already been sent, and in any case in a very short time the whole force would be withdrawn from Kazvin.

No. 202.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 14, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persia.

Your telegram of the 12th February.

M. Sazonof says that M. Kokovtsov still thinks that we should not accept a lower rate of interest than 8 per cent. He promises, however, to persuade him to reduce it to 7 per cent., as he considers it important that both Governments should adopt the same rate of interest. He is accordingly instructing M. Poklewsky to work with Sir G. Barclay with a view to arranging this question on the basis suggested by you.

At the same time M. Sazonof said that it must be understood that this advance would only be made on condition that the Persian Government accepted the five proposals recorded in your telegram of the 2nd February, and especially your fifth proposal with regard to recognition of the Anglo-Russian understanding. From the first his intention had been that the advance should be conditional on the acceptance of these proposals, while he had only deferred the consideration of other questions, such as that of the Cossack brigade, Senate, &c., until the question of the eventual large loan came to be discussed.

I regret if in my previous telegrams on this subject I did not make M. Sazonof's views sufficiently clear.

No. 203.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 15, 1912.

I HAVE received the following telegram dated yesterday from His Majesty's acting consul at Tabreez:—

"Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the Acting Governor-General, has called on me, and I have returned his visit. He is, I understand, antagonistic to the present Government, but if Sipahdar were Prime Minister would obey orders. Secret meetings, I am informed, are taking place to discuss the possibility of re-establishing the ex-Shah; the leading member of these is said to be Reshid-ul-Mulk. They are attended by the clergy and notables. It is also widely rumoured that a large deputation of clergy and notables has left Tehran to bring back the ex-Shah. It is said that Mujallal has joined the ex-Shah, and that he was sent by Shuja. Troops are also reported to be collecting at Mianeh, and I hear that horsemen were recently sent to Resht.

"The head of the clergy in Tabreez, whom the Nationalists had exiled, returned with Shuja. He has refused to remain under the present state of things, and left the town three days ago."

No. 204.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 15, 1912.

DOUGLAS reports that the lease of the building occupied by the squadron at Ispahan expires shortly, and can now be renewed on favourable terms. He asks whether he is justified in assuming that the regiment will remain in present stations until the summer, and in making arrangements accordingly.

No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 15, 1912.

PLEASE enquire of M. Sazonof whether he has any objection to my making a public statement to the effect that the Russian Government concur in the proposal that the two Governments should acquiesce in the appointment of M. Mornard as acting treasurer-general, keeping the definite appointment in suspense, and to my adding that, if the Persian Government object to M. Mornard, it lies with them to put forward another candidate.

You should also ask M. Sazonof if he would agree to my stating that the Russian Government have no intention of permitting the ex-Shah to take up his abode in Russia, and that they are not prepared to guarantee that he will not return to Persia or give any undertaking which might afford ground for an eventual charge of having connived at his return. (See your telegram of the 4th February.)

No. 206.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 16, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 20th February :—

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the *aide-mémoire* setting forth the conditions on which the Russian Government consent to join His Majesty's Government in making an advance of 100,000*l.* each to the Persian Government.

The Russian Government consider that, although some of the conditions stated in your telegram of the 2nd instant are practically fulfilled, the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran should nevertheless address a joint note to the Persian Government, recording all the conditions laid down by the two Governments. This note should, in their opinion, more especially demand an undertaking to the effect that the Persian Government will in future conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian understanding, leaving it to them to propose a formula that will be acceptable to themselves.

The *aide-mémoire* adds that in thus agreeing, in view of the desperate financial position of the Persian Government, not to connect the question of this advance with any further conditions than those above referred to, the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to make any further pecuniary assistance dependent on certain demands, of which they will in due course inform His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 206.

Aide-mémoire.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government agree to make, jointly with the British Government, an advance to the Persian Government of 100,000*l.* from each Power, on the conditions expressed in the *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy of the 21st January (3rd February), omitting, however, from the second point of these conditions the phrase "without the consent of the Russian Government," as has been already verbally intimated to the British Ambassador by M. Sazonof.

At the same time, the Imperial Government consider it necessary to insist on a higher rate of interest on this loan than that which was mentioned in the embassy *aide-mémoire* of the 28th January (10th February), namely, on a rate of 7 per cent. The considerations which impel the Imperial Government to this decision have already, on a previous occasion, been fully explained to the British Embassy.* As

* Namely, that Persia would be obliged to pay interest at the rate of at least 7 or 8 per cent. on an eventual foreign loan.

regards the control over the expenditure of this advance, it appears desirable that the distribution of the money should be approved beforehand by the Russian and British missions in Tehran, in agreement with the acting Treasurer-General, who would then see to it that the money was in fact spent on the objects determined. The security for the Russian share of the loan should be the surplus of the northern customs receipts, and, in case of their being insufficient, any other sources of revenue of the Persian Treasury which may be agreed upon with the Persian Government. The whole advance must be repaid out of the first proceeds of the impending large loan.

Although some of the conditions stated in the *aide-mémoire* of the embassy of the 21st January (3rd February) are already in fact fulfilled, it appears, nevertheless, desirable that the two Ministers should address a joint note to the Persian Government, setting forth all the conditions laid down by the two Governments. In particular, this note should demand from the Persian Government a simple undertaking to make its policy in the future conform with the principles of the Anglo-Russian convention, leaving it to the Persians, if they so desire, to propose some other formula on this point more acceptable to them.

While bringing the above to the knowledge of the British Embassy, and while expressing its readiness to furnish the Russian representative in Tehran with instructions in the sense above indicated, the Imperial Ministry considers it necessary, at the same time, to stipulate that, though now agreeing, in view of the desperate position of the Persian Government and the necessity of coming rapidly to its assistance, not to connect the question of the advance with any further conditions than those stated above, it reserves to itself the right to make any further pecuniary assistance to the Persian Government dependent on certain demands, as to which it will not fail in due course to inform the British Government.

St. Petersburg, February 2 (15), 1912.

No. 207.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 16, 1912.

M. SAZONOF consents to your making a statement in regard to Mohamed Ali in the sense proposed in your telegram of the 15th February. His Excellency agrees to the following announcement as regards the Russian attitude in the question of the Persian treasurer-general:—

“Russian Government have expressed concurrence in the proposal that the two Governments should acquiesce in temporary appointment of Mornard as treasurer-general, while keeping question of definite appointment in suspense. They have at the same time stated that, if within two or three months' time Persian Government could show reasonable grounds for not retaining him permanently, they would not raise any difficulty, provided that really good candidate could be found to take his place.”

No. 208.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 16, 1912.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 14th February, last paragraph.

M. Sazonof told me to-day that the matter was not yet definitely settled. His Excellency said that the post of Governor-General at Tabreez was one that required a strong man, adding that he was not sure that Sipahdar possessed the necessary qualifications for it. He said, however, that the Russian Government would not absolutely insist on Shuja-ed-Dowleh being retained at Tabreez.

No. 209.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 17.)

Sir,

India Office, February 16, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to refer to Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 28th ultimo regarding the sum to be claimed from the Persian Government as compensation for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort.

The sum named (4,734l.) seems to be generally suitable, and should be a first charge on the proposed loan.

It does not appear when His Majesty's Minister proposes to present this demand, but I am to suggest, for Secretary Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the situation, of which this incident was one feature only, should be treated as a whole, and that if it is intended to require of the Persian Government any other reparation or remedial action, a comprehensive demand should be made upon them.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

No. 210.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 17, 1912.

MESHED and ex-Shah.

I have received the following telegram, dated yesterday, from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed :—

“Yusuf's agitation in favour of the ex-Shah has again become more serious even than it was before. I invited my Russian colleague to inform the karguzar, conjointly with myself, that the ex-Shah had consented to quit Persia. Dabija, however, maintains that no such information has reached him. It will be very difficult to restrain the Constitutionalists much longer from retaliating, and I trust instructions may be sent, both to Dabija and myself, to inform the karguzar at once of the arrangement made with the ex-Shah.”

No. 211.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 18, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 19th February :—

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit copy of the joint note which my Russian colleague and I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, embodying the proposals of the two Governments with a view to assisting the Persian Government to restore order and to placing the relations of the Government with the two Powers on a friendly and stable footing.

You will notice that the proposal regarding the treatment of the ex-Shah is recorded, although the negotiations with His Majesty which are involved have already been begun. I should mention that the style given in the note to the ex-Shah—Mohamed Ali Shah—was due to the insistence of my colleague, who urged that his Government had always given him this style. As the question appeared to me to be one of sentiment and not one of material importance, I made little demur.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 211.

Sir G. Barclay and M. Poklewsky to Persian Government.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 18 février, 1912.

ANIMÉES du désir de mettre les relations entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie et le Gouvernement Impérial de Perse sur une base solide d'amitié et de confiance et désireuses d'aider autant que possible le Gouvernement persan dans sa tâche de rétablir et de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans le pays, les Légations de Russie et d'Angleterre, d'ordre de leurs Gouvernements, ont l'honneur de faire au Gouvernement persan les propositions suivantes :—

1. Les deux Gouvernements sont prêts à avancer, pour faire face aux dépenses urgentes, au Gouvernement persan une somme de 100,000*l.* chacun. La Banque Impériale et la Banque d'Escompte ouvriront chacune un crédit pour cette somme aussitôt que les deux légations auront reçu une réponse favorable à la présente note, et il est entendu que le crédit de la Banque d'Escompte sera mis à la disposition du Gouvernement persan en roubles, s'élevant à la somme de 945,750 roubles.

2. Les sommes susindiquées seront prêtées à un taux d'intérêt de 7 pour cent par an et devront être remboursées du premier produit du prochain emprunt du Gouvernement persan, et jusqu'alors les excédents des revenus des douanes du nord et du sud, qui jusqu'ici ont été mis par les deux banques à la disposition du Gouvernement persan, devront être employés intégralement et respectivement pour le service de l'amortissement et des intérêts des parties russe et anglaise de la présente avance.

3. L'avance doit être dépensée sous le contrôle du trésorier général et d'après un programme élaboré par ce dernier d'accord avec le Cabinet et approuvé par les deux légations. Il est entendu qu'une partie considérable sera affectée à l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale avec l'aide des officiers suédois. En faisant cette proposition et pour atteindre les buts indiqués au commencement de cette note, les deux légations espèrent que le Gouvernement persan s'engagera (1) à conformer dorénavant sa politique aux principes de la convention anglo-russe de 1907 ; (2) à licencier, aussitôt que Mohammad Ali Schah et Salar-ed-Dowleh auront quitté la Perse, les fédais et les forces irrégulières qui se trouvent actuellement au service persan ; (3) à discuter avec les deux légations un projet d'organisation d'une petite armée régulière et effective ; (4) à arriver à un accord avec Mohammad Ali Schah au sujet de son départ de la Perse, de sa pension et d'une amnistie générale à ses partisans.

En espérant une réponse favorable, nous saisissons, &c.

G. BARCLAY.
POKLEWSKY-KOZIELL.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, February 18, 1912.

ANIMATED by the desire to place upon a solid basis of friendship and confidence the relations between the Government of His Britannic Majesty, the Imperial Government of Russia, and the Imperial Government of Persia, and desirous of assisting the Persian Government as far as possible in their task of re-establishing and maintaining order and tranquillity in the country, the Russian and British Legations have the honour, by instruction of their Governments, to make to the Persian Government the following proposals :—

1. The two Governments are prepared, in order to meet urgent expenditure, to advance to the Persian Government a sum of 100,000*l.* each. The Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Escompte will each open an account for this sum as soon as the two legations have received a favourable reply to the present note, and it is understood that the sum paid into the account by the Banque d'Escompte will be placed at the disposal of the Persian Government in roubles, amounting to the sum of 945,750 roubles.

2. The above-mentioned sums will be lent at a rate of interest of 7 per cent. per annum, and will be repayable out of the first proceeds of the forthcoming loan of the Persian Government, and until then the surpluses of the northern and southern customs revenues, which have hitherto been placed by the two banks at the disposal of the Persian Government, will be wholly and respectively assigned to the amortisation of and to the payment of interest on the Russian and British portions of the present advance.

3. The advance will be expended under the control of the treasurer-general, in accordance with a programme prepared by him in agreement with the Cabinet and approved by the two legations. It is understood that a considerable part will be assigned to the organisation of the Government gendarmerie with the assistance of the Swedish officers. In making this proposal, and in order to attain the ends indicated at the beginning of this note, the two legations hope that the Persian Government will undertake (1) to conform their policy henceforth with the principles of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; (2) as soon as Mohamed Ali Shah and Salar-ed-Dowleh have left Persia, to dismiss the fedais and irregular forces now in the Persian service; (3) to discuss with the two legations a scheme for the organisation of a small regular and effective army; (4) to come to an agreement with Mohamed Ali Shah on the subject of his departure from Persia, of his pension, and of a general amnesty to his followers.

Hoping to receive a favourable reply, we avail, &c.

G. BARCLAY.
POKLEWSKY-KOZIELL.

No. 212.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 19, 1912.

MY telegram of 4th February, reporting that Mohamed Ali Khan had dispatched culprits in recent incidents to Shiraz.

Acting British consul now reports that these so-called culprits are irresponsible scapegoats, who declare that the principal offender, Feridoun, was released by Mohamed Ali, and has fled to Soulet.

No. 213.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 19, 1912.

I HAVE received the following telegram, dated to-day, from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed :—

“An enormous mob is now assembling at the mosque in support of the ex-Shah, and, as it is armed, bloodshed may occur at any moment.

“The ex-Shah was proclaimed in the mosque last night, and it is improbable that I can save the situation much longer unless you can arrange for my colleague to be instructed to join me in joint message to the karguzar, as previously suggested by me. The strongest action is urgently required.”

I have replied as follows :—

“The Russian Minister has assured me that telegraphic instructions will be sent to Russian consul; and as soon as Dabija receives them you can act with him in any announcement he may be instructed to make in order to allay the public excitement.”

No. 214.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 19, 1912.

PLEASE communicate to M. Sazonof the substance of Tehran telegram of the 17th February respecting the situation at Meshed.

No. 215.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 20, 1912.

PLEASE see Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 14th instant.

The ex-Shah expresses his willingness to quit Persia, but he insists on his former pension being renewed, and also demands the prompt payment of 100,000 tomans. He declares that this sum is necessary in order to pay off his Turkoman and Caucasian levies.

Russian Minister has consulted his consul at Astrabad as to whether this latter sum is necessary. Russian consul has replied that, if devastation by Mohamed Ali's followers is to be avoided, the sum mentioned is indispensable.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the matter is urgent the Russian Minister and I are advising the Persian Government to allow the ex-Shah a pension of 75,000 tomans per annum, and to pay the sum of 100,000 tomans demanded. The Persian Government will bear one-half of this sum and the ex-Shah the other half. His Majesty's pension will therefore be reduced from 75,000 tomans to 50,000 tomans for the first two years.

The Russian consul at Astrabad will assist in distributing the 100,000 tomans.

No. 216.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 20, 1912.

MESHED disturbances.

Your telegram of the 19th February.

M. Sazonof was unable to see me to-day, and I accordingly wrote him a private letter in the sense of your instructions. I included in this letter the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 19th February, and asked his Excellency to instruct the Russian consul-general at Meshed at once in the sense desired.

No. 217.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 21, 1912.

MY telegram of the 20th February.

In conversation with me to-day M. Sazonof said that he had hoped that the Meshed trouble had been finally settled, as he had sent most categorical instructions to the Russian consul-general there. He promised, however, that he would telegraph again to Prince Dabija.

The conversation then turned to the demands put forward by the ex-Shah (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 20th February), and M. Sazonof said that if the Persian Government could be induced to accept the joint proposals which had been made by the two Ministers at Tehran, he for his part would raise no objection to the arrangement suggested.

No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 21, 1912.

THE agent of the oil company at Kasr-i-Shirin has telegraphed that the company's operations are seriously threatened by Mohamed Kerim Khan Kalhur, who is supported by Salar-ed-Dowleh. He adds that all communications have been cut, and that the removal of the two persons mentioned is urgently necessary.

The necessary protection should be afforded to the representative of the company to enable their operations to be carried on. Please approach Persian Government accordingly.

No. 219.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 22, 1912.

MY telegram of 20th February.

After discussion with the Persian Government, Russian Minister is instructing Russian consul at Astrabad to press the ex-Shah to accept pension of 75,000 tomans, and, in addition, such a lump sum as is necessary for payment of his Caucasians and Turkomans, the latter amount to be repaid to the Persian Government by annual deductions of 25,000 tomans from pension.

No. 220.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 22, 1912.

MY telegram of 18th February.

Russian Minister and I are given to understand that, subject to some verbal changes, our proposals will be accepted if a more palatable formula can be found for recognition of Anglo-Russian convention. Persian Government have suggested two alternative formulas, of which only one is worth submitting to the two Governments. It runs as follows:—

“Animated by desire of establishing stable relations of friendship with the neighbouring Powers, Persian Government undertake to conform their policy to principles of the convention of 1907 in so far as such policy shall not be derogatory to (“pas porter atteinte à”) the fundamental principles laid down in preamble of the said convention, viz.: (1) independence and integrity of Persia; (2) her peaceful development; and (3) equal opportunities for commerce and industry of all countries.”

No. 221.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 22, 1912.

SEE telegram from St. Petersburg of yesterday.

If the increase of the ex-Shah's pension is very repugnant to Persian Government, perhaps the question might be settled by some compromise.

No. 222.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 23, 1912.

RUSSIAN troops at Kazvin.

My telegram of the 14th February.

I was told to-day by M. Sazonof that he had received a telegram from Tehran in which M. Poklewsky expressed the opinion that the withdrawal of the whole Russian force from Kazvin at the present moment would be most inadvisable. M. Poklewsky added that he believed that the Persian Government themselves, in view of the prospect of the disarming of the fedais, would be glad to have a Russian force at hand that could reach the capital in three days.

M. Sazonof said that he had been enquiring whether it would still be possible to postpone the departure of the force from Kazvin, but feared that the authorities had already made all the final arrangements for withdrawing them.

No. 223.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 23, 1912.

PERSIAN recognition of Anglo-Russian agreement.

Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 22nd February.

M. Sazonof thinks that we should explain to the Persian Government that as only Russia, Great Britain, and Persia are concerned in the matter under discussion, there is no need for them to refer in their reply to outside Powers, and that we should press them to omit the third point in their formula.

No. 224.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 23, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me telegram from Russian consul-general at Tabreez stating that acting British consul had telegraphed to Sir G. Barclay that it was in every way desirable to recognise Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who was popular and possessed influence among nomads, as Governor-General. Acting consul was opposed to appointment of Sipahdar, who was surrounded by fedais and Armenians, and whose arrival might give rise to fresh disorders.

M. Sazonof further told me that, although he had no desire to force the Persian Government to appoint Shuja-ed-Dowleh, it would in his opinion be very much wiser to keep him on as Governor-General—at any rate, for the time being; for he could not answer as to what effect might be produced on Russian policy if disorders were to break out at Tabreez again.

No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 23, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 22nd February: Joint note to Persian Government.

Persian formula appears to us objectionable because it places in opposition the principles of the convention and those of the preamble, a distinction which the two signatory Powers could hardly admit. Moreover, the principles of the preamble are incompletely summarised in the formula, "maintenance of order" being omitted.

I would propose to omit all words in Persian formula from "convention of 1907," and substitute following words: "and gladly recognise (or take note of) the assurances implied in the preamble of the said convention."

You should suggest this to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and enquire whether Russian Government have any other proposal to make.

No. 226.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24, 1912.)

Sir,

Shiraz, December 26, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Minister, a despatch enclosing a return of robberies and attacks on British subjects and of robberies of British goods which have occurred on the roads in this consular district during the last four years. The amount of property lost in these robberies and recovered by the Persian authorities is also noted.

I have, &c.

G. G. KNOX.

Enclosure 1 in No. 226.

Acting Consul Knox to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Shiraz, December 26, 1911.

IN compliance with instructions contained in your circular telegram of the 8th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith a return of attacks and robberies on British subjects and of robberies of British goods which have taken place in this consular district within the past four years. This return is confined to those attacks and robberies that have occurred on the main roads.

I have treated the subject-matter in two forms, the first dealing with the date of the robbery, the locality, the aggressors, and the persons prejudiced; in the second I have noted the nature of the attack or robbery, the value of the property robbed, and the amount recovered by the Persian authorities. It has also seemed not inappropriate to append a statement of wilful damage to the lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Department during the last three years for which figures are at present available.

I have, &c.

G. G. KNOX.

Enclosure 2 in No. 226.

RETURN of Attacks on and Robberies from British Subjects for 1908-12.

Form I.

No.	Date.	Locality.	Aggressors.	Persons or Firm Prejudiced.
1908.				
1	January 12 ..	Kotal-i-Malu ..	Villagers ..	His Majesty's Government.
2	February 5 ..	Sivand ..	Arabs ..	Messrs. Haji Ali Akbar, of Manchester.
3	March (?) ..	Ab Barik ..	Basiri ..	Messrs. Dixon
4	" 18 ..	Mian Kotal ..	Kashgais ..	" "
5	July 8 ..	" ..	Kaloonis ..	" Ziegler.
6	August 10 ..	Dalaki ..	Villagers ..	" Somech.
				" Isaacs.
7	" 18 ..	Near Dalaki ..	" ..	" Dixon.
8	" 20 ..	Zarghun ..	Arabs ..	" Ziegler.
				" Zeitoon.
9	" 20 ..	Kazerun ..	Road guards ..	" Dixon.
10	" 23 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Villagers ..	" D. Sassoon.
11	September 6 ..	Mian Kotal ..	" ..	" Dixon.
12	" 9 ..	Shulgistan ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Imperial Bank.
13	" 9 ..	Khaneh Khorreh ..	Arabs ..	Egyptian subject.
14	October 3 ..	Shulgistan ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Tehran Club.
15	November 7 ..	" ..	" ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
16	" 10 ..	Ahmadi ..	Unknown ..	Bombay Parsi firm.
				Major Ducat.
17	" 17 ..	Shulgistan ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Messrs. Dixon.
18	December 7 ..	Deh Sheikh ..	Masermi (?) ..	" Zeitoon Khalil.
1909.				
19	February 15 ..	Zinian ..	Unknown ..	Messrs. Somech.
20	March 17 ..	Kurdshul ..	Lashanis ..	Mr. E. Gentleman.
21	" 30 ..	Abbasabad ..	Villagers ..	Rev. J. C. Linton.
22	April 6 ..	Sivand ..	Arabs ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
23	" 9 ..	Behbehan ..	Lurs ..	Mr. J. C. Smith (Indo-European Telegraph Department).
24	May 16 ..	Chenar Rahdar ..	Masermi ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
25	" 18 ..	Abdui ..	Road guards ..	" Dixon.
26	" 22 ..	Deh Sheikh ..	Masermis ..	" Ziegler.
27	June 3 ..	Haft Mullah ..	Villagers ..	" Dixon.
28	" 7 ..	Zinian ..	Kashgais ..	" Mowla, of Bombay.
29	August 16 ..	Pul-i-Khan.. ..	Arabs ..	Mr. G. Middleton.
30	October 28 ..	Khaneh Kergun ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Messrs. D. Sassoon.
31	November 28 ..	Sineh Safid ..	Kashgai ..	" Andrew Weir.
32	" 18 ..	Konar Takhteh ..	Villagers ..	" Ziegler.
1910.				
33	January (?) ..	Chenar Rahdar ..	Masermis ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
34	April 12 ..	Kaderabad.. ..	Villagers ..	Clerk, His Majesty's consulate.
35	" 17 ..	Shulgistan.. ..	Boir Ahmad (?) ..	Mr. J. H. Bill, His Majesty's consul.

No.	Date.	Locality.	Aggressors.	Persons or Firm Prejudiced.
	1910.			
36	May 30 ..	Near Siakh ..	Sorkhis ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
37	August 13 ..	" ..	Kashgais ..	" "
38	November 14 ..	Ag. Cheshmeh ..	Kashgai and Lur (?)..	" Dixon. " Somech. " Service Reeve. " D. Sassoon. " H. S. Mqhammed Kazeruni, of Bombay.
39	August (?) ..	Gerdeneh Imamzadeh Ismail ..	Kashgai ..	British Indian subject.
40	November (?) ..	" ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Two British Indian subjects.
	1911.			
41	February 22 ..	Ab Barik ..	Arabs ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
42	" 15 ..	Khaneh Kergun ..	Kurdshulir ..	" "
43	March 13 ..	Surmek ..	Villagers ..	" "
44	April 1 ..	God-i-Narm ..	Kurdshulis ..	" Dixon.
45	February 12 ..	Khaneh Kergun ..	" ..	" D. Sassoon.
46	June 20 ..	Kamarej ..	Kashgais ..	" Livingstone.
47	July 7 ..	Dastarjin ..	Villagers ..	" Dixon.
48	" 17 ..	Morghab ..	Unknown ..	" Ziegler.
49	" 27 ..	Khosrow Shirin ..	Kashgais ..	Imperial Bank of Persia.
50	August 22 ..	Kazerun ..	Villagers ..	Messrs. Livingstone.
51	" 26 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Kamarejis ..	" Somech.
52	September 7 ..	Konar Takhteh ..	Villagers ..	" Ziegler.
53	" 9 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Kashkulis ..	" Sassoon.
54	" 17 ..	" ..	Road guards ..	British Indian subject.
55	" 26 ..	Pul-i-Fesa ..	Kashgai ..	Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, I.A.
56	October 1 ..	Pulabguineh ..	Villagers ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
57	" 3 ..	Tang-i-Turkan ..	Kashkulis (?) ..	" Andrew Weir.
58	" 12 ..	Shulgistan ..	Boir Ahmad ..	(a.) Miss Ross. (b.) Messrs. Ziegler. " Dixon. Lloyd's (insured opium).
59	" 13 ..	Deh Sheikh ..	Kashgai ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
60	" 29 ..	Khaneh Khorreh ..	Uncertain ..	Miss Ross.
61	November 19 ..	Pul-i-Karagach ..	Boir Ahmad ..	Japanese merchants under British protection.
62	" 30 ..	Shulgistan ..	Kuhgelus (?) ..	One squadron 39th C.I. Horse.
63	December 20 ..	Dastarjin ..	Villagers ..	Messrs. Ziegler.
64	" 24 ..	Kotal Dakhter ..	Kashkulis ..	Fifty men 39th C.I. Horse.

NOTE.—It seems worthy of note that only one British subject has travelled between Shiraz and Ispahan in the interval between the attack on Mr. Bill in April 1909 (No. 35) and that on Miss Ross on the 12th October, 1911.

No. 62 was an attack on a caravan near the squadron of Central India Horse proceeding to reinforce the consular escort at Ispahan; in the ensuing skirmish the rissaldar major of that regiment was severely wounded.

No. 64 was a treacherous attack by road guards, in which one sowar was killed, one wounded, and two horses killed.

Form II.

No. in Form I.	Nature of Robbery.	Value Robbed.	Amount Recovered.
1	Escort sowar held up ..	Krans. 2,360·00	Krans. Nil.
2	Caravan robbery ..	630·00	"
3	" ..	2,615·00	"
4	" ..	4,398·00	"
5	" ..	350·00	"
6	" ..	1,470·00	"
7	" ..	2,300·00	"
8	" ..	9,768·00	5,255·00
9	" ..	2,745·00	Nil.
10	" ..	7,800·00	"
11	" ..	2,785·00	"
12	" ..	2,550·00	"
13	" ..	1,150·00	"
14	" ..	2,730·00	"
15	" ..	2,650·00	"

No. in Form I.	Nature of Robbery.	Value Robbed.	Amount Recovered.
		Krans.	Krans.
16	Caravan robbery	1,220·00	Nil.
17	" "	31,368·25	"
18	" "	2,065·75	"
19	" "	2,396·00	"
20	Robbery and assault	10,600·00	"
21	" "	6,194·00	"
22	Caravan robbery	651·00	651·00
23	Attack	5,800·00	5,800·00
24	Caravan robbery	18,888·00	Nil.
25	" "	1,749·00	"
26	" "	1,800·00	"
27	" "	2,332·00	"
28	" "	5,800·00	"
29	Robbery and assault	2,110·00	"
30	Caravan robbery	23,072·00	"
31	" "	28,080·00	"
32	" "	1,119·00	"
33	" "	21,792·00	4,196·00
34	Robbery and assault	5,600·00	600·00
35	Attack on His Majesty's consul (two sowars of escort killed)
36	Caravan robbery	565·00	Nil
37	" "	2,941·00	1,373·85
38	" "	54,277·00	Nil.
39	Attack	398·00	"
40	" "	346·00	"
41	Caravan robbery	5,673·00	"
42	" "	1,320·00	"
43	" "	835·00	"
44	" "	4,510·00	"
45	" "	3,500·00	"
46	" "	4,698·00	"
47	" "	1,300·00	"
48	" "	15,515·00	"
49	" "	15,000·00	"
50	" "	750·00	"
51	" "	2,057·00	"
52	" "	280·00	"
53	" "	2,500·00	"
54	" "	1,349·00	"
55	Robbery and assault	Property restored.
56	Caravan robbery	600·00	Nil.
57	" "	21,600·00	"
58	(a.) Robbery and assault	13,515·00	13,515·00
		(255L)	
	(b.) Caravan robbery	359,100·00	Nil.
		(approximate)	
59	Caravan robbery	5,115·00	"
60	Attack	633·00	"
61	Robbery and assault
62	Skirmish
63	Caravan robbery	850·00	850·00
64	Attack
	Total.. ..	738,165·00	32,240·85

NOTE.—The designation of caravan robbery includes in some cases simple thefts of merchandise on the road.

STATEMENT of Wilful Damage to the Lines of the Indo-European Telegraph
Department between Bushire and Abadeh.

Year ended the 1st January, 1909	Krans.
" " " 1910	16,726
" " " 1911	33,893
					47,323
Total	97,942

G. G. KNOX.

No. 227.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 24, 1912.

MESHED and the ex-Shah.

His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed has been asked by the Governor-General to send a written message to the agitators to the effect that, acting on the representations of Great Britain and Russia, the ex-Shah has declared his willingness to leave Persia.

As the agitation is increasing, His Majesty's consul-general has requested me to authorise him to comply with the request of the Governor-General.

I have telegraphed in reply that he may inform anyone he pleases, in writing, that the ex-Shah is being urged by the two Governments to leave Persia, and that the only matters in this connection awaiting settlement are those relating to the amount of pension to be accorded to him.

No. 228.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 21st February.

I was asked last month by the agent at Kasr-i-Shirin of the oil company whether an escort of Indian sowars could be sent to protect the property of the company until the Persian Government should have restored order.

I replied that I did not see my way to advise that further troops should be sent from India, nor could I authorise the use of the consular escort at Kermanshah for the purpose desired.

I have made representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed in your telegram. His Excellency states that the Persian Government wish Farman Farma, the new governor, to proceed to Kermanshah with some Government troops, but that they have not the necessary money.

As reported in my telegram of the 13th instant, Salar-ed-Dowleh and Daoud Khan have already fled from Kermanshah.

No. 229.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 24, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government and southern gendarmerie.

You are reported to have stated on the 21st February in Parliament that the British share of the joint advance would be utilised for the restoration of security on the southern roads.

It would seem, in my opinion, quite unnecessary, and would starve other urgent needs, to earmark so large a sum as 100,000*l.* for the portion of the gendarmerie to be organised in the south (please see my telegram of the 2nd February).

In view of your telegram of the 5th February, I have discussed with the acting treasurer-general a draft programme of expenditure which provides for 420,000 tomans for the whole gendarmerie. This is in accordance with Swedish colonel's estimates, and is thought to be enough to finance the organisation for six months. Do you regard this as satisfactory, or would you wish me to insist on the sum being expressly divided between northern and southern gendarmerie?

No. 230.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 24, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to enquire, with reference to your letter of the 16th instant, whether Lord Crewe is of opinion that the moment has now

arrived for informing the Persian Government of the amount of compensation that His Majesty's Government have decided to claim for the attack on Mr. Consul Smart, in view of the fact that the sum has recently been mentioned in the House of Commons.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 231.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 12th February, and Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 23rd February.

It will be most disappointing if decision to withdraw Russian troops from Kazvin is revoked. Does the safety of foreign lives and property, in your opinion, depend upon their remaining in the neighbourhood of Tehran, or have strong representations been made by the Persian Government in favour of their retention?

No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Refer to St. Petersburg telegram of the 23rd February.

Is there any prospect, in view of our combined action concerning the ex-Shah, of obtaining the consent of Persian Government to the appointment of Shuja-ed-Dowleh to the post of Governor-General; and, if so, what confidence could they place in his loyalty to them?

It appears that Mr. Shipley is inclined to agree that it might be desirable that the appointment should be given to Shuja.

No. 233.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, February 26, 1912.

DANS notre opinion, le Gouvernement persan ne fait que retarder le départ si urgent de Perse de Mohammed Ali par les difficultés créées au sujet de sa pension, d'une avance destinée à couvrir ses engagements envers ses adhérents Turcomans et autres et de l'amortisation de cette avance.

Nous chargeons M. Poklewsky de s'exprimer dans le sens qu'une défalcation de 20,000 tomans d'une pension de 70,000, somme de la pension projetée, réduction contre laquelle nous n'élevons pas d'objections, est trop considérable. Cette déduction devrait être réduite à 10,000.

Quant à l'avance, elle devrait être suffisante pour couvrir les nécessités réelles, le contraire ne pouvant que faire prévoir des troubles et des rapines de la part de ces mêmes Turcomans et adhérents.

M. Poklewsky est chargé d'appuyer sur ces conclusions.

La question la plus urgente étant le départ de l'ex-Schah, il serait extrêmement désirable que Sir George Barclay fût muni d'instructions qui le mettent à même d'appuyer M. Poklewsky en cette démarche.

*Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 26 février, 1912.*

(Translation.)

IN our opinion, the Persian Government are only delaying the so necessary departure of Mohamed Ali from Persia by the difficulties raised respecting his pension, an advance intended to meet his engagements to his Turcoman and other followers, and the repayment of that advance.

We are instructing M. Poklewsky to express the view that, while we do not object to a reduction, a deduction of 20,000 tomans from a pension of 70,000 (the amount of the proposed pension) is too much. This deduction ought to be reduced to 10,000.

As regards the advance, this should be sufficient to provide for real needs, otherwise we must expect disorders and raids on the part of these Turcomans and followers.

M. Poklewsky is instructed to lay stress on these considerations.

As the most urgent question is the departure of the ex-Shah, it is very desirable that Sir George Barclay should be furnished with instructions enabling him to support M. Poklewsky's action in the matter.

Russian Embassy,
February 26, 1912.

No. 234.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH.

Your telegram of yesterday.

The telegram from acting consul at Tabreez to which M. Sazonof refers is dated the 16th February, and is as follows:—

“I venture to lay before you the following considerations: Persian Government, however justified they may be in holding the view they do, would do wrong to forget that the only man able to maintain order in Azerbaijan is undoubtedly Shuja-ed-Dowleh; he is greatly feared by the numerous lawless tribes, even though these say openly that they have nothing to fear from the central authorities. I am informed that Shuja has some secret pact with the chiefs of the tribes, and the Sipahdar, if he is appointed, would require Shuja's co-operation as long as the latter is allowed to remain in the country.

“On the other hand, Reshid-ul-Mulk and Rafi-ed-Dowleh, Shuja's subordinates, who exact money from rich and poor, are the curse of the town and of the province. They should not in any case be permitted to have anything to do with the local authorities.”

The opposition of the Persian Government to the appointment of Shuja as governor is as strong as ever. The following telegram which has just reached me from the acting consul at Tabreez confirms my own strong doubts whether he could be trusted to remain loyal to the Persian Government:—

“The Khan of Maku has been appointed by Shuja-ed-Dowleh Governor-General of Khoi, Salmas, and Urmia districts. Shuja has taken this step in order to assure for himself the khan's co-operation. The principal chiefs of all the tribes, including Kurds, have received titles. I am informed that all this is part and parcel of a programme in favour of the ex-Shah. In order to try and force the return of the ex-Shah, a general rising of the population of Azerbaijan will, I hear, be brought about in the spring. We may expect trouble very soon unless steps are taken by the Persian Government to thwart such intrigues.”

No. 235.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

RUSSIAN troops.

Your telegram of yesterday.

So far from the Persian Government's strongly urging that the Russian troops should be retained at Kazvin, they occasionally request my support to obtain their withdrawal. Their presence near the capital is not essential, in my opinion, for the safety of foreign lives and property. Nevertheless, as the removal of the fedai is more likely to be accomplished without bloodshed if they know that Russian troops are within easy reach of Tehran, I still think it would be wiser not to press for their withdrawal for the moment.

No. 236.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

MY telegram of this morning.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that the Russian troops at Enzeli and Resht are to be withdrawn to Russia; the Kazvin force is also to be recalled thither, with the exception of one regiment of Cossacks, two battalions of infantry, and four mountain guns, which will stop at Enzeli and Resht.

Orders have actually been received for the above movements and also for a considerable reduction in the force at Tabreez.

No. 237.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

MY telegram of the 26th February.

Russian consul-general at Tabreez has been instructed by my colleague to discourage Shuja from making any appointments whatever, as, should he do so, it will be more difficult to return to a legal situation, *i.e.*, government by a Governor-General appointed by the Central Government.

While it is certainly desirable that, until Sipahdar can be sent from here, Shuja should continue to be *de facto* governor, it would be well that the Russian Government should give him the strongest injunctions to abstain from intrigues. When the Sipahdar has taken up his post, the Persian Government would, I understand, be quite ready later to reinstate Shuja in his former post as Governor of Maragha.

No. 238.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

MY telegram of the 22nd instant.

The ex-Shah has requested the Russian Government to lend him 6,000 roubles which he promises to repay on his arrival in Odessa. He has also asked them for a ship of war to take him away. Arrangements are, I understand, being made with a view to meeting his wishes.

He now states that only 70,000 tomans are needed to pay off the Turkomans and Caucasians; he begs that this sum be provided partly by the Persian Government. He has also again requested the Russian Government to obtain for him a renewal of his former pension.

While adhering to a pension of 75,000 tomans, and to the ex-Shah bearing the expense of paying off the Turkomans and Caucasians, the Russian Government consider that the sum required for the purpose should be paid back to the Persian Government by annual deductions of 10,000 tomans and not of 25,000.

My Russian colleague is pressing the Persian Government to agree to this, and I am giving him my support in view of the urgency of the matter.

In the opinion of the Russian consul the 70,000 tomans should be distributed before the ex-Shah leaves Persia. I understand that the Russian Government concur in this view.

I do not see how this sum is to be paid unless it is advanced by the two banks.

Could the Imperial Bank of Persia be urged to advance it on current account as a first charge on the joint Government advance? Delay would be involved by the Russian Bank being obliged to obtain the necessary sanction to bear its share.

No. 239.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

MESHEH.

His Majesty's consul-general telegraphs as follows, dated to-day :—

“The numbers of the Royalists in possession of the shrine are increasing.”

I have sent the following telegram in reply :—

“You should propose to Russian consul such joint action as you think desirable with a view to quieting the agitation. Report action taken.”

No. 240.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 26, 1912.

MY telegram of 13th February.

Persian Government learn that Salar-ed-Dowleh has retaken Kermanshah and looted bazaars.

Russian Minister has no instructions as regards joint communication to Salar-ed-Dowleh (see your telegram of 8th February).

No. 241.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 24th February: Gendarmerie.

Report is inaccurate. The course suggested after discussion with M. Mornard would meet the case, and you may adopt it.

No. 242.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 26, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 26th February.

You should enquire whether Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to ask Russian Bank to advance 35,000 tomans within the next two days. We are requesting Imperial Bank to advance this sum at once, and will ask them to advance the whole amount of 70,000 tomans if M. Sazonof replies in the negative.

Please telegraph result of your enquiry.

No. 243.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 23rd February.

Russian Government have instructed their representative at Tehran to propose to join with Sir G. Barclay in submitting to Persian Government formula of recognition of the Anglo-Russian convention suggested by you.

No. 244.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

Sir,

India Office, February 27, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 24th instant, regarding the situation in Southern Persia, and, in reply, to say that his Lordship, for the reasons already given, would have preferred that the claims of His Majesty's Government should be presented as a whole; but, as the sum to be demanded as compensation has been mentioned in Parliament, and as delay in claiming it may be misunderstood, he sees no objection to the proposed communication being made now to the Persian Government.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

No. 245.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 28, 1912.

YOU will probably be approached this afternoon by the Imperial Bank of Persia on the subject of an advance to the Persian Government of 100,000 tomans. This sum is independent of the advance required to pay off the ex-Shah's Turkomans and Caucasians.

In consequence of an appeal made to me by the acting treasurer-general, I spoke to the manager of the Imperial Bank this morning with regard to the former advance, but my Russian colleague, whom I have since seen, wishes the advance to be withheld until the attitude of the Persian Government towards the amended formula for the recognition of the Anglo-Russian Convention is seen. We are proposing this amended formula to the Persian Government this afternoon.

No. 246.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 28, 1912.

MY telegram of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to consult Cabinet to-night, and to tell us to-morrow verbally whether the amended formula is accepted or not. He could not give us any certain indication this afternoon as to its chance of being accepted.

If the formula is accepted I hope that the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia will be authorised by his head office to advance the 100,000 tomans, which Mornard needs most urgently, without conditions, to be repaid from the joint advance made by the two Governments. It is possible this latter advance may be delayed for a day or two even after the amended formula is accepted.

No. 247.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 26th February.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday as instructed.

His Excellency told me to-day that he was in communication with Minister of Finance, and that as soon as he received latter's sanction he would send an urgent telegram to Russian Minister authorising advance of 35,000 tomans by Russian Bank.

No. 248.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 28, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 26th February: Communication to Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is sending instructions to Russian Minister on the subject, but fears that after his recent success Salar-ed-Dowleh may not be easy to deal with.

No. 249.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 29, 1912.

YOU should present claim for 4,734l. for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort (see your telegram of 23th January), unless you see objection at present moment.

No. 250.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 28th February.

Imperial Bank has been requested to place 35,000 tomans at once at disposal of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

No. 251.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 29, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Refer to Tehran telegrams of the 28th February.

The Imperial Bank is, at my request, holding 100,000 tomans in readiness, but perhaps the Russian Government would prefer to advance half of the necessary sum. Please find out from M. Sazonof whether they wish to do this, or whether they are willing that the Imperial Bank should advance the whole amount.

No. 252.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 1, 1912.

PERSIAN gendarmerie.

One Swedish officer is already at Shiraz; three others leave Tehran to-morrow. Swedish colonel hopes to have his gendarmerie in full working order on the Bushire-Ispahan road twelve months after their arrival at Shiraz. He hopes to be able to guard half the road from Bushire to Yezdikasht in six months after their arrival. He has not yet made up his mind which half it is to be—whether it is to extend somewhat north of Shiraz and stop short at Kazerun, or to be the portion between Bushire and Shiraz.

His scheme, as far as the south is concerned, aims only at guarding the road from Bushire to Yezdikasht, and whatever the prospects of the success of the Swedish officers may be in this limited sphere, it would be rash to rely on Persia's ever being able to undertake the great military effort by which alone order in the south could be restored.

Your telegram of the 29th ultimo.

I had under-estimated in my telegram of the 28th January loss of property

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by 10L. ; claim for 4,744L. therefore will now be presented to the Persian Government. Payment will be pressed for out of the next loan as distinct from the joint advance which the two Governments are about to make.

No. 253.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 1, 1912.

MY telegram of the 28th February.

Russian Government consent to advance 35,000 tomans, and have telegraphed to Russian Minister to concert with Sir G. Barclay as to method of utilising this sum for paying off ex-Shah's followers.

No. 254.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 1, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 15th February : Ispahan escort.

You should inform Colonel Douglas that, while no decision can be reached at present as to length of time for which the regiment will be required to remain at Ispahan, he should secure an extension of the lease, if possible, for a short term.

No. 255.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 1, 1912.

SEE Petersburg telegram of the 1st March : Ex-Shah.

You should act in concert with M. Poklewsky.

No. 256.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 2, 1912.

MY telegram of the 26th February.

Ex-Shah has gone to Russian naval station of Ashurada, leaving his brother, Shoa-es-Sultaneh, at Astrabad to settle with His Majesty's Turkomans and Caucasian followers in concert with Russian consul.

No. 257.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 2, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from Shiraz, 2nd March :—

“Major Kettlewell and Captain Pitcher were exercising one squadron of Indian cavalry about 6 miles from town. Inhabitants of village called Sultanabad and riflemen in sangar on hill above village fired at our cavalry about forty shots in all, some falling right amongst our men. Major Kettlewell restrained his men from returning fire, and managed to get into communication with riflemen on hill, who said they had taken our sowars for surkhis who had been plundering villages in the neighbourhood. They expressed regret for mistake. I made necessary representations to Kawam, who brought in Kadkhoda of Sultanabad and sent him to consulate. As incident really seems to be result of a mistake, I, with Douglas's

concurrence, reproved kadhoda in suitable terms and warned him of danger he and his village would incur if such mistake were repeated. I am informing local authorities that I cannot be responsible for results of action our troops may have to take if fired on again."

I have approved acting consul's attitude.

No. 258.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, March 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 28th February: Advance to Persian Government.
Russian Government may prefer Imperial Bank to advance whole sum of 100,000 tomans, so I have asked the Bank to hold that amount in readiness.

No. 259.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 29th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs considers no further advance ought to be made to Persian Government until the latter have accepted the proposals contained in joint note.

When once these proposals are accepted the Russian Bank would be instructed to advance half, viz., 50,000 tomans.

No. 260.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 4, 1912.

CONVEYS the substance of the following despatch, dated the 8th March:—

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a note in which I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I had placed to the credit of the Persian Government at the Imperial Bank of Persia the sum of 35,000 tomans, in connection with the ex-Shah's departure from Persia. A copy of his Excellency's reply acknowledging receipt of this sum is also enclosed.

The same sum has also been advanced by the Russian Bank on similar terms.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 260.

Sir G. Barclay to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

March 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have to-day, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, placed to the credit of the Persian Government at the Imperial Bank of Persia, at the disposal of the acting treasurer-general, the sum of 35,000 tomans. This sum is half of the 70,000 tomans required in connection with Mohamed Ali's departure.

It is understood that this 35,000 tomans must constitute a first charge on the advance of 200,000*l.* from the British and Russian Governments, should that advance be made; and that should that advance not be made, the 35,000 tomans will be secured on the receipts of the southern customs in the same manner as was proposed for the British share in the joint advance of 200,000*l.* in the joint note of the 13th February.

I should be glad of an early reply.

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I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 260.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

March 3, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of the 2nd instant respecting the sum of 35,000 tomans placed at the Imperial Bank of Persia in connection with Mohamed Ali Mirza's departure. The Persian Government, in expressing their thanks for the special assistance given by His Britannic Majesty's Government in this matter [beg to state that] the statements made in your note under reply have been accepted, and that the acting treasurer-general has been told to act accordingly.

I avail, &c.
VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 261.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 4, 1912.

MY telegram of 5th February.

Swedish colonel of gendarmerie desires to engage two more Swedish officers as well as a Swedish veterinary surgeon.

I presume there is no objection; Russian Minister sees none.

This will bring total of Swedes in gendarmerie up to twenty.

No. 262.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 5, 1912.

ACTING treasurer-general has furnished a statement to the two legations showing that apart from maliat the Persian revenue, on the basis of average of the last five years, is 4,000,000 tomans from customs, mint, telegraphs, passports, Crown lands, opium, and alcohol excise. Of this sum the present fixed charges absorb about 2,800,000 tomans, which would be reduced to 2,150,000 tomans by the liquidation of the Persian Government's debt to the Russian Bank.

He deduces from these figures that there is sufficient security for a loan of 33,000,000 tomans at 5 per cent., which, after the liquidation in question, would, if issue price were 85, give the Persian Government a balance of 22,000,000 tomans, out of which there would remain to be paid a floating debt of about 2,000,000 tomans and foreign claims, of which I hazard estimate of about 3,000,000 tomans.

No. 263.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 5, 1912.

SHUJA-ED-DOWLEH and Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, dated to-day, from the acting British consul at Tabreez:—

“Meetings of notables and of clergy, at which the return of the ex-Shah was strongly advocated, have taken place during the last week; elders of the quarter were

compelled to attend them. To-day white flags have been hoisted over a considerable number of shops; these bear the inscription, 'Long life to Mohamed Ali Shah!' The same thing is said to have taken place at Ardebil, Urmia, and Khoi."

No. 264.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 5, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from acting consul at Shiraz to-day :—

"Ilkhani arrived at Kazerun 1st March. Kashkuli and Farsimeidan Khans came in to greet him. He is counting for certain on the Shishbulukis, whose chief, Ahmed Khan, is his father-in-law. Soulet-ed-Dowleh is said to be intriguing and bribing to detach khans from ilkhani. Soulet-es-Sultaneh has not yet come in to ilkhani, and is apparently reluctant to support either side, being desirous of becoming ilkhani himself. Hadji Mohamed Kerim Khan is intriguing actively in Soulet-ed-Dowleh's favour with Soulet-es-Sultaneh and other khans. It seems unlikely that any of the three brothers can for the present establish himself properly over the whole tribe. Kashgais will perhaps sway from side to side, generally inclining to the chief who offers them best guarantees for liberty to pay no taxes and rob with impunity."

No. 265.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 5, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from acting consul, Shiraz, to-day :—

"Large consignment of cases for Indian troops, after long delay on Bushire road, has at last arrived here. Many cases had been opened and sundry effects stolen. Muleteers state that tufangchis all along road, having been wrongly informed from Bushire that consignment contained arms and ammunition for Indian troops, made dead set for our cases, which were frequently opened and searched. Khan of Kamarej, who also opened cases, appropriated sundry articles. Sardar Ihtesham, on his way to Kazerun, also opened one case in search of arms near Khanehzinian. We are about to make necessary representations in competent quarters, and will put in claim when loss accurately determined. All reports indicate bad feeling along road against us, and much exultation among tribesmen at what they consider their victories over Indian troops.

"Dixon's Armenian mirza coming up road at first tried to pass himself off as European, as was often done formerly, but soon found it much more prudent to feign to be Persian Mussulman."

No. 266.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 5, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of 4th March.

Russian Government have no objection to engagement of two more Swedish officers.

No. 267.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 19th February: Attack on Mr. Smart.

We should obviously gain nothing by the punishment of persons who are not the real culprits.

You need take no further action in this respect at present.

No. 268.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.

INDIA OFFICE propose to sanction recommendation of Government of India that infantry detachment of sixteen men at present at Bunder Abbas be retained there for further period of two years.

I am informing the Treasury that I consider it desirable to concur in the proposal of the India Office.

No. 269.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 4th March: Swedish officers.

I have no objection if Russian Government instruct your Russian colleague to raise none.

No. 270.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 6, 1912.

MY telegram of 5th March.

My Russian colleague is instructing Russian consul-general at Tabreez to concert with acting British consul with a view to a joint warning to Shuja against instigating demonstrations in favour of the ex-Shah.

No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 26th February: Kermanshah.

Have you and your Russian colleague acted as proposed in your telegram of 7th February?

British merchants are complaining of great danger to life and property.

No. 272.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 7, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 6th March: Kermanshah.

We have instructed consuls in the sense indicated. They were to inform Salar-ed-Dowleh of the negotiations with the ex-Shah, and that His Majesty was about to leave, and to advise Salar-ed-Dowleh strongly to leave on conditions offered by Persian Government.

Our instructions were sent on 1st March through the managers of the Imperial Bank of Persia and Russian Bank at Hamadan for conveyance to consuls by messenger, telegraphic communication between Hamadan and Kermanshah being still interrupted.

No. 273.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 7, 1912.

MY telegram of 6th March.

Acting consul at Tabreez reports that Russian consul has requested Shuja to stop agitation on behalf of ex-Shah, and that demonstrations in favour of His Majesty have now ceased.

No. 274.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 7, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs this morning visited Russian Legation by appointment to discuss with my Russian colleague and me terms of answer to joint note. He brought with him a draft which was unsatisfactory as regards certain points mentioned below, though after discussion he modified objectionable passages subject to approval of the Cabinet. He promised to submit it to us in a revised form before signing it to-morrow:—

1. In draft Minister for Foreign Affairs said nothing about approval of two legations for programme of expenditure of advance.

2. Draft stated that Persian Government would carefully conform to principles of the Anglo-Russian convention, but the remainder of formula was vague, and appeared again in some measure to place principles of convention in opposition to those of preamble.

3. Paragraph regarding army said nothing about discussion with two legations, but merely stated that Persian Government would look to their effective assistance in choice of foreign officers from minor Powers, and for armament of force.

After discussion we agreed as regards these three points as follows:—

1. Programme of expenditure is to be described as a programme of which two legations have already had cognisance.

2. Latter part of formula is to run as proposed by two Powers except that "takes official cognisance of" is substituted for "takes act of," there being in Persian no exact equivalent for latter, and that word "gladly" is omitted.

3. Wording is as follows: Persian Government will inform two legations of their programme for formation of an army, in order that an exchange of views may be effected on necessary points.

Draft deals very briefly with question of ex-Shah's pension and expresses the hope that the two Governments will lend their help to the Persian Government to prevent His Majesty from ever returning. Details of pension arrangements are to be embodied in a separate note. These are to be as already reported, except that in addition to ex-Shah's pension (1) 6,000 tomans are to be given to a son of His Majesty who lives in Tehran, and (2) a pension of 25,000 tomans is to be continued to ex-Shah's family on His Majesty's decease. These two last points were not dealt with in our joint note, but they are reasonable, and Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to submit them to Cabinet.

Draft concludes with hope that two Governments will now facilitate a loan without other conditions than those regarding security, &c., and that question of presence of foreign troops will soon be decided in accordance with hopes of Persian Government.

No. 275.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 8, 1912.

MY telegram of 1st March.

I spoke to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday about compensation for the attacks on Smart's escort.

He agreed with me that our claim was a very moderate one. He was about to submit it to the Cabinet. I told him that I should be satisfied with an undertaking that the claim should be a first charge on the next loan, and he led me to believe that there would be no difficulty about this.

No. 276.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 8, 1912.

MY telegram of 26th February.

Russian Minister informs me that he proposes to leave two battalions—1,300 men—at Kazvin for the present, and a similar force divided between Resht and Enzeli.

No. 277.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 8, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from British consul-general, Bushire, 8th March :—

“On 10th February navy captured dhow attempting smuggle large consignment arms from Arab coast to point on coast 80 miles to the west of Lingah. Arms proved belong to inhabitants of hinterland district of Tarakumah. Latter have been since endeavouring to raise force for attack on Lingah generally, and customs and British vice-consul in particular.

“British vice-consul now telegraphs force hold Tangi Khirjal pass, 30 miles to the north of Charak, which pass is key of the road to Lingah, and that general advance on town may be expected forthwith. Inhabitants uneasy, and local authorities express inability to offer any assistance. Sheikhs of Shibkuh ports have taken sides: Mirghu and Mukani are endeavouring to oppose raising force, while Charak and Chiru are in collusion with it.”

No. 278.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 8, 1912.

LINGAH.

Refer to my preceding telegram of to-day.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire telegraphs that 150 men are being moved from Jask to Lingah by senior naval officer, who considers that further advance on Lingah would probably be checked altogether by the demolition by His Majesty's ship of Sheikh of Chiru's towers, which would in any case have a salutary effect. Vice-consul at Lingah concurs in this view.

British consul-general at Bushire recommends the following action :—

His Majesty's vice-consul at Lingah should warn the Sheikhs of Chiru and Charak through His Majesty's ship that, if they permit raid on Lingah to take place, we shall assume their complicity, and His Majesty's ships will, without further discussion, take punitive action against them.

Sheikh of Chiru has given trouble for a long time. In October 1910, during a similar raid, his attitude was unsatisfactory, and a dhow laden with British goods, when passing island of Hindarabi in his jurisdiction, was fired on recently. British vice-consul asked for redress, and has just received an impertinent reply from the sheikh to his letter. Sir P. Cox advises that we should take this opportunity to exact reparation for this incident, and that we should call upon the Sheikh of Chiru to deposit at once 5,000 rupees on board of His Majesty's ship, or else give a satisfactory hostage as surety for the settlement of the case, and that the sheikh should be warned that his towers will be at once demolished failing compliance within forty-eight hours.

I have telegraphed to His Majesty's consul-general that I approve his action as

regards bringing up the 150 men to Lingah; if he considers protection of British life and property demands that they be landed, I have authorised him to issue the necessary instructions. I have also expressed concurrence in his recommendations as to the manner in which the two sheikhs are to be treated.

No. 279.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 8, 1912.

SEE telegram from Tehran of the 7th March: Joint proposals.

Please enquire M. Sazonof's views on the proposed amendments. They appear to me to meet the case.

No. 280.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 9, 1912.

MY telegram of 7th March.

It appears that our insisting on the Persian Government's undertaking to discuss with the two legations the formation of an army has aroused suspicion of the Cabinet.

Minister for Foreign Affairs visited us yesterday and entreated us to accept the omission of any mention of an exchange of views, intimating that the Cabinet might resign sooner than record this in an official note, though they were quite prepared in practice to discuss their army scheme with us. He said that our objection to his original formula, which mentioned engagement of foreign officers from minor Powers, lent itself to the construction that we should insist on Russian officers in the north and British officers in the south. He pressed us to state what were the points we wished to discuss, and, in particular, he wished to know whether our intentions were really what might be suspected from our objections to his formula. We said we could not specify points to be discussed until the Persian Government had communicated to us their scheme for organisation of an army. My Russian colleague reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Excellency was well aware that the Russian Government desired an increase in the Cossack brigade, but he had no instructions regarding their precise requirements. I said that I also was without instructions, but what I knew my Government desired was the organisation of a force capable of restoring order. We assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that our reason for desiring a discussion was that we wished to ensure that the force organised should be really effective, and that if in course of discussion we gave advice which the Persian Government considered unacceptable, the mere words of formula which we had induced him on 7th March to submit to the Cabinet would not commit the Persian Government to accepting such advice. We strongly urged his Excellency to bring the Cabinet to accept this formula.

His Excellency promised to submit what we had said to the Cabinet.

No. 281.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 9, 1912.

MY telegram of 26th February, last paragraph.

Acting consul at Tabreez reports that 1,500 Russian troops have left, but that 1,000 arrived a few days ago.

There are now 3,000 troops in Tabreez, and 500 on the road between that town and Julfa.

No. 282.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 9, 1912.

PERSIAN advance.

Your telegram of the 8th March.

M. Sazonof told me to-day that he agreed with your decision that the three points might be considered satisfactory, and said that he was ready to make the advance as soon as the amended Persian reply was received.

He was at first inclined to take exception to the mention of the presence of foreign troops in the last sentence of the draft reply, but eventually agreed to withdraw his objection on the ground that the sentence need not be taken as being directed specially against Russia, since Great Britain also had troops on Persian territory.

No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 9, 1912.

REFER to my telegram of the 25th February and your telegram of the 8th March.

When the fedais have been disbanded it is to be hoped that the Russian troops at Kazvin will be still further reduced, if the state of affairs has sufficiently improved. You will no doubt approach M. Poklewsky in this sense at the proper time.

No. 284.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 9, 1912.

YOUR telegrams of 8th March: Lingah.

I approve.

No. 285.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the question of the indemnity to be paid to Mr. Shuster's American assistants on vacating their appointments, which has been engaging the attention of the Persian Government for some time past, has now been settled.

Mr. Shuster had been requested by the Persian Government to hand over the office of treasurer-general to a committee appointed *ad hoc*, which it was intended should in its turn hand over to M. Mornard, the acting treasurer-general, the idea being that it would be easier for Mr. Shuster's *amour-propre* if the committee acted as an intermediary than if he had to hand over direct to M. Mornard. There was, however, some delay in the committee's getting to work, and as the date on which Mr. Shuster had arranged to leave—the 11th January—was approaching, he handed over to Mr. Cairns, the American next in seniority, leaving it to the latter to hand over either to the buffer committee or to M. Mornard. Mr. Shuster having left on the 11th January the *raison d'être* of the buffer committee had disappeared, and it therefore dissolved, and Mr. Cairns handed over the office of treasurer-general to M. Mornard on the 12th January. On this occasion Mr. Cairns, on behalf of his American colleagues, made it clear that they would not consent to continue to serve under any foreigner but an American citizen, and shortly afterwards a claim was presented to the Persian Government by the fourteen American assistants for payment of the emoluments to which they would have been entitled, provided they had served the full three years for which they had contracted. These emoluments included not only the salaries to the end of the three years, but also a bonus of one half-year's salary and travelling expenses back to America—amounting in all to upwards of 25,000*l.*

After considerable discussion it was agreed, at M. Mornard's suggestion, that the three Americans who had arrived in Tehran at the same time as Mr. Shuster, and had done eight months' useful work, should receive payment on this basis, but that the others who had recently arrived should be paid only one year's salary from the date of their vacating their posts, together with their travelling expenses and the bonus of one half-year's salary.

In this despatch I have spoken in general terms of the "American assistants." As a matter of fact, two of these have agreed, with the consent of the two legations, to continue to serve. They are Colonel Merrill and Major Preuss, who were engaged by Mr. Shuster for the Treasury gendarmerie, and are now serving under the Swedish colonel of gendarmerie. Colonel Merrill had done much valuable gendarmerie service in the Philippines, and Colonel Hjalmarsen is glad to have him. Major Preuss was originally in the German army.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 286.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 17, 1912.

SUBSEQUENTLY to my despatch of the 17th ultimo, the insurrection seemed for a time to have taken a more serious turn.

The Persian Government learnt that Shuja-ed-Dowleh from Tabreez and other agents of the ex-Shah in Azerbaijan were planning the dispatch along the Tehran road of a combined force to attack Mianeh. Russian reports from the provinces of Astrabad and Mazanderan showed that these provinces were entirely in Mohamed Ali's hands. His Majesty himself was in Astrabad, and his forces were said to number 3,000 men, including a large contingent of Caucasians. The reports added that his forces were contemplating an attack on Shahrud, and that they were confident of victory. At the same time, a serious agitation on behalf of Mohamed Ali was reported from Meshed. It was therefore high time for making the pronouncement against the ex-Shah upon which the two Governments had agreed, as suggested in the identic telegram from the two legations (see my telegram of the 10th January). As will be noticed in a subsequent despatch, the Russian consul at Astrabad was instructed on the 8th February to convey this pronouncement to Mohamed Ali. The final result of the ensuing negotiations with His Majesty is not known at the moment of writing.

Instructions had already been sent to the Russian consul-general at Tabreez to warn Shuja-ed-Dowleh that as Russia had declared that so long as Russian troops were near Tehran the ex-Shah would not be recognised His Majesty's cause was hopeless, and expeditions in his name were aimless and were disapproved by the Russian Government. The Russian consul-general at Meshed also was given peremptory orders to do his best to still the agitation in that town. These instructions have so far borne fruit that Meshed is reported calmer, and nothing more has been heard of the advance of Shuja-ed-Dowleh's forces on Mianeh.

Telegraphic communication with the west is still interrupted, and the intelligence which reached me of Salar-ed-Dowleh's movements is fragmentary. When last heard of on the 8th February, the Prince had been driven out of Kermanshah by a Government force under a certain Yar Mohamed Khan, a prominent Mujtahid.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 287.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 20, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of the *aide-mémoire* which my Russian colleague and I left with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of our representations respecting the ex-Shah, reported in my telegram of the 7th instant.

As reported in that telegram, the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted the inter-

vention of the Russian consul at Astrabad for the conduct of the negotiations with the ex-Shah with a view to His Majesty's leaving the country, on condition that he should receive a pension of 50,000 tomans and that a complete amnesty should be accorded to his adherents.

On the following day, the 8th February, the Russian Minister telegraphed to his consul at Astrabad the necessary instructions with a view to negotiations on these lines. The consul was to point out to the ex-Shah the hopelessness of his case, as he would never be recognised by His Majesty's Government. He was also to inform His Majesty that the two Powers would give their moral and material support to the Persian Government. If these arguments failed, the consul was to do his best to remove the Caucasians who had recently come to Astrabad in the ex-Shah's cause.

On the 9th instant the consul reported having carried out his instructions. Mohamed Ali seems to have been greatly surprised by the communication made to him. He said he had hoped for Russian sympathy, and intimated that if he had regained the throne he would have been guided in his actions by the requirements of Russia. Nevertheless, he expressed his willingness to leave Persia if the Emperor desired it, and said he would await orders from the Emperor and an adjustment by his Imperial Majesty of the question of the pension, as he considered the amount offered by the Persian Government inconsistent with his dignity.

On the 15th February the Russian consul was instructed to tell the ex-Shah that the Russian Government's decision was final, and that he had better seize the present opportunity to secure a pension and amnesty, and that he could hope for nothing better. To this message the ex-Shah replied that he was willing to leave, but he repeated that the pension named was insufficient, and that he must have the same sum as was granted to him at the time of the revolution, *i.e.*, 100,000 tomans a-year. He further demanded a sum down of 100,000 tomans in order to pay off his Turkomans and Caucasians, who would otherwise create disorders.

Before we make further definite proposals to the Persian Government my Russian colleague is enquiring of the Russian consul at Astrabad whether he considers this latter sum necessary, and whether he could himself ensure its employment for the purpose indicated.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 287.

Aide-mémoire.

NOUS sommes venus ce matin, le Ministre de Russie et moi, pour suggérer au Gouvernement persan, par ordre de nos Gouvernements, que le Gouvernement persan entre maintenant en négociations avec Mohammad Ali Mirza afin de lui persuader de quitter la Perse à condition que sa pension, dont le montant serait déterminé par le Gouvernement persan d'accord avec l'ex-Schah, soit renouvelé et qu'une amnistie complète soit accordée à ses partisans. Nous sommes chargés d'ajouter que dans le cas où le Gouvernement persan désirerait que les négociations pour le départ de Mohammad Ali Mirza fussent conduites par l'intermédiaire du consul russe à Astrabad, le Ministre de Russie enverra des instructions au consul d'appuyer sur la nécessité qu'il y a pour l'ex-Schah d'accepter l'offre du Gouvernement persan.

Téhéran, le 6 février, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE Russian Minister and I have come this morning to suggest to the Persian Government, by order of our Governments, that the Persian Government should now enter into negotiations with Mohamed Ali Mirza in order to persuade him to leave Persia on the condition that his pension, the amount of which would be determined by the Persian Government in agreement with the ex-Shah, is renewed, and that a complete amnesty is granted to his adherents. We are instructed to add that, in the event of the Persian Government desiring that the negotiations for the departure of Mohamed Ali Mirza should be conducted through the Russian consul at Astrabad, the Russian Minister will send instructions to the consul to emphasise the necessity of the acceptance by the ex-Shah of the Persian Government's offer.

Tehran, February 6, 1912.

No. 288.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 20, 1912.*
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 288.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending February 20, 1912.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—On the 14th of February it was announced that Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh, who was Foreign Minister in the Sipahdar Cabinet which resigned on the 24th July, 1911, has succeeded Hakim-ul-Mulk as Minister of Finance. Other Cabinet changes are said to be in contemplation.

American Officials.—Mr. Cairns left Tehran suddenly on the 10th February, and most of the other American Treasury officials have also left. The question of their indemnification has been settled, as reported in a separate despatch.

Anglo-Russian Proposals.—On the 7th February the British and Russian Ministers called together on the Regent and Foreign Minister and made proposals with a view to the eventual departure of the ex-Shah from Persia. The proposals having been favourably received, the Russian consul at Astrabad made the necessary communication to the ex-Shah regarding the hopelessness of his attempt to regain the throne, and the pension the Persian Government is willing to allow him if he leaves the country.

On the 18th February the two Ministers again called on the Regent and Foreign Minister to present a joint note laying down the terms on which the two Governments are prepared to advance 100,000*l.* each to the Persian Government.

General Situation.—There has been almost complete calm at Tehran during the past four weeks. The Government continues to maintain order and the democratic party has shown no activity. Some excitement was caused by the action of Amir Mufakham, the Bakhtiari Khan, who on the 18th February caused the Minister of the Interior to come to his house, and there detained him for four hours and threatened to have him beaten, in consequence of the arrest of certain persons who were accused of making a demonstration in favour of the ex-Shah.

The Press.—At the end of January an official organ called the "Aftab" ("Sun") commenced to appear, and has since published a series of political articles, evidently inspired by the Government, which display moderation and a true sense of Persia's real interests.

Tabreez.

There have been no further disturbances in Tabreez during the last four weeks.

Zia-ed-Dowleh, who has been a refugee in the British consulate since the 26th December, 1911, committed suicide on the 5th February.

Mr. Consul Shipley left on the 9th February, and Mr. Stevens is acting for him during his absence.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh, who has been acting as governor of the town since the 2nd January, led Mr. Stevens to understand, in an interview he had with him on the 14th February, that he was opposed to the present Government unless Sipahdar was Prime Minister.

It is reported that secret meetings, attended by the clergy and leading local Persians, are being held to discuss the possibility of re-establishing the ex-Shah.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

Of the Persian notables who were deported to Russia and sent back to Resht by the Russian authorities to be tried by court-martial, four were found guilty and

hanged on the 31st January. Two other persons were executed at Enzeli by the Russians on the 2nd February.

General Genikh, commanding at Baku, has been placed in command of the Russian troops in Ghilan. The Russian garrison at Resht was reinforced by 400 infantry from Baku on the 30th January.

In consequence of alarmist reports received by the Russian Government regarding the alleged danger to Russian subjects and trade in Mazanderan and Astrabad, it was decided at St. Petersburg at the beginning of February to send two companies of infantry with two mountain guns to Astrabad, one company to Barfrush, and one company to Meshedisser.

Meshed.

Major-General Redko, who is in command of the Russian troops in Khorassan, arrived in Meshed with 400 infantry on the 12th January.

Early in February an agitation was started in favour of the ex-Shah. On the 5th February the situation became most serious, as a large mob commenced parading the streets and defying the police. Eventually, however, the mob dispersed.

The province is generally disturbed, owing to the presence of large raiding parties of Turkomans and Kurds.

Ispahan.

The town has remained quiet, but the environs continue to be subject to burglaries.

The boycott of foreign goods is ended.

Owing to the severity of the weather there has been a decrease in the number of robberies in the province.

M. Mornard has confirmed Mr. Haycock in his appointment as local agent to the treasurer-general.

Sardar Zafar, the newly-appointed governor, has left Tehran for Ispahan.

Naib Hussein, the notorious brigand, has now come to terms with the Persian Government, and his son, who was a prisoner at Tehran, joined him at Kashan on the 8th February.

Yezd.

The town is reported quiet, but the financial situation continues unsatisfactory.

Shahab-ed-Dowleh, the governor (Assadullah Mirza, the former deputy and Cabinet Minister), is reported to be displaying more energy in meeting the unrest than most of his predecessors, although complaints of his avarice and pan-Islamism are rife.

Seistan.

The acceptance of the Russian demands caused general satisfaction.

The news of recent events in Tabreez has reached Seistan, but His Majesty's consul considers that disturbances are improbable, as the principal mullahs are well disposed towards us, and as Hashmat-ul-Mulk, the governor, is opposed to any anti-foreign demonstration.

Kerman.

The news from northern Persia caused considerable excitement in Kerman. The bazaars were closed, inflammatory speeches were made, and the drilling of "national volunteers" was commenced.

However, on the arrival of Amir Azam, the new Governor-General, on the 15th December, the bazaars were opened, the drilling of the "national volunteers" ceased, and the town resumed its normal state.

Sardar Nasret (the former acting governor of Kerman) left on the 6th February for Tehran, where he had been summoned to give an account of himself and of the money supplied to him for the troops.

Kermanshah.

On the night of the 16th January shots were fired at the British consulate, where a considerable number of persons have taken refuge, including Azam-ed-Dowleh, the former acting governor. On representations being made to the Persian Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Salar-ed-Dowleh was responsible for the firing, and that he had done this in consequence of the continued presence of the

refugees at the consulate. He added that the Persian Government were unable to take any steps against Salar-ed-Dowleh beyond pressing Farman Farma, the newly-appointed governor, to proceed to Kermanshah as soon as possible.

Telegraphic communication with Kermanshah is interrupted, and various conflicting reports have reached the legation as to the situation there. It was reported on the 8th February that Salar-ed-Dowleh had fled, and that the refugees had left the consulate, but it has been subsequently reported that Salar-ed-Dowleh has re-entered the town.

No. 289.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 23rd January respecting the state of the southern roads, I have the honour to report that, as usual in the depth of the winter, few if any robberies have been reported.

A telegram from the acting British consul at Shiraz states, as regards the Bushire-Shiraz road, that one caravan reports from Rahdar that it is delayed owing to the insecurity of the road, while muleteers who have reached Kazerun refuse to proceed owing to excessive blackmail at the hands of the Kashgais. Two bales for British officers are reported to have been robbed by Kashgais at Tangi-Turkan, where the muleteers complain that Kashgai road guards are continually pilfering from caravans, and two further bales were robbed in Tangi Bulaki. Mr. Smart adds that he is arranging for the dispatch of a special "memur" to treat for the protection, and if possible for the transport to Shiraz, of British goods scattered along the road.

A camel caravan travelling from Shiraz to Ispahan was attacked and sixty camels with loads were carried off, but on the whole, according to reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan, from the middle of January up to the 3rd February, caravans seem to have been passing freely along the Shiraz-Ispahan road. The danger point is in the neighbourhood of Abadeh, but Major Petersen, the Swedish gendarmerie officer, on his way to Shiraz has passed that locality unescorted in safety. Near Dehbid Major Petersen fell in with a donkey caravan which had just been looted, and he and his three or four companions followed up the robbers, who fired upon him, but he wounded and secured two of them.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 290.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 11, 1912.

MY telegram dated the 9th March.

A further draft of the Persian Government's reply to the joint note of the two legations was submitted to me yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs through Moin-el-Vezareh.

Document in question differs in many respects from the previous draft as amended during our discussion of the 7th March (see my telegram of that day). Principal point of divergence is with regard to the formula for the engagement to discuss the formation of an army with the two legations. This is now worded so as to bind the Persian Government only to submit the choice of officers to discussion (they are already bound to do this), and to obtain necessary men only from among the subjects of a minor Power.

I find M. Poklewski naturally disinclined to commit himself so far as to exclude Russian officers, and I have therefore, after consultation with him, informed Moin-el-Vezareh—although the latter, in communicating to me Minister for Foreign Affairs' draft, stated that it was Persian Government's last word—that there is so much divergence between the new draft and that discussed and amended on the 7th March that we are unable to agree to it.

I gather that the Persian Government are not altogether unwilling to accept a moderate increase in the Cossack brigade, but the Cabinet and also the Regent are

strongly averse to taking upon themselves the responsibility for giving an undertaking which they now fear forms but the prelude to the introduction into the main army of Russian and possibly of British officers, and the employment of this army in separate zones.

No. 291.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 11, 1912.

MY telegram of the 4th March.

Russian consul at Astrabad reports that paying off of the Caucasians has proceeded smoothly, and that these have now left Astrabad.

No. 292.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 11, 1912.

MY telegram of the 1st March.

I have received note from the Persian Government repeating their regrets at the incidents, and agreeing to 4,744l. to be paid as compensation as proposed by me.

No. 293.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 11, 1912.

LAST fortnight has shown a recrudescence of robberies on southern roads. Between Shiraz and Ispahan, caravan attacked to the south of Dehbid, Messrs. Ziegler losing goods to the value of nearly 2,000l., a second caravan robbed in the same place a few days later, another caravan attacked to the north of Abadeh, sixty camel-loads belonging to Ziegler carried off. Large caravan attacked near Kumisheh by 300 robbers, details of losses unknown. Band of 400 Kuhgeluis occupied Orchini Pass, and 8th March robbed post and travellers.

Consul-general at Bagdad reports all routes from Bagdad to Tehran closed, two European travellers having just returned from Khanikin unable to proceed further.

His Majesty's consul at Bunder Abbas reports caravan robbery, Hindus losing 250l. value of goods.

No. 294.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 11, 1912.

REFER to your telegrams of the 26th February and the 8th March.

Are not further Russian troops to be withdrawn from Tabreez besides the 500 men who left the other day?

As regards the troops at Kazvin, do you mean that 1,400 men have been recalled thence to Russia, or were some of them to stop at Tabreez?

No. 295.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 12, 1912.

FROM reports from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed, situation appears to be still disquieting.

Ex-Shah's party is now very strong, with plenty of arms and ammunition, and local authorities are hardly able to cope with situation.

Russian Minister has offered the co-operation of Russian troops to assist local authorities to deal with the situation.

No. 296.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 12, 1912.

AS the Persian Government have just consented to pay the compensation demanded in connection with the escort incidents in December last, the present moment seems especially fitting for a declaration from His Majesty's Government with regard to a reduction of our escorts, but of course such a reduction should be made dependent on the arrival at Shiraz of the new Governor-General.

The Persian Government appointed Mukhber-es-Sultaneh Governor-General weeks ago, but lack of funds has hitherto prevented him from proceeding to take up his post. He is, I believe, as good a choice as any that could be made.

No. 297.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 12, 1912.

KERMANSHAH.

My telegram of the 26th February.

In a telegram dated the 29th February, but only received to-day, His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah confirms the news furnished by the Persian Government to the effect that Salar-ed-Dowleh had recaptured Kermanshah. Mr. McDouall reports that a great deal of looting then ensued and that the late acting-governor and other officials were executed. He adds that Salar attributes his previous defeat to the presence of bastis in His Majesty's consulate; he is therefore exceedingly irritated against our consulate and also against the Imperial Bank.

Five of the Government force appear to have taken refuge at our consulate. Mr. McDouall also reports that one or more sowars of our consular escort have been wounded, but does not state under what circumstances.

No. 298.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 12, 1912.

EX-SHAH left Ashurada 10th March for Baku.

No. 299.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 12, 1912.

RUSSIAN troops.

Your telegram of the 11th March.

There is no question of sending any of the Kazvin force to Tabreez; as far as I can discover no troops have yet left Kazvin for Russia.

My Russian colleague tells me that the position is now as follows:—

If the Russian Government accept his proposal (see my telegram of the 8th March), which was made after consultation with the Russian general at Kazvin, two regiments will be withdrawn from Resht to Russia, and three battalions and two batteries from Kazvin will be also withdrawn to Russia.

If, on the other hand, the Russian Government do not accept the proposal, and

the evacuation of Kazvin is to be completed immediately, the impending withdrawal will amount in all to two regiments, two batteries, and five battalions.

Russian Minister is unable to give me the precise figures as regards Tabreez; he says that some battalions have already been sent back to Russia. It is clear that these are the 1,500 troops mentioned in my telegram of the 9th March. Two regiments now remain at Tabreez, and the 1,000 new-comers are recruits joining these.

No. 300.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 12, 1912.

REFER to Tehran telegram of the 9th March.

I would propose that the two Ministers should make an unofficial communication to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Persian Government have wrongly interpreted our rejection of the first formula, and that subjects of the minor Powers, not of Great Britain and Russia, would, according to our proposals, be employed in the Persian army.

Enquire of M. Sazonof whether he would agree to this.

No. 301.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 13.)

Sir,

Admiralty, March 12, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 12th instant from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station relative to a threatened raid on Lingah and the landing of 150 sepoys.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 301.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Bombay, March 12, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer reports that raiders, numbering about 2,400 men, intend undoubtedly advancing on Lingah. The landing of sepoys having been recommended by the senior naval officer and the vice-consul at Lingah for defence of consulate, I have ordered reinforcement of 150 troops to land, and have ordered Naval Brigade to be held in readiness to land should further reinforcement of consular guards be required.

No. 302.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 12th March.

No objection is raised by M. Sazonof to your suggestion that we should inform the Persian Government that the interpretation they put upon our rejection of the first formula is erroneous. At the same time his Excellency reserves his right to demand that the Cossack brigade should be increased, and I gather that his idea is that when the Russian troops are recalled from North Persia the Cossack brigade should be employed in their stead.

No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 13, 1912.*
 THE Persian Minister called here on the 6th instant and was received by Mr. Mallet.

He enquired whether His Majesty's Government would not accept the formula proposed by the Persian Government on the subject of the recognition by them of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 (see your telegram of the 22nd ultimo), and abstain from pressing for the acceptance of the amended version as put forward by us.

Mr. Mallet pointed out, in reply, that the formula of the Persian Government appeared to His Majesty's Government to be objectionable because it placed in opposition the principles of the convention and those of the preamble of that incident, a distinction which the two signatory Powers could hardly admit. Moreover, the principles of the preamble of the agreement were summarised incompletely in the Persian formula, which omitted all reference to the "maintenance of order." He accordingly urged Mirza Mehdi Khan to advise his Government to accept the version proposed by the two representatives without further delay.

I am, &c.
 E. GREY.

No. 304.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 28, 1912.*
 WITH reference to my despatch of the 17th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, reporting the recapture of the town by the Government forces and the consequent flight of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

~~I have, &c.
 G. BARCLAY.~~

Enclosure 1 in No. 304.

Consul McDouall to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir, *Kermanshah, February 9, 1912.*
 I HAVE the honour to report that, on the evening of the 7th, reports were received that Yar Mohamed Khan, commanding the Government forces, had occupied Mount Bisitun. During the night there was a skirmish at the Karasu Bridge, four miles from town, and the Kalhurs from there passed behind the consulate in flight towards Mahidasht. About ten mujtehedes were killed at the bridge, one an officer, Hussein Khan Kermanshahi. At 5 A.M. on the 8th there was some firing, and soon after Yar Mohamed Khan came alone to consulate and asked permission to see Azem-ed-Dowleh, who might have some plan to prevent bloodshed. I agreed, and he came in for a few minutes only.

Fighting continued all day, the Government forces gradually advancing, and by sunset they held nearly all the town up to the gates of the palace, which is an extensive block of buildings. They sent twice to ask Azem-ed-Dowleh to join them, and two officers called with the same message. I held him and his associates in bast to their promise not to go to the town until it was in the occupation of Government, in accordance with what I had told Salar-ed-Dowleh. After dark the palace was entered, but Salar-ed-Dowleh and Daoud Khan, Sardar Mozaffir, and others had fled. They had left by a gate on the outskirts of the town, and are reported to have gone to Darband, on the Kurdistan-Kermanshah border. Their further movements have not yet been reported.

The majority of the prince's forces do not appear to have ventured outside to withstand the soldiers. Sharaf-el-Mulk Kurdistani is known to have been killed, but there were not many casualties on either side as far as I have yet heard.

This morning a guard of honour with a flag came to the consulate and conducted the bastis to the palace, after formally thanking me.

Azem-ed-Dowleh is now acting governor, and has issued a proclamation that any looting will be punished by death.

Owing to the advance of the Government forces the Russian Cossacks were detained, but leave to-morrow, and I send this by favour of my Russian colleague.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 304.

Consul McDouall to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Kermanshah, February 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of my despatch of the 9th February, to inform you that Sharaf-el-Mulk Kurdistani was not killed in the fighting. He was at the house of Aga Mahmud, brother of Aga Mohamed Mehdi Mujtehed, and the morning after the fighting was shot, with his nephew and two servants, by mujtehedes. The Kurdistanis in Kermanshah have written a deposition stating that he was killed by mujtehedes and the townspeople are innocent, and sent it to the tribe to prevent them killing any Kermanshahis.

Aga Mahmud was arrested, also Aga Rahim, Haji Aga Wali, Aga Seyyid Reza Qumi, and Sheikh-el-Islam of Hersin, all mujtehedes. The whole of Salar-ed-Dowleh's correspondence was found in the palace and Aga Mahmud's despatch-case was brought from his house. The extraordinary commission of Government enquired into the case against them. There was no doubt of his (Aga Mahmud's) guilt. The commission decided that he must pay 4,000 tomans and be sent to Tehran with the others.

During the night Yar Mohamed Khan Sardar ordered his execution, and he was hanged at daylight on the 12th. Yar Mohamed informed the commission that he acted on orders from Tehran. The others will probably be sent to Tehran, but there is some doubt if Aga Rahim will escape death.

On morning of the 9th two officers of the Zangineh regiment, two executioners, and one or two others were shot.

Salar-ed-Dowleh took his wife, a local princess, with him. On the 9th they were at Mahidasht and looted neighbouring villages for supplies. Salar Mas'ud (Hussein Khan Guran) and Samsam-el-Mamalek Sinjahi went to their homes and refused to assist Salar-ed-Dowleh further. He has with him Sardar Mozaffir and Salar Humayun and their followers, amounting to about 300 men and one gun. From Mahidasht they have moved to the Crown lands, about 12 miles from Kermanshah to the north-north-west, and are said to have sent to the Kalhurs, to Kurdistan, and Luristan for reinforcements.

The Government forces consist of about 200 mujtehedes, 100 Kuliaii horse, and local soldiers and volunteers—perhaps 1,000 in all. They are well supplied with ammunition. They have telegraphed to Farman Farma for reinforcements.

The town is quiet and people in terror. Two akhunds have taken bast at the consulate, named Seyyid Mohamed Rauza-khan and Naib-Sadr. They are accused of political offences, but say they can prove their innocence.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

No. 305.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 12th March : Kermanshah.

You should, if possible, convey a serious warning to Salar-ed-Dowleh.

No. 306.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 15, 1912.

KERMANSHAH.

I received yesterday the following telegram from His Majesty's consul, dated the 8th March:—

“By the official request of the karguzar I opened and made an inventory of the contents of the bag deposited by Salar-ed-Dowleh at the Imperial Bank of Persia. When the Prince returned to Kermanshah, he declared that 95,000 tomans had been taken from it. This is wholly false. Although I informed him of the true facts of the case, he has repeated his accusation and declares that the deficit must be made good by the Imperial Bank. Up to the present moment he has sent no reply to my demand for an apology. I am afraid the bank may be in some danger.”

No. 307.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 15, 1912.

KERMANSHAH.

Your telegram of yesterday.

Messengers refuse to travel between Hamadan and Kermanshah, and bank at Hamadan informs me in consequence that there are no means of communicating with Kermanshah.

By this time our joint communication should have been made to Salar-ed-Dowleh, as the bank managers at Hamadan forwarded our instructions to the consuls at Kermanshah on the 2nd March by two Russian Cossacks who were proceeding thither.

I do not think it is practicable at present to convey any further warning to the Prince.

No. 308.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1912.

SEE first sentence of telegram from St. Petersburg of the 13th March.

You should make a communication to Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly, when M. Poklewsky has received similar instructions.

No. 309.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 16, 1912.

JOINT negotiations: Question of Persian army.

Your telegram of yesterday.

My Russian colleague and I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and informed him that there was no question of limiting the size of the army, and that the two Powers were not opposed to the engagement by the Persian Government of officers for the army from subjects of minor Powers.

Though we had already in our conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs disclaimed any intention of limiting the army, the Persian Minister in St. Petersburg had raised the point.

It was made clear to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by my Russian colleague that our communication had no reference to the Cossack brigade, and that the latter would be organised on the same lines as at present, were it to be increased.

No. 310.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 16, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran enclosing the scheme, elaborated by Colonel Hjalmarson, for the organisation of a national gendarmerie in Persia.*

It will be seen that, so far as the province of Fars is dealt with, the idea is to establish the head-quarters of the force at Shiraz, and it is hoped that by the end of the first year posts will be stationed southwards as far as Kunar Takhteh, some 120 miles south of Shiraz, and northwards as far as Baghi Khan, 12 miles north of that town.

During the succeeding 9 months posts would be extended to Bushire in the south and to Yezdikhast in the north.

Sir E. Grey is of opinion that the arrangement at present in contemplation is open to a grave objection in that it leaves unguarded for at least 12 months a broad stretch of country—some 55 miles, in fact—between Bushire and Kunar Takhteh, at the mouth of the main channel of British trade into the interior, while no such omission is contemplated on the northern road from Tehran to the coast.

While this stretch remains unguarded the fact that the section between Kunar Takhteh is safe will be of no benefit to British trade, since goods will be liable to robbery as soon as they leave Bushire, and I am accordingly to enquire whether, in Lord Crewe's opinion, it would not be desirable to instruct Sir G. Barclay to urge the Persian Government to pay attention in the first instance to the whole road south of Shiraz rather than to any part of it, such as that leading to Baghi Khan, to the north of that place.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 311.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 17, 1912.

PERSIAN Minister called to-day and asked whether I could do anything to hasten negotiations for large loan.

I told him that it was useless for me to press Minister for Foreign Affairs till reply had been received from the Persian Government to our joint note. He assured me that reply would not now be delayed, and begged me to represent to you urgent necessity of arranging loan as soon as reply was received.

No. 312.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, suggesting that the present moment is opportune for telling the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government will reduce the escorts now at Shiraz after the arrival at that town of a Governor-General.†

I am to state that on the information now before him, Sir E. Grey is disposed to share the views expressed by Sir G. Barclay, although he realises that no definite decision can be arrived at until the views of the Viceroy have been received by Lord Crewe.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 152.

† No. 296.

No. 313.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 19, 1912.

MR. MOIR, British vice-consul and Ziegler's manager at Sultanabad, has been robbed by Bakhtiaris on the way to his post between here and Kum.

No. 314.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 19th March.

The Bakhtiaris might be restrained by Samsam-es-Sultaneh. Can you induce him to take the necessary steps?

No. 315.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 21.)

Sir,

India Office, March 20, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 16th instant, regarding the scheme prepared by Colonel Hjalmarson for the organisation of a national gendarmerie in Persia.

The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it would be preferable that provision should be made first for the protection of the whole road between Shiraz and Bushire. But Kunar Takhteh is apparently the last stage in the hilly country, in which caravans are most likely to be attacked, and shortly after it the road crosses the Kotal-i-Malu and drops to the plain; and it is probably Colonel Hjalmarson's view that with a post at Kunar Takhteh the road as far as Dalaki, at the foot of the hills, would be sufficiently protected, and that the plain might be left to such a force as the Governor of Bushire may possess. Lord Crewe would deprecate any avoidable interference with the Swedish officer's discretion, and he would suggest that His Majesty's Government might acquiesce in the proposal on the understanding: (1) that the post at Kunar Takhteh patrols as far as Dalaki; (2) that the Governor of Bushire is made personally responsible for the safety of the rest of the road to Bushire. It will be remembered that in this last section is the village of Borasjun, a dangerous place, the khan of which is a notorious evildoer.

Sir E. Grey may like to consult the political resident, Persian Gulf, before arriving at a decision.

Lord Crewe observes that no provision is apparently made for the protection of the Bunder Abbas-Kerman road, which, already disturbed, is likely to become more so as raiding ceases to be profitable between Bushire and Shiraz. Representations have repeatedly been made by His Majesty's consul, Kerman, and by the firms whose property has suffered, and his Lordship would suggest that the Persian Government should be pressed to take measures for the restoration of order on this road as well.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

No. 316.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 21, 1912.

FOLLOWING is Persian Government's reply, dated 20th March, to our joint proposals:—

M. le Ministre,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 29 safar (18 février) dernier, d'accord avec son Excellence le Ministre de Russie, au sujet de certaines propositions tendant à établir sur une base solide de

confiante amitié les relations existantes entre les Gouvernements persan, anglais et russe, ainsi qu'à faciliter au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah le soin de rétablir et de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité dans le pays. Le Gouvernement Impérial, très touché des bonnes intentions des deux Puissances voisines et animé du désir de donner à l'ensemble desdites propositions la suite la plus favorable, a l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance ce qui suit :—

A.—1. Sur la question du crédit de 200,000L. que les Banques Impériale et d'Escompte ouvriront au profit du Gouvernement persan, à titre d'avance sur le premier emprunt que la Perse va conclure, mon Gouvernement consent à ce que cette somme soit remboursée par le premier produit dudit emprunt. En attendant, les intérêts seront calculés à raison de 7 pour cent par an ; et les excédents des recettes douanières du nord et du sud seront affectés intégralement et respectivement pour le service de l'amortissement et des intérêts de la présente avance.

2. Pour assurer l'emploi intégral de cette somme aux dépenses déjà fixées par le Gouvernement, et connues des deux légations, le gérant de la Trésorerie générale sera chargé par le Gouvernement Impérial de contrôler les dépenses imputées sur ce crédit. Il est entendu qu'une partie considérable de l'avance sera affectée à l'organisation de la gendarmerie gouvernementale avec l'aide des officiers suédois.

B. En ce qui concerne les quatre points de la partie *in fine* de la note collective, le Gouvernement persan, convaincu que le respect de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de la Perse ainsi que son développement pacifique forment l'objet de la sollicitude sincère des deux Gouvernements amis, accueille avec plaisir ces bonnes dispositions en y répondant dans les termes suivants :—

1. En vue de témoigner son vif désir d'établir sur une base solide d'amitié et de confiance les relations entre la Perse, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie, le Gouvernement persan se montrera soucieux de conformer sa politique aux principes de la convention de 1907, et il prend acte des assurances contenues dans le préambule de ladite convention.

2. Conformément à ce qui a été arrêté dans le programme de mon Gouvernement, après le départ définitif de Mohamed Ali Mirza et de Salar-ed-Dowleh du territoire persan, les mujahids seront licenciés et les autres forces irrégulières seront disciplinées et incorporées dans le cadre des forces régulières au fur et à mesure du développement de l'organisation militaire.

3. En vue du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans le pays, l'organisation d'une armée régulière et effective constitue un des points fondamentaux du programme ministériel. Il est évident que l'armée à organiser sera proportionnée aux besoins du pays.

Dans le but de faire partager aux deux Puissances voisines la conviction qu'il considère comme son devoir des plus impérieux de procéder à l'organisation de cette armée, le Gouvernement persan informera les deux légations du programme de ladite organisation afin qu'un échange de vues amical puisse avoir lieu sur les points nécessaires.

4. En ce qui concerne le départ de Mohamed Ali Mirza et l'octroi d'une pension en sa faveur, par déférence pour les propositions des Gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de Russie, un accord qui fera l'objet d'une note à part est déjà intervenu à ce sujet.

Pour enlever tout obstacle à l'apaisement du pays et au rétablissement de l'ordre et pour assurer l'efficacité des mesures prises par l'État pour le maintien de la sécurité publique, le Gouvernement persan a le ferme espoir que les deux Puissances voisines ne manqueront pas de lui prêter tout leur concours, de façon à écarter tout danger d'une nouvelle tentative de rentrée en Perse par l'ex-Schah. Désirant donner suite à la proposition formulée par les Gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial accordera une amnistie générale aux partisans de Mohamed Ali Mirza. Cette mesure ne concernera bien entendu que les faits et agissements antérieurs et ne pourra être étendue aux faits postérieurs à la date de l'amnistie.

C. Ayant donné dans ce qui précède les preuves de ses intentions amicales à l'égard des deux Puissances et de son désir sincère de rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité dans le pays, le Gouvernement persan tient à obtenir le concours efficace des deux pays voisins sur les deux points suivants :—

1. Pour la conclusion urgente de l'emprunt nécessaire à la réalisation des réformes, et dont les conditions se rapporteraient exclusivement aux taux d'intérêt, à l'amortissement et à la garantie.

2. Pour que l'évacuation du territoire de la Perse par les troupes étrangères s'accomplisse dans le plus bref délai possible conformément aux souhaits du Gouvernement persan.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

I HAVE had the honour to receive the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 29th Safar (18th February) last, in conjunction with his Excellency the Russian Minister, relative to certain proposals with a view to establish on a solid basis of confidence and friendship the relations between the Persian, English, and Russian Governments, and to assist the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah in their task of re-establishing and maintaining order and tranquillity in the country. The Imperial Government, deeply sensible of the good intentions of the two neighbouring Powers and animated by the desire to carry out these proposals in their entirety in the most satisfactory manner, have the honour to inform you as follows:—

A.—1. In regard to the question of the sum of 200,000*l.* for which the Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Escompte will open an account in the name of the Persian Government, representing an advance on the first loan which Persia is about to contract, my Government agree that this sum shall be repaid out of the first proceeds of that loan. In the meanwhile, interest will be calculated at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum; and the surpluses of the northern and southern customs revenues will be wholly and respectively assigned to the amortisation of and to the payment of interest on the present advance.

2. In order to secure that this sum shall be wholly employed to meet expenditure already decided upon by the Government, and known to the two legations, the officer in charge of the treasury-general will be entrusted by the Imperial Government with the duty of controlling the expenditure defrayable out of this account. It is understood that a considerable part of the advance will be assigned to the organisation of the Government gendarmerie with the assistance of the Swedish officers.

B. As regards the four points in the last part of the joint note, the Persian Government, convinced that the integrity and independence of Persia, as well as her peaceful development, are the object of the sincere solicitude of the two friendly Governments, welcome with pleasure this favourable attitude and reply thereto in the following terms:—

1. In order to prove their earnest desire to establish on a solid basis of friendship and confidence the relations between Persia, Great Britain, and Russia, the Persian Government will take care to conform their policy with the principles of the convention of 1907, and they take note of the assurances contained in the preamble of that convention.

2. In accordance with what has been decided in the programme of my Government, after the final departure of Mohamed Ali Mirza and Salar-ed-Dowleh from Persian territory, the mujahids will be dismissed and the other irregular forces will be disciplined and gradually incorporated in the regular forces, as the military organisation is developed.

3. With a view to the maintenance of order and security in the country, the organisation of a regular and effective army constitutes one of the fundamental points of the ministerial programme. It is evident that the army to be organised will be proportionate to the needs of the country.

In order to convince the two Powers that they consider the organisation of this army as one of their most pressing duties, the Persian Government will inform the two legations of the programme of this organisation with a view to a friendly exchange of views on the necessary points.

4. As regards the departure of Mohamed Ali Mirza and the grant of a pension to him, in deference to the proposals of the British and Russian Governments, an agreement, which will form the subject of a separate note, has already been arrived at.

In order to remove every obstacle to the pacification of the country and to the re-establishment of order, and to ensure that the measures taken by the State for the maintenance of public security shall be effective, the Persian Government are confident that the two neighbouring Powers will not fail to render them every assistance, so as to obviate all danger of a fresh attempt by the ex-Shah to enter Persia. Desiring to act upon the proposal of the British and Russian Governments, the Imperial Government

will grant a general amnesty to the followers of Mohamed Ali Mirza. This measure will of course only apply to events and acts previous to the date of the amnesty, and will not extend to those subsequent thereto.

C. Having in the preceding paragraphs given proof of their friendly intentions towards the two Powers and of their sincere desire to re-establish order and security in the country, the Persian Government are anxious to obtain the effective assistance of the two neighbouring countries on the two following points :—

1. For the immediate conclusion of the loan necessary for the realisation of the reforms, the conditions attached to such loan to relate only to the rate of interest, amortisation, and guarantee.

2. To effect the evacuation of Persian territory by foreign troops within the shortest possible period, in accordance with the wishes of the Persian Government.

No. 317.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 22, 1912.

PLEASE see your telegram of the 20th March: Robbery of vice-consul at Sultanabad.

I am afraid it is not easy to control the Bakhtiaris now: during the last few years they have taken advantage of the prevalent disorders to rob with impunity, but Samsam-es-Sultaneh will no doubt do what he can to restrain them.

I had already called the attention both of the Government and of the Bakhtiari chiefs to the robbery, and I am now about to present a claim for the goods stolen, as to which I have just received details.

No. 318.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1912.

THE reply of the Persian Government to the joint note appears to me to be satisfactory, and I propose to instruct His Majesty's Minister to pay to them our share of the advance immediately.

Enquire whether Russian Government agree.

No. 319.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 22nd March: Advance to Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs, and will instruct Russian Minister accordingly.

No. 320.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

Sir,

Stockholm, March 19, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 5th instant, I have the honour to state that I called on the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs with the chargé d'affaires of Russia, and informed his Excellency that the two Governments had no objection to the employment of two more officers and a veterinary surgeon in the Persian gendarmerie.

Count Ehrensward thanked us, and stated that he had not as yet received any

information on the subject of the application made by the Swedish colonel, which would no doubt reach the Minister of War in due time.

I have, &c.

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

No. 321.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 25, 1912.

THERE has been a serious development in the situation at Meshed. Our consul-general reports that fighting is incessant, and that martial law is about to be proclaimed by his Russian colleague.

No. 322.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 25, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 7th March: Kermanshah.

In a report dated the 15th instant His Majesty's consul states that the advice tendered by himself and Russian consul has been rejected by Salar-ed-Dowleh, who not only declines to consider the terms which the Persian Government offer him, but puts forward a claim to rule, under the Shah's suzerainty, over the whole of Western Persia.

No. 323.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 25, 1912.

MY telegram of to-day.

My Russian colleague and I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday of Salar-ed-Dowleh's reply to the communication of the two consuls.

His Excellency said that Salar's pretensions were clearly inadmissible. They violated the integrity of Persia, and were thus contrary to the interests not only of Persia, but also of the two Powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured us that the Government were preparing an effective expedition against Salar, and he begged us to repeat our representations in a stronger form and to instruct the consuls to make these representations widely known.

We propose, subject to the approval of the two Governments, to comply with Minister for Foreign Affairs' request and to instruct the consuls to urge Salar most strongly to leave Persia, pointing out to him that his present attitude is contrary to the interests of the two Powers, that the Persian Government are assured of our full sympathy and of our support in the action they are taking against him, and that if he does not leave Persia the two Powers will take no further action to secure for him a pension nor will they afford him any protection.

The two consuls would be instructed to make their communication as public as possible.

No. 324.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 25, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of the 24th March.

You may advance our share immediately.

No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 25, 1912.

I HAVE been in communication with the India Office in regard to the scheme, reported in your despatch of the 14th February, for the organisation of the Swedish gendarmerie.*

The Secretary of State for India considers the scheme generally acceptable, but considers, and I agree, that, in view of the danger to which caravans are exposed on leaving Bushire for Shiraz, one of the first steps should be to provide for the protection of the whole of the road between those places.

We desire to avoid any further delay, and to leave matters as far as possible to the colonel's discretion, and we will therefore accept his scheme provided that (1) the Governor of Bushire undertakes personal responsibility for the security of the road from Bushire to Dalaki (including Borasjun, which has on two occasions been the scene of robberies), and (2) that the gendarmerie force stationed at Kunar Takhteh patrols the road up to Dalaki.

As regards the road between Bunder Abbas and Kerman, Lord Crewe fears that the present insecurity of this road will be increased in proportion as the state of road via Shiraz becomes better, and thinks that the Persian Government might be urged to take steps to obviate this. I doubt whether this would be within their power until they obtain the necessary resources from the projected loan.

You should consult consul-general at Bushire and let me have your views by telegraph.

No. 326.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 26, 1912.

MANCHESTER firms complain of grave danger at Hamadan, presumably owing to Salar-ed-Dowleh. Urge Persian Government not to delay expedition.

No. 327.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 26, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of the 25th March: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I approve proposal, and should be glad to learn views of the Russian Government.

No. 328.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)

Sir,

Admiralty, March 27, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 26th instant from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station relative the situation on the Persian Gulf.

Copy has been sent to India Office.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 328.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Bombay, March 26, 1912.

SENIOR naval officer reports to-day :—

Movement against Lingah seems to be assuming nature of a Holy War, but according to latest news attack is being delayed owing to son of Governor of Shiraz, whose movements in Jahrum are doubtful. It is most probable that Lingah will be attacked by much larger force than originally estimated, including most of Laristan tribes, unless the movement is checked at Lar by the son of the Governor of Shiraz.

No. 329.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 27, 1912.

SITUATION at Hamadan.

Refer to your telegram of the 26th March.

I have on several occasions received from Persian Government an assurance that they are making every endeavour to get a sufficient force despatched without delay.

As a result of further enquiry I ascertained to-day that Farman Farma, who has been appointed governor, had been entrusted with the levying of the greater part of the force—the intended strength of which seemed to me inadequate—and I have begged of the Persian Government that some of Yeprim's fedais, who have acquitted themselves so well on previous occasions, may be despatched against Salar-ed-Dowleh.

No. 330.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 26th March : Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also approves, and is sending Russian Minister at Tehran necessary instructions.

No. 331.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 28.)

Sir,

India Office, March 27, 1912.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 18th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward copy of a telegram received from the Government of India regarding the situation in Fars.

While the Marquess of Crewe concurs with Sir E. Grey generally in the proposal made in your letter under reply, he desires to lay great stress on the necessity of requiring from the Persian Government—since His Majesty's Government cannot undertake it themselves—the summary punishment of those who are well known locally to have been responsible for the attack on Mr. Smart's escort.

His Lordship would also suggest that a condition of ultimate withdrawal should be an undertaking by the Persian Government to support the Swedish officers by all means in their power in organising the force of gendarmerie.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 331.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.)

March 23, 1912.

SITUATION near Shiraz is, in Sir P. Cox's opinion, improving.

We consider that we should continue to press Persian Government to inflict punishment on those responsible for attacks, and that payment of compensation by them should not relieve them of duty of doing so.

We agree with Sir G. Barclay, in regard to question of retaining Shiraz and Ispahan consular escorts, that practical proof in near future of friendly attitude on part of tribal headmen along road should be the condition of reductions of consular guards.

No. 332.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 25th March.

I have to-day handed to the Persian Government a cheque for 100,000L., British share of joint advance, and have requested acting treasurer-general to arrange with Imperial Bank of Persia for repayment of 35,000 tomans already advanced in connection with departure of ex-Shah.

As you are aware, surpluses of northern and southern customs receipts are to be employed respectively in their entirety for interest and repayment of Russian and British shares in joint advance of 200,000L.

After consultation with manager of Imperial Bank of Persia, I would suggest, subject to your approval, that surplus of southern customs should be remitted monthly, beginning 1st May, by bank to London, on account of His Majesty's Government, until British share is paid off.

No. 333.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 28, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 27th March: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

You are authorised to act as proposed in your telegram of 25th March.

No. 334.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 29, 1912.

FOLLOWING is extract from telegram from acting consul at Shiraz 24th March, and seems to show that there is good chance of tribal migration passing off quietly:—

“Bushire road has been slightly disturbed owing to tension between Kazerunis and Kashgais, and there have been several petty robberies from caravans, and one total robbery of post from Bushire. Governorship of Kazerun has, in deference to Kazerunis' determined objections to Kashgai Governor, been transferred from Mohamed Ali Khan to Muntesar-ul-Mulk, commander of Malayer regiment. Kashgais are deflecting traffic after Kamarij to Shapur, and thence to Dashtarjin via Nandan, leaving out Kazerun altogether. Kawam and merchants have been forced to acquiesce, but Kawam assures me at first *détente* he will strike for reversion to high road. Ilkhani is at Jirreh with Government force, 250 horse and foot and 2 guns and flints and Kashgai riflemen, said to number about 2,000. Kashgai, Shishbuluki, Farsimedan,

Sefikhani, and Namadi chiefs are with them. Soulet-es-Sultaneh has been hitherto maintaining neutral attitude, but by latest reports from Kazerun he is now expected to come into Tekhani; Soulet-ed-Dowleh has left his family behind, has moved up with one section of Darashulis, and is about 20 miles distant from ilkhani; other sections of Darashulis are said to be for ilkhani. Chiefs and Mohamed Kerim Khan, who are with ilkhani, have been talking for some time of arranging peaceful compromise between two brothers. Chiefs apparently are not keen on shedding blood for any ilkhani, their growing independence rendering ilkhaniship no longer matter of vital importance to them. Talk of peace has not yet assumed any practical shape. Nasred-Dowleh is at Fesa, where Arabs are collecting; tribes are now all in motion, and should be entering Shiraz Valley in fortnight. Kawam, who has been hitherto maintaining excellent order in Shiraz and environs, is anxious, mainly owing to entire lack of money, and for some time has been telling me that, unless Persian Government send him money, he cannot carry on. It is desirable that Persian Government should send Fars Government some money immediately to pay police in town and guards in vicinity of Shiraz. With money local authorities think they can tide over safely critical moment of tribal passage and prevent incidents."

Acting treasurer-general has promised to remit 30,000 tomans from joint advance to Shiraz for payment police and guards.

No. 335.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 30, 1912.

GENDARMERIE scheme.

Please refer to your telegram of the 25th March.

I have explained to the Swedish colonel your wishes as regards the road between Bushire and Shiraz. He realises that it is desirable to provide for the protection of the whole of this section from the outset, and he had originally intended to propose this. He felt himself obliged, however, to abandon the idea on its being represented to him that the hostility of the Kashgai tribe would be increased if they saw that the gendarmerie were employed exclusively on their section, while no attempt was made to check the depredations of the tribes between Shiraz and Ispahan. Before deciding definitely, he wishes to await a report from the officers who have already left for Shiraz. I propose not to press him further in the matter, unless you instruct me to do so, as I should prefer to leave it to his discretion as far as possible.

I have consulted Sir P. Cox in regard to your telegram. Not having yet seen the colonel's scheme, he is unable to judge as to the probability of its proving successful, but he thinks it right to point out that it is not based on experience of the local conditions since none of the officers has yet passed along the road.

He considers it most desirable that the scheme, even in its initial stages, should extend to the whole of the road between Shiraz and Bushire. He does not think we ought to agree to any proposal under which the control of any part of the road would be left in Persian hands without the road being both patrolled and financed under the supervision of the Swedish officers. There is not, in his opinion, much ground for thinking that the security of the road from Bunder Abbas to Kerman would be endangered as a result of an improvement on the Shiraz-Bushire road. This would more probably be the effect of stopping the disorders immediately north of Shiraz. The Kashgais do not extend their operations as far as the Kerman roads; the only tribes of Fars which do so are some of the Arab tribes, who, so far as the Ispahan-Bushire road is concerned, do not go further south than Shiraz. He sees no objection, however, to making the suggested representation to Persian Government in this respect, but I am averse to doing so, as, until they have obtained a loan, I do not think we can expect them to take energetic steps to stop the disorders on the Bunder Abbas-Kerman road. All we can hope for at present is that the necessary action will be taken to carry out the limited proposals of the Swedish colonel.

No. 336.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the receipt of the instructions contained in your telegram of the 29th ultimo, demanding compensation for the two attacks on our consular escorts in December last.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 336.

Sir G. Barclay to the Persian Government.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, March 4, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to recall your Excellency's attention to my two notes of the 25th and 27th December last, in which I brought to the notice of the Persian Government two serious attacks on the consular escorts dispatched from Shiraz and Bushire to accompany Mr. Smart, His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, on his return from leave to his post.

These grave outrages resulted in the killing of three men belonging to the two escorts and the disappearance of another, in the wounding of Mr. Smart and of ten other persons, and in loss of property to the value of 944*l*.

I am now directed by His Majesty's Government to present a claim for compensation for these attacks, and to demand the punishment of those responsible.

His Majesty's Government are well aware of the serious financial straits of the Persian Government, and being desirous to refrain as far as possible from embarrassing the Persian Government they have assessed the damages on a moderate scale, and the sum I am to claim is 4,744*l*. This sum is made up as follows:—

For the wounding of Mr. Smart, 1,000*l*.
For the four men killed or missing, and for three men who are likely to be permanently disabled by their wounds, 300*l*. each, equals 2,100*l*.
For the seven men less seriously wounded, 100*l*. each, equals 700*l*.
The value of the lost property, 944*l*.

I venture to hope that I may receive a favourable reply at an early date.

I avail, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

No. 337.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 12th March: Situation in South Persia.

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the whole situation in South Persia, with special reference to the attack on Mr. Smart.

1. It seems essential that the men who are well known locally to have been guilty of that outrage should be handed over to the Persian Government for punishment. If this were done, His Majesty's Government would at once withdraw the detachment now at Bushire, and if the tribal chiefs and headmen have shown a friendly feeling and peaceful attitude for at least two months, and no more road outrages occur, the withdrawal of the cavalry from Shiraz and Ispahan will follow.

The Persian Government must, however, understand that continuance of this benevolent attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government must depend on the establishment of an efficient Swedish gendarmerie, and they must therefore undertake before final withdrawal of troops to support the Swedish officers by all means in their power.

From your telegram of 29th March it appears that Kawam is maintaining

order well at Shiraz, and it would perhaps be inadvisable to supersede him just at the time of the tribal immigration, but the new Governor-General should be sent to Fars as soon as possible and a good post found for Kawam; but whoever is Governor-General it is essential that he should have full support of Persian Government and the necessary money.

2. In view of improved situation I am inclined to postpone making any proposal to the Persian Government for making use of the tribal chiefs.

3. It does not seem advisable to make any public announcement of our policy beyond informing the Persian Government.

LEP217 N° 2 (1815)
PERSIA. No. 5 (1912).

FURTHER Correspondence respecting the Affairs
of Persia.

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 4 (1912)":
Cd. 6105.]

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command
of His Majesty. July 1912.*

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RESPECTING THE

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 5 (1912)": Cd. 6264.]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 9, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 5th March* respecting the revenues available as security for a Persian loan, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a communication which I received from the acting treasurer-general, and on which the figures given in my telegram were based.

It will be observed that, apart from the receipts of the Maliat, the Persian Government at present dispose of an assured annual income of 4,000,000 tomans, of which sum 2,831,000 tomans are already absorbed by fixed charges arising from existing foreign loans and certain indispensable Government expenses.

The projected loan would, of course, include the conversion of the Persian Government's consolidated debts to the Russian Bank, the interest and sinking fund of which absorb 650,000 tomans annually. Consequently the fixed charges alluded to would be reduced by that amount, and the margin of the assured revenues available as security for the loan would thus work out at 1,819,000 tomans.

A 5 per cent. loan of 33,000,000 tomans could, according to M. Mornard, be raised on this security, and, assuming that the issue price were 85 per cent., a sum of 28,050,000 tomans would be at the disposal of the Persian Government, of which 6,000,000 tomans would be required for the redemption of the debt to the Russian Bank.

M. Mornard further gives a list of the floating debts of the Persian Government, including that to Messrs. Schneider, and these amount to 1,932,000 tomans.

In addition to this sum, the acting treasurer-general has tabulated a sum of 700,000 tomans as representing British claims, and 1,800,000 tomans those of Russia. These figures were given to M. Mornard verbally by the two Ministers as an estimate made on the spur of the moment, and are therefore only roughly approximate.

The grand total of the floating debt is therefore placed at 4,432,000 tomans, which, together with the 6,000,000 tomans devoted to the liquidation of the debt to the Russian Bank, may be deducted from the proceeds of the loan, and thus leave a balance to the Persian Government of about 17,600,000 tomans, exclusive of Messrs. Schneider's claim. No mention has been made of foreign claims other than British and Russian. I have no knowledge of the claims made by the Turkish Embassy, but those put forward by the other legations would probably be covered by a sum of 500,000 tomans.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

M. Mornard to Sir G. Barclay.

M. le Ministre,

Trésorerie générale, Téhéran, le 4 mars, 1912.

SATISFAISANT au désir que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer au cours d'une récente conversation, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer ci joint quelques renseignements

ments destinés à vous permettre d'apprécier l'importance et la sûreté des garanties que pourrait offrir le Gouvernement persan, dans le cas où il serait amené à présenter un projet d'emprunt extérieur.

Je tiens à faire ressortir que les prévisions de recettes indiquées, soit 40,000,000 de krans par an, sont certainement inférieures à toutes les probabilités. Il est à remarquer qu'en effet ce chiffre de 40,000,000 de krans est une moyenne annuelle des revenus perçus au cours des cinq dernières années, qui, ainsi que vous le savez, ont été marquées par des événements politiques graves et des troubles fréquents dans toutes les provinces.

Aussi, je ne crains pas d'affirmer qu'aussitôt l'ordre rétabli dans le pays, les diverses sources d'impôts ne tarderont pas à accuser un accroissement sensible de produits dans toutes les provinces de l'Empire.

Il est à peine besoin d'ajouter que la réorganisation prochaine du service du Maliat ne peut manquer d'apporter au Gouvernement un supplément considérable de revenus qui mettrait éventuellement les prêteurs à l'abri de toute surprise.

Je saisis, &c.

Le Trésorier général *ad interim*,
C. MORNARD.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

The Treasury, Tehran, March 4, 1912.

IN compliance with the request which you made in the course of a recent conversation, I have the honour to communicate to you herewith certain information which should enable you to appreciate the value and the safety of the guarantees which the Persian Government could offer if they should decide to submit a scheme for a foreign loan.

I would emphasise the fact that the receipts (40,000,000 krans per annum) are estimated at a figure undoubtedly lower than what will, in all probability, be realised. It is to be observed that this figure of 40,000,000 krans is the annual average of the revenues obtained during the last five years, which, as you know, have been marked by serious political events and frequent disorders in every province.

I think I may safely assert that, as soon as order is re-established in the country, the various sources of taxation will quickly show a marked increase of productiveness in every province of the Empire.

It is hardly necessary to add that the forthcoming reorganisation of the collection of the maliat cannot fail to afford the Government a considerable addition to the revenue, which would secure lenders against all risks.

I avail, &c.

C. MORNARD,
Treasurer-General (ad interim).

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Note communicated to Sir G. Barclay.

LES renseignements contenus dans les relevés ci-joints établissent—

1. Que le Gouvernement dispose, dès à présent, d'un revenu annuel assuré de 40,000,000 de krans, provenant des recettes des douanes, de la mounaie, des télégraphes, des passeports, des khalassehs et des accises sur l'opium et l'alcool ;

2. Qu'une partie de ces revenus, soit 28,310,000 krans, est déjà aliénée en garantie d'emprunts contractés à l'étranger, ainsi que de certaines dépenses gouvernementales obligatoires ;

3. Que dans l'éventualité du remboursement à la Banque d'Escompte de Perse de la dette de 60,000,000 de krans 7 pour cent consolidée en 1910, l'excédent disponible des revenus gouvernementaux atteindrait un chiffre de 40,000,000 — 21,810,000 = 18,190,000 krans ;

4. Que cet excédent peut constituer une garantie de premier ordre pour un emprunt futur d'environ 330,000,000 de krans à 5 pour cent d'intérêt et au taux minimum d'émission de 85 pour cent, soit 280,500,000 krans liquide ;

5. Qu'après remboursement de la dette de 60,000,000 de krans 7 pour cent et des

dettes flottantes (44,000,000 de krans) il resterait un solde net de 176,000,000 de krans à la disposition du Gouvernement persan.

Le Gérant de la Trésorerie générale,
C. MORNARD.

Téhéran, le 4 mars, 1912.

REVENUS gouvernementaux dont la Perception est assurée

					Krans.
Douanes (moyenne de cinq années)	*32,000,000
Télégraphes (minimum présumé)..	1,000,000
Monnaie (minimum présumé)	3,000,000
Passeports (minimum présumé)	1,600,000
Khalesseh (minimum présumé)	1,000,000
Opium, alcool, &c. (minimum présumé)	1,400,000

Total net 40,000,000

*Douanes { Sud .. 8,000,000 de krans.
 { Nord .. 24,000,000 „

CHARGES grevant les Revenus des Douanes, de la Monnaie et des Télégraphes.

Désignation de la Dette ou de la Dépense.	Gages ou Garanties.	Rang de l'Hypothèque.	Montant des Annuités.
			Krans.
1. Emprunt de 1900 et 1902 5 pour cent Banque d'Es-compte	Revenus des douanes du nord	Première hypothèque ..	9,600,000
2. Emprunt de 1910 7 pour cent Banque d'Escompte	(a.) Revenus des douanes du nord	Troisième „ ..	} 6,500,000
	(b.) Monnaie	Première „ ..	
3. Emprunt de 1904, dit du Chil, 5 pour cent Imperial Bank	(a.) Télégraphes	Première „ ..	} 4,400,000
	(b.) Douanes du sud ..	Deuxième „ ..	
4. Emprunt de 1910 5 pour cent Imperial Bank	Revenus des douanes du sud	Première „ ..	5,310,000
5. Dépenses gouvernementales fixes	(a.) Revenus des douanes du nord	Deuxième „ ..	} 2,500,000
	(b.) Revenus des douanes du sud	Deuxième „ ..	
			28,310,000
	A déduire en prévision de la conversion de l'emprunt No. 2 ..		6,500,000
			21,810,000*

* Nord, 14,910,000; sud, 6,900,000 krans.

RELEVÉ des Dettes flottantes remboursables immédiatement.

					Krans.
Créance Schneider, Paris	12,000,000
Découvert à la Banque Impériale	3,300,000
Découvert à la Banque d'Escompte	1,120,000
Indemnités du chef des vols postaux	2,000,000
Créance Toumaniantz	500,000
Créance Djemchidian	400,000
Total	19,320,000

*Indemnités du chef des pertes causées pendant les } Anglais .. 7,000,000
troubles aux sujets étrangers .. } Russes .. 18,000,000

Total 44,320,000

Dettes consolidées à convertir 60,000,000

Total général 104,320,000

* Ces deux sommes sont indiquées verbalement par leurs Excellences les Ministres de Russie et d'Angleterre.

(Translation.)

THE information contained in the annexed tables shows:—

1. That the Government at present disposes of a certain annual revenue of 40,000,000 krans derived from the receipts of the customs, mint, telegraphs, passports, khalassehs, and excise on opium and alcohol;

2. That a part of these revenues (28,310,000 krans) is already alienated as guarantee for foreign loans and for certain obligatory Government expenditure;

3. That, in the event of the repayment to the Banque d'Escompte of Persia of the 60,000,000 krans 7 per cent. debt, consolidated in 1910, the available surplus of the Government revenues would reach the figure of 40,000,000 - 21,810,000 = 18,190,000 krans;

4. That this surplus would constitute a first-class guarantee for a future loan of about 330,000,000 krans at 5 per cent., issued at a minimum price of 85 per cent., or 280,500,000 krans net;

5. That, after repayment of the 60,000,000 krans 7 per cent. debt and of the floating debts (44,000,000 krans), a clear balance of 176,000,000 krans would remain at the disposal of the Persian Government.

C. MORNARD,

Superintendent of the General Treasury.

Tehran, March 4, 1912.

GOVERNMENT Revenues of which the Collection is certain.

						Krans.
Customs (average of five years)	*32,000,000
Telegraphs (estimated minimum)	1,000,000
Mint (estimated minimum)	3,000,000
Passports (estimated minimum)	1,600,000
Khalasseh (estimated minimum)	1,000,000
Opium, alcohol, &c.	1,400,000
						40,000,000
Net total	40,000,000
* Customs	{	Southern	8,000,000 krans.	
	{	Northern	24,000,000 ..	

CHARGES on the Revenues of the Customs, Mint, and Telegraphs.

Debt or Expenditure.	Security or Guarantee.	Order of Charge.	Amount per Annum.
			Krans. 1
1. Banque d'Escompte's 5 per cent. loan of 1900 and 1902	Northern customs revenues	First charge	9,600,000
2. Banque d'Escompte's 7 per cent. loan of 1910	(a.) Northern customs revenues	Third charge	} 6,500,000
	(b.) Mint	First charge	
3. Imperial Bank's 5 per cent. loan of 1904 ("Chil")	(a.) Telegraphs	First charge	} 4,400,000
	(b.) Southern customs	Second charge	
4. Imperial Bank's 5 per cent. loan of 1910	Southern customs revenues	First charge	5,310,000
5. Fixed Government expenditure	(a.) Northern customs revenues	Second charge	} 2,500,000
	(b.) Southern customs revenues	Second charge	
			28,310,000
	Deduct, in anticipation of conversion of loan No. 2	6,500,000
			21,810,000*

* North, 14,910,000; south, 6,900,000 krans.

STATEMENT of Floating Debts Repayable Immediately.

					Krans.
Créance Schneider, Paris	12,000,000
Overdraft at Imperial Bank	3,300,000
Overdraft at Banque d'Escompte	1,120,000
Indemnities on account of postal robberies	2,000,000
Créance Toumaniantz	500,000
Créance Djemchidian	400,000
Total	19,320,000
*Indemnities on account of losses of foreign subjects				English	7,000,000
during the disturbances		Russian	18,000,000
Total	44,320,000
Conversion of consolidated debt	60,000,000
Grand total	104,320,000

* These two sums are given verbally by the Russian and British Ministers.

No. 2.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April 2, 1912.*
 I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Jask, April 2, 1912.*
 SENIOR naval officer, Persian Gulf, reports to-day :—

“Lingah raid unlikely to take place, as it is now reported that tribes who were threatening town seem to be dispersing gradually. Punishment of Sheikh of Chiru and landing of consular guard the chief cause of this.”

For the present I propose leaving increased guard at Lingah.

No. 3.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, April 2, 1912.*
 ACTING consul at Shiraz reports that Nasr-ed-Dowleh, Kawam's son, has killed Reza Kuli Khan, a powerful Arab chief. Incident occurring at the present moment, when tribes are migrating and when the question of Soulet is still unsettled, may increase disorder. Kawam, however, thinks that, with the assistance of the other Arab tribes, he can overawe the tribe to which Reza belongs.

No. 4.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 2, 1912.

ACTING consul at Resht reports fresh arrivals of troops from Russia. These movements are difficult to follow, but Russian Minister tells me that new arrivals are only recruits, and that the net result of the present movements will be as indicated in my telegram of 8th March.*

No. 5.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 3, 1912.

SIPAHDAR has been appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan, and he has appointed Shuja-ed-Dowleh as deputy governor until he arrives at Tabriz. Shuja has accepted post of deputy governor.

No. 6.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 3, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.†

You should also require Persian Government to restrain extremists in Tehran and elsewhere, and to induce the Nejef and Kerbela clergy to recant their recent incitations and use their influence to secure a more friendly attitude on the part of the tribal chiefs.

No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 3, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 2nd April.

Could the Russian troops, in your opinion, now safely be withdrawn from Kazvin, or do you still think it likely that there will be disturbances upon the disbandment of the fedai?

No. 8.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 3, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for the information of the Marquess of Crewe, that upon the receipt of your letter of the 20th ultimo, regarding the scheme prepared by Colonel Hjalmarson for the organisation of a national gendarmerie in Persia, he requested His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in a telegram, of which a copy is enclosed,‡ to furnish his views and those of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, on the points raised in that communication.

I am at the same time to enclose a copy of Sir G. Barclay's answer,§ from which Lord Crewe will see that Sir P. Cox shares Sir E. Grey's opinion that it is essential that the whole of the Bushire-Shiraz road should be dealt with from the outset, and be both financed and patrolled under Swedish supervision. He is, moreover, of opinion that any improvement on the Bushire-Shiraz road will not necessarily entail any aggravation of the situation on the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road.

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 276.

† See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 325.

‡ See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 337.

§ See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 335.

His Lordship will further notice that the Swedish colonel himself had originally intended to include the whole of the Bushire-Shiraz road in his scheme, but abandoned the idea from fear of accentuating the hostility of the Kashgai. Sir E. Grey thinks however, that the establishment of one post, 12 miles to the north of Shiraz, is not likely to diminish their animosity, and he would propose, subject to Lord Crewe's concurrence, to instruct Sir G. Barclay to urge the colonel to revise his scheme by reverting to his original intention of patrolling the whole road from Shiraz to the coast, even if such a course should necessitate the abandonment of the proposed post to the north of that town. In Sir E. Grey's opinion, it is essential at once to obtain a degree of security for British and Indian trade between Bushire and Shiraz, and sufficient to deal later with the Shiraz, Yezdikhast, and Bunder Abbas-Kerman roads.

Sir E. Grey would also propose to instruct Sir G. Barclay to convey a warning to the Persian Government to the effect that, if the Khan of Borasjun proved obstructive to the gendarmerie scheme, it may become necessary for His Majesty's Government, in view of his bad record in the past, to take forcible measures against him.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 9.

Lord Kilmarnock to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Stockholm, April 4, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir C. Spring-Rice's despatch of 19th March*: Persian gendarmerie.

Swedish Government state that request of Swedish colonel has now been received, and is for five (not two) more officers, one veterinary surgeon, and one quartermaster. They have ascertained from St. Petersburg that the Russian Government have no objection, and enquire whether His Majesty's Government agree.

The extra officers are to replace American gendarmerie officers.

No. 10.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 5, 1912.

RUSSIAN troops at Kazvin.

Your telegram of the 3rd April.

It would not, in my opinion, serve any useful purpose to press for evacuation at the present moment. I feel certain that the Russian Minister would urge against it, and he would, I think, be right.

The disbandment of the fedai will, I admit, probably be effected without disturbances; but the fact that the Russian troops are at Kazvin will be undoubtedly of assistance in ensuring the maintenance of order in this connection. Apart from the question of the fedai, I think that the force at Kazvin should not be further depleted until Salar is dealt with and Hamadan and other places cease to be threatened by his adherents.

The recent action of the Russian Government with the ex-Shah has removed one of my chief objections to the presence of Russian troops at Kazvin. I objected to them in the past as the reactionaries were thereby encouraged to create incidents on behalf of the ex-Shah; but the ardour of the reactionaries has been damped by action of Russia against him. I also objected to the Russian troops at Kazvin because their presence diminished the prestige of the Persian Government, but the latter now depends almost entirely on the support of the two Powers, especially of Russia, for any prestige it may have. The withdrawal of the troops would encourage the extremists, who are now cowed. I do not believe in the Government's expressed desire that the troops should be withdrawn.

*See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 320.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Kilmarnock.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 6, 1912.

WE have no objection to the proposed increase in the number of Swedish office for Persian gendarmerie. (See your telegram of the 4th April.)

No. 12.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 7, 1912.

ONE hundred Russian troops have been sent to Hamadan, that town being threatened with Salar-ed-Dowleh's adherents.

It is hoped that this demonstration will save Hamadan from disturbances from which Kermanshah has suffered. Step is taken on advice of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and is, I think, wise.

No. 13.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 8, 1912.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

The Minister of Finance has been making persistent attempts to nullify the functions of the treasurer-general. M. Mornard has in consequence addressed a reasoned appeal to the Cabinet, urging them to "take steps to permit treasurer-general to take in hand vigorously and promptly the reorganisation of the financial administration, which has been placed provisionally under Mornard's orders," and complaining of the attitude adopted by the Minister of Finance.

A copy of this document has been communicated to the two legations.

M. Mornard informs me that he intends to follow this appeal up with a scheme of reorganisation, for which he will invoke the support of the two legations. The scheme will involve the engagement of some thirty additional Europeans; these will doubtless be mostly Belgians.

It is clear that we shall be called upon shortly to decide the question of the definitive appointment of Mornard as treasurer-general. You have doubtless furnished Sir W. Townley with your views on this subject. My own opinion of Mornard has not changed to his disfavour since my last report.

No. 14.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 18, 1912.

SINCE my despatch of the 17th February* the most important episodes in the insurrection have been the departure of the ex-Shah from Persian territory on the 10th March, the recapture of Kermanshah by Salar-ed-Dowleh, and the communication which the British and Russian consuls have been instructed to make to the latter.

As already reported by telegraph, the result of the negotiations conducted by the Persian Government with Mohammed Ali through the Russian consul at Astrabad, at the suggestion of the two Powers, was that the ex-Shah, finding on appeal to the Emperor that the decision of the Russian Government was final and that he could hope for no better terms than a pension for himself and an amnesty for his followers, declared his willingness to leave Persia. He asked, however, for the renewal of his former pension and for 100,000 tomans down in order to be able to pay off his followers. In these circumstances my Russian colleague and I decided to recommend the Persian

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 286.

Government to compromise by giving a pension of 75,000 tomans and such lump sum down as was really necessary to pay off his followers and thus avert deprivations by them. With some difficulty we induced the Persian Government to consent to these terms. The sum reported by the Russian consul as necessary for the paying off of the ex-Shah's followers was 70,000 tomans, and it was arranged that this sum was to be repaid to the Persian Government by the ex-Shah by annual deductions of 10,000 tomans from his pension. In their present financial straits it was impossible for the Persian Government to furnish this lump sum, and it has been advanced in equal shares by His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, to be repaid out of the impending joint advance of 200,000*l*. The ex-Shah left Astrabad for the Russian naval station at Ashadura at the end of last month, and has since, on the 10th March, proceeded to Russia on board a Russian gun-boat, which had been placed at his disposal. Shoaes-Sultaneh has remained at Astrabad to assist the the Russian consul to settle with his brother's followers. According to latest intelligence from the Russian consul at Astrabad the paying off of these has proceeded smoothly, and the Caucasians who were in Astrabad have now left the town.

I have only fragmentary information as to the situation at Kermanshah, telegraphic communication being entirely cut off between Hamadan and Kermanshah, and the post being very irregular owing to the disorders in that district, but it appears from a private letter which has got through to me from His Majesty's consul that Salar-ed-Dowleh, aided by Daoud Khan, chief of the Kalhors, re-entered Kermanshah on the 22nd ultimo. Most of the town is reported to have been looted. Many of the Government troops are said to have been killed, and many Government officials, including Azam-ed-Dowleh, the late deputy governor, who had formerly been in bast at His Majesty's consulate, are reported to have been hanged.

On the 1st instant my Russian colleague and I instructed the two consuls to urge Salar-ed-Dowleh to accept the terms which the Persian Government offered him and to leave the country. We have so far received no reports as to the action taken on our instructions, of which I enclose a copy.

At Meshed the situation is still disquieting, and the local authorities seem quite unable to deal with the disturbing royalist elements who are still in bast in large numbers at the Shrine. The Russian Minister has offered the co-operation of the Russian troops in order to break up the movement, and the Persian Government would, I think, be wise to accept the offer.

The warnings to Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabriz seem at last to have produced some effect, for he ordered the cessation of certain demonstrations in the ex-Shah's cause, which marked the early part of this month, and he has since disavowed a certain Mohammed Khan, who, with a number of horsemen, has recently occupied Zenjan, though unfortunately this brigand remains in possession of the latter town, which now that Shuja-ed-Dowleh has disavowed him he holds in the name of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

The further progress of the insurrection will depend largely on the result of the joint communication of the two consuls to Salar-ed-Dowleh at Kermanshah.

I have, &c.

GEORGE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 14.

Sir G. Barclay to Consul McDouall.

Tehran, March 1, 1912.

YOU should concert with your Russian colleague to inform Salar-ed-Dowleh jointly that, in order to put an end to the insurrection which is causing such incalculable loss to Persia, His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government have suggested to the Persian Government that latter should open negotiations with a view to the ex-Shah's leaving the country on condition that a pension is granted him and a complete amnesty accorded to his adherents.

The Persian Government have accepted the suggestion and negotiations with the ex-Shah have been proceeding through the Russian consul at Astrabad.

The ex-Shah is about to leave, and there only remain to be settled matters connected with his pension.

Persian Government now offer Salar-ed-Dowleh a pension of 6,000 tomans for himself and 6,000 tomans for his family, and the revocation of the confiscation of his estates, on condition that he maintains order at Kermanshah and the places in his

occupation, hands them over to a governor appointed by the Persian Government and then leaves Persia with an undertaking not to return to the country without the previous consent of the Persian Government.

The two legations strongly advise Salar-ed-Dowleh to accept the proposal of the Persian Government and to leave Persia on the above-mentioned conditions.

No. 15.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 18, 1912.

ON the 16th instant, in pursuance of instructions of our Governments, my Russian colleague and I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs verbally that the two Powers were not opposed to the engagement of officers for the army from subjects of the minor Powers, and we also informed him, with reference to a communication which had been made to the Russian Government by the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg, who had mentioned the apprehensions of the Persian Government lest the two Powers should seek to limit the strength of the new army, that the two Powers had no such intention, as, in their opinion, Persia needed a much larger army than her means would allow her to create and maintain. Although my instructions said nothing expressly to warrant my joining in the latter part of this communication, I saw no objection in doing so. I must not omit to report that, after making this joint communication, M. Poklewsky added that the declaration regarding the engagement of officers from the minor Powers did not apply to the Cossack Brigade, the organisation of which, if the brigade was increased, must remain on the same lines as heretofore.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 16.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending March 18.

Tehran.

Anglo-Russian Note of the 18th February.—Negotiations have been in progress during the past four weeks between the Persian Government and the two legations respecting the Persian Government's reply to the joint note.

The Cabinet.—Samsam-es-Sultaneh is still Prime Minister, and though Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, the Foreign Minister, tendered his resignation to the Regent on the 11th March, and the Prime Minister resigned the following day, the resignations were withdrawn soon after.

General Situation.—The situation at Tehran continues to be quiet, but the provinces, as will be seen from the provincial section of this summary, are even in a more disturbed condition than usual.

The departure of the ex-Shah has brought about a considerable *détente* in the north, but the continued activity of Salar-ed-Dowleh gives much anxiety to the Government.

Prince Farman Farma, who spent several months in the vicinity of Kazvin, finding himself unable to reach his post at Kermanshah, has returned to Tehran, and it is the intention of the Government to send him to his post accompanied by a force of Persian Cossacks.

Sipahdar has not yet been definitely nominated Governor-General of Azerbaijan, but it is known that the appointment would be agreeable to the Russian Legation. Endeavours are, however, being made to bring about a change of Cabinet, with Sipahdar as Prime Minister. It is generally thought that rumours to this effect brought about the Cabinet resignations reported above.

Tabriz.

On the 5th March there was some excitement in the city due to the hoisting of several flags bearing the inscription "Long Life to Mohammed Ali Shah," but on representations being made to Shuja-ed-Dowleh by the British and Russian consular authorities all the flags were removed on the following day.

Since the above episode there have been no further demonstrations in favour of the ex-Shah.

Early in March 1,500 Russian troops left Tabriz and 1,000 arrived. According to the Russian consul-general, there are some 3,000 troops in Tabriz, and about 500 on the Tabriz-Julfa road.

Isfahan.

Sardar Zafar, the new governor of the province, arrived on the 25th February.

Naib Hussein, who has so long been a disturber of the peace in the Kashan district, has at last made his peace with the Persian Government, and has been appointed Governor of Natanz.

Under instructions from the Central Government, Mirza Assadullah Khan, the ex-Government Treasury agent, who has been plotting incessantly against Mr. Haycock, was sent under a guard to Tehran on the 29th February.

Mr. Moir, British vice-consul and Messrs. Ziegler's manager at Sultanabad, was robbed by Bakhtiaris at Hassanabad on the 18th March while on his way to his post.

Shiraz.

On the 28th February a squadron of the 39th Central India Horse, when exercising about six miles from Shiraz, was fired on. The fire was not returned, and the officer commanding the squadron managed to get into communication with the riflemen, who said that they had mistaken the sowars for robbers, and expressed their regret at the mistake.

On further enquiries being made, His Majesty's consul satisfied himself that the incident was really the result of a mistake.

Mr. Acting Consul Knox left on the 29th February.

On the 2nd March a party of 130 gendarmes, under three Swedish officers, left Tehran for Shiraz. The gendarmes are to form a nucleus for the Fars Battalion, which is to be raised for the protection of the Bushire-Shiraz-Yezdikhast road.

Seistan.

There have been no political disturbances, and, with the exception of Baluchi raids in the Kainat, all has remained quiet in the province.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Azam has continued in his policy of discouraging anti-foreign demonstrations.

Rifat-ed-Dowleh has been appointed Governor of Bam.

There has been considerable unrest in commercial circles owing to the numerous failures of business firms.

Kermanshah.

On the 8th February a Government force under Yar Mohammed arrived and took the town. Salar-ed-Dowleh fled, and Azam-ed-Dowleh left the consulate where he had been a refugee since the 15th December, and again took over the governorship of the town.

On the 22nd February, Salar-ed-Dowleh recaptured Kermanshah, took Azam-ed-Dowleh prisoner and had him executed, and gave the town over to his followers to plunder. Yar Mohammed, the leader of the Government force, managed to escape.

A sowar of the consular escort was deliberately wounded by one of the followers of Salar-ed-Dowleh. The latter, on hearing of this, sent an apology and a cheque for 200 tomans to the sowar, but His Majesty's consul ordered the cheque to be returned, and informed Salar-ed-Dowleh that the matter was too serious for him to accept a compromise.

Owing to Yar Mohammed's defeat, Farman Farma, the newly-appointed governor, who was on his way to Kermanshah, returned to Tehran. The Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Farman Farma will shortly leave for Kermanshah with a force of Persian Cossacks.

Zenjan.

On the 13th March, Mohammed Khan, a brigand, entered the town with a number of horsemen, having promised submission to the governor. The governor telegraphed to Tehran that he was very pleased to report Mohammed Khan's submission, and the Minister of the Interior asked the Regent to confer a title upon him. Shortly afterwards the brigand, who was in collusion with a local notable, seized and imprisoned the governor and asked Shuja-ed-Dowleh what he was to do with him. Shuja-ed-Dowleh replied that he was to be set at liberty, and this was done, but Mohammed Khan remains in possession of the town which he holds in the name of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Lingah.

In February the tribesmen of the Tarakumah district, owing to the capture of a large consignment of arms destined for them, commenced raising a force to attack the customs and British consulate at Lingah.

A force, estimated at 2,400 tribesmen, was reported to be some sixty miles from Lingah on the 12th March.

As a general advance on the town appeared imminent, and as the local authorities were unable to offer any resistance to the raiders, 150 men of the 7th Rajputs were brought from Jask and landed at Lingah on the 12th March for the protection of British lives and property.

No. 17.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 9.)

Sir,

India Office, April 6, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, on the subject of the scheme prepared by Colonel Hjalmarson for the organisation of a national gendarmerie in Persia, and in reply to say that he concurs in the instructions which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to send to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran. He would, however, venture to suggest—while recognising that it would be useless to press for protective measures at the present juncture on the Bunder Abbas-Kerman road—that the necessity for restoring order there at the earliest possible date should be kept steadily before the Persian Government. As Sir E. Grey is aware, many representations on this subject have been made by Indian firms, and as the Kerman road (unlike the Shiraz road) is within the British sphere it would seem to have an especial claim to the attention of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

No. 18.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 9, 1912.

RECENTLY Regent has repeatedly complained of his state of health.

My Russian colleague and I waited upon his Highness this afternoon to discuss question.

His Highness said that he had had two attacks of angina pectoris in the last few days, that he was suffering from insomnia, that his nerves had broken down under the

continuous strain of his work, and that his doctor had ordered him rest. We expressed our misgivings at the prospect of his departure in view of unsettled situation, but he said that it was imperative for him to take a cure, and that he intended to leave in the middle of May, returning in September. He hoped after his cure to be able to have an exchange of views with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and with you. He said that he would delegate his powers to Cabinet, retaining right to sign decrees, which he could exercise in case of urgency by telegram. He thought that his advice from abroad would be readily followed by the Cabinet, that a temporary absence would take off edge of the intrigues against him, and that he would be able to return with renewed influence.

His Highness assured us that he would return, and that when abroad he would keep in touch with the two Governments.

In view of above we think that it would be inadvisable to press Regent further to forgo his holiday, to which his Highness says Cabinet have consented.

No. 19.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 10, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram of yesterday.

As M. Sazonof had not received news of the intention of the Regent to leave Persia, I communicated substance of above telegram to him.

The Regent would, His Excellency said, in all probability never return if once he left the country. He did not see, however, how we could prevent his going, though it was much to be regretted, as we were on the eve of important discussions on the subject of the Trans-Persian Railway, loan, army, and other questions.

M. Sazonof's language with regard to the situation was somewhat despondent. Matters had not improved, although the ex-Shah had been disposed of, and the state of affairs was serious, especially at Kermanshah.

M. Sazonof stated that, as a result of disturbances which were connected indirectly with Salar-ed-Dowleh, the Russian Government were sending a sotnia of Cossacks to Hamadan from Kazvin.

No. 20.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 11, 1912.

THREE Swedish-officers reached Shiraz 5th April.

No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 30th March*: Gendarmerie.

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the question, and have come to the conclusion that the most pressing need is for some security for British and Indian trade on the road between Shiraz and Bushire. It is therefore desirable that the colonel should revert to his original idea of patrolling the whole of this road, and you should urge him to revise his last scheme to this extent, even if the proposal to establish a post north of Shiraz should have to be temporarily abandoned in consequence.

If the proper execution of the gendarmerie scheme is obstructed by the Khan of Borasjun, His Majesty's Government may find themselves compelled to take forcible measures against him. You should so warn the Persian Government, calling attention to the khan's bad record in the past.

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 335.

We recognise that the present moment is not suitable for urging the Persian Government to take measures to protect the road between Bunder Abbas and Kérman. We are, however, bound to devote special attention to this road, which lies within our sphere, and to require that order shall be restored on it as soon as may be, and you should see that the Persian Government do not allow this question to escape their attention.

No. 22.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a diary compiled by His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, showing briefly the position of affairs at that place from the 16th February to the end of the month.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Kermanshah Consulate Diary from February 16 to 29, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH on leaving Kermanshah went to Mahidasht and remained there two days. He then sent his wife to the Kalhur country, and with Sardar Muzaffir and the town Khans moved to the Crown lands, which extend from 7 to about 15 miles to north-west of town. They robbed all villages in the neighbourhood, and sent messengers in all directions to call forces. The town was in perfect order, and the general and commission occupied in regulating affairs and fortifying the town.

2. On the 17th a letter arrived from Salar-ed-Dowleh through the Russian consul, saying he was going to besiege the town, and consuls and foreign subjects should withdraw to villages till he had punished the unruly. A man from his camp asserted that the rebels ascribed their defeat to the presence of officials in the British consulate, and say that if allowed to destroy the consulate they can take the town. He also declared that the Prince had promised them the loot of the consulate and the bank. The road to Kangawar was held by Kakawand, and no messengers were able to get through. Two from consulate returned wounded, and one of them died.

3. Etila-ed-Dowleh became president of court-martial and rais kashun, as well as president of special commission. Gates were erected in several places, and messengers sent to Farman Farma to send reinforcements. Various chiefs, including Sardar Akram, wrote to the authorities that they submitted to Government. Things promised well in expectation of the arrival of Farman Farma, but no news coming from him, the adherents of Salar-ed-Dowleh believed he was not coming, and they had only a small force to deal with, and those who had accepted service with the Government were prepared to desert or assist the rebels.

4. Mujallal-es-Sultan, on behalf of Mohammed Ali Mirza, joined Salar-ed-Dowleh with fifty horsemen and many Kurdistanis (Jaf Juwanrudi) eager to avenge their chief, Sharaf-el-Mulk, as well as the local tribesmen of the province under orders of Sardar Muzaffir. On the 18th there was skirmishing outside the town, one local volunteer was killed, and several on the rebel side.

5. On night of the 21st there was some firing on the west of the town, where sangars were held by town volunteers with a small backing of mujahids. At sunrise the volunteers joined the rebels, who then occupied the Chia Surkh, a hill suburb of Kermanshah. Advancing thence, they occupied about one-third of the bazaar, when they were attacked and driven back with loss by a body of fifty mujahids, who held a sangar afterwards till next morning. The rebels, who consisted of Kurdistanis, Sinjabis, and town Khans, then entered the town at other points, and by 9 P.M. the greater part of the town was in their hands. The officials and Yar Mohammed then evacuated the palace and fled towards Dinawar with several loads of ammunition. At least 400 had been killed on both sides.

6. In the afternoon some Kakawand sowars were in the valley behind the consulate, but on learning the consulate was in front of them left. Five Kalhurs passed, and being told this was the consulate their leader said they had orders to

respect the consulate from Sardar Muzaffir, and there was nothing to fear, a man behind then put up his rifle and shot an Indian sowar of the escort through the arm, declaring he was a mujahid. They then went on.

7. On the 23rd Salar-ed-Dowleh and Sardar Muzaffir went to the palace. The latter had, it is said, been given a free hand. As soon as the Kalhurs, who had taken little part in the fighting, arrived they began looting. One of the first houses plundered was that of the dragoman of the Russian consulate, who had a Russian flag flying. An Indian ferrash of this consulate was also robbed of all his goods; there was a flag on the house. Two sowars of the Turkish consular escort were stripped in the street. General looting took place, only the caravanseraï of Wekil-ed-Dowleh, where many British goods were stored, escaped and the "bozzaz khane," but in the latter there were few goods, most of the shopkeepers having taken them to their houses for safety. All caravanserais in the outskirts of the town were looted, including goods owned by Manchester merchants in transit to Hamadan. Particulars not yet known.

They searched everywhere for mujahids and several were arrested. On the 25th the Ilkhani (Salar Humayun, head of town Kalhurs) was, with his son Fath-el-Ayaleh, indefatigable in trying to stop the plundering, and certainly saved the office of Messrs. Ziegler and some others. Mujallal-es-Sultan abused Sardar Muzaffir, and told him that this plundering would ruin their cause and threatened to leave, but was persuaded by Salar-ed-Dowleh to remain.

8. On the 23rd, Etila-ed-Dowleh was discovered with two mujahids and executed next day, the body being barbarously exposed. Several mujahids were also executed. On the 25th it was reported that Azam-ed-Dowleh had been captured, and the three consulates sent their munshis to intercede for his life. Salar-ed-Dowleh said it was not in his power to save him. It turned out that he had not been captured, but thirty-four others of the garrison, who had escaped, were brought in and twenty executed. Others who were executed were three or four officers of mujahidin. On the 27th Azam-ed-Dowleh was brought in and with his son and two others hanged. They were captured near Kenduleh in the Dinawar district. There is no reliable news of Yar Mohammed Khan and the rest of his force.

9. Salar-ed-Dowleh has sent a force to occupy Sahna and Kangawar, and is giving out that he will advance on Hamadan in a few days.

W. McDOUALL.

No. 23.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 29, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 25th instant,* I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, reporting the refusal of Prince Salar-ed-Dowleh to accept the terms of the Persian Government as communicated to him by the British and Russian consuls at that place.

My Russian colleague and I are to-day addressing instructions to the two consuls to make a further and stronger communication to the Prince, of which I enclose a copy.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

Consul McDouall to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Kermanshah, March 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that with my Russian colleague I called on Salar-ed-Dowleh, and we read him a translation of the identical telegram of the 2nd March from the two legations, and pointed out that the two legations strongly advise him to accept. He would not accept, but made other proposals embodied in a long letter which I enclose in original with translation. His letter was not received till the 14th. On its receipt my Russian colleague came to me and we sent a message advising him

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 322.

to make a more reasonable proposal. He replied no doubt they would make alterations in Tehran. He would not alter it here at present.

Amir Jang is the Vali of Pusht-i-kuh; the statement that he and the other chiefs are preparing to move is, I believe, imaginary, and probably only means that the Prince has asked them to do so.

The Prince has only about 500 men in Kermanshah at present.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

Salar-ed-Dowleh to Consul McDouall.

(Translation.)

YESTERDAY with M. Nicolsky, Russian consul, you stated the contents of a telegram from Tehran. Although I gave the necessary answer verbally at the time, yet I write this summary, which you will agree to telegraph. First, you stated that His Majesty Mohammed Ali Shah, the natural and glorious King, had agreed to leave Persia. Although order to this effect has not been issued to me, yet it is necessary for me to write. After I had undergone for four years every kind of adversity and trouble and loss and imprisonment and exile from my fatherland, having spent two and a-half years in Europe in great straits, I constantly stated my case to the Persian Government and received no reply. They did not even pay me what was due as arranged through the Russian Government. To settle the business I went to London and stayed at the Persian Legation, and stated my case to the late Regent Azad-el-Mulk. He replied, "What is necessary for your case in Europe will be arranged." They did nothing. This is a small matter; they have confiscated all my property without reason; as all my estates are pledged to the Banque d'Escomptes for 150,000 tomans and interest borrowed through Arbab Jamshid, and my receipt is there. The estates which my Royal father bequeathed me they have seized. They have given Esratabad on lease, and confiscated Mardabad, and have not given me what was due to me. They have also seized the revenues of my purchased estates; my family were in such straits that they had to sell their house furniture to live. This is concealed from no one. A telegram came from Sattar Khan and Bagir Khan that it is necessary that you come to Persia to end the disorders, and plainly called me in this language: "The people approve your coming, and will esteem it a favour." I came to Resht, and they imprisoned me for two days; however much I implored them to take me to Tehran in that state, and let me remain there two days, and after making arrangements for my family I would leave Persia, they did not agree.

After my return from Persia I promised His Majesty Mohammed Ali Shah and swore to him that as long as His Majesty wished for the rights of his ancestors I would not fail in his service to spend my last breath. Provided that Mohammed Ali Shah is in Persia, I have no opinion of my own whatever. I and the 3,000,000 people of these provinces will not fail in carrying out his desires to the last drop of our blood. What is said to me must be said to him; I am only in reference to him an unworthy subject. But if His Majesty Mohammed Ali Shah is willing to give up his personal rights my promises to him are void, and I consider myself entitled to the rights of my forefathers. Your statement that with regard to me the Persian Government had proposed to the two legations that a sum of 6,000 tomans for myself and a like sum for my family be granted, that I should sell the graves of my ancestors for this price, and that the confiscation of my estates should be annulled. Under the circumstances, I write this reply, that all the world may know that I have no personal spite, and undertook this trouble to put an end to the confusion and disorder of the last four years, which has been caused by the incapability of the Persian Government. Firstly, if the remaining one of seven Kings is to become a beggar, he will earn more than this. Secondly, when in Europe this was my charge to my friends there: if I die in Europe, take my body and bury in the soil of my beloved native land. Far be it that I should go alive from this soil. As before stated, if Mohammed Ali Shah does not want his rights, I consider myself entitled to take them; but to-day, for certain reasons, I put aside the taking of the rights of my forefathers to show all the world the last scene in this sad drama. Therefore, that I be not suspected of causing a continuance of this civil war and destruction of a 6,000-year old State and the desolation of Persia, I will cease from war and obey, provided that the Persian Government accepts the under-mentioned conditions through the Ministers of the two Powers.

The countries in my occupation as below be under my rule, and the sovereignty of the King of the Kajar dynasty for the time being (Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Carus, the mines of Upper and Lower Tarem), which by concession of Muzaffir-ed-Din Shah were granted to Amanianz the Christian, and by zeal of the Foreign Office and Atabeg Azam transferred to me with the villages (of Azariad and Anguran) situated in Zinjan, where I have property (Hamadan, Kermanshah and neighbourhood, Kangawar and Assadavád, Burujird, Luristan, and Arabistan, the three districts of Kamara, Gulpaigan, Khunsar, the three districts of Malavir, Sultanabad, Irak). The above districts, which were and are in my possession, are my home, and all my wives are the children of the chiefs of these countries, and my estates are situated in them. Some of these countries are necessary for the preservation of order in the others. It is known generally to all the world, and to Great Britain in particular, that Persia is powerless to preserve order in these countries, especially in Burujird, Luristan, and Kermanshah; no one but myself has the power to hold these countries and collect the revenue and repel the criminal. If accepted, I will promise to agree to the orders of the King of Persia as far as they do not interfere with the order of the country in my occupation. After this agreement has been made and the expenses of the amount of troops that I can raise for the protection of these countries, and the expenses of civil government paid, I will pay the remainder of the revenue and other receipts into the King's Treasury in two instalments yearly. Orders to me to be issued only by His Majesty. The damage which has been done to me in these four years and to my dependants, and the persons who caused this damage to me and took my property to be handed to me, according to a list which I will give, by the Persian Government. No official of the Persian Government is to come to these countries unless with my concurrence and agreement. They shall give no orders unless in a matter which concerns me personally. In all matters, civil and military, without any exception of these countries, I am personally answerable to His Majesty. From the date of signature of this agreement, if Persia makes any agreement with any European Power whatever concerning these countries it must be with my knowledge and consent; otherwise the people of these countries will have the right of acceptance or refusal; in the event of refusal by the people of these countries they will not be responsible for any loss or damage to that Power. For the repair of the damage of these four years, the restoration of what has been ruined, and for making guardhouses on the highways and roads and organising a gendarmerie, and repair of Government buildings in these countries which are all laid waste, and for assistance to the rayats of the estates which are ruined—perhaps to-day there is no vestige of them—the Government of Persia after approval must give the money either from the Treasury or by borrowing on terms approved by Persia from the two Powers. Whenever money is required it is to be arranged as above. I will buy what arms are necessary and sufficient for protection of these countries, because to-day the Government arms do not exist, and countries cannot be held by the arms of the tribes, and revenue will not be collected, and order and peace will not be arranged, and things will remain as they are. With the consent of the two Powers teachers for agriculture, commerce, colleges and army will be engaged from abroad, and I myself will summon them and make arrangements with them; this is my personal business and wish, and after it will be reported to the King. I will be satisfied when the agreement is signed and guaranteed by the two Powers. Should the Persian Government at any time by a trick stretch out its hand and cause disorder to the people of these countries, the Powers to be judges. Should these conditions of mine be accepted I undertake to render obedience to my King, Sultan Ahmed Shah. Further, should he require service from me temporarily in any other place I am ready to carry it out—obedience to the King is imperative. After signature of the agreement the Persian Government to give me without delay official permission with full powers to treat with Turkey regarding the land from Baneh to Katr, which without right they have seized and occupied, and to take the necessary steps, with the cognisance of the Persian Government, to obtain the evacuation of that district. Should the Government of Persia not accept this agreement the two Powers, with that kindness and generosity to Persia that they have always shown just as at the time when Mohammed Ali and myself came to Persia they decided to be neutral, and informed the Persian Government officially of this, at this time when I am ready with all my power to recover my rights being neutral, I and this honourable people will be content.

All this is provided that Mohammed Ali Shah is not in Persia, and has resigned his rights otherwise. I am only one of his subjects faithful to His Majesty, and have no opinion of my own. I beg that a reply, in affirmative or negative, may be

obtained from the Persian Government without delay or procrastination, because that Amir Jang and all the chiefs of these countries are ready to move with their forces, and I myself on the 5th of next month (25th March), if these conditions are not accepted, will be obliged to move and send an army and finish my business if war is to continue.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 23.

Sir G. Barclay to Consul McDouall.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 30, 1912.

YOU should, in concert with your Russian colleague, urge Salar most strongly to hand over the provinces occupied by him to Farman Farma, who is appointed governor of that part of Persia, and to leave Persia. You should inform Salar that his proposal is unacceptable, and that his longer stay in Persia is destructive of peace and contrary to the interests of the two Powers. Consequently, Persian Government have their full sympathy and support in the action they are taking against him. Persian Government are preparing a strong force against him, and they have means for the purpose, as they have received a considerable pecuniary advance from the two Powers.

If Salar refuses to follow this strong advice, you should tell him that he will forfeit all chance of assistance from the two Powers to obtain for him a pension and all chance of protection from them in future.

No. 24.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 12, 1912.

KERMANSHAH and Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Your telegram of 28th March.*

I have just received the following telegram, dated the 6th April, from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah:—

“My Russian colleague and I to-day visited Salar-ed-Dowleh, and, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your telegram of 30th March, urged him to accept the terms offered to him. He refused, however, and added that this reply to his telegram set him free to proclaim himself Shah. As a patriot and Mahometan leader his object was to bring about the restoration of order and religion and to create a strong Government.”

I defer observations until Russian Minister receives the reply from his consul, when they can be made jointly.

His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah also telegraphs under date of 7th April as follows:—

“Prince Salar-ed-Dowleh has left Kermanshah for Kalhur in order to see the chiefs and collect men. He thinks the vali will also come, but I doubt this. Salar's force will increase with every delay on the part of the Persian Government in taking action.

“I informed the Sinjabi chief of the contents of the communication from the legation to Salar. He said he would undertake to deal with the Kalhurs if Farman Farma came personally immediately with 300 men and guns; the tribes would, he said, be forced otherwise to join Salar-ed-Dowleh.”

Farman Farma has arrived as far as Kazvin; I will press the Persian Government to hasten his journey and to strengthen his forces. He himself is confident that he can eject Salar from Kermanshah with the forces now at his disposal, and also by negotiating with the Sinjabis.

* See “Persia, No. 5 (1912),” No. 333.

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. A. Young.(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 12, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 216 of 28th March*: Joint advance.

I approve suggestion in last paragraph.

Interest will presumably be claimed on sum of 35,000 tomans advanced to Persian Government on 2nd March for period prior to its repayment, and accounts of recent advance be kept distinct from those of Anglo-Indian loan of 1903 and 1904.

No. 26.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, April 13, 1912.*

REGENT'S proposal to leave Persia.

M. Sazonof thinks that His Highness is anxious to leave Persia altogether. While agreeing, however, that nothing can be done to prevent his departure, M. Sazonof has sent instructions to M. Poklewsky to lay before the Regent reasons why it would be desirable that His Highness should not leave at the present moment.

The news just received from Kermanshah of the intention of Salar-ed-Dowleh to proclaim himself Shah has much perturbed his Excellency.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 13, 1912.*

TEHRAN telegram of yesterday.

Please ask M. Sazonof to instruct M. Poklewsky to support the representations which His Majesty's chargé d'affaires is making with regard to Salar-ed-Dowleh.

No. 28.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, April 14, 1912.*

MY telegram of 12th April.

Russian consul at Kermanshah has now reported similar reply from Salar-ed-Dowleh. Russian Minister and I agree that there is nothing more to be done at present than to inform Persian Government that they must now do their best with Farman Farma.

No. 29.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, April 14, 1912.*

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Your telegram of the 12th April.

We must, when giving instructions to the bank, define what the surplus of the southern customs means.

There are certain quasi-fixed charges necessary to the good administration of the country over and above the service of the Anglo-Indian loans and the bank loan of last year. No formal tabulation has ever been made of these charges, but I presume you would not desire to see them interfered with.

The surplus of the customs revenues is the treasurer-general's only dependable resource; he cannot, of course, get on at all without it, and the utility of the recent advance is largely nullified if it is totally appropriated for the immediate repayment of

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 332.

the advance. It is therefore probable that he will request us to forgo repayment either for a specified period or until a loan has been concluded.

Moreover, he informs me he will shortly have to ask us for another advance, as the recent one has already practically gone (he has made provision for another 3½ months' gendarmerie pay).

M. Mornard is preparing this week a project respecting the confirmation of his own appointment as treasurer-general. This is only one of the several projects referred to in Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 8th April.

No. 30.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 15, 1912.

MY telegram of 12th April.

Farman Farma has left Kazvin for Hamadan. Russian general officer commanding at Kazvin reports favourably on quality of his troops.

No. 31.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 15, 1912.

I SAW M. Sazonof this afternoon. His Excellency told me that he feared that the force under Farman Farma would be too weak to defeat Salar-ed-Dowleh, but that M. Poklewsky had been instructed to support the representations of his British colleague at Tehran (see your telegram of the 13th instant).

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then turned to the situation at Tabriz, and on this subject he spoke very pessimistically. About 900 fedais had arrived immediately after the announcement of Sipahdar's appointment. Shuja-ed-Dowleh was the only man who was capable of maintaining order, and his Excellency blamed himself with having made a serious mistake when, out of a desire to conciliate the Persian Government, he had agreed to his removal. Now that the ex-Shah had left Persia he was co-operating with the Government, though formerly he had been considered a partisan of Mohammed Ali. If disorders, like those which had broken out in last December, were created by Sipahdar's friends, the fedais, the assumption of the administration of Northern Azerbaijan would be the only course to which the Imperial Government could resort.

I pointed out to M. Sazonof that there must be enough Russian troops at Tabriz to render the outbreak of disorders of this description impossible, and I begged his Excellency not to think of taking over the administration.

M. Sazonof replied that if there were a recurrence of these disturbances even he would advocate this course, and he doubted the Russian troops being strong enough to quell them. To persuade the Persian Government to keep Sipahdar in the capital and to allow Shuja to exercise the functions of Governor-General of Tabriz, even though they belonged nominally to Sipahdar, seemed to his Excellency to be the only other alternative. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would wait until he received further news from the acting Russian consul at Tabriz, and if he found it necessary to ask the Persian Government to keep Shuja there he would instruct Count Benckendorff to request you to support M. Poklewsky's representations.

No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. A. Young.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 15, 1912.

I SHOULD be very glad if the Regent would remain at Tehran until Persian Government have disposed of Salar-ed-Dowleh. I do not, however, like making a suggestion which might seem unfeeling, and if his Highness's immediate departure is rendered urgently necessary by the state of his health, I cannot press him further.

You should consult M. Poklewsky as to what communication it may be possible to make to the Regent.

No. 33.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 16, 1912.

PERSIAN customs receipts for year just concluded show increase: Northern customs, 10½ per cent.; southern, 20 per cent.; Bushire alone, 45 per cent.

No. 34.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 16, 1912.

RUSSIAN general officer commanding at Kazvin and his staff were received in audience by Regent and the Shah previous to their return to Russia. They received high decorations.

Their departure, however, does not imply any further diminution of troops.

Russian Minister is very pleased at good feeling now shown towards Russian troops by authorities and inhabitants, and at invitation received from Persian Government, before they had heard of the recent victory of their own troops at Zenjan, to detach a few companies to restore confidence there.

No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. A. Young.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1912.

ENQUIRE of the acting British consul-general at Tabriz whether he can confirm M. Sazonof's information as to the probability of disturbances in Northern Azerbaijan, as reported in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 15th April.

No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 15th April.

I am enquiring whether the acting British consul-general at Tabriz confirms M. Sazonof's pessimistic views as regards the situation in Northern Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, you should inform M. Sazonof that I earnestly trust that he may be able to avoid the assumption by Russia of the administration, which would create a very bad impression here.

No. 37.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 17, 1912.

FOLLOWING from acting British consul at Tabriz, dated yesterday:—

“Two hundred infantry and 300 Russian Cossacks have arrived at Tabriz. The Russian troops at Khoi, which numbered about 5,000, have been strengthened by 1,400 infantry, who have just crossed the frontier *en route* for that place.”

No. 38.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 17, 1912.

TABRIZ.

Your telegram of yesterday.

I have received no news of the kind from His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz, and have instructed him to report fully by telegraph.

There has been no indication of any immediate intention on the part of Sipahdar to take up his post, but I will make further enquiries this afternoon. I was told by the Russian Minister a few days ago that Shuja-ed-Dowleh was now expressing his discontent at his position, though it had been previously understood that the arrangement reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 3rd April was satisfactory to him.

No. 39.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 5, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 2nd instant,* I have the honour to transmit copy of a note which I addressed yesterday to the Persian Government.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Sir G. Barclay to the Persian Government.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, April 4, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 10th ultimo, and to take act of the assurances that the sum of 4,744*l.* will be paid out of the next loan.

I am now instructed to make the following communication to the Persian Government:—

His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the whole situation in the south of Persia, with special reference to the recent attacks on the Indian troops dispatched from Shiraz and Bushire to escort Mr. Smart, His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, who was returning from leave to his post.

His Majesty's Government consider it essential that the men who are well known locally to have been guilty of these outrages should be handed over to the Persian Government for punishment. If this is done, His Majesty's Government will at once withdraw the detachment recently sent to Bushire; and if the tribal chiefs and headmen show a friendly feeling and peaceful attitude for at least two months, and no more outrages occur during that period, the withdrawal of the Indian cavalry reinforcements from Shiraz and Ispahan will follow.

I am, however, to make the Persian Government understand that the continuance of this benevolent attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government must depend on the proper establishment of a gendarmerie under Swedish officers, and the Persian Government must therefore undertake before the final withdrawal of the troops above mentioned to support the Swedish officers by all means in their power.

I am also to request the Persian Government, as an initial and essential step towards securing the peaceful and friendly attitude of the local chiefs, on which the withdrawal of the above-mentioned troops depends, to restrain those mischievous persons in Tehran and in other places in Persia whose inflammatory telegrams were so largely responsible for the attacks on our troops. It is also essential that the Persian Government should induce the clergy of Nejed and Kerbela to recant their recent incitations to the priests and headmen of Fars, and to telegraph to these persons expressing their belief in the desire of Great Britain not to intervene in Southern Persia. The clergy should also urge upon the tribal chiefs and headmen the necessity

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 337.

of placating Great Britain by promoting British interests by a friendly attitude to British subjects and commerce.

In conclusion, I am to emphasise strongly the necessity of sending the new Governor-General to Shiraz as soon as possible, and of giving him the full support of the Persian Government and supplying him with the necessary money.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

No. 40.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 18, 1912.

TABRIZ.

My telegram of yesterday.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz:—

“It would appear that the Russian Government have been wholly misinformed. A few fedais who were in hiding ventured out some time ago, but none have arrived; except for four or five leaders in bast at the Turkish consulate-general, who have been seen in the town accompanied by a gholam of the Turkish consulate, no other leaders are here.

“In my opinion, the pessimistic views and apprehensions of the Russian Government are absolutely unfounded; not a soul will ever dare to move here. After the recent occurrences it is, of course, possible that disturbances may be created, especially when a man like Shuja-ed-Dowleh is here. The latter resents the appointment of Sipahdar as Governor-General of the province; he identifies him with the Caucasian revolutionaries, and fears he will lose the support of the chiefs of the tribes, Russian sympathy, and, above all, a lucrative post. When he was told that the Sipahdar's appointment had been approved by the Russian Government he announced his willingness to retire to Maragha. He is under obligations to Russia.”

The Russian Minister has no information respecting the alleged 900 fedais. Acting Russian consul has merely reported similar cases to those mentioned by Mr. Stevens. The Russian Minister states that these could be dealt with by the Russian troops now at Tabriz at any moment. The Persian Government also know nothing of the 900 fedais.

The acting Russian consul has reported Shuja's discontent and certain fictitious allegations against the Sipahdar. In reply he has just been instructed by the Russian Minister to use severe language to Shuja, and to tell him that he must remain loyal to the Persian Government, with whom, by the instrumentality of Russia, he has made peace on favourable terms. If he cannot remain loyal he must leave Persia, and Russia will have nothing more to do with him.

When the Sipahdar was appointed Governor-General he offered Shuja the post of Governor of Maragha and other districts; it is, however, clear that Shuja has not been co-operating with the Central Government, and he has also declined to send any reports to the Sipahdar in Tehran.

No. 41.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 18, 1912.

PLEASE refer to your telegram of the 16th April.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and his Excellency reverted to what you had said in your telegram above mentioned, substance of which I communicated to him in a private letter yesterday.

M. Sazonof said that the Russian Government would be compelled, in self-defence, to take over the administration of Northern Azerbaijan if the fedais were to make treacherous attacks on the Russian troops, as they did last December. He said that he had only spoken to me in order to warn you that this would be so, and that he had

not yet spoken to any of his colleagues on the subject. If the Persian Government would leave Shuja at Tabriz as deputy governor it might be possible to avoid having recourse to such a step altogether, and his Excellency assured me that he would only take it in the very last resort. He begged me to tell you that he would be grateful of British support at Tehran in inducing Persian Government to leave Shuja at Tabriz.

No. 42.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 18, 1912.

I ENQUIRED to-day of M. Sazonof as to the movements of Russian troops reported in Tehran telegram of the 17th instant.

M. Sazonof explained that fresh troops were now replacing the time-expired men in Persia, and declared that the statement of the acting British consul at Tabriz, to the effect that there were 5,000 troops at Khoi, was a gross exaggeration.

No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1912.

PLEASE communicate to M. Sazonof Tehran telegram of to-day, and say that, according to our information, the situation in Northern Azerbaijan is not so serious as to give cause for anxiety.

No. 44.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 19, 1912.

TABRIZ.

Mr. Young's telegram of yesterday.

Shuja-ed-Dowleh has sent a satisfactory reply in answer to the acting Russian consul's remonstrances. He professes to be ready to follow the advice of the Russian Minister and to be loyal to the Central Government. He hopes the Sipahdar will hasten his arrival, but consents to continue to act as deputy governor until his arrival. The acting Russian consul also reports that Shuja has addressed a telegram of a satisfactory nature to the Sipahdar.

No. 45.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 20, 1912.

MR. YOUNG'S telegram of the 14th April.

It is thought possible that Salar-ed-Dowleh may proclaim himself Shah. The British and Russian consuls enquire what attitude they should assume in this event.

My Russian colleague suggests that we should instruct them that, if Salar takes this step, they should continue to behave towards him as at present, but at the same time to avoid, as far as may be possible, any personal intercourse with him.

No. 46.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 20, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Mr. Young's telegram of the 14th April.

Acting treasurer-general represents that, with the exception of that portion of the

credit of 200,000*l.* advanced two months ago which has been put aside for specific purposes, such as the purchase of arms and ammunition in Europe, the maintenance of the gendarmerie for four or five months, and of the police of Tehran for three months, the sum advanced will be completely exhausted by the end of the present month. He has therefore made an official request to the two legations for a further advance of 50,000*l.* to the Persian Government by the British and Russian Governments, or by the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Russian Bank.

The Russian Minister suggests that, if the two Governments consent to make a further advance, provision should be made for 100,000*l.*; he thinks that the sum which M. Mornard has named is too small to meet the expenses that must necessarily be incurred on account of the expedition against Salar-ed-Dowleh and for other purposes. He thinks that a further irritating request for money will be inevitable if the smaller sum only is advanced. He suggests that the Persian Government should not be made aware that the larger sum has been put at their disposal. The loan negotiations may have been completed by the autumn, and he thinks that the larger sum held in reserve should be sufficient to enable the Persian Government to tide over their present financial difficulties until then.

No. 47.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 20, 1912.

TABRIZ.

Mr. Young's telegram of the 18th April.

My Russian colleague informs me that the latest news which he has received regarding the situation at Tabriz is of a most satisfactory nature. Shuja has fulfilled his promise to get into communication with Sipahdar. The latter will leave for Tabriz next week. He has offered Shuja a post which the latter has accepted.

No. 48.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 18th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated the telegrams from His Majesty's Legation at Tehran of the 18th, 19th, and 20th instant, expressed the view that it would be much better if Shuja remained at Tabriz. Russia could count on the friendly disposition of Sipahdar, but the present situation required a stronger man, such as Shuja, who inspired confidence.

M. Sazonof said, however, that he did not intend to urge the Persian Government to postpone Sipahdar's departure from Tehran.

No. 49.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1912.

TEHRAN telegram of 20th April: Kermanshah.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that the consuls should have no official relations with Salar, but should confine themselves to transacting absolutely necessary business with him should he establish himself as a *de facto* authority.

No. 50.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1912.

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs had not yet heard from the Russian Minister of the suggested further advance to Persian Government, so I communicated to him substance of Sir W. Townley's telegram of 20th April.

His Excellency expressed himself as personally favourable to views of Russian Minister as stated in that telegram, but would have to consult Minister of Finance before taking a decision.

No. 51.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 20th April.

If Russian Government approve M. Poklewsky's proposal in regard to Salar-ed-Dowleh, you may give instructions as suggested to His Majesty's consul.

No. 52.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 21, 1912.

I HAVE received the following telegram from acting British vice-consul at Resht, dated the 19th April:—

“There was fighting between Russian Cossacks and natives on the 16th April at Kerganrud. Casualties were two Russians wounded, eight Persians killed. Though it is not yet known which side began the fight, the cause of it seems to have been that the natives of Talish refused to accept the son of Sardar Amjad as governor; the Russian consul was supporting this man's candidature.

“During the fight the Russian gun-boat, which had left Enzeli some days before, bombarded the coast of Talish at the bazaar of Alam.

“The Russians have only 150 Cossacks at Kerganrud; remainder are still in Enzeli. They have telegraphed to Ardebil and Astara for reinforcements.”

I have spoken to my Russian colleague on the subject. He says that robber bands have been inflicting serious losses on Russian subjects, and that the object of the expedition was to punish these and establish Persian authority as governor. Russian consul at Resht has gone to the scene of action, but he had not heard that reinforcements had been summoned. He puts the Persian casualties at over twenty.

No. 53.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 22.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 20, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated to-day from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

April 20, 1912.

REFERENCE is to my telegram of the 2nd instant.

I have to report withdrawal of increased consular guard from Lingah to Jask.

No. 54.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 23, 1912.

TABRIZ.

Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of 18th April.

Preparations are being made by the Sipahdar to leave Tehran for his post in about a fortnight. The Sipahdar is personally not at all desirous of proceeding to Tabriz. My Russian colleague, however, is of the opinion that it would be difficult for him now to suggest that he should not go there. He tells me that the pressure which he has been exerting on Shuja has had the effect of bringing that individual into line, and that his attitude towards the Sipahdar is now loyal and correct.

If the latter assumes the office of Governor-General it will be considered here as tantamount to a resumption of Persian authority over Azerbaijan.

No opinion either in favour of Sipahdar or Shuja or the reverse has ever been expressed by His Majesty's Legation.

No. 55.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 23, 1912.

KERMAN.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Kerman, dated yesterday:—

“Complete confusion reigns at the present time in the affairs of this province. The Governor-General had sent out Mirza Hussein Khan to collect revenue in certain districts; a large force and some guns accompanied him. He has, however, joined the principal local khans of Jiruft and Rudbar, who refused to pay taxes. The Governor-General's ferrash bashi, who was busy collecting revenue, has been robbed and imprisoned, and the khans are reported to be marching on Kerman, their avowed object being to expel the Governor-General and to loot the town. It is reported that the Affshars and Buchakchis are making common cause with them. I have hopes that such an ill-assorted crew will quarrel among themselves before reaching Kerman, and I personally doubt whether in any case they will dare to attack the town, but this belief is not shared by people here, who are in no little alarm. Most of the regular troops have deserted for want of pay, and the best of them are with Mirza Hussein Khan, so that the Governor-General has hardly any force wherewith to repel an attack should one be made.

“I hardly think the rebels will trouble me, but Europeans living near to the town might be robbed or molested.”

I am to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs to-morrow and will speak to his Excellency on this subject.

No. 56.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 23, 1912.

REGENT.

Your telegram of the 15th April.

The Russian Minister informs me that his Government have furnished him with no instructions on the subject of representations to the Regent respecting his proposed departure from Persia on leave of absence. His own opinion is that His Highness ought certainly to stay in the country until the question of Salar-ed-Dowleh has been disposed of. Though the Persian Government appear confident that they will have little difficulty in expelling Salar from Kermanshah, and loyal forces seem to be rallying to Farman Farma, who has now arrived at Hamadan, the Russian Minister thinks the task may prove a more serious matter than anticipated.

Do you wish me to make any representations to the Regent? I shall probably see His Highness in a few days' time.

No. 57.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 24, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of the 23rd April.

M. Sazonof thought that instructions had been telegraphed to M. Poklewsky respecting a communication to the Regent, but he finds that no definite instructions have been sent. His Excellency is now telegraphing to M. Poklewsky to join his British colleague in making a representation to the Regent in accordance with the instructions sent to Sir W. Townley.

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd April.

A communication might be made to the Regent somewhat on the lines of my telegram of the 15th April. Concert with M. Poklewsky as to doing this.

No. 59.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 25, 1912.

BAKHTIARIS and Sheikh of Mohammerah.

An enquiry is being conducted by British consular officers with a view to establishing conflicting interests at Shuster of the sheikh and the Bakhtiari. His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, who is now at Ahwaz with the resident at Bushire, and who has recently visited Shuster, reports by telegraph that that place has been attacked by Bakhtiari, who have declined to await the result of the mediatory enquiry. Major Haworth fears that the quarrel may develop into a conflict in which British interests may suffer serious damage. He reports that the attitude of the sheikh has been perfectly correct throughout the whole trouble, and represents that he is entitled to the full support of His Majesty's Government.

I have brought the matter to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also to that of the Bakhtiari khans, who hold a prominent position here in the government of the country. The latter profess their willingness to await the result of the consul's enquiry, and say that they sincerely desire to find a *modus vivendi*. They maintain that their tribesmen have not attacked Shuster, and they assure me that urgent telegraphic instructions have been sent to them not to fight.

No. 60.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 26, 1912.

AN incident, which my Russian colleague looks upon as a serious one, occurred two days ago in the district of Khalkal.

Some Shahsevan tribesmen attacked and surrounded a small Cossack detachment on its way to Ardebil. The enemy greatly outnumbered the Cossacks, but the officer in command succeeded in warding them off until reinforcements came up to his relief. An attack was then made on the tribesmen by the combined Russian force. Russian casualties were one officer and two men killed and eight men wounded. About 100 or 200 of the Shahsevans were killed.

No. 61.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 27, 1912.

MY telegram of 20th April.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Minister of Finance declares that he cannot consent to any further advances to the Persian Government, as, though he made an exception with regard to the last advance, he was really acting beyond his powers in doing so.

On my asking the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of our wishing to come to the assistance of Persian Government by advancing the money by ourselves he would raise any objection, his Excellency replied he would like to think matter over before giving a definite answer.

No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 27, 1912.

I SHOULD be glad to learn whether the Persian Government are taking any steps in regard to the capture of those responsible for the outrage on Mr. Smart. Three weeks have now elapsed since they were notified of our intentions.

No. 63.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 28, 1912.

GENDARMERIE and South Persia.

Your telegram of the 11th April.

Swedish colonel, whom I have advised in the sense of your telegram, states that he will do everything in his power to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government. He says that no definite decision with regard to the programme has yet been taken, and that he will instruct the Swedish-officer at present at Shiraz to prospect the road as desired. The original scheme appears to coincide with his own views, and I gathered from his remarks that he foresees no difficulty in reverting to it.

No. 64.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 29, 1912.

FINANCIAL straits of Persian Government.

Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 20th April.

M. Mornard has addressed a letter to my Russian colleague and myself, begging our assistance with a view to a further advance being made through the two banks. He has called our urgent attention to the fact that owing to the Treasury being empty he is not able to pay the greater part of the salaries of the various offices here.

I should also be glad to learn the views of His Majesty's Government as to the possibility of forgoing the repayment of the first advance until conclusion of anticipated loan or for a fixed period (please see Mr. Young's telegram of the 14th April). It is possible that I may be pressed at an early date to state what the views of His Majesty's Government are on the question.

No. 65.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 29, 1912.

BAKHTIARIS and Sheikh of Mohammerah.

My telegram of the 25th April.

The situation at Shuster formed the subject of consideration at a Cabinet Council which the Regent tells me he convened yesterday. His Highness informed me that the Sheikh of Mohammerah had telegraphed to him complaining of the attitude of the Bakhtiaris, and stating that he was forced to take up arms on behalf of his people, whom the Bakhtiaris were threatening to dispossess of their property. His Highness admitted that the sheikh's telegram was couched in most loyal terms.

The Regent tells me that the Government have sent a tranquillising telegram in reply, and have told the sheikh that the departure of the new Governor-General of Arabistan for his post will be expedited. A peremptory telegram has also been addressed to the Bakhtiaris by the Prime Minister desiring them to cease hostilities.

I spoke strongly to the Regent about the importance of preserving order in Arabistan, and reminded His Highness that there were important British interests in that province, and that it was absolutely necessary to prevent the Bakhtiaris plundering along the roads. I also said that His Majesty's consular officers on the spot considered the Bakhtiaris to be clearly the aggressors, and that in all their reports furnished to His Majesty's Legation they spoke in warm terms of the sheikh's forbearance. I said that they also considered that if time were given for a thorough enquiry to be made a *modus vivendi* could be arrived at.

No. 66.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 29, 1912.

SITUATION in Tehran.

The police have just brought to light a conspiracy to overthrow the present order of things. I am told by the Regent that though the object of the plot was to upset the existing form of government it is not clear what was to be set up in its place. His Highness says that the conspirators were advanced Nationalists and violent reactionaries with a strong clerical element, and that the movement was marked by a distinct anti-foreign feeling, the exasperation caused by the bombardment of the shrine of Imam Reza at Meshed being to a large degree the cause of this.

It is thought that the plot has been successfully thwarted in a manner that will considerably strengthen the hands of the present Government. The police have arrested and deported to Mazanderan and Yezd some eight or nine of the ringleaders; they have also arrested other persons, including Wahid-ul-Mulk and Suleiman Mirza, the late leader of the Democratic party in the Medjliss. These and other persons said to have been implicated in the affair will either be invited to go to Europe or else will be deported to the provinces.

No. 67.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 29, 1912.

MY telegram of 23rd April.

British consul at Kerman reports that the governor receives neither money nor support from the Central Government and is talking of taking bast in the consulate.

Mirza Hussein Khan and his allies have left Bam and have now a force of 3,000 men with two guns. Great alarm is felt in Kerman by Persians and agents of British and American carpet firms, and British consul is less confident that the rebels will hesitate to attack the town.

I am again bringing to the notice of the Persian Government serious nature of the situation, inadequacy of the local forces, and the risk of loss of property to British subjects, for which the Persian Government must accept the responsibility.

No. 68.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 30, 1912.

HIS Majesty's acting vice-consul at Resht telegraphs as follows, dated the 29th April:—

“The inhabitants of Talish telegraphed on the 27th April to the Governor of Resht that they would surrender provided that no member of the family of Sardar Amjad were sent to them as governor. Otherwise they would fight to the last drop of their blood. After consulting with my Russian colleague, governor replied that they must surrender unconditionally.

“A Russian gun-boat leaves to-day to bombard the Talish coast. There are at the present moment 250 Cossacks in Talish. My Russian colleague says that their sole object is to remove disturbing elements from the district.”

No. 69.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 30, 1912.

SITUATION at Kerman.

My telegram of the 29th April.

The Persian Government state that the corrupt practices of the Governor of Kerman are the immediate cause of the trouble in that district. I have consulted His Majesty's consul as to the truth of this accusation. Colonel Haig has replied that governor is at least less corrupt than his predecessors, though it is true he is not perfect. Before being appointed to Kerman he was at Astrabad, from which place he brought a good reputation; he seems quite deserving of any support we can give him. I am replying in the above sense to Persian Government's accusation.

The latest information from Colonel Haig is to the effect that the rebels are collecting supplies three stages from Kerman, in the neighbourhood of Rayin. Should an attack on the town appear inevitable, he proposes to advise all Europeans to take refuge at his house. He does not think the rebels will attack the consulate, but he adds that some people are less confident on this point than himself.

No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 30, 1912.

I APPROVE your action, as reported in your telegram of the 29th April, in regard to the situation at Shuster.

No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 30, 1912.

TEHRAN telegram of the 29th April and your telegram of the 27th April.

It is possible that the Persian Government may collapse completely, failing the advance which Russian Government refuse. Please enquire what Russian Government propose to do. They may possibly be willing to arrange for the immediate conversion of the Russian Bank's loan, or to discuss the question of an immediate loan with the bankers, with whom I understand they have been in consultation.

No. 72.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 1, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

According to a report which has just reached me from Hamadan, a telegram had been received there from Salar-ed-Dowleh to the effect that he had been joined by the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh and his adherents, and that he was on his way back to Kermanshah, whence he would advance on Hamadan. In the same telegram Salar-ed-Dowleh stated that he had instructed Amir Mofakham to advance on Sultanabad, and Mujallal-es-Sultaneh on Hamadan.

From news just received from the British consular agent at Hamadan, Mujallal-es-Sultaneh is said to have left Kurdistan for Hamadan. He also reports the departure of the Government forces from Hamadan for the front.

No. 73.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, May 1, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 30th April.

M. Sazonof has informed me that Russian Minister of Finance is still of opinion that Russian participation in the proposed further advance to Persia is impossible. The existence of constitutional objections is confirmed by a leading member of the Duma to whom I mentioned the matter.

M. Sazonof would prefer that advance should not be made by His Majesty's Government alone, and is causing enquiry to be made with a view to obtaining through a Paris bank the sum required for the Russian share. He is prepared to begin negotiations immediately for the large loan to Persia, pending the issue of which nothing can be done with regard to the conversion of the Russian Bank's loan.

His Excellency proposed that instructions should be sent to the two representatives at Tehran to prepare, after consultation with the two banks, a memorandum of proposed conditions for the loan. If the British and Russian Governments approved the conditions in the memorandum they would then ascertain from the bankers of the "Société d'Études" whether they were ready to issue a loan on these conditions. Persian Government would, M. Sazonof thinks, require about 6,000,000*l.* He is of opinion that the first instalment should be a fifth or sixth of this total, and that, in communicating with the bankers, the two Governments should fix the date on which it should be placed at the disposal of the Persian Government.

No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1912.

SITUATION at Kerman.

I approve Colonel Haig's proposal, reported in your telegram of 30th April.

No. 75.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 2, 1912.

THE arrest and deportation of the majority of the democratic members of the old Medjliss, as reported in my telegram of the 29th April, appears to be to some extent explained by the announcement now made that a new Medjliss is to be convoked.

I was told yesterday by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Government will issue a decree of convocation almost at once, and that they will arrange all the necessary preliminaries for the elections before the departure of the Regent for Europe.

No. 76.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 2, 1912.

KERMAN.

Your telegram of the 1st May.

I discussed at considerable length yesterday afternoon with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the question of responsibility for the present disturbed state of the province of Kerman. At the end of our discussion his Excellency, while maintaining that the Governor-General had made political mistakes, practically agreed that Hussein Khan, the leader of the rebels, was the real culprit. He assured me that a strong telegram ordering him to keep the peace had been addressed to him by the Minister of the Interior.

The Governor-General may not be irreproachable, but it is clear that the present situation has been brought about by intrigues against him. I hope there may now be an improvement in the state of affairs.

No. 77.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 27th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me yesterday that question of capture of men responsible for outrage on Mr. Smart has not been neglected by Persian Government. He said culprits are at present moment in camp of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who is in open conflict with his brother, who has supplanted him as Ilkhani of Kashgais, and consequently cannot be captured for present.

His Excellency added that other conditions contained in Sir G. Barclay's note of 4th April are being carefully observed, and that an early satisfactory answer is expected from clergy of Nejed and Kerbela.

No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.

MY telegram of 24th April: Regent.

Have you made any communication, and what is the Regent's present intention?

No. 79.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 3, 1912.

REGENT'S departure.

Your telegram of the 2nd May.

I had an audience with the Regent on the 28th April. As my Russian colleague had received no instructions to make any representations to His Highness, I confined myself, when alluding to his approaching departure for Europe, to a friendly expression of your views as set forth in your telegram of the 15th April.

His Highness replied that his intention was to leave Tehran on the 14th May. He said that the state of his health rendered it imperative for him to go to Europe. If the Salar-ed-Dowleh question were not settled by that date he might perhaps postpone his departure, but he had hopes that Salar would have been expelled from Persia before then.

It appeared to me that His Highness—who looked ill and greatly aged—had definitely decided to go, and a public announcement has since been made that he will

leave on the date he mentioned. He said that he would continue to act as Regent from abroad, and he assured me that he had every intention of returning to Persia at the end of his leave.

No instructions to make any representations had been received by the Russian Minister up to two days ago.

No. 80.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 3, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 1st May: Loan to Persian Government.

You should discuss question of loan with your Russian colleague and the representatives of the two banks, as suggested by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 3, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 1st May: Advance to Persian Government.

Your Excellency should, if possible, expedite reply of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the Russian share of small advance through a Paris bank, as the matter is one of urgency.

No. 82.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, May 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 3rd May: Advance to Persian Government.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs promised that matter should be pushed forward in Paris.

No. 83.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 28, 1912.

IN my telegram of the 21st instant* I furnished you with a French translation of the Persian Government's reply to the joint proposals of the 18th February. This translation was made at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and accompanied the note. It is an accurate rendering of the Persian text, which alone bears the signature of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am much pleased to learn from your telegram of the 22nd instant† to Sir G. Buchanan that you consider the terms of this communication satisfactory, and I have to-day, in pursuance of your telegram of the 25th instant,‡ advanced to the Persian Government the British share of the joint advance of 200,000*l.*, forwarding to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a note, which his Excellency has acknowledged, a cheque to the order of the acting treasurer-general for 100,000*l.*

I have the honour to transmit the programme for the expenditure of the joint advance. This programme was prepared by the treasurer-general, in concert with the Cabinet, and has the approval of the two legations. It will be observed that the total sum assigned to the gendarmerie is 420,000 tomans, of which 140,000 tomans are for the purchase of arms. I understand that rifles and pistols are to be ordered in Germany and side-arms in Sweden, and that the Russian Government is disposed to

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 316.

† See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 318.

‡ See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 324.

allow their transit through Russia duty free, subject to satisfactory guarantees that the arms will not fall into improper hands. The other items of expenditure are, in the opinion of the Russian Minister and myself, well chosen. You will see that 100,000 tomans are set aside for pensions. One of the principal elements of unrest now prominent in the capital is the unpaid pensioners, and the sum assigned on this head enables M. Mornard to compound with these malcontents for the past year on a basis of 33 per cent.

I also enclose translation of a note from the Persian Government embodying the pension arrangements for the ex-Shah and his family, as well as a translation of a note in which the Persian Government take act of the verbal communication, which I reported in my despatch of the 18th instant, regarding the engagement of instructors for the army from subjects of the minor Powers. The Persian Government would have wished to make in their answer to the joint proposals some mention of the minor Powers in the formula regarding the discussion of the formation of the army, but my colleague and I thought it better to hold them to the formula which we had induced the Minister for Foreign Affairs to insert in his original draft on the 7th instant (see my telegram of the same day*), and which had the express approval of the two Governments.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 83.

M. Mornard to Sir G. Barclay.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 27 mars, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement a approuvé en Conseil des Ministres, tenu le 22 mars courant, la répartition suivante de l'avance de 200,000l. qui a été consentie par les deux Gouvernements anglais et russe savoir :—

	Tomans.
1. A S.A. Mohammad Ali Mirza	70,000
2. Achat d'armes pour la gendarmerie	140,000
3. Mensualités à la gendarmerie	280,000
4. A la police de Téhéran	100,000
5. Aux Bakhtiaris	125,000
6. Pensions	100,000
7. Expéditions en province y compris envois aux gouverneurs	100,000
8. Dépenses urgentes	85,000
9. Arriérés des Ministres.. .. .	100,000
Total	1,100,000

Veillez, &c.
MORNARD.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, March 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Government have approved, at a Council of Ministers held the 22nd instant, the following programme of expenditure of the advance of 200,000l. granted by the British and Russian Governments :—

	Tomans.
1. To His Highness Mohammed Ali Mirza	70,000
2. Purchase of arms for the gendarmerie	140,000
3. Monthly pay of gendarmerie	280,000
4. Tehran police	100,000
5. To the Bakhtiaris	125,000
6. Pensions	100,000
7. Remittances to the provinces, including those to the governors	100,000
8. Urgent expenditure	85,000
9. Arrears due to Ministers	100,000
Total	1,100,000

I have, &c.
MORNARD.

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 274.

Enclosure 2 in No. 83.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, March 25, 1912.

IN pursuance of the conversation I have had with your Excellency in connection with the grant of a pension to Mohammed Ali Mirza, and in continuation of my note of the 20th instant, in which it was stated that the matter would form the subject of a separate note, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in deference to the request of His Britannic Majesty's Legation, the Persian Government will be prepared to grant an annual pension of 75,000 tomans to Mohammed Ali Mirza. This pension will begin from the 31st March, 1912, and will be paid in quarterly instalments. For the purpose of the amortisation of the 70,000 tomans advanced to Mohammed Ali Mirza for his departure from Astrabad, a sum of 10,000 tomans will be deducted annually from the pension of 75,000 tomans—*i.e.*, from the current year Sichkani-il for seven years, 65,000 tomans a-year, and after that 75,000 tomans a-year will be paid. Mohammed Ali Mirza will have to pay all the expenses of his family and children who are with him, as well as the expenses of his daughter at Tehran. The Persian Government has also assigned a pension of 6,000 tomans a-year to His Imperial Highness the Etezzad-es-Sultaneh, who will reside at Tehran, and this sum will be paid to him for his expenses.

In case of Mohammed Ali Mirza's decease, one-third of his pension—*i.e.*, 25,000 tomans a-year—will be assigned to his family and will be divided among its members, and after the decease of each member his or her share of the pension will be stopped.

Should Mohammed Ali Mirza again intrigue against the actual Government, or attempt to return to Persian territory and repeat his former conduct, the Persian Government will not be responsible for any of the conditions mentioned in this note.

With regard to the Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property, which was confiscated on account of his misbehaviour, I have the honour to state that now, in accordance with our conversation, the property has been released, the prince having left Persia. It is obvious that this good-will on the part of the Imperial Government will continue as long as His Royal Highness will not attempt to return to Persia without the permission of the Persian authorities, and as long as he refrains from repeating his former ill-conduct.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 83.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, March 25, 1912.

I HAVE formally, and with great pleasure, taken note of the official representations made to me on the 14th instant by Mr. Churchill and M. de Giers, the first dragomans of the British and Russian Legations, on the part of your Excellency and the Russian Minister. The representations were as follows:—

The Persian Minister at St. Petersburg has asked as to the position of the British and Russian Governments in regard to the Persian army and foreign military instructors, and has asked for information whether the two Governments have the intention of defining the strength of the Persian army and whether they object to the engagement of officers from minor Powers.

We have been instructed to reply to the two questions as follows: Firstly, there can be no question of the British and Russian Governments desiring the limitation of the Persian army, because, in the opinion of the two Governments, Persia should have a larger army than she has the means to create and maintain. Secondly, the two Governments will not oppose the engagement by the Persian Government of military instructors from minor Powers.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 84.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

Sir, *Tehran, April 17, 1912.*
 I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks, ending this 17th day of April.

I have, &c.
 A. YOUNG.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending April 17, 1912.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—At the beginning of April the Foreign Minister tendered his resignation to the Regent, but it was not accepted, and he subsequently withdrew it. The Ministries of Posts and Telegraphs and Justice are vacant for the present, and the Cabinet is composed as follows:—

Prime Minister, Samsam-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister of the Interior, Kawam-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister of War, Sardar Mohtashem.
 Minister of Finance, Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh.

The Regent.—His Highness was somewhat agitated at the beginning of the month, owing to indications of dissatisfaction among the people and to the fear of demonstrations which might be eventually directed against himself. He further complained of ill-health, and announced his intention to take short leave of absence in Europe and to start at the beginning of May. Sipahdar added to the Regent's uneasiness by addressing him a letter containing an indictment of his policy and accusing him of weakness.

Diplomatic Changes.—Sir George Barclay left Tehran on the 12th instant, and Sir Walter Townley arrived at Enzeli on the 13th.

Emin Bey, the new Turkish Ambassador, arrived at Tehran on the 19th March.

Advance to the Persian Government.—The sum of 100,000*l.*, being the British moiety of the joint Anglo-Russian advance, was handed to the Persian Government on the 28th March.

Operations against Salar-ed-Dowleh.—Farman Farma left Tehran on the 6th April for Hamadan with a considerable force. He delayed a short time at Kazvin, but eventually proceeded. A force of some 600 Bakhtiari under Shahab-es-Sultaneh and Zia-es-Sultan followed a little later and had orders to proceed to Zenjan, where they will receive further orders as to their ultimate destination.

Ghilan and Mazanderan.

During the past four weeks there has been a redistribution of Russian troops at Enzeli, Resht, and Kazvin. The 2nd and 4th Caucasian Rifles have been relieved by a battalion of the Salianski Regiment from Russia, and the half battery of field artillery formerly at Resht has been transferred to Kazvin.

According to the Russian Minister, the net result of these movements leaves 1,300 men at Resht and Enzeli, and a similar number at Kazvin.

Shoa-es-Sultaneh left Astrabad for Russia on the 17th March.

Ispahan.

As regards the maintenance of order in the province, there has been some improvement since Sardar Zaffar's arrival, but the situation in the town itself has remained unsatisfactory.

His Majesty's consul-general reports that the Governor-General is intriguing with a view to undermining the power of the agent to the treasurer-general, and that he is

endeavouring to provoke popular outbursts in the town by artificially putting up prices.

Mr. Vice-Consul Knox and Major Capper arrived from Shiraz on the 22nd March without incident. The former left for Tehran on the 26th March.

Yezd.

The situation, from a commercial point of view, continues to be most unsatisfactory, owing to the increased insecurity of the roads and to the scarcity of money.

The Parsis and certain pension-holders have complained against the exactions of Majd-ul-Mamalek, the Governor-General's chief clerk. The Central Government have sent instructions to the governor to make enquiries into the matter.

Shiraz.

The detachment of the new Government gendarmerie, which left Tehran at the beginning of March, arrived at Shiraz on the 5th April.

An incident which may lead to trouble among the Arab tribes occurred on the 31st March. Nasr-ed-Dowleh, son of the Kawam, ordered the arrest of Reza Kuli Khan, a Sharybani Arab chief, as the latter refused to make good articles robbed from some Jahroom merchants. Reza Kuli Khan resisted and fired shots into the room where Nasr-ed-Dowleh was sitting, whereupon the latter's guards shot Reza Kuli Khan dead.

Seistan.

It is reported that a force of 2,700 Baluchis is marching on Birjand.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh has rendered himself very unpopular in Kermanshah owing to his exactions.

He has refused to accede to the proposals of the British and Russian Governments to accept a pension and leave the country, but, according to reports received by the Central Government, has gone to the Kalhur country in order to enlist the sympathies of the tribesmen and induce them to assist him in his campaign against the Government.

Mujallal-es-Sultan, one of Salar-ed-Dowleh's lieutenants, is in the neighbourhood of Hamadan. Amir Nizam, the governor, has fortified the town.

Farman Farma, with a force of Persian Cossacks and sowars, left Tehran early in April for Kermanshah via Hamadan.

Zenjan.

According to reports received by the Central Government, a force of Bakhtiaris captured Zenjan at the beginning of April. Mohammed Khan, the brigand who captured the town on the 13th March, was killed.

Bushire.

Nizam-es-Sultaneh left Bushire on the 18th March for Bombay *en route* to Europe.

On the 20th March the Deputy Governor of Bunder Abbas took refuge in the consulate at Bushire to avoid imprisonment by the Governor of the Gulf Ports. The resident appealed to the governor on behalf of the refugee, and an understanding was brought about, with the result that the deputy governor left the consulate on the 28th March.

Ahwaz.

The question between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiaris regarding the Governorship of Shuster has been settled by the appointment of a neutral governor, Viquar-ul-Mulk, who entered the town as deputy governor on the 5th April.

No. 85.

Mr. A. Young to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a table showing, by provinces, the receipts and expenses of the Persian Customs Administration during the past three years.

The Administrator-General of Customs informs me that the figures in this table are only provisional, but that any changes in them will only be of slight importance, and will not in any case have any sensible effect on the considerable increase, viz., 12 per cent., in the total receipts by which last year was marked.

I would call your attention to the fact that the table enclosed shows an increase in the northern customs of roughly 10½ per cent., and in the southern customs of nearly 20 per cent. If the receipts at Bushire and dependencies are taken alone they show an increase of 45 per cent.

The decrease in the proportion between the receipts and the expenses of administration reflects credit on the responsible Belgian functionaries.

I have, &c.

A. YOUNG.

Enclosure in No. 85.

STATEMENT of Receipts and Expenditure of Persian Customs Administration.

(Translation.)

Province	Year Takagou-il (March 21, 1909 to March 20, 1910).			Year It-il (March 21, 1910 to March 20, 1911).			Year Tangouz-il (March 21, 1911 to March 20, 1912).		
	Gross Receipts.	Expenses of Administration.	Net Receipts.	Gross Receipts.	Expenses of Administration.	Net Receipts.	Gross Receipts. (Provisional estimate).	Expenses of Administration. (Provisional estimate.)	Net Receipts. (Provisional estimate.)
	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.	Kr. s.
Azerbaijan	6,177,852 30	727,066 60	5,450,785 70	6,469,799 90	731,841 90	5,737,958 00	7,129,472 00	727,479 65	6,401,992 35
Astara	1,604,474 80	204,896 50	1,399,578 30	1,670,005 75	218,118 00	1,451,887 75	1,592,167 15	261,840 65	1,330,326 50
Ghilan	6,776,115 80	490,852 90	6,285,262 90	7,159,730 75	441,776 60	6,717,954 15	11,347,693 05	513,885 55	10,833,807 50
Mazanderan	2,543,940 30	124,492 75	2,419,447 55	1,708,878 80	121,316 20	1,587,562 60	2,211,611 90	121,371 00	2,090,240 90
Astrabad	1,553,809 60	167,848 15	1,385,961 45	1,610,346 50	169,461 80	1,440,884 70	1,227,376 75	193,132 70	1,034,244 05
Khorassan	2,989,923 55	678,103 35	2,311,820 20	3,247,429 95	699,944 65	2,547,485 30	3,813,860 70	741,936 80	3,071,923 90
Kermanshah	5,713,238 50	405,001 90	5,308,236 60	5,815,488 15	472,770 20	5,342,717 95	4,585,571 50	483,246 00	4,102,325 50
Tehran	1,000,685 25	40,039 90	960,645 35	2,161,177 45	39,981 30	2,121,196 15	1,222,754 60	46,667 75	1,176,086 85
Totals of northern customs ..	28,360,040 10	2,838,302 05	25,521,738 05	29,842,857 25	2,895,210 65	26,947,646 60	33,130,507 65	3,089,560 10	30,040,947 55
The South	4,111,084 90	581,192 00	3,529,892 90	3,286,137 70	482,268 45	2,803,869 25	4,825,107 15	523,592 75	4,301,514 40
The Far South	1,670,355 40	227,708 70	1,442,646 70	1,959,444 70	212,381 80	1,747,062 90	1,878,399 55	229,658 30	1,648,741 25
Arabistan	2,042,262 00	192,933 35	1,849,328 65	3,074,829 95	243,474 15	2,831,355 80	3,218,217 75	278,002 95	2,940,214 80
Totals of southern customs ..	7,823,702 30	1,001,834 05	6,821,868 25	8,320,412 35	938,124 40	7,382,287 95	9,921,724 45	1,031,254 00	8,890,470 45
Total of the provinces ..	36,183,742 40	3,840,136 10	32,343,606 30	38,163,269 60	3,833,335 05	34,329,934 55	43,052,232 10	4,120,814 10	38,931,418 00
Central Administration ..	156,580 55	648,568 65	491,988 10	539,142 20*	678,547 40	109,405 20*	353,459 75	771,725 95	418,266 20
General total	36,340,322 95	4,488,704 75	31,851,618 20	38,732,411 80*	4,511,882 45	34,220,529 35*	43,405,691 85	4,892,540 05	38,513,151 80

* Corrected figures.

The gross receipts for Tangouz-il show, it will be seen, an increase of 467,328 tomans 1 shahi, or 12·06 per cent., over the gross receipts of the preceding year It-il. The increase in net receipts amounts to 429,262 tomans 2 krans 9 shahis, or 12·54 per cent.

The percentage of costs of administration, which was 12·35 per cent. in Takagou-il, and had been reduced to 11·65 per cent. in It-il, fell to 11·27 per cent. last year.

No. 86.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 1st March.*

Colonel Douglas telegraphs as follows through acting British consul at Shiraz :—

“If His Majesty’s Government intend to keep the cavalry for another winter at Shiraz, it is essential that we take into early consideration the question of the provision of proper accommodation. The present leases expire in October, and fresh leases will have to be negotiated and new buildings constructed. Pending receipt of instructions, the completion of the unfinished buildings has been suspended. I should be glad of instruction at as early a date as possible.”

Mr. Smart adds that negotiations for the leases should be opened as soon as possible, as there will probably be considerable difficulty regarding their renewal.

My own view is that it is somewhat early to talk of winter quarters for the cavalry. While, unfortunately, not feeling justified at present in giving any assurances, I sincerely hope that before next winter the Persian Government may have accorded the reparation demanded on account of the attack on Smart, and that there may have been a sufficient improvement in the general situation to permit of His Majesty’s Government’s withdrawing the supplementary consular escorts.

No. 87.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 6, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

Information has reached the Persian Government that the rebels have defeated the Government forces commanded by Farman Farma at a place about 28 miles from Hamadan. The Government forces had previously gained the victory in a skirmish with an advance guard of Salar’s army outside Hamadan, some three days ago. The latest news is that Farman Farma has sent for reinforcements. He is still fighting, though he has only 150 men with him.

Yeprim Khan is to be sent from here, and a force of about 700 Bakhtiaris have been instructed to move from Zenjam to Farman Farma’s assistance. The rebels seem to be the detachment led by Mujallal-es-Sultaneh (see my telegram of the 1st May).

No. 88.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 6, 1912.

KERMAN.

My telegram of the 2nd May.

At the request of the representative of the Parsees here, I am instructing His Majesty’s consul at Kerman to extend such protection to the Parsees at that place as he properly can.

According to news received from Parsee sources to-day the situation there is critical; the rebels are said to be at the gates of the town and the governor to have no means of preventing their entry.

Letters incriminating the governor have, I am officially informed, been published, and the Minister of the Interior has sent telegrams both to him and to the rebels informing them that a special commissioner has been appointed to enquire into the trouble, and ordering the rebels not to enter the town but to await the arrival of the commissioner.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 7, 1912.

LOAN to Persian Government.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that loan should be made by Russian Bank at Tehran or by the Imperial Bank of Persia and by the banks participating in the "Société d'Études" of the Trans-Persian Railway scheme. Persian Government should also be required to guarantee to these banks, in quite general terms, the concession for the construction of that railway.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks, moreover, that so signal a service rendered to the Persian Government would justify England and Russia in stipulating for certain advantages which would ensure to them a favourable solution of certain long outstanding questions.

To give an example, Minister for Foreign Affairs mentions among the questions which concern Russian interests (1) the right for Russian subjects to acquire real estate in Persia and to accept it as security for loans; (2) the improvement of the judicial procedure and of the execution of judicial decrees. I should be glad of your observations on these suggestions.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that the study of all the conditions of the loan might be entrusted to you and your Russian colleague, subject to the approval of the two Governments.

You are authorised to discuss question with your Russian colleague.

No. 90.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 8, 1912.

IMPERIAL Bank of Persia are pressing for instructions as to manner in which His Majesty's Government desire that their share of joint advance should be repaid, and for a definition of term "surplus receipts." See legation telegrams of 14th and 29th April.

No. 91.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Crewe, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* regarding the possible need of finding proper accommodation for His Majesty's forces at Shiraz next winter.

Lord Crewe will remember that on the 2nd April† Sir G. Barclay (at that time His Majesty's Minister at Tehran) was instructed to inform the Persian Government that, if the tribal chiefs and headmen showed a friendly feeling and peaceful attitude for at least two months and no more road outrages occurred, the withdrawal of the cavalry from Shiraz and Ispahan would follow.

It is thus not impossible that the cavalry at present stationed at those places may be able to be withdrawn in June (or at any rate before the winter sets in), and Sir E. Grey is therefore of opinion, while fully appreciating the drawback of deferring action too long, that it would be advisable to take no action until it is seen how the situation develops in Southern Persia.

I am to enquire whether his Lordship concurs in the proposal to inform Sir W. Townley accordingly.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 86.

† See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 337.

No. 92.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 9, 1912.

SITUATION at Kerman.

Colonel Haig telegraphs as follows, dated yesterday :—

“Amir Azam has decided to escape from Kerman. I have done my utmost to prevent him taking this step, and had even promised to support him by my presence in the citadel. He will leave the town to-morrow morning and move into camp. The rebels will probably make their appearance the following day. Should it be found necessary to move the Europeans to the consulate this will be done to-morrow. The bank are moving in their treasury this evening. The gardens round the consulate are owned by khans who are friendly disposed and who will hold them against the rebels. I believe that Turks, Hindoos, and Parsees intend to take bast here, so that, except for a certain amount of inconvenience, we are hardly likely to suffer anything.

“Things may possibly settle down quietly when the Amir Azam has left, but I feel obliged to take the necessary precautions in view of the fact that the rebels are led by a lunatic, and that many of their officers and rank and file are robbers.”

No. 93.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 9, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 6th May.

According to the latest official information Mujallal-es-Sultan's force completely routed Farman Farma and captured all his artillery and ammunition, including three Schneider field guns, from which, however, Farman Farma is reported to have been able to remove the breech blocks in time. About 500 fedais have moved to his assistance from Sultanabad, and have reached Hamadan on their way to the small village outside Hamadan where Farman Farma is awaiting reinforcements. Owing to conflicting orders issued to the fedais by the Armenian Central Committee and to seditious advice sent to them by exiled democrats they are said to be somewhat disaffected. Some 700 Bakhtiaris have been ordered to leave Zenjan for Hamadan. The entire force will be commanded by Yeprim Khan, who left Tehran yesterday. His arrival will probably inspire confidence and cohesion among the fedais.

No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 9, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 8th May: Joint advance.

Is there enough left after paying the service of the loans and quasi-fixed charges for interest and amortisation of the recent advance of 100,000L.?

No. 95.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 10, 1912.

MY telegram of 29th April.

Following from consul at Mohammerah, 9th May :—

“Sheikh advanced on Shuster, and Bakhtiaris evacuated town.”

No. 96.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, May 12, 1912.***SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.**

My telegram of the 9th May.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, dated the 8th May, and dispatched from Hamadan the 11th May:—

"I have the honour to report that Salar returned on the 3rd instant to Kermanshah. Except for 200 Kalhurs he has not been joined by any of the local tribes; his forces now number less than 1,000, half of which hold Bisitun. The Prince says that in order to avoid injury to non-combatants he would like to arrange with the Persian Government to fight outside Hamadan—say, 12 miles or so from the town. He would accept such an arrangement. Otherwise he says that if foreign goods are damaged he will not be responsible. He begs me to telegraph to ask the legation to advise the Persian Government in this sense."

My latest information is that the Government forces are assembling at Hamadan. They will presumably march out to meet Salar as soon as it is considered that they are strong enough to do so.

No. 97.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 13, 1912.

IN view of the situation at Hamadan the Regent's departure for Europe has been postponed for a fortnight. It is thought that a decisive engagement between Salar and the Government forces will take place in a few days' time at Hamadan.

No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 12th May: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

You should instruct His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah seriously to warn Salar that he must restrain his followers from damaging foreign goods and endangering foreign lives.

No. 99.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

Sir,

India Office, May 13, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 8th instant, regarding the possible need of finding suitable accommodation for His Majesty's forces at Shiraz next winter, and to say that he concurs in the instructions which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proposes to send to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.

But as it is important that the troops should not remain there longer than the situation requires, and, on the other hand, that they should not be exposed while there to unnecessary hardships, the Marquess of Crewe would suggest that Sir W. Townley might ascertain at once from Colonel Douglas what is the date beyond which a decision cannot be postponed, and then apply all possible pressure upon the Persian Government to get the necessary measures of pacification carried out by that date. It might move the Persian Government to promptitude if they were informed that delay would necessarily involve the retention of the British force throughout the winter.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

No. 100.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 9th May.

In statistics received from acting treasurer-general, he placed the charges on southern customs at—

1. Service of loans, 4,400,000 krans (= 88,000*l.*);
2. Fixed charges, 2,500,000 (= 50,000*l.*);

while receipts are estimated at 8,000,000 (= 160,000*l.*).

This leaves a balance of 1,100,000 krans, or 20,000*l.* Treasurer-general's figures are inaccurate, and I calculate that a further 10,000*l.* will be required when sinking fund of the Anglo-Indian loan comes into operation again next year.

The question of fixed charges will have to be examined and put on a proper basis in the course of negotiations for big loan, but I think that it would be premature and inconvenient to do so now.

Under present system bank retains per month from southern customs a proportion of all sums for annual service of the existing loans.

Would it not be sufficient for bank to be instructed to retain, and remit to His Majesty's Government monthly, a sufficient additional sum to pay the interest of the advance, and to suspend the employment of the surplus receipts for repayment of the advance for twelve months, *i.e.*, until 28th March next? If no loan has been concluded question can be reconsidered.

Position of the Russian advance is different, as fixed charges have priority, according to Russian Bank's convention, over service of consolidated debt, while the surplus receipts are only paid over half-yearly to Persian Government.

Question whether Russian Government will forgo immediate repayment of their share of the advance will thus only come up on 14th July, when there will be an available surplus of about 80,000*l.*

No. 101.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 16, 1912.

SITUATION at Bunder Abbas.

In consequence of internal dissensions at Bunder Abbas the town is being threatened by a well-known brigand anxious to take advantage of the situation; he has a following of about 400 men. His Majesty's ships "Perseus" and "Alert" are on the spot, but the situation has become so grave that the resident at Bushire has urged the Government of India to dispatch 150 sepoy's from Jask; these will co-operate with landing parties from the ships.

The causes of the situation are somewhat obscure. I have made repeated representations to the Persian Government with a view to putting an end to the troubles, but up to the present all my representations have been unavailing.

No. 102.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 17, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.

Senior naval officer reported 16th May that, in view of situation at Bunder Abbas, he was landing 110 men from ships for protection of British lives and property. Resident at Bushire, with concurrence of the Government of India, has asked admiral to dispatch to Bunder Abbas as many men from Jask as can be spared.

No. 103.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 17, 1912.

MY telegram of the 9th May.

There was a change for the worse in the situation at Kerman yesterday. The near approach of the rebels terrified the governor to such an extent that he left Government house and took bast at His Majesty's consulate.

On the receipt yesterday of some suggestions made by Colonel Haig with a view to easing the situation, I made representations to the Minister of the Interior, who received them in such an unsatisfactory manner that I thought it well to lay the whole matter before the Regent.

His Highness expressed concern, and undertook to back up any vigorous steps which I might take on behalf of the Governor of Kerman. I therefore instructed Mr. Churchill to go at once to see the Minister of the Interior and to insist on an immediate warning being telegraphed to the rebels of such a nature as would ensure the safety of Kerman, and to demand the fulfilment of the remedial measures proposed by His Majesty's consul. The Minister of the Interior showed some slight hesitation, but eventually complied.

I visited the telegraph office in the middle of the night and had a long conversation over the wire with the consul and the governor. I was able to induce the latter to leave the consulate and to resume his duties at Government house.

No. 104.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, May 17, 1912.

PLEASE refer to my telegram of the 4th instant.

I was informed yesterday by M. Sazonof that he had abandoned idea of advance to Persian Government being made through Paris banks, and had reverted to that of advance being made by Russian Bank in Tehran. The new proposal, however, which he had submitted to the Minister of Finance was to the effect that the Persian Government should be simply allowed to overdraw its account with the Banque d'Escompte to a fixed amount.

No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 6th May.

British troops cannot be withdrawn from Shiraz until the first condition mentioned in my telegram of the 2nd April* has been fulfilled. You can impress this on Persian Government. We are anxious to withdraw the troops when possible.

You should, meanwhile, explain the situation to Colonel Douglas, and instruct him to report by what date, at the very latest, a decision must be taken as to providing accommodation for the cavalry.

No. 106.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 18, 1912.

MY telegram of 17th May: Threatened raid on Bunder Abbas.

Following from Cox, Muscat:—

"Senior naval officer reported 17th May that landing of troops has discouraged raiders, who according to reports received have moved off with no intention of returning. If this is confirmed he proposes to re-embark on ships landing parties forthwith, leaving extra consular guard for a few days."

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 337.

No. 107.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 18, 1912.

SITUATION at Kerman.

My telegram of the 17th May.

According to the latest information received from Kerman the rebels have cut the telegraph wires to Tehran and India; it was feared that an attack would be made last night by the rebels on the town and consulate.

It is true that Colonel Haig has reported that one of the rebel leaders is a lunatic, but I can scarcely believe that the news of an imminent attack on the consulate can be correct. I am making further energetic representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

No. 108.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 18, 1912.

BAKHTIARI road.

I am informed by Messrs. Lynch's agent here that in view of the absence of sufficient protection his firm have suspended their transport service on the Bakhtiari road, and also the work of repairing the Godar bridge.

I shall make representations to the Bakhtiari chiefs in Tehran on the subject.

No. 109.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 18, 1912.

SITUATION at Kerman.

My telegram of to-day.

I was assured this afternoon by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Government, having taken action suggested by me after consultation with consul, will carry it through loyally.

Telegraphic communication with Kerman has now been re-established via India. No fighting has occurred so far, but the town is practically besieged. Governor, however, seems to be holding his own, and should be much strengthened by telegrams from the Government, which will now get through.

No. 110.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 19, 1912.

BAKHTIARI road.

My telegram of 18th May.

I was assured yesterday by the Bakhtiari khans that all possible steps had been and would be taken to secure safety on the road at the more dangerous season; they said there was no fear of disorders on the road for another two months.

It appears that Sardar Ashjaa is coming to Tehran; it is he whom Lynch's agent especially complains of. Yussuf Khan has been appointed to see to the security of the road. I am assured that another khan will be sent to take his place should he be found incapable of doing so.

No. 111.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 20, 1912.

MY telegram of 18th May.

Following received from Cox, Muscat, to-day :—

“Consul at Bunder Abbas reports troops re-embarked 19th May; war-ships leaving.”

No. 112.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 14th May: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I am informed by reliable authority at Hamadan that Yeprim Khan completely routed rebels under Mujallal-es-Sultan yesterday.

Unfortunately Yeprim was murdered after the battle was over.

No. 113.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 21, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.

I now learn that Yeprim fell shot through the head fighting bravely, and was not murdered, as I reported in my telegram of yesterday. Some confusion was at first caused in the ranks of the Government forces by his death, but they eventually rallied and continued the fight for a couple of hours, driving the rebel forces in front of them. Their forward movement has been continued, and it is hoped that the enemy may be completely routed.

The fact that Yeprim was the only reliable general whom the Persian Government possessed alone makes his death a serious event, but when it is remembered that it was he who maintained order in Tehran during the past two years under very difficult circumstances his disappearance is still more unfortunate.

No. 114.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 22, 1912.

MY telegram of 17th May.

Consul at Kerman reports situation much improved, and thinks hostile movement may now be considered at end. He has shown great courage, determination, and tact at trying moment. I consider that his attitude has done much to protect British interests, whilst assisting governor to maintain prestige and authority of Persian Government, and is worthy of warm approval.

No. 115.

Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, May 22, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he recently received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the effect that your firm had suspended work on the Godar bridge and also your transport service on the Lynch road through the Bakhtiari country owing to adequate protection not being forth-

coming. Sir W. Townley added that he was making representations to the khans in Tehran.

As a result of his representations, Sir W. Townley was assured by the Bakhtiari khans on the 18th instant that no disorder on the road need be apprehended for two months more, and that they were taking and would take all possible measures to ensure the safety of the road at the more dangerous season.

Your agent had complained especially of Sardar Ashjaa, who, the khans stated, was coming to Tehran; and they also promised that if Yussuf Khan were incapable of looking after the road—to which task he has been appointed—they would appoint someone else for the duty.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 116.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 30, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir G. Barclay's despatch of the 14th February, 1912,* I have the honour to report that I have received from Colonel Hjalmarson a scheme showing certain changes in the organisation of the Government 'gendarmarie, whereby the Tehran and Kazvin commands take the place of the Tehran, Ghilan, and Khamseh battalions.

The scheme is provisional, as, under the new organisation, the estimate for the first twelve months amounts to 1,697,490 krans (33,949*l.*), as compared with 1,343,935 krans (26,878*l.*) under the old, an increase of 353,555 krans (approximately 7,071*l.*).

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 117.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from the acting British consul at Shiraz, reporting the defeat of Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 117.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, May 9, 1912.

ASKER KHAN and other Arab and Baseri chiefs entered town 18th April with only personal following, expressing their unwillingness to help Kawam owing to their dissatisfaction with Nasr-ed-Dowleh's administration of Khamseh tribes, especially in connection with killing of Reza Kuli Khan. Kawam conciliated them by promising to assume himself governorship of Khamseh tribes. Arab, Baseri and Kavar riflemen came in later, and under chiefs, with few serbaz, Shiraz Government sowars and one mountain gun, occupied heights above Karabagh. 28rd April ilkhani, with force of probably 1,000 Kashgai riflemen under principal chiefs, marched against Soulet, then at Mishau. 25th April outposts came into collision, Soulet's getting worst of skirmish. Kashgais showed utmost reluctance to shed one another's blood, and two forces sat for long time *farsakh* apart while Soulet treated for peace. 30th April Karabagh force joined ilkhani, and in subsequent battle Kashgais and Arabs fought side by side against Soulet.

Before dawn 2nd May Darashulis, having deceived ilkhani with promise of

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 152.

submission, began to move northwards, and when close to ilkhani's position delivered treacherous attack, which was repulsed after fighting lasting till sunset. Casualties difficult to ascertain, probably about thirty killed, larger proportion being Soulet's. Ilkhani was in fighting line and received insignificant skin wound in forehead from bullet.

After this Soulet's following began to desert until he was so weakened that Khamseh urged general attack, but Kashkulis refused on ground that many of their kinsmen in Soulet's camp would be killed. On night of 6th-7th May Soulet, with Darashuli chief responsible for treachery of 2nd May, disappeared with small body of horsemen. Ilkhani states that he has gone to Firuzabad, and Mohammed Beg Kashkuli is pursuing him with 400 sowars. They left their wives and children behind. Ilkhani reports remaining tribes have come in to him, and that Soulet's wife and children are with ilkhani.

No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 22nd May: Kerman.

Please convey to His Majesty's consul at Kerman my high appreciation of his successful handling of a very difficult situation.

His action throughout has my entire approval.

No. 119.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 24, 1912.

REGENT'S departure on leave.

At an audience which we sought with the Regent yesterday afternoon, my Russian colleague and I persuaded His Highness not to leave on the 28th May, as he had intended to do, but to postpone his departure for three weeks, or until the situation might assume a more settled outlook.

The Government troops are reported to be steadily driving back the forces of Salar-ed-Dowleh, but now that Yeprim is dead there is little confidence in the Government commanders, whose military worth is unknown. Until, therefore, a final defeat has been inflicted on the Prince, there must be no little anxiety as to the result of the campaign.

Before the Regent leaves Persia he should also settle a Cabinet crisis with which we are threatened at the present moment.

His Highness was very reluctant to accept our advice, but ultimately agreed to postpone his departure.

No. 120.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 17th May.

I have received the following telegram, dated yesterday, from acting British consul at Shiraz:—

“Douglas asks me to send the following message:—

“Matter of leases can, in Smart's opinion, now be arranged; if, therefore, definite instructions reach me in time to enable me to begin work early in August I shall be able to manage. Plans and estimates can in the meantime be prepared.”

“We ought, if possible, to commence negotiations at the beginning of July for the renewal of leases with supplementary conditions authorising construction.”

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 25, 1912.

TREASURER-GENERAL.

The acting treasurer-general has presented to the Cabinet a proposal for his confirmation in office and for the definition of his executive powers. The following is the text of the proposal :—

“Vu la nécessité de nommer un titulaire au poste vacant de trésorier général ;

“Sur la proposition du Conseil des Ministres ;

“Nous décrétons :

“1. M. Jacques-Joseph Mornard, Administrateur général des Douanes, est nommé trésorier général de l'Empire.

“2. M. Mornard est chargé en sa nouvelle qualité des attributions prévues par la loi du 23 Djaouza Tangouz-il, qu'il exercera sous l'autorité du Ministre des Finances conformément à la loi et aux règlements administratifs élaborés par le trésorier général de concert avec le Ministre des Finances et sanctionnés par le Conseil des Ministres.

“3. Le trésorier général a la direction supérieure des divers services ressortissant au Ministère des Finances, y compris le service des douanes, services dont la plupart seront réorganisés d'urgence par M. Mornard.

“4. Le trésorier général doit veiller spécialement à ce que les obligations financières contractées par le Gouvernement vis-à-vis des établissements ou des sujets étrangers soient ponctuellement remplies. A cet effet, il a pleins pouvoirs de prendre, en temps opportun, les mesures nécessaires afin d'éviter des retards dans le payement des intérêts, amortissements ou remboursements de dettes gouvernementales, ainsi que des traitements, subsides, indemnités ou allocations quelconques légalement accordés par le Gouvernement.

“5. La durée du mandat confié à M. Mornard sera déterminée par un contrat bilatéral, qui fixera également le montant de ses appointements.”*

M. Mornard elaborated the above programme in concert with the Russian Minister and myself. He clearly understands that it is subject to the approval of our respective Governments and alteration by them if necessary.

It will be noticed that the programme is based on the law of the 23rd June, 1911, passed by the late Medjliss, and that care has been taken to associate, nominally, at any rate, the Minister of Finance and the Cabinet with the treasurer-general.

Article 4 is so framed as to place in the hands of the treasurer-general entire control of all sources of revenue devoted to the service of foreign loans.

As Persian Ministers strongly dislike the idea of any curtailment of their financial prerogatives, the measure will probably encounter considerable opposition.

In reply to a direct question which we put to the Regent two days ago, His Highness replied that neither he nor the Government had anyone to propose in the place of M. Mornard.

I know of no better candidate ; an important point in his favour is that he understands the Persians.

* TRANSLATION.—“Having regard to the necessity of making a definite appointment to the vacant post of treasurer-general ;

“On the proposal of the Council of Ministers ;

“We decree :

“1. M. Jacques-Joseph Mornard, administrator-general of the Customs, is appointed treasurer-general of the Empire.

“2. M. Mornard is invested, in his new capacity, with the functions provided by the law of 23 Djoza Tangouz-il, which he shall exercise under the authority of the Minister of Finance, in accordance with the law and with the administrative regulations drawn up by the treasurer-general in concert with the Minister of Finance, and sanctioned by the Council of Ministers.

“3. The treasurer-general shall superintend the various services for which the Ministry of Finance is responsible, including the Customs service. The greater part of these services shall be reorganised with all dispatch by M. Mornard.

“4. The treasurer-general shall make it his special duty to ensure that the financial obligations contracted by the Government with foreign establishments or subjects are punctually fulfilled. With this object, he has full power to take, at the proper time, the necessary steps to avoid delay in the payment of the interest, amortisation, or repayments of Government debts, and of salaries, subsidies, indemnities, or allowances of any kind lawfully granted by the Government.

“5. The duration of the appointment conferred on M. Mornard shall be determined by a bilateral contract, which shall also fix the amount of his emoluments.”

No. 122.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.-- (Received May 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 27, 1912.

MY telegram of the 21st May.

Reports announcing the capture of Mujallal-es-Sultan and death of Salar-ed-Dowleh have reached the Government. I do not think that much credence can be given to these rumours, but it appears clear that the Government forces have in general been successful, and that they are marching on Kermanshah.

The latest information received here states that the townspeople of Senna have routed a detachment which had been sent to occupy that town, but for the present nothing reliable is known.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 24th May: Regent.

If your Russian colleague receives similar instructions, you may inform the Regent that I have learnt with much satisfaction of his Highness's decision to remain at present at Tehran, where his presence is indispensable at the present juncture.

No. 124.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.-- (Received May 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 28, 1912.

KERMAN.

Your telegram of the 23rd May.

The latest news from Kerman is that the Governor-General attacked the rebels on the 26th, defeated and dispersed them.

No. 125.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.-- (Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, herewith, copies of despatches which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah upon the subject of the communication he made, under instructions from the legation and in conjunction with his Russian colleague, to Salar-ed-Dowleh, advising him to retire from Persian territory.

As you will remember, Sir, it was agreed between my predecessor and the Russian Minister here that the fact of the above-mentioned communication having been made by the two consuls should be made public by each of them. You will observe from a perusal of Mr. McDouall's despatch of the 15th ultimo that this arrangement was not carried out by his Russian colleague, and that the British Consulate has thereby incurred some animus among Salar-ed-Dowleh's partisans, and that the Russian consul has stated that he received no instructions to act in this sense. I have called M. Poklewsky's attention to this omission on the part of the Russian consul, and he has assured me that he must have misunderstood his instructions, and that he would write to him on the subject.

The situation of Salar-ed-Dowleh has throughout the last few weeks been extremely obscure, as the means of communication between Kermanshah and Tehran have been practically interrupted. Neither this legation nor the Russian Minister, nor the Persian Government has been in possession of any trustworthy information as to the number of his following, the importance of the adherents he has managed to collect, and the strength of the force he is likely to be able to put in the field. From rumours received he has been reported to have been first with Daoud Khan, and then with the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, whilst at another moment he was said to be marching on Dizful against

the Bakhtiaris, having made an alliance with the Sheikh of Mohammerah and with the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh.

From latest advices he would appear to have been unsuccessful in his endeavours to secure the co-operation of powerful chieftains and to have returned to Kermanshah at the head of a force variously estimated at from 1,000 to 2,000 men, mostly Kurds who are unlikely to follow him far, and that the tribes are not with him. It is possible that the publication of the action taken by His Majesty's consul may have had a deterrent effect upon certain of the chiefs, as would appear from Mr. McDouall's report of events.

I have received a somewhat bombastic message from Salar-ed-Dowleh sent through Mr. McDouall under date of the 8th May, asking me to advise the Persian Government to send their army to meet him outside Hamadan, as he would be unable to guarantee the life and property of the inhabitants of the city if the battle took place nearer to it, or within its walls. My Russian colleague has received no communication in this sense, and I have merely repeated it to the Regent in the course of a social visit as a good joke, showing that Salar has still some sense of humour left or has lost none of the overweening conceit that has caused him to proclaim himself Shah on more than one occasion.

The above-mentioned telegram was dispatched before Salar-ed-Dowleh could have received news of the engagement some thirty miles outside Hamadan between Farman Farma and Mujallal-es-Sultan, as reported in my telegram of the 9th instant, which resulted in the discomfiture of the Government troops, and in the loss of three Schneider field guns and some mountain batteries with all their ammunition. It is officially stated that the breach-blocks of the guns were removed before they were abandoned, and accounts vary as to the strength of the forces engaged. The advantage has not been pushed by the enemy, who have allowed Farman Farma to recover from his defeat, and have given time for reinforcements to come up from the Sultanabad and Zenjan.

There is some doubt as to how the former troops who are Armenian fedais under Kerri Khan may behave, as there is known to be disaffection in their ranks. Their trusted leader Yeprim Khan has now joined them, and there is reason to believe that he may, by the force of his personality, and the prestige of his previous victories, induce them to fight loyally. The other reinforcements that have reached Hamadan are Bakhtiaris. Yeprim Khan will presumably command the Government forces which will probably have engaged Salar-ed-Dowleh before you receive this despatch.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 125.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, April 6, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that your telegram dated the 30th March through the Bank, Hamadan, reached me on the afternoon of the 5th April. I at once called on my Russian colleague and arranged to visit Salar-ed-Dowleh the next morning. On arrival we read him a translation of the first part of the communication. He replied that he was much obliged as his hands had been tied out of respect to the legations as they were acting as mediatories, now he would proclaim himself Shah and take steps to notify the Powers of his accession. We then gave the last part of the communication. He said that he had not come to Persia to get a pension, but as a Persian his heart was moved by the affliction of his country in the hands of a boy King, an incapable Regent, and Ministers whose only aim was to fill their own pockets. I told him that he should consider carefully before finally refusing when two Powers such as Britain and Russia were united in making a demand no Great Power even would lightly refuse. My Russian colleague also urged him to consider as a refusal was very serious. He replied that the two Powers were not so unjust as to attack him themselves, and even then he would have the support of the entire Mahometan world, some 400,000,000 people. All he asked was that the legations should compare the state of the provinces in his occupation with that of Tehran and other places in Persia. I mentioned that trade in Kermanshah was at a standstill since his arrival, he refused to admit this and said the road was safe. We pointed out that his tribesmen could not withstand a proper army which was now to come against him. He said the sooner they came the better, that the matter might be settled. After further urging him to accept without effect we left.

The fact is that he is so carried away by dreams of future greatness that it is impossible to convince him of the reality of his position.

I have sent Mr. Soane a copy of the telegram to make known to any of the Khans he is in communication with, and communicating to various men locally.

It is said in the town that the communication made by the two consuls yesterday was due to the action of the British Minister and consul only. My munshi warns me that Salar-ed-Dowleh's men believing that we are their enemies might try to injure the consulate or British subjects. Personally I hardly think it likely but it is possible, if there is any delay in the re-establishment of a Government here.

Salar-ed-Dowleh is going to Harunabad, the headquarters of Daoud Khan, to interview the local chiefs and arrange their quarrels.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 125.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, April 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions in Sir G. Barclay's telegram through the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, Hamadan, I have taken steps to make known the communication made to Salar-ed-Dowleh on behalf of the legations. My Russian colleague states that he has no orders to publish this.

I first informed Samsam-el-Mamalek, the chief of the Sinjabi tribe. He said that his son Ali Akbar had formed a combination against Daoud Khan Kalhur but was now holding his hand as Daoud was Salar-ed-Dowleh's most trusted supporter and he was not strong enough to oppose Salar-ed-Dowleh if he supported Daoud. If a man of such rank as Farman Farma arrived in Kermanshah with even 500 men and two guns his presence would be sufficient and the combination would deal effectively with Daoud. Such action must be at once or the tribes would be obliged to join, or at least to send small contingents to Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I informed Aga Mohammed Mehdi Mujtehed, who at once left for his village, and no mujtehed of any importance except Aga Rahim is now in evidence.

On the 8th I sent a messenger to Pusht-i-Kuh to the vali with a copy of the communication and also sent by post to Mr. Vice-Consul Soane at Kasr, for publication.

I sent for the ilkhani, son of late Farukh Khan, head of the Hajizadeh branch of the Kalhur in the town and *de jure* Ilkhani of Kalhur. I told him that as he had rendered some service in protecting British subjects when the town was plundered, I wished him to know what had been communicated to Salar-ed-Dowleh and to Mujallal-es-Sultan that he might consider his position. He said his position was different from that of others as he was a townsman and had rights and estates in the country now usurped by Daoud Khan. His first object was the protection of the town. He considered that there was no immediate necessity to change his course of action but in say a month's time when Farman Farma was really advancing he would know what to do.

On the 13th about 100 of the Prince's adherents met at the house of Aga Rahim. The principals being Ilkhani, Salar Mozaffir and Meshedi Hassan, brother of the late Muin-er-Raya. Aga Rahim said he was afraid at the news which emanated from the British consulate and thought of leaving, the others said there was nothing from the Russian consulate and all that was clear was that the British were enemies of Salar-ed-Dowleh. Aga Rahim suggested writing to Tehran saying that they were poor inoffensive people and submitted to anyone who came with a force, and to ask for an amnesty. The others refused. They finally drew up and dispatched a letter to Salar-ed-Dowleh that from the time he left the British consulate had spread stories that Mohammed Ali has left and that Salar-ed-Dowleh must leave, and that the Government in Tehran is powerful, that it is imperative that he get, in any way, the vali to join him and that he return at once to Kermanshah with the vali's forces or he will lose the town. If the vali is not with him and he can do nothing he must inform them that they may provide for their safety.

The fact that the Russian consul says nothing and that the Turkish consul is at the Prince's services makes the populace believe that only the British are the Prince's enemies and should he return in force he may make it unpleasant for British subjects.

Salar-ed-Dowleh has no loyal friends, those who join him do it out of policy or fear, some again for the sake of plunder, others because they are too much committed to him and some, even if they obtained Government pardon, know that they would be murdered for the part that they have taken in ill-treating the townsmen. Prompt action on the part of the Government is all that is required to prevent him raising another army. The story is assiduously spread that there is no force in Tehran, that none has left for Hamadan, and that the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh and the Sheikh of Mohammerah are advancing to join Salar-ed-Dowleh.

There is no reliable news from Ghilan (Kalhur country) where Salar-ed-Dowleh now is. He is said to have been joined by Nizam-es-Sultaneh and he has written to prepare quarters for the Pusht-i-Kuh sowars; but that is very likely one of the stories he is in the habit of circulating to encourage his adherents. On the other hand there is a rumour that the vali has refused to join him, and the latest definite news of the vali was that he was on a hunting expedition.

The situation appears to depend on the vali, and he, like Sardar Akram, is known to be offended at the honours heaped on Daoud Khan, a man of no birth.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

No. 126.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending May 14, 1912.

Tehran.

His Majesty's Minister.—Sir Walter Townley arrived at Tehran on the 18th April, and presented his credentials to the Shah on the 20th.

Political Arrests.—At the end of April a number of political arrests were made, including Sardar Mohy and his two brothers (Kerim Khan and Amid-es-Sultan), Yamin-i-Nizam, Naser-ul-Islam, Suleiman Mirza (the leader of the democratic party), Montasser-es-Sultan, Seyyid Jelil Ardebili, and Wahid-ul-Mulk. In all, about twenty persons were arrested and expelled from Tehran. Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab was at the same time given his passport.

Elections to the Medjliss.—Early in May a decree signed by the Regent and dated the 30th April was published. It referred to the Regent's intention to proceed on a journey to Europe and to the necessity of proceeding as soon as possible with the elections for a new Medjliss. A translation of this document is enclosed in a separate despatch.

Operations against Salar-ed-Dowleh.—On the 6th May news reached Tehran of the defeat of Farman Farma's force by that of Mujallal-es-Sultan. The following day Yeprim Khan left Tehran for Hamadan to lead the Armenian volunteers. The Armenian confederation at Tehran has in the meantime raised objections to the employment of the Armenian volunteers in the service of the Persian Government on the ground that the constitution appears to be in abeyance. Negotiations are still in progress on this subject between the leaders of the confederation and the Government.

The Regent.—The Regent, who had decided to leave Tehran on the 14th May, has put off his departure for a fortnight. On the 11th and 12th May His Highness received the various diplomatic missions to say farewell.

Tabriz.

There has been no change in the situation in Tabriz during the past four weeks.

His Majesty's vice-consul reported on the 15th April that the Russian force in Tabriz had been increased by 500 men and that 1,400 Russian infantry had crossed the frontier for Khoi.

Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Talish.

The provinces of Ghilan and Mazanderan have remained quiet, but in Talish there has been some fighting between the natives and the Russian troops, owing to the former having refused to accept as governor the nominee of the Russian consul-general at Resht.

The Russian troops were withdrawn from Talish to Astara early in May, after having restored order in half the district. The Russian authorities have not yet decided whether or not to send a second expedition to complete the pacification of the district.

The prospective governor, who accompanied the Russian troops to Astara, has now returned to the quiet district.

On the 25th April 200 Cossacks arrived from Russia and 400 infantry from Kazvin. The infantry left the same day for Baku.

Ispahan.

Owing to the continued rise in the price of food-stuffs, the distress among the poorer classes is reported to be greater now than it was during the winter months.

There has been little or no improvement in the insecurity in the province. On the 18th April Major Petersen, one of the Swedish officers with the Government gendarmerie, returning from Shiraz to Tehran with a small party, was fired on at Murchikhurt, some 20 miles north of Ispahan, and one of his gendarmes, who was in search of fodder, was captured by the tribesmen. Major Petersen managed to escape with the remainder of his party, and the captured gendarme was released on the following day.

Sardar-i-Zaffar, the Governor-General, has continued in his opposition to Mr. Haycock, the agent to the treasurer-general. On the 17th April a meeting took place between them with a view to coming to an understanding, but the proposals put forward by his Excellency were so extravagant that they are not likely to be accepted by the Central Government.

Yezd.

An agitation, instigated by the clergy and certain notables of Yezd and Ardistan, is on foot against Shahab-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General.

On the 7th May a body of 400 Arab tribesmen was reported to be advancing on Yezd from the south-west, and another force, consisting of about 150 Baharlus, was reported to have captured the hamlet of Shahr-i-Babek, 100 miles south of Yezd.

Shiraz.

A deputation of Arab chiefs entered Shiraz on the 18th April to express their dissatisfaction with Nasr-ed-Dowleh's administration of the Kamsseh tribes, especially in connection with the killing of Reza Kuli Khan (*vide* summary for last month). Kawam, Nasr-ed-Dowleh's father, conciliated them by promising to take over the administration of the Kamsseh tribes himself.

On the 23rd April the ilkhani left Shiraz with some 1,000 Kashgais to march against Soulet-ed-Dowleh, his brother, the former ilkhani of the Kashgais. On the 30th April a force of Arab tribesmen joined him, and on the 6th May, with his combined force of Kashgais and Arabs, he attacked and dispersed Soulet's following. Soulet-ed-Dowleh fled to the hills with a few of his adherents, followed up by Mohammed Beg, a Kashkuli chief, with 400 men.

Kerman.

Early in April Amir-i-Azam, the governor, who apparently had received no funds since his arrival in Kerman, sent Mirza Hussain Khan, his chief of police, into the district with an armed force to collect revenue.

On the 22nd April news reached Kerman that Mirza Hussain Khan, together with

Rifaat-i-Nizam, the Governor of Bam, and certain local khans, was marching on Kerman with the object of plundering the town and expelling the governor.

As the governor was receiving no support from the Central Government, chiefly owing to the intrigues of Sardar Nasrat, and as most of his troops had deserted owing to want of pay, he was with difficulty restrained from abandoning the town to its fate.

However, on representations being made by His Majesty's Minister, the Central Government telegraphed to Amir-i-Azam and to the rebels, saying that a special commissioner would be sent to enquire into the causes of dissatisfaction, and warning the rebels against entering the town.

On the 11th May the rebel force encamped some two marches from Kerman, and on the following day, at the request of the governor, His Majesty's consul addressed an assembly of the leading men of the city, and pointed out to them the grave responsibility they would incur if they allowed the rebels to enter the town.

At the time of writing pourparlers are in progress between the governor and the rebels, and the situation appears to be hopeful.

Kermanshah.

Farman Farma arrived at Hamadan on the 5th April, and on the 3rd May advanced against Mujallal-es-Sultan. The opposing forces met on the 5th May, when the Government troops were defeated and compelled to fall back on Hamadan.

Yeprim arrived in Hamadan on the 11th May with 200 men, and will join Farman Farma when he again advances.

Further reinforcements for the Government troops are reported to be *en route* for Hamadan.

Salar-ed-Dowleh, after his attempts to enlist the services of the Kalhurs and of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, with what success is not known, returned to Kermanshah with a following of about 600 on the 12th May.

The Sinjabi and other smaller tribes, although not openly breaking with Salar-ed-Dowleh, sent no representatives to meet him when he was at Ghilan.

Bushire.

Owing to the presence of robber bands in the Kazerun valley, the merchants of Shiraz have telegraphed to the Bushire merchants that no merchandise should be forwarded.

Plague has broken out at Ahmedi and in the neighbouring villages half-way between Bushire and Borasjun.

Bunder Abbas.

The deputy governor, who was a refugee in the consulate from the 20th to the 23rd March, again took bast on the 20th April on learning that the "Persepolis" was expected with tofangchis on board, as he feared arrest.

On the 21st April the bazaars were closed, and some 200 merchants and others took refuge in the consulate as a protest against the oppression of the Governor of the Gulf Ports.

On the 11th May the situation was rendered still more unsatisfactory by the arrival of a party of about 200 raiders some 10 miles from the town.

Shuster.

In spite of the fact that Viquar-ul-Mulk, a neutral governor, entered Shuster on the 5th April, and that the Central Government had given orders for an enquiry to be made into the differences between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiaris, the latter occupied Shuster in force on the 1st May.

On receipt of this news the sheikh collected a force of 10,000 men at Ahwaz and advanced on Shuster.

The sheikh's action, together with His Majesty's Minister's representations to the khans to withdraw their forces pending the result of the enquiries about to be conducted, led to the evacuation of the town by the Bakhtiaris on the 9th May.

No. 127.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey, (Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 14, 1912.

THE situation in the neighbourhood of Shuster has been the cause of no small amount of anxiety during the past few weeks. It having been brought to my notice by His Majesty's consular officers at Mohammerah and Ahwaz that the Bakhtiari showed a firm determination to establish themselves at Shuster, to the detriment of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and his adherents, I renewed representations previously made by Sir G. Barclay to the Bakhtiari khans in Tehran, and I warned the Persian Government that a most serious situation might be created were a conflict to break out in Arabistan, which would not only endanger the safety of what is known as the Bakhtiari road, and consequently largely hamper British trade, but might have a most important effect upon the general situation in Persia.

The khans replied that they are the possessors of several villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Shuster, and claimed that they are much more genuinely interested in that district than are the Sheikh of Mohammerah and his Arab followers. At the same time they promised me to send stringent orders to the local khans to refrain from hostilities, and to await the result of an enquiry into the conflicting claims which is being conducted on the spot by His Majesty's consuls at Mohammerah and Ahwaz, who have further had the invaluable assistance of the advice of Sir Percy Cox, who has visited the Karun district lately.

I forwarded a list of the villages claimed by the Sardar Assad and the Minister of War as being in the neighbourhood of Shuster and as belonging to themselves or their dependents to Major Haworth, who has replied that they are all in the Dizful district, except one important group of villages called Akili, which has always been recognised as being near Shuster. Whether or not the orders issued by the Prime Minister, Samsam-es-Sultaneh, and the Sardar Assad arrived too late I am unable to say, but it is clear from the conflicting reports that have reached me that a forward movement was made on Shuster by the Bakhtiaris, and that they occupied the town. It would equally appear evident that they subsequently evacuated the town again, although whether they did so, as is asserted by the khans here and the Persian Government, in consequence of orders received from Tehran, or whether they did so as the result of an aggressive forward movement on the part of the sheikh, as is stated by unofficial informers, I am not in a position to know.

I have been informed by the Regent that most loyal assurances have been received by the Persian Government from the sheikh, who, in complaining of Bakhtiari aggression, has declared his willingness to await a definite settlement of the questions at issue, and has asserted that he has no desire to secure a paramount position in Arabistan at the expense of the Bakhtiaris, and has protested his willingness to co-operate loyally with the Governor of Arabistan, who will, I am promised, proceed to his post without delay. His Highness on the same occasion told me that the Bakhtiari chiefs who occupy such an important position in the Central Government of to-day have sent the most categorical orders to the local khans to refrain from hostilities, and he expressed a confident belief that peace would be preserved. I have been without definite news from the spot for some time, which leads me to indulge in a hope that the danger has been averted for the present, at all events.

Meanwhile news has reached me of threatened hostilities on the road between the Bakhtiaris and the Kuhgeluis, and Messrs. Lynch's agent has been warned to clear all the caravanserais on the road of accumulated merchandise. This information has also been brought to the notice of the Bakhtiari leaders, who have assured me that all necessary precautions for the protection of the road shall be taken.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY,

No. 128.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey, (Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 14, 1912.

AS I had the honour to report to you in my telegram of the 29th ultimo, the Regent told me in the course of a conversation which I had with his Highness on the 28th April that the arrest of certain persons had been found to be necessary,

because it had come to the ears of the Government that a dangerous conspiracy was being prepared which had for its object the overthrow of the existing order of things. Nasr-ul-Mulk added that a particularly unpleasant feature of the movement was the presence of a pronounced spirit of xenophobia, due in no small measure to the religious excitement that had been roused by the bombardment of the sacred shrine of Imami Reza at Meshed. He said it must not be imagined that this unfortunate event had aroused little resentment because there had not been much public display of this feeling, since such was not in fact the case.

A Yazd priest who was the leader of the movement was the first person to suffer. He was arrested and deported to Mazanderan. It was at first stated that the arrest of this one man had sufficed to quell the threatened rising, but his fate was soon that of several other so-called malcontents of various political shades, such as Sardar Mohy and his two brothers, Suleiman Mirza, the leader of the Democratic party, and a good many of the prominent members in the former Medjliss of that party, whilst Wahid-ul-Mulk and Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab were advised to travel in Europe.

There does not appear any good reason to suppose that these members of the Progressive party had been directly implicated in the conspiracy which had led to the earlier arrests, but it would seem clear that the moment was considered a favourable one to pay off old scores and eliminate from the political arena all the leading members of the party which had made itself conspicuous in the former Assembly by its adherence to the Shuster programme and by its uncompromising hostility to Russia.

Beyond the fact that the persons arrested have been deported to various parts of the country they have not suffered personally, and in the case of those who are in need of financial assistance the Government has provided a monthly stipend. It is believed that the majority of them will be allowed to return to Tehran if and when the new Medjliss has assembled, the convocation for the election of which will form the subject of an accompanying despatch.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 129.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a rescript by the Regent, dated the 30th April, in which His Highness calls upon the Ministers to proceed to the election of the members of a new Medjliss in accordance with the requirements of the constitution. The rescript further explains that the elections can, of course, only be partial at the present moment on account of the disturbed state of affairs in many parts of the country, but urges the importance of having elections at Tehran as soon as possible.

The rescript was not made public until several days after it was signed, but on the 1st instant the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me upon the subject, saying that the Government were of opinion that it was desirable to carry out elections as soon as might be convenient and speaking generally in the terms of the rescript. His Excellency added one point of some importance which is not alluded to in the official proclamation, namely, that it is the intention of the Government to proceed to the creation of an Upper Chamber, or Senate, as soon as can be conveniently done after the assembling of the Medjliss. Vossuk-ed-Dowleh pointed out that the Upper Chamber would be formed, in accordance with the conditions of the constitution, of members, of whom one-half would be nominated by the executive and one-half chosen by the Medjliss, so that no progress could be made with its institution until after the new Medjliss had entered upon its duties. His Excellency added that circumstances would render it necessary that nearly all the members of the Medjliss should be elected for Tehran, and that even those for other places should be voted for at the capital. He expressed belief that it would be found possible to elect a legal quorum, namely, one member more than a half of a full house.

It was early clear that this show of eagerness to proceed to new elections was made with the object of calming public opinion, and but little effort has since been made to prepare for the selection of candidates or to take any steps in the direction of naming a day for the elections, which could hardly fail in existing conditions to be a farce, whilst it is more than doubtful if a quorum could be obtained. It is just possible that the

hand of the Government may be forced if affairs at Hamadan do not make satisfactory progress, because the Armenian central committee of Tehran has made the holding of early elections one of the conditions under which the fedais, who have played such an important part under Yeprim Khan in the maintenance of the present order of things, will consent to fight against Salar-ed-Dowleh.

The Government have given a written assurance that elections will be held, but it is couched in such vague language as to the date and conditions that the committee has become more than ever suspicious of the real intentions of the Government, and is unwilling to accept such qualified assurances.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 129.

(Translation.)

The Regent's Rescript regarding Elections.

To the Cabinet,

April 30, 1912.

YOU are aware that, in accordance with the legal requirements, I issued a firman and rescript for new elections on the occasion of the termination of the National Assembly's legislative term, and these were published through the Ministry of the Interior. Unfortunately, owing to certain events, to the absence of governors from certain provinces, and the want of order and the perfect tranquillity which is necessary during elections, there has so far been delay in their execution.

Though it is clear that, as is the custom in other countries, the object of the Government was, firstly, to prepare the ground, and then in a short time to begin elections, yet, as delay in this matter is not permissible, and as it is said, furthermore, that some people, owing to ignorance and some owing to prejudice, attribute this to negligence and indifference on the part of the Government, I urgently draw the attention of the Ministers to this point. I recommend them to make a diligent study of the question, and at all events to begin elections without delay in those places where there is a possibility of free choice and where elections are possible, and especially in the capital, which is of greater importance in comparison to other places.

If, in certain places, owing to the above-mentioned conditions, there should be a measure of delay in the elections, endeavours will, of course, be made during the course of elections in other places to bring about favourable conditions as soon as possible in those parts as well.

As the firmans already issued said all that was necessary on this subject, I will only repeat and urge in this memorandum that the interests and future happiness of the country depend entirely upon the result of the elections for this legislative term.

I expect that a definitive decision should be arrived at without delay, and that the result will be announced, so that, before starting on a journey which I have in view, I should know that the Ministers have urgently and clearly in mind the importance of this duty and have taken measures in this respect, and that, in those places where the conditions are favourable, preliminary measures will be taken, while in such places where order and tranquillity will be restored steps will be taken in due course to carry on elections.

As the primary condition for the welfare, happiness, and progress of the country depends on the carrying out of this important duty and its proper execution, the Cabinet Ministers will thereby best succeed in bringing about my happiness and peace of mind. And as this question directly concerns the Minister of the Interior I hope that, in view of his experience, he will act with special energy and vigour, and will publish this memorandum through the official press for the information of the public.

I pray to God for all blessings for the Ministers, in order that they should acquit themselves of this important responsibility as soon and as well as possible, so as to assist the welfare and true happiness of the country.

ABUL KASSEM.

No. 130.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 15, 1912.

THE situation at Kerman during the past month has been most unsatisfactory, and has necessitated constant representations to the Persian Government. On the 22nd April, His Majesty's consul telegraphed that Mirza Hussein Khan, who had been dispatched with a considerable force and some guns to collect revenue in the district, had joined the khans of Jiruft and Rudbar, and that they had seized and robbed the Governor-General's "farrashbashi," who was also collecting revenue, and were marching on Kerman for the purpose of expelling the governor and plundering the town.

I brought the situation to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th April, and pointed out to his Excellency the great importance to British trade that tranquillity should prevail at Kerman, and that order should be maintained on the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road. The Minister professed to have little information upon the subject, but promised to make immediate enquiry.

On the 28th April I spoke to the Regent in the same sense, adding that Colonel Haig seemed satisfied that the Amir Azam was performing his duties well, and that I had been obliged to discourage a belief to the contrary, which appeared to be prevalent at Tehran. I added that the source of this intrigue had been traced to the deputy governor, Sardar Nusrat, who was at Tehran at the present moment. I spoke somewhat strongly about Sardar Nusrat's action, and said that I much resented his presumption in coming to the legation to endeavour to prejudice us against Amir Azam.

His Highness replied that very circumstantial reports had reached him to the effect that all the trouble in the Kerman district was traceable to the extortionate habits of the Governor-General, who had sold official appointments on all sides, and had squeezed the populace as much as he possibly could. He asked me to ascertain from Colonel Haig whether there was real foundation for these stories.

I communicated Colonel Haig's reply to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 1st May. It was to the effect that if the Governor-General was not perfect, he was at least better than his predecessors. I took occasion to explain to the Minister that as long as the unfortunate system continued of making governors of provinces pay for their appointments, it must be expected that they would recoup themselves from their provincial subordinates. I used strictly diplomatic language, but I let the Minister clearly understand that I was aware that Amir Azam had had to pay a heavy fee for his appointment. The hint went home, not a very long way to go, as the Minister is the brother of the Minister of the Interior, with whom the appointment of provincial governors rest.

The Minister promised that no effort should be spared to endeavour to restrain the advance of the rebels, but maintained his assertions that the Governor-General is a corrupt official. His Excellency subsequently sent me copies of letters said to have been found on his "farrashbashi," presumably when he was seized by the rebel Mirza Hussein Khan, in which Amir Azam instructed him to get as much money out of the people as he possibly could. The Minister at the same time caused me to be informed that the Government proposed to send an impartial official to hold an enquiry on the spot, and that a communication in this sense had been sent both to the governor and the rebel leaders, who had been ordered to await the result of this enquiry.

The fact that the Government claimed to be able to bring pressure to bear on the rebels would seem to afford good proof that they have regarded the growth of the movement benevolently. His Majesty's consul has reported that constant communications passed between the town and the rebels during the past few days, and that he himself, at the governor's request, had publicly explained the situation to the people.

For a time there appeared reason to hope that an amicable arrangement would be reached, but the latest advices would seem to show that negotiations have failed, and that the rebels are rapidly approaching the town, which the governor seems impotent to defend.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 131.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram from the acting British consul at Shiraz on the subject of the tribal situation in and near that town.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 131.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, May 15, 1912.

MY telegram of 9th May.

10th May Khamseh tribesmen with their chiefs made triumphal entry into town with prisoners and loot of Soulet's camp. 11th May ilkhani with his force arrived Chenar Rahdar. 12th May ilkhani brought all Kashgai kalantars to pay their respects to Kawam, who received them in his garden just outside town. Kalantars one by one did obeisance to Kawam. Gathering was unique, as all Kashgai kalantars have never come to Shiraz together before. After ceremony Kashgai and Khamseh chiefs, who were also there, made merry together. Number of Kashgai kalantars came into town, which for several days has been full of armed Kashgais, who have been most orderly. Mass of Kashgai tribes held back by recent strife have been passing Chenar Rahdar, and migration should soon be over. It is reported Ayaz Kika Darashuli, chief responsible for treachery of 2nd May, and Soulet have slipped past northwards with small body of horsemen. Ilkhani has started for Guyoum in case there is any trouble. If Soulet goes north he may intend either to collect Darashulis and non-Kashgai elements with a view to fighting at Baiza.

Soulet's wife, who is a Kashkuli, is reported to be about 30 miles south of Shiraz with one of Kashkuli khans, but it is not known where his children are.

No. 132.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Persian Government on the 9th May, reminding them of their responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of British subjects in Kerman.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 132.

Sir W. Townley to the Persian Government.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, May 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Kerman stating that a force of rebels was advancing on the city, and that the Governor-General was preparing to flee.

It is my duty to remind the Persian Government in the strongest terms of their responsibility for the safety of British lives and property in the face of the threatened disorder.

I avail, &c.

W. TOWNLEY.

No. 133.

*Persian Transport Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)*3, *Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,*

May 28, 1912.

Sir,

I AM directed by my board to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, and to request you to convey their thanks to Sir W. Townley for the steps he has taken to press upon the khans the necessity for adequate protection to caravans traversing the Ahwaz-Ispahan road.

As regards the abandonment of work on the Godar bridge, I am directed to inform you that our engineer, Mr. Sotham, telegraphed us on the 14th instant to the effect that he has carried out such necessary repairs to the bridge as, in his opinion, will render it safe against further deterioration for at least twelve months. He goes on to say :—

“I have had no support from the Bakhtiari, although rigorous instructions were sent from the khans in Tehran; they are not in the country and they have no authority. Great difficulty experienced with guards, whom I pay heavily, over closing bridge for a few hours. My men have been assaulted; my life once threatened; had greatest difficulty in carrying on work. Kuhgelus expected raid road soon; road already unsafe. Last two couriers from Ahwaz beaten and robbed on road.”

Owing to neglect on the part of the chiefs to act on the advice given by Mr. Sotham in December last, that the bridge should be closed to traffic, the sag had become so pronounced that on his arrival in March the bridge was on the point of collapsing. The correction of the sag can now only be carried out by dismantling the bridge, which means closing it to traffic for at least two months.

It had been our earnest desire to get the whole of the work thoroughly done at the present time, and to this end our agents have made repeated appeals to the khans to take such protective measures as would enable our engineer to carry out his difficult task with promptitude and safety. These steps not having been taken, and the season having now so far advanced as to render it difficult to work except at night and the early morning owing to the intense heat, we have been compelled to withdraw our engineer and his staff.*

I have, &c,

FRED. W. PARRY, *Acting Secretary.*

No. 134.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 19, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a decree recently issued by the Regent in the name of the Shah and countersigned by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of the Interior, authorising the acting treasurer-general to proceed to the collection and storage of Government grain in the district of Tehran and in the adjacent districts wherever he may consider such collection profitable.

The execution of this decree should serve two purposes: Firstly, it should protect the people from the disgraceful system at present prevailing by means of which the price of this prime necessity of life is run up to a prohibitive figure; and secondly, it should secure an ample supply of grain for the wants of the capital.

M. Mornard estimates that the amount of grain from the above-quoted sources brought to market in the past season, which was an average agricultural one, did not exceed 15,000 khalvars, whereas he estimates that under a proper system of collection it should amount to at least 60,000 khalvars, and possibly even 80,000 khalvars.

In addition to the very great material advantage that it is anticipated the people of Tehran will derive from this measure, the issue of the decree may have a most important bearing upon the executive functions of the treasurer-general. It may in

* Note.—Besides taking the measures, recorded in subsequent correspondence in this publication, to restore order on the road, the Bakhtiari eventually agreed to pay the whole of the expenses incurred in repairing the Godar bridge.

a sense be considered as the thin edge of the wedge inserted into the system by which Cabinet Ministers sought to keep in their own hands such lucrative duties as the collection of the Government grain which during the past season has been cornered and diverted to personal purposes in such a shameless manner that it was one of the crying abuses to which I called the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of my first visit to his Excellency. It is also a sign that the Government realise that the mission of the treasurer-general is a serious one, and that the two legations are heartily in accord in seeking to make it a material success. No pressure to secure the adoption of the proposal was required, fortunately, but there can be no doubt that the knowledge of the solidarity of the two Governments influenced the Cabinet very considerably.

M. Mornard is of opinion that the decree confirms indirectly the powers of the treasurer-general as under the law of 23 Jauza, Tankouz-il, and doubtless it will serve as a most useful precedent for the extension of his administrative powers in other parts of the country. It will, however, probably be found desirable to clearly define the duties of the treasurer-general at an early date, so that it is hardly necessary to attach more importance to the above-quoted law of the late Medjliss than the very useful fact that it gives the decree as it were a legal sanction under the constitution.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 134.

Decree Issued by Regent.

In the Name of His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

(Translation.)

IN order that the people should not suffer from scarcity as they did last year at Tehran, we ordain, in accordance with the decision of the Cabinet, as follows:—

Article 1. The treasurer-general, in accordance with his duties fixed by law of 23 Jauza, Tankouz-il, will take steps from now for the collection of Government grain in the district of Tehran and its adjacent districts in any place which he considers profitable, whether from privately owned or Government lands, and will have the grain stored in the Government stores for the special use of the inhabitants of the capital.

Art. 2. The revenue officials will collect the revenue in kind and the harvest of the Crown lands at the commencement of the harvest time, so that by the end of Mizan (the 21st September) the entire amount should be collected. The officials will be careful to act in accordance with custom, and those who have to pay taxes in kind and the lessees of the Crown lands may not, under any pretext, delay or refuse the payment of the dues claimed by the revenue officials.

Art. 3. The owners of private land and the lessees of Crown lands or their representatives will send a delegate to the spot to hand over the Government grain to the collectors. If such a representative is not present, a written notice will be sent, and if such a notice is not observed within fifteen days, the collectors will have the right to take the Government grain from the harvest of the place.

Art. 4. In case the taxpayers or the lessees of Crown lands have any complaints against the Treasury officials or consider the amount claimed to be illegal, they will submit their complaints in writing to the treasurer-general. The latter, after careful consideration, will refer the matter, if he thinks fit, to a commission, which will be established for this purpose at Tehran.

Art. 5. Persons guilty of dishonesty or of the theft of Government property will be arrested and forced to restore the same. The treasurer-general, after obtaining the restoration of the Government property, will prosecute the offenders, and have them tried in a competent court and published according to law.

Art. 6. Any persons interfering with the Government revenue illegally or without proper authorisation on the part of the Government, or any persons taking part in or assisting the same in bringing about loss to the Government, whether taxpayers or not, will be dealt with in accordance with article 5. Should the arrest of the offenders not be possible, the treasurer-general will seize such an amount of their property as will indemnify the Government for the loss incurred.

Art. 7. The Ministry of the Interior and the representatives of the Government forces will assist the revenue collectors in carrying out their duties in connection with the collection of Government revenue and the transport of Government grain to the Government storehouses.

Art. 8. The Ministers of Finance and of the Interior are charged with the carrying out of this rescript.

(Signed and sealed)

NASER-UL-MULK, NAIB-ES-SULTANEH.

(Signed)

NEJEF KULI BARHTIARI, *Prime Minister.*

MOHTASHEM-ES-SULTANEH, *Minister of Finance.*

KAWAM-ES-SULTANEH, *Minister of the Interior.*

No. 135.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 30, 1912.

MY telegram of 27th May.

I am informed officially that Government troops defeated rebels in successive engagements in immediate neighbourhood of Kermanshah on 28th May and yesterday with considerable loss, that rebels subsequently fled in direction of Luristan, and that road to Kermanshah is now open.

It is not known whether Salar-ed-Dowleh is still at Kermanshah or if he fled to Luristan.

No. 136.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 30, 1912.

YOUR telegrams of 2nd and 25th May: Shiraz.

Have the Persian Government received satisfactory answer from clergy?

What action are they taking?

No. 137.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 31, 1912.

MY telegram of 30th May.

Russian consul at Kermanshah telegraphs that Salar-ed-Dowleh intends to defend town, that he has been reinforced by arrival of Mujallal, 2,000 Kalhurs, and men of the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh.

I should be inclined to doubt estimate of Kalhurs' strength, and it would seem strange that vali should have joined him after defeat, when our information points to his having refused to do so when his prospects wore rosy hue.

No. 138.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 31, 1912.

SOUTH PERSIA.

Your telegram of yesterday.

Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me a week ago that the promised telegram from the Ulemas had not yet reached him.

The local authorities at Shiraz are the only people who can secure the surrender of the culprits. Efforts are being made in that direction. Preparations for the departure of the Governor-General for his post are being renewed.

I shall see the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the course of a day or two and will report further. I have been unable to see his Excellency for some days owing to a Cabinet crisis, which is now declared terminated.

No. 139.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 31, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Cabinet crisis is over. Minister of the Interior alone resigns.

No. 140.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 2, 1912.

MY telegram of 31st May.

I am informed by Minister of War and by Russian Legation that Government forces have entered Kermanshah without firing a shot.

Latest news from British consul is dated 28th May.

No. 141.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 4, 1912.

MY telegram of 2nd June.

I am still without official confirmation from the consulate of the fall of Kermanshah, but it seems to be quite clear that it has been taken, and that Salar has taken refuge with Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh.

Daoud Khan, Kalhur, and his son were both killed.

No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 4, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 25th May: Treasurer-general.

I consider the terms of the appointment unobjectionable, but should be glad to receive views of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, especially as regards length of the appointment.

No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 4, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegrams of the 18th and 19th ultimo regarding the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter* from the Persian Transport Company in reply to a communication that I caused to be addressed to them conveying to them the substance of your above-mentioned telegrams.

The situation as depicted in this letter is well-nigh intolerable, and I have to request you to urge the Bakhtiari khans in Tehran in the strongest manner to insist on their local representatives in the Bakhtiari country and the tribesmen in general both permitting the necessary repairs to be carried out and supporting the company's engineer in every possible manner.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

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No. 144.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 4th June: Persian treasurer-general.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he sees no objection to proposed terms of appointment.

As regards its duration, he would be inclined to think five years suitable.

No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 15th May: Joint advance.

Treasury and India Office approve proposal in fifth paragraph of your telegram. Repayment of advance made by His Majesty's Government and Government of India may therefore remain in abeyance.

No. 146.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 7, 1912.

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from consul at Kermanshah, bearing date 31st May:—

“On 29th May engagement near Sahneh. Daoud Khan, his eldest son, many others, including leading Kalhurs, killed; rest fled. Hearing this, Salar and Mujallal and adherents fled towards Luristan. Farman Farma arrived 30th May. Town quiet.”

Above is first official report which I have received from consul at Kermanshah on subject of Salar's defeat.

No. 147.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 7, 1912.

REGENT and Cabinet crisis.

Your telegram of the 27th May.

The Russian Minister and I had a joint audience of the Regent yesterday. As M. Poklewsky had received no instructions from his Government on the subject, I made no special mention to His Highness of the satisfaction felt by His Majesty's Government at the postponement of his journey to Europe.

The Regent is determined to leave Tehran on the 11th June in spite of the fact that the Cabinet crisis has only been patched up temporarily. As it seems improbable that matters would be improved by his presence in Persia, we did not press His Highness to remain here.

No. 148.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 7, 1912.

CHIEF of police in Tehran.

My Russian colleague and I had an audience of the Regent yesterday, at which His Highness spoke to us on the question of a successor to the late Yeprim Khan, and pressed us to ascertain the views of our respective Governments on the subject.

The presence of a strong chief of police will be most desirable when the fedais and the Bakhtiaris who have been fighting against Salar-ed-Dowleh return to the capital, where the situation is then likely to become serious.

According to His Highness the Persian Government had made up their mind that the post in question should be filled by a foreigner. He said that the question was not to be broached officially yet, and he urged us to ascertain the views of our Governments privately before the question became official.

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 7, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 25th May.

The proposed terms of M. Mornard's appointment as treasurer-general appear to be unobjectionable. The appointment might, I think, be for five years. If it proves satisfactory, this term could be extended.

Am I to understand that M. Mornard proposes to control the customs service in addition to performing the duties of treasurer-general? Please report whether this would, in your opinion, involve more work than a single man could cope with. Have you discussed this point with your Russian colleague?

No. 150.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 9, 1912.

A SERIOUS engagement has taken place between 500 Russian troops and marauding Shahsevans 20 miles from Ardebil. The latter lost heavily; Russian casualties numbered thirty, including two officers killed.

Six companies have been sent from Resht in reply to a request for reinforcements; there remain, therefore, at Resht two companies of infantry and 300 Cossacks.

No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 7th June: Chief of police.

Would it not be possible to find a suitable man among the Swedish officers?

No. 152.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 11, 1912.

REGENT leaves for Europe this morning. Will leave Enzeli 13th June on Russian gun-boat.

No. 153.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 7th June.

Mornard is in charge of the official Belgian Mission lent for customs service; it is therefore desirable that he should continue to be nominally director-general of customs as well as treasurer-general. A subordinate (Wibier by name) will act as director-general under Mornard's supervision. He has been doing so for some time past. My Russian colleague and I are of opinion that this arrangement is the best possible.

A separate contract for Mornard as treasurer-general will be signed by the Minister of Finance; the period named in the contract will be five years.

Regent signed decree appointing Mornard treasurer-general before he left yesterday. I understand a few quite unimportant alterations were previously made in the text, which otherwise is identic with that submitted to our respective Governments. It will be published in a day or two.

No. 154.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 12, 1912.

CHIEF of police at Tehran.

Your telegram of the 10th June.

No Swedish officer could be spared from gendarmerie work, nor is there one suitable for the post.

It is possible that the Persian Government will continue police of Tehran under a Persian who was Yeprim's second in command.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 15, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 31st May, last paragraph: Barracks at Shiraz.

Please report. We must decide about barracks at Shiraz in three weeks' time. Does the Persian Government realise the position?

No. 156.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 17, 1912.

MY telegram of the 9th June.

Threatened Russian movement against the Shahsevans is causing Persian Government considerable alarm. They are afraid that the intention of the Russian Government is to annihilate the tribe entirely.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that reinforcements are to be sent to Sarab from Tabriz, and that the Russian Prime Minister has requested the Caucasus authorities to send troops. This is, of course, in addition to the detachment already sent from Resht. The Russian Minister says that the military authorities appear disinclined to send troops to Persia, and that they are indeed anxious to recall to Russia those that are already in the country.

No. 157.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 15th June.

As soon as the Cabinet was reconstructed the Minister for Foreign Affairs resigned. It has been therefore impossible to make any further progress with the question of obtaining reparation for the attack on our troops.

Ala-es-Sultaneh has to-day been definitely appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Vossuk-ed-Dowleh's place.

The Minister of the Interior came to see me this morning. He assured me that the question had received his earnest consideration since his assumption of office three weeks ago. He said that he had telegraphed repeatedly to Shiraz insisting that the culprits be arrested. He added that he hoped matters might improve greatly after the

arrival of the new Governor-General, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, at his post ; the latter was, he said, leaving for Shiraz in a few days' time.

I strongly doubt the power of the present Government to secure the arrest of the culprits. The late Minister for Foreign Affairs asserted that they were with Soulet, but this does not seem to be the case.

I am of opinion that the Government entirely realise the situation ; they are, however, unfortunately unable to effect anything. They greatly appreciate the benevolent attitude of His Majesty's Government.

No. 158.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 19, 1912.

KERMAN.

My telegram of the 28th May.

Rebels have been dispersed, and their two leaders have been made prisoners. Colonel Haig reports that the Governor-General intends to execute the two men ; they are old offenders, have been captured in open warfare against the constituted authority, and are responsible for much misery in the province. Colonel Haig agrees with the Governor-General, and thinks that it would be folly to pursue any other course.

Though I am very reluctant to do so, I am obliged to concur in this view, as in the present distracted state of the country such an example is, in my opinion, necessary. If breakers of the peace are not severely punished when captured it is hopeless to expect public order to be re-established.

I have given no advice to the Governor-General on the subject, as he has not asked my opinion.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 19, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 17th June makes it evident that we cannot expect the persons guilty of the attack on the British troops to be handed over to the Persian Government in three weeks from the present date. As you know, we made the withdrawal of the detachment from Bushire conditional upon the surrender of these men.

We shall have to build quarters for the troops at Shiraz if we are obliged to leave them there. Unless, therefore, the Persian Government undertook to refund the cost of the buildings when eventually evacuated, we could not grant them an extension of time for compliance with our demand.

I gather that the Persian Government are quite unable to secure the arrest of the guilty parties, but you should report whether they have really attempted to negotiate with the tribes for this purpose.

Please telegraph your views as soon as possible after consulting consul-general at Bushire and Colonel Douglas.

No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 20, 1912.

MY despatch of 4th June and your telegram of 19th May : Lynch road.

Khans have raised difficulties, and have asked Lynch to advance 8,000*l.* to put in force arrangements to protect road.

You should try to influence Bakhtiari khans to fulfil their obligations, and to give Yusuf Khan wide powers.

No. 161.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 23, 1912.

AHWAZ road.

Your telegram of the 20th June.

I much hope that a permanent improvement of the conditions of security on the road may result from an arrangement which I have for some days been busy negotiating with the khans.

Yusuf Khan has failed, and Sardar Jang will take his place. The necessary money will be found by the khans themselves. Now that there is no longer any question of a threat Messrs. Lynch may be willing to find the necessary funds themselves, and I am given to understand that, the conditions being altered, they may even desire to make a loan, in which case they will be free to make the offer.

No. 162.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 23, 1912.

SOUTH PERSIA.

Your telegram of the 19th June.

As the Central Government is ignored in Fars, they would have been quite incapable of securing the arrest of the persons guilty of the attacks on our troops even if they had made any really determined attempt to do so. It is difficult to say whether any such attempt has been made or not.

The Prime Minister, with whom I had a long conversation yesterday, assured me that the Nejeef clergy had certainly sent the telegram referred to; he added that he proposes to expel the chief priest of Shiraz, who is a most undesirable person. He promised that the new Governor-General of Fars should arrest the culprits as soon as he assumed office, and he threw the whole blame on the treasurer-general for the delay in the departure of his Excellency for his post.

The acting British consul at Shiraz and Colonel Douglas seem to think that the troops must stay on, or that punitive measures must be undertaken by His Majesty's Government.

The consul-general at Bushire is absent and cannot be reached by telegraph. In his absence Mr. Bill suggests that His Majesty's Government may perhaps be forced to reconsider their policy in Southern Persia when the result of the Swedish gendarmerie scheme in Fars is seen, and that therefore much depends on the success or failure of the scheme.

No. 163.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 26, 1912.

MY telegram of the 12th June.

Minister of the Interior recently suggested a Dutchman as successor to Yeprim Khan as chief of police. Russian Minister informs me that his Government approve the idea.

No. 164.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 26th June.

The appointment of a Netherland subject as chief of police would meet with no objection from us.

No. 165.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, June 30, 1912.

M. SAZONOF gave me yesterday to read a telegram which he had received from the Russian acting consul at Tabriz in regard to Sipahdar replacing Shuja. Acting consul strongly deprecated proposed step, and stated his conviction that it would provoke disturbances. He also reported Shuja as saying now that he did not wish for the post of governor anywhere else.

His Excellency said that for the moment there was nothing to be done. He appeared, however, to attach value to the opinion of the acting consul.

No. 166.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 14, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, reporting upon the recent military events which have led up to the eventual triumph of the Government forces, to the recapture of Kermanshah, and to the defeat and flight of the army under Salar-ed-Dowleh and Mujallal-es-Sultan.

You will notice, Sir, that the first of these despatches contains a report of assurances given to Mr. McDouall by Salar-ed-Dowleh of his friendly feelings towards the British Government, in spite of the fact that British action in the past had been hostile to his family. Mr. McDouall communicated this passage to me by telegraph, but I returned no reply. Neither did I answer a later telegraphic communication sent to me direct by Salar-ed-Dowleh, in which he asked me to invite the Persian Government to send their troops 16 miles outside Hamadan to fight him, as he would not otherwise be able to guarantee the life and property of the peaceable citizens of that town.

The progress of the military movements has been reported to you by telegraph as anything of interest occurred. The march of Farman Farma, who was in command of the Government forces, and who left Tehran early in April was very leisurely. He did not reach Hamadan until nearly the end of the month. His first encounter with the forces of Salar-ed-Dowleh under Mujallal-es-Sultan was most unfortunate, as he was severely defeated with the loss of several guns. The Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently told me that the battle was of a "bouffe" nature. The two armies when they came in sight of each other fired at each other and then fled incontinently, Mujallal winning because he looked round first, and discovered that he and the enemy were playing the same game.

Although it was fully expected that Farman Farma would be beaten, and much wit was expended over his discomfiture, general consternation was felt when the news reached Tehran. The famous Yeprim Khan was at once dispatched to the front to take command of the Armenian fedais, who had been hurried up from Hamadan. The Bakhtiari contingent which had gone round by Zenjan received orders to proceed to the scene of action with all speed. Yeprim hastened to Hamadan in motor-cars which had by chance been assembled from Baku for the Regent's voyage to Enzeli.

Upon Yeprim's arrival affairs assumed a more business-like turn. He advanced at once to meet Mujallal, who had withdrawn some distance to the rear on hearing of his approach, and taken up a strong defensive position in some hills. The battle commenced at 9 A.M., and by 4.30 P.M. it appeared as if the Government forces had won a decisive victory, when Yeprim Khan rashly approached a mud-tower, from which some unpleasant sniping had been annoying him during the battle. There would appear to have been no sort of reason for his doing this, as his men were quite able to capture and punish the sharpshooters in the tower. It seems he had got quite close to the tower when a young Persian doctor of much promise was shot down by his side. At an exclamation of warning from another companion, Yeprim looked up, and as he did so, a bullet fired from the tower struck him at the corner of the mouth, passing out at the back of his neck and shattering his skull. He fell dead on the spot. There can be no question of foul play as he fell in fair fight to an enemy's rifle.

It is possible that he may have sought death, as it is otherwise hard to explain why, for no purpose, he rode close up to a tower from which shots were being fired.

When Yeprim fell a panic ensued, and but for the courage and determination of Kerri Khan, an Armenian, who succeeded Yeprim in command, there might have been a disaster, as almost at the same moment Mujallal brought up reinforcements which he had held in reserve for the purpose of attacking Yeprim's men when tired with a day of battle. Kerri succeeded in staying the rout by ruthlessly shooting down the first fugitives. Then the Armenians and Bakhtiaris fought bravely, and after three hours' hard fighting succeeded in completely routing the forces under Mujallal.

Salar-ed-Dowleh's star had waned. The advantage gained was pressed home more resolutely than is usually the case in Persian warfare, and Mujallal was gradually driven back until he fled with some eighty men to Kermanshah. The further approach of the Government troops met with but slight opposition until they arrived within a couple of days' march of the town. Here a stand was made by the Kalhurs and other tribes which had joined Salar-ed-Dowleh, but it is now evident that the Prince himself was not present at any of the encounters. Fortune again favoured the forces of the Government, and the tribesmen were defeated with the loss of Daoud Khan, Kalhur, and his son.

The road to Kermanshah was now open, and the town was entered without opposition; despite a bombastic threat on the part of Salar that he would defend it to the last, and that the Government should be held responsible for any damage done during a bombardment.

It is not quite clear what has happened to Salar-ed-Dowleh, but it is believed that he and Mujallal have fled to the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh. The Bakhtiaris and fedais are already clamouring to return to Tehran, which would seem to indicate that there is not much to loot at Kermanshah. The presence of these undesirables is not wanted at Tehran, and there would be a serious danger that the Prince might again repossess himself of the town were it to be evacuated before he is accounted for.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 166.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, May 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday Salar-ed-Dowleh wrote asking me to call upon him. I complied, and he said that he wished me to explain to you that his position was that of a Persian patriot, and that his only object was the restoration of order and establishment of a capable Government in Tehran, which those at present in power could never succeed in doing. He could be of much more use to the British than Sardar Assad, who was bound by the promises which he had made to M. Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador in Paris, when he was last there. He (the Prince) personally had no reason to love the British, who had handed him over to his brother when he took refuge in the consulate here, which led to his imprisonment and exile and loss of estates; but as a patriot he fully recognised that the British Government was really anxious to preserve the integrity of Persia, and further, that it was in their interest that that integrity and independence should be preserved. He therefore was anxious to do all he could to support British interests, and had throughout given orders to respect British goods. I said that according to reports from Hamadan, Mujallal-es-Sultani had given out that as the Ministers of Tehran had sold Persia to the two Powers, the Ulema of Kurdistan had authorised a "jihad" against the two Powers, and that foreign goods would first be looted. He replied that the story was a trick of his enemies, and Mujallal could not circulate such a story without his orders, which had not been given. I promised to let you know what he had said.

He then told me that Ali Akbar Khan Sinjahi had left for Mujallal's camp with 800 men, and others would follow. My information is that they have not yet left.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 2 in No 166.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, May 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report in continuation of my despatch of yesterday, that from further information obtained it appears that on hearing of the quarrel between the tribes, Kazim Khan Sinjabi and Salar Arshad Kurdistani, who were with the Mujallal-es-Sultan when he defeated Farman Farma, returned. They advised great care, as Farman Farma's force was only a small one. Mujallal wrote to Salar-ed-Dowleh that instead of receiving reinforcements some of his force had left to take part in the tribal quarrels of Kermanshah, and urging him to arrange matters and send reinforcements. Salar sent some Ulema and others to the Sinjabis, and in consequence Samsam-el-Mamalek came to the Prince. The Prince embraced him, called him his father, and gave him 3,000 tomans and other presents. Samsam said that the tribes would not accept to be placed under the Government of Kalhurs, and if they and the Kalhurs met there would be fighting, it was impossible for them to serve in the same army as Kalhurs. Salar promised that if they would support him they should never be made to submit to Sardar Mozaffir. He requested that 800 men should go under Ali Akbar and Kazim Khans to Kurdistan to reinforce Mujallal, and Sardar Mozaffir would accompany the army under himself. Samsam appears to have agreed, and returned to his village to see his son Ali Akbar, who is the real head of the combination, and it has not yet transpired whether he will accept. They are probably awaiting news from Farman Farma, and should he defeat Mujallal before they leave they would not go. Sardar Mozaffir has written to Ihtesham-el-Mamalek, of Kerind, that he was quite right to punish the Kalhurs for their misbehaviour. He is evidently frightened at the strength of the combination, and will not fight unless attacked by them. He is expected here in a day or two to join in an advance towards Kangawar, but his movements are always uncertain. The ilkhani, who is at Sahneh with 300 to 400 men, informed Salar-ed-Dowleh that the Khezal were holding their border, and Salar instructed him not to advance but to hold Sahneh.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 166.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, May 22, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 16th May, I have the honour to inform you that the Sinjabi chief has replied to Salar-ed-Dowleh's messenger that as he has a quarrel with the Kalhurs, as long as their contingent has not advanced from Kermanshah, he cannot, and further, that there being trouble on the frontier stirred up by the Kalhurs, he cannot spare a man. None of his sons have returned to Kurdistan. On hearing of the fighting between the Bajlan and Sheikh, Nasir-ed-Din, Ali Akbar Khan Sinjabi left with 300 men to support the Bajlan. Sardar Mozaffir has informed Salar-ed-Dowleh that he cannot come until the Sinjabi contingents have left Kermanshah, and further, that he will come when the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh does. The latter replies that he will come, but in each letter makes some excuse for delay.

Salar-ed-Dowleh being dependent on the Kermanshah tribes is in a difficult position. Mujallal-es-Sultan is constantly writing to him for reinforcements and to come in person; but the Prince can do nothing. He sends false messages to his supporters reporting the arrival of various chiefs to try and encourage them. I have reason to believe that he is preparing to flee.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 4 in No. 166.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, May 31, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 27th the ilkhani reported to Salar-ed-Dowleh that he had defeated the advance guard of the Government, and asking for

reinforcements. Daoud Khan Kalhur (Sardar Mozaffir) joined him on evening of the 28th, and after a skirmish the Government outposts retired into Sahneh. In the morning Daoud Khan's force was attacked by artillery and Maxims, Daoud Khan was wounded, and his eldest son, Ali Akbar, killed with many others, including leading men of the Kalhurs, the rest fled and were pursued to Bisitun, and thence fled to their own country. Daoud Khan died of his wound, the Hajizadehs of the ilkhani fled to the hills. Salar-ed-Dowleh, who had refused to believe that any one dare attack him, was sending Mujallal-es-Sultan with a gun and reinforcements, when news arrived of the defeat and flight of his army. Kazim Khan Sinjabi was with him, but at once left with his followers and some Kurdistanis for his villages. Salar-ed-Dowleh and Mujallal with one gun and what men they had fled in the direction of Luristan, but may have gone to the Kalhur country. The force is small, but I have not been able to obtain an estimate of its numbers.

On the afternoon of the 30th May Farman Farma arrived in Kermanshah with his forces, and all is quiet.

I have, &c.
W. McDOUALL.

No. 167.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 14, 1912.

ADVANTAGE has been taken of the presence of Captain Grey, His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz, to go fully into all the questions with which the Bakhtiari khans are concerned. Of these the most important is the state of tension approaching to open hostilities that at present exists between the Bakhtiaris and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

You are aware, Sir, that a serious conflict between the parties was only averted last spring by the pressure brought to bear upon the khans by the legation at Tehran and by the counsels of moderation urged upon the sheikh by His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah. Unfortunately these good offices have resulted in both parties considering that they have suffered serious material losses because they listened to the advice given.

The Bakhtiaris claim that they duly evacuated Shuster under instructions received from the Persian Government and at the instance of His Majesty's legation. They assert that after they had done so the sheikh's men not only occupied the town but burned the crops and villages of Akili, by which deed damage to the value of 100,000 tomans (20,000L.) was done to the property of Sardar Motashem, the Minister of War. They further assert that certain of their adherents and dependents who had remained at Shuster were imprisoned and ill-treated by the Arabs.

The khans, but more especially Sardar Motashem, are furious at what they consider to be a breach of an agreement made under the auspices of the Persian Government, and they are resentful towards His Majesty's legation because they say that they never would have adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the sheikh had they not been assured that he would on his side observe the terms of the contract. Sardar Motashem declares emphatically that, unless full compensation is paid for the damage done, he will assemble a force of 5,000 sowars in the autumn and drive the sheikh into the sea.

It is asserted on the part of the sheikh that the Bakhtiaris did not evacuate Shuster, but fled on the approach of the Arabs, carrying away with them a sum of 5,000 tomans (1,000L.) belonging to the sheikh's adherents in the town. It is granted that a part of the lands of Akili was destroyed, but it is claimed that this was done in direct opposition to the sheikh's orders, and it is thought that he will probably make the losses good to the villagers, such being his custom on these raiding occasions, but that he would do so out of the 5,000 tomans (1,000L.) carried off by the Bakhtiaris from Shuster. It would appear that the sheikh is also dissatisfied with his British advisers, because, but for them, he would have loosed his Arabs on the surrounding Bakhtiari country at a moment when all the odds were in his favour.

Such is, as far as my information goes, the present somewhat complicated situation. It is far from easy to get at the true facts of the case even with the impartial assistance of His Majesty's consular officers on the spot, as their sources of information are naturally coloured. Major Haworth understands that the Bakhtiaris did not

evacuate Shuster until forced to do so by the approach of an overwhelming Arab force, and that consequently the Bakhtiaris did not, as claimed by the khans, voluntarily carry out their share of the agreement made under the auspices of the Persian Government. Captain Grey has been assured that the main force of the Bakhtiaris had left Shuster before the Arabs appeared, and that only a small body had remained for police purposes. Major Haworth considers that the sheikh would crush the Bakhtiaris by weight of numbers, but Captain Grey thinks that the latter would walk through the Arabs by reason of their superior military qualities.

Speculation as to which side would win is vain, as the object we have in view is to prevent the collision which would settle the disputed point. For this purpose we have urged upon the khans during Captain Grey's visit here that they should agree to a meeting being held in the autumn at some place near Shuster, at which both the sheikh and the Bakhtiaris should be represented by duly authorised persons. Major Haworth and Captain Grey would also attend, and a serious effort would be made to come to a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions in the hope that a more or less durable peace may be secured.

The khans have declared their willingness to send a duly accredited agent to such a meeting, but they say that their representative could not be given full powers to conclude an arrangement on the spot. He would have to refer the terms of a prospective settlement to Tehran for their consideration and approval. It is proposed that a meeting should be held in the month of December next, and it is calculated that a discussion of all the questions at issue would take at least one month. I have reason to believe that the idea of such a meeting has the full approval of His Majesty's resident and consul-general at Bushire, who might possibly himself be able to attend at the place of meeting for a short time. I have submitted the suggestion to Sir Percy Cox for his observations, and I would propose, Sir, with your approval, to endeavour to get the khans interested to state in writing their willingness to be represented.

I have much hope that such an exchange of views might have the happiest results, but I am further of opinion that it would assist very materially to the maintenance of better relations between the rival parties were it found possible by the Persian Government to keep an impartial Governor-General of Arabistan continuously in residence at Shuster. In such a case his guard should, if possible, be drawn from neither faction. Were this not found feasible, I would suggest that the guard should be composed half of Arabs and half of Bakhtiari sowars, the former of whom should be employed on business connected with the Arab population of the province and the latter on Bakhtiari affairs. It is, of course, understood that neither the dependents of the sheikh nor of the Bakhtiaris should have any share in the administration of the towns of Shuster and Dizful. Many of the past quarrels have been due to the long interregna when, in the absence of the proper Government officials, the sheikh or the Bakhtiaris have been entrusted with the administration of these places.

I have put these views before Sir Percy Cox and Major Haworth, and I hope that, if approved by you, Sir, they may furnish a way of arriving at a definite settlement of a situation that contains many unpleasant possibilities, among which would be the total closing of the so-called Bakhtiari road, the only one available to-day for British trade from the south to the north. It will be noticed that there is a great difference between the value of the damage done at Akili as estimated by Sardar Motashem and Major Haworth. The latter is probably thinking of the actual harm done, whereas the Sardar maintains that his villagers have been driven away and will never dare return, thus leaving his fields barren of crops for many years to come. The lands were leased for 16,000 tomans (3,200*l.*) in 1912.

It is very improbable that the Sardar could put a force of 5,000 men in the field, since the entire fighting strength of the Bakhtiaris is only estimated at 8,000 men, of which 2,000 men are actually employed outside their own country at Tehran and Ispahan. At the same time a conflict between the Bakhtiaris and the sheikh might have very far-reaching effects upon the political situation in Persia as well as upon British trade. One thing is certain, and that is that the Bakhtiaris have taken full advantage of their present political position to stock their country with arms and ammunition.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 168.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 14, 1912.

MY preceding despatch upon Bakhtiari affairs deals with the question of the relations between this powerful and influential tribe and the Sheikh of Mohammerah. It will be my endeavour in this one to explain the present situation of the road from Ahwaz to Ispahan, which is generally known as the Bakhtiari road, although it is almost equally familiar under the name of the "Lynch" road, due to the fact that its construction was carried out by the firm that is so styled.

For some time past complaints have been frequent that the Bakhtiari khans responsible were not taking the necessary steps to secure the safety of the road. Representations on the subject were constantly made to the khans in Tehran, who sent repeated instructions to the local khans to take the necessary steps to protect the traffic on the road. Much stress was laid upon the fact that Yusuf Khan, Amir Mujahid, had been appointed Governor of Behbahan, a position which would enable him to control the thieving Kuhgeluis that infest the road at certain times of the year, when the nomad Bakhtiari have moved off to other pastures where water is more plentiful.

At a critical moment, when it was most essential that the measures for the control of the Kuhgeluis should be taken, news was received that the Amir Mujahid had not proceeded to Behbahan, and was abandoning his charge because of the opposition of Sardar Ashja, his cousin, who had constituted himself controller of the road, and was behaving in a high-handed manner that was in no sense in accordance with the best interests of the road. Sardar Ashja was until recently Governor-General of Ispahan, where he proved a failure. Hot upon the news of this chief's behaviour to his cousin came a report that he had also refused to allow Messrs. Lynch's road inspectors to do their duty, and had sent them back to Ispahan. A protest was at once addressed to the khans by the legation, and Sardar Ashja has been summoned to the capital to explain his conduct. It is said that he is now on his way here, but, meanwhile, the road has been left to the mercy of the Kuhgelui robbers, and there is small doubt that it will be completely closed to trade in a few weeks.

The question is now receiving the serious attention of the khans here, and formed the subject of conversation during Captain Grey's recent visit. After much deliberation they have proposed to Messrs. Lynch's agent that his firm should advance them a sum of 40,000 tomans (about 7,500L.), repayable in five years by instalments, on the plea that they have no funds available for the policing of the road. If the money is forthcoming they propose to name Sardar-i-Jang, a brother of the Sardar Ashja, Governor of Behbahan, with full power over the road and the entire Bakhtiari country, and they profess to anticipate a restoration of order under his control. The khans propose to pay the instalments and interest on the loan out of the road tolls, and are prepared to hand over the collection of the tolls to Messrs. Lynch, should they fall into arrear in the payments due on the loan. They declare that if the money is not forthcoming they cannot hold themselves responsible for the safety of the road, because they are without funds for the purpose.

Sardar-i-Jang called upon me on the 14th instant. He assured me that he would do his best to guarantee the safety of the road and to restore order throughout the country. He has the reputation of being a plucky man of considerable military acquirements, and to have much force of character and determination, and he impressed me somewhat favourably. In answer to my enquiry as to what had happened to the tolls that have been collected this year, Sardar-i-Jang stated that the money had been spent in buying horses and the necessary equipment for the Bakhtiaris who had been taking part in the recent military operations.

I impressed upon Sardar-i-Jang the great importance that His Majesty's Government attach to the road being kept continually open and free of robbers. He assured me that he would put a thousand men on the road if Messrs. Lynch produced the money required for the purpose, but the khans have nothing but their word to offer as security that the money, if forthcoming, will be spent for the purpose for which it is intended.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 169.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 17, 1912.

IN reply to enquiries which I thought it opportune to address to His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz with regard to the state of security of the main southern road during the last few weeks and the prospects of improvement in the near future, I have received telegrams from those places, of which I have the honour to enclose copies.

As you, Sir, will observe, although few robberies of importance are reported, yet the difficulties besetting the passage of caravans and travellers on account of blackmail and danger to life and property appear to be on the increase, and neither Mr. Bill nor Mr. Smart can point to any indications of approaching improvements.

With regard to the state of the Shiraz-Ispahan section from the 1st April to the 7th June, Mr. Consul-General Grahame telegraphs "about 400 head of transport arrived at Ispahan from Shiraz on the 28th May; about 400 left Ispahan for Shiraz on the 7th June, otherwise no caravan traffic. Security on Ispahan-Abadeh section improved. No robberies reported by British firms. Above figures and necessity for strong guard whenever a caravan moves show abnormal condition of road. Contrary to previous custom, incoming muleteers from Shiraz latterly refuse to return south, preferring to work on other roads, a significant symptom."

It will be seen from Messrs. Bill and Smart's telegrams that Mohammed Ali Khan and two others responsible for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort, contribute largely to the terrorism exercised on the Bushire-Shiraz section of the road, and that Kawam-ul-Mulk does not feel himself strong enough to seize or coerce these chiefs. In regard to this point I have had no opportunity as yet of bringing further pressure to bear on the Central Government, as the Cabinet crisis referred to in my telegram of the 31st May has been prolonged by the endeavours made to induce Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to remain in office and by the vacillating attitude of this Minister in response.

With regard to the tribal situation in the south and the struggle between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the new Ilkhani of the Kashgais, I have the honour to enclose copy of the latest communication, dated the 28th May, I have received on this subject from Mr. Acting Consul Smart, from which it would appear that Soulet's forces have dwindled to an insignificant number, but that it will be difficult to run him actually to ground.

Though the tribal migration seems to have taken place without the occurrence of unfortunate incidents at one time anticipated, yet the director of the Indo-European Telegraph Department complains bitterly of the wilful damage inflicted on the lines in the Fars province which occasioned serious interruptions and dislocation in the international traffic.

A satisfactory feature of the situation in Fars is reported by Mr. Acting Consul Smart (on the 4th June) in the considerable improvement shown in the attitude of the priests towards the British, and on the occasion of the King's birthday the Imam Juma of Fars exchanged compliments with myself.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

P.S.—Since writing the above His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan telegraphs that a caravan (of the 28th May) also arrived at Ispahan via Sarhad.

W. T.

Enclosure 1 in No. 169.

Acting Consul Bill to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, June 8, 1912.

ONLY complaints for robbery of British goods made here has been for robbery of opium of Dixon, worth 40*l.*, stolen at Khwajeh Ibrahim caravanserai by Ali Mohammad Kamareji, outlaw, one of those responsible for attack of last December, but it is believed there has been general pilferage along road from Konar Takhteh; secondly, there are no indications of improvement, on the contrary the condition of the road has been worse than ever for caravans and for European travellers, and for British subjects dangerous.

Bank assistant got up as he had large escort from Shiraz, but he states tofanghis took 7 tomans per mule. German merchant about same date was fired on at Diris and threatened up to Tangi Turkan, having to pay 100 tomans. French travellers in April were fired on and had to pay 40 tomans. Another German merchant arrived few days since had to pay 15 tomans and his wife was insulted at Jafferjin. Indian cavalry camp followers and Baluchi camelmen robbed near Yezd some years ago returned two weeks ago and reported robbery under arms at Khwajeh Ibrahim caravanserai, one Mohammadan being accused of being Hindu was made to repeat Mohammadan declaration of faith after being taken to village and detained. Others of party were robbed at Jafferjin. Thirdly, rahdari illegal exactions have mounted from 15 to 70 krans per mule in April, 1911, and 17 to 95 krans in September, 1911, to 21 and 27 krans in past two months. Tofanghis now extort exactions in more than thirty places, and sugar and tea were recently being heavily pilfered. Muleteers complain bitterly. Fourthly, one of worst features since access to power of Kashkuli chiefs has been their auction of stretches of road to highest bidders and manipulation for their own benefit. Right to fleece and blackmail is now being bought and sold openly. Kashkulis have deflected road to Kadun valley so as to avoid passing through Kazerun. They have entrusted ill-famed caravanserai mentioned to Ali Mohammed who is at enmity with Khan of Kamarej, next stage. Caravans were detained by tribal fighting near Zinian at end of April and beginning of May. Fifthly, in course of last ten weeks only 4,024 mules were recorded during fifty days as entering Bushire and only 1,070 in past eighteen days. This is totally insufficient. Unauthorised Shilf route with its attendant difficulties has also been brought into use again. Hire has now risen to 34 tomans for 770 lbs. from Bushire to Shiraz. Sixthly, caravanserai and Jafferjin village are worst plague spots on road at present, but unbridled licence prevails and armed men growing more truculent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 169.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, June 9, 1912.

MAIN road Shiraz to Ispahan frontier has been closed to caravan traffic during past ten weeks. At beginning of April Kawam managed to get two French travellers from Yezd frontier to Shiraz safely via Dehbid. After much negotiation with Khamseh chiefs and delays and with huge escorts, at some stages amounting to 200 tribal riflemen under four chiefs, we have succeeded in getting Maletta and eighteen *fourgons* loaded with British and native goods to Abadeh in three weeks. They are now hung up there, governor Abadeh considering necessary huge Kashkuli escort regarding which I am negotiating. However, for last ten weeks section Abadeh to Ispahan frontier has been much safer, and Indo-European Telegraph Department inspector was able to go up and down that section inspecting line in safety. Amelioration was probably largely due to brigands deserting road owing to absence of caravans to plunder. Arrival of Kashgais migrated northwards may keep this section open as they block access of Kuhgelus. Caravans and post, however, use now Sarhad route and are likely to do so until winter, when Khamseh tribes leave main road on southward migration.

Bushire road is open to caravans, but in most unsatisfactory state. Fars Government have just informed me that reversion to main road after Kamarij has been secured, but reports from Kazerun seem to show this announcement premature. Hitherto some caravans to escape ruffianly roadguards, Mohammed Ali Khan's dependents at Rahdar, scene of attack on our troops, make short cut from Kamarij over precipitous pass to Kazerun via Bardun, this track being at present efficiently guarded by Kurshid Khan of Kamarij and Kalantar of Kazerun, but these caravans north of Kazerun are harassed and blackmailed even more excessively than usual by Kashgar roadguards, who hold road north of Kotali Dukhter, for not having gone by Naudan route. Other caravans which come to Rahdar are there deflected at rifle point by Rahdar roadguards to Naudan route, though occasionally they appear to have been allowed to continue by main road on payment of enormous blackmail. Chief of these Rahdar ruffians is one of culprits wanted for attacks on our troops. Kawam in spite of assurances to me has not yet been able to seize or even remove him from road. All along road Kashgai guards blackmail and harass muleteers beyond endurance, opening and pilfering from cases. Settled population along road are on bad terms with Kashgais, and Khurshid threatens to recover by force Rahdar and Shapur villages seized by Mohammed Ali Khan last summer after Nizam's wanton aggression

against Khurshid. If Khurshid could recover those places, Kamarij-Mian Kotal section would improve. He has appealed to me for support. While strongly counselling moderation to Khurshid and his allies among settled population in order to avoid hostilities, which might temporarily close Bushire road altogether, I am urging Kawam in interests of road to satisfy Khurshid's just demands, and restrain Kashgais from retaliation. Kawam does not, however, feel strong enough yet to coerce powerful Mohammed Ali Khan, who is chief cause of evil.

Owing to assistance of Kawam, and personally friendly attitude of Kashkuli Khans towards consulate, I have been able to pass five European travellers up and down Bushire road, but only by entrusting them to tribesmen implicated in attacks on our troops, and with much arrangement and anxiety. Two of these travellers were violently insulted and blackmailed by Rahdar ruffians, who pointed rifles at them, and even fired in air to intimidate them.

One robbery of six bales British goods just south of Dastarjin, value 180*l.*, and three instances of petty-thefts have been reported to me since the 1st April. All information regarding frequent interruptions of telegraph wires and robberies of Gholams repairing lines can be obtained from director, Tehran.

I see little prospect of general improvement on northern section until winter, reduction of Khamseh tribes being at present impossible, and on southern section until arbitrary power of Kashgais over road is moderated. Government of Fars is, in absence of military force, being run with considerable dexterity by tribal combinations. Mohammed Ali Khan and Kashkulis are at present important link in Government tribal combination, and it may be long before Government can dispense with their support, and rearrange Government tribal combination.

Enclosure 3 in No. 169.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, May 28, 1912.

SOULET rejoined Darashoolis at Baiza and tried to regain their support by taunting them with having been defeated by Kashkulis. Tribe refused to respond, and, Ilkhani having arrived with force, Soulet retreated northwards. Pursuing, Ilkhani caught him up at Duzdkurd, where fighting took place, in which Soulet bolted without making serious stand. He managed to double back southwards, and was reported to be again in Baiza. Two Kashkuli and Farsimedan chiefs, who are stationed permanently in Shiraz, were sent out on the 26th May by Kawam to reconnoitre in Baiza with thirty Farsimedan sowars. They stopped first night at Puzeh Kushan, only 5 miles from town, and during night Soulet unexpectedly appeared with chiefs, say, 200 sowars. Farsimedanis attacked, killing few Souletis and number of horses. Soulet and his escort scattered and fled in the dark towards, it is supposed, Firuzabad. Chiefs told me that they were so close that they heard Soulet's voice, beseeching his Kashgai assailants not to fire on him because he had women and children with him.

It is not clear why, if his only object was to escape southwards, he chose risky course of passing through outskirts of town. It is thought by many that he intended to make dash for consulate.

Soulet, unencumbered by flocks, families, &c., is very mobile, and will hardly be caught by incoherent methods of tribal warfare. Probably only a Government force under Government officer in co-operation with tribal allies could, with carefully laid plans and foresight, run him to ground.

No. 170.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 12th instant; I have the honour to forward to you herewith translation of a decree, signed by the Regent before his departure for Europe, appointing M. Mornard to be treasurer-general of Persia.

In forwarding this document to me, M. Mornard calls attention to the fact that it does not in any way affect the Customs service, the administration of which will be carried on under his direct supervision and responsibility.

As stated in my telegram above referred to, the wording of this decree is

substantially identic with that submitted for your approval in my telegram of the 25th May. There is a slight weakening, perhaps, of the treasurer-general's powers as regards the payment of charges due on foreign loans, but, if it is found necessary, additional power can always be conferred especially upon him, in connection with any future foreign loan. My Russian colleague shares this view.

M. Mornard informs me that a separate contract, fixing the period of his term of service for five years, will be signed with the competent Minister.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Decree.

(Traduction.)

AU nom de Sa Majesté Impériale Sultan Ahmed Chah, Kadjar ;

Vu la loi du 23 Djoza Tangouz-il ;

Vu la nécessité de désigner un titulaire au poste de trésorier général ;

Sur la proposition du Ministre des Finances et l'approbation du Conseil des Ministres ;

Nous décrétons :

1. M. Jacques-Joseph Mornard, administrateur général des Douanes, est nommé trésorier général de l'Empire.

2. M. Mornard sera investi, en sa nouvelle qualité, de toutes les attributions prévues par la loi du 23 Djoza Tangouz-il, qu'il exercera sous l'autorité du Ministre des Finances, conformément aux règlements administratifs qui seront élaborés par le trésorier général, de concert avec le Ministre des Finances et approuvés par le Conseil des Ministres.

3. Le trésorier général aura à charge l'administration générale des différents services ressortissant au Ministère des Finances, y compris le service des Douanes, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans la loi susdite, services qu'il organisera en vertu de l'article 2.

4. Le trésorier général veillera spécialement à ce que toutes les obligations financières contractées par le Gouvernement à titre étranger, telles que paiement des intérêts, amortissements, remboursement des dettes gouvernementales, traitements, subsides, indemnités, rémunérations et toutes autres allocations légalement accordées par le Gouvernement, soient ponctuellement remplies.

5. Une indemnité de 20,000 fr. par an sera allouée par le Gouvernement à M. Mornard pendant toute la durée de sa mission en qualité de trésorier général. Cette indemnité est indépendante de ses appointements primitifs.

6. Le Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Le Régent,

ABOLGASSEM NASSER-EL-MOLK.

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,
NADJAFGOLI, Bakhtiari.

Le Ministre des Finances,
MOAVEN-ED-DOWLEH.

*Téhéran, le Djemadial okhra
Sitchgan-il, 1330.*

(Translation.)

IN the name of His Imperial Majesty Sultan Ahmed Shah, Kadjar :

Having regard to the law of 23 Djoza Tangouz-il ;

Having regard to the necessity of making a definite appointment to the post of treasurer-general ;

On the proposal of the Minister of Finance and with the approval of the Council of Ministers ;

We decree :

1. M. Jacques-Joseph Mornard, administrator-general of the Customs, is appointed treasurer-general of the Empire.

[1340]

N 2

2. M. Mornard shall be invested, in his new capacity, with all the functions provided by the law of 23 Djoza Tangouz-il, which he shall exercise under the authority of the Minister of Finance, in accordance with the administrative regulations which shall be drawn up by the treasurer-general, in concert with the Minister of Finance and sanctioned by the Council of Ministers.

3. The treasurer-general shall superintend the various services for which the Ministry of Finance is responsible, including the Customs service, as provided in the above-mentioned law. He shall organise these services in pursuance of article 2.

4. The treasurer-general shall make it his special duty to ensure that the financial obligations contracted by the Government with foreigners, such as the payment of the interest, amortisation, or repayments of Government debts, and of salaries, subsidies, indemnities, remunerations, and allowances of any other kind lawfully granted by the Government, shall be punctually fulfilled.

5. A salary of 20,000 fr. per annum shall be granted by the Government to M. Mornard for the whole duration of his mission as treasurer-general. This salary is independent of his original emoluments.

6. The Minister of Finance is to take the necessary measures for the execution of the present decree.

AB-UL-KHASSEM, NASER-UL-MULK,
Regent.

NADJAFGOLI, Bakhtiari,
President of the Council of Ministers.

MOAVIN-ED-DOWLEH,
Minister of Finance.

Tehran, Djemadial-okhra
Sitchgan-il, 1330.

No. 171.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 17, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 5th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a letter which I addressed to the Imperial Bank of Persia in Tehran on the 7th instant on the subject of the repayment by the Persian Government of the advance of 100,000*l.*, and instructing them respecting the collection of interest on the sum of 35,000 tomans (7,000*l.*) advanced by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government in anticipation.

Copy of a letter which the chief manager of the bank has addressed to me in reply is also enclosed.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 171.

Sir W. Townley to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Tehran, June 7, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir G. Barclay's letter to you of the 28th March relative to the advance to the Persian Government of 100,000*l.*, I have, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to request the Imperial Bank of Persia, after meeting the service of the "Anglo-Indian loan," 1903 and 1904, and that of the Persian Government 5 per cent. sterling loan of 1911, henceforth to retain from the receipts of the southern customs and remit to His Majesty's Government monthly a sum sufficient to meet the 7 per cent. per annum interest charged on that advance calculated from the 28th March last. Interest at the same rate on the sum of 35,000 tomans advance to the Persian Government on the 2nd March for the period prior to its repayment should also be collected and its equivalent remitted to London. The accounts in regard to these matters should be kept distinct from those relating to the Anglo-Indian loan, 1903 and 1904.

I have to add that, as you are aware, according to the arrangement with the Persian Government the surplus receipts of the southern customs are to be employed

in their entirety for the repayment of the advance of 100,000*l.* His Majesty's Government have, however, decided to suspend the operation of this sinking fund for the period of twelve months, dating from the 28th March last, and you may in the meantime place the surplus at the disposal of the Persian Government, subject, of course, to the proviso that these surplus receipts remain hypothecated to the discharge of the debt in question failing the conclusion of a loan, and its discharge from the proceeds within the period mentioned.

I am, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 171.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Tehran, June 13, 1912.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, and to note the wishes of His Majesty's Government with regard to repayment of capital, collection and remittance of interest, and the matter of the security assigned to the advance of 100,000*l.* to the Persian Government on the 28th March last.

We have advised the treasurer-general (as per copy of our letter enclosed) of the conditions above referred to, and on the 20th instant we propose to remit the accrued interest from the 28th March if there are sufficient funds to meet requirements; but, under present circumstances, it does not seem at all likely that there will be, as the receipts of the southern ports are still being utilised by the treasurer-general in total disregard of the various services to which they are specially assigned.

We have, &c.

A. O. WOOD, *Chief Manager.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 171.

Imperial Bank of Persia to the Treasurer-General.

Sir,

Tehran, June 13, 1912.

WITH regard to the advance of 100,000*l.* made to the Persian Government on the 28th March last, we are now instructed by his Excellency the British Minister to remit to London the monthly interest only, and to waive the matter of repayment of capital for one year from the date of the advance. In the meantime, it is to be noted that the surplus receipts of the southern customs remain as security for the service of this advance, both as regards interest and capital. We therefore propose to remit on the 20th instant the accrued interest at 7 per cent. per annum on 100,000*l.* from the 28th March last.

We have, &c.

A. O. WOOD, *Chief Manager.*

No. 172.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 18, 1912.

AS I had the honour to inform you in my telegram of the 17th June, it has not been possible to make any progress in the negotiations connected with the attack upon Mr. Smart and the withdrawal of the British Indian troops for several weeks. Since the 22nd May there has been a continuous Cabinet crisis, which was only patched up to break out again. The late Minister for Foreign Affairs was closely connected with this crisis, that occupied his attention to the exclusion of all other subjects, the result being that it was hard to get him to discuss questions even of such moment as the one I am reporting upon.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh has at last definitely resigned and his successor has been appointed. Motashem-es-Sultaneh, the Minister of the Interior, called upon me yesterday. In the course of our conversation, his Excellency told me that he had at once, upon assuming office, sent for the papers connected with this incident. He had

seen with pleasure that His Majesty's Government had, as usual, been animated by genuine feelings of goodwill towards Persia, and had made their conditions as lenient as possible. He had, he assured me, telegraphed to the Deputy Governor of Shiraz to instruct him that the culprits must be arrested. His Excellency said that these men are not with Soulet-ed-Dowleh, as Vossuk-ed-Dowleh had told me, but that they are actively employed in combatting that chieftain under the orders of his brother, the present Ilkhani of the Kashgais. This fact, he had impressed upon the Kawan-ul-Mulk, should not stand in the way of their arrest and dispatch to Shiraz for trial.

Motashem-es-Sultaneh added that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, the Governor-General of Fars, is now making preparations for an early departure for his post, and expressed great hope that his assumption of office would be speedily followed by a marked improvement in local conditions. His Excellency further stated that it would seem that the difficulties between the deputy governor and Major Siefert, the senior Swedish gendarmerie officer, had been overcome, and that special instructions would be given to the Governor-General to assist the Swedish officers in their mission.

The Minister's statement about the present whereabouts of the parties directly responsible for the outrage upon Mr. Smart and his escort is confirmed by latest reports from the acting British consul at Shiraz. It is possible that the new Governor-General, who will be supported by all the Bakhtiari influence, may feel himself strong enough, after he has taken over the government, to take steps to effect the arrest of the chiefs implicated. I shall impress the necessity for such action upon his Excellency before his departure.

I will also call his urgent attention to the importance attached by His Majesty's Government to the success of the mission of the Swedish officers, which, it is hoped, will result in the reopening and proper protection of the important trade road between Tehran and Bushire. I propose to speak to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh very seriously upon this subject, because I have reason to believe that the all-powerful Bakhtiari chiefs have not been very genuine in their support of this scheme.

Mr. Smart reports that he is continually pressing the chiefs for the surrender of the culprits, but that they plead impotence to do so, because they have all fled to Soulet-ed-Dowleh, or elsewhere out of reach. This was doubtless the excuse made to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh and repeated to me. There seems to be little doubt that the chiefs have not told the truth, but it is Mr. Smart's opinion that they are unlikely to hand over the culprits except under serious menace.

I am afraid that, under these conditions, preparations will have to be made for the troops to remain over the winter, unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to take steps of such a threatening nature as would induce the Persian Government to bring real pressure to bear on the local authorities at Shiraz.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 173.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past five weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 173.

Summary of Events in Persia for five weeks ending June 18, 1912.

Tehran.

The Regent and Cabinet.—The Regent had originally intended to leave for Europe at the end of May, but a threatened Cabinet crisis and the representations of the British and Russian Ministers caused him to defer his departure for a fortnight.

On the 3rd June the Cabinet was reconstructed as follows :—

Premier, Samsam-es-Sultaneh.
 Foreign Minister, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister of War, Sardar Motashem.
 „ Interior, Motashem-es-Sultaneh.
 „ Finance, Moavin-ed-Dowleh.
 „ Education, Ala-es-Sultaneh.
 „ Justice, Momtaz-ed-Dowleh.
 „ Posts and Telegraphs, Mustashar-ed-Dowleh.

The Regent left Tehran on his way to Europe on the 11th June, but in the meantime Vossuk-ed-Dowleh resigned the post of Foreign Minister, declaring that he could not work in harmony with the Bakhtiari Premier.

The Treasurer-General.—M. Mornard was confirmed as treasurer-general and given a five years' contract in that capacity on the 10th June.

The Democratic Party.—As reported in the last summary, a number of the leaders of the Democratic party were arrested and deported. Wahid-ul-Mulk and Hussein Kuli Khan Nawab have now left for Europe, and the Democratic party may now be said to be broken up at Tehran for the present.

The Medjliss.—There are no signs for the present of elections taking place in the near future for a new Medjliss.

Yeprim Khan.—The notorious Armenian chief of police and leader of volunteers, who was shot by the enemy near Hamadan on the 19th May, had rendered the Government incalculable service during the last two years, and it will be difficult to replace him. The body was brought to Tehran for interment.

The King's Birthday.—His Majesty's birthday was celebrated in the usual manner on the 3rd June. In the morning a deputation from the Shah and Government was received by His Majesty's Minister in uniform; in the afternoon the British colony, Persian notables, and diplomatic corps attended a garden party at the legation, and in the evening an official dinner was given to the Cabinet and the principal members of the colony.

Caspian Provinces.

During the first week in June an engagement took place near Ardebil between Russian troops and some Shahsevan marauders, who had been pillaging the villages in the neighbourhood. The Russians had thirty casualties, including two officers killed. The Russian vice-consul at Ardebil asked for reinforcements, and six companies of infantry were sent from Resht on the 6th June, leaving two companies of infantry and 300 Cossacks at Enzeli and Resht.

In Talish the Russians have taken no further steps since the withdrawal of their punitive force at the commencement of last month.

His Highness the Regent left Enzeli on the 13th June on board a Russian gun-boat.

Meshed.

The general insecurity in the province continues, and several Afghan and Berberi landowners are said to be selling their property and migrating into Afghanistan.

Yusuf Khan, Herati, was captured by Persians near Fariman, 40 miles south of Meshed, and brought to Turuk, 8 miles from Meshed, where he was shot. On the following day, the 24th May, his body was brought into the town and exhibited to the populace.

The head of the mosque of Gauhar Shah left Meshed at the end of May to pay a visit to the ex-Shah at Odessa.

Neiir-ed-Dowleh, the new Governor of Khorassan, arrived at Meshed, on the 5th June.

Ispahan.

The province is in its usual unsettled state, especially the Sultanabad district, where the postal service has been at a standstill since the beginning of June owing to the roads being infested by robbers. The general distress in the town has increased, chiefly on account of a corner in grain made by the governor and some of his friends.

His Excellency, ignoring the authority of the agent to the treasurer-general, has commenced collecting the revenue himself, and is inciting taxpayers to resist the efforts of the Treasury gendarmes to collect taxes.

Yezd.

The province continues to be overrun by parties of robbers, as the governor has no adequate force at his disposal for the maintenance of order.

The Arabs, reported in last month's summary as advancing on Yezd, have broken up into small parties and commenced plundering the district.

The Baharlus, who captured the hamlet of Shehr-i-Babek, were dislodged by a force under the governor of that place. But, as the Government force was not strong enough to break up the gathering, other villages in the neighbourhood are suffering.

On the 7th June Entezam-ul-Mulk, formerly Governor of Yezd but now a reactionary, raided Ardistan, but was dissuaded from plundering the town by the chief priest, who bribed him with a mare and a Lebel rifle. According to latest reports, he is being followed up by a party of Government troops.

Shiraz.

Soulet-ed-Dowleh, since his defeat at the hands of the Arabs and Kashgais, has been a fugitive in the hilly country around Shiraz. Parties of his pursuers came up with him twice last month, but he managed to escape on both occasions.

Kerman.

On the 17th May Amir-i-Azam, the governor, owing to the near approach of the rebels, forsook his post and took refuge in the consulate. He was, however, persuaded to return to the city and to carry out the duties his position demanded.

On the 26th he attacked the rebels, with the result that they left the precincts of the town and moved into the Bardsir district to the south-west of Kerman.

After some hesitation, Amir-i-Azam was induced to follow up the rebels. On the 8th June he was reported to have reached Baghin (30 miles south-west of Kerman) with a force of 1,000 men.

Kermanshah.

On the 19th May the Government force, under Yeprim, attacked and defeated the rebels under Mujallal-es-Sultan, near Hamadan. Mujallal is reported to have had some 300 casualties, including 120 prisoners. The Government losses were 30 killed and wounded. Yeprim was killed during the fighting, and Kerri, an Armenian, Yeprim's second in command, took his place.

The Government troops followed up the retreating rebel force, and on the 29th May another engagement took place close to Kermanshah, in which Daoud Khan, the leading Kalhur chief and one of Salar-ed-Dowleh's principal supporters, was killed. On the following day the Government troops, with Prince Farman Farma, the newly appointed Governor of Kermanshah, entered the town.

Salar-ed-Dowleh and Mujallal-es-Sultan are reported to have fled into Luristan.

Bushire.

The plague in the district is reported to be getting worse, and an exodus has commenced from Bushire itself owing to the prevalence of the disease.

Telegraphic communication with Ahwaz has been interrupted since the 29th May, when 4 miles of wire and posts were carried off in the vicinity of Behbahan by some of the local tribesmen.

Bunder Abbas.

The party of raiders, mentioned in last month's summary, increased by local contingents to some 500 men, advanced their main body to within 8 miles of the town on the 15th May, and pushed forward an advanced party of about 70 men to some wells 2 miles from the consulate.

On the morning of the 15th the consular guard drove off the advanced party of the raiders. The same afternoon, in view of possible developments, the senior naval

officer landed 120 men and 4 Maxims from the ships, and on the 17th 30 men and 1 Maxim from the 7th Rajputs. The raiders, disheartened by the arrival of these reinforcements, dispersed.

On the 19th May the troops were re-embarked.

No. 174.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 18, 1912.

IN his telegram of the 5th March* my predecessor had the honour to repeat to you a telegram received from Mr. Acting Consul Smart reporting the interference and petty robberies to which certain cases destined for His Majesty's troops at Shiraz had been subjected on the road from Bushire to the interior in January and February last.

No details as to the nature and value of the articles stolen had been received from Mr. Smart until the arrival on the 14th June of the despatch of which I enclose an extract, and consequently no claim has yet been made by the legation to the Central Government in regard to this matter.

It now appears that the value of the articles, viz., 200*l.* is much larger than had been anticipated by the tenour of Mr. Smart's original telegram. It is to be noted that Colonel Douglas has asked the Indian authorities to refund to him the amount, pending recovery from the Persian Government, in order that the officers and men should not suffer hardship.

I have requested Mr. Smart to furnish me with fuller details in regard to the nature of the articles stolen.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

June 20, 1912.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received a telegram from Mr. Smart in which he states that the articles extracted from the cases comprise binoculars, stirrups, boots, blankets, reins, supplies despatched to the supply and transport officer, Shiraz, and a consignment of clothes addressed to Lieutenant Fraser of the Central India Horse.

Mr. Smart adds that it has been impossible to ascertain all the points on the road at which the cases were opened, though Khurshid Khan of Kamarej, and Tofanghis at Tangi-Turkan and Rahdar appear to have been the principal offenders.

W. T.

Enclosure 1 in No. 174.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Extract.)

I VENTURE to invite your attention more especially to claim No. 112. The circumstances of this robbery, or rather of these robberies, were of a peculiarly aggravated nature. Colonel Douglas has, I understand, asked the competent Indian authorities to refund to him the amount of this claim pending recovery from the Persian Government. The officers and men of the Central India Horse are, I submit, in a privileged position regarding such robberies, and it would seem inequitable to expect them to suffer, apart from the hardships entailed from the deprivation of very necessary articles, heavy pecuniary loss for the indefinite period which seems to stretch before ordinary British claimants in Fars. I venture to hope, therefore, that you will be able to bring this claim to the notice of the Persian Government with a view to a less remote settlement than that in prospect for most of our claims in this province. I may mention that a further series of petty robberies, similar to those included in claim No. 112, from consignments sent from Bushire to the Central India Horse has occurred during the last month, and, in the event of my being unable to settle these claims locally, I shall include them in my next quarterly list.

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," No. 265.

Enclosure 2 in No. 174.

Précis of Claim No. 112.

No.	Claim.	Amount.	Date.	Remarks.
112	Officers and men of the 39th Central India Horse	Krans. 10,448	Jan. to Feb. 1912.	Robberies of personal and regimental effects from cases sent from Bushire on Bushire road, presumably by roadguards. Notified to local authorities at Shiraz on March 2, 1912.

No. 175.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 18, 1912.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch of the 4th June respecting the Bakhtiari road and the repair by Messrs. Lynch of the Godar Bridge.

Messrs. Lynch's engineer, Mr. Sotham, has returned to Tehran from the Bakhtiari country, having repaired the bridge sufficiently to prevent its collapse for at least twelve months. He was not able to complete the repairs satisfactorily, owing to the unsettled state of the Bakhtiari country and in a great measure to the unfriendly attitude of Sardar Ashja, one of the principal khans who has already been the subject of strong complaints on the part of the legation.

I have not failed to represent the gravity of the situation to the khans at Tehran, and I have again complained very seriously of Sardar Ashja, who has now been summoned to Tehran. But in view of the fact that the principal khans are engaged in Tehran and elsewhere in Ministerial posts and as provincial governors, I see very little prospect of their being in a position in the near future to deal effectively with the situation in their own country. I will of course continue to press them to take effective measures to keep their people and the Kuhgelus in order, but I cannot entertain much hope, if the present conditions continue, of seeing any appreciable improvement in the near future.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 176.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 20, 1912.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram of the 17th May, the situation at Kerman suddenly took a turn for the worse on the 17th May, and the Governor-General took refuge in His Majesty's consulate. As a result, however, of a lengthy telegraphic conversation in the middle of the night with his Excellency and Colonel Haig, I was successful in persuading the former to return home and resume his duties.

A few days later, his Excellency attacked the rebels—fortunately with success; he defeated the rebels, though Colonel Haig considers that a more complete success would have been obtained had his Excellency attacked them a few days previously. The rebels, though put to flight, were not dispersed; his Excellency preferred, however, not to pursue them, but to wait in the hope of a split in the rebels' camp, which active measures on his part would doubtless have accelerated.

My latest information is that he has now captured Mirza Hussein Khan and Rifat-i-Nizam, the leaders of the rebels, and that the remainder have submitted. The above-mentioned leaders have been hanged. When it is considered that these men had no grievance whatever except that the Governor-General had issued orders forbidding them to rob, and calculated to deprive them of the chance of doing so, that they were the originators of the late movement, and have caused much misery in the

province, and heavy loss to the Government, that they resisted the Governor-General in arms, and remained in arms after having been warned by the authorities that the Government would regard them as rebels unless they dispersed, their execution seems justifiable and necessary as a warning to others that such movements against the local authorities cannot be undertaken with impunity. In the case of Rifat-i-Nizam, it is not the first time that he has rebelled against the Government. Three years ago, he marched on Kerman, and reached Mahun before his force was defeated and dispersed.

It is, unfortunately, necessary in the present distracted state of the country that such examples should be made; very reluctantly, I cannot but approve the Governor-General's determination which was taken without seeking my advice.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 177.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 20, 1912.

I MUCH regret to have to state that it has not been found possible to make any progress with the consideration of the conditions under which a loan could be made to Persia under reasonable conditions.

M. Poklewsky and I have repeatedly pressed M. Mornard to go more carefully into the nature of the revenues that may still be available as securities for such a loan, as it is obvious that the statement submitted to you, Sir, in Sir George Barclay's despatch of the 9th March does not provide sufficient security out of the assured available revenue for a loan of the magnitude of the one projected, despite the fact that M. Mornard expressed his opinion in the above-mentioned statement that the 1,819,000 tomans available should suffice for the issue of a loan of 33,000,000 tomans, or about 6,000,000*l.*

Both the managers of the Imperial and Russian Banks and M. Poklewsky share my opinion that this sum would be quite insufficient for the purpose of a security, and M. Mornard has been told that an available income of 3,000,000 tomans would be required before we could support a contention that the assured annual revenues of the country are sufficient to meet a loan of 6,000,000*l.* The treasurer-general has not so far been able to furnish us with the data required.

We have discussed the question of the possibility of judicial reforms and of an alteration of the laws governing the rights of foreigners to hold real estate in Persia, and to accept it as security for loans, with the Regent.

His Highness gave it as his opinion that a reform in the nature of an improvement of judicial procedure and of the execution of judicial decrees would be both possible and desirable. On his departure for Europe he included this question in a memorandum of instructions which he left to the Cabinet for their guidance during his sojourn in Europe.

The question of land tenure would appear to be a more difficult one, as the Regent pointed out that a European holding real estate in Persia would be not only outside the power of the Persian judicial jurisdiction himself as concerned his estate, but that it would also be held that all the persons employed on such estate are outside Persian judicial jurisdiction. Turkish subjects can hold real estate by virtue of an arrangement by which the consular authorities are divested of power of interference, but such an arrangement would hardly recommend itself to a European Christian Power. Naib-es-Sultaneh seemed to favour the view that it would be better to leave matters in this respect as they are, as under existing conditions real estate is accepted by the banks and such institutions as security for mortgages, and many Russian and British Indian Mussulmans do hold landed property despite the law to the contrary.

I would respectfully venture to request that these impressions may be accepted as merely the result of primary enquiries, as it has not yet been possible to go more fully into the matter in consequence of the uncertainty which was for some time attached to the life of the late administration.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 178.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 1, 1912.

A NOTE has been addressed by the Russian Minister to the Persian Government in which the departure of the Sipahdar is rendered conditional on the formation at Tabriz of a force of Persian Cossacks, commanded by two Russian officers and four non-commissioned officers. The maintenance of the force, which is to be 700 strong, is to be charged to the revenues of the province. According to M. Poklewsky an arrangement was made with the Regent and the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, that the arrival of the Sipahdar at Tabriz and the creation of the above force should coincide in point of time. The proximate increase in the Tehran brigade, as recently proposed, will, according to the terms of the note, be in no way affected.

A favourable reply, in which the Persian Government will express their hope of the early withdrawal of the Russian forces now in occupation of Azerbaijan, has been promised in the near future, though it is to be foreseen that a delay may arise through the postponement of the Sipahdar's departure.

No. 179.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 1, 1912.

MY telegram of the 17th June.

M. Poklewsky informs me that the Russian general has been obliged to leave only a very small force at Ardebil in order to free his troops for the operations against the Shahsevans. To ensure the safety of this garrison he has deemed it imperative to station it in the citadel, which he describes as unoccupied. Russian troops will only remain temporarily in the citadel, and will not hoist the Russian flag.

This act of Russian general is looked upon by Persian Government as a gross violation of the sovereignty of Persia, as they maintain that the citadel is the seat of the Government of the town. They also state that Shruja has imprisoned and deported the karguzar, on whom the only blame that can be laid is that he was endeavouring to bring about a peaceful settlement with the Shahsevans.

No. 180.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 2, 1912.

SOUTH PERSIA.

My telegram of the 23rd June.

The ilkhani has informed Kawam that he has abandoned all hope of persuading Mohammed Ali Khan to hand over of his own free will the persons guilty of the attacks on our troops.

I discussed the situation yesterday at length with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I reminded him that His Majesty's Government were anxious to learn whether the Persian Government had done anything to secure redress, and if so what the nature of their action had been.

In reply, his Highness assured me that the matter had been pressed upon the authorities of Fars repeatedly by the Central Government, but the latter were not in a position to make their power felt so far from the capital at the present unhappy moment; he felt sure His Majesty's Government must recognise this. He assured me that full powers and instructions to deal drastically with this question would be given to the new Governor-General, who would start in a few days. He said that he was confident that the new Governor-General would succeed in arresting the culprits. He added that special instructions would be given the new Governor-General to support the Swedish gendarmierie officers, and he urged that His Majesty's Govern-

ment should give the Governor-General time to prove his capability of securing redress.

Though the desired telegram from the Nejed Ulemas has never been published at Shiraz, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me officially that it was duly sent.

No. 181.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 2, 1912.

ACCORDING to a telegram which I have just received from His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz, it is expected that Sipahdar's arrival will be the signal for Shuja to retire to a house which he has constructed in Russian village in the neighbourhood of Tabriz; this will be equivalent to his taking bast. Mr. Stevens adds that Salar-ed-Dowleh is expected to arrive there shortly, and that his lieutenant, Mujallal, has already taken bast there. Salar is reported to be at Sakkis, in Kurdistan, but Persian Government pretend that they place no credence in the report. They say, however, that their latest information is that the Kajar factions have accepted Salar as their candidate for the throne.

Under existing conditions the presence of Sipahdar in the capital is, in my opinion, a standing danger to the public peace.

No. 182.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 3, 1912.

ACTIVITY of the ex-Shah.

My telegram of yesterday.

The "chef de cabinet" of the Foreign Office called on me this morning on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to express the anxiety the Persian Government felt at the recent news of the movements of the ex-Shah and his supporters at Tabriz, begging me to bring to the notice of His Majesty's Government the extreme gravity of the situation, which, in the opinion of the Ala-es-Sultaneh, would be followed by the gravest consequences for Persia should Mohammed Ali Mirza succeed in setting foot again in Persia. The presence of Shuja at Tabriz, of his brother at Zenjan, and of Farman Farma, of whose fidelity there is some doubt, at Kermanshah would seem to argue carefully concerted action for the reception of the ex-Shah, whilst it is expected that Gilan, Mazanderan, and Khorassan would throw in their lot with the Royalists. The gravity of the situation is further aggravated, as Ala-es-Sultaneh points out, by the fact that the resources of the Persian Government in arms and specie are considerably weaker than they were last year.

The Minister is anxious that His Majesty's Government should do their utmost to prevent the return of Mohammed Ali Mirza, and enquired if the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to this question remains the same as publicly expressed in the past. He spoke very earnestly on the desirability of expediting the departure of the Sipahdar for his post.

In reply, I stated that I had no reason for supposing that the views of His Majesty's Government had undergone any alteration, and assured him that I would lose no time in conveying to you the purport of his communication.

No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 3, 1912.

THE Persian Minister called here on the 1st instant and communicated to Sir L. Mallet a telegram from his Government calling attention to the Russian movement against the Shahsevañs, to the continued dispatch of troops to Ardebil and the requisitioning of the citadel there for the housing of the troops.

He expressed the hope that I would ask the Russian Government to recall the troops, and would protest against the use of the citadel for their shelter.

Sir L. Mallet replied that he would inform you of this request.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 184.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 5, 1912.

SOUTH PERSIA.

Mr. Smart telegraphs from Shiraz that he does not think we should be justified in holding chief priest of Shiraz responsible for non-publication of the telegram from the Ulemas of Nejef. Mr. Smart hears that all the responsible Kashgai chiefs and the principal Ulemas have been furnished with copies of the telegram, but he adds that messages of Mesopotamian Ulemas are apt to excite more easily than restrain tribal opinion.

No. 185.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 7, 1912.

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Bushire has kindly repeated to me the following telegram, dated the 5th July, which he has addressed to the Government of India:—

“As the present authorities in Fars are clearly unable to press the Kashkulis in the matter of the arrest of those guilty of the attack on our troops, there seems no probability of early compliance by the Persian Government with our demand. I think, therefore, that we should proceed with the construction of barracks. When we evacuate Shiraz we can recover the cost of construction from the Persian Government, who would doubtless find them useful for the gendarmerie force which is being created at Shiraz.”

No. 186.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 22, 1912.

MY despatch of the 20th instant, which left here by bag the same day, will show you what is the present situation at Kerman and the steps leading up to the defeat and dispersal of the rebels.

I now have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two interesting despatches which I have received from Colonel Haig, in which he reviews the origin of the rebellion and its progress up to the 22nd May.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 186.

Consul Haig to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kerman, May 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you with the origin and progress of the rising against the Governor-General of Kerman and Baluchistan which has, for the past fortnight, been causing grave anxiety among most classes in the city of Kerman.

2. When Amir-i-Azam, in December last, came to Kerman as Governor-General he was accompanied by Mirza Hussein Khan who had formerly been chief of police in Kerman, and was returning with a view to being reinstated in that appointment, for which, I understand, he had been recommended to Amir-i-Azam by the Minister of

the Interior. It was discovered, however, that he had made so many enemies in the town during his previous tenure of the appointment, that it was undesirable to reinstate him, and he remained for a short time without definite employment until he was appointed Governor of Bam. The people of Bam, having heard of his violence and rapacity, telegraphed to the Governor-General protesting against the appointment, which was cancelled in consequence of the protest. Mirza Hussein Khan was, however, sent to Bam as a "mamur," or deputy, of the Governor-General to restore order in the town and its neighbourhood. While he was there Amir-i-Azam associated him with Rifaat-i-Nizam for the performance of an important duty. The two were to collect all the troops, regular and irregular, that could be assembled, and were to march through Narmashir, Jiruft, Rudbar, Akta-i-Afshar, and Sirjan for the purpose of restoring order and collecting all arrears of revenue, returning from the last-named district to Kerman. They left Bam for Narmashir early in March 1912 with a large force of infantry and cavalry and two guns.

3. The selection of these two men for a duty of this nature was most unfortunate. Mirza Hussein Khan's sole merit is physical courage. In other respects he is totally unfitted for employment in any position of responsibility. Many have told me that they warned Amir-i-Azam of the folly of entrusting any important duty to Mirza Hussein, and especially of placing guns at his disposal, but the warning had no effect. Rifaat-i-Nizam is a man with an overweening idea of his own importance. His personal history is well known. Without possessing the advantages of good birth or wealth, he obtained some notoriety and influence in Bam when the constitution was first granted as a protagonist and expounder of constitutional principles. He has suffered some vicissitudes, but has recently recovered his former influence in Bam and has used it for his own selfish ends. He was innocently recommended for responsible employment to Amir-i-Azam by Hadji Itibar-us-Sultaneh, whose father has been well served by Rifaat-i-Nizam's father, and whose opinion of Rifaat-i-Nizam was coloured by this claim on his good offices.

4. As soon as Mirza Hussein Khan and Rifaat-i-Nizam had entered upon the duty entrusted to them various circumstances caused Amir-i-Azam to modify his original plan of leaving the collection of the revenue of the richest districts of Kerman in their hands. Mohammed Khan, the largest landowner in Jiruft and formerly governor of that district, came into Kerman and persuaded Amir-i-Azam to reinstate him in his former appointment, promising to collect all arrears of revenue without the intervention of Mirza Hussein Khan and Rifaat-i-Nizam. There is every reason to believe that he paid or promised to pay a sum of money for the appointment, and the Minister of Interior has made this transaction a cause of complaint against Amir-i-Azam as though the sale of appointments were unknown in Tehran and were not the custom of the country. Bahadur-ul-Mulk, the dismissed Governor of Jiruft, who has paid no more than one-eighth or one-tenth of the revenue due from him, was much perturbed by Mohammed Khan's appointment, fearing lest he should be forced to disgorge the revenue which he had already appropriated. At the same time Amir-i-Azam changed his attitude towards Zargham-i-Nizam of Rudbar, who had paid no revenue for some time and was to have been attacked by Mirza Hussein Khan and Rifaat-i-Nizam. He sent him a complimentary present intended as a formal recognition of his position as agent for the collection of the revenue in Rudbar.

5. In the meantime Mirza Hussein Khan and Rifaat-i-Nizam had begun their operations in Narmashir by plundering the people, and Amir-i-Azam rebuked them, commanded to restore their spoil to its lawful owners, and informed them that their services would not be required in Jiruft and Rudbar, where other arrangements had been made for the collection of the revenue. Disappointed by the discovery that they were not to be allowed to plunder indiscriminately, and by their exclusion from two districts in which they had expected to reap a rich harvest, they returned an insolent message to Amir-i-Azam bidding him mind his own business. Rebellion was now the only course open to them, and, encouraged by the possession of two guns and the adhesion of Bahadur-ul-Mulk and Muin-i-Divan, ex-Governor of Jabalbariz, who had been punished by the Governor-General, they declared their intention of expelling Amir-i-Azam as an unconstitutional and oppressive governor, and marched towards Kerman through Jabalbariz and Jiruft, plundering the country on their way on the pretext of collecting the revenue and supplies for the constitutional force. The property of Mohammed Khan of Jiruft was placed under contribution, and he himself was forced to join the rebels, as his men were dispersed and he had no force with him beyond two mounted personal attendants. Zargham-i-Nizam of Rudbar, though nominally loyal, judged it prudent to conciliate the rebels by sending a small force to co-operate with them, but refrained from joining them in person. In Jiruft the rebels captured Haider Khan,

Amir-i-Azam's farrashbashi, and twenty or thirty men who had been sent with him to collect revenue. Haider Khan has been released, but the other prisoners are still detained by the rebels. From Jiruft the whole force proceeded to Baft, where Bahadur-ul-Mulk's influence induced the two sections of the Afshars under their chiefs, Ghunj Ali Khan and Soulet-ul-Mulk to join it. The Buchakchis, under Shukuh-us-Sultan and Shuja-us-Sultan, also joined the movement, and as this tribe is at enmity with the Afshars, and will never in ordinary circumstances work with them, there can be little doubt that they are acting at the instigation of Sardar-i-Nusrat, who was accompanied to Tehran by Bahman Agha, a Buchakchi, who has sent several telegrams in cypher from Tehran to the chiefs of his tribe. The rebels, whose number, at first greatly exaggerated, appears to be 800 or 1,000, did much damage in the neighbourhood of Baft, plundering the people and cutting the green crops for fodder. The property of the karguzar in and around Lalazar was laid waste, and two of his men were killed. They advanced into the Bardsir district, where they plundered the villages belonging to Prince Farman Farma, and announced their intention of advancing immediately on Kerman. Amir-i-Azam, who had less than a hundred trustworthy troops to oppose to them, was much terrified by the prospect of their advance, and prepared for flight by packing up his portable property and drawing his money out of the bank. I did my utmost to reassure him and to prevail on him to remain, and wrote a letter to the rebels warning them of the responsibility which they would incur should they enter Kerman, where their troops and followers would certainly plunder the people, for the purpose of expelling a Governor-General who, whatever opinion they might entertain of his measures, had been lawfully appointed by the Persian Government, and was entitled to the obedience of all loyal subjects of Persia until he should be dismissed by the same authority. This letter was signed by the acting Russian consul as well as by me, and I also wrote letters to the chiefs of the two tribes warning them of the risk which they incurred by associating themselves in such a cause with two men without a stake in the country who, in the event of the failure of the movement, would disappear and leave those whose homes and lands were in the province to bear the brunt of the Government's displeasure. To this joint letter the rebels replied by a letter bearing thirty-one seals, in which they disclaimed any intention of disobeying the Government or molesting the people of Kerman, and said that their sole object was to petition the Government with a view to procuring the dismissal of an extortionate and oppressive Governor-General. They requested us at the same time to prevent the Governor-General from opposing their entrance. To this we replied that if their attitude was that of petitioners they should release their prisoners and dismiss their troops, and they answered in a brief letter informing us that they had sent a detailed reply to the karguzar and requesting us in future to address them through that channel, "in accordance with law." In their answer addressed to the karguzar they expressed their readiness to obey the "lawful" orders of the Persian Government, reserving to themselves apparently the right of distinguishing between lawful and unlawful orders, again requested the consuls to prevent the Governor-General from opposing them, and, in particular, from using artillery against them, and concluded by challenging the Governor-General to come out and meet them where they were encamped, about 50 miles from the town.

6. On the 8th May, the Governor-General having withdrawn his money from the bank and assured me positively that he intended to leave on the following morning, the treasure of the Imperial Bank of Persia was transferred to the British consulate, where it is still stored. The Europeans had already been warned that it might be necessary for them to come to the consulate and were prepared to move. Two telegraph lines were run to the consulate in the course of the next two or three days, in case it should be necessary for the telegraph-house to be vacated. On the morning of the 9th May the Governor-General sent for me and I went to the palace, taking my Russian colleague with me. Amir-i-Azam had decided to postpone his departure for a few days, but was still in a state of terror. I again exerted myself to reassure him, and discovered that he was as apprehensive of the party in the town styling themselves "Democrats" as of the force in the field. The Democrats, lead by Agha Yahya, late chairman of the local assembly, had been secretly encouraging the rebels to advance and occupy the town, and, as some of them were then present at a meeting which my arrival had interrupted and was assembled in the room next to that in which Amir-i-Azam had received me, he suggested that I should speak to them. He wished me to frighten them by threatening them with the immediate arrival of British troops, but this, of course, I declined to do. I informed them that British subjects and other foreigners were extremely apprehensive of molestation at the hands of the rebels, and

asked them what they proposed to do. I was met with assurance that the people would fight to protect foreigners, but derided such promises, pointing out that the rebels were not disciplined troops, but robbers under no proper control, that I knew that many people were preparing to flee from the town with their goods, and that those who remained would, even if they were disposed to fight at all, which might be doubted, have too much to do in defending their own property to be able to devote any attention to the defence of that of foreigners. When the assurance was repeated I insisted that there was only one way to protect the property of foreigners, and that was to keep the robbers out of the town. I ultimately forced the leaders to undertake to do this, and, though I had no faith in the undertaking, I had gained something by compelling those who entered into it to stultify themselves and by producing an excellent effect on the courage and spirits of the Governor-General, who for the time gave up all idea of flight.

7. From news which I received from the camp of the rebels I was led to hope that they were losing heart and would probably quarrel among themselves or disperse, but this hope has unfortunately not been realised. They have again advanced and have, I hear, to-day reached Baghin, one stage from the town. The town will probably suffer severely at the hands of the rebels, who during their advance have plundered and laid waste the country, have put to death those who have made any attempt to defend their property, and have violated women. I am informed that their leaders, when in their cups, boast of their intention of putting to death the consuls and other Europeans, but disclaim such intentions in their sober moments. I can hardly believe that they will venture to attack the consulates, but I have little expectation that the property of Europeans and Hindus in the town will be safe. The stocks of four carpet firms have been transferred to the consulate, and I propose to invite the Europeans here to-morrow morning. The Hindus have already sought refuge, but I have no means of protecting their property in the town, worth many hundreds of thousands of rupees.

8. I need not at present enter into the merits of the movement against Amir-i-Azam beyond saying that, although he has not been faultless as a governor, he has done nothing to justify a rebellion. The rebels are, I believe, actuated by various motives, but one is common to them all—the hope of plunder.

I am, &c.

T. W. HAIG, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 186.

Consul Haig to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kerman, May 22, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 15th May, 1911, I have the honour to inform you of the progress of the movement against Prince Amir-i-Azam, Governor-General of Kerman and Baluchistan.

2. Between 9 and 10 P.M., on the 16th May, a confidential employé of the Prince, who usually goes by the name of M. Jean, and claims to be a French subject, but is, I believe, an Armenian, came to the consulate and informed me that the Prince was coming almost immediately to take bast in the consulate. As he did not appear within a reasonable time, I left the lights burning for him and went to bed. In the morning I discovered that he had not come during the night, but he arrived before I was out and, encamped in a large garden adjoining the consulate garden belonging to Nurullah Khan and generally believed to be under the protection of the consulate. He came to see me, and I endeavoured to persuade him to return to the city, again assuring him that I was convinced that his presence there would be sufficient to prevent an attack, but to no purpose. The rebels were then reported to be at Baghin, one stage from Kerman. When it was light I went to see him again, and he announced his intention of resuming his duties, and asked me to go at once into the town and arrange with the karguzar for the assembly of a meeting of the leading men of the city, promising to follow me as soon as I informed him that the meeting was ready to receive him. I was still in the karguzar's house arranging details when news was brought that the Governor-General had passed down the main street with his escort on his way to the citadel. Almost immediately afterwards two of his sowars appeared and asked me to follow him to the Persian telegraph-office, a large and convenient building in the citadel. I did so, and found him at work there. We discovered that the first step necessary was the suspension of

Basharat-ul-Mamalik, the recently appointed superintendent of the telegraph-office. This man had been sent by the Persian Government to the rebels to order them to disperse and obey the orders of Government; but we received information, which has since been confirmed by the best authority, that he accepted a bribe of 1,000 tomans from them and promised to work for them. On this evidence I promised Amir-i-Azam to support his demand for Basharat-ul-Mamalik's dismissal, which is absolutely necessary.

4. The rebels have advanced in the meantime from Baghin to within 2 or 3 fersakh of the town, and on the evening of the 17th I learnt that all the telegraph wires had been cut on both sides, and was informed that the rebels intended to attack the town that night. I did not believe this, but informed all Europeans that if they were alarmed the consulate was open to them, and took necessary precautions. Very few accepted my invitation, and no attack was made. On the following morning I again visited the governor, and remained with him during the day. I wrote to the rebels asking them why they had not obeyed the orders of their Government, and why they had damaged the telegraph line. In reply they impudently accused Amir-i-Azam of having caused the line to be cut, and requested me to go out and see them. My messenger informed me that he believed that their object in asking me to visit them was to attempt to induce me to withdraw my support from the Governor-General and transfer it to them, and as I believed that their ignorance of the limitations imposed on me by my office they might encourage themselves and their followers by the hope that such a change of attitude was possible, and suspected that they would try to represent the recent telegram addressed to them by the Minister of the Interior as a forgery by the Governor-General, I considered it advisable to remove all doubt on these two points, and decided to visit them on Sunday. I suggested that the karguzar should accompany me, as he, in his capacity as a Persian official, would be able to assure them of the attitude of the Central Government, and to convey any messages that the Governor-General might wish to send, whilst I should be able to assure them from the information received by me from you that the karguzar's account of the attitude of the Central Government was correct. My proposal that the karguzar should accompany me was accepted, and he assisted me beyond my expectations. I studiously confined myself when all were present to assuring the rebels that as consul of a foreign State I was bound to recognise an official duly appointed by the Persian Government, and no one ventured publicly to suggest that I should change my attitude, although many in private conference with me urged me to do so. It very soon became evident that there was no likelihood of obtaining from the leaders of the rebels a concise statement of their grievances. Those of Mirza Hussein Khan and Rifaat-i-Nizam have already been stated in paragraph 5 of my last despatch; Muin-i-Divan, late Governor of Jabalbariz, complains that the Governor-General has punished him, but from all accounts that I have heard he deserved his punishment; Bahadur-ul-Mulk resents his dismissal from the governorship of Jiruft, and fears lest he should be called upon to pay the arrears of revenue due him; Ghunj Ali Khan, Ilkhani of the Afshars, has not paid revenue for three years, and is naturally apprehensive of being called to account; but most of the others confessed that they had no grievance, but had accompanied their friends. I plainly informed them separately and privately that not one of the grievances alleged by them could be advanced either as a ground for the dismissal of the Governor-General or in palliation of their attitude, and some of them then endeavoured to excuse themselves by making vague and unsubstantiated charges of extortion and oppression against Amir-i-Azam. I informed these that I did not believe them, but that whatever the Governor-General might have done, he had not inflicted on the inhabitants of the province one-thousandth part of the misery which the rebels had inflicted. When I asked them in the presence of all why they had cut the telegraph wires, they repeated their assertion that Amir-i-Azam had caused them to be cut, and on my enquiring why he should have done so foolish a thing, they replied that he had done it in order to prevent them from communicating with Tehran. I then told them that he had no need to cut the wires for that purpose, as he was occupying the telegraph office, and would not allow any telegram to be dispatched until it had received his approval. This information silenced them for a time, until one suggested that the wires had been cut lest they should communicate with Tehran through the British office, to which I replied by telling them that they knew as well as I did, that no telegram from them would in any circumstances be accepted by the British office. They were again silent for a time, and then suggested that the wires had been cut "to give them a bad name." I answered that Amir-i-Azam had complete control of the Persian office, and could more effectively "give them a bad name" by means of telegrams to

Tehran than by cutting off a means of communication which it was to his interest to keep open. This completely silenced them, and Mirza Hussein Khan afterwards admitted to me, in private conversation, that he had himself cut the wires. Shortly before sunset, the karguzar and I left the camp and returned to the town, where we informed the Governor-General of what had passed. After some discussion, it was decided that the karguzar and I should go again to the camp on the following day, and persuade five of the leaders to return with us under a safe conduct to be given by me, to represent their grievances to Amir-i-Azam.

5. On Monday the karguzar and I went to the camp and made this proposal to the leaders, but they had evidently realised that it was impossible for them to submit, as grievances against the Governor-General, such complaints as they had made to me, and endeavoured to evade the proposal on various pretexts and by means of frivolous suggestions. They urged that, if five of the leaders came in, those who remained would not be sufficient to maintain order among the troops, and suggested that they should send in one representative. I replied that, as each man seemed to have a distinct cause of complaint, one representative would not suffice, and that five, or at least four, was the smallest number to which Amir-i-Azam would agree. Then, having complained that five of the leaders could not safely leave the troops, they suggested that all of them, to the number of twelve or thirteen, should come in. To this proposal, which was evidently not serious, I replied by repeating their own objection to sending as many as five. It was then suggested that the conference should take place in the consulate, instead of in a tent outside the city as Amir-i-Azam had proposed. I objected to this suggestion as being an insult to the Persian Government, and assured them that they would be as secure in the tent as in the consulate, as I promised to take them in in safety, to be present throughout the conference, though I should not take part in it, and to see them safely to the camp again. It was then proposed that I should hold a sort of court and act as judge between themselves as plaintiffs and Amir-i-Azam as defendant. I disclaimed jurisdiction, and said that I could not insult the Governor-General by entertaining or making such a suggestion. They then asked me to guarantee that the conference would lead to a satisfactory settlement, and I replied that I could not guarantee that it would lead to any settlement at all, though it seemed to me to offer the only chance of arriving at one. They then openly requested me to withdraw my support from the Governor-General and transfer it to them, and I explained the impossibility of such a course, and said that, as they had rejected the only proposal which offered the chance of a peaceful settlement, I must conclude that they did not desire such a settlement, and declined to discuss the question further with them. They were most unwilling to let me go, hoping apparently that they might still persuade me to help them, and, fearing that my final withdrawal would alienate those who had been in a manner forced to join them. At length I succeeded in getting away, and discovered that their fears had been realised, and that what I had said in private to those whom I knew to be lukewarm had had effect. Soulet-us-Sultan and his brother, two Afshar leaders, had preceded me to the city with about 200 followers, and I had not driven more than 2 or 3 miles when I saw a body of horse riding after me. I drove on for some distance, and as they came nearer drew aside from the road to let them pass. They were about fifty Afshars, commanded by Soulet-ul-Mulk and accompanied by his father-in-law, Mohammed Khan, of Jiruft, an old friend of mine, and formerly my guest in the consulate. I welcomed and congratulated him, and he laughingly replied that he could not let me return to the city alone. I drove on with the karguzar and found Amir-i-Azam in the highest spirits talking to the two Afshar leaders who had already arrived. I was present when he received Mohammed Khan and Soulet-ul-Mulk, and left shortly afterwards.

6. The Prince has been hesitating as to attacking the remnant of the rebels. He is now stronger than they are, and if he attacked them would certainly be joined by the Government troops still in their camp; but he is still hesitating and sending out messages to them. He has to-day, however, informed me that he proposes to attack them to-morrow.

7. I must now explain the circumstances in which I obtained 5,000 tomans from the Imperial Bank of Persia for the Governor-General. I had already received your assurance that the money had been, or was about to be, placed at his disposal, and I had seen the telegram received by him from the Minister of the Interior, in which he was informed that orders for its payment had been issued to M. Mornard. Up to the time when the telegraph wires were cut no telegram had been received from M. Mornard, and money was urgently needed, for the troops had long been unpaid, and there was every likelihood that numbers would desert. It was impossible to say when telegraphic

No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 8, 1912.

MY telegram of 27th June : Chief of police.

Are any steps being taken in regard to appointment of a Dutch police officer ?

No. 189.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 9, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 8th July.

Netherlands Minister submitted desire of the Persian Government for services of one senior and two subordinate police officers to his Government by post on 27th June.

No. 190.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 10, 1912.

PERSIAN Minister here has complained of Mujallal-es-Sultan's bast with the Russians (see your telegram of the 2nd July), and maintains that His Majesty's Government should see that the protocol of 1909 (article 10) is carried out.

There certainly appears to be some justification for the complaint, and you should speak to your Russian colleague on the subject.

No. 191.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 12, 1912.

MUJALLAL-ES-SULTAN.

Your telegram of 10th July.

Russian consul at Tabriz was instructed by my Russian colleague to arrest Mujallal as soon as news reached the Russian Legation of the fugitive's arrival at Nehmetabad. Russian Minister subsequently, as soon as instructions reached him from his Government, issued orders that the basti was to be deported to Russia, and that pending his expulsion he must not be permitted to communicate with his friends at Tabriz. As soon as he has signed an undertaking that he will not return to Persia without the sanction of the Persian Government he will be expelled ; it is expected that this will take place in a day or two.

I understand that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed himself as satisfied with the steps taken by the Russian Legation in the matter.

No. 192.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 12, 1912.

AHWAZ road.

My telegram of the 23rd June.

I have the honour to report the conclusion of an arrangement by the terms of which Sardar Jang will go to the Bakhtiari country with a view to restoring order and guaranteeing security of the road. A son of the Prime Minister will accompany him.

The Persian Government and the khans have granted Jang a firman for a period of five years, giving him full powers as Ilkhani of the Bakhtiari and Governor of Behbahan. The Imperial Bank of Persia has advanced the sum of 8,000*l.* necessary

to finance the mission; the khans' shares in the Bakhtiari Oilfields Company form the security for the loan.

I think there is good ground to hope that the mission may have satisfactory results, and that the Sardar fully realises the importance of the task entrusted to him. He will leave here in a few days' time, and at his special request will be accompanied along the road by Captain Grey, who is now at Ispahan, and who will await Jang's arrival there.

No. 193.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 12, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 14th June, reporting on the recent dispute between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari khans regarding the Government of Shuster.

I approve your proposal to try to induce the khans interested to state in writing their willingness to be represented at a meeting to be held at some place near Shuster in December next, at which a serious effort would be made to come to a satisfactory settlement of all outstanding questions between the sheikh and the khans.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Bentinck.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 12, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran regarding the possible appointment of a Netherlands subject as chief of police in that town.

I may add, in case you are approached by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, that His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government would view such an appointment with approval.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 195.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 13, 1912.

COSSACK brigade at Tabriz.

My telegram of the 1st July.

Russian Legation received the Persian reply yesterday accepting the creation of a Cossack detachment at Tabriz. Sipahdar still loiters here, however, and keeps finding pretexts for not proceeding to his post.

It is urged by the Persian Government that the public peace is gravely threatened by his continued presence here; they state that the adherents of the ex-Shah are constantly in his entourage, and that there is no concealment of the fact.

I think that as long as Sipahdar remains here there will be no feeling of security, and that the Government will be seriously hampered in their work. The departure of Sipahdar was one of the conditions which the Minister for Foreign Affairs made when he accepted office.

* Nos. 163, 164, and 189.

No. 196.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 14, 1912.

ACTING consul at Tabriz reports that 600 Russian infantry, with two guns, arrived there 14th July, and that total of Russian troops there is about 1,500.

No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Mirza Mehdi Khan.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Persian Minister, and, with reference to his remarks to Sir A. Nicolson on the 9th July regarding Mujallal-es-Sultaneh, has the honour to inform him that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, dated the 12th July, the Russian Minister upon hearing of Mujallal-es-Sultaneh's arrival at Nemetabad sent instructions to the Russian consul to arrest him, and later, acting on instructions from St. Petersburg, ordered his deportation to Russia without permitting him to hold any communication with his friends in Tabriz.

The telegram adds that Mujallal-es-Sultaneh will be expelled after signing a document undertaking not to return to Persia without having received the Persian Government's permission.

Ala-es-Sultaneh stated that he was satisfied with the action taken in the matter.

Foreign Office, July 15, 1912.

No. 198.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 16, 1912.

MY telegram of the 3rd July.

According to a rumour current here ex-Shah has left Vienna for Tabriz. Rumour, to which I do not attach much credence, emanates from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Partisans of the ex-Shah's return seem, however, to be increasing in boldness as well as in strength.

No. 199.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 16, 1912.

CHIEF of police.

My telegram of the 9th July.

No answer has yet been received by my Netherlands colleague from his Government with regard to the Persian Government's application for police officers for Tehran.

For the present the Minister of War, a Bakhtiari, is acting as chief of police. I have good reason to think that he will endeavour to secure the appointment of one of the lesser khans to the post; they are discontented, and such an appointment might solve a difficulty. The Russian Minister would probably resent such a step, and I also am of opinion that a Bakhtiari would be undesirable.

My Russian colleague complains that the Persian Government are disinclined to arrest certain fedais who have lately returned to Tehran from abroad and who are well known to have taken part in the outrages committed on Russian troops at Tabriz in January last.

No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 16, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 13th July: Tabriz.

In view of great embarrassment which Sipahdar's presence in Tehran causes the Persian Government, would Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs be willing to instruct Russian Minister at Tehran to urge Sipahdar to proceed to his post?

If so, I would instruct Sir W. Townley in similar sense.

No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 16, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 14th July: Russian troops.

I should be glad to learn whether these troops are reinforcements or are merely to replace time-expired men.

No. 202.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 17, 1912.

FINANCIAL straits of Persian Government.

I received a visit this morning from the Minister of Finance. He begged me to bring to your urgent notice the question of an advance by the two Governments, as the Persian Government were in the greatest need of money. He said that their most pressing requirements were for the equipment of an expedition to Luristan, where the Lurs are in open rebellion, and are threatening to menace seriously the State. The troops at Kermanshah, too, are clamouring to come back to Tehran. He said that if the troops evacuated Kermanshah the town would, without any doubt, be reoccupied by Salar-ed-Dowleh, who is still in the neighbourhood. The governor, Farman Farma, would certainly be the first to leave with the troops.

According to the Minister of Finance, my Russian colleague has agreed to telegraph to his Government.

No. 203.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 16th July.

This afternoon I touched upon the subject of Sipahdar in conversation with M. Nératof, who said that so far as he knew the presence of that chief in Tehran was not causing any such grave embarrassment to the Persian Government; in fact, his Excellency apprehended that once Sipahdar were at Tabriz he would be a cause of much greater anxiety to them, as his actions would be less under their control. In the opinion of the Russian Government it would have been preferable that Shuja should be kept at Tabriz; Sipahdar did not inspire them with the same confidence as Shuja, who was far more influential.

I observed to his Excellency that the maintenance of order at Tabriz must surely be thoroughly guaranteed by the Russian troops there, to which an increase of 600 men had recently been made (see your telegram of the 16th July). M. Nératof explained, however, that the object of the Russian Government in sending this reinforcement was to punish the Shahsevans, and that it was their desire to avoid any forcible intervention as far as was practically possible.

As regards the question whether it would be expedient to bring pressure on Sipahdar to leave Tehran for Tabriz, M. Nératof promised that he would enquire the views of M. Poklewsky.

No. 204.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 17, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of the 16th July: Ex-Shah.

I mentioned to M. Nératof to-day, in the course of conversation, the rumour that Mohammed Ali had left for Tabriz, and observed that apparently His Majesty's partisans in Persia were hard at work to engineer his return.

M. Nératof replied that he had no knowledge whatever of these movements, and said that in his opinion Mohammed Ali could reckon on no serious support to his cause in Persia and therefore would not make the attempt.

I observed to his Excellency that it was to be hoped the Russian Government would take all possible precautions to prevent His Majesty travelling across Russia in secret. I added that failing such precautions the accusation might once more be levelled against Russia that she had arranged for Mohammed Ali's return to Persia; and the position of His Majesty's Government would in that case be most embarrassing.

M. Nératof replied that such precautions could easily be taken if the ex-Shah had not left Odessa; but if His Majesty were to arrive in Russia from abroad with a false passport and in disguise, to stop him would be a matter of some difficulty. His Excellency is, however, convinced that a repetition of last year's adventure is most improbable, taking into consideration the grave warnings conveyed to His Majesty at Odessa by the Russian Government.

No. 205.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Odessa, July 17, 1912.

MOHAMMED ALI is still here. I have not been able to ascertain intended date of his departure.

No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Bentinck.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 17, 1912.

HAVE you any information whether Netherland Government are prepared to lend officers for the police at Tehran? See Tehran telegram of the 16th July.

I should be glad to hear that they consent to do this.

No. 207.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 18, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 17th July: Ex-Shah.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has since written to say that he learns that the ex-Shah was still at Odessa a few days ago, but intends to go to France for a cure. He therefore thinks that the rumour mentioned by me cannot have any foundation in fact.

No. 208.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 18, 1912.

I AM assured by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh will really leave Tehran for Shiraz on Saturday next, the 20th July. He will be

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accompanied by the necessary troops and will be furnished with guns. The telegram to the Shiraz clergy from the Nejez clergy has now, I am assured, been publicly circulated, the chief mujtahid of Shiraz adding a minute on it to explain the document.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz has represented that it is essential the deputy governor, the Kawam, should attack the turbulent Arab tribes. The Central Government proposed to await the arrival of the Governor-General at his post. Ala-es-Sultaneh has, however, now promised to issue instructions to the Kawam to act as proposed at once.

The Central Government also inform me that they will increase the pay of the road guards between Shiraz and Bushire from 1,000 to 1,400 tomans per month. Ala-es-Sultaneh expresses the hope that the rapacity of the road guards in the matter of the exaction of excessive and illegal tolls may be curbed by this treatment. It appears to me, however, that it is the tribal chiefs who, by not allowing caravans to pass except on payment of extortionate tolls, are responsible for the behaviour of the road guards. I have pointed this out to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Mohammed Ali Khan has, it appears, informed the Kawam that the summer season is not suitable for carrying out the arrest of the men guilty of the attack on Smart; he says that he is prepared to surrender the culprits, but asks for a delay of two months.

No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 18, 1912.

IN view of the situation in Persia, as depicted in Sir W. Townley's telegram of the 17th July, it is absolutely necessary that Persian Government should be provided with some funds.

His Majesty's Government are in a position to advance 50,000*l.* at any moment, as, on receipt of Sir W. Townley's telegram of the 20th April, they took the necessary steps to have this sum in readiness.

Please ask Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs whether it would not be possible for Russian Government to hold the same sum at the immediate disposal of M. Poklewsky, in order that a joint advance of 50,000*l.* may be made without delay, and the same amount held in reserve.

Perhaps, if every other course is impossible, Russian Government would allow Persian Government an overdraft up to 25,000*l.* at Russian Bank, on the sole condition that the rate of interest charged on the previous advance should be paid on overdraft?

No. 210.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 19, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 16th July to St. Petersburg.

Sipahdar left last night for Tabriz viâ Kazvin, where he will probably remain a week or ten days.

He left most reluctantly under strong pressure from the Russian Minister.

No. 211.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 20, 1912.

PERSIAN finances.

Your telegram to St. Petersburg of the 18th July.

M. Mornard came to see me yesterday. The object of his visit was to explain the hopeless financial straits of the Government. He seemed to be much annoyed because the surplus of the northern customs, amounting to about 40,000*l.*, has been retained by the Russian Bank to go towards the repayment of the recent advance. This has been done under instructions from St. Petersburg.

No. 212.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 20, 1912.

RUSSIA and the Shahsevans.

My telegram of the 1st July.

Acting vice-consul at Resht telegraphs as follows, under date 19th July :—

“I learn that 2,000 Russian infantry have reached Ahar, about 40 miles to the north-west of Ardebil. They have come from Russia. It is said that Russian troops are also moving from Mogan and Tabriz against the Shahsevans.”

No. 213.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 20, 1912.

KERMANSHAH situation.

My telegram of the 17th July.

News has reached the Russian Legation from their consul at Kermanshah that the city has been deserted by the Bakhtiari and mujahids, and is again threatened by Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Bakhtiari sources here confirm the news. It is also reported that the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh with a considerable force is approaching Kermanshah. His intentions are not clear, and it is as yet uncertain whether he will support Salar or the Persian Government.

The Russian consul urges that the 250 mujahids and two guns should be ordered to return to Kermanshah at once. Such orders would, however, be futile in view of the penniless state of the Treasury.

Russian consul states British consul will telegraph in the same sense.

No. 214.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 20, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of to-day: Russian troops in North Persia.

M. Nératof tells me that, beyond the 600 troops to which Sir W. Townley refers in his telegram of the 14th instant, no further dispatch of troops from Russia to Persia has been made; he therefore thinks the 2,000 infantry mentioned in Tehran telegram of to-day must consist of men already in Persia, drawn from Tabriz or other places. The Shahsevan disorders may, however, necessitate the dispatch of reinforcements.

No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 20, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of to-day.

In view of above-mentioned telegram, the need of money mentioned in my telegram of 18th July is even more imperative, and I sincerely hope that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs may be able to do something to relieve situation.

No. 216.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 18th July: Joint advance to Persia.

M. Nératof is consulting the Minister of Finance and trying to obtain his Excellency's concurrence.

His Excellency also promised at my request to urge M. Kokovtsof to consent to Russia waiving the claim to the surplus on the northern customs receipts (40,000*l.*), referred to in Sir W. Townley's telegram of to-day. I communicated to him the substance of that telegram.

No. 217.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 24, 1912.

MY telegram of 20th July.

Persian Government have very reassuring information regarding Kermanshah and Salar-ed-Dowleh. Latter's principal protectors, the Lur Chief Nazar and the Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, have made submission to Government. Prince himself is a fugitive, and is said to be making his way to Tabriz.

No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 16th July.

It will, I am afraid, be very difficult to obtain the services of a Netherlands subject as chief of police at Tehran.

No. 219.

Count Bentinck to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

Sir,

The Hague, July 24, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that he has telegraphed to M. Oudendijk to say that the Netherlands Government were unable to recommend anyone for the post of police officer at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BENTINCK.

No. 220.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 18th July.

In reply to letter pressing for answer, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has written to say that he is in communication with Minister of Finance and the Russian Minister at Tehran respecting proposed advance to Persian Government. His Excellency awaits further information on the subject from them, and he regrets that he cannot yet reply to your enquiry. He is unable to fix an early date on which such reply may be expected, but he promises to inform me of decision come to by Russian Government as soon as possible.

No. 221.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government: see my telegram of the 26th July.

I spoke on this subject yesterday to M. Nératof, and gathered from his Excellency that M. Kokovtsof will probably consent to 25,000*l.* being advanced at once by both

Great Britain and Russia, but as it is certain that a further advance will be solicited by the Persian Government as soon as this 50,000*l.* has been expended, M. Kokovtsov thinks it must be indicated to them that they will be expected, in return, to furnish some proof that the confidence of the two Governments is well placed.

No. 222.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 27, 1912.

MY telegram of the 24th July.

We are now definitely informed that Netherlands Government cannot recommend anyone for the post of chief of police.

No. 223.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 26th July.

Please represent to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that the case is urgent, and that immediate relief must be procured for the serious straits in which the Persian Government find themselves financially. Beg him to agree at least to the suggestion in the last paragraph of my telegram of the 18th July.

It is most desirable that some advance should be made simultaneously and jointly by the two Governments, but I am prepared, if Russian Government cannot arrive at a decision at an early date, to examine the question whether we could advance the whole sum ourselves, leaving Russia's share to be repaid subsequently.

No. 224.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 7, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of an interesting review by His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan of the insecurity of the trade routes in that province during the March quarter in so far as the trade of the district was thereby affected.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 224.

Ispahan Trade Report for Quarter ending March 1912.

Roads.

SNOW which lay deep all over the province during the earlier part of January, and a spell of abnormally severe cold at the end of the month, tended to impede transport and retard posts on nearly all the roads, but at the same time drove the tribesmen off them, thus securing a respite from robberies.

With the abatement of the cold at the beginning of February transport conditions, more especially towards the north, improved, but robbers began to reappear on the Shiraz road rendering large escorts necessary for caravans. The improvement on the Tehran, Yeزد, and Hamadan roads was maintained throughout February, but the continued presence of robbers on the Shiraz road and the blockage of the Ahwaz road by snow tended to deprive Ispahan of all supplies from the south.

At the beginning of March the condition of the Shiraz road became deplorable and continued so till the end of the month. The Hamadan road was for a time

declared unsafe, and the Tehran roads were not altogether free from incidents. Towards the end of the quarter the material condition of the Ahwaz road began to improve.

On the 10th February Major Carl Petersen, instructor, a Swedish officer charged with the preliminary organisation of the Treasury gendarmerie in Fars, left for Shiraz accompanied by four gendarmes.

On the 20th March three other Swedish officers of the same force (Major Siefert, Major Norén-Brandel, and Captain Mystrom), left Ispahan for the same destination with 150 foot, 30 mounted gendarmes, and 17 waggons of supplies.

Ahwaz Road.

During January and February, in consequence of the very heavy snow lying on the track, traffic returns were almost nil. Postal kasids who made their way slowly and with difficulty reported the road safe. At the end of February traffic began to revive, but the amount of merchandise received from and dispatched to Ahwaz during March was relatively small. Incoming caravans reported well as to the security of the road in general, but towards the end of March some robberies—apparently of a petty nature—were notified to have occurred at or near the Gav Peeseh Pass (Ispahan territory). Snow continued to be the main obstacle to traffic. The execution of repairs during February–March to the bridge at Goudar-i-Balutak by Messrs. Lynch's engineer also tended in a measure to minimise traffic.

According to a report from Messrs. Lynch's road inspector at Dehdiz dated the 2nd March the khans were at that date contemplating the construction of six forts for the better security of the hill sections, viz., at Sareh Rak, Kalaa' Madrisseh, Balout Buland, Lujamgir, Shalil (two), and arrangements were being made for the appointment and payment through Messrs. Lynch's inspector of 200 guards to patrol the road.

Shiraz Road.

In the first week of January local traders, encouraged by the temporary immunity of the road from robbers—the result of the severe weather conditions—dispatched several caravans to Shiraz for supplies of groceries. The news of an attack near Burji-Gardan Gir (Fars boundary) by Sarhadis on the postal waggon on the 14th January, when all the mails were reported completely destroyed and the four postal horses carried off, served to check further dispatch.

About the 20th January caravans began to arrive from Shiraz, and continued to do so in fairly large number during the next ten or fifteen days. Large caravans with local produce left Ispahan for the south at the end of January and beginning of February. Simultaneously with this revival of traffic bands of robbers began to reappear on the road. One of these (said to be Mahyaris) attacked an Ispahan caravan on the 5th February near Kalaa' Ahmedabad, another (said to be Kuhgelus) seized and for several days occupied the tower between Yezdikhast and Shulgistan, thus arresting for a time further movement of caravans.

Northward bound caravans which had reached Abadeh in safety experienced a long delay there and considerable difficulties about obtaining local guards.

Nor was the presence of these always a sufficient deterrent. Thus on the 23rd February a large caravan under a special escort from Abadeh was attacked near the Yezdikhast tower by a band of some sixty Kuhgelus, which, however, was repulsed.

About the same time a party of Persian merchants and a pilgrim caravan were attacked at Kalaa' Ahmedabad just south of the Orchini Pass and robbed, one pilgrim being killed.

South of Abadeh Baseri tribesmen were reported looting caravans and villagers.

As the season advanced the condition of the Shiraz road became markedly worse. At the end of February reports showed the road immediately north and south of Yezdikhast held by armed bands. During the first week in March a large caravan, chiefly of British goods, was attacked by Boir Ahmedis just north of Abadeh, and about sixty camel-loads property of a British firm carried off; a large caravan of local produce from Ispahan for the south was attacked near Kumisheh by a band of Sarhadis, Kuhgelus, and Nafars, who also raided the flocks of that place; a post and three Persian travellers were looted at the Orchini Pass by Kuhgelus, who held a large tract of the road immediately south of that pass in force.

These Kuhgelu bands harried the villages near the road, and did not hesitate to

molest parties of Bakhtiari between Ispahan and Kumisheh, on one occasion attacking the Bakhtiari deputy governor of that place. To keep them in check the Governor-General of Ispahan found himself obliged to station a small force of Bakhtiari permanently at Mahyar.

The continued presence of these tribesmen throughout March, both in the neighbourhood of Abadeh and in that of the Orchini Pass, served to minimise caravan traffic, the only movement of importance during the month being the arrival on the 22nd-23rd March of caravans, said to number 600 to 700 head of transport, which came up from Shiraz immediately in the wake of a British consular officer (Mr. Knox) and under the protection afforded by the special escort provided for him by the Persian authorities.

Tehran Road.

At the beginning of January, owing partly to heavy snows, partly to the lack of horses at the post-houses, Ispahan was practically cut off from communication with Tehran except by telegraph. A protest was made by the Russian and British consulates to their respective legations regarding the continued interruption of postal communication with the north.

The reappearance near Ardistan of the noted outlaw, Naib Hussein, tended still further to disorganise the postal service, but confidence was restored by the report that an amicable arrangement had been concluded between the Persian Government and Naib Hussein, and considerable quantities of local produce destined for the north, which had been held over in Ispahan for some time for fear of the outlaw, began to find dispatch in the latter part of January. Very severe cold, however, at the end of the month again checked all traffic, and the partial occupation of Kashan by the Naib and his men in the first days of February raised some suspicions.

A change in the weather and the appointment of Naib Hussein to the governorship of Natanz stimulated traffic and heartened the authorities to replace post-horses on the Kashan-Ispahan tract.

Throughout the remainder of February and the first half of March the road was in fairly good condition, caravan traffic normal, and postal communications improved. A robbery which occurred on the 17th March near Gandiabad on the caravan road to Tehran, when eight loads of merchandise property of the Russian Banque des Prêts were carried off and reports of excesses by parties of Bakhtiari on the postal road in the neighbourhood of Kum, caused a falling off in traffic and some disorganisation of postal service during the latter half of March.

Yezd Road.

Throughout January this road was reported safe, but weather conditions reduced caravan traffic to a minimum and retarded the posts.

With a change in the weather at the beginning of February caravans began to ply freely, and posts to arrive more rapidly. The road throughout the month was reputed safe, but a small caravan which arrived from Yezd on the 2nd March reported that it had been attacked between Nain and Nou Gumbaz by a band of thirty or forty Baseris, who, however, were beaten off by the guards escorting the caravan.

During March caravans, posts, and travellers passed over the road without molestations, but towards the end of the month there were rumours of robbers at various points.

Incoming caravans during the last week of March dropped their loads and took up others for Yezd a stage or two outside the town to avoid seizure of the pack-animals by the Governor-General for transport of grain from Chahar Mahal to Ispahan.

Sultanabad-Kermanshah-Hamadan Roads.

These roads throughout January were safe. In spite of very heavy snow and severe cold caravans and travellers continued to pass over them in both directions till the close of the month when the increase of cold checked traffic. A caravan returning empty from Khomai was robbed of money between Tiran and Nejeftabad on the 30th January.

With the change in the weather at the beginning of February traffic somewhat revived. From the 18th to the 23rd February there were large arrivals of merchandise from Hamadan, and in a lesser degree from Kermanshah. From then till about the

middle of March traffic was maintained, but a warning telegram from Hamadan, and the robbery on the 14th March close to Gulpaigan of the Sultanabad post caused an interruption of caravan traffic. Further reports of the excesses of Salar-ed-Dowleh's followers in the Kermanshah and neighbouring districts reduced it to nil before the end of the month.

No. 225.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual summary of events in Persia for the last month.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 225.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending July 8, 1912.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—Vossuk-ed-Dowleh having resigned the post of Foreign Minister, as reported in the last summary, Ala-es-Sultaneh was appointed in his place, and the Ministry of Education is vacant for the present.

Police Department.—Sardar Mohtashem, the Bakhtiari Khan who is at present Minister of War, has been temporarily placed in charge of the police department. An application has been made to the Netherlands Government for the services of an officer to act as chief of police at Tehran.

Provincial Governors.—Sipahdar, whose appointment as Governor-General of Azerbaijan was officially announced more than three months ago, is still at Tehran.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, the Governor-General elect of Fars, continues to delay his departure from Tehran on the plea that the treasurer-general does not furnish him with the necessary funds.

The Bakhtiari road has been closed to traffic owing to the activity of the tribesmen and the Bakhtiari country seems to be in great confusion. The legation has brought pressure to bear on the khans with the object of making them send a responsible khan to undertake the restoration of order there. There seems to be some hope that Sardar Jang will shortly be entrusted with this important mission. With this object in view a loan of 8,000*l.* at 7 per cent. interest per annum guaranteed by the khans' shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is being arranged for them by the Imperial Bank.

Caspian Provinces.

On account of the hostile attitude of the Shahsevans, the Russian authorities considered it necessary to take punitive measures against them. With this object, the Russian commander at Ardebil moved the bulk of his force into the district at the end of last month, leaving only a very small detachment behind in the town. On the departure of the movable column this detachment took up its quarters in the citadel.

On the 4th July fifty Russian infantry, from the force at Kazvin, left Enzeli for Baku.

Meshed.

The town and its immediate environs have continued quiet during the last three weeks, but the province is still infested by bands of robbers, especially the Karez, Kuchan, and Abassabad districts. About 100 families are said to have migrated into Afghanistan last month.

The Russian garrison at Meshed has been increased lately by the arrival of some sixty recruits from Turkestan.

Ispahan.

The province is in its normal state of insecurity, and robberies on the Lynch road in Chaharmahal, a district hitherto regarded as comparatively secure, are reported.

The state of affairs in the town and environs continues to be unsatisfactory, owing to the dearness of foodstuffs and to the constant petty affrays between the governor's following and the treasury gendarmes. There is also a certain amount of uneasiness among the Jewish community, caused by the apparently motiveless murder of two of their race in one of the suburbs of the town.

General Malletta, who some two years ago was sent by the Persian Government to Shiraz to raise a corps of gendarmerie for Fars, passed through Ispahan on the 16th June *en route* to Tehran.

Yezd.

There has been no improvement in the situation in the Yezd district during the past few weeks. In spite of the efforts of the Kawam of Shiraz to induce the local Arab chiefs to turn back marauders from Yezd territory, villages within ten miles of the town have been pillaged, and caravans, including that of Dr. Carr of the Church Missionary Society (medical mission), robbed. The governor is strengthening the defences of the town and is making such arrangements for its protection as the means at his disposal permit.

Entezam-ul-Mulk, who raided Ardistan on the 7th June, was attacked by a force of Bakhtiaris a few days later and compelled to retire into the Biabanak hills.

Naib Hussein, the Governor of Natanz, on being asked to co-operate with the Bakhtiaris against Entezam-ul-Mulk, dispatched 200 sowars to Ardistan. These sowars, however, instead of assisting the Bakhtiaris, plundered the houses in the town and returned to Natanz with the booty.

The Bakhtiaris returned to Ardistan, and Entezam-ul-Mulk and his following still remain at large.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Azam, the Governor of Kerman, followed up the rebels who had been threatening the town at the beginning of last month into the Bardsir district and dispersed them.

Rafat-i-Nizam and Mirza Hussein Khan, two of the rebel leaders who took refuge with the local tribesmen, were handed over to the governor and hanged by his Excellency's orders.

Kermanshah.

Since the arrival of Prince Farman Farma, there have been no disturbances in the town; but the outlying district remains unsettled, as no measures are being taken against the remnants of Salar-ed-Dowleh's followers, who still hold several of the villages in the neighbourhood.

No. 226.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 9, 1912.

ON the 24th June the Cabinet and the corps diplomatique were invited to the formal opening of the gendarmerie school at Yusufabad.

The school consists of an officers' college and a depôt for training non-commissioned officers for the Tehran and Kazvin commands (see my despatch of the 30th April, 1912).

About 400 men were present on parade, and the manner in which the various exercises were carried out showed that great progress had been made in training and discipline since the school was started on the 15th April last.

The men are comfortably housed, and their appearance gave the impression that the service was popular.

The various branches of training, such as musketry, gymnastics, training in mounted duties, &c., are each under the direct supervision of a Swedish officer.

[1340]

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The physique of the rank and file at present is not good, but it will doubtless improve, as the Swedes attach such great importance to the gymnastic training.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 227.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 9, 1912.

I HAD the honour to inform you in my telegram of the 2nd instant that it was reported from Tabriz that Mujallal-es-Sultan, who has recently gained some notoriety as a lieutenant of Salar-ed-Dowleh, had arrived at Nehmetabad, and had practically taken sanctuary in this village near Tabriz, in which the summer quarters of the Russian consulate-general are situated.

This report was confirmed by my Russian colleague, who added that he had instructed the acting consul-general to proceed at once to the arrest of Mujallal-es-Sultan, and that he had subsequently, upon the receipt of authority to do so from St. Petersburg, caused the late rebel general to be deported to Russia.

On hearing of Mujallal's arrival at Nehmetabad, the "chef de cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me, and said that the Persian Government proposed to demand the surrender of the refugee from the Russian Minister, on the ground that it was agreed at the time when Mohammed Ali Mirza's pension was arranged that any of his followers returning to Persia and bearing arms against the Government should be treated as outlaws.

I strongly dissuaded Moin-el-Vezareh from the adoption of such action; firstly, because it would be impossible for the Russian Legation to surrender a fugitive to certain execution; and, secondly, because by making such a demand they would inevitably estrange many of their European well-wishers.

I understand that no such demand has been made.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 228.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 9, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 22nd June, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul at Kerman, in which the defeat of the rebels is recorded.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 228.

Consul Haig to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kerman, May 28, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 22nd May, 1912, I have the honour to inform you that the rebels were driven from the neighbourhood of Kerman on the 25th May.

2. On the 24th May Prince Amir-i-Azam went so far as to leave the town in order to meet the rebels near their camp and discuss terms of peace, the meeting having been arranged by two mullahs who had been sent out, but as he went out with his full escort the rebels were alarmed and refused to meet him. The next day he marched out of the town with about 600 men and a 9-centim. gun. The rebels had already begun a retrograde movement, which was interrupted by his attack, from Fathabad towards Baghin, and had carried off one of the two 7-centim. guns which they had and all their plunder. In the fight which ensued the other 7-centim. gun was captured and the rebels were put to flight, but they all escaped and no captures of any importance

were made. His losses were four wounded, one of whom has since died, and those of the rebels, which it is impossible to ascertain, are variously estimated at two killed by the most virulent of his detractors and seventy killed and wounded by the most sanguine of his adherents. I am inclined to believe that between ten and twenty killed and wounded would be a fair estimate. The rebels have retired to Bardsir, where Bahadur-ul-Mulk's property is situated, and have thus for the present made good their escape, whereas if Prince Amir-i-Azam had attacked them just before dawn in their camp at Fathabad, when their spirits were at the lowest ebb, I believe he could have captured all of them and recovered both guns. He informs me that he proposes to follow them into Bardsir within the next two or three days, and I shall do my utmost to keep him to his word, for although I do not believe that they will again threaten the city, they will certainly cause much misery in the province so long as they remain in arms and together.

3. I have explained in my previous despatches on this subject the motives which prompted those who marched on the city to rebel, and in paragraph 8 of my despatch of the 22nd May I have mentioned the existence in the city of a party which sympathised with the rebels, maintained constant communication with them, and urged them to advance and take possession of Kerman. These are the persons styling themselves democrats—men without ability or political convictions. Prince Amir-i-Azam has done little to justify their animosity, but they are opposed to the presence of a strong governor in Kerman. It was they who assisted Sardar-i-Nusrat in the intrigues which ended in the dismissal of Prince Jalal-ed-Dowleh, who afterwards protested vigorously against the appointment of Sardar-i-Muhiyy, and who five months ago fomented the anti-foreign agitation, which was suppressed by Amir-i-Azam on his arrival. The invalidation of the elections for the local assembly—which has been attributed by some to the Prince—annoyed the leader of this party—Agha Yahya—lately chairman of the assembly, and he and all his followers have for some time past been intriguing against Amir-i-Azam. What they desire is the appointment of some local nonentity as Acting Governor of Kerman, and the distribution of offices in the various departments among themselves. The dispatch of Sardar-i-Nusrat to Tehran caused his adherents to ally themselves to the democrats, and the movement has been much assisted by Adl-es-Sultan, Sardar-i-Nusrat's brother, who has been receiving numerous telegrams from his brother in Tehran. Basharat-ul-Mamalik, the recently appointed superintendent of the Persian telegraph office, joined the movement soon after his arrival, and was most unfortunately selected by the Persian Government as an envoy to the rebels. When he visited their camp he accepted large sums of money as the price of his support. I have already mentioned 1,000 tomans (200*l.*) as the sum received by him, but have since seen a detailed account prepared by him in which he acknowledges the receipt of 975 tomans (195*l.*), of which 100 tomans (20*l.*) were contributed by Seyyid Bakir, an assistant in the revenue office, who joined the rebels. The superintendent of this office, Mirza Mahdi Khan, a Kermani, originally sympathised with the movement, but he is a nervous man, and, when its success appeared to be doubtful, asked me whether I would shelter him in the consulate in case of necessity. I replied that I would admit neither him nor any other opponent of the Governor-General, and he changed his attitude, but he is utterly unfitted for his post, and should be replaced by somebody who does not belong to Kerman. Amir-i-Azam did not know to whom to turn for assistance or whom to trust, and even those who favoured his cause were lukewarm in their support, fearing to render themselves obnoxious to his enemies, but what chiefly disheartened him was the conduct of the Persian Government. When I visited the camp on the 19th May and assured the leaders that their Government would regard them as rebels if they did not disperse, they were most indignant, and openly accused the Minister of the Interior of duplicity. They produced telegrams which they had received from him and which were very far from being discouraging in tone. The Persian Government has accused Amir-i-Azam of ordering his farrashbashi in writing to squeeze as much money as he could out of the people of Jiruft. It would be interesting to learn how it got this information. The farrashbashi was captured and his papers stolen from him by the rebels in Jiruft, and I do not believe that between the time of his capture and the time when the Government brought the accusation against Amir-i-Azam there was time for the incriminating letter to have reached Tehran from Jiruft; and if this be so, the Government was relying, not only for the existence of the letter, but also for the nature of its contents, on telegraphic information received from the rebels, and in any case has convicted itself of holding direct communication with them. As a matter of fact, the ex-governor of Jiruft, who was one of the leaders of the rebels, had paid only

about one-eighth or one-tenth of the revenue due from him for the last year, and it is quite possible that a stringent, but justifiable, order for the collection of all arrears was distorted by the rebels into a general licence to plunder.

I am, &c.

T. W. HAIG, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

No. 229.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 10, 1912.

WITH reference to previous correspondence upon the subject of the present state of the Shiraz-Bushire road, and the failure of the Persian Government to carry out the conditions contained in Sir G. Barclay's note of the 4th April last respecting the attack upon Mr. Smart and his escort in the month of December last, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining the steps that the Persian Government have taken with a view to complying with the demands of His Majesty's Government.

It will be seen that Ala-es-Sultaneh states that a telegram has been sent to the ulema and chiefs in Fars, advising them to adopt a friendly attitude towards British subjects and British commerce. I have ascertained that this telegram has now been duly circulated, but I am advised by His Majesty's consular officer at Shiraz that such messages from the Princes of the Church at Nejed and Kerbela no longer have the same effect as in the past to allay mischief, though they are as efficacious to-day as ever they were to afford a good pretext for making trouble.

It is true that arrangements have been made for the departure of the new Governor-General, and I am assured almost daily, from one source or another, that he is leaving in a few days. M. Mornard has been freely accused of being the cause of the delay, through his unwillingness or inability to produce the necessary funds for the purpose. I have repeatedly urged upon M. Mornard the urgent importance of arranging the financial difficulties, and have invariably received the most satisfactory assurances that all is in order. Still, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's departure is delayed, and only yesterday I was advised by M. Mornard that he had sent a fresh telegram to Shiraz urging the financial agent there to expedite the necessary payments. This fact proves that, in spite of the repeated assurances to the contrary, there has been some opposition on the part of the treasurer-general for which I am unable to account.

In the course of recent conversations, Ala-es-Sultaneh has expressed the utmost confidence in the ability of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to restore order and secure the arrest of the persons responsible for the attack on Mr. Smart. The same faith in the new governor is expressed by Sardar Assad, who professes to anticipate a complete restoration of order in the south with Sardar Jang in charge of the Bakhtiari country and the governorship of Behbahan and the Kuhgelui tribes and Amir Mufakham at Kerman.

You will notice, Sir, that in dealing with the clause concerning the punishment of the culprits, Ala-es-Sultaneh's note states that his predecessor understood from Sir George Barclay that the acceptance by the Persian Government of the obligation to pay 4,744*l.* as compensation had closed the incident, and that the question of the punishment of the offenders would not be insisted upon.

There is nothing on record to show that Sir G. Barclay made such a statement, and when Vossuk-ed-Dowleh made the same remark to me some time ago, I said that I thought he must have misunderstood my predecessor's meaning, since his intention could only have been to express in his own name and that of His Majesty's Government his satisfaction that the Persian Government had so readily recognised their obligation to pay such a very moderate compensation as that put forward. It is asserted that the interview in question took place at the Russian Legation whilst Sir G. Barclay and Vossuk-ed-Dowleh were waiting for the Russian Minister. I cannot ascertain that any one else was present on the occasion. Vossuk-ed-Dowleh's knowledge of French is somewhat elementary, and he may easily, in good faith, have construed more into the necessarily complimentary phrases that my predecessor would have used than the words themselves implied.

I have recently discussed the situation on the Bushire-Shiraz road and the failure to arrest the culprits at considerable length with Ala-es-Sultaneh, and I have pointed

out to his Highness the very serious state of affairs existing in the province of Fars. I have shown him that the situation is rapidly becoming an intolerable one, and I have warned him, speaking confidentially in my own name only, that it would appear to me inevitable that His Majesty's Government will be obliged to alter their present conciliatory attitude unless it is seen that the Persian Government are able to restore order on the road, the disturbed condition of which causes such incalculable damage to British trade.

His Highness has assured me, in reply, that the Persian Government fully appreciate the friendly attitude of His Majesty's Government, and that they entirely realise the seriousness of the situation. He has pointed out that special local conditions that have no connection with the unfortunate incident dealt with in the note are responsible for the deplorable state of affairs that prevails, and he has expressed his sincere regret that the Persian Government are unable at the present moment, when they are without any reliable military force at their disposal, and have had to repel the rebellious inroads of a pretender in the north, to take the necessary steps to restore order. The Minister has expressed great hope in the future, and would appear to anticipate good results from the gendarmerie force now being organised under Swedish officers. His Highness has added that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has been given special and definite instructions to assist to the utmost of his ability the Swedish mission.

The question as to which is the best course to adopt in order to obtain that peace and security upon the Bushire-Shiraz road that is of such paramount importance to British trade with Persia is a most difficult one. With it is closely connected the question of the arrest of the men guilty of the attack upon Mr. Smart, because when once order has been restored the surrender of the culprits should follow of itself. At the time of writing I have received a private letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, assuring me that the reports of the state of affairs that I have received from the south are exaggerated, and that the Government's advices are to the effect that there is good hope of a peaceful solution, and of a satisfactory settlement as soon as Mukhber-es-Sultaneh arrives. Ala-es-Sultaneh adds that the present Government have only recently assumed the reins of office, and declares that they are paying very serious attention to the question of the disordered condition of Fars. His Highness expresses an earnest hope that His Majesty's Government will give them time in which to prove themselves, and he repeats the oft-told tale that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh is about to start.

I am strongly of opinion that a British occupation of South Persia should be avoided as long as may be possible, although I am fully alive to the fact that the present intolerable situation cannot be endured indefinitely. It would, in my opinion, be impossible to fix a term for such an occupation, which I fear might be accompanied by very far-reaching consequences. I am also somewhat sceptical as to how much foundation there is for the statement occasionally made that British prestige has been entirely destroyed in the south. Mr. Smart's correspondence would seem to show that he can still make his influence felt to no inconsiderable extent, although the situation is a difficult one when such men as Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli apparently flout all constituted authority, Persian and European alike.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 229.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

July 2, 1912.

IN reply to Sir G. Barclay's note of the 4th April last I have the honour to state that, as the Imperial Government appreciate the friendly representations made by His Majesty's Government, and consider it necessary to make their best efforts to consolidate the existing friendship, they have taken into special consideration the suggestions made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the note under reply. Since the receipt of the note in question the Persian Government have not failed to make every effort, and in most of the steps taken they have been successful. These are enumerated here for your Excellency's consideration.

As your Excellency has already been verbally informed, the attention of the clergy has been drawn to the fact that, according to the statement made in the note under reply, the policy of the British Government is based on non-intervention in the

south, and telegrams have been sent to the ulema and chiefs in Fars advising them to adopt a friendly policy towards British subjects and British commerce.

2. Effective measures have been taken for the organisation of a gendarmerie under Swedish officers. A school has been opened at Shiraz, where over 300 men are under arms and being trained. This number will be increased until the plan made for the gendarmerie of the south is put into execution. It is hoped that it will be possible that most of the important roads should be guarded by the gendarmes by next autumn.

3. Arrangements for the departure of the new Governor-General of Fars have been made, and he will start in a few days.

With regard to the punishment of the culprits implicated in Mr. Smart's incident, I have the honour to point out that, after the Persian Government had agreed to pay the sum of 4,744*l.*, his Excellency Sir G. Barclay thanked my predecessor and assured him that the question of punishment would not be insisted upon, and my predecessor, therefore, considered the question closed.

I hope, as I have already told you verbally, that after the arrival of the new Governor-General of Fars local difficulties will be ended, and that the gendarmerie will be more effective. The Persian Government, therefore, hope that His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to show the good will and friendship they have always shown in the past, and, as promised, that they will recall the Indian troops in Shiraz, Ispahan, and Bushire.

I avail, &c.

MOHAMMED ALI.

No. 230.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to report that an arrangement has now been practically concluded by which Sardar Jang has been put in control of the Ispahan-Ahwaz road and the entire Bakhtiari country. A son of the Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the actual Prime Minister, has been associated with Sardar Jang. A firman signed by the four leading khans has been given to Sardar Jang, conferring upon him very full powers and fixing the duration of his mission at five years. He will also be Governor of Behbahan, and have control over the Kuhgeluis, who are chiefly responsible for the raids on the road. The 8,000*l.* that are required by the khans for the financing of Sardar Jang's mission have been advanced by the Imperial Bank of Persia as a loan, secured on the khans' shares in the Bakhtiari Oil Company.

Sardar Jang has by no means an easy task before him, as the younger khans, who have remained with the tribes, are very out of hand. At the request of the khans here, I am sending them a strong message through His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan. I have also instructed Captain Grey to accompany Sardar Jang on the road, as his presence may be useful to him, and he will thus be in close touch with the most important Bakhtiari leader as far as concerns British trade interests.

I have great hopes that the mission of Sardar Jang, who is an energetic and able man, may prove a real success, and may result in the re-establishment of order and security on the road, but Persians are apt to disappoint, and the fair promises made in Tehran may be forgotten or blown away on the Bakhtiari mountains.

In order to secure the services of Sardar Jang on the Bakhtiari road, I have agreed to the appointment of his elder brother, Amir Mufakham, as Governor of Kerman. I have reason to hope that he will prove a good and capable governor, who will restore order in that troubled province. He has shown himself a capable administrator. I have impressed upon him the importance of the post he is about to occupy from the point of view of British interests, and I have told him that I expect him to keep the road to Bunder Abbas open and free from robbers. He is a man of few words but of considerable resolution, and the assurances he has given me have been of the most satisfactory nature.

If these two brothers act up to their promises they may be able to render valuable assistance to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh at Shiraz, as the marauding tribes with which they will have to deal on each side of Fars extend their fields of operation into that province.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 231.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 28, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabriz.

Acting British consul at Tabriz telegraphs as follows 26th July:—

“Shuja-ed-Dowleh yesterday sent for the merchants ostensibly in connection with the question of the export of carpets containing aniline dye. When they arrived they found the Russian consul-general, who informed them that the Russian Government intended to inflict severe punishment on the Shahsevans. They were then asked by Shuja in the presence of the Russian consul-general what their opinion was with regard to the appointment of Sipahdar. They of course answered that they would rather stay under Shuja's rule. The question of aniline carpets was then lightly touched on. Merchants were again sent for this morning and requested to come to the telegraph office. On their arrival a telegram was dispatched to Tehran praising Shuja and requesting the Persian Government not to send Sipahdar to Tabriz. A letter couched in the same terms was also sent to the Russian consul-general here. Merchants were very reluctant to sign the letter, but were obliged to do so. I am under no doubt that all the above was previously arranged and that every effort is being made to prevent the arrival of Sipahdar.

Further telegram dated 27th July:—

“Please see my telegram of yesterday.

“Seyyids closed the bazaars this morning: I have no doubt in my own mind that Shuja ordered them to take this step. Mullahs then made inflammatory speeches to a crowd which gathered in the mosque near the British and Russian consulates. The speeches were directed against the constitutionalists and against those responsible for the appointment of Sipahdar. The population seems bent on using all means to prevent the latter coming to his post. The outcome of the present demonstration might easily be a demand for the recall to Persia of Mohammed Ali Shah. More serious trouble may ensue here unless Russian consul-general gives instructions to Shuja to stop at once all these intrigues.

“Shuja is such a violent opponent of Sipahdar that if the latter does come here it would be desirable that the former be compelled to quit the province.

“The Russian consul-general informs me, in reply to a friendly note in which I expressed my surprise at Shuja's behaviour, that he has urged him to cause the bazaars to be reopened. He suggested that I should take similar action. I therefore addressed a note to Shuja in this sense.”

Mr. Acting Consul Stevens had informed me in a previous telegram that the Belgian Customs officer appointed by the treasurer-general to represent him had been ejected by Shuja from the Tabriz provincial Treasury. The officer in question had thereupon resigned both from the Customs as well as from the Treasury.

No. 232.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 28, 1912.

MY telegram of to-day.

The “chef de cabinet” of the Minister of Foreign Affairs came to see me this morning to say that the Persian Government were receiving a flood of telegrams from Tabriz deprecating the appointment of Sipahdar and urging the retention of Shuja as governor: There was little doubt, he said, that Shuja had organised the dispatch of these telegrams. The Government were afraid that endeavours would be made to close the bazaars and to bring about other demonstrations of a violent nature. It was feared that on hearing of these manifestations against him the Sipahdar might resign his appointment and retire to his estates in Mazanderan; he is now in camp at Kazvin. Should the Sipahdar do this, Shuja, acting as he does independently of the Central Government, would be left in possession of the Governorship of Azerbaijan, that province being therefore virtually separated from the Empire,

The Persian Government would not accept the responsibility for such a situation, and the Cabinet would prefer to resign office. Unless Sipahdar replaced Shuja, the Persian Government would be stultified in the eyes of the people, as they had accepted the extension of the Cossack brigade on the express understanding that Sipahdar should take up the Azerbaijan appointment.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs would be most grateful if you would urge the Russian Government to send immediate instructions to their representative at Tabriz to use all his endeavours to prevent Shuja encouraging the opposition to Sipahdar's arrival at his post.

No. 233.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 28, 1912.

JOINT advance.

The "chef de cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me this morning. He said that the Russian Government were making the concession to Russia of the Julfa-Tabriz-Urmia Railway a condition of the further advance of money which the Persian Government were now endeavouring to obtain. He said that the Persian Government begged that we would use our influence at St. Petersburg with a view to the question being dealt with separately, and he explained how strongly opposed the Persian Government were to the Russian point of view.

Moreover, should the Persian Government persist in their attitude, the Persian Government expressed their earnest hope that the British share of the advance might be made without waiting for the Russian share. The need of money for the payment of the troops at Kermanshah was most urgent, and the favourable moment for completing the work of pacification in that province was slipping away.

I had not received your telegram of 27th July to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg at the time that the above communication was made.

No. 234.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 28, 1912.

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Meshed telegraphs as follows under date the 27th July:—

"I hear from reliable sources that the Russian Government will shortly withdraw from here General Redko and Taman and Caucasian Cossacks, Kuban battery, and the 13th Turkestan Rifles.

"The Kuchan garrison will be strengthened by one company of the 18th Turkestan Rifles; the garrison there will then be 250 strong. The garrison at Meshed will consist approximately of 850 men."

No. 235.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 29, 1912.

FOLLOWING from acting British consul at Tabriz, dated the 28th July:—

"The notes which the Russian consul-general and I addressed to Shuja-ed-Dowleh have had a beneficial effect; the situation has become normal and the bazaars are open.

"Proclamation has been issued by the acting governor stating that he has handed over the finance department to the Belgians, who will continue to administer as before, and that he has taken this step on the receipt of assurances from the Customs officials that the necessary money will be forthcoming for the military expeditions.

"I hear that the Russian troops have badly beaten the Shahsevans, who are retreating in a northerly direction.

"Eight hundred Russian troops are arriving here to-day; the total number now at Tabriz is roughly 2,500."

No. 236.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1912.

TABRIZ.

Tehran telegram of the 28th July.

I asked M. Nératof to-day whether he could not instruct Russian consul-general to use his influence with Shuja-ed-Dowleh to induce him to stop stirring up popular excitement against Sipahdar, especially in view of the fact that the Persian Government had consented to the extension of the Cossack brigade conditionally on the appointment of the latter to Tabriz.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the consul-general had done, and would continue to do, all he could. Shuja-ed-Dowleh had said that he was prepared to leave Tabriz when Sipahdar had arrived within a given distance in deference to the consul-general's representations, but the latter was of opinion that it would be more prudent for him to remain in order to hand over the administration personally to his successor, pointing out that it would be unsafe to leave the town at the mercy of the populace.

No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of the 28th July.

The need of the Persian Government for money is so urgent at the present time that I hope the railway concession will not be insisted on by the Russian Government as a condition.

It will not be necessary for your Excellency to make further representations beyond those indicated in my telegram of the 27th July, but you should mention this point to M. Sazonof unofficially if you have an opportunity to do so.

No. 238.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Your telegram of the 30th July.

I saw M. Nératof to-day. His Excellency informed me that the Russian Minister at Tehran had telegraphed suggesting an arrangement which, in M. Poklewsky's opinion, would be acceptable to the Persian Government. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs did not divulge the nature of this arrangement. He said that in any case he must consult the Minister of Finance before sending a reply.

I told his Excellency that you hoped that the Imperial Government would not press the Julfa-Tabriz Railway concession for the present, as the Persian Government were so urgently in need of money. I enquired whether an assurance from the Persian Government that they would immediately enter into negotiations respecting the railway would satisfy the Russian Government. I added that I had discussed the question with the Persian Minister that morning, who seemed to be of the opinion that his Government would be prepared to give such an assurance, more especially if the Russian Government let them understand that some participation in the project would be allowed them.

The Minister of Finance was determined, M. Nératof informed me, that this question should be settled once and for all. He thought that an arrangement of the nature I proposed might be arrived at, as the Russian Government were quite prepared to offer favourable conditions. But the Minister of Finance must be consulted before he could come to any decision.

No. 239.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 31, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabriz.

Acting British consul at Tabriz telegraphs as follows, dated the 30th July :—

“ Merchants and influential persons have signed telegrams and letters which have been addressed to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, the Russian Minister at Tehran, and the French consul, urgently imploring them not to allow Sipahdar to come to Tabriz with his large following of revolutionaries, and that Shuja may be allowed to remain as Governor of Azerbaijan.

“ I have obtained the above information from an entirely reliable source. The merchants and others were compelled to affix their signatures to these documents, and were not able to give utterance to their true opinion.

“ Shuja is, however, it must be admitted, preferred by a considerable number of people.”

No. 240.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 2, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabriz.

St. Petersburg telegram of the 29th July.

I am assured by my Russian colleague that the Sipahdar is continuing his journey to Tabriz, and that he has left Kazvin for Zenjan.

The proceedings of Shuja are still causing the Persian Government considerable uneasiness. He is reported to have sent artillery secretly to Mianeh, on the Tabriz road, and to be preventing the delivery of reassuring telegrams which the Sipahdar has addressed to the inhabitants of Tabriz.

No. 241.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 3, 1912.

ACCOMMODATION for consular escort at Shiraz.

Following from acting consul at Shiraz with reference to his telegram repeated in my telegram of 25th May :—

“ Delay is running things very fine. Further delay would involve arranging in a violent hurry, with consequent disadvantageous conditions involving pecuniary loss for His Majesty's Government.

“ Colonel Douglas asks me to add that in his calculation he forgot Ramazan, which will delay work, and to lay stress on urgency of immediate start if work in question is to be done.”

New Governor-General of Fars assures me that he will start for his post on 4th August.

No. 242.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 3, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabriz.

Acting British consul telegraphs as follows, dated the 2nd August :—

“Daily meetings, at which inflammatory language is used, continue to be held in the mosque. I am informed that those persons who are prepared to prevent the Sipahdar entering the town are being supplied with arms and ammunition for the purpose.”

No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 3, 1912.

TEHRAN telegram of the 2nd August.

Would Russian Government be willing to instruct their consul-general at Tabriz to address to Shuja a serious warning against obstructing Sipahdar's arrival there and resisting the instructions sent by him?

No. 244.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 5, 1912.

RUSSIAN Minister has now heard from Tabriz that Shuja has given the fullest assurances of co-operation with Sipahdar.

No. 245.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 5, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabriz.

Acting British consul telegraphs the 4th August as follows :—

“Shuja has been informed by the Russian consul-general that the Emperor of Russia wishes the Sipahdar to take up his post at Tabriz, and that Shuja must consent to work under him. Shuja has, in consequence, to-day announced his readiness to co-operate with the Sipahdar ; he has also forbidden the meetings at the mosques.”

No. 246.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 5, 1912.

TABRIZ.

Your telegram of the 3rd August.

I am informed by M. Nératof that the telegrams to which Sir W. Townley refers had in fact been stopped by Shuja, but his Excellency added that all was now satisfactorily settled. Shuja had promised that Sipahdar would be received in a friendly manner on his arrival, and that assistance would be offered to him, and the Russian consul-general was to use his good offices with a view to regulating Shuja's personal position. M. Nératof was, however, unable to say for certain whether Shuja would stay on in Tabriz under the authority of Sipahdar, or whether another appointment elsewhere would be given to him.

No. 247.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 5, 1912.

MY telegram of the 31st July: Julfa-Tabriz Railway.

I am informed by M. Nératof that the Persian Government are practically sure to accept the proposals submitted by M. Poklewsky in regard to this scheme. M. Nératof therefore has hopes that a settlement may also be reached before long as regards the advance.

No. 248.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 6, 1912.

ACTING CONSUL at Shiraz telegraphs that gendarmerie has met with a reverse at the hands of a marauding band under Soulet-ed-Dowleh, about 500 strong, which had taken up a position commanding Shiraz-Bushire road, which was thereby practically blockaded. Acting consul reports that gendarmerie force was composed of 80 cavalry and 180 infantry, with 1 mountain gun, under two Swedish officers; that greater part of them fled without firing a shot, and were subsequently surrounded by enemy, to whom they surrendered without resistance, losing all their arms. Breech of the gun blew up and was abandoned. Small part of force, with two officers, fought for some time ineffectually, but succeeded in retreating to Shiraz. Major Siefert, who was in command of expedition, was slightly wounded in stomach.

It would appear that original intention was for gendarmerie to move out one stage from Shiraz to Chenar Rahdar, and from there advance against Soulet with a force under Kawam, but that Major Siefert, without communicating with Kawam, advanced alone in spite of urgent representations not to do so. Actual engagement took place near Diringun.

No. 249.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 6, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to refer to Sir W. Townley's despatch of the 23rd June last, and to enquire what are the views of the Marquess of Crewe and of the Government of India on the policy of assisting the Governor-General by lending direct to him money for the re-establishment of order in Fars.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 250.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 7, 1912.

CHIEF of police.

Your telegram of the 27th July.

Having failed to secure the loan of police officers from the Dutch Government, the Persian Government have requested the Swedish Government to provide the men.

This step was taken without consulting the two legations. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that the Government should not have acted in this way. After offering some excuse, his Highness said that the colonel of the gendarmerie had been consulted before the step was taken. Colonel Hjalmarson had expressed the opinion that both services should be in Swedish hands and that it would be to the advantage of both.

The Russian Minister says that Colonel Hjalmarson used the same language to him.

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No. 251.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 3rd August.

Colonel Douglas and his Majesty's consul should arrange for housing the troops as best they can until a final decision can be taken. Please instruct them accordingly.

No. 252.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 6th August.

The news of the reverse to Major Siefert's force is serious, and it comes at a most inopportune moment. You are authorised to lend 10,000*l.* at once to the Persian Government out of our share of the joint advance on condition that it is transmitted to Shiraz for payment of troops and financing a forward movement against Soulet.

No. 253.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 7, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 6th August: Defeat of gendarmerie by Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

It is absolutely imperative that the Persian Government should have money, and I am telegraphing to Sir W. Townley that he may at once advance 10,000*l.* for transmission to local authorities at Shiraz. You must explain reason for this, and express hope that the Russian advance may be made forthwith.

No. 254.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 8, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 7th August.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs raised no objection to advance of 10,000*l.* which Sir W. Townley has been instructed to make, and said that Russian Minister had been authorised to advance 25,000*l.* as soon as Persian Government consent to enter into negotiations respecting the Julfa Railway.

Until this condition is accepted I fear Russian Government will advance nothing.

No. 255.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 8, 1912.

A GROUP has been formed for the purchase of the Persian Crown jewels, and we have been approached in the matter. If the Persian Government are desirous of selling it is not for the two Powers to prevent them, but to take the matter in hand and facilitate the transaction on certain conditions. Otherwise the Crown jewels will be sold surreptitiously, and no one will be the gainer.

At present matters are moving in a vicious circle. No one will lend money to Persia until her house is in order, and no improvement is possible in the state of the country unless money is forthcoming. The two Powers might arrange for the sale of

the jewels, repay themselves for the recent small advances, and lay down conditions for the expenditure of the rest of the money.

Please discuss this with M. Sazonof. I am seriously disturbed at the reverse suffered by the gendarmerie near Shiraz, and I am anxious to avoid the necessity of drastic measures.

No. 256.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 9, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 8th August: Crown jewels.

M. Sazonof quite approves your suggestion, and is ready to instruct Russian Minister to consult with Sir W. Townley as to the best way of giving effect to it in the sense indicated by you. If the Persian Government object to intervention of the two Powers we could point out that if we take the matter in hand they will probably get better price for the jewels than if they in their present bankrupt condition were to try and find a purchaser.

No. 257.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 10.)

Sir,

India Office, August 10, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant regarding the proposal to subsidise the Governor-General of Fars instead of the Central Government, and to state that the effective expenditure of the money appears to the Marquess of Crewe more likely to be achieved in this than in any other way. But it will presumably be necessary to consider the position of the Central Government and especially of the treasurer-general. Lord Crewe would suggest that Sir W. Townley should be consulted on the question of policy; but in the meantime he notes the instructions conveyed in Sir E. Grey's telegram of the 7th instant, and moreover until the situation created by the defeat of the gendarmerie has developed he is inclined to doubt whether anything can be done.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

No. 258.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 10, 1912.

ADVANCE of 10,000*l.* for Fars.

I should be glad to receive instructions as to the particular account I am to debit with regard to payment to Persian Government sanctioned in your telegram of the 7th August.

In my opinion, the best plan would be to hand over the money to the treasurer-general, making arrangements with him to transmit amounts to Shiraz as required by Smart, who estimated that 5,000*l.* would be a sufficient sum. Under Smart's supervision the proper distribution of the money should be assured, and any surplus that might then remain could be devoted to the continuation of the Kawam's work by the new Governor-General on his arrival.

No. 259.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 12, 1912.

SWEDISH gendarmerie.

My telegram of the 6th August.

The unfortunate incident which has just occurred at Shiraz will compel the colonel of gendarmerie to change his plans. He proposes to keep at Shiraz the 300 men he

now has there in training, and hopes to be able to send from here next spring a force of 700 trained men to take over control of the road.

He assures me that no time has been lost in reality, as he would not have been able in any case to take over charge of the road this autumn. The colonel seems very sanguine about the ultimate success of the gendarmerie, though he is naturally much distressed by this incident.

No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 10th August.

I approve.

Imperial Bank of Persia are to-day placing to your account 25,000*l.*, being the whole amount of the share of His Majesty's Government and of Government of India in the joint advance, as we understand that so far the Russian Government are only contemplating a joint advance of 50,000*l.*

No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 12, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 9th August: Sale of jewels.

You are authorised to discuss the matter with your Russian colleague and the treasurer-general. I am strongly in favour of the proposal, and hope that it will be found practicable.

No. 262.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 13, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Meshed :—

“Reduction will take place as reported, except that 13th Rifles relieve 18th Rifles at Meshed. Latter return to Turkestan. Numbers remain the same. Troops expected to march on 18th August and 21st August.”

Following from acting vice-consul at Resht, 12th August :—

“Six hundred Cossacks and foot arrived 10th August at Enzeli; half arrived here yesterday. They are probably required for Talish.”

No. 263.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 13, 1912.

SWEDISH officer for Tehran police. Please refer to Tehran telegram of the 7th August.

I discussed this subject with M. Sazonof last night, and his Excellency said that he would not raise any objection to this post being given to a Swede.

No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 13, 1912.

MY telegram of the 12th August.

I leave it to your discretion to decide when and how the advance should be made. The sum advanced should not be greater than what is actually required, and should be paid to the Persian Government as it is required.

No. 265.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 17, 1912.

PERSIAN army.

Netherlands Minister has been requested by the Persian Government to discover whether his Government would be willing to lend twenty-seven officers to organise a small army for Persia. It is said that this army is to consist of 6,000 men, but no scheme has been laid before the two legations.

The Russian Minister and I have, in a joint note, asked the Persian Government to submit their army scheme to us without delay. We have pointed out in the note that their action in this matter is not consistent with their engagements to seek the advice of the two legations before engaging foreign officials.

I gather that the Netherlands Minister, when submitting the Persian request to his Government, counselled its rejection on the ground that there is much uncertainty with regard to Persian finances, and because it was improbable that any credit would be reflected on the foreign officers by the material which would, in his opinion, be available for recruiting purposes.

He has submitted the request to his Government by post.

No. 266.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 19, 1912.

SOUTH PERSIA.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh came to see me yesterday afternoon; our conversation was long and satisfactory. His Excellency really expects to leave for Shiraz in a few days' time; he is already encamped outside the town. He impressed me favourably. He has decided views about the administration of Fars, and seems confident that he will be able to restore order there.

No. 267.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 19, 1912.

YOUR despatch of the 23rd June.

What is your opinion as to the policy of financing Mukhber direct?

No. 268.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 21, 1912.

SWEDISH gendarmerie.

My telegram of the 12th August.

Colonel Hjalmarson has shown me rough scheme for force which he proposes to dispatch to Fars in the spring of 1913. This force will consist of 334 cavalry, 564

infantry, 2 mitrailleuses, with 27 gunners. Force to be employed round Tehran will, he assures me, be in no degree affected by the size of the force for Shiraz. In two months' time the former will, he says, be policing 1,000 kilom. of road. He is very hopeful with regard to the ultimate success of the gendarmerie, but complains that the present very healthy development is being checked by lack of money.

I am asking Reuter's agent to publish a reassuring telegram about the Shiraz incident. I am taking this step as the colonel is considerably distressed because the Swedish press have been publishing reports of such a nature as to convey the impression that the whole gendarmerie scheme has been proved a failure.

No. 269.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 21, 1912.

CHIEF of police.

St. Petersburg telegram of the 13th August.

An early definite answer about the Swedish police officer is being anxiously awaited. Persian Government say that until they obtain the official consent of the two legations they can take no further steps in the matter, and that the police is for the present in the hands of the Armenians, which is an unsatisfactory arrangement.

No. 270.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 17th August: Persian army.

I approve your action.

No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 22, 1912.

PLEASE see St. Petersburg telegram of the 13th August.

We have no objection to the appointment of a Swedish subject to the police. I presume your Russian colleague has received similar instructions.

No. 272.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 21st August: Gendarmerie.

If you have not advanced the whole of the 10,000l., some of it might go to the gendarmerie.

How much does the colonel want?

No. 273.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 22, 1912.

RUSSIAN troops in Khorassan.

My telegram of the 13th August.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed dated the 21st August:—

“With reference to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Meshed, I have the honour to report that the troops have left as foreseen in my previous telegram.”

No. 274.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 23, 1912.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

Your telegram of the 22nd August.

The money which Colonel Hjalmarson requires is for the development of the general gendarmerie scheme; he is afraid that in consequence of the present financial situation the men's pay will be in arrear.

In any case I think the colonel requires more money than now remains of the 10,000*l*. The whole of this sum will eventually be urgently needed for Fars.

No. 275.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 23, 1912.

PERSIAN finances.

Considerable resentment is felt here at an official statement made in the House of Commons to the effect that it would be difficult for Persia to make a foreign loan without a British and Russian guarantee in the present state of her finances and condition of the country.

Persian Government consider that His Majesty's Government have a false impression of the state of the country, and I am held responsible for this impression.

Treasurer-general, when discussing the financial situation with me to-day, said that in his opinion the resources of the country would be sufficient to meet a loan of 6,000,000*l*., but that unless the proceeds of such a loan were devoted to developing the productive resources of the country, and the settlement of outstanding claims postponed until the effects of the financial assistance given had had time to make themselves felt, there would be little money left for daily expenses.

A much more thorough European control of the finances than exists at present would, in my opinion, have to be established if such a result is to be attained.

No. 276.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 24, 1912.

RUSSIAN demands respecting the concession for the Julfa-Tabriz-Urmia Railway have now been accepted by the Persian Government in such terms that an immediate commencement of the Russian negotiations can now be made, and negotiations carried through to a successful conclusion without any reference to a Medjliss. Russian Minister is of opinion that his Government will be satisfied with the Persian reply, though it is true there is some vagueness in their assurances as to the part relating to the Medjliss. It will probably be possible, however, for the Russian Government to carry this point under pressure when the time comes.

With regard to the Mohammerah line, I have obtained, in addition to the Shah's rescript, verbal assurances from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the line shall enjoy equal advantages with the Russian line as regards negotiations. Under these circumstances it is highly desirable that negotiations should be pushed on with as little delay as possible.

No. 277.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 24, 1912.

SITUATION at Tabriz.

Following from acting British consul at Tabriz, dated the 23rd August:—

“Sipahdar, who arrived at Basminch on the 21st August, has announced that he will remain there until the conclusion of Ramazan. He has presumably taken this

step in order to give the Russian authorities time to move out of the palace. Shuja's attitude at present gives no grounds for uneasiness. He has issued a proclamation informing the people that the Persian Government have sent Sipahdar as governor, and exhorting them to submit to him, as his aims are those common to all Mussulmans. But it depends largely on how Sipahdar treats Shuja whether the latter's future attitude remains benevolent or not."

My Russian colleague informs me that telegrams have reached Sipahdar from the population of Tabriz expressing contrition for their former obstructive messages and congratulating him on his appointment.

No. 278.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 12th August: Sale of jewels.

My Russian colleague has no instructions. Treasurer-general is convinced that Persian Government have no intention of selling the Crown jewels, and thinks that they would never entertain such a proposal. He has himself unsuccessfully advocated the sale of certain useless and unimportant jewels.

No. 279.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 25, 1912.

KERMANSHAH and Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I have received the following telegram dated the 22nd August from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah:—

"On the 19th August Yar Mohammed Khan and Museyib Kuli Khan arrived at Kermanshah, having deserted the Governor-General one stage from Sinna. They had a following of some 300 Mohammedan mujahids. They declared for Salar, who promises to restore a Parliament in the capital. They are being joined by Salar's former adherents. Order is being preserved in the town."

It does not appear clear from other information in my possession whether the above mentioned mujahids have declared for Salar or whether they have only telegraphed to Tehran demanding a change of Government and the election of a Medjliss. But in any case the town of Kermanshah would appear to be in their hands.

No. 280.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 7, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 280.

Monthly Summary of Events in Persia for the past Four Weeks.

Tehran.

Provincial Governors.—Sipahdar-i-Azam left Tehran for Tabriz on the 18th July, and after a short stay at Kasvin proceeded to his post via Zenjan.

Amir Mufakham Bakhtiari has been appointed Governor of Kerman, and left

Tehran for his post on the 16th July. He travelled viâ Kemereh, and has not yet reached Ispahan.

Sardar Jang left Tehran on the 19th July to take up his duties as supreme ilkhani of the Bakhtiari tribe.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, the Governor-General elect of Fars, has now moved out of Tehran, having apparently at last made satisfactory arrangements with the treasurer-general.

Elections for the Medjliss.—There has been some slight agitation of late in the local press and among the public generally with the object of holding elections for a new Medjliss. Various meetings have been held by the Cabinet to discuss the question with representatives of the notables and other classes, but no definite decision has as yet been reached.

Tabriz.

On receipt of the news that Sipahdar, whose appointment as Governor-General of Azerbaijan had been officially announced some four months ago, had actually left Tehran to take up his duties, Shuja-ed-Dowleh commenced an agitation against him.

At his instigation a telegram protesting against Sipahdar's appointment was sent by the local merchants to Tehran; the bazaars were closed, inflammatory speeches against the constitution were made in the mosques, and arms and ammunition were served out to the populace, to enable them to oppose Sipahdar's arrival by force.

Representations, however, having been made by the British and Russian authorities, Shuja desisted in his attempts to incite the people against the Central Government, and agreed to hand over the administration to Sipahdar as soon as the latter arrived.

Sipahdar, who left Tehran on the 18th July, remained at Kazvin while the demonstrations against him continued; but, on hearing that the state of affairs in Tabriz was becoming normal, he left for Zinjan on the 1st August.

During July the Russian forces in the field against the Shahsevans were reinforced by some 2,000 men from the Tabriz garrison. These were replaced by fresh troops from Russia.

Meshed.

The state of the province and the town has remained the same as reported in last month's summary.

Ispahan.

During the past month the condition of the town and environs have been as unsatisfactory as usual, but the lawlessness in the province has increased, especially in the neighbourhood of Kum, where several caravans have been robbed of late.

On the 10th July a party of Kuhgeluis looted and burnt the caravanserai at Malamir, on the Lynch road, and other parties of the same tribe are reported to have plundered some villages in Bakhtiari territory.

On the 19th July about 100 men and women belonging to a local tribe took refuge in the office of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Kum, in order to compel the governor to take action against one Mirza Reza Khan, who had driven them away from their pasture lands. The tribespeople are still in "bast," as the governor does not appear to have any power over Reza Khan. The matter has been taken up by the Central Government.

Yezd.

Although no further depredations have been reported in the immediate vicinity of Yezd, the district is still infested by bands of marauders.

On the 2nd August Bahramabad, on the Yezd-Kerman road, was attacked by a large force of Baharlus, and on the night of the 2nd/3rd August the caravanserai at Ardekan, 40 miles north-west of Yezd, was rushed by a party of tribesmen, and 250 loads and 700 camels carried off.

Acting under instructions from the Minister of the Interior, Entezam-ul-Mulk, who has been at large since his raid on Ardistan last June, has returned to that town in order to make his peace with the Government.

Shiraz.

Owing to the inability of the deputy governor of the Arabs to maintain any semblance of order among the tribes in Eastern Fars, and to the activity among Soulet's followers, Kawam commenced collecting a force in Shiraz with a view to going out himself and restoring order in the province.

At the beginning of August Kawam's forces were not ready to take the field, but as Soulet's followers had approached quite close to Shiraz, Major Siefert with a party of 80 mounted and 180 dismounted gendarmes moved out to Chenar Rahdar, about 10 miles to the east of Shiraz. It was Kawam's intention to join him there as soon as he had collected a sufficient force. On the 5th August, however, without waiting for Kawam's men, Major Siefert marched against Soulet's following, and was severely defeated, losing the greater part of his force. Major Siefert, who was wounded, and Captain Nystrom together with a few gendarmes managed to fight their way back to Shiraz.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Azam, having been removed from the post of governor by the orders of the Central Government, left Kerman at the end of July.

On his departure, Adl-es-Sultan, the commander of the troops, brought some tribesmen into the town, ostensibly for the purpose of assisting his troops to keep order. These tribesmen, however, commenced robbing the townspeople, especially those who had been loyal to the governor during the recent troubles. This resulted in some thirty people taking "bast" in His Majesty's consulate.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh, according to the latest information received by the Persian Government, is still in the vicinity of Kermanshah.

Prince Farman Farma, having no money to pay his troops, has informed the Central Government that unless money is sent to him he will be compelled to take over the customs receipts to pay his men, otherwise they will disperse and the town will again be at the mercy of Salar-ed-Dowleh.

No. 281.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 6, 1912.

MY telegram of the 12th July reported the final conclusion of the arrangement fully described in my despatch of the 10th July, by which Sardar Jang has been appointed supreme ilkhani of the Bakhtiari and Governor of Behbahan and the Kuhgeluieh for a period of five years. I now have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of Sardar Assad's letter to me, enclosing the text of the agreement, dated the 10th July, by which Sardar Jang is appointed supreme ilkhani with absolute power. This document, of which a translation is enclosed (Enclosure No. 2), will show you, Sir, that the khans seem at last to be determined to make a serious attempt to restore order in their country and to maintain security on the Ispahan-Ahwaz road. Article 5 stipulates that all the revenues usually collected by the khans, including all sums payable by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, are to be encashed by the new ilkhani and his partner, Morteza Kuli Khan (the Prime Minister's son), and are to be expended "for internal Bakhtiari purposes, such as guards for the road and the oil-wells, the repair of the bridges, and the improvement of the caravan roads."

Enclosures Nos. 3 and 4 relate to the loan of 45,000 tomans (9,000L.) at 7 per cent. interest per annum, on the security of the khans' shares in the Bakhtiari Oil Company and the first exploitation company which the khans obtained from the Imperial Bank of Persia for the purpose of facilitating Sardar Jang's mission.

I further enclose a copy of my reply to Sardar Assad (Enclosure No. 5), a copy of my letter to Sardar Jang congratulating him on his appointment (Enclosure No. 6), and finally, a copy of my letter of the 13th July to Captain Grey (Enclosure No. 7), informing him of the arrangements made and instructing him to accompany the new ilkhani from Ispahan when he leaves for the Bakhtiari country. At Sardar Jang's request I have

since arranged with Colonel Douglas, who is in command of the Indian detachment at Shiraz and Ispahan, that fourteen men and a non-commissioned officer of the Ispahan detachment should be added to Captain Grey's escort of six sowars, thus bringing his escort to a total of twenty-one men. This addition to Captain Grey's escort will only be temporary during that officer's stay in Chehar Mahal, and will return to Ispahan when he leaves Sardar Jang. By this means it will be made quite clear to the minor khans, who are inclined to give trouble, that Sardar Jang enjoys the moral support of His Majesty's Legation, and I hope that the new ilkhani will thus be enabled so to strengthen his position as to render himself paramount.

Turning to the question of Bakhtiari relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, which are referred to in Sardar Assad's letter to me and my reply, and have formed the subject of considerable telegraphic correspondence between myself and His Majesty's resident at Bushire of late, I need perhaps not weary you for the present with a detailed report of the conflict and its present phase. There are many questions at issue between the two sides, and I propose, as already reported, with your concurrence, to delegate His Majesty's consular officers at Mohammerah and Ahwaz to act as arbitrators in the matter.

The appointment of Sardar Jang, however, leads me to entertain some hope that there need not be any fear of any fresh complications arising between the sheikh and the Bakhtiaris, and that the settlement of such differences as have already arisen will be facilitated.

If the present arrangement results, as I have every reason to hope, in the restoration of security and order on the Ispahan-Ahwaz road, the time and trouble expended upon it will not have been in vain.

At the moment of closing this despatch I have received a telegram from Sardar Jang announcing his safe arrival and stating that he proposes to continue his journey to the Bakhtiari country at an early date, in full confidence of the success of his mission, despite the fact that certain sowars promised him by the Central Government have not been dispatched. As I have already informed Sardar Jang by telegraph, the present pecuniary difficulties of the Government have prevented their carrying out their promise. The arrears of pay due to all such men as those required by Sardar Jang are so considerable that the dispatch of even fifty men would mean a heavy call on the resources of the Treasury, as the men refuse to start until all the salary due to them for past services has been paid up in full.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 281.

Sardar Assad to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

July 10, 1912.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's two notes dated the 26th May and the 27th June, respecting security in the Bakhtiari country and the differences between the Bakhtiari khans and the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

As your Excellency is aware, I have always done my utmost in the interests of security on the Bakhtiari road, and now that this security has been somewhat shaken, I have taken definite measures in the matter.

Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan have been given absolute authority and the necessary powers, and have been entrusted with the mission of maintaining order in the Bakhtiari country and on the Ahwaz road. They will start within a day or two, and after their arrival in the Bakhtiari country all cause for anxiety will be removed. I enclose a copy of the agreement made with Sardar Jang for the purpose of realising these intentions.

With regard to the unpleasantness between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the khans, I would like to have the differences removed and friendship established between them, but for that purpose certain measures on the part of the sheikh are necessary, and that must be done through your kindness. The conditions proposed by the khans are as follows:—

1. That the sheikh should pay compensation for all the damage which he has done to the properties of the khans and the Bakhtiari tribe.
2. That blood-money should be paid for those who have been killed.

3. That the sheikh should not interfere with Shuster and Dizful. He should release all the Shusteris and the dependents of the khans who have been imprisoned by him, and pay compensation for the losses suffered by them.

Should the sheikh carry out the above conditions, I can assure you that the unpleasantness would be removed, and I would be able to establish friendship between him and the khans, so that there may be no difficulties between them in the future.

I avail, &c.

ALI KULI BAKHTIARI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 281.

Agreement given to Sardar Jang, July 10, 1912.

In the name of God, &c.

(Translation.)

WE, the undersigned, have with complete confidence on this 24th day of the month, Rejeb, 1330 A.H. (10th July, 1912 A.D.), by order of the Imperial Government and of our own family, appointed Sardar Jang to be Governor-in-Chief of Bakhtiari, Chaharmahal, Kuhgeluieh, and Behbahan, from the present year Sichkan-il (21st March, 1912-20th March, 1913), until the end of the year Loin-il (21st March, 1916-20th March, 1917), which constitutes five complete years. He will independently and powerfully, with absolute authority be independent "ilkhani" of the Bakhtiari tribe, and will carry out the conditions of the following articles:—

Article 1. He will be, as stated above, for five complete years independently and powerfully the "ilkhani," and will not be liable to dismissal. During these five years one of the sons or descendants of the late ilkhani will always be in partnership with him in the capacity of "ilbeggi," and will join him in profit or loss. For the present that person will be Morteza Kuli Khan. As long as Sardar Jang is satisfied with him he will remain with Sardar Jang and keep order. Whenever Sardar Jang is dissatisfied with him, and no longer desires that Morteza Kuli Khan should remain with him, he has the right to change Morteza Kuli Khan, and to appoint another of the sons (or descendants) of the late ilkhani in his place to act as his (Sardar Jang's) partner, and no one will have the right to make any objections.

Art. 2. Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan have full powers with regard to the minor khans who are the sons or descendants of Jaafar Kuli Khan, and will, if they desire, retain them in Bakhtiari and Chaharmahal, but are at liberty to expel them if they deem it necessary to do so. The Government and we ourselves will accord the utmost support. If any of the sons (or descendants) of the late Jaafar Kuli Khan should disobey or rebel, they (the ilkhani and ilbeggi) will have the right to punish them severely with personal and tribal force. Should the affair become serious, and should the disobedient person or his dependants sustain loss, either of property or of life, no member of that family will have the right to complain.

Art. 3. For the maintenance of order in the Bakhtiari tribe and Chaharmahal Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan are empowered and authorised to issue any orders they like, or to inflict any punishment or penalty on the minor khans, headmen, and Bakhtiari. They are likewise empowered and authorised to dismiss or appoint, and to grant or withhold salaries. Any orders which they issue during these five years will be correct, and will always be carried out and approved, and will never be reversed.

Art. 4. Sardar Jang and his partner will every year collect all the revenues of Bakhtiari and Chaharmahal, the flock revenue of Faraidan and Chaharmahal, the money for guarding the oil (company), the road tolls of the bridges, and will expend the same for internal Bakhtiari purposes, such as guards for the road and the oil-wells, the repair of the bridges, and the improvement of the caravan road. No member of the family will on any account have the right to interfere or to claim any share.

Art. 5. Regarding the maliat of Bakhtiari and Charharmahal, it has been agreed that Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan will each year pay the Government salaries and emoluments of the (Bakhtiari) family, the pay of the sowars of Sardar Ashja and Sardar Bahadur, which it has always been customary for the Government to pay. If there should be a small balance it is to be paid to the special Bakhtiari sowars. Should the Government claim the balance of the Bakhtiari maliat the family must be responsible for it, and Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan will not be answerable for the same. The existing claim of Messrs. Lynch will be payable each year by Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan, in accordance with the instalments laid down.

Art. 6. With regard to the 8,000*l.* borrowed from the Imperial Bank on account of the shares, and given by us to Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan, they will have to pay the bank every year 2,000*l.* and interest, beginning from the end of the year Oud-il (21st March, 1913–20th March, 1914) and terminating at the end of the year Loin-il (21st March, 1916–20th March, 1917), which constitutes four complete years, during which time the administration of Bakhtiari is in the hands of Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan. In this way the whole of the 8,000*l.*, with interest, will have been paid up in the four years. Should it so happen that one of these two men should die, which God forbid, their families must undertake to refund the balance of the pounds sterling due. Should it so happen (God forbid) during these four years, in each of which they must pay 2,000*l.*, with interest, that Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan cease to interfere [? in tribal affairs] or are dismissed, they will have to pay from the year Oud-il (1913–14), when 2,000*l.*, plus interest, will be payable, up to such year as they actually collected the Bakhtiari maliat and other revenue. After they have ceased to collect, they will have no responsibility, and such persons collecting the maliat and other revenues of Bakhtiari and Chaharmahal, the bridge, the flock revenues, the petroleum, &c., will have to undertake the liability.

Art. 7. Regarding the maliat for the present year Sichkan-il (1912–13) of Bakhtiari, the bridge, the flocks of Chaharmahal, and Faraidan, which has been collected by the khans of the family, every member will be responsible for the sum he has collected, and must hand it all over to Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan. Should they make difficulties in handing over the money, Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan will have the right to take it from their estates.

Art. 8. It has been agreed that as many sowars as are necessary for Tehran, from 100 to 2,000, will be prepared and sent to Tehran by Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan, or whoever is Sardar Jang's partner, on condition that the sum of 15 tomans for each sowar is paid before their departure—for as many sowars as are required—to Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan, who will deliver them at Tehran. Any khan of the family who is appointed governor will have to pay 15 tomans per sowar for as many sowars as he wants Sardar Kuli Khan to send, and they will be dispatched.

Whatever has been written in this document will not be contravened.

NEJEF KULI BAKHTIARI, *Samsam-es-Sultaneh.*
 ALI KULI BAKHTIARI, *Sardar Assad.*
 GHOLAM HUSSEIN BAKHTIARI, *Sardar Motashem.*
 LUTF ALI BAKHTIARI, *Amir Mufakhem.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 281.

Agreement.

(Translation.)

IN consideration of the Imperial Bank of Persia having advanced us the sum of 45,000 tomans for the period of five years, we, the undersigned, do hereby hold ourselves responsible, jointly and severally, for the repayment of the said sum, plus interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. The payment of capital and interest will be as follows:—

						Krans.	Krans.
Norouz 1331 (March 21, 1913)—							
Principal	Nil.	
Interest from July 11, 1912, to March 21, 1913	24,675	24,675
September 21, 1913—							
Principal	90,000	
Interest	15,750	
							105,750
March 21, 1914—							
Principal	Nil.	
Interest	12,600	12,600
September 21, 1914—							
Principal	90,000	
Interest	12,600	
							102,600
March 21, 1915—							
Principal	Nil.	
Interest	9,450	9,450

							Krans.	Krans.
September 21, 1915—								
Principal	90,000	
Interest	9,450	
								99,450
March 21, 1916—								
Principal	Nil.	
Interest	6,300	6,300
September 21, 1916—								
Principal	90,000	
Interest	6,300	
								96,300
March 21, 1917—								
Principal	Nil.	
Interest	3,150	3,150
September 21, 1917—								
Principal	90,000	
Interest	6,300	
								96,300

(L.S.) NEJEF KULI BAKHTIARI.
(L.S.) GHOLAM HUSSEIN BAKHTIARI.
(L.S.) ALI KULI BAKHTIARI.
(L.S.) NASSIR BAKHTIARI.

Norouz 1331 (March 21, 1913).

Enclosure 4 in No. 281.

Agreement.

WE, the undersigned, do hereby undertake to execute in proper form the necessary transfer of the following shares, viz.: 11,670 shares in the Bakhtiari Oil Company, 15,540 shares in the First Exploitation Company, to the Imperial Bank of Persia as security for a loan of 8,000L. to be made to us by the said bank, and for which a separate bond will be executed under our joint and several responsibility.

In the meantime we authorise the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) to deliver to the Imperial Bank of Persia the above-mentioned shares, and it is understood that when our debt to the bank is fully discharged the shares will be surrendered to us by the bank.

(L.S.) ALI KULI BAKHTIARI, *Sardar Assad.*
(L.S.) GHOLAM HUSSEIN BAKHTIARI, *Sardar Motashem.*
(L.S.) NASSIR BAKHTIARI, *Sardar Jang.*
(L.S.) NEJEF KULI.

Rejeb 1330 (July 13, 1912).

Enclosure 5 in No. 281.

Sir W. Townley to Sardar Assad.

Your Excellency, *Tehran, July 19, 1912.*
I RECEIVED with great pleasure your Excellency's letter of the 10th July, forwarding me a copy of the agreement made with Sardar Jang, by which he is appointed supreme ilkhani of the Bakhtiari with full powers.

I am informing my Government of what has been done, and I am sure it will afford them great satisfaction to see that the Bakhtiari khans are making a determined effort to maintain order in Bakhtiari and on the Ahwaz road. Sardar Jang will receive the fullest support from His Majesty's consular officers in the accomplishment of his important task, which I sincerely hope will be eminently successful. I must congratulate you on having come to this very satisfactory arrangement.

With regard, however, to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, I take note with satisfaction of your desire to maintain friendly and cordial relations with him, and I repeat that it

is of the utmost importance that peace should be maintained between the Bakhtiari and the sheikh.

I have asked for authority from my Government to depute two of His Majesty's consular officers in the south to act as mediators in the existing differences between the Bakhtiari and the sheikh. When the necessary authority reaches me I will ask that Sardar Jang should name his representative and request the sheikh to do the same.

The commission of enquiry will then go into all the questions at present in dispute, including those enumerated in your letter, and a final settlement will, I hope, be arrived at which will avoid any further trouble in this respect.

I avail, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 6 in No. 281.

Sir W. Townley to Sardar Jang.

I HAVE received from his Excellency Sardar Assad a copy of the agreement signed by Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Sardar Assad, Amir Mufakham, and Sardar Motashem, by which you are appointed Governor-in-Chief of Bakhtiari, Chaharmahal, Kuhgeluieh, and Behbahan for a period of five years. I observe with satisfaction that you will independently and powerfully, with absolute authority, be independent ilkhani of the Bakhtiari tribe, and that the eight articles of the agreement communicated to me confer upon you the fullest powers and the most absolute authority which it is possible to give you.

This document, of which I am sending a translation to His Majesty's Government, will prove to them that the ruling chiefs of the great Bakhtiari tribe are determined to maintain security, peace, and order in Bakhtiari and the adjoining countries, and will, I am sure, afford them the utmost satisfaction.

Having full confidence in your ability, integrity, devotion to duty and personal courage, I am confident that, if you receive the necessary support from those whose duty it is to support you in your mission, you will have no difficulty in bringing about peace and order in Bakhtiari and on the Ahwaz road, which is so important to British commerce.

You will receive in your mission the fullest support from His Majesty's consular officers, and if you should be in need of my own help, I will not fail to extend such assistance as I properly can.

I wish you every success and a pleasant journey.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Tehran, July 13, 1912.

Enclosure 7 in No. 281.

Sir W. Townley to Captain Grey.

Sir,

Tehran, July 13, 1912.

WHEN you were in Tehran on a visit lately the Bakhtiari khans were being pressed to take immediate measures to restore order in their country and especially to restore security for British trade on the Bakhtiari road. The khans informed us, as you will remember, that they were prepared to entrust their mission to Nassir Khan Sardar Jang, but that for this purpose he would require to borrow the sum of 40,000 tomans for which they offered the road tolls as security. Shortly after your departure I was sounded by the khans as to the proposed appointment of Lutf Ali Khan Amir Mufakham to the governorship of Kerman and Baluchistan. I intimated that if the khans were unable to maintain order in their own country it was clearly out of the question for me to entertain their proposal. They subsequently offered to mortgage their shares in the Bakhtiari Oil Company and the First Exploitation Company as security for an advance for the purpose of facilitating Sardar Jang's mission. This has now been arranged, and you will see from the enclosed copies of the two bonds the khans have signed under what conditions they have borrowed 45,000 tomans from the Imperial bank.

I also enclose Persian text and translation of the document signed by the khans

appointing Sardar Jang "ilkhani" and Morteza Kuli Khan "ilbeggi" for five years with full powers.

I have written to Sardar Jang that I take note of his appointment with satisfaction and wish him every success. A copy of my letter is also enclosed for your information.

It has been arranged that you are to accompany Sardar Jang from Ispahan when he leaves for the Bakhtiari country in order to assist him at the outset of his mission to deal with the minor khans who are at present, I understand, somewhat out of hand.

You are authorised to impress upon them the utmost importance of assisting Sardar Jang in every possible way, and to threaten them if necessary with the displeasure of His Majesty's Government if they do anything to hamper the new ilkhani and ilbeggi in the execution of their duties.

I trust that you will be able to achieve the object in view without much difficulty and that Sardar Jang's mission will prove an eminent success.

You will see that the Bakhtiari Khans' share certificates are to be delivered to the Imperial Bank, and I request you to carry this out in due course.

I am, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 282.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 7, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit three telegrams that I have received from the acting British consul at Shiraz reporting upon the circumstances which led up to the defeat of the new gendarmerie force under Major Siefert and Captain Nystrom on the 5th instant at the hands of an irregular force of 500 men under Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who has succeeded in collecting a small body of men round him, and is occupying a position at Siakh, from whence he can command the caravan traffic on the Shiraz-Bushire road.

I spoke at length yesterday to the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the situation at Shiraz, and I urged upon his Highness the pressing need of immediately sending 25,000 tomans to the Kawam-ul-Mulk to meet the unavoidable expenses necessitated by an expedition against Soulet, whose forces are likely to be largely increased as a result of his victory over the gendarmerie under European officers.

Ala-es-Sultaneh promised that he would do his utmost to find some money, but he shrugged his shoulders hopelessly and said that all possible financial resources had been exhausted in finding money for Kermanshah and other places where it is urgently needed, and that the Treasury chest is quite empty.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 282.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, August 4, 1912.

SOULET, profiting by absence of Kashgais in north, is threatening Shiraz valley with some 500 mainly non-Kashgai freebooters under his brother-in-law, Soulet himself not accompanying party. Marauders advancing from Khojeh captured Diringun from Kashkuli chief, who with about fifty men fought for one night and then retreated. Yesterday marauders made incursions on to Bushire road, near Chenar Rahdar, but caravans threatened managed to get through safely, while Gellehzan Kashgais, who by good luck happened to be in the neighbourhood, held enemy in check. Kawam has ordered ketkhuda of Dastarjin to detain upcoming caravans, and is stopping caravans leaving Shiraz for few days.

Enemy is now in possession of Siakh, and commands first stage of Bushire road. Kawam has summoned Arab riflemen. Kashgai force is already dribbling in. Army, when collected, will march to Siakh. Major Siefert, with 200 gendarmes, leaves to-day to hold Chenar Rahdar. He has not yet decided whether he will subsequently go with Government army to Siakh. Kawam's departure to Arabs has unfortunately, but necessarily, been postponed.

Local authorities have hardly any money or cartridges. Sarbaz are clamouring for pay. They have long been in bast at Persian telegraph office, and threatening to come to consulate. Kawam has been restraining them, but 31st July they evaded his surveillance by slipping singly out of town and collected behind consulate with intention of forcing a bast. I only succeeded in dispersing them by threatening their officers that my guard would fire if sarbaz came on, and by promising to use my influence privately to obtain them relief. I fear scanty maliat still obtainable must be given to sarbaz to keep them quiet.

It is urgent that serious expedition be dispatched to drive back marauders and occupy Firuzabad. Some financial help is necessary for this, otherwise Kawam will probably only be able to reoccupy Siakh and drive marauders into Khojeh, whence they will return when Government army disperses for want of funds necessary to follow up enemy. Repetitions of these alarms and excursions is most disastrous financially and for general order of the province. Arabs, who had been expecting Kawam, will now probably, relieved from fear, redouble their depredations.

Could Persian Government give local authorities, say, 25,000 tomans to send force to drive back marauders and occupy Firuzabad? Money could be largely recovered from maliat of Firuzabad and of Arabs, against whom deferred measures would then be possible; 25,000 spent now would be worth double that sum spent after things have got worse. I hope you will be able to persuade Persian Government to succour local authorities with that sum, without which they can do nothing effective.

Enclosure 2 in No. 282.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, August 5, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.

Kawam has just sent me urgent message to effect that Major Siefert with his 200 gendarmes, without previously consulting Kawam, left at dawn to-day for Siakh. Kawam's five sowars, whom he had given to Siefert to help latter locally at Chenar Rahdar, begged major to communicate first with Kawam, but he refused. Kawam fears Siefert, unfamiliar with tribal guerilla warfare, may lead his men to defeat, which would have bad effect on future prospects of gendarmerie and on present campaign against Soulet's freebooters. Arab riflemen entered town to-day, and Kashgai reinforcements are expected to-morrow. Arabs are too tired to start out to-day. Kawam suggests I should use my influence to moderate Siefert until Government army can join him.

As a civilian, I am reluctant to interfere with military dispositions of the major, who might resent my interference. Moreover, if he has really gone to Siakh, he must by now be within the war zone. I propose, therefore, unless I hear from you by noon, to tell the Kawam that I do not think it advisable to interfere.

Enclosure 3 in No. 282.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, August 6, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.

Major Siefert and Captain Nystrom, with 80 mounted, 180 foot gendarmes and 1 gun marched towards Diringun, near which they encountered Soulet's force. Great part of infantry gendarmerie fled without firing a shot and were surrounded by enemy, to whom they surrendered without resistance. Rest of force, with Swedish officers, fought for some time, but ineffectually. Gun, breach of which blew up while being fired, was abandoned. Gendarmerie generally scattered and fled, Swedish officers being then compelled to retreat with few men. Soulet's men tried hard to catch them, but they succeeded in getting back to Chenar Rahdar, though Siefert's horse was shot in three places, and himself wounded in stomach, but not seriously. There were a number of casualties, and enemy appear to have captured nearly all the rifles, only fourteen having as yet been accounted for. Swedish officers returned last night, and fugitive gendarmes are dribbling in. They apparently took no water with them on the march through waterless region, and it is to be feared that many of the wounded out

there will die unless enemy succour them. Soulet's men were in hillocks fortified with sangars, and apparently got round gendarmes, unused to hill fighting and ignorant of country, very easily. Probably enemy will let prisoners go.

This disaster will have worst possible effect on present campaign, as utter rout of Government force will encourage enemy and make many new rebels.

No. 283.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

Sir, *Tehran, August 7, 1912.*
 WITH reference to my telegram of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, reporting the departure from the town of the Government forces.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 283.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Kermanshah, July 16, 1912.*
 I HAVE the honour to report that all the bakhtiari and mujaheds left on 12th for Bisitun and are now at Sahneh, a stage beyond that place. There remain here the Hamadan fedai regiment and some 500 of the Farman Farma's own sowars, as well as local troops; more of latter are expected. The military leaders were dissatisfied at being kept here idle and scattered about the town, and also because Farman Farma had told some of those applying to him for pardon that they should not come in at present, the inference being that the military could not be trusted, which they deny. On 14th I met Farman Farma at the Russian consulate. He told us that the troops had left without his permission, and that the presence of 300 of the mujaheds was necessary with a Maxim and two guns, as many of the local troops had been on the side of the rebels, and the presence of a small body of trustworthy troops would prevent them yielding to any intrigues by Salar-ed-Dowleh. We both agreed that this was necessary, and telegraphed to that effect, sending telegrams to Hamadan by that night's post.

From information which I have since obtained, I am inclined to discredit his Highness's assertion that the troops left without his permission and to believe that their objective is secret. At the same time, I am of opinion that the presence of a small body of trustworthy troops is necessary. Most of Salar-ed-Dowleh's adherents are approaching Farman Farma through different channels to obtain pardon, and the return of those who belong to the town might cause further intrigues, if the governor had no thoroughly reliable troops in town. Further, Kurdistan is in a state of anarchy.

Salar-ed-Dowleh is in Alishtar of Luristan with Nazar Ali Khan Amrai, Sardar Akram. They have about 700 men, but Nazar Ali is in constant communication with Farman Farma, and it is said that he would betray Salar in exchange for the governorship of Luristan; but I cannot vouch for this. I also hear that Salar-ed-Dowleh has made overtures to Farman Farma to submit to the Government, if granted a governorship anywhere in Persia. My authority for this is the man who brought the message to Farman Farma, a former basti.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

No. 284.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

Sir, *Tehran, August 14, 1912.*
 WITH reference to my telegram of the 6th August, and to my despatch of the 7th instant, upon the subject of the reverse suffered by the gendarmerie forces near Shiraz on the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit copies of telegraphic correspondence that has passed between this legation and the Shiraz consulate.

I have also had a conversation with Colonel Hjalmarson, who told me that he had decided, in consequence of what has happened, to somewhat alter his plans respecting the policing of the Bushire-Shiraz road. He represented that he personally had always been opposed to the establishment of a separate gendarmerie detachment at Shiraz, but that he had been obliged to adopt this course against his will by the Persian Government. He now proposes to return to his original idea, and to prepare a special force at Tehran for the Shiraz-Bushire road, leaving the 300 men now at Shiraz to finish their course of instruction there. Colonel Hjalmarson hopes to have 700 efficiently trained and equipped men ready in the spring for service on the road in question. He further pointed out that the unfortunate incident near Shiraz will not really delay operations, as he had already made up his mind that it would not be possible for the gendarmerie to assume control of the road in October, as had been anticipated.

Colonel Hjalmarson, though much distressed by the reverse suffered at Shiraz, appeared in good heart about the future efficacy of the gendarmerie, and seemed quite satisfied with the general progress made.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 284.

Sir W. Townley to Acting Consul Smart.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 7, 1912.

I HAVE urged upon the Central Government the great importance of sending Shiraz 25,000 tomans at once. The Minister for Foreign Affairs promises to try and find the money, and the Government fully realise the seriousness of the situation, but pending the conclusion of the conditions of a fresh Anglo-Russian advance there is no money in the Treasury, and the financial situation is extremely critical. The unwillingness of the Persian Government to accede to the Russian demand for a railway concession from Julfa to Tabriz with an extension to the north of Lake Urmia is delaying the fresh Anglo-Russian advance.

It was impossible for me to take any action on your telegram of the 5th August, which reached me too late. You acted quite rightly in not trying to dissuade Major Siefert from making his forward movement.

Enclosure 2 in No. 284.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, August 8, 1912.

GENERAL situation.

Postponement of Kawam's departure to Khamseh tribes is having effect anticipated in penultimate paragraph of my telegram of the 4th August. Mirza Fazlullah Khan, deputy governor, Khamseh, telegraphs it is useless his remaining among tribes unless Kawam comes out by 1st of Ramazan; that already Arabs, Baseris, and Baharloos, in bands of hundred strong, are on war-path towards Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman; that loyal Kalanters cannot restrain their men any longer, &c.

Kawam has now about 1,000 Arab and 400 Kashgai riflemen in town, whom he has not money to pay. He as yet holds them in control, though they are of course robbing in and around town in recognised manner of Persian irregulars on war-path. Kawam in consultation with me is taking precautions for protection of British houses distant from consulate, but he anticipates no danger at present. Kawam has summoned Baseri and more Arab riflemen, and he expects to have 4,000 to 5,000 tribal levies in town within few days. Allowance must be made for oriental exaggeration in computation, but the presence of large numbers of tribal bandits is unpleasant for the town. Telephone message from Asker Khan to-day seems to hint than Kawam may have some difficulty in getting further Arab levies, and this difficulty is likely to be increased by gendarmes' defeat.

Force of Kashkulis and Farsimadanis is being collected in the neighbourhood of Khané Kinyan. At present these are confining their attention to methodical smashing of our telegraph insulators for extraction of steel stalks. Bushire road if still closed. Northern wires are of course going down with daily regularity.

Soulet's men have hitherto been inactive, beyond raiding Karabagh, 5 miles south of town.

Kawam makes no offensive movement until his whole force is collected, as he hopes, if he can get any money, to make a thorough job of business this time.

Unpaid sarbaz sent me round robin yesterday, complaining of my failure to succour them and renewing threats of bast. It has been usual for consulates to accept sarbaz basts in past, but with Indian soldiers ignorant of language encamped in and around consulate I cannot risk presence of sarbaz, which might be productive of misunderstanding, leading to regrettable incidents. I propose therefore, if I cannot keep sarbaz quiet by further procrastination, to accept in bast few officers as representative.

No. 285.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 26, 1912.

RUSSIAN expedition against the Shahsevans.

Following from acting British consul at Tabriz, dated the 25th August:—

“Some 70 Russian killed and wounded were brought here from Ardebil on the 23rd August. Though it is given out that the Russians have defeated the Shahsevans, it is rumoured that they have suffered a heavy defeat and have been obliged to retire from Ahar.”

No. 286.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.

YOUR telegrams of 21st and 23rd August.

You may at your discretion advance further instalments of the 25,000L. placed to your account on condition that it shall be for the use of the gendarmerie which is at present in Fars, or which is to be sent there in the spring.

No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 23rd August: Financial situation.

If the Persian Government resent my statement in Parliament, for which I take full responsibility and which I am not prepared to modify as long as condition of southern roads remains what it is at present, they should put forward definite proposals for a loan without a guarantee.

No. 288.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 26, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 23rd August: Gendarmerie.

It being essential that the gendarmerie should not be crippled for want of funds at this juncture, I have authorised Sir W. Townley to draw on the British share of the advance, presuming that the Russian share is on the point of being advanced.

No. 289.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 26, 1912.

TEHRAN telegram of 24th August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that as Persian Government have consented to enter into negotiations respecting Julfa Railway he is asking Minister of Finance to advance 25,000*l.* at once.

His Excellency added that he knew latter will not consent to any further advance beyond this sum till concession had been actually granted.

No. 290.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 26, 1912.

PERSIAN Crown jewels.

Please refer to Tehran telegram of the 24th August.

I saw M. Sazonof to-day, and his Excellency promised to telegraph instructions to M. Poklewsky at once and expressed his regret that, owing to an oversight, this had not been done before. He said, however, that there seemed, from what I told him, little prospect of obtaining consent of Persian Government to sale of the jewels.

No. 291.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 19, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from the acting British consul at Shiraz on the subject of the state of the roads in Fars, and on the gendarmerie now being organised by Swedish officers.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 291.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Shiraz, July 15, 1912.

I VENTURE to offer some observations on the state of the roads in Fars, and on the gendarmerie now being organised by Swedish officers.

Shiraz is mainly important for British trade as a depôt to which the exports of the province, such as opium and gum tragacanth, are brought from the districts for transport to Bushire, and as a distributing centre for merchandise imported via Bushire. The main outlets of this distributing centre are Ispahan, Yezd, and the districts of Fars. The last of these outlets is by far the most important, and is at present practically closed for regular trade, whether in exports or imports. The present satisfactory state of the Sarhad route under the guardianship of the Ilkhani of the Kashgais, makes a certain amount of retail trade possible with the villages along that road, but the volume of this trade is insignificant. The regions capable of absorbing foreign imports to Shiraz are eastern and south-eastern Fars, especially the latter. At present the Government does not possess even nominal authority in most parts of these regions, which are closed to regular caravan traffic. Occasionally a caravan, by paying heavy blackmail to Khamseh tribesmen, can, at considerable risk, circulate in parts of these regions, but the heavy rates of transport under such conditions, together with the attendant peril, render such trade of a precarious and not very profitable nature. The activity of the gendarmerie is, I understand, destined to be limited to the main road, and its efforts, successful or otherwise, would not

directly affect eastern and south-eastern Fars. British trade cannot hope for any great revival, unless the districts are opened to local caravans and Shiraz pedlars.

However, the success of the gendarmerie would open up two important outlets for Shiraz trade, namely, Ispahan and Yezd, for, if the gendarmerie could succeed in establishing itself on the Ispahan postal road, little difficulty should be experienced in maintaining tolerable security on the short stretch of the Yezd road running from the Ispahan road just north of Dehbid to Aberkuh. Moreover, the gendarmerie's success on the main road would, both by the preliminary coercive measures necessary for its inception, and by the moral effect of the opening of the Bushire-Ispahan trade route, greatly strengthen the Government's authority in the province generally, and must incidentally lead to an amelioration of the state of the outlying districts.

The main road between Bushire and Ispahan is now in a deplorable state. The Shiraz-Ispahan section is at present closed to caravan traffic, and even to travellers, except under escorts amounting to a military force. In the summer months the Arab tribes, who are entirely out of hand, render any regular traffic on that road impossible. In the winter months Lashanis, Chiharrahis, and miscellaneous brigands from the villages render the Shiraz-Dehbid section very insecure, but caravans under strong escort are able to circulate with occasional robberies. In the spring and autumn the Abadeh-Aminabad section is exposed to Kuhgelu depredations of monotonous regularity and on a large scale. Sarhadi villagers and the inhabitants of Shulgistan and other villages adjacent to the road also prey upon this section in the autumn, winter, and spring months. The arrival of the Kashgais in their northern quarters generally renders robberies in the summer between Abadeh and Aminabad unlikely without their connivance. With an ilkhani well disposed towards the Government, as is at present the case, the Abadeh-Aminabad section is relatively safe during the summer months. The vagaries of the Arabs, however, between Abadeh and Shiraz during these months compel caravans, to and from Ispahan, to use almost exclusively the Sarhad route. Even caravans to and from Yezd travel by the Sarhad route, using a road running from Aberkuh through Surmek and joining the Sarhad route near Asepas. Since the break-up of the Government's authority in Fars, the only roads in a relatively satisfactory condition have been those running through Kashgai territory and almost exclusively under the control of that tribe. The Jirreh, Firuzabad, and Sarhad routes, even under an ilkhani on bad terms with the Government, were generally safe and subject to moderate rahdari, which was mainly confined to the control of one tribe. The Sarhad route this summer has proved no exception to the rule. Rahdari is of course levied, but not so exorbitantly as on the Bushire road, and caravans and the post have been able to pass in safety. The rates of hire, though high, compare favourably with the almost prohibitive prices prevailing on the Bushire road.

The difficulty of the Bushire-Shiraz telegraph road lies in the lack of unity in its control. It is normally only disturbed between Kamarij and Shiraz, this section, dominated by the Kashgais, being the crux of the road question. In November 1910, Soulet-ed-Dowleh was induced by the Central Government to abandon his policy of deflecting the traffic to the eastern by-roads and to assume responsibility for the Bushire telegraph route from Shiraz to the border of Kamarij territory. The results were most discouraging. Robberies at once took place, and Soulet-ed-Dowleh, being unable to control the road without the assistance of the local headmen, was compelled to share the profits of rahdari with them. This naturally involved a large increase of this illegal imposition on the Shiraz-Kamarij section. From Kamarij to Bushire each local khan, of course, imposed similar taxes, with the result that the total exactions on the telegraph route were much in excess of the sums levied on the Jirreh or Firuzabad route. After the eclipse of Soulet-ed-Dowleh in October of last year the route from Shiraz to the Tang-i-Turkan was entrusted to the Kashkuli khans, and their chief, Mohammed Ali Khan, was made Governor of Kazerun. These khans continued the system of sharing rahdari profits with the local headmen. The road question was considerably complicated by the bitter local animosities resulting from Nizam-es-Sultaneh's disastrous régime and by the disintegration of the Kashgais, whose petty chiefs, becoming increasingly independent of the ilkhani, tended to exercise an irresponsible, extortionate, and multiple control of the road. Khurshid Khan had, until the spring of 1911, been in possession of the Tang-i-Turkan, Rahdar, and the adjacent Shapur district, besides the valley of Kamarij. He had kept his section in admirable order, though he had of course levied rahdari like the other headmen along the road. Incited by Soulet-ed-Dowleh, Nizam-es-Sultaneh made a futile, wanton aggression against Kamarij. Khurshid was driven out, Kamarij plundered, and Shapur

appropriated by Mohammed Ali Khan, who played a prominent part in these offensive operations. Khurshid succeeded in reinstating himself in the Kamarij valley, but was unable to recover Shapur, which remained in the possession of Mohammed Ali Khan, together with the control of Rahdar and the northern end of the Tang-i-Turkan. A number of Kamarijis, who had betrayed and fought against Khurshid, took refuge with Mohammed Ali Khan. These exiles, whom Mohammed Ali Khan was compelled to conciliate, have proved a fruitful source of trouble on the road by their extortionate exactions from caravans and their violent insolence towards muleteers and travellers. One of them, Ali Mohammed Kamarij, who is still in charge of the Rahdar caravanserai, took part in the attack on our troops at that spot. On the other hand, Khurshid, who had suffered heavy pecuniary loss through Nizam-es-Sultaneh's aggression, has been endeavouring to recuperate by increasing his exactions of rahdari and even by pilfering from caravans. Needless to say, the hostility existing between the guardians of two adjoining sections of the road greatly added to the uncertainty of that part of the route. To make matters worse, the increasing bitterness of the Kazerunis against the Kashgais culminated in an open breach and the enforced retirement of Mohammed Ali Khan from the governorship of that town. The Kashkulis retaliated by deflecting the traffic from the Tang-i-Turkan to Shapur and thence viâ Naudan to Mian Kotal, thus depriving Kazerun of the profits to be reaped from passing caravans. This road is in the summer very trying for mules owing to the prevalence of fly-disease. Khurshid and the Kazerunis combined against the Kashgais and succeeded in passing a number of caravans by a very precipitous route from Kamarij to Kazerun viâ Bardoun, thus avoiding Rahdar altogether. These caravans, when, after Kazerun, they again passed through Kashgai jurisdiction, were made to pay very heavily for having avoided the Naudan route. This hostility between the settled population and the Kashgais has caused periodical blocks on the road and a general state of uncertainty, which, together with the heavy exactions of the roadguards and headmen, has raised the rate of hire to almost prohibitive figures. The Kashgais, since they began to migrate northwards, have been compelled to leave the road almost entirely in the hands of the local headmen, to whom they have leased the road, section by section, from Shiraz to the Tang-i-Turkan viâ Naudan. The headmen have to levy from caravans enough rahdari to pay for these leases and to make their own profit at the same time. It is not easy to ascertain the exact amount of the rahdari levied, for the muleteers exaggerate the figures in order to increase their rates of hire. Moreover, the exactions vary, Kazeruni muleteers being more heavily mulcted by the Kashgais than muleteers from other parts. On an average, however, it is probable that for a single journey the muleteers have to pay about 3 tomans a mule in rahdari. The road guards also help themselves freely to sugar and tea from the loads and even pilfer fitfully from other merchandise that takes their fancy. Fodder along the road is, of course, sold to the muleteers at extravagant prices.

I have not failed to make continual and earnest representations to the local authorities regarding this deplorable state of affairs on the most important route for British trade in Persia. Without money or troops the local authorities are unable to take any heroic measures, and we can at present only hope for some slight palliatives to this disastrous situation. Any permanent improvement on the main road from Shiraz to Abadeh can only be effected by some sort of repressive action against the Arabs. If the Central Government grant permission, Kawam-ul-Mulk proposes to go out in person to deal with these turbulent tribes. He hopes to overawe the recalcitrant sections with the help of the relatively loyal chiefs and a force of Kashgais supplied by the ilkhani. It is very doubtful whether any efforts he can make will result in the opening of the northern postal route during this summer. Any permanent improvement on the Ahadeh-Aminabad section would only result from punitive measures against the Boir Ahmedi, and I see no possibility of such action in the near future, unless the Bakhtiari could chastise this turbulent tribe.

With regard to the Bushire road, it appears that the natural causes mentioned above, combined with Kawam-ul-Mulk's incessant pressure and the Bardoun route development, have forced the Kashkulis' hands. Mohammed Ali Khan has notified Kawam-ul-Mulk that the road guards have been withdrawn from the Naudan route, and Ali Mohammed Kamaraji at Rahdar has informed the muleteers that they can go by whatever route they wish. This will seem to indicate that the Kashkulis have at length acquiesced in a reversion to the main road. However, no permanent improvement in the Kamarij-Shiraz section can, it would seem, be effected except by a compromise between the Kazerunis and the Kashgais or by restoring Kazerun to the Kashgais. For the first purpose it would be necessary that an impartial governor

proceed to Kazerun as soon as possible. Nasir-ed-Diwan, the Kalentar of Kazerun, at present in charge of that town, is on the worst possible terms with the Kashkuli khans. With a neutral Governor at Kazerun the bitterness of the Kashkulis might be moderated, and they might be more amenable.

However, the attitude of Mohammed Ali Khan, who, since the unpunished attacks on our troops, seems to entertain exaggerated notions of his own power, is not encouraging. Pressure might be brought to bear on him through his fear of his cousin Mohammed Khan, who is hostile to him. Pressure of a different kind might be exercised against him and the other Kashkuli khans, as well as against their adversaries among the settled population on the telegraph route, by the temporary opening of the Jirreh route with the help of the Farsimadan Kashgais, who have been detained this summer in the neighbourhood of Shiraz as a protective measure. Both parties would suffer considerable pecuniary loss by the adoption of the Jirreh route, which might facilitate negotiations for a compromise. Failing such a compromise, the only solution would seem to be the forcible re-establishment of a Kashgai nominee in the governorship of Kazerun and the sacrifice of the special interests of the settled population in favour of the general interests of the road. This arrangement would not be easy to effect; it might cause serious complications and the temporary closing of the road; it would, moreover, be very inequitable and objectionable for the undesirable increase it would cause in the already excessive power of the Kashgais. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that for several years the Kashgais have had control of Kazerun, and their resentment at their ejection from that town is easily comprehensible.

I have, in the course of informal conversations with Major Siefert, endeavoured to explain to him the conditions prevailing on the road and the general political aspects of the province. It is, of course, impossible to expect European officers without any knowledge of the language or the peculiar conditions of the East to realise immediately the complicated situation in Fars. Major Siefert appears to be a reasonable, energetic, and able officer, and I have no doubt that in time he will gain the experience necessary for the comprehension of the local situation.

I venture to hope that the commencement of the gendarmerie operations will not be unduly precipitated. It would be much wiser to keep the gendarmerie in Shiraz, increasing its efficiency and numbers, than to risk a disastrous fiasco by premature action. Thus retained at Shiraz, the gendarmerie might gradually develop into a useful regular force, somewhat similar to the Cossack Brigade, which would strengthen the Government's authority, and could, as occasion arose, be used in co-operation with the Government's irregular troops, for punitive expeditions, and in time be put out on the road.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

No. 292.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 29, 1912.

PERSIAN finances.

Your telegram to St. Petersburg of the 26th August.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs urged to me yesterday that His Majesty's Government should at once advance the whole 100,000*l.* which the Persian Government understand they are holding in readiness for them. His Highness impressed upon me very earnestly Persia's pressing want of immediate financial assistance on a larger scale than the 50,000*l.* about to be advanced by the two Governments. He pointed out that 10,000*l.* of the British share had been allocated to Shiraz and that 15,000*l.* of the Russian share was retained on account of the Kermanshah customs seized by Farman Farma, and that therefore half of the joint advance had to all intents and purposes disappeared as far as the Central Government was concerned.

I replied that unless the Russian Government were prepared to act in a similar way I could hold out small hope of His Majesty's Government agreeing to advance the whole 100,000*l.* I hinted, however, that His Majesty's Government might perhaps take into consideration the question of assisting Persia by relieving her, temporarily, at any rate, of some of her financial liabilities in the south.

I urged that no time should be lost in coming forward with proposals for a loan, and

I told him that in my opinion these repeated small doles of money seemed to me an unsatisfactory way of helping Persia out of her financial difficulties. His Highness declared that the treasurer-general could produce sufficient available security for a large loan.

No. 293.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 29, 1912.

MY telegram of 25th August.

Kermanshah situation appears to be very confused. Persian Government do not seem to know in whose name rebellious mujaheds have seized town, which they count on recovering with the help of Bakhtiari levies, of which 500 are with Farman Farma, 150 on the way from Sultanabad, and 350 to be dispatched from here. It is noteworthy that no reliance is to be placed on Governor-General and regular army.

From information which has reached me it would seem money is as usual at the root of the movement. Farman Farma says all will be well if he gets 35,000 tomans (7,000L.). Rebel leader promises the same result for 40,000 tomans (8,000L.). Both parties evidently mean to squeeze Government if possible.

No. 294.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 30, 1912.

MY telegram of 26th August.

Following from consul at Tabriz, 29th August :—

“Some five days ago Khoja Beglu Shahsevans advanced to Karadag to assist another clan who were cut off in mountains, and escort them to Ardebil. Russian commander let tribe enter mountains, and on their return attacked both clans, inflicting heavy loss. Shahsevans fled in disorder to Ardebil.”

No. 295.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 30, 1912.

SOUTH PERSIA.

I have been carefully considering the question of financing the Governor-General direct (see your telegram of the 19th August). Excellent results might be obtained from such a policy. Of the sum of 10,000L. which His Majesty's Government recently advanced to the Persian Government, we paid 10,000 tomans (2,000L.) to the new Governor-General in order that he might be enabled to start for his province. There remains a sum of about 20,000 tomans (4,000L.) in hand for his use on arrival at Shiraz. If we gave him a sum of from 2,000L. to 3,000L. a month for a year he would be able to raise a really useful military force by means of which he could maintain order in the province. He ought to have established himself firmly by the end of a year; he would then be able to collect all the revenue which the needs of his administration require. Persian susceptibilities might be in some degree safeguarded by the money being paid through the treasurer-general to his agent in Shiraz and handed by the latter to the Governor-General in concert with His Majesty's consul.

No. 296.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 26th August.

Persian Government are sending circular financial statement to their legations abroad showing that national resources available as security for a loan of 5,000,000*l.* should more than suffice for the purpose without touching the maliat.

Treasurer-general told me this morning that Government intend to approach two legations with proposals for a loan at an early date.

No. 297.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

Sir,

Bushire, August 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information a memorandum drawn up by Mr. H. G. Chick, my commercial adviser, on the recent history and present aspect of the all-important question of "rahdari," *i.e.*, the forcible levy of blackmail on passing caravans by the headmen on the Bushire-Shiraz road, in the form of transit dues and exorbitant charges for forage, calculated to amount collectively to not less than 20,000*l.* per annum.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure in No. 297.

Memorandum on the Rahdari Question by Mr. H. G. Chick.

THIS question is of fundamental importance at the present juncture, for there can be little doubt that "rahdari" and its prevention must be taken in hand before the restoration of order, either by the Persian gendarmerie or by our own troops. "Rahdari" is, in fact, the governing factor in the existing situation along the road, and our hands are bound to be forced to action in regard to it, sooner or later.

It may be convenient to record the recent history of the levy.

"Rahdari" existed previous to 1900 in the form of small tolls of a few shahis on caravans, levied almost entirely on the lower part of the road only, and at a few centres such as Borazjun: the toll was taken spasmodically, and by no means regularly, by the local khans at the stages, and payment of it entitled caravans to night watchmen, and to an escort of a few riflemen as far as the next stage. It is important to note that the sedentary tribesmen along the route were scantily armed up till 1900, after which date arms from Muscat began to filter in.

"Alafi," another toll, originally a grazing fee, is, I think, an older fee than "rahdari;" but it was formerly levied at certain seasons, and never made a permanent charge. The toll is now become another form of blackmail levied at the halting-stages by the khans from the muleteers through suppliers of fodder; it is usually recovered by the grant of a monopoly of supply to a single individual, who charges 1 or 2 kranš, as it may be, over and above the price of fodder for each animal, for the benefit of the khans. It may also take the form of the supply of short weight of fodder to each animal, which is charged for at the full price of the full weight.

Even in 1903, however, these exactions "rahdari" and "alafi," irregularly levied as they were, were a sufficiently heavy tax to cause their abolishment to be made on the part of the Persian Government one of the chief *quid pro quos* for the imposition of a higher customs tariff, and from the point of view of British interests this was the most valuable stipulation of any attached to the convention.

In point of fact, however, the Persian Government were powerless to make good their engagements. The only authorities capable of stopping the exactions were the chiefs of the district through which the route passed, seven or eight in number, and, as they

were in no way benefited by the new tariff, they were in no way inclined to give up what constituted a valuable addition to their revenue. The Persian Government, when pressed to have the routes properly guarded, made the additional blunder of calling on their chiefs to provide riflemen, and omitting to arrange for their payment. This omission provided the khans with a convenient excuse for recovering the pay of their men, and making a large income for themselves from inordinate blackmail.

Many protests have been made to the Persian provincial and central Governments by the residency here and by His Majesty's Legation in Tehran since 1906. The Central Government, however, always replies that orders have been sent; but if sent, such orders are always disregarded; and even the provincial Governments both at Bushire and Shiraz, continue to levy "rahdari" in one form or another on all mules arriving at Bushire and Shiraz, and to all protests at Bushire the reply is that they have no option as the Ministry of Finance continue to include such charges in the schedule of revenue of the town, and require the payment of it from local governors (a flagrant breach by the Central Government of its own undertaking of 1903).

Since the end of 1906 the gradual and serious development of the system has continually exercised me, and I have collected all available information and statistics regarding it. The growth of oppression was gradual up to 1907, and rapid from the end of 1910. The following instances show the rise up to the present recorded in our monthly bulletins, obtained from local merchants:—

	Per mule.	
	Krans c.	
June 1907	3	70
June 1909 (approximately)	15	00
January 1910	11	15
February 1910	9	75
March 1910	9	35
April 1910	7	10
June 1910	10	80
July 1910	10	50
August 1910	10	70
October 1910	13	62
January 1911	9	25
February 1911	11	90
March 1911	11	00
April 1911	15	30
May 1911	12	95
June 1911	14	20
July 1911	16	35
September 1911	17	95
January 1912	28	12
March 1912	21	35
May 1912	27	50

These sums represent only "rahdari" and "tufangchigiri," as it is called, and do not include "alafi"; they represent the enormous sum of 10s. for every 300 lbs. approximately, in addition to a rate of hire, which had risen by June 1912 to 34 tomans (over 6L.) per 770 lbs. for a distance of some 180 miles, and this takes no account of loss by pilferage.

About the summer of 1910 the manner in which these exactions were levied changed considerably for the worse, and can best be accounted for by saying that for a period of nineteen months from March 1909 to December 1910 the caravan route was diverted by Soulet-ed-Dowleh to the Firuzabad and Jirreh routes (where caravans were treated more kindly) at the end of which time khans and tufangchis on the Kazerun road were missing their regular incomes and spoiling to get at caravans.

By this time tufangchis from villages on the Kazerun route, nominally under the control of their khans, were primarily out to plunder a living for themselves; the khans relying on their men finding their own pay, while they themselves confined their incomes to larger extortions at the chief village passed in each district, *i.e.*, Ahmedi, Borazjun, &c.

Auction of Stretches of Caravan Route.

But with Kashgai Ilkhani controlling the route to be followed, a system of "auction" of the right to secure passage of caravans came rapidly into vogue with the smaller khans, more especially where alternative routes are possible. There are many examples of this system of auction—"kharid"—though most transactions remain secret to us. It started from the Bushire end of the road.

In March 1907 the Khan of Angali bribed the Governor of Bushire with 500 tomans and a horse to divert the road from Borazjun to Shief, vice the land route via Ahmedi. In May 1907 the Governor of Bushire was being offered 4,000 tomans (800*L.*) for the Shief route by the Angali Khan (who wanted to charge 1 kran for every three animals), while the price from the Khan of Ahmedi was 1,500 tomans (300*L.*). In consideration of the road passing by the land route, the governor also demanded an extra 2,200 tomans (440*L.*) from the kalantar (who was to take it from caravans). Ultimately 1,700 tomans (340*L.*) were paid by the Khan of Ahmedi, and a cheque for 4,000 tomans (actually seen by the writer in May 1907) returned to the Khan of Angali.

In 1907 also the Khan of Borazjun took 5,000 tomans (1,000*L.*) from his tufangchis on account of "rahdari" from caravans; but as long as Haidar Khan of Kumarij was master of the road from the first Kotal to Kazerun, and had it under one control (viz., till his death in September 1909), "rahdari" was low, not more than 1½ krans per mule from Konar Takhteh to Kazerun.

In March 1909 Soulet-ed-Dowleh undertook from certain Persian merchants in Shiraz and the Government of Fars to guarantee the safety of merchandise sent via Firuzabad and his own tribal country on a monthly payment of 1,000 tomans (200*L.*).

Certain Persian merchants at Shiraz working for Soulet-ed-Dowleh arranged to take from all muleteers arriving at Shiraz 2½ krans (about 1*s.*) on every mule. This sum was raised to 4 krans for the Jirreh route and again reduced by March 1910. It was reported then that the merchants engaged in collecting the impost in Shiraz "have now found that a great deal more than 1,000 tomans per month was realised by the tax of 4 krans, and have reduced the payment to 2½ krans, which suffices to bring in a revenue of 1,000 tomans a-month to Soulet-ed-Dowleh. One Shiraz merchant had, in fact, offered to Soulet-ed-Dowleh to farm the road out for 2,500 tomans (500*L.*) per mensem, but the Ilkhani had replied 'no,' that 1,000 tomans was quite sufficient, and he did not want unnecessary payments to be extorted from muleteers and traders.

"Under Soulet's management, the khans of Daliki and Borazjun had been forced to reduce their charges; formerly Daliki taxed mules to the tune of 3 krans per head, and the tufangchis another 2 krans out of the muleteers. Now, Daliki charged only 2 krans per mule, and had forbidden his tufangchis to take anything from the muleteers. Similarly Soulet-ed-Dowleh had instructed the Kalantar of the Farsimedan that he might charge only 5 shahis per mule at the three stages between Jirreh and Daliki."

There had been friction between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and the Khan of Dashti over the section of the Firuzabad route through Dashti, the latter wishing to take more than half of the sum levied in Shiraz.

Meanwhile, the khans from Daliki to Bushire were now willing to pay any sum to secure the reversion of the road to Jirreh by way of their districts. The khans of Borazjun and Daliki paid Soulet-ed-Dowleh 3,000 tomans (600*L.*) in February 1910 for this privilege. The two khans (it should be remembered that the Shief and Ahmedi routes to Bushire branch off in Borazjun territory and are under the control of the former khan) then applied pressure on the Khan of Ahmedi to pay 700 tomans (140*L.*) and a rifle as his share in the price, and on his refusal sent for the Khan of Angali and offered to divert the road via Shief for 1,000 tomans (200*L.*).

At the time of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's visit to Bushire at the end of December 1910 the Darya Begi, then governor, stated "Soulet-ed-Dowleh has taken 3,000 tomans (600*L.*) and a horse from Sheikh Hussein Khan and given him permission to charge 'rahdari.' He also wishes to take 2,000 tomans (400*L.*) from Mustapha Tul-i-Siahi and give him permission to exact 'rahdari.'"

Soulet-ed-Dowleh's official "protection" of the road ceased in September 1911, and the guardianship of the upper part of the road fell into the hands of the Kashkuli chiefs, whose tribal sphere of migration touched most points on the Kazerun road between Shiraz and Kumarij. The object of the Nizam-es-Sultaneh's expedition against Kumarij in March 1911 was to obtain possession of this very strong position on the caravan road for the Kashgai tribe, Soulet-ed-Dowleh having applied for Kumarij in 1910, and the Kashkuli clan having long coveted it. Whereas Soulet's selling of the road to the sedentary khans applied to the road from Daliki downwards, the limits of possibilities for the Kashkulis of raising money lay over the road from Shiraz to Kumarij or to Konar Takhteh.

In October 1911 Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli told the writer at Shahpur that he was contemplating diverting the road from the Kazerun plain by mountainous route called Kuh-i-Surkh, so as to cut off Kumarij, and thus subject the road to Kashkuli exactions all the way to Konar Takhteh. In November 1911 the Kashkuli encampment

had penetrated to the Khisht plain, with the object of further encroachments on the caravan road.

In November also, while a guest with Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, I met the khan of the Dushmanziari, to whom the Kashkuli khan then sold the "protection" of the road from Chenar Rahdar to near Dashtarjin.

From April 1911 the Kashkuli khans, despite their hostilities against Khurshid Khan on the Kumarij plain, insisted on all caravans passing by the Tang-i-Turkan, so as to pay "rahdari" at the ill-famed caravanserai at the Kazerun end of the pass. From that time till now the caravanserai has been held in force either by the Kashkulis themselves or leased out to their subordinates, such as Ali Mohammed, the Kumariji outlaw: and its commanding situation at the entrance to the ravine makes caravans an inevitable prey to its garrison.

The details given above of the growth of "rahdari" and of the "auction" of stretches of the caravan route by dominant chiefs for the time being will, I hope, make it clear that the question of the security of the Bushire-Shiraz road goes deeper than the measures hitherto proposed for the remedy of its present condition can be said to penetrate.

The following are instances of the insecurity of this road:—

1. The first European to traverse the road after the attack, was a young German merchant of Shiraz, Herr Roever, who came to Bushire to marry his fiancée in early April. According to his statements, he was held up at Diris, and was told by Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli that after the blood which had been shed it was lucky for him that he was not an Englishman; he was roughly treated at the Khwajeh Ibrahim caravanserai by tufangchis, and from the caravanserai to the mouth of the Tang-i-Turkan pass had to pay 25 tomans (5*l.*), being menaced with a rifle at the last point. He stated that altogether he had had to pay 100 tomans (20*l.*).

2. Mr. Lowen, an accountant of the Imperial Bank of Persia, proceeding to Shiraz, was able to start, early in April, as some thirty Persian sowars had been sent to Bushire by Kawam-ul-Mulk, for the purpose of escorting Lord Lamington to Shiraz, and he was able to return with them without being pestered by tufangchis. Yet his muleteers with him, he states, had to pay some 7 tomans (1*l.* 5*s.*) per mule in blackmail.

3. Comte A. de Moustier and M. Viollet, proceeding from Tehran to the Gulf, had shots fired at them on the Kazerun plain and again at Jafferjin. They were much pestered by the tufangchis, and had to pay about 40 tomans (8*l.*) in blackmail. In a written report, which was later forwarded to the French Legation, they complained of the dangers of the road.

4. Herr Heinicke and his wife, mother of Herr Roever, arrived from Shiraz in May. They were unable to pass from Kazerun by the usual route to Kumarij, but were taken up the Rah-i-Bardun route over the mountains and so down to the Kumarij plain, in order to avoid the caravanserai at the mouth of the Tang-i-Turkan, relations between Kazerun, Kumarij, and that post being strained. They had to pay about 15 tomans (3*l.*) in exactions, mostly from Kumarij onwards, and Mme. Heinicke was insulted by tufangchis at Jafferjin.

5. At the end of May, some Indian servants and camp followers of the Central India Horse in Shiraz, accompanied by Beluchis, who belonged to a camel caravan robbed near Yezd in 1909, and who were returning to India after some years' fruitless endeavour to get redress, were robbed at the Khwajeh Ibrahim caravanserai and at Jafferjin by tufangchis.

H. G. CHICK, *Commercial Adviser to the
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

No. 298.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 2, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Tabriz to-day:—

"Sipahdar entered town on 1st September. He is quartered in kalantar's house."

No. 299.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 3, 1912.

ISPAHAN detachment.

Colonel Douglas telegraphs as follows, the 2nd September :—

“The officer commanding the Ispahan squadron informs me that the lease of their quarters expires on the 5th October, that a renewal of the lease of the stables will be impossible to obtain, that it will be impossible to rent other buildings, and that as regards the men’s quarters, unless we close immediately with an offer which is now open, renewal of the lease may be refused.”

No. 300.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, September 3, 1912.

MY telegram of 26th August.

Aide-mémoire received yesterday from Russian Government states that Russian representative has telegraphed that there is at present no question of selling the Crown jewels at Tehran, and that he considers that it would be better not to suggest to Persian Government this method of replenishing their exchequer.

Russian Government concur in these views, and think that we should not only abstain from raising the question, but even prevent, as far as possible, any sale taking place in the event of Persian Government thinking of such a measure.

No. 301.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 4, 1912.

RUSSIA and Shahsevans.

My telegram of the 30th August.

Russian Legation inform me that the Shahsevans are now assembled in full force in the neighbourhood of Mianeh, having broken through the lines between Ardebil and Akher. It is reported that they have announced their intention of marching to Tehran viâ Kazvin.

Russian Legation also tell me that they have now not more than 500 men at Kazvin.

No. 302.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 3rd September.

The retention of the detachment at Ispahan is not desirable any longer. You should consult the officer commanding at that place, as well as Colonel Douglas, as to the possibility of withdrawing this detachment safely to Shiraz without adversely affecting the situation there. If their opinion is favourable, and you concur in it, I shall be ready to authorise the withdrawal whenever Colonel Douglas thinks the proper time has come.

No. 303.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 8, 1912.

KERMANSHAH.

His Majesty's consul telegraphs as follows, dated the 5th September (received here to-day):—

“Salar-ed-Dowleh, with some 500 men and several Kurdish chiefs, returned to Kermanshah on the 3rd September. Yar Mohammed received him warmly. The latter has a following of some 1,000 men; he may have other forces outside the town, but I cannot yet learn whether this is so or not.”

No. 304.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 11, 1912.

MY telegram of 8th September.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Armenian emissary sent to Farman Farma's camp had arrived and had succeeded in persuading the Prince, Bakhtiaris, Armenians, and mujaheds to combine in an attack on Kermanshah. Advance, his Highness said, would commence at once.

No. 305.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 12, 1912.

PERSIAN Government have handed to the two legations memorandum showing that advance of 50,000*l.* would be of no use to them in their present financial difficulty, and asking that it may be increased to 200,000*l.*, half from each Government. It is shown that 40,000*l.* is wanted for gendarmerie for five months, 25,000*l.* for police of Tehran, 15,000*l.* for maintenance of garrison at Tehran, 12,000*l.* for Kermanshah army for two months, 3,500*l.* for Cossack brigade at Tabriz for two months, 30,000*l.* for arrears of pay due Government departments, 30,000*l.* for purchase of arms and ammunition, and 40,000*l.* for reorganisation of army.

It is pointed out that nearly a half of the 200,000*l.* lent last March has been spent on the gendarmerie, and that 40,000*l.* of it was repaid to Russia last July, and it is argued that Persia cannot continue reforms so satisfactorily started without money, and that to deprive her of financial assistance now would seriously jeopardise success of the reforms initiated. Memorandum states in conclusion that the advances would be repayable from loan which it is hoped to make shortly, for which application will be made this month.

Scheme of army reorganisation has not yet been submitted to us.

Falling off in southern customs receipts would, I think, justify request for some satisfactory assurance respecting railways as means of improvement of trade should His Majesty's Government be disposed to entertain Persia's request.

No. 306.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 12, 1912.

WINTER quarters for troops at Shiraz.

Colonel Douglas telegraphs the 11th September as follows:—

“By the middle of October the leases of the quarters occupied by the troops will expire. Would you authorise me to ask Mr. Smart to endeavour to arrange for renewal of the leases for a short period, preferably from month to month?”

Mr. Smart adds that the landlords have been pressing him for a long time to make some statement as to his intentions with regard to the leases, and that he would be grateful for early instructions.

I should be glad of your instructions as soon as possible as matter is becoming urgent.

No. 307.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 13.)

Sir,

India Office, September 12, 1912.

WITH reference to the instructions sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in Sir E. Grey's telegram of the 5th September, I am directed to enclose a copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, and to say that, if it is found impracticable to withdraw the detachment at Ispahan, the Marquess of Crewe concurs in the view that the Persian Government should be approached as proposed by the Viceroy with a view to facilitating the arrangements involved by the continued retention of the troops at that place.

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 307.

Government of India to Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.)

September 7, 1912.

COLONEL DOUGLAS reports that on 5th proximo lease of quarters occupied by squadron at Ispahan will expire, and that if we do not close with offer which is now open lease of stables cannot be renewed, nor can other building be rented, while we may be refused a renewal of lease of men's quarters.

We suggest that strong representation to assist in matter and make all convenient arrangements for accommodation of our troops should be made to Persian Government, and that troops should decline to move from quarters now occupied by them pending such arrangements, and should simply continue to pay rent as hitherto. It seems preposterous that our troops should be put to inconvenience in regard to leases and quarters, considering the circumstances in which they were sent to Ispahan and Shiraz.

No. 308.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 13, 1912.

MUKHBER-ES-SULTANEH should be leaving Ispahan to-morrow for Shiraz. I would strongly urge that he should be given a fair chance of securing compliance with our demands. He assured me before leaving Tehran that were our troops obliged to winter at Shiraz he would do everything in his power to ensure their comfort. It might be well if I were to impress on the Persian Government that as long as our troops remain at Shiraz they must have suitable accommodation and that steps must be taken to secure this.

While expressing the opinion that the detachment at Ispahan should be withdrawn to Shiraz as soon as possible, Colonel Douglas hopes that the increased force will not be obliged to winter at Shiraz.

Except that the roads are occasionally impassable for a few days they are in good order for marching troops till the end of November or middle of December, according to the season.

No. 309.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 13, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 12th September: Advance to Persian Government.

I should be glad to receive views of Russian Government as soon as possible.

No. 310.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, September 14, 1912.

TEHRAN telegram of the 12th September: Advance to Persian Government.

I conveyed the substance of the above telegram to M. Sazonof to-day in an *aide-mémoire*.

His Excellency informed me that a similar communication had already reached him from the Persian Government, and that before he could give a definite answer he would like to study the matter more carefully. As regards any further advance, however, he said that there was no prospect whatever of getting the consent of the Russian Government until the concession for the railway from Julfa to Tabriz had been granted by the Persian Government.

No. 311.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 15, 1912.

I AM awaiting your reply to my telegram of 5th September.

If it be impracticable to withdraw detachment from Ispahan to Shiraz, His Majesty's Government concur in view expressed in Viceroy's telegram of 7th September, and in that case you should address strong representations to Persian Government in that sense, and instruct Colonel Douglas to issue necessary orders to officer commanding at Ispahan accordingly; but it will be better if the detachment can be moved to Shiraz.

No. 312.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 16, 1912.

COLONEL DOUGLAS sees no objection to the withdrawal of the Ispahan detachment to Shiraz. I am taking steps for carrying this out, but the actual date cannot be fixed because the new Governor-General at Fars is delayed at Ispahan, and officer commanding squadron there thinks it desirable for commissariat reasons that he should have start of at least ten days.

I am doing all I can to expedite Governor-General's departure from Ispahan for Shiraz.

No. 313.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 13th September: Situation at Shiraz.

His Majesty's Government have decided to retain the detachment at Shiraz for the present. Arrangements must therefore be made for quarters for them. If any

difficulty is made about this you should state to Persian Government that His Majesty's Government expect them to give every facility.

The Ispahan detachment should be withdrawn to Shiraz as soon as Colonel Douglas thinks proper.

No. 314.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 16, 1912.

BAKHTIARI road.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz, who has accompanied Sardar Jang on his mission, telegraphs as follows from Chigakhor on the 10th September:—

“Most friendly relations have been established between Jang and Amir Mujahed. Latter has, in consequence, been induced to accept Governorship of Behbahan. He will leave for his post about the end of this month. He is the most likely person to be able to establish order among the Kuhgeluis, to whom he is related.

“I think no more trouble is to be expected from the young khans, whose differences have been disposed of.

“An escort of 200 Bakhtiari roadguards (under a minor khan), drawn from the well-armed sections, will accompany Amir Mujahed, and will remain with him until he has assumed control of the Kuhgeluis. Their number will then be reduced to what is sufficient to garrison guard towers.

“The above arrangements should be sufficient to restore order, and I trust I may be able to recommend that traffic along the road be resumed before the end of the present month.”

I am congratulating Captain Grey on the share he has played in conciliating all parties. The arrangement reported appears most satisfactory and promising for future peace on the Bakhtiari road. There was considerable trouble at first with the minor khans, as was anticipated.

No. 315.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 17, 1912.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz, 17th September:—

“Several of the ex-Shah's followers have arrived here, among them Salar-i-Muazzaz and Hajib-ed-Dowleh, who has come from Resht viâ Kazvin. One adherent of ex-Shah has stated that latter will leave Odessa for Europe in a month.

“It is reported that Shuja will depart shortly for Russia.

“Hashmat-ed-Dowleh left some days ago, nominally for Tehran, but it is believed he is going to join ex-Shah.

“Mohammed Ali's chief interpreter is due here shortly from Berlin.”

No. 316.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 18, 1912.

INSTRUCTIONS contained in your telegram of 16th September have been carried out. I do not anticipate any trouble in withdrawal of Ispahan squadron to Shiraz. Movement is at present delayed by Mukhber, date of whose definite departure from Ispahan is vague, as he cannot obtain troops promised him. Colonel Douglas is of opinion that withdrawal should take place as soon as possible, and agrees with me that a date should be fixed irrespective of Mukhber's departure. I have instructed consul-general at Ispahan to advise Mukhber, and to tell him that it would

not appear to me to be politic that squadron should appear to be accompanying him, but that its departure cannot be delayed indefinitely, and must either precede his or take place about ten days later. Actual date can be best arranged by Mr. Grahame, officer commanding squadron, and Mukhber.

No. 317.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 18, 1912.

PERSIAN finances.

St. Petersburg telegram of the 14th September.

Russian Government have instructed my colleague to repeat to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs a communication which Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has made to the Persian representative at St. Petersburg, to the effect that when the Persian Government have given satisfactory assurances regarding the Julfa-Tabriz railway concession, the Persian request for an advance will be submitted to the Russian Government.

No. 318.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 19, 1912.

MY telegram of 8th September.

His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah telegraphs that Salar and Yar Mohammed have abandoned town and marched to Kurdistan with 600 men. They are now threatening Senneh to such good purpose that governor has taken refuge in Turkish consulate, and townspeople are fleeing in terror.

Persian Government confirm news, but know nothing of the whereabouts of Government army under Farman Farma, which was in possession of Senneh a week ago when the movement on Kermanshah began.

Presumably two armies passed each other on different roads, and by accident or design have exchanged cities of occupation without firing a shot.

No. 319.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 19, 1912.

MUKHBER-ES-SULTANEH and Fars.

My telegram of the 18th September.

His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan reports that Mukhber left yesterday. The squadron will leave, as at present arranged, on the 30th September. This arrangement meets with Colonel Douglas's approval.

I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that the squadron was about to leave Ispahan. Ala-es-Sultaneh observed that he was convinced that as soon as the new Governor-General arrived at Shiraz all would be well, and expressed his confidence that His Majesty's Government would find it possible to withdraw the whole British force before the winter. He added that Soulet-ed-Dowleh had sent the most satisfactory assurances of repentance and allegiance to the Central Government. He had promised to secure order on the Bushire road, and also to return the arms captured from the gendarmes on the occasion of their late defeat. He enquired whether Soulet had addressed similar assurances to myself. I replied in the affirmative, but that as, in my opinion, the new Governor-General was the person to arrange the differences with the tribal chiefs, I had sent no reply to Soulet's messages.

No. 320.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, September 19, 1912.

JULFA Railway and Russian advance to Persian Government.

Aide-mémoire from the Russian Government confirms information in my telegram of 14th September, and states that, as soon as Persian Government inform Russian Minister at Tehran in writing of their decision to grant concession in principle, Russian Government will then take question of grant into consideration.

No. 321.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 19, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 18th September.

I approve course proposed as regards Ispahan detachment.

You should now address a note to the Persian Government as follows:—

“His Majesty’s Government would before now have withdrawn their detachments from Ispahan and Shiraz had the situation in the province of Fars justified their doing so, and had the moderate conditions laid down in the note presented by Sir G. Barclay on 4th April last been complied with. His Majesty’s Government are desirous, nevertheless, of showing their good-will and forbearance towards the Persian Government, and are making arrangements for the withdrawal of the detachment at Ispahan to Shiraz. His Majesty’s Government in taking this step wish to give time to Mukhber to restore order, and to exact the reparation demanded by His Majesty’s Government for an unprovoked attack on a British consular officer and his escort, and they trust that the efforts of his Excellency to that end will meet with success.

“Trusting that the Persian Government will recognise their friendly attitude, His Majesty’s Government request them to give necessary instructions to local authorities that all possible assistance shall be rendered at Shiraz in the matter of securing suitable accommodation for British troops now there, as also for detachment that is about to withdraw from Ispahan to Shiraz. Failing such help, His Majesty’s Government will be constrained to cause barracks to be constructed, and will be obliged to hold Persian Government responsible for expense so incurred.”

No. 322.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 12th September: Shiraz.

You should authorise Mr. Smart and Colonel Douglas to endeavour to secure renewal of lease to cover, if necessary, the winter months.

No 323.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 21, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul-general at Ispahan:—

“Officer commanding informs me, after reference to Colonel Douglas, that he has altered date of departure of squadron to 5th October.”

No. 324.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 9, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the English text of a joint note which the Russian Minister and I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 17th instant, informing His Highness that it had come to our knowledge that the Persian Government had approached the Netherlands Minister with a view to ascertaining if his Government would be disposed to lend officers for the organisation of the army it is proposed to create, reminding His Highness that such action is not in conformity with the agreements made, under which the advice of the two legations should be sought before foreign officials are engaged by the Persian Government, and, finally, requesting that the scheme of the new army, which has apparently been elaborated, should be communicated to us in accordance with the agreement entered into by the Persian Government on the occasion of the joint advance of March last.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

 Enclosure in No. 324.
British and Russian Ministers to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Your Highness,

August 17, 1912.

IT has come to the knowledge of the two legations that the Persian Government have deemed it advisable to seek the assistance of the Netherlands Government with a view to the appointment of twenty-seven Dutch military officers to organise a small army which the Imperial Government contemplates forming at an early date.

We would remind your Highness that such a proceeding, should it be shown that our information is correct, does not appear to be in keeping with the arrangement made, with the details of which your Highness is familiar, under which the Persian Government agreed as regards the engagement of foreign employes and officers to effect an exchange of views beforehand with the Russian and British Legations in order that an agreement should be arrived at.

We would further point out that it was also understood and agreed upon by an exchange of notes, dated the 18th February and the 20th March last, that the plan of the army which the Persian Government proposed to create at a suitable moment should be submitted to the two legations "in order that an amicable exchange of views should take place on necessary points." Presumably, if it is the intention of the Persian Government to seek the assistance of foreign officers at an early date, such a plan must have already been elaborated. Such scheme should, therefore, in accordance with the friendly arrangement come to and recorded in the notes above-mentioned, be communicated to the two legations at as early a date as may be convenient.

We avail, &c.

S. POKLEWSKY KOZIELL.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

 No. 325.
Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 26, 1912.

WITH reference to my predecessor's telegram and to your reply of the 24th and 27th January respectively,* I have the honour to report that I am informed by the treasurer-general that the appointment of the eight Belgians as assistants to the Treasury has been ratified. M. Mornard also informs me that the Persian Government have decided to engage two more Belgians as assistants in the Postal Administration, and that they will also shortly open negotiations with M. Boyer,

* See "Persia, No. 5 (1912)," Nos. 123 and 134.

a Russian subject, with a view to his appointment as "inspecteur mécanicien" of the Persian telegraphs. M. Boyer has for many years been employed here as a mechanic by the Indo-European Telegraph Company.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 326.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 26, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in view of recent threatened "bread" riots in Tehran, the treasurer-general has concluded an arrangement with the Bakers' Association, which the former claims should put an end to all fears of future bread riots and make ministerial manipulation of the wheat supply for personal gain impossible in future.

The association undertake to establish forty-five bakers' shops in various parts of the city and to bake therein for a year, using exclusively wheat supplied by the Government. The treasurer-general undertakes to furnish a fixed quantity of wheat daily on condition that it is used exclusively in the said bakers' shops. Should the above number of shops not suffice for the consumption of the allowance of wheat supplied by the Government, the association are at liberty to open others. The association undertake to return daily to the Government granaries whatever wheat they do not consume. Certain penalties are fixed for the use of non-Government wheat and for the adulteration of the bread.

The contract has received the approval of the Cabinet, and has been extended to all bakers who undertake to buy from the Government stores only on the conditions of the contract. The treasurer-general is prepared to furnish to the combined bakeries 250 kharvars (162,500 lbs.) of wheat per diem.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 327.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 31, 1912.

THE statement recently made in the House of Commons, to the effect that it would appear improbable that any group of financiers could be found to make a loan to Persia in her present state of political and financial chaos without a British or Russian guarantee has aroused considerable resentment here. On the strength of a telegram from the Persian Minister in London, I am held responsible for having misinformed His Majesty's Government as to the available resources that Persia could offer as security for a loan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has spoken to me reproachfully on the subject, and has represented that Persia could easily borrow money elsewhere than in England and Russia, if allowed to do so.

I explained to Ala-es-Sultaneh that your reference was presumably to the insufficiency of the security produced by the treasurer-general for a loan of 6,000,000*l.*, a sum which it was thought represented the minimum of Persia's wants to enable her to pay her debts and re-establish her financial house on such a footing of stability as would give promise that the money raised might have productive results. I have discussed the situation with M. Mornard, who is of opinion that the available resources of Persia should suffice to provide adequate security for a 6,000,000*l.* loan, but he owns that such an arrangement would absorb all Persia's working capital and would leave her little or nothing to meet daily expenses. He added that he had not put forward any proposals since we discussed the possibilities of a loan last May, because he felt that if such a loan was to be devoted to the payment of claims, the creation of an army, and such like non-productive purposes, the state of Persia would be financially worse after the money had been obtained than at present.

M. Mornard thought that there is good reason to hope that there will be a steady financial improvement as the working of his administration gets more firmly established, but he quite agreed that prospective increase of revenue is not an asset to set before

European financiers who may wish to examine the nature of the genuine resources that Persia may have to offer as a guarantee for a loan. He considered that what would be most for Persia's interests would be a smaller loan, the objects of which should be clearly defined, and that it should be more especially devoted to the furthering of projects likely to be productive of increased revenue. He did not, apparently, attach much importance to the real value that a small army would have in re-establishing order, and he expressed a hope that it might be found possible to postpone the settlement of the claims bill until the country had had time to recuperate and reap some benefit from the capital that could be invested, if a loan were made on a reproductive scheme. I am of opinion that it will be extremely hard to arrive at a true and useful appreciation of the resources available for a loan, unless some person or persons more expert in such matters, and less busily occupied with other affairs than M. Poklewsky and myself, were to come out and study the conditions on the spot.

It is extremely difficult in a country where neither budget nor statistics exist to form an opinion of any value on the financial situation. The treasurer-general appears to be consistently hopeful about the success of the administrative schemes he has organised in and around Tehran, and augurs from this that similar methods of improving the mode of the collection of taxes should gradually give better results in other parts of the country when they can be applied.

Since I commenced to write this despatch the Persian Government have had a new financial statement drawn up by the treasurer-general. It is their intention to distribute copies of this document—which I have the honour to enclose for your information—to the Persian representatives abroad, in order that they may be in a position to correct any wrong impression as to the financial status of this country which may have gained ground in Europe and the United States from the statement you made, Sir, in the House of Commons, to which a reference has previously been made in this despatch. A perusal of this paper will show that there are various discrepancies between it and the previous statement published in March last, a copy of which accompanied Sir G. Barclay's despatch of the 9th March.

It will be seen that the estimated revenue from the customs, telegraphs, mint, excise, and other sources for the current year is put at 100,000*l.* higher minimum than it was calculated at last March, and that various new items figure in the list, whereas the "khallesh," or grain tax, collected in kind, figures with the "malial" as revenue reserved for administrative purposes. It will be noticed that, owing to the high price of silver and consequently small opportunity for minting, revenue under this head is reduced from 3,000,000 kran (60,000*l.*) to 1,000,000 kran (20,000*l.*). On the other hand, it is estimated that the excise on opium and alcohol will produce 5,000,000 kran (100,000*l.*), instead of 1,400,000 kran (28,000*l.*). M. Mornard explains that this increased appreciation is justified by the fact that he has now been able to obtain a fuller control over the opium production, which, he says, may well develop very largely.

The situation of the northern customs continues satisfactory, but there is a consistent falling off, I understand, in the southern customs receipts. In a recent conversation the treasurer-general stated that he was meditating a small increase of the import duties all round. He argued that they average at the present about 7 per cent. *ad valorem*, whilst some articles almost escape duty altogether. He observed that his proposal would be so framed as neither to check imports nor increase the price of commodities for consumers.

M. Mornard owns that it is extremely hard even for him to judge the situation accurately, but he professes to place faith in his calculations of revenue under the first heading, though I am somewhat sceptical as to some of the items. There must be a great deal of guesswork about the "malial" returns, because M. Mornard has often confessed to me that many of the provinces produce nothing, and are a burden upon the Central Government, although in the case of some of them, such as Fars, they should produce considerable revenue available for national purposes beyond their own requirements, if only law and order could be re-established. Some provinces, such as Azerbaijan and Khorassan, have been productive until recently, but have now fallen off and have ceased to contribute to the public purse.

Mr. Mornard told me that it was the intention of the Government to approach the two legations at an early date with proposals for a loan of 5,000,000*l.*, but in the meantime he sincerely hoped that the two Governments would consent to make an advance of 200,000*l.* in order that he might be able to tide over the months that must elapse before a loan can be negotiated. He added that he would, all the same, sooner have no advance than one such as the last, which put him in the position of being unable to

refuse to make certain payments at the last Persian New Year, but obliged him to repay 40,000L. last July—about three months after the advance was made—at a moment when he was sorely in want of money.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 327.

Financial Statement by Treasurer-General.

LES revenus actuels de la Perse dont la perception est confiée au trésorier général seront pour l'année Sitchghan-II :—

1. Douanes, télégraphes, monnaie, passeports, accises sur opium et alcool, boyaux, timbre, mines, régie du tabac et concession pétrole—

							Krans.
Minimum	45,000,000
Maximum	57,000,000

2. Impôts fonciers et revenus des domaines de l'État—

							Krans.
Minimum	25,000,000
Maximum	50,000,000

Total des revenus—

							Krans.
Minimum présumé	70,000,000
Maximum	107,000,000

Le Gouvernement persan doit payer annuellement en amortissement des emprunts de 1900, 1902 (en Russie), 1904 aux Indes et 1911 en Angleterre une somme totale de 14,000,000 de krans.

Si le Gouvernement fait un nouvel emprunt de 5,000,000L. à 5 pour cent, il aura à rembourser annuellement capital et intérêts, une somme de 14,400,000 krans.

Au total les obligations résultant des emprunts précédents et de l'emprunt futur ne seront pas supérieurs à 28,400,000 krans ; tandis que les douanes seules rapportent un revenu net de 32,000,000 à 35,000,000 de krans.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement persan contracterait un emprunt de 5,000,000L., il aurait à rembourser immédiatement sur les fonds de cet emprunt :—

							Krans.
1. Différentes dettes du temps de feu Mozaffaréd-Dine Schah et de Mohammad Ali Mirza s'élevant à	73,000,000
2. Des emprunts récentes s'élevant à	14,750,000
3. Des indemnités diverses non liquidées	15,000,000

Ensemble 104,870,000

Après l'emprunt et le remboursement de toutes les dettes flottantes, le Gouvernement disposerait encore d'un excédent minimum de 125,000,000 de krans, ce qui est largement suffisant pour assurer les réformes urgentes pendant deux ans.

RECETTES annuelles en garantie.

	Minimum.	Maximum.
	Krans.	Krans.
Douanes	32,000,000	35,000,000
Télégraphes	1,000,000	1,500,000
Monnaie	1,000,000	5,000,000
Passeports	2,500,000	3,500,000
Accises (opium, alcool)	5,000,000	7,500,000
Boyaux	500,000	700,000
Oxyde d'Hormuz	300,000	600,000
Mines divers	400,000	500,000
Régie du tabac	150,000	200,000
Timbre (enregistrement et chancellerie)	1,000,000	1,500,000
Pétrole	1,400,000	1,400,000
	45,250,000	57,400,000
Autres revenus— Impôts, Maliyat et produits Khalessadjat ..	25,000,000	50,000,000
	70,250,000	107,400,000

DETTES.

					Annuités.
					Krans.
Emprunts d'État—					
1900 and 1902, 5 pour cent Russie	9,500,000
1904 5 pour cent Indes					
1911 5 pour cent Imperial Bank	} ..	} ..	} ..	} ..	4,500,000
					<u>14,000,000</u>
Emprunt futur 1912, 5,000,000 <i>l.</i> at 5 pour cent	14,400,000
					<u>28,400,000</u>

SITUATION financière de la Perse, après remboursement de toutes les dettes flottantes au moyen d'un emprunt.

					£
Emprunt 1912 (brut)	5,000,000
85 pour cent (net)	4,250,000
					Krans.
Soit en krans	230,000,000
A réduire (remboursements)	104,870,000
					<u>125,130,000</u>

DETTES flottantes à rembourser.

					Krans.	Krans.
1. Schneider, Paris	12,000,000	
Banque d'Escompte	2,250,000	
Id. arriérés	1,120,000	
Toumaniantz	1,500,000	
					<u>16,870,000</u>	
2. Chiffre approximatif d'indemnités non liquidées	17,000,000
3. Dettes unifiées à la Banque russe, 7 pour cent	60,000,000	
Dernière avance	11,000,000	
					<u>71,000,000</u>	
Total général	104,870,000

(Translation.)

THE present Persian revenues, the collection of which is entrusted to the treasurer-general, will be, in the year Sitchgan-II :—

1. Customs, telegraphs, mint, passports, excise on opium and alcohol, guts, stamps, mines, tobacco régie, and petroleum concession—

					Krans.
Minimum	45,000,000
Maximum	57,000,000

2. Land tax and revenues of the State domains—

					Krans.
Minimum	25,000,000
Maximum	50,000,000

Total revenues—

Estimated minimum	70,250,000
„ maximum	107,000,000

The Persian Government has to pay annually in amortisation of the loans of 1900, 1902 (Russian), 1904 (Indian), and 1911 (British) a total sum of 14,000,000 krans.

If the Government raises a fresh loan of 5,000,000*l.* at 5 per cent. it will have to pay annually capital and interest to the amount of 14,400,000 krans.

Altogether the obligations arising out of the preceding loans and the future loan will not exceed 28,400,000 krans, while the customs alone bring in a net revenue of from 32,000,000 to 35,000,000 krans.

In the event of the Persian Government contracting a loan of 5,000,000*l.* it would have to provide out of the proceeds of this loan for the immediate payment of :—

					Krans.
1. Various debts dating from the time of the late Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah and of Mohammed Ali Mirza, amounting to	73,000,000
2. Recent loans amounting to	14,750,000
3. Various claims not yet paid	15,000,000

Altogether, 104,870,000 krans.

After the loan and the repayment of all the floating debts the Government would still dispose of a minimum surplus of 125,000,000 krans, which is amply sufficient to provide for urgent reforms during two years.

ANNUAL Receipts forming Security.

	Minimum.	Maximum.
	Krans.	Krans.
Customs	32,000,000	35,000,000
Telegraphs	1,000,000	1,500,000
Mint	1,000,000	5,000,000
Passports	2,500,000	3,500,000
Excise (opium, alcohol)	5,000,000	7,500,000
Boyaux	500,000	700,000
Hormuz oxide	300,000	600,000
Various mines	400,000	500,000
Tobacco régie	150,000	200,000
Stamps	1,000,000	1,500,000
Petroleum	1,400,000	1,400,000
	45,250,000	57,400,000
Other revenues— Taxes, Maliat and Khalessadjat produce ..	25,000,000	50,000,000
	70,250,000	107,400,000

DEBTS.

	Annual Payments.
State loans—	
1900 and 1902 5 per cent. Russian	9,500,000
1904 5 per cent. Indian }	4,500,000
1911 5 per cent. Imperial Bank }	14,000,000
Future loan, 1912, 5,000,000l. at 5 per cent.	14,400,000
	28,400,000

FINANCIAL Situation of Persia, after Repayment of all Floating Debts by means of a Loan.

	£
1912 loan (gross)	5,000,000
85 per cent. (net)	4,250,000
	Krans.
In krans	230,000,000
Deduct repayments	104,870,000
Available	125,130,000

FLOATING Debts to be Repaid.

	Krans.	Krans.
1. Schneider, Paris	12,000,000	
Banque d'Escompte	2,250,000	
Do. arrears	1,120,000	
Toumaniantz	1,500,000	
	16,870,000	17,000,000
2. Approximate amount of claims not paid	60,000,000	
3. Unified debts to the Russian Bank, 7 per cent. Last advance	11,000,000	
	71,000,000	
Grand total	104,870,000	

No. 328.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 4, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

 Enclosure in No. 328.
*Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending September 4.**Tehran.*

Provincial Governors.—Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, who was reported in last month's summary as having moved out of Tehran, did not actually leave the precincts of the capital till the 22nd August, when he left for Shiraz, with an escort of two Swedish officers and 100 men of the Treasury gendarmerie and some 200 sowars.

Elections for the Medjliss.—Under the orders of the Central Government a committee of former deputies and notables was formed to consider the question of new elections, especially whether they were to be held in accordance with the Electoral Law passed by the last Medjliss, or whether they were to be carried out through electoral colleges, as was the case before. The committee decided that it would be unconstitutional to alter the electoral system adopted by the last Medjliss; and as the Central Government consider it impossible to conduct elections on this system at present, the question of forming a new Medjliss has been dropped for the time being.

Diplomatic Corps.—The new German Minister, Prince Henry XXXI of Reuss, arrived at Tehran on the 10th August, and presented his credentials to the Shah on the following day.

Shah's Birthday.—The Shah's birthday was celebrated on the 11th August. In the morning the corps diplomatique was received in audience, and in the evening the Prime Minister gave an official dinner.

Government Gendarmerie.—The six Swedish officers, who left Stockholm in July for service with the gendarmerie, arrived in Tehran last month.

Tabriz.

The operations against the Shahsevans have been in progress throughout the last month, and, according to the latest report received from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz, the tribesmen suffered a severe defeat in the latter half of August. The Russian casualties, however, have also been heavy, as some seventy killed and wounded were brought into Tabriz from Ardebil on the 23rd.

On the 29th August, Sipahdar-i-Azam arrived at Baring, a suburb of the town, where he held a reception.

Resht and Kazvin

On the 10th August, 600 Cossacks and infantry arrived at Enzeli from Baku, of these, 200 left for Talish on the 31st.

The Russian detachment of 100 men at Hamadan rejoined the force at Kazvin on the 7th August.

Meshed.

There has been no change in the condition of the town and province during the last month.

The Russian garrisons at Meshed and Kuchan have been reduced to 850 and 250 men respectively.

Ispahan.

The Sultanabad and Kum districts have been the chief centres of unrest of late. The governors of these places are without troops, and so unable to take any steps against the parties of banditti who infest the country.

In spite of repeated representations made to the Central Government, the refugees, who took "bast" in the telegraph office last July, have not yet left.

Sardar Jang arrived at Ispahan on the 1st August, and left on the 23rd to take up his duties as supreme ilkhani of the Bakhtiari tribe.

Yezd.

Entezam-ul-Mulk, who has been a disturbing element in Yezd territory for the past three months, and who, apparently, did not see his way to making his peace with the Government last July (*vide* last summary), entered Nain district at the beginning of last month and commenced raiding.

The deputy-governor of Ardistan, with a force of Bakhtiaris, took the field against Entezam and came up with him at Sarhangabad. In the action that took place, Entezam and five of his followers were killed and the rest fled.

Ustad Mohammed, a leader of the revolutionary movement last year, was reported on the 11th August to be advancing towards Yezd, with a following of some 400 sowars.

Shiraz.

There has been no further fighting since the 5th of August, but Soulet's levies still hold the hills in the vicinity of Shiraz, and traffic on the Bushire road is suspended. The Arab and Kashgai force collecting at Shiraz has not yet moved out against Soulet.

A consignment of cases for the Central India Horse, coming up from Bushire by the Firuzabad route, was plundered by some of Soulet's followers, and Government, regimental, and private property, to the value of 165*l.*, was carried off.

Kerman.

Amir Mufakham, the new Governor of Kerman, reached Yezd on the 26th August, but has not yet arrived at Kerman.

Kermanshah.

Owing to the depredations committed by Salar-ed-Dowleh's followers and other parties of robbers at Kurdistan, Farman Farma commenced making preparations to move into the district with a view to restoring order.

On the 15th August, on receipt of the news that Salar-ed-Dowleh was 40 miles from Kermanshah, Farman Farma left with his army for Sahna.

On the 19th August, Yar Mohammed (*vide* summary for March) and 300 mujtaheds returned to Kermanshah, having deserted the Governor General.

According to a telegram received from His Majesty's consul, the mujtaheds have declared for Salar-ed-Dowleh; but information received by the Central Government is to the effect that Yar Mohammed has published a manifesto, saying his return is in no way due to enmity towards Farman Farma, but that he and his followers desire the opening of the Medjliss and a change of Government.

According to the latest reports, the town is quiet and in the hands of the mujtaheds.

Bunder Abbas.

A party of 100 Baharlu sowars arrived in the vicinity of Bunder Abbas on the 24th August, and robbed a British subject at Naiband, 2 miles from the town. On the following day they attacked the custom-house, and carried off six rifles and 800 tomans, and seized a large herd of cattle. The deputy governor sent his tofangchis out against them, but they apparently shirked meeting the tribesmen.

On the 1st September the raiders left the district.

No. 329.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 4, 1912.

THE difficulties with which the Central Government have to contend in the province of Fars were further increased in the middle of August by the outbreak of

hostilities among the Arab tribes around Dehbid, in which an Arab chief was killed. The Arab chiefs in command of the contingents in Shiraz threatened to leave with their men to avenge the death of their relative. The Kawam-ul-Mulk endeavoured to persuade them to stay in the town, but sent for Baseri and other Arab riflemen in case his persuasive efforts should prove unavailing. About the same date the followers of the rebel Soulet-ed-Dowleh made another descent on the Bushire road between Chenar Rahdar and Zeniyan, and plundered a Farsimadan donkey caravan. They raided Karabagh once more, thus compelling the Kawam to send thither a small force of Kashkulis. The Kashgais also showed activity by sacking on the night of the 13th August a large tea-house in Shiraz just behind His Majesty's consulate. On the same day the Arabs plundered a large supply of wheat at the entrance to the town. In consequence of this act the Kawam moved his Arab force 2 miles away from the town. In addition to these disorders a Kashkuli band was reported to be plundering just north of Shiraz as far as Zirghan.

Mr. Smart reported that the chiefs, whether Khamseh or Kashgai, could no longer control their men in or outside the town, even when they evinced any desire to do so; that the principal Baharlu chief had written to the Kawam that he had ceased to try to control his tribesmen, who were quite out of hand, and that the telegraph wire to the north and south were being cut daily. 130 "sarbaz" made their appearance at His Majesty's consulate on the 14th August without warning with the intention of taking bast. Mr. Smart persuaded them to leave by taking ten of their number in bast pending an arrangement of their claim.

In reporting these events Mr. Smart stated that the anarchy in the province was now beyond remedy with the means at the disposal of the local authorities; not only Government authority, but also tribal authority, was in complete dissolution. The only hope of opening the Bushire road was to drive Soulet's men out of Siakh; the only chance of preserving order in the Shiraz Valley was to clear the tribal forces out of the valley on their expedition against Firuzabad. The Kawam was arranging for the passage of caravans by a detour through the Farsimadan pastures, thus avoiding the stage from Chenar Rahdar to Zeniyan. Ten days later Mr. Smart reported that two bands of Soulet's adherents had made a fresh descent into Karabagh, one attempting to pillage a large village, from which they were repulsed by a Kashkuli post, the other proceeding along the valley and attacking 2 miles from Chenar Rahdar a snow caravan guarded by over a dozen village riflemen, one of whom was killed. This latter band carried off thirty mules, on which they loaded some plundered grain and returned to Siakh. This incident had two inconvenient aspects: firstly, that Shiraz was deprived of its snow supply; and, secondly, it was clear that the enemy could reach the detour by which caravans had been avoiding the first dangerous stage of the Bushire road. British caravans were being warned not to pass Dastarjin without adequate special escort under chiefs which the Kawam periodically arranges. Soulet's followers also plundered a consignment of cases for the Central India Horse coming up from Bushire by the Firuzabad route and Government, regimental, and private property to the value of about 165*l.* was carried off. A consignment of 70,000 cartridges for the Fars Government coming from Bushire was also reported to have been seized by the villagers of Jarferjin and Konartakteh. The Kawam made strong representations to the Khan of Daliki, in whose jurisdiction these villages are situated, for the recovery of the cartridges, but it was expected that these representations would be ineffectual, as the Khan in question had just arbitrarily seized Cherun village, belonging to Kamarij. On account of the seizure of this village it was thought probable that the Khan of Shabancara, who is friendly with Kamarij, might attack the Khan of Daliki. The loss of the cartridges was very serious, as the Government would be compelled to buy cartridges locally at an exorbitant rate for the campaign. The Kamarijis and Kazerunis were also reported to be indulging in some fighting on their own account from Tanji Turkhan to near Kazerun against Ali Mohammed Kameriji. The latter was defeated and retired to Shapur; in consequence of this disturbance caravans were again using the Bardoon route.

The Jabbara and Shaybani Arabs were also preparing for a fight, and were encamped in hostile formation opposite each other round Murghab. The Kawam had sent a messenger out to patch up a peace. The Shaybanis accused the deputy governor of the Arabs of having stirred up the discord, and demanded his recall to Shiraz. In view of this friction Mr. Smart thought that it was impossible for the Kawam to count on the Arabs in his campaign. The departure from Shiraz of over half of the Arab contingent had left the Kawam with a mixed Khamseh-Kashgai force of less than 1,000 men. Mohammed Khan Kashkuli was at Khani Zeniyan, where he, with a Farsimadani

chief, was collecting Kashkuli and Farsimadani levies. Mr. Smart expressed the opinion that the loyalty of Mohammed Ali Khan, who had been much frightened by the pressure of the Kawam and of the ilkhani for the surrender of the culprits of the attacks on our troops, could not be counted on. He thought that, in view of the present confused situation and the Arab difficulty, the expedition against Firuzabad was for the moment inadvisable; the chiefs of the different contingents being all equals, there was no leader available whom they would all obey. Were the force to quarrel over the spoil on the way, as would probably be the case, the expedition would result in a disaster. In addition, tribal levies sent at a distance from their tribes, must be paid regularly, and the expenses in that case would far exceed the funds available.

Mr. Smart thought that, with the means now at the Kawam's disposal, it would be wiser to aim only at the capture of Siakh, leaving there a small garrison until the ilkhani, within a month, could descend with the tribes. His authority would be accepted by the petty chiefs, and then the tribal riflemen, being close to their tribes, could be put in motion much less expensively. The ilkhani could then march on Firuzabad with much better chance of success, and even failure would not be so disastrous to the Shiraz Valley, as the tribes must then remain in the lowlands. Mr. Smart thought that a fiasco now would lay the Shiraz Valley open to the enemy.

Mr. Smart spent the whole of the 22nd August in negotiations with the Kawam respecting the advance of 20,000 tomans (4,000*l.*) for the campaign. The latter was besieged by tribal levies clamouring for pay. He finally induced the Kawam to agree to the following arrangement: of the sum of 20,000 tomans, 12,000 tomans (2,400*l.*) to be paid to him on the 24th August, 3,000 tomans (600*l.*) after the capture of Siakh, and 5,000 tomans (1,000*l.*) after the arrival of the ilkhani on the scene, except in the case of grave emergency, when the last instalment would be paid sooner. The Kawam promised to dispatch 1,000 men to Siakh three days after payment of the 12,000 tomans. This was considered an adequate force, the enemy numbering, it was thought, 500 men.

Mr. Smart expressed the opinion that this plan of campaign, though disappointing, compared with an immediate march on Firuzabad, was more prudent and would, if successful, at least open the Bushire road, and rid the Shiraz Valley of marauders.

News has just been received of an attack on Lieutenant Fraser and a sowar on the night of Sunday the 1st September as the former was returning home from dining out. The incident occurred about half a mile from the consulate. Fortunately Lieutenant Fraser succeeded in cutting his way through his half a dozen assailants with the help of his sowar's sword, and neither he nor his attendant was wounded, though the latter's waistband and coat sleeve were pierced by a bullet. The necessary representations have been made, Mr. Smart reports, to the local authorities, but so far the culprits have not been arrested.

It was to be hoped that this outrage may prove an isolated event, but I have impressed the seriousness of such an incident upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 330.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 12, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit copy of a memorandum that has been communicated to the two legations by the Persian Government showing the reasons why a loan of 50,000*l.* would not suffice to meet Persia's immediate necessities, and begging that the advance of that sum recently proposed by the British and Russian Governments may be increased to 200,000*l.*, half from each Government. It will be seen that the hope is expressed that the Persian Government may shortly be able to make a loan from which this new advance would be refunded, and it is stated that a proposal in connection therewith will be presented before the end of the current month.

I have not had an occasion of consulting my Russian colleague since receiving the memorandum, but I may add that it is quite clear that the wants of the Persian Government are very genuine, and that there is special reason to fear that the development of

the gendarmerie scheme, which would appear to be making real progress at the present moment, may be seriously checked unless funds are forthcoming.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 330.

Memorandum.

IL serait utile d'insister, au sujet d'une avance de fonds que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se dispose à faire au Gouvernement persan, que le chiffre de ladite avance ne soit pas inférieur à 100,000L.

On pourra aisément se rendre compte par les renseignements qui vont suivre qu'une avance de 25,000L., voire de 50,000L., ne saurait suffire pour mettre le Gouvernement à l'abri des difficultés financières qu'il traverse actuellement, nonobstant les efforts qu'il fait et les résultats déjà acquis dans la voie de la réorganisation de ses finances en général.

La Légation de Sa Majesté britannique n'ignore pas que depuis une dizaine d'années la Perse n'a cessé d'avoir recours aux emprunts dans le but de solder son budget annuel et d'acquitter certaines dépenses extraordinaires, telles que l'achat d'armes et munitions. Ces emprunts se divisent comme suit :—

- 1900, emprunt or 5 pour cent, 20,000,000 de roubles ;
- 1902, emprunt or 5 pour cent, 12,500,000 roubles ;
- 1904, emprunt des Indes 5 pour cent, 300,000L. ;
- 1910, unification de dettes diverses, 60,000,000 de krans ;
- 1911, emprunt 5 pour cent, 1,250,000L. ;

soit, ensemble, 32,000,000 de tomans empruntés et totalement dépensés en l'espace de douze années.

Il est à remarquer qu'à la fin de l'année 1911 la totalité du dernier emprunt de 1,250,000L. était dépensée. A cette date le trésorier ne possédait rien, et pour faire face aux dépenses courantes il n'avait d'autres ressources que les recettes journalières provenant des impôts et de la vente des blés du Gouvernement, auxquelles il y a lieu d'ajouter une somme de 250,000 tomans environ, formant l'excédent disponible des douanes à la date du 1^{er} (14) janvier, 1912.

Au mois de mars, il est vrai, les deux Gouvernements anglais et russe ont bien voulu avancer au Gouvernement persan une somme de 200,000L., dont près de la moitié a servi à l'entretien de la gendarmerie jusqu'à ce jour et dont un cinquième environ a dû être remboursé, il y a deux mois, sur les produits des douanes.

En réalité, le Gouvernement persan n'a emprunté cette année que 1,000,000 de tomans, tandis qu'il a fait face aux dépenses de la campagne de Kermanschah et assuré constamment l'entretien du nouveau corps de gendarmerie. Comparé à l'exercice précédent, on peut donc affirmer que l'exercice courant est nettement en progrès.

Est-ce à dire que la Perse pourrait soutenir son système de réformes tout récemment ébauché sans recourir à de nouveaux emprunts? S'engager dans une pareille voie serait aller directement à un échec et compromettre à brève échéance les excellents résultats déjà acquis à la fois dans l'administration des impôts et dans l'organisation de la gendarmerie.

C'est pour ces considérations de premier ordre que le Gouvernement persan estime qu'il est de toute nécessité d'emprunter, sous forme d'avance, une nouvelle somme de 200,000L., dont la moitié seulement est demandé au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et l'autre moitié au Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

En ce qui concerne l'emploi de ladite somme de 200,000L., le Gouvernement persan désire la répartir de la manière suivante :—

	Tomans.
1. Entretien de la brigade de la gendarmerie pendant cinq mois ..	200,000
2. Entretien de la police de Téhéran pendant cinq mois ..	120,000
3. Entretien de l'armée de Kermanschah pendant deux mois ..	70,000
4. Entretien de l'armée en garnison à Téhéran pendant cinq mois ..	75,000
5. Paiement de deux mensualités à la Brigade des Cosaques à Tauris ..	18,000
6. Paiement des arriérés aux diverses administrations gouvernementales..	150,000
7. Achats d'armes et de munitions ..	150,000
8. A effectuer à la réorganisation de l'armée ..	200,000
9. Divers imprévus ..	117,000
Total ..	1,000,000
Soit ..	200,000L.

Quant aux conditions de remboursement, le Gouvernement s'engagerait à restituer la totalité de la somme de 200,000L. sur le prochain emprunt qu'il compte pouvoir conclure à brève échéance et dont le projet sera soumis à la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique dans le courant du présent mois de septembre.

(Translation.)

IT is desirable to insist, with reference to the advance which His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to make to the Persian Government, that the amount of this advance should not be less than 100,000L.

It is evident from the information given below that an advance of 25,000L., or even of 50,000L., would not be sufficient to secure the Government against the financial difficulties in which they at present find themselves in spite of the efforts which they are making and the success already achieved in the matter of the reorganisation of their finances in general.

His Britannic Majesty's Legation is aware that for some ten years Persia has constantly had recourse to loans for the purpose of balancing her annual budget and of meeting certain extraordinary expenses, such as the purchase of arms and ammunition. These loans are as follows :—

- 1900, 5 per cent. gold loan of 20,000,000 roubles ;
- 1902, 5 per cent. gold loan of 12,500,000 roubles ;
- 1904, Indian 5 per cent. loan of 300,000L. ;
- 1910, unification of various debts, 60,000,000 krans ;
- 1911, 5 per cent. loan of 1,250,000L. ;

or, altogether, 32,000,000 tomans borrowed and entirely spent in the period of twelve years.

It is to be observed that at the end of the year 1911 the whole of the last loan of 1,250,000L. had been spent. At that date the treasurer had no funds in his hands, and he had no means of meeting current expenses except the daily receipts from the taxes and from the sale of Government corn, to which must be added a sum of about 250,000 tomans, being the available surplus of the customs on the 1st (14th) January, 1912.

It is true that in March the British and Russian Governments consented to advance to the Persian Government a sum of 200,000L., of which nearly half has been utilised for the maintenance of the gendarmerie up to the present date and about one-fifth had to be repaid two months ago out of the customs receipts.

In reality, the Persian Government have only borrowed this year 1,000,000 tomans, while they have met the expense of the Kermanshah campaign and provided without intermission for the maintenance of the new gendarmerie corps. It may therefore be asserted that the present financial year, compared with the preceding one, shows distinct progress.

This does not, of course, imply that Persia could proceed with the system of reforms recently devised without recourse to fresh loans. An attempt to do so would meet with certain failure, and would very shortly compromise the excellent results already attained both as regards the administration of taxes and the organisation of the gendarmerie.

In view of these important considerations, the Persian Government consider that it is absolutely necessary to borrow, in the form of an advance, a further sum of 200,000L., of which one-half only is requested of the British Government, and the other half of the Russian Government.

As regards the disposal of this sum of 200,000L., the Persian Government desire to apply it in the following manner :—

	Tomans.
1. Maintenance of the gendarmerie brigade for five months	200,000
2. " " Tehran police for five months	120,000
3. " " army at Kermanshah for two months	70,000
4. " " garrison of Tehran for five months	75,000
5. Two months' pay for the Cossack brigade at Tabriz	18,000
6. Arrears due to various Government administrations	150,000
7. Purchase of arms and ammunition	150,000
8. Reorganisation of the army	200,000
9. Various unforeseen expenses	117,000
Total	1,000,000
	or, £200,000

As regards the conditions of repayment, the Government would undertake to refund the whole sum of 200,000*l.* out of the forthcoming loan which they expect to be able to raise shortly, a proposal in connection with which will be presented to His Britannic Majesty's Legation in the course of this month of September.

No. 331.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 23, 1912.

MY telegram of 16th September.
Following from Grey at Ispahan :—

“Satisfactory arrangements have been come to for guarding Lynch's road. Sardar-i-Jang has notified me officially that traffic may be resumed.

“I have informed Ispahan, Ahwaz, Bushire.”

No. 332.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 24, 1912.

TELEGRAM signed by Imam Jumah and others has reached me from Tabriz. Petitioners ask for restoration of Mohammed Ali.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begs me to tell you that signatories of this telegram, which has also been sent to Russian and other legations, are persons of small importance, who have on previous occasions distinguished themselves by signing petitions having entirely contrary bearing.

No. 333.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Balmoral, September 24, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a memorandum which M. Sazonof communicated to me to-day respecting British railway concessions in Persia.

I have replied that the only railway concession of those mentioned for which we are pressing is the Mohammerah-Khoremad line. I recognised that with regard to further railway concessions in the neutral zone we must discuss them with Russia. This would not apply to a railway from Bunder-Abbas to Kerman or any other in the British sphere. To this M. Sazonof agreed. He recognised that the Mohammerah-Khoremad railway was essential for our trade, and he would not oppose it.

I have told M. Sazonof that the Mohammerah-Khoremad line stands apart from the others in the neutral zone. As regards the others, we might ask Russia at any time later on to consent to them, but we could not claim her consent to them as a matter of right until the trans-Persian railway proceeded beyond Russian sphere, and then apparently the actual condition was some international basis.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 333.

Memorandum.

UN syndicat anglais (Messrs. Greenway, Seligman, Lynch) a présenté au Gouvernement persan un projet de construction d'un réseau de chemins de fer dans le sud de la Perse, projet se résumant en traits généraux aux points suivants :—

1. Émission par la Perse d'obligations garanties par les lignes de chemin de fer elles-mêmes et leurs revenus, ainsi que par les revenus douaniers et autres revenus du Gouvernement persan, au choix du syndicat.

2. Construction des lignes de chemin de fer—
 - (a.) De Mohammerah ou de Khor-Mousa à Khorremabad ou Bouroudjird (ce dernier point situé dans la zone russe).
 - (b.) De Bender-Abbas à Kerman.
 - (c.) „ „ Chiraz.
 - (d.) „ „ Mohammerah.
3. Droit de construire des ports dans chacune des villes maritimes susmentionnées.
4. Option pour la construction de prolongations de ces lignes ou de toutes autres lignes dans le sud de la Perse.

Ce projet entraînerait une augmentation considérable de la dette publique en Perse, ce qui ne manquerait pas d'avoir de graves inconvénients, eu égard aux engagements financiers déjà contractés par ce pays envers la Russie et l'Angleterre. En tout cas, la garantie des obligations par "les revenus douaniers et autres," déjà affectés au service des emprunts antérieurs ou constituant la seule source de revenus susceptibles de garantir le grand emprunt dont il est question en ce moment, soulève de sérieuses objections.

Sans entrer dans les détails du projet mentionné, qui demandent une étude plus approfondie, on ne saurait passer sous silence que l'exploitation de la zone neutre étant également ouverte aux capitaux des deux pays, toute absorption plus ou moins exclusive des chemins de fer dans cette zone serait peu conforme à l'esprit de la convention de 1907. Quant au projet de faire éventuellement aboutir une des lignes à Bouroudjird, ville rentrant dans la zone russe, ce projet serait en contradiction avec les principes mêmes de cette convention.

Il semblerait, par conséquent, fort opportun de soumettre le projet élaboré par le syndicat à un examen préalable de la part des Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne et de Russie.

(Translation.)

AN English syndicate (Messrs. Greenway, Seligman, and Lynch) have submitted to the Persian Government a proposal for the construction of a system of railways in South Persia, which may be summarised generally as follows:—

1. Issue by Persia of bonds secured on the railways themselves and their revenues, as well as on the customs and other revenues of the Persian Government, at the option of the syndicate.
2. Construction of railways—
 - (a.) From Mohammerah or Khor-Musa, to Khoremabad or Burujird (this latter point being in the Russian zone).
 - (b.) From Bunder Abbas to Kerman.
 - (c.) From Bunder Abbas to Shiraz.
 - (d.) From Bunder Abbas to Mohammerah.
3. The right to construct ports in each of the above-mentioned coast towns.
4. The option for the construction of extensions of these lines or of any other lines in South Persia.

This scheme would entail a considerable increase of the public indebtedness in Persia, which could not fail to involve serious inconveniences, having regard to the financial engagements already contracted by that country with Russia and England. In any case, the securing of the bonds on the "customs and other revenues" already assigned as security for previous loans, or forming the only source of revenues capable of serving as security for the large loan now under discussion, is open to grave objection.

Without entering into the details of the scheme, which require closer study, it must be observed that, the exploitation of the neutral zone being open to the capital of both countries equally, the more or less exclusive monopoly of the right to construct railways in that zone would hardly be in conformity with the spirit of the convention of 1907. As for the proposal to make one of the lines end at Burujird, which is situated within the Russian zone, this would be contrary to the very principles of that convention.

It would therefore seem to be very desirable that the syndicate's scheme should be submitted to a preliminary examination by the British and Russian Governments.

No. 334.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 24, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a memorandum which I have to-day received from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the proposed trans-Persian railway.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 334.

LA Société d'Etudes, constituée en vue de tenter la construction d'un chemin de fer transiranien, a songé dernièrement à l'exécution partielle de ce projet sans attendre qu'une décision définitive soit prise quant à la réalisation du projet. Dans cet ordre d'idées il s'agirait d'entreprendre dès maintenant la construction d'une ligne, qui, partant d'Alat sur le Transcaucasien, irait jusqu'à Téhéran et constituerait ainsi une partie du tronçon russe de la grande ligne projetée. En principe, le Gouvernement Impérial serait prêt à admettre une semblable solution.

La Société d'Etudes a, paraît-il, l'intention d'entamer à cet effet des pourparlers avec le Gouvernement persan tant au sujet des recherches préalables à exécuter sur les lieux que de l'option à obtenir pour les lignes qui l'intéressent. Considérant que, par elle-même, l'option obtenue n'implique pas encore la construction effective des voies visées, le Gouvernement Impérial aime à croire que le Gouvernement britannique ne verra, de son côté, aucune objection à ce que la Société d'Etudes obtienne l'option en question, car, le cas échéant, ladite société restera libre de ne point user du droit acquis pour ce qui concerne le tronçon anglais du chemin de fer. Le Gouvernement Impérial espère, par conséquent, que rien n'empêchera les représentants britannique et russe à Téhéran d'appuyer, tous les deux, les démarches de la société dans le sens précité.

Afin de faciliter l'heureuse issue de ces démarches, il serait désirable d'encourager la Société d'Etudes à faire simultanément des offres sérieuses au Gouvernement persan en vue de réaliser le grand emprunt dont il a besoin.

(Translation.)

THE Société d'Etudes, formed with a view to the construction of a trans-Persian railway, has lately considered the question of partially carrying out this scheme without awaiting a final decision in regard to its complete realisation. The idea would be to undertake at once the construction of a line which, starting from Alat, on the Trans-Caucasus Railway, would run as far as Tehran, and would thus form a part of the Russian section of the great railway proposed. The Imperial Government would be ready, in principle, to allow a solution of this kind.

The Société d'Etudes intends, it appears, to enter into negotiations with the Persian Government with this object, both as regards the preliminary investigations to be made on the spot and as regards the option to be obtained for the lines in which it is interested. As the option, when obtained, would not by itself imply the actual construction of the lines in question, the Imperial Government hope that the British Government will also see no objection to the Société d'Etudes obtaining the option referred to, since, if necessary, the société will be free to abstain from exercising its rights as regards the English section of the railway. The Imperial Government hope, therefore, that nothing will prevent the British and Russian representatives at Tehran from supporting together the action taken by the société in the sense above described.

In order that this action may have a better prospect of success, it is desirable to induce the Société d'Etudes to make to the Persian Government at the same time a serious offer with a view to their obtaining the large loan of which they are in need.

No. 335.

Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir, *Balmoral, September 25, 1912.*
I HAD some conversation with M. Sazonof to-day on the subject of Persia, and pointed out on the map how large the Russian sphere was as compared with the British.

I said that what people here felt was that the changes since the Anglo-Russian Convention had been to our disadvantage. Russia was now in military occupation of some portions of northern Persia; her shadow was thereby thrown right across the north, that inevitably made her influence predominant at Tehran, and ours correspondingly less; and all this made it more than ever essential that we should be quite sure as regards the rest of Persia, and especially with regard to our commercial interests in the neutral zone; that Persian governors should be supported by the Central Government in protecting these interests; and that the Russian Minister at Tehran should never work against them. As long as M. Poklewsky was there we were sure this would be safe.

M. Sazonof said that whatever Russian Minister was there, his instructions would always be the same, to act as M. Poklewsky had done in this respect.

No. 336.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 25, 1912.

MY telegram of 19th September.

Difficulties of Persian Government have been increased by the defection of Bakhtiaris and Armenian mujaheds, in all about 800 men, who have left Kermanshah on the way to Tehran. They have refused to fight any more, and have reached Kangavar, where they have consented to await the arrival of reliefs. Unfortunately Government is not in a position to send more than 150 Bakhtiaris from capital, and it is said that none are available from their own country.

If the matter cannot be arranged situation will be a serious one, because Government forces are not of much fighting value without these auxiliaries. It is said that Salar-ed-Dowleh was able to escape to Senneh because these troops refused to fight. Reason given for their action is that they have been fighting for a constitution and a Medjliss, but refuse to continue to do so when the former is ignored and there is no hope of latter being summoned.

No. 337.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 20th September.

Following from His Majesty's representative at Shiraz, in reply to a telegram transmitting text of note to Persian Government:—

“Following from Colonel Douglas:—

“It is absolutely necessary to build additional accommodation in enclosures now occupied by troops. I thought this was clear from previous correspondence, and put work in hand immediately on receipt of Foreign Office telegram of 16th September. For Ispahan squadron I hope to be able to rent Serai, on outskirts of city, about a mile distant from remainder of troops. This arrangement, though inconvenient, appears to be the best and most economical possible.”

It would appear that no other course was open to Colonel Douglas, and I should be glad of your instructions to approve action taken.

No. 338.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 28, 1912.

MY telegram of 25th September.

News from Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Hamadan is most disquieting.

Salar-ed-Dowleh is reported to have left Senneh with a force of about 7,000 men, chiefly tribesmen who have rallied to his standard. It is not clear whether he intends to march on Kermanshah or Hamadan. Whereabouts of Farman Farma and Government forces is also doubtful. One report says that he is preparing to take bast with all his men in consulates at Kermanshah. Another has it that he is with Bakhtiaris and Mujaheds at Kangavar.

There is a panic at Hamadan, whence Mujaheds under Kerri are reported to have telegraphed to Tehran that they refuse to fight because there is no Medjliss and are returning to Tehran. Bakhtiaris also refuse to fight for same reason.

My Russian colleague and I have made urgent representations that Bakhtiari reinforcements should be sent at once under a capable leader.

No. 339.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 29, 1912.

MY telegram of 19th September.

Latest news from south is to the effect that Mukhber has left Kumisheh where he halted for some days to let his reinforcements come up. It is reported that there is a considerable force of Boir Ahmadis on the road bent on plunder. They have robbed a force of sowars which were coming to meet Governor-General at Abadeh and there may be some fighting.

Acting consul at Shiraz telegraphs that there is much unrest there and that Ilkhani of the Kashgais has resigned, leaving tribe without a leader. He does not appear to anticipate hostility towards the British community, but reports attack on bank manager and his wife by roughs believed to be Kashgais.

No. 340.

Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 29, 1912.

THE Marquess of Crewe informs me that he had a conversation with M. Sazonof to-day, respecting the question of railways in Persia.

M. Sazonof began with a reference to the Trans-Persian Railway, and the question of an option for the Société d'Études, on which I had asked him to obtain Lord Crewe's view. His Lordship said that the proposal appeared to be for a limited option, and when M. Sazonof asked what that meant, answered that he could not call it a full option if it remained in our power to defer indefinitely the construction of the line in our sphere of influence. M. Sazonof agreed that this was so, that the option was simply for the Société d'Études, not for the construction of the line, meaning that if and when construction took place it should not be through any other agency. Lord Crewe said that in that case he saw no difficulty in agreeing. As regards the Mohammerah-Khoremabad line, M. Sazonof said that it ought to be made a joint arrangement between the two countries.

No. 341.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1912.

I HAVE stated to the representative of the British group taking part in the Société d'Études for the Trans-Persian Railway that I think that group would be

justified in sending a representative to Tehran to co-operate with the other representatives of the Société in applying for an option for the construction of the railway, on the condition that the consent of His Majesty's Government must be obtained before any extension beyond the Russian sphere is undertaken.

I authorise you to act in concert with M. Poklewsky with a view to obtaining an option for the Société on this condition.

The British group understand that the proposed line from Mohammerah to Khoremabad is quite distinct from this. You can now approach the Persian Government for the purpose of obtaining a concession for the last-mentioned railway. M. Sazonof has no objection to its being granted to a British company.

No. 342.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 1, 1912.

FOLLOWING telegram from Tabriz, dated the 30th September:—

“I have received telegrams signed by Ulema and merchants of Zenjan asking for the restoration of the ex-Shah. I am replying that I am informing you of their petitions. My Russian colleague has received a similar telegram. Bazaars in Zenjan are closed.

“I do not attach importance to these demonstrations, as the Governor of Zenjan is a brother of Shuja, and anybody refusing to comply with his wishes would probably suffer.”

Similar petitions have been received from other places in the Russian zone.

No. 343.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 4, 1912.

MY telegram of 28th September.

Following from British consul at Kermanshah, 3rd October:—

“Army returned to Kermanshah 1st October. All bastis left consulate 3rd October on written assurances of Governor-General and personal assurances of Saham-ed-Dowleh and Samsam-ul-Mamalik.”

No. 344.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 4, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th ultimo, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a memorandum respecting British railways in Persia, which I have to-day communicated to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 344.

THE British syndicate which has applied to the Persian Government for a concession for the construction of certain railways in South Persia is styled the Persian Railways Syndicate, but does not include Messrs. Seligman.

As regards the railways in question, His Majesty's Government informed the Russian Government early in 1911 of their wishes on the subject, and later expressed their willingness to assent in principle to the Trans-Persian Railway, on condition, *inter alia*, that the Russian Government would support the British demands for the railways in question.

As regards the Mohammerah-Khoremabad line, this is the only railway for

which His Majesty's Government are pressing at present, and they take note of M. Sazonof's assurance that, in view of its essential importance to British trade, he will not oppose it.

Concerning the possible extension of the line to Burujird, situated in the Russian sphere, a means of obviating any difficulty in the matter might be found if the Russian Government invoked the aid of British capital for the construction of the part in the Russian sphere, or for a line from Khoremabad to Ispahan, thereby rendering less important the branch from Khanikin to Tehran.

With regard to further railway concessions in the neutral zone, His Majesty's Government are quite prepared to discuss the matter with the Russian Government, and to request the syndicate to send out a representative to St. Petersburg. His Majesty's Government may ask Russia to consent to them in due course, it being understood that such consent would not be claimed as a matter of right until the Trans-Persian Railway shall have proceeded beyond the Russian sphere.

As to railways in the British sphere such as Bunder Abbas to Kerman, His Majesty's Government have no doubt that the Imperial Russian Government will admit that these are matters solely affecting British interests, but His Majesty's Government would always be happy to keep the Imperial Russian Government informed of any project of railway enterprise in the British sphere.

Any increase of the Persian public debt due to the construction of railways in the neutral zone may fittingly be dealt with in discussion between the two Governments.

No. 345.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 4, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th ultimo, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the proposed Trans-Persian Railway, with which I have to-day furnished the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 345.

Memorandum.

HIS Majesty's Government share the view of the Russian Government that it is desirable to occupy the ground by securing an option for the Société d'Études, whereby the two Governments will be in a position to say when and where a trans-Persian line would be built.

His Majesty's Government have therefore no objection to the Russian Government constructing a line to Tehran, and, subject to all the reserves and conditions already stipulated as to the route of the railway outside the Russian sphere, and that it shall not, without agreement with His Majesty's Government, proceed beyond the Russian sphere, have authorised his Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to co-operate with his Russian colleague to secure the said option for the Société d'Études.

The British group of the Société d'Études have also been informed that they would be justified in sending to Tehran a representative to co-operate with representatives of the other groups of the société to the same end.

As regards the suggestion that the société should be encouraged to make a big loan to the Persian Government, such action appears somewhat difficult, as there is to be no Anglo-Russian guarantee.

No. 346.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 5, 1912.

IT is essential that a strong Government should be established in Persia. I agreed with M. Sazonof when he was in England that Saad-ed-Dowleh is the only

Persian who is likely to be able to restore order in the country, although I am aware that his past record is not perfect.

Your Excellency should now ask M. Sazonof whether he will instruct M. Poklewsky to join Sir W. Townley in supporting Saad's appointment as Prime Minister.

The conditions of the appointment should, I think, be (1) an undertaking by Saad not to place obstacles in the way of the effective and honest administration of the finances of Persia; and (2) an assurance that, in this event, both he and the governors appointed by him will receive the moral support of both Governments and of their agents in all parts of Persia.

No. 347.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 6, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from Ispahan:—

“Squadron left 5th October.”

No. 348.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 7, 1912.

MY telegram of 4th October.

Persian Government have received telegraphic information that battle has been fought within Kermanshah which resulted in total defeat of Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces. Yar Mohammed Khan was killed, but Salar-ed-Dowleh, who was not present in the fighting lines, escaped.

No. 349.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 24, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 19th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Persian Government on the 20th September, informing them of the intention of His Majesty's Government to withdraw the British squadron now at Ispahan to Shiraz, and requesting the assistance of the Persian Government in the matter of securing suitable accommodation for His Majesty's troops at the latter place.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 349.

Sir W. Townley to Persian Government.

Your Highness,

Tehran, September 20, 1912.

HIS Majesty's Government would have before now withdrawn their military detachments from Ispahan and Shiraz had the situation in the province of Fars justified their doing so, and had the moderate conditions laid down in the note presented by Sir George Barclay on the 4th April last been complied with.

His Majesty's Government are desirous, nevertheless, of showing their good-will and forbearance towards the Persian Government, and are making arrangements for the withdrawal of the detachment at Ispahan to Shiraz. His Majesty's Government in taking this step wish to give time to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to restore order and to exact the reparation demanded by His Majesty's Government for an unprovoked attack on a British consular officer and his escort, and they trust the efforts of his Excellency to that end will meet with success.

Trusting that the Persian Government will recognise their friendly attitude, His

Majesty's Government request them to give the necessary instructions to the local authorities that all possible assistance shall be rendered at Shiraz in the matter of securing suitable accommodation for the British troops now there, as also for the detachment that is about to be withdrawn from Ispahan to Shiraz. Failing such help, His Majesty's Government will be constrained to cause barracks to be constructed, and will be obliged to hold the Persian Government responsible for the expenses so incurred.

I avail, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 350.

Sir W Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 8, 1912.

THE Russian Minister and I received separate visits yesterday from the Prime Minister, who wished to tell us that he would like to resign, being in need of a rest. He suggested that Ala-es-Sultaneh would be a suitable person to succeed him.

Both my Russian colleague and I urged his Highness to remain in office for a while longer, and he agreed to do so. I do not think he really wants to resign office, but the Cabinet is not united, and it is a moment of uncertainty.

No. 351.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 8, 1912.

MY telegram to St. Petersburg of the 5th October, and your telegram of to-day.

Perhaps Saad-ed-Dowleh's appointment as Prime Minister would be facilitated if Samsam resigned, as he has suggested doing.

No. 352.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 3rd September.

You might suggest to M. Sazonof that the Persian Crown jewels could be used as security for a loan to Persia if there is any difficulty in providing security.

I should be glad to know what has been the result of the enquiry as regards the prospect of a loan which M. Sazonof was going to make at Paris.

No. 353.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 10, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 5th October: Prime Minister.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed, and said that he would send necessary instructions to Russian Minister at Tehran.

No. 354.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1912

IN view of Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of yesterday, I authorise you, when M. Poklewsky receives his instructions, to act in the manner proposed in my telegram of the 5th October to his Excellency.

No. 355.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 12, 1912.

LOAN to Persia.

Your telegram of the 10th October.

I am informed by M. Sazonof that when he was in Paris last week the question was discussed by him with the representatives of the three groups. The latter had begun by asking that the Russian and British Governments should give a guarantee, but he had replied that this was out of the question. He had suggested to them, however, that the financial question should be investigated by the experts who are going out to Persia on behalf of the Trans-Persian Railway ("Comité d'Études"); they might then try to ascertain whether there were not some source of revenue available for a guarantee. To this suggestion the English and French representatives had replied that it would, in their view, be preferable that financial agents of the groups themselves should proceed to Persia. M. Sazonof said that in that case it would be very desirable for the financial experts to be sent out with the representatives of the Comité d'Études immediately. As regards the Crown jewels, his Excellency raised no objection to the suggestion made by you, but he observed that the jewels could not suffice to cover more than one-sixth of the loan which it was proposed to make.

No. 356.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 25, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Persian Government on the 18th instant, presenting a claim for 305*l.* on account of thefts from various consignments of cases dispatched during the current year from Bushire to His Majesty's troops at Shiraz.

I have now received a reply from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that telegraphic instructions have been sent to the new Governor-General to deal with the question immediately on arrival at his post.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 356.

Sir W. Townley to Persian Government.

Your Highness,

Tehran, September 18, 1912.

I REGRET to have to call your Highness's attention to a series of claims which His Majesty's Government have against the Persian Government on account of the plundering of cases consigned to His Majesty's troops at Shiraz.

1. During the months of January and February last certain cases were subjected to interference by road-guards between Bushire and their destination, as a result of which many articles, the property of His Majesty's Government, were stolen: the articles in question comprise binoculars, stirrups, boots, blankets, reins, clothing and supplies generally, the total value being 200*l.*

A claim for this amount was presented in due form to the local authorities at Shiraz on the 2nd March, but no settlement has yet been effected.

2. On the 31st August His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz informed me that a consignment of cases coming up from Bushire via Firuzabad had been plundered. The loss of Government, regimental and private property, was estimated at 165*l.*; the principal articles stolen were saddlery, medical stores, provisions, wines, clothing and other stores and parcels. A certain proportion of the plundered goods have been recovered, but a claim for 80*l.*—the value of those which have been permanently lost—has been presented.

3. Some wine and clothing, also the property of His Majesty's troops, were stolen

at Kamarij and in the caravanserai at Ja'afar Jinn by Khorshid and road-guards respectively in March last. Claims for 10*l.* in all were presented to the local authorities on the 5th and 18th April respectively, but have not been settled.

4. Rations, clothing and horseshoes—to the value of 15*l.*—have recently been pilfered by road-guards at Mian Kotal from cases consigned to His Majesty's troops at Shiraz.

I am instructed by my Government to bring the total claim of 305*l.* on account of thefts of Government and regimental property to the notice of the Persian Government, and to request your Highness to be so good as to take such steps as may be necessary in order to effect an early settlement of this claim.

I avail, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 357.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 14, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 7th October.

It is reported that Salar is somewhere between Hamadan and Kazvin. According to one report he is almost alone, and is seeking to take bast in the Russian consulate; according to another he is at the head of a force of 2,000 men.

No. 358.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 17, 1912.

MUKHBER arrived Shiraz yesterday.

No. 359.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 18, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

Information has reached my Russian colleague, who has not yet returned to town from the summer legation at Zerguendeh, that Salar is approaching Tehran, and that he is actually within 40 miles of the town. M. Poklewsky fears that grave disorders may ensue as he thinks that Salar would never have ventured on this daring move unless he had supporters within the walls upon whom he can rely. He suspects the democrats and mujaheds here of being in league with Salar. He has, therefore, warned the Russian general at Kazvin to be prepared to march on Tehran at a moment's notice, and has told him that in the event of telegraphic and telephonic communications being interrupted he should move at once without instructions. He wrote all the above to me late last night.

I told him that personally I did not anticipate serious trouble, but that I quite concurred in his communication to the Russian general as a precautionary measure.

The Persian Government do not themselves know Salar's exact whereabouts nor the number of his followers, but as he seems to have travelled at great speed this is probably small. My own information is to the effect that he is somewhere in the triangle formed by Hamadan, Kazvin, and Tehran. There is naturally considerable excitement in the town at the rumoured near approach of the Prince, and there is also no little dissatisfaction with the present administration, but, though the occasion might easily be utilised for the organisation of a demonstration against the Bakhtiaris and the Government, I cannot ascertain that there is any serious danger of a popular movement in the Prince's favour. The Government are taking preparatory police and military measures.

No. 360.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 18, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Tabriz, 17th October:—

“Russian troops have begun to withdraw; about 2,300 left in the last two days.”

No. 361.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1912.

ACCORDING to information received by M. Sazonof, the question of the convocation of a Medjliss is to be discussed by an assembly of notables which is shortly to meet at Tehran.

M. Sazonof thinks it undesirable that a Medjliss should be convoked pending the establishment of a more stable Government.

I should be glad to learn your views. M. Poklewsky has been instructed to discuss the question with you.

No. 362.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 19, 1912.

WITH reference to Tehran telegram of the 18th October, I have to request your Excellency to inform M. Nératof that the reports which we have received do not indicate that Tehran is in any immediate danger, and to express the hope that Russian Government will refrain from dispatching troops thither unless they are urgently required by the situation.

No. 363.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 20th September.

Consul at Shiraz reports that owner of garden occupied by British troops now demands 100 tomans rent a-month, and threatens to telegraph to London unless his terms are agreed to or his garden evacuated, to the effect that his property is being occupied against his will.

Acting consul represents that rent asked is exorbitant, but that if the troops are removed within six months to do so will entail less expense than the carrying out of a proposal entailing compensation, which has already been made to owner. He nevertheless asks for authority to refuse terms, and wait until the proprietor agrees to his offer.

I am instructing acting consul to seek good offices of Governor-General. I much hope that it may be found possible to carry out withdrawal of the troops within six months, and it seems undesirable for a difference in expenditure that would amount to about 10% a-month to risk creating ill-feeling at Shiraz.

No. 364.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 18th October.

A commission composed of fifty-six members selected from various classes has held several sittings to discuss how new elections can be held. Sardar Assad has been

named chairman. I cannot make out that much progress has been made, as opinions appear to differ widely as to the most suitable procedure, whilst not a few people contest constitutional legality of commission altering the electoral law passed by the last Medjliss. Supporters of such a change urge that special circumstances of situation justify apparent unconstitutional action.

Saad-ed-Dowleh has been invited to return by Prime Minister, and Regent has been pressed to say whether he intends to return or not.

No. 365.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 20, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Saad-ed-Dowleh has replied to telegram from Prime Minister in grateful terms, and announces his intention of returning to Persia at an early date.

No. 366.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 20, 1912.

MY telegram of 18th October.

Salar-ed-Dowleh has at last, after being lost for two days, been located at Soujboulak, a place about 40 miles from here to the north of Kazvin road. A force of Bakhtiaris and gendarmes is proceeding thither to-morrow in the hope of effecting his capture. It is not improbable that he will escape to Mazanderan and join certain disaffected persons in that province.

No. 367.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 29, 1912.

IN my despatch of the 4th September I had the honour to describe the state of anarchy prevailing in the neighbourhood of Shiraz during the period immediately preceding that date. I regret to have to state that since the above-mentioned report was written there has been no improvement to chronicle in the condition of the province and that the warring factions of the Kashgai tribes continue to be the principal factor in making the situation in Fars extremely disquieting.

On the 7th September Mr. Smart reported that Soulet-es-Sultaneh had endeavoured to bring his own tribe to the assistance of his rebel brother, Soulet-ed-Dowleh. This attempt was frustrated by the ilkhani's full brother, Salar Hishmet, who attacked and defeated him near Asepas and detained the tribe. Soulet-es-Sultaneh fled with a few men to Baiza where he found support from several smaller tribes who were in revolt against the ilkhani's attempt to exact maliat. From Baiza he commenced intrigues with Soulet-ed-Dowleh's lieutenant at Siakh. Mr. Smart expressed the opinion that the whole revolt appeared to be a question of taxes, the revolting tribes seeming to want Soulet-es-Sultaneh as ilkhani in preference to Sardar Ehteshem, knowing the former to be too weak to press for taxes.

Negotiations between Soulet-es-Sultaneh and the ilkhani, Sardar Ehteshem, then appear to have been conducted at Baiza whither the notorious Mohammed Ali also proceeded with a force. Though it did not appear that the latter had decided to throw in his lot with Soulet-ed-Dowleh, he had been much alarmed by the defeat of Soulet-es-Sultaneh and the consequent advance of the ilkhani. During the negotiations at Baiza he appears to have thrown his whole weight on the side of Soulet-es-Sultaneh and to have imposed unacceptable conditions on Sardar Ehteshem in consequence of which the new and entirely unexpected development has arisen of the resignation of the latter from the ilkhaniship.

A few days previous to this event Mudabber-es-Sultaneh, the Deputy Governor of Shiraz, and Musteshir-ul-Mulk, a large landowner in Fars and a man who has taken a

considerable part in local politics, went out to Guyum to endeavour to reconcile Soulet-es-Sultaneh and the ilkhani: they failed to do so. On the 25th September on returning to Shiraz they were attacked by Kashkulis apparently partisans of Soulet-es-Sultaneh. Mudabber escaped but Musteshir was made prisoner. Now that the ilkhani has resigned Mohammed Ali and Soulet-es-Sultaneh have sent emphatic assurances of loyalty to the Kawam-ul-Mulk requesting the latter's instructions and promising reparation for the unauthorised attack on Mudabber-es-Sultaneh. Soulet-es-Sultaneh has also informed Kawam that he has rejected Soulet-ed-Dowleh's advances for an alliance.

With regard to the ilkhaniship, Haji Mohammed Kerim Khan, who is with Soulet-es-Sultaneh and Mohammed Ali, has written to Kawam that the Kashgai tribes will no longer obey any ilkhani of the ruling family, and suggesting the appointment of Nasred-Dowleh, a son of Kawam by a Kashgai mother, as ilkhani. Kawam has rejected the proposal, and has telegraphed to the Central Government suggesting that Soulet-es-Sultaneh, without being nominated ilkhani, should be entrusted to the care of the Kashgai tribes until the new Governor-General arrives at his post, and can come to some suitable decision.

Mr. Smart's opinion is that the disintegration of the Kashgais is now complete; that the attempt of Sardar Ehteshem to re-establish the authority of the ilkhaniship, and to collect maliat, has signally failed; that there seems, at present, no man strong enough to renew the attempt, and that the Government will probably be compelled to divide up the tribes under several chiefs.

The most unsatisfactory feature of the situation appears to be that Mohammed Ali seems, for the moment, to have recovered lost ground. He has now overthrown two ilkhani, and is posing as a king-maker.

As regards the position of the Government army which was to oppose Soulet-ed-Dowleh, the force, mainly composed of Kashgais, was encamped on the 7th September round Chenar Rahdar, where it had been halted with a view to blocking the way of the revolted tribes. Kawam-ul-Mulk maintained that it could not advance on Siakh until the ilkhani reached Baiza, from which point the southward movement of the tribes could be controlled.

On the 27th September, however, Mr. Smart reported that the Government army had returned to Shiraz refusing to remain in the field without pay, and that Soulet-ed-Dowleh had moved his force to a spot half way between Chenar Rahdar and Khaneh Zinian. The approaches to Shiraz are now unprotected: there are, however, hopes that, owing to the advanced season, the Kashgais will hasten southwards without creating serious disorders in the Shiraz valley; this hope is encouraged by the fact that the tribes seem determined not to fight *pour les beaux yeux* of any member of the ruling family.

The latest reports, however, show that Kashgai riflemen are plundering in and around the city, though the presence in Shiraz of some half-dozen Kashgai chiefs, who are very friendly to the British, renders, in Mr. Smart's opinion, any serious danger to the British colony unlikely.

Notwithstanding this, two incidents occurred yesterday in Shiraz. As reported in my telegram of the 29th September, the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, his wife and child, were returning home at sunset on the 28th September, and were attacked just outside the gate of their house by about a score of men, said to be Kashgais, armed with rifles and sticks. They were pulled off their donkeys, with which the robbers decamped. The Persian soldiers on guard at the manager's house appeared on the scene and opened fire on the robbers, who released two of the donkeys. With Colonel Douglas's permission, Mr. Smart has placed fifteen sepoy in the house of the bank manager (1½ miles from the consulate), and of Zeigler's manager: the latter lives with his wife next door to the bank.

A Persian servant of a British resident staying with Mr. Smart was also returning to the town on the same evening, and was attacked by half-a-dozen riflemen just outside the consulate, to which he managed to escape.

Mr. Smart has made the necessary representations to the local authorities, but it is to be feared that the latter, as in the case of Lieutenant Fraser (see my despatch of the 4th September), will be powerless to apprehend the culprits.

While the above events have been taking place at or to the south of Shiraz, a party of fifty sowars sent by the Kawam-ul-Mulk to Abadeh to meet the new Governor-General, as well as thirty other sowars following on the same errand, were attacked by a large force of Boir Ahmadis at Khaneh Khurreh and fled, losing baggage, rifles and ammunition.

The fugitives reached Surmek apparently without loss of life. The Boir Ahmadi remain in possession of Khaneh Khurreh, where they have cut the telegraph wires.

Telegraphic interruptions in the province of Fars are reported to have been more frequent than ever of late. There have been interruptions between Dashtarjin and Mian Kotal caused by Farsimadan Kashgais. Repeated orders to the Khans to prevent damage have proved unavailing, the tribesmen being wholly out of hand. Arabs and Baseris are smashing the lines between Sivend and Shiraz; Kashgais are doing the same between Shiraz and Khaneh Zinian. Gholams sent out to north or south to repair the lines are maltreated and stripped.

Insulators, stalks, brackets and stays are being carried off wholesale and miles of wire are being removed.

On the 28th September Mr. Smart reported that the Bushire and Ispahan roads were closed for the moment and that no posts had come through from Bushire for a fortnight.

A large caravan of pilgrims which has started for Bushire had been obliged to return to Shiraz.

It will thus be seen that the situation in the province of Fars is a most unsatisfactory one. It should, however, be borne in mind that the present is a moment when disturbances may be expected as the tribes are on the move from their summer to their winter quarters. The advent of a new Governor-General is, moreover, frequently the signal in Persia for disorders to break out or be renewed.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 368.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 1, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 12th July last upon the subject of the settlement of claims between the Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiari khans, I have the honour to report that I am in receipt of two most satisfactory telegrams from His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, informing me that the relations between the above-mentioned parties are so much improved that there will no longer be any need of such a meeting as was proposed, because there is every reason for anticipating that they can now settle their difference in an amicable and satisfactory manner.

Major Haworth says that the sheikh is of opinion that any arrangement made should be with the knowledge of His Majesty's consular officers, and suggests that when the two parties sign the agreement, they should exchange copies of the instrument through the intermediary of the British consul, who should also receive a copy. He is of opinion that such a proceeding would commit us to nothing, but that it would make it difficult for the parties concerned to go back on their word, which otherwise might only hold good as long as it was in the interest of one or other of the parties concerned. Sir Percy Cox has telegraphed his opinion that the agreement might be registered at the consulates at Mohammerah and Ahwaz, where copies would be taken of it for transmission to the higher authorities.

It would appear to me that it would suffice if copies of the arrangement were communicated to the two consuls, but it is possible that it is considered desirable that more importance should be given to the act than seems to me necessary. I am communicating further with Sir Percy Cox.

Major Haworth also telegraphs that largely owing to the good relations existing between the sheikh and Amir Mujahed, who has been appointed Governor of Behbahan and Kuhgelui by Sardar Jang, the former has instructed the chiefs of all his tribes on that frontier to render all assistance that he may require to Amir Mujahed, and has sent 100 men to meet the amir and accompany him as far as he may desire. The sheikh has also written to all the Kuhgelui chiefs on his frontier with whom he has friendly relations, warning them that if they resist the amir he will help him to wipe them out.

This should augur well for a peaceful time on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, provided that jealousies of the other khans do not lead to tribal disturbances.

I had the honour to inform you, Sir, in my telegram of the 23rd ultimo, that the road was declared open for traffic.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 369.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 369.

Summary of Events in Persia for September.

Tabriz.

THERE has been no serious fighting between the Russian troops and the Shahsevans during the past month. A certain number of tribesmen have given up their arms, but there are still some 1,500 in the field who are endeavouring to break through the Russian lines and take refuge in Turkish territory. The Governor-General of Azerbaijan has sent 400 Persian cavalry and infantry to Soujboulak to cut off this party.

Sipahdar-i-Azam moved into Tabriz on the 19th September.

Gilan and Mazandaran.

Mr. Worrall arrived at Resht on the 11th September, and took up his duties as His Majesty's acting vice-consul.

The majority of the Russian troops forming the Astrabad garrison have moved into camp at Kareh-Su, 20 miles to the west of the town, where they are constructing barracks and making preparations for the winter.

Hamadan.

On the 23rd September Major Borrell left Hamadan with a force of ninety gendarmes, with two guns borrowed from the governor, to disperse a large gathering of robbers assembled in the adjacent hills. He came up with the robbers on the 27th September, and, in the engagement which ensued, was wounded. On the following day he withdrew his force to Hamadan, in accordance with what he believed to be the orders of the commandant of the gendarmerie.

It transpired afterwards that the Governor of Hamadan, fearing an attack by some of Salar-ed-Dowleh's followers, had altered the commandant's order "to return the guns to Hamadan" into "to return to Hamadan with the whole force."

Meshed.

The province is in its usual state of unrest, especially in the neighbourhood of Shahrud, where the roads have been blocked for the past ten days by a large party of Turkoman robbers.

During the last week in August, Prince Dabija and General Redko left for Russia. On the departure of the latter, Colonel Drozdovski took over the command of the Russian troops in Khorassan and established his head-quarters in Meshed.

Amir Azam, formerly Governor of Kerman, has arrived at Shahrud.

Major Sykes, His Majesty's consul-general, left Meshed on the 1st September for a tour in the Bujnurd district.

Ispahan.

There has been no improvement in the Kum and Sultanabad districts. In addition to the usual robberies of caravans, several Armenian villages in the vicinity of Sultanabad have been plundered in the course of the past month by raiding parties of Lurs. Also, in the Fereidan district, the distress among the Armenian peasantry is said to be very great, owing to their oppression by the deputy governor and leading seyyids.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, the Governor-elect of Fars, left Ispahan on the 18th September with an escort of 180 gendarmes. While halted at Kumisheh, the gendarmes were fired on in their billets during the night of the 25th-26th September. The Swedish officer in charge of the party attacked and dispersed the robbers. The leader of the band, one Ali Khan, was taken prisoner and shot.

Sardar Jang is now in the heart of the Bakhtiari country with Captain Grey, His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz, who reports favourably on the progress made towards the restoration of order. Amir Mujahid, who was hostile to Sardar Jang at the outset, has now come to terms with him, and has been appointed Governor of Behbahan.

Yezd.

Ustad Mohammed, who was reported in last month's summary to be advancing on Yezd, has left the district. A large party of Boir Ahmedis, however, entered the Ardekan district during the latter half of September, and have been committing depredations there ever since.

The governor, Assadullah Mirza, has resigned his appointment, but his successor has not yet been appointed.

Shiraz.

Soulet-ed-Dowleh's following is still in the vicinity of Shiraz, and the main road to Bushire is closed.

Several bands of Boir Ahmedis are reported to be in the Abadeh district. On the 25th September one of these parties, numbering about 500, attacked some villages on the main road between Abadeh and Dehbid. They were repulsed by the villagers and moved off in the direction of Dehbid, plundering several villages *en route*.

Kerman.

The various parties of robbers who have been plundering the districts to the north and west of Kerman for some time past, received a series of defeats at the hands of Amir Mufakham, when the latter was on his way to take up his duties as Governor-General of Kerman. Large quantities of stolen property have been recovered, and in the various engagements the robbers are reported to have suffered some 100 casualties.

Amir Mufakham is at present at Rafsinjan, and intends to leave for Kerman as soon as he has arranged for the security of the Rafsinjan district.

Kermanshah.

On the 3rd September Salar-ed-Dowleh joined Yar Mohammed at Kermanshah. But on the 16th September, hearing that Farman Farma was 25 miles from the town, Salar-ed-Dowleh left without fighting, and the Governor-General entered Kermanshah a few days later.

On the 22nd September the Bakhtiari and mujahid, who formed a part of the Government force, deserted Farman Farma and left for Hamadan. The two legations brought strong pressure to bear on the Central Government to order the Bakhtiari and mujahid to return forthwith to Kermanshah, and it is now reported that they are on their way there.

Salar-ed-Dowleh proceeded from Kermanshah to Senneh, where he collected as many men as possible. He is now reported to be on his way back to Kermanshah with Yar Mohammed Khan and a force estimated at 1,200 men.

No. 370.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 2, 1912.

THE situation at Kermanshah and in the neighbourhood of that place affords a further proof of the incapability of the Persian Government and of its military executive to restore and maintain order, even in a part of the country where the Government forces appeared to have obtained a complete mastery some three or four months ago. No very serious attempt would appear to have been made at the time of the reoccupation of Kermanshah to capture Salar-ed-Dowleh, and during the past few months the appearance of the ubiquitous Pretender has been reported from various places in Luristan and Kurdistan. Owing to the lack of telegraphic communication and to the absence of reliable agents in the districts frequented, it has been extremely difficult to locate the exact whereabouts of the elusive Prince.

It will be remembered that as soon as Kermanshah had been recaptured and Salar-ed-Dowleh had been driven out to wander a fugitive among the wild tribes of Luristan and Kurdistan, the Bakhtiari and mujahed forces with Farman Farma began to clamour loudly for permission to return to Tehran, since there was no more fighting to be anticipated. In July it was reported that they had actually marched out of Kermanshah on their homeward journey. They then halted at Bisitun, and consented to return to Kermanshah on receipt of money from the Central Government, which enabled the arrears of pay due to them to be paid up to date. Complaints were also made at the time that all the spoils of war went to enrich Farman Farma, and that neither the Government nor the men who had won the victories for him received any share.

Early in August, Farman Farma with the whole of his army marched, leaving a quite inadequate force at Kermanshah, to Senneh, the capital of Kurdistan, of which province he is also Governor-General. Whilst the Government forces were on the march to Senneh, a certain Yar Mohammed Khan deserted Farman Farma, and returned to Kermanshah at the head of about 300 Mussulman mujaheds. He would appear to have got possession of Kermanshah by a ruse, and to have occupied the city, from whence he telegraphed to Tehran that he and his men had forsaken Farman Farma because they wished the Regent to be dismissed, the Cabinet to be changed, the constitution to be maintained, and a Medjliss to be summoned. It was early rumoured that Yar Mohammed intended to declare for Salar-ed-Dowleh, as was proved when the Prince re-entered Kermanshah on the 3rd September at the head of 500 men, and was warmly welcomed by the ex-democrat, Yar Mohammed, now turned rebel and traitor.

Before it was quite clear which side Yar Mohammed meant to take, the Government dispatched a young Armenian named Mirza Yanz, who was formerly Yeprim Khan's "chef de cabinet," to the army in the hope that he might be able to patch up the differences between the Mussulman mujahed deserters and the Armenians who had remained faithful under Kerri Khan. Mirza Yanz arrived too late to effect the purpose for which he had been dispatched, and it would appear that his mission has proved a complete failure, since, not only did he fail to convince the rebel mujaheds of the error of their ways, but he has also associated himself with the loyal mujaheds and Bakhtiaris, and has signed a petition to the Government representing that the forces in the field have been fighting for months for the constitution and a Medjliss, and that the one is persistently ignored, whilst there is no sign of any intention to proceed to the election of the latter.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of this document, together with that of a sort of covering manifesto issued by a secret society which declares that the Persian people will not again submit to the autocratic rule of Mohammed Ali Mirza, despite the statement made in certain quarters regarding the people's desire for the return of the ex-Shah. These papers were handed to Mr. Churchill by an individual speaking English whom he had never seen before.

After considerable hesitation, the troops under Farman Farma were persuaded to return to Kermanshah for the purpose of recapturing the town. On their approach, Salar-ed-Dowleh and Yar Mohammed Khan marched out in the direction of Senneh, which was subsequently occupied. Two stories are told of the manner in which the hostile forces passed each other without exchanging a shot. The one is to the effect that they took different routes: the Government troops the public highway, and the rebels, who numbered about 600 men when they left Kermanshah, a less frequented mountain road. The other version of the story is that the opposing

forces actually met, but that the Bakhtiari and mujaheds, who form the militant portion of the army, refused to attack Salar and his men.

No sooner was Farman Farma re-established in Kermanshah than the Bakhtiari and mujaheds declared that they would not fight any more, and actually deserted the town with the avowed intention of returning to Tehran. They had already reached Kangavar when they were persuaded by the remonstrances of the khans at Tehran to await there the arrival of Bakhtiari reliefs, which it was promised should be dispatched at once. Unfortunately, these reinforcements are not forthcoming, as it has not been found possible to muster more than about 150 men at Tehran, whilst no recruits are available from Bakhtiari at this period of the year. There is said to be a small Bakhtiari force between Sultanabad and Hamadan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that these men have been ordered to the front, but some people seem to doubt their existence.

Under these conditions, my Russian colleague and I deemed it advisable to make a strong representation to the Bakhtiari Prime Minister and Minister of War to the effect that, if they cannot persuade their tribesmen at the front to do their duty and refrain from meddling in politics, we shall feel constrained to withdraw our support from the Bakhtiari, both at the capital and in the provinces. Our representations would appear to have borne fruit, because we are now assured that a portion of the force at Kangavar will return to Kermanshah, whilst the remainder will proceed to Hamadan to strengthen the garrison there. Reports from the front are extremely conflicting, but it would appear established that Salar-ed-Dowleh has succeeded in collecting again a considerable force of tribesmen round him, and that he has left Senneh either for Kermanshah or Hamadan. His army is estimated at 7,000 men, which is probably an exaggeration, and he has one mountain gun.

Salar-ed-Dowleh would now appear to have somewhat changed his tune. He is said to have disavowed all pretensions to the throne, to which he owns that he has no claim, and poses as a champion of the independence of Persia under a constitutional Government.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 370.

Copy of Letter from Persian United Associates.

(To the Cabinet. Copy to Sardar Assad, and copy through the Dashnaksutiun to the Diplomatic Body.)

IT is of course well known to the Ministry that each member of the army has, from the beginning of the constitutional era, everywhere and at all times supported the independence of the State and protected the constitution. In pursuance of this sacred purpose we have sacrificed ourselves. We have made war and gained great victories, such as the victories of Tehran, Ghilan, Zenjan, Karachedagh, Ardebil, Mazanderan, Astrabad, Arshad-ed-Dowleh, Salar-ed-Dowleh, &c., up to the end. Each individual is still of the same persuasion and will sacrifice himself, and we are convinced that the Cabinet holds the same sacred views as the army.

Seven months ago the Government were forced, on account of external difficulties, to close the Medjliss, and this army corps approved this course and assisted in the execution on account of expediency. The Medjliss was closed; the Cabinet gave explicit promises that the Medjliss would be reopened after the lapse of three months. Seven months have now passed since that promise was made and there is no sign of the reopening of the Medjliss. This has caused us disappointment, and therefore the individual members of the army in general, and the superior and minor officers in particular, ask the Government to open Parliament, to give exceptionally stringent orders for the holding of elections, and to institute Parliament in a very short time. This will bring about contentment in the country and render the army grateful.

Zia-es-Sultan, Mirza Yanz, Shahab-es-Sultaneh, Kerry, Ghaffar Kazvini, Salar Mansur, Jevad Khan, Gholam Hussein Khan Habib, Bahadur-ed-Dowleh (and about 30 more).

10 Shavel, 1330.

Enclosure 2 in No. 370.

Central Committee of the Persian United Associates to British Legation at Tehran.

To the British Legation :

WE desire to contradict categorically the statements which emanate from certain quarters regarding the desire for the return of Mohammed Ali Mirza—a statement made by the originators of sedition and by those persons who, up till now, have obstructed the pacification of this country. The Persian people will not again submit to the autocratic rule of Mohammed Ali. We trust that those who sympathise with humanity will not tolerate the continuance of revolution and bloodshed in Persia. We are certain that the British Legation will submit to the British Government the (above) expression of the Persian nation's sentiments.

(No signatures.)

(Sealed) Central Committee of the United Associates.

Tehran, 16 Shavel, 1330.

No. 371.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 3, 1912.

COLONEL HJALMARSON, commandant of the Swedish gendarmerie, was good enough to submit to me recently a number of documents in connection with the reorganisation of the Government gendarmerie.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a summary of these papers, which has been prepared for me by the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 371.

Report on the Reorganisation of the Government Gendarmerie.

RECENT events in Fars, the failure of the system of transferring officers from the army to the gendarmerie, and the need for further decentralisation in the north, having rendered the reorganisation of the corps necessary, Colonel Hjalmarson, the commandant of the gendarmerie, submitted a scheme to the Central Government early in September.

The changes recommended, which entailed an additional expenditure of 369,440 krans (6,717L.), were sanctioned by the Minister of the Interior and came into force on the 24th September.

Under the new organisation head-quarters have been remodelled, the officers' and under-officers' colleges at Tehran amalgamated, and the Kazvin, Tehran, and Fars commands organised in three regiments.

Head-quarters.

Head-quarters consist of the commandant and the heads of the pay, supply, military works, and veterinary departments, with their respective staffs.

Officers' and Under-Officers' College.

It was originally intended to officer the gendarmerie with officers transferred from the army, and when the officers' college was opened last winter, Colonel Hjalmarson asked the Minister of War to distribute a circular among the officers of the army, explaining the conditions of entry, &c. The Minister of War, however, suppressed the circular, and only a small number of army officers joined the gendarmerie. As

this source of supply has now ceased entirely, Colonel Hjalmarson has decided to select his officers from among the under-officers of the gendarmerie, and, in order to ensure a continuous course of instruction, has amalgamated the officers' and under-officers' colleges.

Organisation into Regiments.

According to the new system, each regiment will consist of one or more battalions of trained men for duty on the roads and a depôt battalion for training recruits.

Northern Section.

The 1st regiment is organised in three battalions. The 1st and 2nd battalions, with head-quarters at Tehran and Kazvin respectively, are allotted to the roads in the vicinity of the capital and to the Tehran-Kazvin-Enzeli and Kazvin-Hamadán roads. The 3rd, or depôt battalion, has its head-quarters at Tehran.

The 2nd regiment consists of only two battalions, both with their head-quarters at Tehran. The 1st battalion is distributed along the Tehran-Kum-Passangan and Tehran-Veramin roads. The 2nd is the depôt battalion.

Southern Section.

The organisation of the 3rd regiment, which at present numbers about 250 men, and has an under-officers' school attached to it, will not be completed till next spring.

Colonel Hjalmarson intended to train the whole of the first levée for the Fars gendarmerie at Tehran. Last spring, however, before an adequate number of men had been trained, and in spite of his remonstrances, the Central Government directed him to commence work at Shiraz without any further delay. Accordingly, 130 men, under three Swedish officers, were transferred from Tehran last March to form a nucleus for the Fars gendarmerie. But owing to opposition on the part of the local authorities, recruits were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers. The reverse at the hands of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's followers last August has rendered recruiting even more difficult than hitherto; and as there is no likelihood of any improvement in this respect until the gendarmerie is strong enough to command respect locally, the commandant has decided to train a draft of 925 men at the head-quarters of the 1st and 2nd regiments, and to transfer it to Shiraz next spring.

The organisation of the regiment into battalions, its distribution along the Bushire-Shiraz-Yezdikhast road, and if possible the formation of an officers' and under-officers' college, similar to that at Tehran, will then be taken in hand.

Ispahan Regiment.

Next year, provided funds are forthcoming, the commandant hopes to be able to form a regiment with head-quarters at Ispahan, for the protection of the road from Passangan to Yezdikhast, thereby linking up the northern and southern sections of the gendarmerie.

Estimated Cost.

The estimated cost of the maintenance of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments for the twelve months commencing from the 1st October is 6,163,071 krans (112,056*l.*), and for the raising and upkeep of the Ispahan regiment for a similar period, 4,072,425 krans (74,044*l.*).

Recruiting.

Colonel Hjalmarson, in his observations on the work of the gendarmerie, draws attention to the difficulties he has had to contend with since his arrival in Tehran, especially as regards recruiting.

In the north as well as in the south those in authority have hindered the development of the corps.

The governor of Kazvin, for instance, demanded a bribe of 2,000 tomans from a recruiting party under a Swedish officer sent into his district last spring. As his request was not acceded to, he forbade the tribal chiefs under his jurisdiction to

have any dealings with the recruiting officer, and the party failed to obtain any recruits.

Later on in the year the officer in charge of the Kazvin command managed to recruit locally some twenty men, but as soon as the Minister of War heard of this, he issued an order prohibiting recruiting in the district.

In the Kum district the local regiment and its recruiting area was placed at the disposal of the gendarmerie by the orders of the Central Government. The commandant entrusted the work of obtaining men for the gendarmerie to the officers of the regiment; but these, instead of spending their energies in recruiting, levied blackmail on all concerned under threats of enforced service in the gendarmerie.

In view of the extra recruiting necessary this autumn, owing to the preparation of the draft for Shiraz, representations have been made to the Minister of the Interior to take steps to suppress these abuses.

Courts of Justice.

Colonel Hjalmarson also complains that the methods of the Persian courts of justice, to whom the gendarmerie have to hand over offenders for punishment, leave much to be desired.

He suggested to the Minister of Justice that Persian officers of the gendarmerie should be empowered to give minor punishments, and that, wherever Swedish officers were stationed, courts should be formed under their presidency for dealing with the more serious offences.

The Minister of Justice said he could not sanction the proposed reform, as it would be contrary to the laws of the country. He assured Colonel Hjalmarson, however, that he would appoint suitable men as justices of the peace, especially for dealing with offenders handed over by the gendarmerie.

Prospects of ultimate Success.

In spite of the opposition of certain Cabinet Ministers and provincial governors, and of the exaggerated stories regarding the harshness of the discipline that have been spread abroad, Colonel Hjalmarson is confident of success.

The clergy, whom he has conciliated in various ways, are so far well disposed towards the gendarmerie, and he is of opinion that so long as the men are paid regularly service in the corps will be popular.

He says that his officers have found the men intelligent and willing to learn at first, but that as soon as they enter on the higher forms of training they are liable to become lethargic. He hopes that with patience his officers will be able to overcome this weakness in the Persian character.

He does not think that the men are wanting in the necessary military qualities. He says that the men under the immediate command of the Swedish officers fought well in the engagement which took place near Shiraz last August, and that those who left the field were under a Persian officer who was wanting in courage, and so unable to set his men a good example.

No. 372.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you the accompanying programme which was communicated to the Russian Minister and myself to-day by Ali Kuli Khan, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the name of the Persian Government.

There are, in our opinion, only three points in it of any special importance, namely, those referring to the formation of an army of 28,000 men; to a loan of 30,000,000 tomans, about 5,500,000*l.*; and to the construction of a railway from the Caspian Sea, or a point on the frontier of Azerbaijan, to the Persian Gulf.

I asked Ali Kuli Khan what further steps the Persian Government proposed to take in the matter of the loan. He at first seemed disposed to consider that the opening given was sufficient and that the two Powers would do the rest. On reflection he suggested with some hesitation that presumably the treasurer-general would call at

the two legations and furnish full details as to the resources available as security for such a loan. He added that M. Mornard's financial statement, a copy of which accompanied my despatch of the 31st August, made it quite clear that the northern and southern customs alone would suffice for the service of a loan such as the one proposed.

I replied that on paper this was the case, but that recent experience had shown that the southern customs did not apparently suffice to meet the service of the existing loans secured on them. I added that I was quite aware that the receipts of the southern customs ought to be amply sufficient to satisfy the fixed charges on them, but that unfortunately the treasurer-general would persist in diverting this source of revenue to purposes for which it could not properly be used until the calls upon it under the loan contract of 1911 had been satisfied. Such proceedings, I said, did not inspire confidence, and I thought that expert opinion would have to be taken upon the figures supplied in the statement referred to above before the possibility of making such a loan as the one proposed could be established.

I then asked Ali Kuli Khan what the proposal for a railway from the north to the south meant, and told him that I had received your instructions to co-operate with my Russian colleague in asking for an option on behalf of the Société d'Études, an Anglo-Franco-Russian syndicate, for the construction of a railway on much the same lines as those indicated.

Ali Kuli Khan replied that he believed that the line I mentioned was the scheme alluded to, and that he thought there would be no difficulty in securing the option sought. He added that considerable progress had been made lately with the British and Russian railway schemes that are before the Persian Government, and seemed to anticipate that the questions would be settled satisfactorily very soon.

It was clear, I said, that Nos. 6 and 7 did not concern me, but I expressed a hope that he would pardon me for saying that I considered their inclusion in such a paper very bad diplomacy. The Russian Government, if they chose to reply to No. 6, could easily answer in such a manner as would leave the Persian Government without a reply, and no good could be expected from an allusion that could not fail to be irritating. Whatever one might think about the influences that had been connected with the appointment of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, that official had been actually appointed by the Governor-General, who might well be held to blame by the Russian Government if he allowed his subordinate to usurp his functions. As to the question of the Shahsevans, it was folly to talk of the Governor-General settling it, when all the world knows that he has no force at his disposal capable of making any impression upon that turbulent tribe, even if it were likely that the pious wish expressed would turn the Russian Government from their purpose or have any but an irritating effect. The Russian Government considered the predatory habits of the tribe a constant source of danger to the lives and property of the neighbouring inhabitants, and had therefore decided, possibly most reluctantly, to inflict a punishment that the Persian Government were unable to impose under existing circumstances.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 372.

Statement by Persian Government.

DEPUIS plusieurs années tous les efforts du Gouvernement Impérial ont tendu vers la réalisation des réformes urgentes; néanmoins, le temps et les moyens dont il disposait ayant été consacrés à réprimer des troubles inattendus, il n'a pu complètement atteindre le but qu'il se proposait.

L'achèvement des réformes projetées ne pouvant être, d'autre part, différé plus longtemps, le Gouvernement Impérial est fermement déterminé à mettre en exécution, dans le plus bref délai possible, le programme qu'il s'est tracé.

A cet effet, il attire l'attention des deux Puissances voisines sur les points suivants, désireux qu'il est de s'assurer leur concours amical en ce qui les concerne:—

1. Le rétablissement de l'ordre et la sécurité des routes commerciales font, en première ligne, l'objet de la plus vive sollicitude du Gouvernement, et cela par les moyens suivants:—

- (a.) Développement de la gendarmerie avec l'aide des officiers suédois.
- (b.) Organisation de la police avec l'aide des officiers suédois.
- (c.) Organisation d'une armée de 28,000 hommes, bien armés, dont un premier

corps de 7,000 hommes sera formé à Téhéran avec le concours d'officiers européens empruntés à une Puissance dite de second ordre. Ces officiers formeront à Téhéran un cadre de réforme par lequel passeront graduellement tous les autres corps d'armée formant garnison dans les provinces et chargés d'y maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité.

2. En vue de préparer les moyens nécessaires au rétablissement de l'ordre, l'achat d'une quantité suffisante d'armes, les réformes administratives, la mise en valeur des richesses naturelles du pays et surtout la réforme financière, le Gouvernement Impérial est obligé de recourir à un gros emprunt comportant des conditions d'un caractère exclusivement économique. Il est d'ailleurs tout disposé à entrer sans retard en pourparlers à cet effet.

Les revenus actuels du pays, exception faite du maliat (impôt foncier) et après déduction des sommes affectées à l'amortissement des emprunts antérieurs et du paiement des dépenses obligatoires, suffisent à garantir un emprunt de 30,000,000 tomans au moins.

En attendant la conclusion de ce gros emprunt et pour poser les bases de son programme, le Gouvernement persan demande aux deux Puissances, à titre d'avance, une somme de 200,000*l.*

3. La présence de troupes étrangères sur le territoire persan étant évidemment nuisible au prestige du Gouvernement central, celui-ci attire l'attention favorable des deux Puissances sur la solution de cette difficulté, afin qu'il puisse avec l'autorité voulue procéder à gouverner le pays.

4. Étant donné que le développement du commerce et la prospérité du pays sont irréalisables sans la construction de chemins de fer, le Gouvernement Impérial est décidé de relier par une voie ferrée internationale la Mer Caspienne ou l'un des points situés sur la frontière d'Azerbeïdjan au Golfe Persique.

5. La réouverture du Parlement forme également l'objet de la sollicitude du Gouvernement.

6. Le rétablissement de l'ordre dans la province d'Azerbeïdjan étant particulièrement en vue, le Gouvernement Impérial attire l'attention favorable du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie sur les points suivants, afin de réaliser ce but et d'affermir ainsi l'autorité du Gouverneur général de cette province :—

(a.) La non-immixtion de Hadji Chodja-od-Dauleh dans les affaires du Gouvernement central d'Azerbeïdjan.

(b.) Le règlement de l'affaire des Chahsévènes exclusivement par ledit Gouverneur général.

7. Étant donné que les bruits du retour de l'ex-Schah troublent de temps à autre les esprits et encouragent les éléments de désordre, le Gouvernement Impérial réitère ses demandes antérieures en priant les deux Puissances signataires du protocole de 1909 de lui fournir des assurances formelles à l'effet d'écarter tout danger d'une nouvelle tentative de rentrée en Perse par l'ex-Schah.

(Translation.)

FOR several years the Imperial Government's every effort has been directed towards the realisation of urgent reforms. As, however, they have been obliged to devote the whole of their time and money to the repression of unexpected disturbances, they have not been able completely to achieve the object which they had in view.

But the execution of the proposed reforms cannot longer be postponed, and the Imperial Government are firmly resolved to carry out, with the least possible delay, the programme which they have drawn up.

They accordingly draw the attention of the two neighbouring Powers to the following points, in the hope of securing their friendly assistance, in so far as they are concerned :—

1. The re-establishment of order and the security of the trade routes form, in the first place, the object of the most anxious attention of the Government. For this the following measures are proposed :—

(a.) The development of the gendarmerie with the help of the Swedish officers.

(b.) The organisation of the police with the help of the Swedish officers.

(c.) The organisation of an army of 28,000 men well armed ; a first corps of 7,000 men to be formed at Tehran with the help of European officers borrowed from a "minor" Power. These officers will form a training corps at Tehran, through

which will gradually pass all the other army corps quartered in the provinces with the duty of maintaining order there.

2. In order to procure the necessary means for the re-establishment of order, the purchase of sufficient arms, administrative reforms, development of the natural wealth of the country, and, above all, financial reform, the Imperial Government are obliged to have recourse to a large loan on conditions of a purely economic character. They are quite prepared to enter into immediate negotiations with this object.

The present revenues of the country, not including the maliat (land tax) and after deducting the sums assigned to the amortisation of the previous loans and those required for obligatory expenditure, are sufficient for the guarantee of a loan of at least 30,000,000 tomans.

Pending the issue of this large loan, in order to making a beginning with their programme, the Persian Government apply to the two Powers for a sum of 200,000*l.* in the form of an advance.

3. The presence of foreign troops in Persian territory being obviously injurious to the prestige of the Central Government, the latter would request the favourable attention of the two Powers to the solution of this difficulty, in order that the government of the country may be carried on with the necessary authority.

4. Seeing that the development of trade and the prosperity of the country are impossible without the construction of railways, the Imperial Government have decided to connect the Caspian Sea, or a point on the frontier of Azerbaijan, with the Persian Gulf by an international railway.

5. The reassembly of Parliament is also one of the objects of the Government.

6. The re-establishment of order in the province of Azêrbaijan being especially desired, the Imperial Government request the favourable attention of the Russian Government to the following points, with a view to the realisation of this object and the consequent strengthening of the authority of the Governor-General of that province:—

(a.) That Shuja-ed-Dowleh should refrain from interfering with the Central Government of Azerbaijan;

(b.) That the settlement of the trouble with the Shahsevans should be left entirely to the Governor-General.

7. In view of the fact that rumours of the return of the ex-Shah continue from time to time to unsettle men's minds and encourage the disorderly elements, the Imperial Government repeat their previous request that the two Powers which signed the protocol of 1909 will give them formal assurances with a view to removing all danger of a fresh attempt by the ex-Shah to return to Persia.

No. 373.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, October 21, 1912

YOUR telegram of 19th October.

I communicated substance to Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs in a private letter yesterday.

His Excellency told me to-day that Russian Minister had been authorised to summon troops to Tehran in case of urgent danger, as he alone was in a position to judge whether their presence was necessary or not.

I remarked that Russian Minister seemed to take too serious a view of the situation, and expressed earnest hope that such a step would only be taken in very last resort.

His Excellency replied that we might be sure of this, and that Sir W. Townley would no doubt keep in contact with Russian Minister and make our views known to him.

No. 374.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 20th October: Troops at Shiraz.

I agree entirely with views expressed in last paragraph.

No. 375.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 22, 1912.

MY telegram of the 20th October.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me yesterday. I had not been able to ascertain the views of his Highness on the present situation before owing to indisposition and various causes.

In his Highness's opinion, Ain-ed-Dowleh would be the most suitable person to form a new Cabinet. His Highness observed that, so long as the present uncertainty lasted, the Cabinet now in office would refuse to sign concessions.

Ain-ed-Dowleh's appointment would meet with opposition from the Bakhtiari, which could doubtless be overcome if it were seen that the two legations were acting in concert. The Russian Minister is a strong supporter of Ain-ed-Dowleh, but the relations between him and His Majesty's Legation have not been friendly for some years, as you already know. Provided, however, that he is considered the best man to establish some sort of order in Persia, the fact that he has been on bad terms with us should not in my opinion militate against him.

No. 376.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 22, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, dated 21st October:—

"Governor-General informs me he is entrusting road from Shiraz to Kazerun to 150 gendarmes and 110 local riflemen from villages along the road. Swedish officer proposes leaving 24th October with gendarmes and special envoys from Governor-General to arrange matters with local headman, &c. He will go direct to Kazerun, whence he will return, scattering gendarmes along the road. Local riflemen are to be under and paid by gendarmerie. Rahdari to be forbidden. The Governor-General proposes to dispense with tribal assistance for guarding of road. From Kazerun special envoy should proceed to Bushire endeavouring to make temporary arrangements with headmen, who are to be left in charge of road until Fars Government can deal more fundamentally with that part of the road, on which attempt to abolish rahdari will not be made. I gather, however, that attempts will be made to moderate it."

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me Governor-General had had most enthusiastic reception at Shiraz. Presumably he has assured himself of the tribesmen before taking, so soon after his arrival, a step that appears hazardous.

No. 377.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 22, 1912.

HIS Majesty's consul at Mohammerah reports that a representative of Bakhtiari Khans has made a satisfactory arrangement of their differences with the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Agreement will be ratified later on, when Sardar Jang and Amir Mujahed are to meet.

No. 378.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 21st October.

You should act as suggested in last paragraph. If Russian troops go to Tehran, unless in case of extreme necessity and obvious danger, it will cause great anxiety here and be taken by public opinion to imply that Russia means to annex the north of Persia.

It is most desirable that the concession for Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway should be put through; this might be done simultaneously with the granting of a concession for one of the railways that Russia wants in the north. Could not you and your Russian colleague bring this about?

No. 379.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 23, 1912.

SHIRAZ situation.

His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz telegraphs as follows dated yesterday :—

"I have had several conversations with the Governor-General, and gather that, as the question of the ilkhaniship has less importance in winter when the tribes are widely scattered, his Excellency proposes to leave it open for the present. In the meanwhile Soulet-es-Sultaneh will be left in nominal charge of the tribes.

"Mukhber has summoned Soulet-ed-Dowleh to Shiraz, but will not be astonished should his invitation be met by a refusal.

"His Excellency proposes to retain Kawam-ul-Mulk, whose assistance he considers very valuable, provided that the latter agrees to co-operate loyally. He appears to have inspired Kawam for the time being with some degree of confidence. His Excellency proposes to avoid any drastic action during the winter; he hopes to be in a position to impose his will on the tribes in the spring, when the force which is now being organised under Daria Begi will be ready. He is also desirous of avoiding partisanship, and announces his wish to support all persons, of no matter what party, provided they are ready to work loyally with the Government.

"He prefers to wait till the organisation of the force under Daria Begi is complete before taking strong action for the arrest of the persons guilty of the attacks on our troops, but he is of opinion that he would find it easier to effect their arrest if their capital punishment is not demanded. May I receive your instructions as to whether I may consent to waive their execution?"

No. 380.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 23, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from Douglas, Shiraz :—

"Squadron from Ispahan arrived 20th October without incident."

No. 381.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 22nd October.

Your Excellency should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should be prepared to agree to the appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh as Prime Minister if Russian Government support it.

No. 382.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 24, 1912.

MY telegram of 22nd October.

Colonel of gendarmerie tells me that he only consented to the gendarmerie proceeding to Kazerun on the receipt of information from officer commanding at Shiraz that Governor-General had received thoroughly satisfactory assurances from tribal chiefs. Three Swedish officers accompany the force.

Colonel is asking for permission to send for two more officers, to replace one invalidated home as the result of wounds received near Hamadan and Colonel Merri, who has resigned. I presume His Majesty's Government have no objection.

No. 383.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 24, 1912.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD railway.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I spoke yesterday in the sense of your telegram of the 22nd October, assured me that this railway scheme is very favourably viewed by the Persian Government. He repeated his previous assurance that this concession would be granted at the same time as that to Russia for the Julfa-Tabriz line. He hoped that a final decision would be arrived at very soon.

In reply to his Highness's request for advice as to the Russian concession, I urged strongly that the Persian Government should grant it.

No. 384.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd October.

You may instruct His Majesty's consul at Shiraz to say that we will not insist on the execution of the culprits when arrested.

No. 385.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 24th October: Additional Swedish officers.

No objection.

No. 386.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 27, 1912.

VICE-CONSUL at Yezd reports a most serious state of things there. Mashallah Khan, son of celebrated highway robber Maid Hussein, has seized town, and is endeavouring to get himself made governor. Vice-consul adds that Mashallah Khan has liberated prisoners and threatens to loot the town. He adds that he hears that Mashallah Khan has stated that he will first attack vice-consulate, Russian agency, and bank, and that his life and that of the bank manager are in danger unless Mashallah Khan is made governor.

I have warned the Persian Government of the danger, and have held them responsible for lives and property of British subjects.

Sardar Fattah, Bakhtiari, has been named governor, and has already left Ispahan for Yezd at the head of a considerable force.

I have advised vice-consul of the steps taken, and have said, after consultation with Russian Minister, that we cannot recommend that Mashallah Khan be made governor. I have instructed vice-consul to inform Mashallah Khan, in the absence of any constituted authority, that Russian Minister and myself will hold him responsible for life and property of foreigners, pending arrival of Governor-General.

No. 387.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 28, 1912.

MY telegram of 27th October.

Mashallah Khan has proved reasonable, and has left Yezd.

No. 388.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 1, 1912.

REGRET to inform you that Lieutenant Bullock, 27th Punjabis, has been robbed and badly beaten on Bakhtiari road near Dopulur on his way here on language leave.

Have taken steps to secure exemplary punishment of robbers and safe escort to Ispahan.

No. 389.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of yesterday.

I approve your action.

Was Lieutenant Bullock seriously injured?

Please report how he is progressing.

No. 390.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 2nd November.

I have no further news of Lieutenant Bullock, who is not, I imagine, seriously injured. There is no telegraphic communication along road. Consul-general at Ispahan reports that drugs and other necessaries have been dispatched with an escort supplied by the Governor-General.

No. 391.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 5, 1912.

I HAVE received from the acting British consul at Shiraz a financial programme submitted to him by the Governor-General. The most important point in it is that the Government at Tehran should guarantee the Governor-General a sum of 6,000l. a-month to be devoted to the payment of the expenses of his administration. Mukhber proposes that a credit account should be opened by the Imperial Bank on which he can

freely draw up to 6,000*l.*, and that all the revenues of Fars shall be paid into his account, the Central Government to make good any deficiency.

The treasurer-general is, however, unable to give the necessary guarantee, as he has no funds available for the purpose. The manager of the bank, having consulted the branch at Shiraz, is also unable to agree to the proposal.

The Governor-General's mission is doomed to failure unless he can be assured of the necessary money to enable his administration to be properly carried on. If once he succeeded in restoring order in Fars, the sum required could be raised in a few months out of the revenues, which have been estimated to yield, in normal times, some 150,000*l.* per annum. The treasurer-general is sending a European representative to Shiraz, where he will arrive in about three weeks, to control the revenue and expenditure. This official will, when he has had time to study the question, be able to report what the revenues should amount to now under proper management.

Money is urgently required. The future situation depends to a great extent on whether or no it can be procured. I think that if you were able to arrange in some manner to give Mukhber financial assistance through the Imperial Bank for a few months the effect would probably be excellent.

No. 392.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 24th October.

Please do what you can to hasten the grant of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad railway concession. It is very desirable that there should be no further delay in the matter.

No. 393.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 23rd September, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz reporting the steps which have been taken by the Bakhtiari chief, Sardar-i-Jang, to re-establish order in Bakhtiaristan and to ensure the safety of the Lynch road.

I would beg to call your attention to the satisfactory nature of this report, and I have reason to know that Captain Grey's presence and advice were of great moral and material assistance to Sardar Jang. I think that no small praise is due to Captain Grey for the successful initiation of a scheme for securing permanent security on the Bakhtiari road, that there is good reason to hope, even in this country of disappointments, may be attended with good results.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 393.

Vice-Consul Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Camp Chighakhur, Ahwaz, September 23, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on my journey to Chighakhur with Sardar-i-Jang, and the steps taken by that chief to re-establish order in Bakhtiari country, and to assure the safety of the Lynch road :—

As already reported the Sardar-i-Jang with Murteza Kulli Khan left Ispahan for Chighakhur, the summer administrative head-quarters, on the 24th August. The same day Sardar-i-Fatheh and Sardar Mu'azam were dispatched to Chahar Mahal bearing letters from me and Sardar-i-Jang to Amir Mujahid. In my letter I gave the message authorised in your Excellency's letter of the 13th July, and explained that I had been

specially deputed to accompany the Sardar and to assist him in his mission, that the Sardar's appointment to the Bakhtiari ilkhaniship had our support, and that any action on his part or on the part of the junior khans which would hamper him in the execution of his duty would incur the severe displeasure of His Majesty's Government.

It was arranged that we should march slowly to Saman where Sardar-i-Fatfeh would bring the replies from Amir Mujahid, and where Sardar-i-Jang had ordered some 200 Bakhtiari sowars to concentrate.

On the 24th August Najafabad was reached, and a halt made the following day. On the 26th we reached Azizabad, and there received news that Amir Mujahid with several of the younger khans and a following of some 1,500 Bakhtiaris had moved from his home (Shamsabad) to Deh Kurd north of which village he proposed to forcibly resist our advance.

On the 27th we marched to Saman where the 200 sowars, mentioned above, joined our camp, bringing the number of the Sardar's following to some 500 horse and foot. The same day Sardar-i-Fatfeh returned to camp with messages from Amir Mujahid to the effect that he and the junior khans had no intention of resisting the Sardar by force, and that, provided the latter was willing to support them in their just demands with the other senior khans, they were prepared to aid him by every means in their power.

On the 28th we moved to Deh Kurd where several interviews took place with the Amir Mujahid and the younger khans. The Sardar-i-Jang promised to support the Amir in his desire to obtain a governorship, but we decided that we would try and induce him to accept the Behbahan governorship for which he was peculiarly fitted owing to his relationship with the Bahmai Kuhgelus, and his intimate knowledge of Kuhgelu politics. The Sardar promised also to use his influence in favour of the junior khans and in return obtained their undertaking to support him.

On the 30th August the camp was broken up, all the khans proceeding to their homes, while tents, provisions, &c., were collected at Chighakhur.

On the 4th September we all concentrated again at Chighakhur, and here we were successful in persuading Amir Mujahid to accept the Behbahan governorship. It was arranged that he should go to his home to make the necessary preparations for his journey, return to Chighakhur about the end of September, and then leave direct for his new capital.

On the 15th September the khans in Tehran notified both the Sardar-i-Jang and Amir Mujahid that the latter had been appointed to the governorship of Yezd. They had arranged this appointment on the recommendation of Sardar-i-Jang at the time when we had considered it advisable to get the Amir out of Bakhtiari territory as soon as possible, and before we had succeeded in inducing him to accept the Behbahan governorship. On the receipt of the news the Amir was immediately summoned to Chighakhur where it was explained to him that his appointment to Yezd was made under a misapprehension, and that he must proceed, as arranged, to Behbahan. It was agreed that he should send Muntazzim-ed-Dowleh to represent him in Yezd, and meanwhile go to Behbahan, take the necessary hostages from the Kuhgelu tribes to guarantee their good behaviour, and then, if all promised well, be relieved by one of the junior khans, and proceed to Yezd. The Amir agreed to these arrangements.

The arrangements made to ensure the safety of the Lynch road were as follows: 200 men have been selected from the Zarraswand and Usiwand sections as road guards. These sections are the best armed of all the Bakhtiaris, 80 per cent. of them possessing magazine rifles. These guards have been paid a cash advance of 120 krans each, the money being paid to them before me, and they have been promised regular pay at the rate of 120 krans per month as long as their services may be required. The command of these guards has been given to Bahadur-es-Sultaneh, the son of Hujabr-es-Sultan, the senior khan of the Haji Ilkhani family. Ample funds have been placed at the disposal of this young chief. In addition to the command of the road guards he has been given certain powers over the Dinaruni (Aurak) section, which occupies the territory adjoining the road, and 300 men from this section have been ordered to remain in the vicinity of the road itself, and made responsible for the safety of traffic.

Bahadur-es-Sultaneh with his guards left Chighakhur for the road on the 16th September. On the 18th September the ilkhani announced to me officially the opening of the road, and I notified Ispahan and Ahwaz,

It is hoped that it will be possible to considerably reduce the number of the road guards once the Amir Mujahid has assumed control at Behbahan, and has got the Kuhgelu well in hand. Sufficient men to garrison the six newly constructed towers

with a few men at each of the six or seven more remote halting places would probably then be sufficient to prevent any Bakhtiari interference with traffic.

The Sardar-i-Jang has promised that the question of providing and improving accommodation at the various stages, making arrangements for fodder and effecting necessary repairs to the track itself will receive his attention as money becomes available from bridge tolls, tribal revenue, &c.

The arrangements made, in my opinion, promise well, and Sardar-i-Jang is to be congratulated on the great deal he has accomplished in so short a time. Murteza Kulli Khan, once having decided to accept the ilbegship, has rendered the Sardar his loyal support and assistance, which was particularly valuable when the resistance of the young khans had to be overcome.

The tribal administration of the Sardar is capable and disinterested, and he is rapidly gaining the confidence and affection of the tribesmen.

In view of the excellent work so far done by the Sardar, and his undoubtedly sincere desire to see order restored and kept in Bakhtiari territory, I venture to point out to your Excellency the importance of rendering him our utmost support, and of ensuring that the ample powers he now enjoys under his "sanad" are not modified during the full term of his appointment.

I have, &c.

A. GREY, *Captain, I.A.*,
Assistant Resident, Ahwaz.

No. 394.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 1st October, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Cowan, commenting on the reactionary spirit at present prevailing in Azerbaijan, and on the prospects of the ex-Shah.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 394.

Acting Consul Cowan to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Tabriz, October 1, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the telegram I received from the merchants and Ulema of Zenjan, the substance of which I have already communicated to you by telegraph. I have acknowledged receipt of the telegram, and informed the signatories that I am communicating its contents to you. My Russian colleague, who has received a similar telegram, has, I understand, returned a like answer.

That the telegram and the closing of the bazaars, which occurred simultaneously with its dispatch, were inspired by Shuja-ed-Dowleh I have not the slightest doubt. If proof were needed, it would be furnished by the fact that he knew of the telegram some time before it arrived at Tabriz. Moreover, the Governor of Zenjan, Muayid-ed-Dowleh, is a brother and confederate of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and apparently almost as forceful a personality. Therefore, I do not feel disposed to place much reliance upon such demonstrations as evidence of the desire of the people of Azerbaijan to see the restoration of Mohammed Ali.

At the same time it must be recognised that, in Tabriz at least, public opinion has undergone a remarkable change. It can now, I think, be said without exaggeration that the former stronghold of Nationalism has gone over almost entirely to the side of Absolutism. This is not to be wondered at when it is remembered that the bulk of the population of Tabriz consists of merchants, who have suffered severely during the disorders of the past few years. I am assured by persons who have been long resident in the town, and who are personally acquainted with men of all classes, that merchants who not so long ago were strong and sincere constitutionalists, are now just as sincerely advocates of the restoration of the ex-Shah. They feel now that the trial of constitutional government was premature; their political leaders are dead or have sought refuge at Constantinople or elsewhere; their fighting men have also departed or are in hiding,

and the only chance of restoring sufficient order to enable them to repair their own fortunes is to revert to an absolute monarchy. In this connection it must be borne in mind that Mohammed Ali, while he was Crown Prince in Azerbaijan, had the reputation of being a strong, if somewhat oppressive, governor, and that he kept good order.

On the other hand, among the official, professional, and leisured classes, there are undoubtedly many ardent speculative Nationalists, but it is questionable if any of these would run the risk of airing their opinions if the ex-Shah were to put in an appearance. Their politics are confined to theory, and I do not believe that there is a man among them capable of leading a constitutional movement at the present time. Moreover, they are cowed by the presence in the town of Shuja-ed-Dowleh and his men.

I have, &c.

N. PATRICK COWAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 394.

Telegram from Zenjan, dated September 27, 1912.—(Through the British Consulate to the British Minister.)

(Translation.)

YOUR Excellency is aware that in the past few years, although a number of intriguers apparently asked for a constitution their sole object was to cause sedition, the consequences of which have upset the country and brought about great bloodshed. Nothing is left for the inhabitants, and their patience can endure no longer. It is evident that a country without a King is like a body without life, and so the only comfort for the general population of Persia is to bring back the Shah.

We, the clerics, merchants, officials, and inhabitants (of Zenjan) from the first understood the case and never wished to depose our Sovereign, and we expressed our opinion to this effect, and waited till it should become clear to everybody. At present there is no remedy for the benefit of the country except to bring back the Shah, "a kind father for all Persians," to his ancestral Throne.

We are but human beings, and do not expect that the great Powers should tolerate more suffering and humiliation on our account, and we hope that His Imperial Majesty will in a neighbourly way help our Sovereign Mohammed Ali Shah in person and direct his kind attention to relieve our distress.

(Signed by sixty mullahs, merchants, and others of Zenjan.)

No. 395.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 7th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, reporting the attack made on the town on the 5th October by Yar Mohammed Khan and his defeat and death.

I also enclose copy of a previous despatch from Mr. McDouall, describing the events immediately preceding Yar Mohammed's attack.

I have, &c.

WAITER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 395.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, September 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in spite of strong telegrams from Tehran, the army went to Assadabad, but has telegraphed this afternoon to the ulema that they will be here in three days. Salar-ed-Dowleh telegraphed to me that he was leaving on the 27th September for Kermanshah, and to-day it is reported that Yar Mohammed with a force has arrived at Kamiaran, about 35 miles from here. Farman Farma with the small force at his disposal may take "bast," but if the town is attacked and he resists, it will again be pillaged.

He has repeatedly spoken to me and to my Russian colleague of the necessity of Government supplying him with funds to raise a local force, saying that local levies

will fight for him if paid regularly. It is certain that unless well paid the tribes would not fight for him, and it is doubtful if they would in any case as long as he has no outside forces, such as Bakhtiari. The 150 Cossacks he has are not reliable; his defeat near Hamadan, it appears, was due to their cowardice or worse. Salar-ed-Dowleh always asserted that the Cossacks would not fight against him.

On the 26th, as reported by telegraph, the townspeople crowded to the British and Russian consulates and presented a petition, which is enclosed, with translation. Ulemas, princes, traders, and mechanics are all represented. There is no doubt that this action was originally instigated by Farman Farma, but was only taken after many meetings and all swearing to act together. The people undoubtedly have cause to complain. There are a certain number who are partisans of Salar-ed-Dowleh and the Government respectively, but the majority only ask for security to carry on their occupations. The town was looted by Salar-ed-Dowleh's savages in February, and the villages have been looted by both parties. Heavy sums were exacted by Salar and smaller sums by Farman Farma. The people say that their property has gone, and that there is no security to try and recover what is left, or cultivate their lands. Only honour remains, and their wives and families are in danger if either side storm the town. They are prepared to submit to whoever has Tehran, but meantime ask to be allowed to be neutral. Farman Farma has orders to hold the town. I believe, till the army arrives, that he has only enough men to hold the citadel. I conveyed to Samsam-el-Mamalek Sanjabi that now was the time to show his loyalty, as the Government has the support of the two Powers. He has come in with his sons and sowars, Sanjabi and Guran. If he is satisfied that the townspeople will not attack him in the rear, I believe he may be able to save the situation, but their faith is doubtful. This morning a deputation waited on me, begging that the consuls would send to the Salar asking him not to fight in the town. They also asked for protection for their families. After consulting my Russian colleague, we replied that we could only protect those in "bast" in the consulates, but not their families and property in town. We have written to Farman Farma and to Salar, or commander of his forces, that if they fight in town they will be responsible for all damage to foreign property.

September 29.—Farman Farma has replied that the army leaves Assadabad to-day for Kermanshah, and that on his return he will order them to go out to attack the rebels and do what is possible to avoid fighting in town, but that, if unexpectedly attacked, he must defend the citadel.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 395.

Petition of Bastis to British and Russian Consuls.

(Translation.)

WE, the undersigned people of Kermanshah, each one represents one community, and it is a long time that we are not masters of our lives, property, good name, and honour. Everyone from every side attacks this one handful of earth. Except killing and plunder, it has in the end no other result for the unfortunate people of Kermanshah, and especially in these days we see that our honour, lives, and property are really in danger. Therefore we are compelled to take refuge in the consulate. We beg you, the representative of a Great Power, neighbour to us unfortunates, to obtain, in whatever way you know, safety of life, honour, and good name, for we can endure no more, and until you give us security of life, property, and good name, we will not leave the consulate. Our request is that the Government troops for war and the troops of Salar-ed-Dowleh do not enter the town, but fight outside.

SULTAN-EL-ULEMA.
 AGA MAHOMED MEHDI.
 AGA SHEIKH HADI.
 AGA RAHIM.
 IMAM JUMA.
 AGA SHEMS-ED-DIN.
 AGA ABUL HASSAN.
 HAJI AGA WALI.
 SHUJA-EL-ULEMA.
 ZAHIR-EL-ULEMA.
 AGA MAHOMED SADIK.
 NAIB SADR.

Following princes and khans :—

MIN-EL-MAMALEK.
 SARDAR IJLAL.
 MUTAZID-ED-DOWLEH.
 SARDAR ASHRAF.
 SAMSAM-ES-SULTAN.
 AKRAM-ED-DOWLEH.
 AMIR MUKTADIR.
 MUTAZID-ES-SULTAN.
 NAZR-ED-DIWAN.
 ABDUL HASSAN KHAN.
 MANSUR-ED-DIWAN.
 UKU-ES-SULTAN.
 HAJI HASSAN KHAN KALANTAR.
 KULI KHAN.
 ASSAD-ED-DOWLEH.

(And many others.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 395.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, October 6, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the rebels under Yar Mohammed Khan Mujahed attacked the town at 2.30 A.M. on the 5th October. Farman Farma held the Government buildings and the Bakhtiari and Sinjabi held Chia Surkh, a hill suburb inhabited by Kurds, with two guns. About 9 A.M. Yar Mohammed, who had advanced to near the square in front of the Government buildings, fell dead, shot through the head. The Kalhurs, of whom there were about fifty with him, at once fled and rode into the consulate asking for asylum. I told them that I could give them no promise of safety, and they left, with the exception of three wounded and five mujahed. The latter only asked to be given to their own officers. Among them was the democrat agent, Kerim Aga; he said he had nothing to do with the fighting, but was with them to try and make peace. I allowed him to remain on the understanding that if he were proved to have taken part in the fighting I could do nothing for him.

The rebels gradually fled, but there was firing at intervals until late in the afternoon. About noon, about 200 Kurds, chiefly of Juanrud, came into the consulate grounds, and the Government troops fired at them with rifle and Maxim, many shots striking the escort quarters, which are 200 yards from the house. I knew nothing of this, it not being safe to go to the escort quarters, till my munshi arrived with a message from the Farman Farma that a number of rebels were in my grounds, and that he would guarantee the safety of their lives if I disarmed them. I went down and admitted them to the stables, where they surrendered their arms. Some had only clubs. They are to be sent with an escort by Farman Farma in the direction of their own country. They ask to be seen safe past the Sanjabi country. This is now being arranged by the karguzar, and I expect them to leave this evening. The wounded, of whom there are a dozen, will be taken to the Farman Farma's hospital. I am also in communication with the mujaheds and Bakhtiari; as to the mujaheds, it seems to be accepted that most of them would have deserted Yar Mohammed had they had a chance. Hussein Kuli Khan, Yar Mohammed's second in command, appears to have got away with his men. It is said that about 200 out of 700 Kurdistanis were killed. After the dead are buried, a proper estimate may be available. After the defeat of the rebels a party of Kalhurs were advancing from Mahidasht to join them, and were met and driven back by the Bakhtiari.

It is generally believed that the death of Yar Mohammed is the final blow to Salar-ed-Dowleh's rebellion.

I have, &c.
 W. McDOUALL.

No. 396.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith translation of the reply which I have received from the Persian Government to my note of the 20th September, enumerating the measures taken by them to obtain reparation for the attacks on the consular escort in December last, and giving assurances respecting the arrangements for the comfort of His Majesty's troops at Shiraz.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

 Enclosure in No. 396.
Ala-es-Sultaneh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

October 17, 1912.

I HAVE communicated to the Imperial Persian Government the contents of your Excellency's note of the 20th September last, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the pleasure with which it was received, and of the confidence the Persian Government have always had in the friendship and good-will of His Britannic Majesty's Government. I have, at the same time, to point out to your Excellency that the Persian Government have considered worthy of deep consideration the contents of Sir George Barclay's note of the 4th April last, and that the adequate measures taken by them have met with success, to wit, the dispatch of a conciliatory telegram by the great Ulema, the prevention of agitation by certain people, the sending of the Governor-General to Fars, and the affording him the necessary support. The only question that now remains unsettled is that of the perpetrators of the regrettable incident of the attack on Mr. Smart. In spite of the verbal assurances given by Sir George Barclay that after the acceptance by the Persian Government of the demand for the payment of 4,744*l.* the question would not be pursued,* the Persian Government have decided that the offenders should be punished, and they have given special instructions to the Governor-General of Fars in the matter, and they hope that after the arrival of his Excellency at Shiraz, and after the preliminary measures which are essential, he will succeed in his task.

With regard to the consular guards at Shiraz, and the detachment proceeding thither from Ispahan, the Governor-General has been requested to assist in the matter, and to make arrangements for their comfort.

I avail, &c.

MOHAMMED ALI, ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

 No. 397.
Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 23, 1912.

AS you have been made aware in previous telegrams and despatches, Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces suffered a defeat at Kermanshah on the 5th instant, at which his new-found ally, the democrat Yar Mohammed Khan, lost his life. The Prince who was not in the firing line at once fled towards Kurdistan, and it was said owed his safe escape to a fortuitous accident which delayed the Government forces at Hamadan from sallying out to cut off his retreat. The troops left at Hamadan consisted for the most part of Armenian mujaheds under Kerri Khan. At the moment when they were about to start in pursuit of Salar-ed-Dowleh news was received that an Armenian ex-deputy, named Mirza Yanz, had been arrested at Kazvin on his way back to Tehran from a special mission to the army of Farman Farma. Suspecting treachery, the Armenians under Kerri at once refused to march. When the news arrived that Mirza Yanz had been released upon receipt of instructions from

* See Sir W. Townley's observations on this point in his despatch of July 10, 1912 (No. 229).

Tehran the chance of capturing Salar had been missed, and the Prince was already beyond their reach.

The fugitive apparently first fled towards Kurdistan as far as Guerous, where all trace of him was lost. Suddenly it was rumoured that he was at Sirab on the road between Hamadan and Kazvin, and conjecture was rife as to his intentions. Many people believed that he was seeking "bast" at the Russian consulate at Kazvin; others had it that he was about to attack that town at the head of a considerable force. An unconfirmed rumour then reported him on the Zenjan road, but his movements were shrouded in mystery until it was suddenly announced that he had been seen at Hessarek, about 35 miles from Tehran, on the night of the 16th instant. Preparations were at once hastily made to defend the town against a hostile attack, as no one had any definite information as to the strength of his following. Permission was given to the Russian officers attached to the Cossack brigade to assist in the defence of the town, for which object they co-operated with the gendarmes under Swedish officers and with the Bakhtiari horsemen.

No definite information could be obtained either of the Prince's whereabouts or of the number of his men for three days, until the news was sent in by a party of Bakhtiari on their way to Kazvin that he was in full retreat towards the mountains in the direction of Mazanderan, and that his force did not number more than 280 men in all. At once hasty preparations were made to send a mixed force of cavalry in pursuit, but so far nothing has been done, and the latest news is to the effect that he has passed into the mountains to the north-east of the town, and that he has a following of a thousand, a figure that is clearly an exaggeration. Nobody appears to know what his object was in coming so near to Tehran, nor are his plans for the future understood. It would appear to be generally believed that he will make for Asterabad and the Turkoman country.

Salar-ed-Dowleh's near approach to the capital and the inexplicable apathy of the Government provoked much comment, and there was a certain amount of public anxiety, as people argued that he would never have approached so near, had he not felt confident that there would be a movement in the town in his favour. The democrats and mujaheds were the parties suspected of being in sympathy with him. The Government were a little anxious for a day or two, as they are well aware of their own unpopularity, and feared lest the malcontents might seize the opportunity to make mischief. I have caused careful enquiry to be made, and have come to the conclusion that there is no party in the town in favour of Salar's pretensions.

My Russian colleague judged the situation sufficiently serious when the news of Salar's near approach was first known to justify him in instructing the general at Kazvin to hold himself in readiness to march on Tehran, should disorders break out. In answering M. Poklewsky's letter in which he informed me that he had taken this step, I expressed my concurrence in his action as a precautionary measure, but I added that I did not personally anticipate any disorders, since I had been unable to discover that the Prince had any serious number of sympathisers in the town.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 398.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 5th November.

I propose to authorise Sir W. Townley to advance to the Persian Government, for the use of the Governor-General, by instalments sufficient funds up to 6,000*l.* a month to enable him to maintain the administration. You should inform M. Sazonof, and express the hope that he will see no objection, as his Excellency raised no opposition in similar circumstances a few weeks since.

It is absolutely necessary for us to do all in our power to assist the Persian Government to restore order in the south.

No. 399.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 8, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 7th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had no objection to your advancing the proposed funds.

No. 400.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 9, 1912.

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH arrived Tehran to-day.

No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 5th November.

You are authorised to advance sums up to 6,000*l.* a-month out of the 15,000*l.* which you have in hand for expenses of Governor-General's administration. The expenditure should be carefully controlled so as to ensure its going to the right objects.

No. 402.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 12, 1912.

BULLOCK'S native orderly, sepoy Gulab Khan, 27th Punjabis, died in hospital, Ispahan, of heart failure following pneumonia and peritonitis, result of gun-shot wound and subsequent exposure. Submit for approval we should claim 1,000*l.* compensation Persian Government as in case of sowars killed when travelling with Bill, April 1910; this would be apart from any other claim on behalf of Lieutenant Bullock.

No. 403.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 11th November.

In accordance with instructions contained in your telegram of 26th August, and on the request of the treasurer-general, I instructed the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia on 24th October to pay remainder of the advance of 25,000*l.* into the account of the treasurer-general, the Russian advance having been made previously. I made it clear that this money was to be for the use of the gendarmerie in south.

No. 404.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 13, 1912.

ACCORDING to a report from the British agent at Astrabad, Salar-ed-Dowleh is at Kojeh Nefas. He is said to have 1,000 men with him, and to have dispatched a force of horsemen in the direction of Shahrud.

No. 405.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

I APPROVE the proposal in your telegram of yesterday as regards compensation for death of Lieutenant Bullock's orderly.

No. 406.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 12th November: Advance to Governor-General of Shiraz. Has the whole of the money been spent, or is any of it still available?

No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

YOUR Excellency should point out to M. Sazonof that Persian Government cannot collect taxes until they have the money necessary to restore order, while financiers are unwilling to lend money without security that the taxes will be collected. It appears to me that this *impasse* can only be avoided by the British and Russian Governments guaranteeing a certain sum to be used for establishing order and assuring the collection of taxes by means of a gendarmerie or other efficient force under the command of foreign officers, such sum not to exceed 1,000,000*l.*

Please ask M. Sazonof whether the Russian Government would be prepared to guarantee one-half of this sum. If so, His Majesty's Government will consider guaranteeing the other half, subject to such conditions as may appear expedient.

Perhaps the best course would be for financiers to lend money on the security of the Persian Crown jewels, as it is required. In this event the guarantee of the two Governments would, in practice, only entail the liability to secure that these jewels were available in case of default.

No. 408.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 14, 1912.

M. SAZONOF promises to consider carefully the proposal contained in your telegram of yesterday in consultation with the Minister of Finance. His Excellency was not very favourable to it at first, so I supported it with all the arguments at my disposal.

No. 409.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 16, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 13th November: Advance to Governor-General of Shiraz.

All the money has been paid over to treasurer-general, and what has not been actually spent has been allocated for southern gendarmerie, which is sadly in need of funds. Swedish colonel is constantly threatening that he will not be able to carry out his programme unless the treasurer-general can guarantee greater regularity in his monthly payments to the gendarmerie.

No. 410.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 17, 1912.

MY telegram of 13th November.

Persian Government confirm report that is current that Salar-ed-Dowleh has been totally defeated near Shahrud by loyalist forces under Amir Azam. Prince escaped.

No. 411.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 17, 1912.

M. POKLEWSKY and I had an interview yesterday with Saad-ed-Dowleh, who gave us the names of certain men who, if they could be persuaded to accept office, would, in his opinion, form a strong and representative Ministry under him.

Saad-ed-Dowleh is apparently in favour of summoning a Medjliss in due course. He proposes to institute a *Conseil d'État*, which would consist of about thirty members, and would represent the Government half of the Senate which he proposes to create when the Medjliss is convoked.

The present Prime Minister, accompanied by the Minister of War, came to see me, as representing the whole Bakhtiari tribe, to discuss the situation. They gave me to understand that, provided assurances were given that hostility would not be shown to their tribe nor the Bakhtiari governors dismissed, the Prime Minister would be prepared to resign on receipt of a friendly intimation from M. Poklewsky and myself that a Ministry had been arranged by Saad which inspired us with confidence.

No. 412.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 17, 1912.

YOUR telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of the 13th November.

At my interview with Saad-ed-Dowleh, reported in my preceding telegram of to-day, he called my attention to the necessity of Persia being supplied with funds. As regards the 150,000*l.* which he understood was to be advanced as soon as the concession for the Julfa Railway was signed, he thought this sum would be insufficient to enable a Persian Government to restore order, and he said it was useless for him to form a Ministry with this object unless the necessary financial assistance was given to him. His brother had, he said, stayed in Europe in order to ascertain what chance there was of raising a loan, but if the British and Russian Governments could not make a substantial advance on such a loan without delay his own task would be hopeless.

We suggested to Saad-ed-Dowleh that he should obtain from M. Mornard, and communicate to us, a statement indicating what amount was immediately required by the administration; we would then refer the question to our respective Governments.

I took the opportunity to impress on Saad-ed-Dowleh, with the loyal support of the Russian Minister, that His Majesty's Government expected the Persian Government to grant the concession for the railway between Mohammerah and Khoremabad at the same time as that for the Julfa Railway, pointing out that the present Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me repeated assurances that this would be done. Saad-ed-Dowleh replied that he was well aware that this undertaking had been given.

No. 413.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 26, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I instructed the Imperial Bank of Persia on the 24th instant to hold the sum of 15,000*l.*, the balance of the 25,000*l.* recently

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advanced to the Persian Government by His Majesty's Government, at the disposal of the treasurer-general.

In conveying this information to M. Mornard, I stated that I was only authorised by His Majesty's Government to make this fresh advance on condition that the money was spent on the requirements of the gendarmerie at present in the province of Fars, or which it was intended, under the scheme drawn up by Colonel Hjalmarson, to send to that province in the spring.

I also informed Colonel Hjalmarson of the fresh advance which was being made and of the manner in which it was to be expended.

M. Mornard assured me in reply that the money would be spent in the manner desired.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same day, informing his Highness that I was placing this further sum of 15,000*l.* at M. Mornard's disposal.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 413.

Sir W. Townley to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Highness,

Tehran, October 24, 1912.

WITH reference to my note of the 8th. August and to your Highness's reply of the 12th August upon the subject of the sum of 10,000*l.* which I had been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to advance to the Persian Government for the special immediate requirements of the province of Fars, I have the honour to inform your Highness that I have to-day instructed the Imperial Bank of Persia to hold the further sum of 15,000*l.* at the disposal of the treasurer-general of Persia.

This latter amount is the remainder of the advance of 25,000*l.* which His Majesty's Government recently consented to make to the Imperial Government.

In informing M. Mornard that this sum is at his disposal, I have added that I am only authorised by my Government to make the advance on condition that the money is utilised for the needs of the gendarmerie which has already been sent to the province of Fars, or which it is intended, under the scheme drawn up by Colonel Hjalmarson, to send to that province in the spring.

I have the honour to advise your Highness, for the information of the proper authorities of the Imperial Government, that this advance of 15,000*l.* is held to be secured upon the revenues of the southern customs in the same manner and at the same rate of interest as the 10,000*l.* advanced in August, and as the advance made to the Imperial Government last March by the Government of His Majesty.

I avail, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 414.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 414.

Summary of Events for the Month of October.

Tehran.

THE Cabinet.—Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet continues to carry on the Government, but it is well known that a change is imminent, as Saad-ed-Dowleh has been

invited by the Premier to come to Tehran. The Premier telegraphed to Saad-ed-Dowleh on the 20th October and received his reply on the 22nd.

Salar-ed-Dowleh.—As reported fully in a separate despatch, Salar-ed-Dowleh came to within 30 miles of Tehran with a small force on the 18th October. For a day or two it was thought he intended to attack the city, and preparations for defence were hastily made. Salar-ed-Dowleh, however, made his way to Shahrstanek, in the mountains north of Tebran, and remained there on the 22nd and 23rd October. He then proceeded in a northerly direction towards Mazandaran. No serious attempt was made by the Government to pursue him till the 27th and 28th October, when a small force composed of about 300 Bakhtiari, 100 Ossanlou horsemen, and 50 Cossacks, with two mountain guns, were dispatched against him. A certain Hayder Kuli Khan took refuge at the legation on the 25th October, and it is thought that he was one of Salar-ed-Dowleh's followers, though he himself denies it.

Political Prisoners.—The political prisoners mentioned in the May summary were brought back to Tehran from Kum on the 19th October, and are now in custody at Bagh-i-Shah. They include Sardar Mohy, his brothers, and Suleiman Mirza, the leader of the Democratic party.

Elections for the Medjliss.—The committee referred to in the September summary subsequently declared that, in their opinion, the question of considering whether it would be desirable to modify the electoral law should be referred to a more representative body. A larger committee was thereupon formed, consisting of about fifty-four members of all classes elected by the people themselves. Sardar Assad was elected to the chair, and several meetings were held in October. By a vote of the majority it was decided that the electoral law passed by the last Medjliss could not, under present circumstances, be carried out. A sub-committee was then formed to elaborate a new electoral law, and is now occupied in drawing it up.

Tabriz.

As the operations against the Shahsevans are, for the time being, in abeyance, the Russians have withdrawn a large portion of their field force from the Ardebil district. Some of the troops have returned to Russia, and some have been transferred to the Urmia district.

Meshed.

With the exception of the road from Meshed to Askabad, which is guarded by Russian posts, practically all the roads in Khorassan have been closed to traffic throughout the past month.

The Turkomans, reported in last month's summary as raiding in the neighbourhood of Shahrud, have lately been joined by other parties of the tribe, and their number is now estimated at about 1,000. The road to Tehran is closed, and posts are being forwarded via Russia.

Ispahan.

There has been some slight improvement of late in the condition of the main roads in the province, but several parties of robbers are reported in the outlying districts.

The town has, as a rule, remained quiet, but there has been occasional firing at night time. On the night of the 6th-7th October, sharp firing broke out in various quarters of the town owing to the presence of an armed party of burglars, and, as some shots passed close to the British hospital, His Majesty's consul-general was compelled to address a warning to the local authorities.

"A" squadron of the Central India Horse left for Shiraz on the 5th October.

Yezd.

Assadullah Mirza, the late governor, left Yezd for Tehran on the 9th October after handing over charge to the deputy governor. Naib Hussein and his son Mashallah, however, who, with a following of 500 sowars, had arrived at Yezd on the 4th October, took over the governorship of the town on Assadullah Mirza's departure, and directed their followers at Kum and at Kashan to join them at Yezd, with the avowed intention of resisting the new governor by force.

On the 25th, on the receipt of a telegram from Tehran announcing the appointment of Sardar-i-Fatteh, Bakhtiari, as governor, Mashallah refused to recognise the

authority of the Central Government, and commenced making preparations to oppose Sardar-i-Fatteh on his arrival. He liberated and armed the prisoners in the jails, summoned into the town several bad characters from the neighbouring villages, and gave out his intention of looting the Imperial Bank, the British vice-consulate, and the Russian consular agency.

The town was completely at his mercy, and several merchants and others took refuge in the vice-consulate. However, on pressure being brought to bear by various authorities, he became more reasonable, and left Yezd on the 29th October.

Sardar-i-Fatteh left Ispahan for Yezd on the 25th October with a force of 200 sowars and two guns.

Mr. Lemon, of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, was robbed by a party of Boir Ahmedis, on the road near Nain, on the 27th October. The tofangchis, acting as his escort, made no attempt at resistance when attacked.

Shiraz.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, the new Governor-General of Fars, arrived at Shiraz on the 16th October.

There have been dissensions among the Kashgais for some time past, and Soulet-es-Sultaneh, with the assistance of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and of some of the smaller tribes, has brought about the resignation of Sardar Ehtesham, the former ilkhani of the tribe.

A party, consisting of a few Europeans and some invalided followers of the Central India Horse, left Shiraz for Bushire on the 24th October under a guarantee for its safe conduct given by Mukhber-es-Sultaneh.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Mufakham, the new Governor-General of the province, arrived at Kerman on the 30th September. Since his arrival the town and environs have remained quiet, and the road to Yezd, along which Bakhtiari guards have been posted, has been opened to traffic.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh and Yar Mohammed, with a force of about 1,000 men, reached Mian Darband, 35 miles from Kermanshah, on the 3rd October, and, in response to a joint communication from the British and Russian consuls requesting that fighting should not take place in the town, agreed to halt for two days so as to enable Farman Farma to move out of Kermanshah and advance against them.

Farman Farma gave orders for his troops to leave on the morning of the 6th; but at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 5th October Yar Mohammed with 400 followers commenced an attack on the town. By 10 A.M. he had penetrated some way into the bazaars, when a sortie was made by a party of Government troops from the Ark. In the fighting which ensued Yar Mohammed was killed, and his followers, apparently losing heart, broke and fled, pursued by the Bakhtiari and mujahedin.

In the engagement the rebels lost some twenty-five men killed and wounded and eighty prisoners.

Salar-ed-Dowleh, who took no active part in the fighting, managed to evade the Government troops, and left the Kermanshah district with some 250 followers. His further movements are reported in this summary under the heading "Tehran."

No. 415.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 29, 1912.

THE Central Government have been looking for some time for a suitable candidate to send to Yezd as governor. They eventually decided to appoint a Bakhtiari, Sardar-i-Fatteh, temporarily, pending the arrival of another Bakhtiari, Amir Mujahed, who is now acting as Governor of Behbahan, where his presence is required.

In the meantime, however, the notorious ex-outlaw, Naib Hussein, proceeded to Yezd with his son, Mashallah, and some 500 sowars. All the power apparently fell into their hands, and they prepared to resist any governor who might be appointed; they levied revenue and proceeded to repair the forts.

Matters came to a head about the 24th instant, on the receipt of the news of the appointment of Sardar-i-Fatteh. Mashallah released the contents of the prisons, who marched about the town fully armed, terrorising the Parsees and the townspeople. He was also reported to have threatened to murder the British vice-consul, the Russian agent, and the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and to loot all the European establishments, his object partly being, it was alleged, to embroil the Persian Government with foreign Governments.

The whole town seems to have been in a complete turmoil, and a large crowd of merchants and others, under the leadership of the principal priests, moved about seeking sanctuary at the British vice-consulate and the Indo-European Telegraph Department's station. Suggestions were put forward from all sides that the Persian Government should be approached with a view to recognising Mashallah as governor, thereby saving the town from the horrors anticipated from a refusal to do so.

It appeared to me, however, after careful deliberation, that Mashallah was playing a bold game, and that he had been scattering his wild threats broadcast with a view to obtaining official support for his demand to be appointed governor. While fully realising the gravity of the situation, of which I kept the Persian Government informed, I could not see my way to advancing the candidature of a rebel outlaw to the governorship of a province without bringing discredit on His Majesty's Government.

After consulting with my Russian colleague, I therefore instructed the British vice-consul to see Mashallah, in the absence of any constituted authority, and to inform him that, as he had taken forcible possession of Yezd, the Russian Minister and myself would hold him personally responsible for the lives and property of foreigners in Yezd, pending the arrival of the new governor. I added that Mr. Blackman should invite the Russian agent to accompany him.

These representations appear to have achieved their object, for, as I had the honour to inform you in my telegram of the 28th October, Mashallah became reasonable and decided to quit Yezd, telegraphing at the same time some excuses to the Minister of the Interior for his behaviour.

Sardar-i-Fatteh, the Bakhtiari governor, left his camp at Ispahan on the 26th October for his post, accompanied by 200 sowars, two guns, and ten gunners.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 416.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a telegram which I have received from the acting British consul at Shiraz, reporting upon a programme concerning the financial arrangements which the Governor-General considers necessary in order that he may be able to carry out the administration of the province in a proper manner.

I have discussed the contents of Mr. Smart's telegram with the treasurer-general, who professed his readiness to meet Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's wishes as far as it may be possible for him to do so. M. Mornard stated that he is quite ready to fall in with the views contained in the first clause, provided that he is advised of the steps that have been taken. He took the occasion to inform me that he had recently strengthened the staff of his representative at Shiraz by the dispatch of a competent Persian from here, and that he intends to send M. Stas from Kerman to Shiraz as his European agent at an early date.

As to the second clause, M. Mornard said that he would do his best to meet Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's wants, but he called attention to the present national penury and pointed out that 30,000 tomans (6,000*l.*) seems to be a sort of stock figure for the monthly requirements of provincial governors. The treasurer-general said that with the best will in the world the Central Government could not finance all the provincial administrations, that ought in normal times to remit considerable sums to the Imperial Treasury instead of being a charge on the national resources. He promised all the same to endeavour to make an arrangement with the Imperial Bank, pledging the revenues of Shiraz as security, and arranging that all the revenue of the province should be paid into the bank at Shiraz.

M. Mornard pointed out that, in his opinion, it was doubtful policy to encourage

provincial governors in a belief that they could count upon the Central Government to make good any shortage on their monthly budgets. Such a knowledge, he thought, encouraged the governors to show leniency to recalcitrant tribes in the matter of collecting revenue from them rather than risk a conflict, thus securing for themselves at the expense of the Government the reputation of having maintained order in the province under their jurisdiction. He thought that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh probably knew at present very little about the possibilities of the province for revenue purposes, and said that he himself would not be in possession of any reliable information upon this point until his European agent, named above, had arrived and had had time to examine the situation closely.

I called M. Mornard's special attention to the third clause of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's desiderata, and reminded him that His Majesty's Government, as he is well aware, attach great importance to the successful development of the gendarmerie scheme, more especially in so far as the southern trade routes are concerned. Whilst on this subject I would beg, Sir, to recall to your recollection my telegram of the 22nd instant, in which I reported that I had learned from Mr. Smart that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh had dispatched a force of gendarmes and local tofangchis to take possession of the road from Zergan to Kazerun, that is to say, from two stages north of Shiraz to the latter place. I have ascertained from Colonel Hjalmarson that he only sanctioned this expedition after he had ascertained from the officer in command of the detachment at Shiraz that the Governor-General had received such assurances from the tribal chiefs located on this portion of the road as justified him in entertaining the belief that a start could be made without undue risk. The colonel added that he had ordered one Swedish officer to accompany the Zergan force and two to proceed to Kazerun, leaving only Major Siefert in charge at Shiraz, that officer being detained there because he has not yet recovered from the wound received during the unfortunate encounter with Soulet-ed-Dowleh's men on the 5th August last.

It is almost impossible to be sanguine about the result of what appears at first sight to be a daring move on the part of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, but his Excellency impressed me as such a cautious man that I cannot help entertaining some hope that he has good ground for placing confidence in the assurances given him by men who would appear from recent correspondence to have been in no small measure responsible for the disturbances that have caused so much trouble in the immediate past. You will notice, Sir, from Mr. Smart's accompanying telegram that he also has some misgivings, as is not unnatural, as to the ultimate success of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's plans. It is, I think, of good augury that his Excellency has, after his arrival at Shiraz, expressed a desire that Kawam-ul-Mulk will remain there, as he is hopeful that his presence and advice may be helpful to him. He has also invited Soulet-ed-Dowleh to Shiraz, and proposes to postpone the appointment of a new ilkhani to succeed Sardar Ehtesham, who has resigned, until after the winter, when he will have had more time to consider the claims of the rival candidates, in the hope of making a selection that will please all parties.

It will be seen, Sir, that Mr. Smart considers that Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has a difficult task, and that our strong support would appear to be his only chance of success. Financial assistance seems to be clearly indicated as expected, if not anticipated. On this point I failed to get any definite pronouncement from Mukhber-es-Sultaneh himself before he left Tehran, but I discussed the question with the treasurer-general yesterday in order, if possible, to ascertain how this could best be done without wounding the very sensitive susceptibilities of the Persian Government. M. Mornard was of opinion that some such scheme as that suggested earlier in this despatch with the Imperial Bank would be the best course to adopt, and, if the idea commended itself to His Majesty's Government, some arrangement could, perhaps, be come to with the directors in London by which Mukhber could be financed and the revenues of Shiraz given as a security. It should, I think, nominally at all events be done through the auspices of the treasurer-general, whose agent, who will be a Belgian, should have a controlling voice in the expenditure.

If the Governor-General is successful, the revenues that it will be found possible to collect should more than suffice to meet the requirements of the administration, and in a year, or possibly a few months, his Excellency should be able to find without difficulty sufficient revenue for the wants of the province.

Mr. Smart does not mention that there is immediate want of money, but it is more than probable that the Governor-General will be asking for funds very soon and there will be no money available in the Treasury unless the recent advance of 25,000*l.* is increased to one of 100,000*l.* The Persian Government anticipate that this

will be done, if the Julfa-Tabriz Railway concession is granted, and it seems not unlikely that their resistance to this scheme may be overcome at no distant date.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 416.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, October 27, 1912.

THE Governor-General's plan for holding the road from Zergan to Kazerun with gendarmes and local riflemen under the gendarmerie has been explained to the Persian Government by his Excellency by telegraph. He has also telegraphed explaining his plan for preparing a regular army for the radical treatment in the spring of the tribal and road situations; the army is to consist of about 1,800 men.

He considers the following conditions essential for the successful execution of his plans:—

1. Treasurer-general's agent at Shiraz to be authorised to settle, with the approval of the Governor-General and without reference to Tehran, the questions of the maliat of the past years and present year as regards remissions for tribal appropriations and on other grounds of equity and expediency. The Governor-General makes a point of there being no reference to Tehran, as such reference causes delays and even evokes vetos from the Tehran authorities, who do not properly understand the local situation, the result being that it is often impossible to collect even the little maliat available.
2. Credit to be opened at the Imperial Bank of Persia of 30,000 tomans (6,000L., about) a-month. The Governor-General to be allowed to draw freely on this credit, presenting detailed account of expenditure drafts to treasurer-general's agent at Shiraz. All the maliat collected to be paid into the Imperial Bank of Persia for repayment of such drafts, the Persian Government making up shortages. The Governor-General hopes that with the increase in the maliat collected as order is gradually restored, the monthly shortage will in less than a year disappear.
3. The expenses of the present force of gendarmerie and of subsequently increased numbers to be paid regularly by the Central Government at Tehran.

The acceptance of the first demand might, it is true, lead to irregularity, but I venture to support it and also the third demand as such irregularity would be of little importance to the Treasury, which has long received no money from the Government of Fars.

As regards the second demand, I am afraid that much of the money would be wasted unless there were some European control. It is not unlikely that the Governor-General will fail in his mission even if supplied with money. His Excellency evidently expects us to lend the money required. As regards the monthly shortage, I cannot say how large it is likely to be or when it might disappear.

The Governor-General's only chance seems to lie in our strong support, and it must be owned his task seems almost hopeless in any case.

His Excellency urges the importance of prompt arrangement in order that there may be no delay in beginning to carry out his plans.

I venture to recommend the second demand to your favourable consideration, with its implication that we should lend the money required, but I think it necessary at the same time to draw attention to the attendant disadvantages indicated above.

No. 417.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 30, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 25th September, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from the acting British consul at Shiraz, transmitting copy of correspondence exchanged between himself and the rebel, Soulet-ed-Dowleh, the result of which was that about one-half of the effects plundered from a caravan for the Central India Horse was recovered.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 417.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley,

Sir,

Shiraz, September 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of correspondence between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and myself. Before dispatching my letter, I communicated the draft to the local authorities, explaining to them that their impotence to recover the goods in the hands of the Surkhis compelled me to refer direct to Soulet-ed-Dowleh. The local authorities acquiesced in my view of the case. As a result of my representations, Hassan Khan, Soulet's lieutenant in Siakh, recovered and sent to me about half the effects plundered from the caravan for the Central India Horse.

I have endeavoured in translation to simplify the confused style of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's letters sufficiently to render them intelligible. I am at a loss to understand his references to forces sent against him. No force was sent against him until he himself took the initiative in hostilities. It is not clear whether his remarks regarding the evils of bringing tribesmen into town refer to his friend Nizam-es-Sultaneh or to his enemy Kawam-ul-Mulk.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

Enclosure 2 in No. 417.

Soulet-ed-Dowleh to Acting Consul Smart.

(After compliments.)

[*Undated.*]

AFTER Kawam-ul-Mulk had incited to seizure of all my property in the highlands, I, in order not to give him an opening for his evil intentions, refrained from taking back my lands and passed my time in retirement. Kawam-ul-Mulk, seeing me quiet, did not content himself with plundering my possessions. Some time ago he sent a large force to plunder and kill those tribesmen who had not left me and had not gone to the highlands. Since God protects the innocent, this force was defeated and fled. And as has been seen, he sent rascals among his dependents, Arabs, robbers, band by band, to plunder the unfortunate people everywhere. Therefore, by means of this letter, I inform the consulate that, with this state of affairs, in order to put a stop to the prejudicial measures of Kawam-ul-Mulk, and in order to maintain security and protect merchants and caravans, I am ready to take steps that, in every way, merchants and the unfortunate people may gain tranquillity. Of course, you will send a copy of this statement to the centre in order that, if you wish it, action may be taken according to the conditions and method exposed in this statement. Please give me always good news of your health, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 417.

Soulet-ed-Dowleh to Acting Consul Smart.

(After compliments.)

August 30, 1912.

IT is the duty of every Persian generally, and of this servant of the Government and people especially, to bring this point to the notice of the officials of the British Government, who profess friendship and concord for Persia, and especially to you, who have been presented to the Persian Government as representative for Fars and the South [*sic*]. If the intention of His Majesty the Emperor and his officials is to make this free tract of Southern Persia part of the British possessions, there is no better method than the present one, namely, that they should decide to help a traitor and drive away and weaken a servant of the two Governments (British and Persian). If their object is other than this, and if they wish their merchandise to be conveyed in safety, this method is not a good one. The chief object of the civilised world is the increase of commerce. Therefore, it would seem contrary to the dictates of experience, nature, and intelligence to destroy at the instigation of ignorant traitors and false friends, a person who has given proof of complete friendship and service, a person from whom they ought to demand every kind of service, whom they ought to support strongly, and to support a man who cannot protect foreign and native merchandise, nay, cannot even protect himself. When I had the Bushire road and nominally

received 1,000 tomans a-month, did not merchandise arrive safely and without damage? Was not the hire of 100 mans 17 tomans? Did not the muleteers arrive at the appointed time? In spite of all this my services were not recognised, and they treated me harshly. As far as possible I restrained the Kashgais and other tribes. What then has happened that they should endeavour to weaken this power (*i.e.*, myself)? It is natural that when wild tribes see no restraining power before them, and see that the Governor for the time being helps them and brings them into town and instigates disorders in Shiraz, the plundering of merchandise in the bazaars and the pillaging in the environs, the country-side becomes disturbed, and the hire of 17 tomans per 100 mans reaches 50 tomans per 100 mans, and the roads are closed. Useless support of traitors to the two Governments will have the above results. Besides giving up my tribe, who are like my children, and like the shirt next to my body, I passed my time in the lowlands. My lands and dependents in the highlands were plundered. Still they did not leave me quiet here, but sent a force against my tribesmen in Siakh. My men dispersed this force, and then were watching Siakh. The gendarmerie were sent against them. My men were compelled to defend themselves, and they repulsed the gendarmerie. They did not understand who were their opponents, but when they recognised who they were they welcomed them with kindness. Why should forces be continually sent against neutral tribes in the lowlands? Apparently the traitors, on account of this, want the Government to incur heavy expenditure. After getting money this time they will ask for it again. They have made this an excuse for getting money. Their object is not service. Their object is that which has been said. Now it is quite easy to rectify all the political errors made on the condition of support (with me). I am ready to do all that is humanly possible for service and maintenance of order, and to repair the past and to bring about your tranquillity, and this without need of giving money to traitors to the two Governments. I await an answer.

Enclosure 4 in No. 417.

Acting Consul Smart to Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

(After compliments.)

September 3, 1912.

I RECEIVED your two letters, and took note of their contents. You yourself write that I "have been presented to the Persian Government as representative" of these parts, and these words alone will suffice to supply my answer. You, of course, know that British officials who "have been presented to the Persian Government" cannot oppose the official authorities, but rather they must support whomsoever is in charge of affairs for the Persian Government. I am sure you know enough of international relations for this answer to suffice you. But with regard to what you write about the protection of merchandise, of course, you have heard that the Surkhis, who form part of Hassan Khan's force in Siakh, have plundered a caravan of thirty-six loads for the consulate. If you are capable to the degree you claim of protecting foreign and native merchandise, you will recover and restore these goods. I have sent a detailed list of the stolen articles to Hassan Khan in order that you may take whatever measures you may think suitable for their recovery. I have nothing to add except the hope that you will, acting in accordance with the duty of every patriotic Persian, recognise the necessity of obedience and submission to your own Government at this delicate juncture of your country's affairs.

No. 418.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 18, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to refer to recent telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran respecting advances to the Governor-General of Shiraz. Copies of the correspondence, ending with Sir W. Townley's telegram of the 16th instant, have already been transmitted to your department.

It is proposed, if the Secretary of State for India sees no objection, to make a further advance of 15,000*l.* to cover a period of two months and a half, and I am to

request that 7,500*l.* may be placed by your department to the credit of His Majesty's Legation at the Imperial Bank of Persia. A corresponding sum will be provided by this department.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 419.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 19, 1912.

TEHRAN telegram of 17th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks we had better suggest to the Regent that he should appoint Saad-ed-Dowleh Prime Minister. Should he refuse, he thinks that present Prime Minister might perhaps appoint Saad-ed-Dowleh to be his successor.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had sent a high official to Odessa as ex-Shah had announced his intention of going abroad for two months. His Excellency is anxious that ex-Shah should remain where he is, as there is less risk of his repeating what he did last year. His Majesty will be informed that it is useless for him to think of re-establishing himself on the throne unless he is assured beforehand of the support of His Majesty's Government and of Russian Government.

No. 420.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 19, 1912.

MY telegram of 14th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Russian Government cannot consider question of guaranteeing a loan or of advancing any money to Persian Government till latter have granted concession for Julfa Railway.

No. 421.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 20, 1912.

LOAN proposals contained in your telegram of 13th November to St. Petersburg have been communicated to Russian Minister from St. Petersburg. He is strongly of opinion that if two Governments are disposed to guarantee a loan they should do so for one of a larger amount, since he considers security available is such as would not entail much risk on guaranteeing Governments, whilst such guarantee would secure financial advantages to Persia such as could not be hoped for under other conditions. I agree if proper supervision of collection and expenditure is insisted on.

The cost of a small army is estimated at 3,500,000 tomans a-year, and of gendarmerie at nearly 1,000,000 tomans, so that almost all the loan would be exhausted in one year. It would hardly be advisable to obtain foreign officers on such a financial basis.

The situation of gendarmerie is becoming precarious. It has existed so far almost entirely on sums earmarked for service out of advances, and now that treasurer-general is solely dependent on the national resources he is over 5,000*l.* in arrears on the last Persian month, and nothing has been paid in towards expenses of current month, although money is due in advance.

No. 422.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 20, 1912.

IT would appear that information contained in my telegram of 17th November was not correct. Salar's lieutenant has been captured and executed, but the Prince himself was not present at the encounter.

No. 423.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 20, 1912.

THE only justification for the action which we have taken with a view to the appointment of Saad-ed-Dowleh as Prime Minister is the fact that money is absolutely necessary to the Persian Government, and that no other appointment appears to be possible which would enable the two Governments to make an advance to be followed by a larger loan by financiers.

The concession for the Julfa Railway is, we gather, required by the Russian Government as a condition prior to the grant of any advance. His Majesty's Government expect that the concession for the Mohammerah Railway will at the same time be given to this country.

If, therefore, these two concessions are granted by Saad, I understand that the Russian and British Governments will either guarantee or themselves make an advance up to 1,000,000*l.*, subject to proper conditions, for certain specified purposes.

The two Governments should also, I think, support Saad's views as to the convocation of a Medjliss and the formation of a Senate (see Tehran telegram of the 17th November).

I wish to know whether the above views are fully shared by the Russian Government. If so, we will instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to join with his Russian colleague in requesting the Regent to appoint Saad-ed-Dowleh Prime Minister.

Please report by telegraph.

No. 424.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 21.)

Sir,

India Office, November 21, 1912.

IN reply to your letter dated the 18th November, 1912, regarding a proposed advance of 15,000*l.* by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government for the use of the Governor-General of Shiraz, I am directed to inform you that the Secretary of State for India in Council will be prepared to place a moiety (7,500*l.*) of this amount to the credit of His Majesty's Legation at the Imperial Bank of Persia on learning that the British moiety has been provided as mentioned in your letter.

It is presumed that this advance will be in all respects on the same footing as the advance of 25,000*l.* referred to in the letter of this Office dated the 14th August last.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

No. 425.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 21, 1912.

MY telegram of 17th November.

It is very desirable that it should be ascertained with the least possible delay whether, if the present Prime Minister resigns, the Regent is prepared to appoint Saad-ed-Dowleh as his successor.

No. 426.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 21, 1912.

YOUR telegram of yesterday.

M. Sazonof cannot see me till to-morrow owing to a Cabinet Council.

I would point out that his Excellency has never definitely stated that if the Julfa Railway concession were granted the Russian Government would make or guarantee the proposed advance to the Persian Government. He only said (see my telegram of the 19th November) that until this concession was granted the Russian Government could not even consider the question.

No. 427.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 23, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 16th November.

What is total amount advanced by Russia during this year, and how much of it has been repaid? Treasury sanction was only given on understanding that advances would be made conjointly with Russia and on same conditions.

With reference to your despatch of 12th September, are any other revenues available as security?

No. 428.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 24, 1912.

HIS Majesty's Consul at Shiraz has not furnished me recently with a report on the state of affairs there, but it appears from information which I have received from other reliable sources that the situation is deteriorating. No funds are available here for the Governor-General, and without them he has no means of preventing the renewal of the former state of disorder.

Please refer to my telegram of the 5th November. I would urge that steps should be taken as soon as possible with a view to assure to the Governor-General a monthly income of 30,000 tomans a month, to be paid through the Imperial Bank, on the conditions suggested.

The Governor-General's chance of success may be entirely destroyed by any delay.

No. 429.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 23rd November.

Russia has advanced 125,000*l.* to Persian Government this year. Surplus of the northern customs available 14th July last, amounting to about 40,000*l.*, was retained in part payment of the first advance of 100,000*l.* made by Russia in March last. Persia's debt to Russia on account of advances made this year amounts therefore to about 85,000*l.*

Statement contained in my despatch of the 31st August shows all revenues other than Maliat which the treasurer-general holds to be available for loan purposes. It is impossible to control his figures.

No. 430.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.

I TRUST that Minister for Foreign Affairs fully realises that it is impossible for anyone to carry on the Government unless some funds are at once supplied to him for essential purposes of creating a stable administration and for re-establishing order in the provinces. These are absolutely necessary preliminaries to a larger loan—we could not press for the appointment of anyone as Prime Minister unless we could assure him that the immediate wants of the Treasury would be met, under, of course, proper safeguards, and I much fear that the general chaotic situation in Persia will be aggravated if the present deplorable condition of affairs is allowed to continue. I earnestly trust that the Russian Government will find some means of meeting, in the way His Majesty's Government have proposed, the pressing exigencies of a disquieting situation.

No. 431.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 20th November.

The problem is how to raise a sufficient sum of money to enable the Persian Government to carry on an effective administration, and eventually repay the sums already advanced by the British and Russian Governments.

Whatever steps be taken to this end, an interval must elapse between the establishment of machinery and the time when the revenues will be flowing into the Persian Treasury.

In the meantime money will be required for the re-establishment of law and order, and until that time it will not be possible to float a loan.

It is proposed that the British and Russian Governments should advance 1,000,000*l.*, secured on Crown jewels, in order to tide over this interval. You should discuss this with M. Poklewsky, and report whether you still remain of opinion that the sum is not sufficient.

No. 432.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 26, 1912.

COLONEL DOUGLAS telegraphs as follows from Shiraz, under date of the 25th November :—

“ At an interview which I had yesterday with the Governor-General he stated that he could neither collect the revenues which are due nor carry out his proposals for restoring order on the roads unless he is provided with money. The only reply which he has elicited from the Central Government to his despatches is that the matter will be gone into by M. Stas when he arrives at Shiraz. The tribal chiefs are well aware of his Excellency's financial weakness, and this fact greatly hampers his negotiations with them.

“ The Governor-General asked me to bring the above to your knowledge.

“ Nobody here knows anything about M. Stas's movements.”

No. 433.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs handed to me yesterday an *aide-mémoire*, stating that the Russian Government are unable to agree with views expressed in your telegram of 20th November respecting advance to be made to the Persian

Government. They consider first object to be attained is to give Persia a Government capable of conducting the affairs of the country and on which England and Russia can count without fear of disappointment. It is clear that no Government in Persia can do anything without money; but first a Government must be formed, and then only must money be furnished for it. Question of advance must only be discussed after a new Cabinet has been formed at Tehran, and Russian Government will communicate to me their views on that question later on. Meanwhile they propose that British and Russian Ambassadors at Paris should be instructed without delay to request the Regent to charge Saad-ed-Dowleh with the task of forming a Ministry. If you agree so to instruct Sir F. Bertie, M. Isvolsky will immediately receive similar instructions.

Russian Government, in conclusion, expressed the hope that no further delay should occur in the matter, and that pourparlers with the Regent should be begun at once.

I reminded his Excellency that you had only promised to approach the Regent with regard to appointment of Prime Minister on condition that the Russian Government adhered to views expressed in your above-mentioned telegram.

His Excellency replied that as soon as the Persian Government accorded concession for the Julfa Railway he would arrange question of advance with the Minister of Finance. On my asking whether there was any hope of the Russian Government joining us in guaranteeing a loan for 1,000,000*l.*, his Excellency said that this, he feared, was too large a sum. The Persian Government had, moreover, declined to pledge the Crown jewels as security for such a loan. All that the Russian Government could do would be to consent to an advance that would enable the Persian Government to carry on for some time. He could tell me, however, that Russian representative on "Comité d'Études" had elaborated a scheme in connection with big Persian loan which he was to discuss with Minister of Finance when he came to St. Petersburg in a month's time.

No. 434.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 26, 1912.

MY telegram of 19th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has written to me that official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Persiani, sent to Odessa, has obtained most tranquillising assurances from the ex-Shah. His Majesty promises first not to return to Persia unless he be asked to do so by the whole Persian people, and only if His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government consent; secondly, not to travel in Western Europe without the consent of the Russian Government. His Majesty, however, expresses the hope that he may be authorised to make a cure abroad when the Russian Government consider it convenient—for instance, next spring.

No. 435.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 24th November.

15,000*l.* is being placed to your credit at Imperial Bank.

It is subject to previous instructions as to payment, supervision of expenditure by His Majesty's consul, and as to interest, security, and mode of repayment.

No. 436.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 26, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant on the subject of the proposed advance of 15,000*l.* to the Persian Government for the use of the Governor-General of Shiraz.

I am to inform you that a moiety of this sum has this day been placed to the credit of His Majesty's Legation at the Imperial Bank of Persia by means of an order on His Majesty's Paymaster-General.

With reference to the final paragraph of your letter, I am directed to draw your attention to the accompanying copy of a despatch dated the 26th October,* indicating the conditions under which the advance of 15,000*l.* was made to the Persian Government on the 24th October. I am also to enclose a copy of a telegram which has been sent to Sir W. Townley to-day,† regarding the conditions under which the present 15,000*l.* is advanced.

You have already been furnished with copies of Sir W. Townley's telegram of the 24th instant, indicating the grounds for advancing the money without further delay.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 437.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 27, 1912.

MY telegram of the 26th November.

I learn from Colonel Hjalmarson that he has received a report from the officer commanding the gendarmerie at Shiraz that, owing to the failure of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to construct the forts promised on the north of Shiraz, he has been obliged to withdraw the posts recently established there.

I am not surprised that it has been found necessary to withdraw these posts, as the forward movement seemed to me premature at the time, but the position of the gendarmerie and of the Governor-General will suffer in consequence. Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has sent me an intimation that unless he is supplied with 20,000 tomans immediately he will have to resign. I am asking M. Mornard to use every endeavour to remit this sum to the Governor-General.

No. 438.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 27, 1912.

YOUR telegram of to-day.

You will be able to relieve the situation by means of the sum which has now been placed to your credit (see my telegram of yesterday).

No. 439.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 28, 1912.

MY telegram of the 21st November.

It seems that Saad-ed-Dowleh has entirely failed to form a Ministry. The effect of the continued uncertainty as to the prospects of the Government is deplorable, and may be really serious in the provinces if the situation is prolonged.

The fact that no decision has yet been reached has, however, encouraged the present Prime Minister, who is endeavouring to arrange for the undesirable members of his Cabinet to be replaced by better men, such as Ain-ed-Dowleh.

I think that, in the interests of peace and order, we ought now to take some decided action in the matter. It is clear, however, that Saad-ed-Dowleh's appointment could not be effected without unconstitutional action, probably leading to disorders, and I cannot take the responsibility of recommending that we should support it.

* No. 413.

† No. 435.

No. 440.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 28, 1912.

IT is impossible for His Majesty's Government to go on advancing money to the Persian Government indefinitely. When the sum now placed to your credit is exhausted, it will therefore be an excellent thing if you are able to arrange for the Governor-General to receive a certain 30,000 tomans a-month as proposed in your telegram of the 24th November.

No. 441.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 29, 1912.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's representative at Bushire:—

“Caravan coming from Bushire was attacked on 27th November between Mian Kotal and Dastarjin. One of the local riflemen reported killed and seven loads belonging to Sassoon carried off. Robbers believed to have been Surkhis.”

No. 442.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 28th November.

In favouring Saad-ed-Dowleh's candidature, His Majesty's Government have been influenced solely by the fact that the establishment of a stable Government appeared to them more probable under him than under anyone else. Under such a Government a pecuniary advance of a substantial amount could have been made pending the issue of a loan by financiers.

We felt that, unless we could promise financial assistance, we should not be justified in asking the Regent to appoint Saad. Sir G. Buchanan's telegrams, repeated to you, will have shown you that this course did not meet with the approval of the Russian Government. This alone would have made it impossible for us to take further steps in this direction. In addition to this, we are now convinced by what you say that it would require the exercise of force to make the Persians accept Saad, and to this His Majesty's Government could in no circumstances consent.

There is thus nothing left but to endeavour to secure the establishment, on some other lines, of as efficient a Government as possible, and you should take steps with this object in concert with M. Poklewsky.

If a really strong and capable Government takes office, I shall again approach the Russian Government with a view to obtaining their consent to a joint advance, subject to such conditions as may be expedient.

No. 443.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1912.

PLEASE inform M. Sazonof of the contents of my telegram to Tehran of to-day.

No. 444.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, November 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 29th November to Tehran.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged to assure you that Russia had no intention of forcing Saad-ed-Dowleh on Persia, and he quite agreed that the two Ministers should keep in constant contact and consult together on the situation. He only begged me to inform you that he could not do anything till the arrival of Russian representative of Comité d'Études, who was hopeful on the subject; if Julfa concession were granted he would arrange small advance.

Referring to the situation in South Persia, he said that customs receipts there for last twelve months show, according to the official returns, an increase of over 1,000,000 krans.

No. 445.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 1, 1912.

YOUR telegrams of 13th and 20th November.

Memorandum received from the Russian Government states that they entirely agree with His Majesty's Government that it would not be sufficient to place at the head of Persian Government an energetic and active man like Saad without providing Government with funds to undertake the necessary reforms. Russian Government consider that it will be necessary to help Persia to conclude a loan for about 5,000,000*l.* or 6,000,000*l.* An advance such as that proposed by His Majesty's Government would only delay the conclusion of the large loan, and, moreover, Russian Government are unable to advance to Persian Government the considerable sum suggested.

Russian Government consider that the only way to meet the requirements of the Persian Government is to hasten as much as possible conclusion of an arrangement between that Government and Société d'Études of the trans-Persian railway. Russian Government understand that société have already chosen representatives to proceed shortly to Tehran in order to negotiate with Persian Government, with support of the two legations, for securing the option to construct trans-Persian railway and permission to begin preliminary works in return for arranging a large loan for Persia. It is to be hoped that those representatives would be satisfied with the guarantees offered by Persia, and would not find it necessary to insist on any guarantees from Russia or Great Britain. Financiers would then probably undertake to float a loan and to advance at once a certain sum to the Persian Government. Russian Government therefore consider that Sir F. Bertie and Russian Ambassador at Paris should be instructed to use their influence with the directors of the société with a view to hastening as much as possible departure of their representatives for Tehran. Meanwhile Russian Government are ready, as soon as Julfa Railway concession is granted, to make an advance to Persia which will enable her to carry on until conclusion of the arrangement with the société. Finally they express hope that Sir F. Bertie may be instructed as set forth above.

No. 446.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1912.

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH called on me to-day. He told me that he had heard from St. Petersburg that it was reported from London that he had spoken to me about Mohammed Ali Mirza in such a way as to give an impression that he was leading up to question of the ex-Shah's return. He asked me to correct this rumour.

I said that I would willingly do so, for excellent reason that we had neither of us mentioned name of ex-Shah. I added that it seemed to me improbable that story could have reached his informant from an official source.

He complained greatly of the intrigues against himself.

No. 447.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 29th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on Russian Minister and myself to-day. He proposed to both of us that it is desirable that present Government should be strengthened or changed, but he insisted on fact that Saad-ed-Dowleh is not acceptable to anyone, though he thought that it might be possible to offer him a seat in Cabinet. His Highness assured me that he is not animated by any personal feelings of animosity towards Saad-ed-Dowleh, but merely had voiced public opinion in saying that he is unacceptable as Prime Minister. He declared that he could count upon co-operation of all best men in Persia at a day's notice if required. He added that Cabinet had determined to resist to their utmost any attempt to impose Saad-ed-Dowleh upon country until the assembling of Medjliss, to whom they could present their resignation.

My Russian colleague having received no instructions to change his attitude, I confined myself to informing the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government were considering situation, and that there was no intention of forcing him upon Persian people.

No. 448.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 27th November.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have instructed me to advance further sum of 15,000*l.* to Persian Government for financial requirements of Government of Fars. I added that I had arranged with treasurer-general that this money should be placed in a separate account at the Imperial Bank of Persia, and that it could only be drawn upon for expenditure agreed on between the Governor-General, the British consul, and the financial agent after treasurer-general and I had compared notes and sanctioned such expenditure.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his gratitude for this further mark of good-will on the part of His Majesty's Government, and said he was convinced that Mukhber would be enabled to succeed by means of this timely financial assistance. He agreed to suggested arrangement, adding that he knew that all possible efforts would be made not to wound Persian susceptibilities.

No. 449.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 2, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 30th November.

In conversation with Count Benckendorff to-day, I observed that I should raise no objection if Saad were appointed Prime Minister, but I was not prepared to join in using force to secure his appointment, and according to my information force would be necessary to impose him upon the Persian people, and to maintain him when appointed.

The best course was, I suggested, to instruct the two Ministers at Tehran to ascertain what was the best Government which would be acceptable to Persians, and to telegraph their views.

No. 450.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 3, 1912.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

In the course of a conversation yesterday Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that the concession for railway was practically granted. All the Ministers had agreed to give two railway concessions, and all that was now required is the final sanction of the Cabinet, which would be given in a few days.

I replied that His Majesty's Government would be much pleased if I could be assured in writing that the concessions would be granted. Final details could easily, I said, be arranged when once concession had been definitely given.

No. 451.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 2nd December and my telegram of 28th November.

I hope you will be able to come to some arrangement by which the Governor-General will be assured of an income of at least 6,000*l.* a-month independently of doles from His Majesty's Government. In view of the importance to us and to the Persian Government of securing order in the south, this is a matter which I should like you to press.

No. 452.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.

SEE Sir W. Townley's telegram of 2nd December repeated to you.

Regent would certainly refuse to appoint Saad-ed-Dowleh on ground that his unpopularity would cause revolt. To this we should have no answer, as it is confirmed by our information from Tehran. If appointed, it would apparently be necessary to support him by force against Persian feeling. I am sure Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs does not desire to produce this situation. I would suggest that British and Russian Ministers at Tehran should be asked for their opinion and advice as to what is best and most practicable method immediately possible of forming a stronger Central Government. One that includes Saad-ed-Dowleh, though not as Prime Minister, seems one possible solution.

No. 453.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 1st December.

The two Governments are agreed that a loan of about 5,000,000*l.* or 6,000,000*l.* will eventually be necessary to enable a Persian Government to carry on an effective administration and to repay existing debts. But as financiers here do not consider it practicable to float a loan until some measure of order and of collecting revenues has been established, some preliminary advance must be made by Russian and British Governments. So long, however, as they are agreed in principle that the immediate object to be aimed at is to assist the Persian Government to establish a condition of things which may be favourable to the eventual issue of a large loan, I do not desire to advance more than is required, and will agree to an outside limit of 250,000*l.* each. Instalments to be advanced only as and when required, after both railway concessions (Julfa and Mohammerah) are granted.

No. 454.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1912.

YOUR telegram of yesterday: Financial assistance for Governor-General of Fars.

If the money allotted to Fars enables Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to improve the situation there during the next three or four months, I think it ought to be possible to make the desired arrangement with the Imperial Bank for securing him a regular income.

No. 455.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 4, 1912.

TRAFFIC on the Tehran-Meshed road is interrupted by Turkoman raiders. Meriton, an inspector of Indo-European Telegraph Department, was captured and roughly handled near Miameh yesterday. One of the Persian gholams accompanying him, and also driver, were killed. He reached Miameh yesterday at 6 P.M. Nelson and family, of the Imperial Bank of Persia, proceeding to Meshed, is unable to continue his journey beyond Shahrud.

Local authorities declare themselves unable to assist. I am making representations to Persian Government. As they are powerless to render any efficacious assistance, I am advising the bank manager to instruct Nelson to return here and go to Meshed via Resht and Trans-Caspian Railway.

No. 456.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 4, 1912.

YOUR telegrams of 2nd and 3rd December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had no wish to impose Saad-ed-Dowleh by force. He would instruct Russian Minister to consult with Sir W. Townley as to what was the best thing to be done. He thought that it might be possible arrangement that Saad-ed-Dowleh should be made Minister of the Interior. He was the only man capable of making his personal influence felt and of restoring order out of the present disorder. Russian Government had warned him before he left Switzerland that he must not think that he was going back to Persia as the pledge of ex-Shah's return, and there was, his Excellency declared, not the slightest danger of his trying to bring back ex-Shah should he be appointed Prime Minister. With a strong man like him in office it might be possible for Russia gradually to withdraw her troops, but, so long as the present state of things continued, Russian occupation would have to be indefinitely prolonged, as it was only owing to presence of Russian troops that Russian trade was able to be carried on.

No. 457.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 4th December.

The proposal that Saad-ed-Dowleh should enter the Cabinet, but not as Prime Minister, seems to be the best solution. You should confer with your Russian colleague as to Saad-ed-Dowleh being appointed as Minister of Interior, and as to any other means which would assist in strengthening the Government.

No. 458.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 4th December.

You should express to Minister for Foreign Affairs my thanks for and appreciation of his attitude. Perhaps he would send instructions to Russian Minister on same lines as those I am sending to Sir W. Townley to-day. Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be inclined to authorise the Russian representative to hold out hopes of gradual withdrawal of Russian troops if a better Government is established with Saad-ed-Dowleh in important office?

No. 459.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 5, 1912.

I WAS informed yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Cabinet had practically agreed to grant the railway concessions. His Excellency added that, if the two Governments would agree to the reconstitution of the present Ministry, he could assure me that all the concessions now applied for would be granted.

No. 460.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, December 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 5th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will send instructions to the Russian Minister at Tehran similar to those sent to Sir W. Townley in your telegram No. 709 of 5th December. He will also authorise Russian Minister to inform Persian Government that as soon as a stable Government is established and order restored in the north Russian Government will commence withdrawal of troops.

His Excellency said that he had suggested Saad-ed-Dowleh's candidature for Premiership as he had believed that he was the best man, but that he was in no way wedded to it, and that if the Persians would not have him he would accept anyone else, provided that he was really a fit man for the post.

No. 461.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 6, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 5th December.

You should express to Minister for Foreign Affairs satisfaction of His Majesty's Government with the communication he made to you, and their sincere hope that an efficient Cabinet will be established.

No. 462.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 10, 1912.

AFTER consultation with treasurer-general and in agreement with Minister for Foreign Affairs, I yesterday instructed manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia to transfer the 15,000*l.* referred to in your telegram of 26th November to a kran account under the heading of "Treasurer-General, Fars."

This account can only be drawn upon by treasurer-general with my sanction and

after it has been established by Governor-General in concert with British consul at Shiraz and financial agent that funds are required for provincial administration.

British consul at Shiraz informs me that the Governor-General has accepted this mode of supervision.

No. 463.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 11, 1912.

REGRET deeply to have received following from Shiraz :—

“ Party of twenty-six sowars Central India Horse, accompanying Major Kettlewell and Captain Eckford, who were proceeding to Dashtarjin to shoot, were attacked this morning, 11th December, between Khanizian and Dashtarjin, some 30 miles from Shiraz, by large body tribesmen, estimated at 200 to 300 men. Much regret to report Eckford was killed and one sowar slightly wounded. Nine mules belonging to regimental baggage were carried off, and also whole caravan of merchandise proceeding Bushire. Party was proceeding with consent of Governor-General, and was within region which is now guarded by gendarmerie. Major Kettlewell and party are now at Khanizian, and will return to-morrow under arrangements now being made by Colonel Douglas. It is not yet known who robbers were, but I will wire later all other details available.”

I have communicated news of this disastrous incident to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who begged me to transmit his profound regret at the news, which had quite stunned him. His Highness expressed gravest apprehension as to effect this would have in London, taken in conjunction with murder of the Belgian customs official on the Turco-Persian frontier. He said he still counted much on the proved friendship and forbearance of His Majesty's Government.

No. 464.

Memorandum by Mr. Shipley on the Events at Tabriz during the months of December 1911 and January 1912, with reference to the Pamphlet compiled by Professor E. G. Browne and published in October 1912.

ON p. 5 of the pamphlet it is stated with reference to the attempt which, from August 1911 onwards, Shuja-ed-Dowleh had been making to gain command of Tabriz that the Russian force outside this latter professed to maintain a sort of neutral attitude. This statement does not convey an accurate account of the action of the Russians. The facts are as follows :—

On Shuja-ed-Dowleh appearing before Tabriz in the month above mentioned it was declared by the Russians that while they would remain neutral no fighting would be allowed to take place in Tabriz itself, being as they were responsible for the general security of the town. It was this declaration, to which, whatever their ultimate intentions with regard to Shuja-ed-Dowleh may have been, they scrupulously adhered, which, in my opinion, was one of the main causes that no attempt was made by him to enter Tabriz by force during the four months or so he was investing it. It is, indeed, to this neutrality of the Russians that I attribute, as did others, the fact that the town was so long able to hold its own. If, notwithstanding the delay of some four months thus gained for the nationalist cause as against the ex-Shah, no relieving force from Tehran appeared before Tabriz, or any attempt was made by the Central Government to drive Shuja-ed-Dowleh away, this could not be ascribed to any local impediment by the Russians.

On the same page of the pamphlet the further statement is made to the effect that the Russians had determined to disarm the fedais, and had eventually succeeded in their task, but only after provoking a certain measure of resistance by their gross mismanagement of the affair. As regards this statement it may be remarked that, whether such a step was being contemplated or not, there was previously to the actual fighting no general disarmament of the fedais by the Russians, though the former may have well believed that some such measure would sooner or later have to be taken in

hand. Moreover, though the subsequent events rendered an official enquiry impossible, such independent information as I could obtain left me no room for doubt but that the first shot on the morning following the affray between the police and the patrol on the night of the 20th December was fired by the fedais, the Russians being everywhere on the defensive.

The affray above referred to certainly formed the starting point of the fighting which ensued. But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that this affray was an isolated incident the responsibility for which was admittedly doubtful, while the suddenness of the outbreak next morning, taking, as it did, the town completely by surprise, and leaving no possibility of enquiry or intervention of any kind, affords very strong grounds for the presumption that the fedais had determined to force matters to a crisis. It is further to be noted that from the beginning the affair was one solely between the fedais and certain of the police on the one hand, and the Russian troops on the other, and that it was one from which the general Persian population, so far from assisting the former or looking upon it as a struggle for their liberties against foreign oppression, not only held completely aloof from first to last, but on the suppression of the rising, denounced the whereabouts of the fugitive fedais, and gave every assistance in the subsequent search for arms. The causes of the outbreak are in my opinion more remote, and are, as I believe, to be sought for in the undue influence which these fedais together with the police had been gradually allowed to usurp owing to the weakness of the Persian administration, and it was this undue influence which constituted a source not only of intrigue and perpetual unrest in the town, but of constant friction with the Russians. It will be recollected that as far back as February 1910, the continued presence in Tabriz of the leaders of these fedais, Sattar and Baghar Khans, was felt to be incompatible with good government in the town, and though the two latter were eventually and with no small difficulty got rid of, the great majority of their followers remained. The obvious policy of the Persian Government should then have been to profit by the opportunity afforded by the disappearance of Sattar and Baghar to effect a disarmament of these men, and to form a small independent military force on whose implicit obedience reliance could be placed, and which could be trusted to suppress disturbance impartially and without reference to outside considerations. No such force, however, was ever created by the Persian authorities nor were any steps taken to disarm the fedais, the expedient resorted to instead being the enrolment of some few of the latter in the police. But the police force itself, the members of which were never free from accusations of levying blackmail, and of perpetrating some of the worst abuses of the old régime, especially against those suspected of entertaining royalist leanings, was from the first an object of mistrust to the population, and served to increase rather than otherwise the prevailing feeling of insecurity and possibility of disturbance from the fear of which the inhabitants were never wholly free. It was, in fact, the inability of the Persian Government to guarantee order in the town which prevented the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the opinion being expressed to me on more than one occasion by my French colleague, M. Nicolas, that it was the presence of these troops alone which kept the town from becoming the scene of the gravest disorder, nor was it ever suggested to me by any of the European residents that the time had come when they could be withdrawn with safety.

If I have dwelt somewhat on this aspect of the matter it is because there can be no doubt that the position of these troops was anomalous, and that their withdrawal, had this been possible, would have been desirable. Their presence was unavoidably not without embarrassment to the local authorities in the relations of the latter with the population, and was further a source of suspicion to the Persians as to the ultimate intentions of Russia which the return of the ex-Shah in the summer of 1911 did nothing to allay. But, whatever may have been the grounds on which the Persians based these suspicions, no act, locally at least, of the Russians was pointed out to me in justification of them. As far as my own observation went, nothing was done by the latter to hinder the Persian authorities from dispensing with the necessity of the presence of these troops, viz., by the process of forming a military force of their own such as I have above referred to, or from otherwise creating an efficient public service, had any serious attempt been made by them to do so. Unfortunately, the effect of a state of affairs such as I have described inevitably tended to create a feeling of hostility and antagonism towards the Russians on the part of these police and fedais—(among which latter it must be remembered were a number of desperate anti-Russian revolutionaries from the Caucasus,—if for no other reason than that the presence of the former acted as a check upon their own proceedings. That some such check was very needed will be denied by no one acquainted with the methods of Persian police if left to themselves.

But, though the Russians may not always have been in the right or their methods invariably conciliatory, it should be pointed out that the exercise by them of this check, as also the measures taken by them for the general security of the town, such as the very necessary precaution of placing patrols when disturbances were apprehended, were in the main imposed upon them by the necessities of the position, and above all by the weakness of the Persian administration.

During the period of the Governor-Generalship of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh matters, owing to the personal influence of the latter, were prevented from reaching an acute stage, and it is possible that, had he remained, an outbreak might have been avoided, for apart from the police and fedais I could see no signs of hostility to the Russians on the part of the general population, towards whom the conduct of the soldiers composing the Russian force had been uniformly good. With the departure, however, of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh in the spring of 1911, and the subsequent arrival of Shuja-ed-Dowleh before Tabriz in the following August, such little respect as had existed for the authority of the Government representatives vanished entirely, the successors of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, viz., the Imam Kuli Mirza and Zia-ed-Dowleh, being merely puppets in the hands of the police and fedais and their leaders, certain of whom were individuals of the obscurest origin. The town, in fact, numbering it must be remembered some 250,000 souls, was completely left to itself, and rapidly degenerated into a state of such administrative confusion, especially during the month of November and the early part of December, that it was impossible to say that the gravest disorder might not break out at any moment. It was a time of great trouble and anxiety, during which the only stable element was that represented by the Russian troops, and it was admitted, even by those whom I had no reason to suspect of pro-Russian sympathies, that the presence of the latter was a fortunate circumstance for the town. I need only briefly allude to the loss entailed upon the merchants and the sufferings undergone by the population consequent upon the stoppage of trade and the rise in the price of food-stuffs occasioned by the prolonged investment of the town by Shuja-ed-Dowleh. The effect of these, however, was to render the inhabitants thoroughly weary of the whole situation, and ready to accept any solution or almost any form of government capable of putting an end to the prevailing anarchy. It is further very significant as showing the attitude of the population towards the outbreak that, although these fedais had been the defenders of the town against Shuja-ed-Dowleh, great resentment was subsequently manifested against them and their leaders by the populace, who even subjected the dead bodies of the Sikat-el-Islam and others executed with him to grossly contumelious treatment.

It was under the conditions I have described above that the fedais, who, save for the presence of the Russians, were the uncontrolled masters of the town, took matters into their own hands on the morning of the 21st December, and, be their motives what they may, the savage ferocity which characterised their methods of fighting admits of no justification or excuse. This aspect of the question has been too lightly passed over in the pamphlet, and though it is true, and is to the credit of the fedais, that the lives and property of non-Russian Europeans were at no time endangered by them, the fact none the less remains that from the outset no mercy was shown by them to defenceless Russians wherever found, that no quarter was given, and that such Russian soldiers as were taken were killed and their bodies subjected to shocking mutilation, while strong suspicions were entertained by the Russians that in certain cases torture was inflicted before death. The fact of this mutilation, information respecting which had already reached me from Persian sources, was subsequently amply proved by the photographs shown to me of certain of the bodies recovered after the fighting. The counter-charge at first put forward against the Russian troops, viz., of massacring 500 old men, women, and children, has not been persisted in, and I only refer to it here to add that my denial of it at the time was confirmed by my United States colleague, Mr. G. Paddock. With regard to the further allegations against the Russians of indiscriminately killing women and children during the progress of the fighting, no evidence in support of it was brought before me, either at the time or subsequently, and I believe it to be equally unfounded, though it is possible that some women and children may have lost their lives during the bombardment of the houses from which the Russians were being fired upon by the fedais. Two cases occurred in which inoffensive non-combatants were shot at and killed by the Russians during the progress of the fighting, but these were the only authenticated instances brought to my notice, and the enquiries which I subsequently made convinced me that the stories of this having been generally and indiscriminately done by the Russians were not borne out by the facts. It should not be forgotten, as bearing on the credibility of these charges generally, that a certain number of Persian women and children took refuge in the camp of the Russians, by whom they were kindly treated,

and no clearer proof can be afforded of the spirit in which the combat was waged by the revolutionaries than the fact that a Russian officer, while peacefully superintending the removal of these families, was shot dead by the former in cold blood. It may be noted here that among these fedais there were, as far as I know, no Armenian revolutionaries, the latter having left the town some little time previous to the outbreak.

As regards the photographs attached to the pamphlet of the persons executed by order of the Russian court-martial at Tabriz and of those of the houses destroyed by order of the same court, I am unable to say by whom these photographs may have been taken, but it is the fact that certain houses, belonging principally to leading men considered by the Russians to have been the instigators of the rising, were demolished by explosives, and that the executions to the number of about forty, which took place at intervals during the month of January of this year, were carried out by hanging, the bodies being left exposed to the public as in the case of the Sikat-el-Islam and his fellow prisoners, the circumstances attending the execution of whom were reported by me at the time. I should state that, as I did not assist at the proceedings before the court-martial, it is impossible to offer any criticisms as to the justice of the sentences passed by it on the persons executed by its orders, and this applies especially to those who were accused of being the instigators as distinguished from those who took part in the fighting. Some, however, were believed to have suffered unjustly, and the later executions created a reaction of feeling against the Russians among the European residents who considered that excessive and in certain cases undue severity was being shown, while the method of execution and the exposure of the dead bodies in public places, as in the case of the Sikat-el-Islam, were resented by them and caused them to overlook somewhat the extreme and unjustifiable provocation given to the Russians by the revolutionaries. My own efforts I need scarcely say were uniformly exerted with my Russian colleague on behalf of mercy being shown where possible, and in the case of the Armenian Bedros I succeeded in obtaining a delay of three days to allow of an appeal being made by his friends on his behalf to St. Petersburg. As regards Bedros I can only repeat the statement made to me by my Russian colleague, that the evidence against him was too overwhelmingly strong to allow the verdict of the court-martial to be set aside.

With regard to the entry into Tabriz of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and his taking over the *de facto* governorship, at the beginning of January of this year, this was done rather with my assent than with my approval, as the following facts will, I think, show. I reported, towards the end of November or beginning of December 1911, that is, some three or four weeks before the rising took place, that the great majority of merchants were ready to accept the appointment of Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and I added that, provided such appointment could be made with the consent of the Central Government at Tehran, it seemed to offer a solution of the difficulty. The state of the town was indeed desperate at the date mentioned—all trade with the surrounding country having been stopped, bread-stuffs, further, being imported only by sufferance of Shuja-ed-Dowleh. The population, in fact, had already taken the matter into its own hands by entering into negotiations with the latter for his entry into the town, the negotiations, however, always breaking down on the question of the number of followers to be allowed to accompany him. The character borne by Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabriz, and as given to me by those who knew him well, was that, though cruel to his enemies, he had never been known to tolerate pillage or disorder. It was further remembered to his credit that, during the troublous times of the first siege of Tabriz by the royalist forces, he had, though he was himself on the side of the latter, permitted no excesses on the part of his troops. A strong man was needed, and it was felt by the Tabrizis, and frequently pointed out to me by those well acquainted with the situation, that it was Shuja-ed-Dowleh alone who could fulfil the condition not only of maintaining order in the town itself, but of ensuring the security of the trade routes in the vicinity of Tabriz, of which only one, viz., that from Julfa, controlled by the Russians, had remained open. At the suppression of the rising, towards the end of December, even the semblance of Persian authority ceased, Zia-ed-Dowleh, the last nominal representative of the Government, having, before the fighting was over, taken refuge in my consulate, stating that no one would obey his orders, and that he had no force whatever on which he could rely. Under these circumstances, if the ordinary business of the town was to be resumed, there was imperative need of someone able both to carry on the government and make his orders respected. If I assented, as I did, to the proposition of my Russian colleague, that this task should be entrusted to Shuja-ed-Dowleh, it was because no one else was available, and because the only other alternative viz., that the Russians should themselves administer the town, appeared to me even if

this were temporary only, to be open to grave objection. With reference to the cruelties perpetrated by Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the exceptional circumstances in which the town then was did not allow of a full enquiry by me, but on my receiving the reports of them I went to my Russian colleague and strongly urged upon him that these barbarous methods must be put a stop to. The representations which the latter made to Shuja-ed-Dowleh were in so far effective as to the best of my recollection there was no repetition of them during the remainder of my own stay in Tabriz lasting until the 8th February of this year.

H. S. SHIPLEY.

Constantinople, December 11, 1912.

Affray between Russian Patrol and Police at Tabriz on the night of December 20, 1912.

So far as I could gather, both from Russian and Persian sources, it would appear that on the night in question a Russian patrol was sent out between 6 and 7 P.M. to re-establish telephone communication between the Russian camp and other Russian stations. In order to carry out this work, however, it was necessary at one point to ascend the roof of a Persian police-station. On permission being refused by the police in charge information of this fact was sent by the patrol to the Russian consulate-general. Application for the necessary permission was thereupon made by the latter to the karguzar, who dispatched a messenger to the police-station in question with orders to allow the work to be carried out without further hindrance. Unfortunately, in the interval which elapsed between the dispatch of the aforesaid messenger and his arrival at his destination a quarrel had broken out between the patrol and the police, in which two of the latter were killed. The fact that authorisation was sent by the karguzar for the carrying out of the work at the police-station was, I was informed by my dragoman, communicated to him by the messenger himself; but beyond the statement by the patrol that one of their number was attacked from behind, but by whom they could not say, it being dark, and that they then fired in self-defence, there is no evidence to show how the quarrel originated, all possibility of official enquiry into the matter being precluded by the fighting which broke out next day, and by the developments of the situation at Tabriz to which this fighting gave rise.

H. S. SHIPLEY.

Constantinople, December 11, 1912.

No. 465.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Stockholm, December 11, 1912.

ACCORDING to the press here the post of chief of police at Tehran has been offered by the Persian Government to a Swedish subject, Wesdal by name. He is said to be starting for Persia shortly.

No. 466.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 11, 1912.

PLEASE express to M. Sazonof my appreciation of his attitude as reported in your telegram of the 6th December.

No. 467.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 12, 1912.

MY telegram of yesterday.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called in person this morning to express his deep regret and that of the entire Cabinet. His Highness expressed his sincere desire that

the affair might be reported, in such a manner as to inflame public opinion in England as little as possible.

He said that the Persian Government counted much upon the highly-trying forbearance of His Majesty's Government, for which they had had such good reason to be grateful in the past.

I said that unfortunate incident was such a one that it was impossible for me to foresee the probable action of His Majesty's Government, but I added that I felt sure that the Persian Government could count on His Majesty's Government endeavouring to maintain their traditional friendly attitude, even though it might be judged that the situation called for energetic action on our part on the spot. I also addressed a note to the Persian Government expressing the earnest hope that immediate steps would be taken to trace the criminals and bring them to justice.

I have no further details from the British consul, but I learn from the colonel commanding the gendarmerie that the major in command at Shiraz reports the incident, adding that two gendarmes were killed and one local rifleman wounded.

It would appear from this that the gendarmes guarding the road were present, and it is possible that casualties occurred in endeavouring to protect the caravan, but all accounts say that the British party was attacked.

No. 468.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 11th December.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government have received with the gravest concern the news of the deplorable event which occurred on 11th December. The murder of a British officer in the circumstances stated constitutes a situation which His Majesty's Government cannot pass over. They must request the Persian Government to state without delay what reparation they are in a position to accord, and the reparation must include, among other conditions, the severe punishment of the tribesmen. If the Persian Government are not in a position to afford themselves the needful reparation, His Majesty's Government will have to consider what steps they themselves should take for that purpose.

No. 469.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 13, 1912.

I HAVE received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz. I have asked him for fuller details:—

“The party arrived safely at Shiraz this afternoon under Major Kettlewell's command. No further incident.

“Following are further details of the attack:—

“The robbers opened heavy fire on both sides of the road, being under cover of thick jungle. Officers and men returned fire and occupied two positions, but they could not prevent the robbers carrying off some mules owing to the fact that robbers came in opposite directions, and that country was very difficult. Captain Eckford's funeral is to take place to-morrow. Other casualties were three gendarmes wounded. Colonel Douglas and I received Governor-General this morning, who came to express his great regret at the occurrence and an assurance that active measures are being taken by him to secure the identification and punishment of the culprits.”

No. 470.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 10th December : Advance to Governor-General of Fars.
Arrangement approved.

No. 471.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, 14th December :—

“ Colonel Douglas has handed me detailed report on incident, drawn up by Major Kettlewell, from which I extract following details :—

“ Party consisted of Kettlewell, Eckford, 1 native officer, 26 sowars, 17 followers, and 17 baggage mules. They started from Khanehzinian at 7 A.M., 11th December, half an hour after a party of about 150 Persian soldiers, who were marching down road independently. Twelve men were told off as baggage guards, remainder with officers as advance guard. At the bridge over Kara Agach River, Persian officer of the gendarmerie with two mounted gendarmes who had accompanied Kettlewell to the river galloped on ahead to inspect gendarmerie post at Burjitinuri, on the top of the Sinehsafid Pass. Kettlewell also sent on ahead native officer and two sowars to prepare quarters at Dastarjin. Scouts were also posted on wooded hills on the left flank. After short halt, party proceeded. Road here runs through jungle for about 1½ miles. Two officers, accompanied by six or seven sowars, had passed beyond jungle, and, just as leading mules were appearing from jungle, hot fire was opened by a party from hills on left. Advanced party galloped ahead, got under cover, dismounted, and started to climb hill. It was difficult to discover enemy through thick jungle, but shots were exchanged, and it is now that Eckford was shot through heart. A few minutes after, Kettlewell saw from crest of ridge 150 to 200 men rush out from bottom of ravine below, towards river-bank. His men fired on them, but they quickly disappeared into jungle. Meanwhile sowars of baggage guard had crossed to north bank of river and taken up position in low hills. They report that smaller body of robbers joined attack also from the north. Kettlewell now collected men with him, descended hills, and crossed river-bed, taking Eckford's body with him. They joined other party, and native officer and two sowars who had gone ahead also rejoined party here. Meanwhile robbers appear to have made off over hills northwards with the booty. Whole party then returned to Khanehzinian, moving by north bank of river. During this movement some fifteen to twenty horsemen were seen on hills to north and shots exchanged. Kettlewell states he saw no caravan litter at caravanserai at Khanehzinian or on road. Small party of Persians with three or four mules, who left serai after sowars had started, were robbed and their mules taken. They returned to serai on foot, where Kettlewell saw them, but he had not seen them on road.

“ Kettlewell also states that, beyond the firing, no attempt was made to attack his small party. Robbers were apparently only out for plunder, and cleared off at once when they had seized mules. As to the gendarmerie, it would appear that Persian officer when he reached the burj brought his men back along crest of hills, and it was there that they were wounded. Kettlewell only saw them in the distance moving along hills to south when he was returning towards Khanehzinian. Copy of Kettlewell's detailed report will be posted to you by Douglas.”

No. 472.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1912.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, 14th December :—

“ My preceding telegram of to-day contains all details which can be furnished by Colonel Douglas and Major Kettlewell regarding actual circumstances of attack on

the latter's party. It will be seen that not only was there no intention of escorting caravan, but that Major Kettlewell was not even aware that there was any caravan in his vicinity.

"As regards your other queries, I beg to report as follows:—

"1. Responsibility of tribesmen is not yet known for certain. Governor-General's secretary informed me yesterday that they were Boir Ahmedi, but other information points to their having been Dushmanziaris, and other Mamaserris, who are under the influence of Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, together with others of the latter's followers. More definite information will be telegraphed to you as soon as it is available.

"2. Casualties amongst gendarmes. Major Siefert now informs me that there are four gendarmes wounded and one rifleman.

"3. Regarding caravan. Reports differ, but latest information gives total number of mules at about 140, of which some 30 only with their loads were carried off, but Major Kettlewell saw nothing of them, and does not know exactly where they were attacked.

"4. It is clear from Major Kettlewell's narrative that attack was not aimed against officers and sowars, but was made purely for sake of robbery, differing from ten previous outrages made upon British officers and their men in vicinity of Shiraz during last twelve months."

No. 473.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Shiraz, dated 15th December:—

"Colonel Douglas asks me to send you following:—

"During last year I have had to choose between keeping officers and men closely confined to the immediate neighbourhood of Shiraz or allowing them such latitude as, after consultation with His Majesty's consul and the local Persian authorities, I thought I might reasonably do. Until quite recently I have thought it advisable to adopt the former alternative, and, although moral effect of such action is exceedingly injurious to regiment, I have, in view of political considerations involved, raised no protest.

"With the increased security following temporarily on the arrival of Governor-General and the policing by gendarmerie of the roads in neighbourhood, I have allowed somewhat greater latitude, and accordingly sanctioned trips to Dashtarjin and availed myself of the opportunity to send with them small surveying party under the superintendence of Captain Eckford, who was himself trained surveyor. In view of result I deeply regret having done so, but submit that the risk was not greater than that incurred by shooting expeditions within a few miles of Shiraz, where small parties of officers and men have frequently been fired at, and there was always chance of encountering a large raiding party."

It has been clear for some time that the situation at Shiraz was well-nigh intolerable for both officers and men, but I had not realised that it was quite so bad as is shown from the telegram just repeated to you. I understand from Mr. Smart that the firing on shooting parties generally was due to the action of villagers, who in the present disturbed state of the province are prone to fire on any armed party on the chance of their being robbers. When there has been any doubt on this point, punishment has been inflicted.

No. 474.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 20, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 1st ultimo, reporting an improvement in the relations between Sheikh of Mohammerah and the Bakhtiaris, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's

consul at Mohammerah, reporting the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement between the two parties.

Though the Bakhtiari khans resident in Tehran are not in possession of the terms of the agreement made, they have declared themselves ready to abide by any settlement reached by Sardar-i-Jang.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 474.

Consul Haworth to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Mohammerah, October 19, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Agha Rahim arrived here on the 14th instant to discuss Bakhtiari differences with the sheikh. The result of this meeting has been as follows:—

The Jarrahi lands recently bought by the Bakhtiaris are to be resold to the sheikh for the price paid for them, *i.e.*, 15,000 tomans.

With reference to the Akili lands, should the Bakhtiaris be able to show that any of their property rests with the Arabs, such property will be returned. To this point I will return.

Further, all the agreements recently made with the Amir Mujahid and signed by him will be ratified by the khans and will be signed by all.

The sheikh agrees to give up all claims with regard to Shuster on the following conditions.

The Governor appointed shall always be a neutral one from Tehran, and Agha Rahim is now to be his assistant and represent both sheikh and Bakhtiari, but neither the governor nor Rahim Khan shall at any time have the right to send a "mamur" to any Arabs residing within the country from Dizful and Husseinabad in the north to the southernmost point of the Arabistan jurisdiction, nor shall they send "mamurs" to Bilaiti (across the river at Shuster), nor to the Gundeزلu, nor to the Kharran lands: should any Arabs, or anyone in the places named, offend, the sheikh will be referred to, and he promises to take the necessary steps to punish them.

The Bakhtiaris further ask that Bakir Khan be released with the condition that he shall not return to Shuster. They also ask that the family of the kalantar be allowed to return to the town. This the sheikh has agreed to, and in return the Bakhtiaris have agreed that no harm shall be done to those who were supporters of the sheikh, on account of anything done against the Bakhtiaris in the past; but this agreement does not affect anything they may do to offend in the future.

After the arrival of Sardar Jang at Abbid, he and Murteza Kuli Khan with Amir Mujahid will meet the sheikh at Wais, one stage from Ahwaz, and all points will be discussed and matters settled and the agreement signed.

I have referred to the question of the Akili lands. After the above-mentioned meeting the sheikh has agreed that on account of certain tents and other stored goods which were lost in the Akili affair, he will make "a present" of 3,000 tomans to the khans concerned. He refused to listen to any question of indemnity, and the matter was thus compromised.

These arrangements are in every way satisfactory, and should provide a means to terminate the friction which has so long existed between the two tribes.

With lands and people who dovetail so much it is impossible to attain a solution which has not its weak points, and there is room still for trouble if the parties to the agreement do not fulfil their contracts, but there appears to be a desire on both sides to make peace, and I have every hope of a settlement which will last for some time to come.

The sheikh has made it a condition that the agreement when signed shall be registered at the British consulate.

Haji Rais left to-day for Ahwaz to communicate with Amir Mujahid, and may possibly visit Ram Hormuz.

I have, &c.

L. HAWORTH, *Major, I.A.*

No. 475.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 475.

*Monthly Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending November 27.**Tehran.*

The Cabinet and Saad-ed-Dowleh.—Saad-ed-Dowleh arrived at Tehran on the 9th November; but, as he has not yet been able to form a Cabinet, Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet continues to carry on the Government.

Salar-ed-Dowleh.—The force dispatched against Salar-ed-Dowleh at the end of last month made no serious attempt to overtake him in his flight northwards. According to the latest intelligence he is in the Astrabad district with a small following, and is endeavouring to come to terms with the Central Government.

Political Prisoners.—The political prisoners mentioned in last month's summary as being in custody at Bagh-i-Shah have been released.

Elections for the Medjliss.—The sub-committee formed to elaborate a new electoral law is still sitting, as it has not yet arrived at any definite proposals.

Resht and Kazvin.

During the past month several changes have been made in the Russian garrisons at Resht and Kazvin. As a nett result the garrison at Resht has been reduced by 300 men, that at Kazvin increased by 200, and the force in Talish increased by 100.

Mansur-ul-Mulk, an agent of the ex-Shah, who for some time past has been living in Tabriz, has now taken up his residence in Resht.

Meshed.

The majority of the roads in Khorassan are still closed to traffic.

M. Leleux, the agent to the Treasurer-General, has raised a force of 200 gendarmerie for the purpose of assisting in the collection of revenue.

Ispahan.

The town and the province appear to be in a more unsatisfactory state than usual. In the town firing by day and by night frequently occurs, and burglaries are rife.

Lieutenant R. S. Bullock, of the India Army, and party, who were proceeding from Ahwaz to Ispahan, were robbed near Dupulun on the night of the 27th-28th October, by some Kugeluis and Bakhtiari. Lieutenant Bullock, his Indian orderly, and two muleteers were wounded. The Indian orderly died of his wounds, but the remainder of the party managed to reach Ispahan on the 7th November without any further incident.

The Central Government has decided to replace the present Governor-General by Sardar Asjha.

Yezd.

Sardar Fattah, the new Governor, arrived at Yezd on the 7th November.

Naib Hussein and his son Mashallah, who at one time threatened to oppose Sardar Fattah at Ardekan, evacuated the town on his approach and returned to Kashan. The merchants and others who took refuge in the consulate when Naib Hussein was in possession of the town left shortly after his departure.

Shiraz.

The main road from Shiraz to Bushire has, for the past few weeks, been safe for parties travelling with large escorts. The party of Europeans and invalided followers of the Central India Horse, who left Shiraz on the 24th October, arrived at Bushire without incident.

"A" Squadron of the Central India Horse, which left Ispahan on the 5th October, arrived at Shiraz on the 22nd.

Kerman.

A large portion of the inhabitants of Shehr-i-Babek, the chief town in Sirjan, lately rose against Salar Amjad, the Deputy Governor. Taking advantage of his temporary absence from the town, they closed the gates to him, and refused to acknowledge him as Governor. The Governor of Kerman, on hearing of this, sent a force under Sardar Nusrat into Sirjan to assist Salar Amjad. According to the latest reports fighting has commenced between the Sirjanis and the Government troops, but no details are available.

Kermanshah.

Although Salar-ed-Dowleh has left the district and no formed bands of his followers exist, general insecurity prevails in the country about Kermanshah.

The town is quiet, but the people do not feel assured as to the future, as in the absence of an adequate force the Governor is unable to restore order in the environs of the town.

His Majesty's consul reports that the charges for road guards are exorbitant, and that trade, a great deal of which is British, is suffering accordingly.

No. 476.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 27, 1912.

I VERY much regret to have to report that the situation in Fars would appear to have taken a turn for the worse, and that there is grave reason to fear a return to the old state of disorder, if not a still worse condition of things, next spring. As I had the honour to inform you, Sir, in my telegram of to-day's date, the officer in command of the gendarmerie at Shiraz has reported that he has been obliged to withdraw the force stationed at Zergun on the Ispahan-Shiraz road, because the Governor-General has not been able to fulfil his promise to build forts on the road between Zergun and Shiraz. I am not at all surprised that this retrograde step should have been found necessary, because when the forward movement was carried out, almost immediately after Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's arrival at Shiraz, I opined that it was premature, and that the gendarmerie force at Shiraz was not in sufficient strength to take over the road. It would appear that it has also not been found possible to carry out the entire programme between Shiraz and Kazerun to the south, in consequence of tribal opposition, and of the inability of the Governor-General to supply local tufangchis as arranged. There would also appear to have been difficulty in recruiting.

It is by no means improbable that the gendarmes on the road south of Shiraz may have to be called in, and it is perhaps unfortunate that the forward movement was taken in hand until the force had been strengthened. Should such a withdrawal have to be made, it must necessarily influence the position of the Governor-General as well as that of the gendarmerie, which would be much to be regretted.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh on his first arrival appeared to be most successful in reconciling divergent interests, and it seemed at one moment as if he might succeed in establishing a better order of things, though Mr. Smart expressed himself as sceptical from the first of much real improvement resulting ultimately. I believe that the Governor-General has been untiring in his efforts to restore peace, but he has unfortunately been handicapped from the first by the usual want of money, which has cramped his efforts, and made it impossible to carry out his promises. The penury of his treasury has been quickly appreciated by the rival chieftains, who have little by little grown colder in their friendship and more apathetic in their offers of assistance, offers

which were probably only made in the hope that there might be money forthcoming for them.

It is to be hoped that the pecuniary assistance now given by His Majesty's Government may not come too late to enable Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to re-establish himself and create a force without which it would be hopeless for him to attempt to collect the revenues or make himself respected. His Excellency has already sent me a message to the effect that he must resign his appointment as no funds were forthcoming.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 477.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1912.

SHIRAZ incident.

My immediately preceding telegrams have contained all the details received from British sources at Shiraz. The Persian Government have communicated to me the report of the incident furnished by the Governor-General. It tallies in all essential particulars with British reports, but makes it evident that there was a caravan, of the presence of which Major Kettlewell was ignorant. From the Governor-General's report it would appear clear that robbers allowed the force of about 100 Persian soldiers, 30 gendarmes, and 10 artillerymen, with 1 Swede and several Persian officers, to pass, and attacked the British party in the belief that they were escorting the caravan they had come out to plunder.

The Governor-General adds that the robbers were undoubtedly Boir Ahmedis, and that twelve of them were killed, and all the mules laden with goods recovered but three. He also states that fighting lasted for five hours, until the failing light and fatigue obliged the gendarmes and horsemen to cease fighting. I am telegraphing to Shiraz for information on these points, and as to the number of gendarmes and the nature of the cavalry engaged. It is now evident that Captain Eckford was the only man killed, though four gendarmes and one rifleman are reported wounded.

The Governor-General is dispatching a force in pursuit of the brigands, but snow in the passes will render all operations difficult, and urgent orders have been sent to the Bakhtiari Governor of Behbahan and to the Sardar Jang to collect a large force of Bakhtiaris and severely punish the Boir Ahmedis, who will thus be taken between two fires.

I fear that there is not much satisfaction to be hoped for from these measures.

No. 478.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 15, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I addressed note couched in terms of your telegram of 12th December to the Persian Government on 13th December. I have to-day received a reply explaining the circumstances of the incident as reported by the Governor-General, and promising to submit the nature of adequate reparation that the Persian Government are prepared to make at an early date.

Note expresses the deep regret of the Persian Government at the deplorable incident. Similar expressions have been made by the Prime Minister and Minister of War, who called specially for the purpose of doing so.

In view of the situation which has prevailed at Shiraz for some time past, which has resulted in occurrence of frequent minor outrages at expense of British officers and subjects and of recent incident, I am decidedly of opinion that nothing short of most exemplary punishment would suffice. The Persian Government express their firm intention to inflict such punishment on tribe which they believe to be guilty, and have ordered the necessary steps to be taken to practically exterminate them. I have pointed out that not only should the tribe be punished, but that also the headmen of the villages where the incident occurred have earned condign punishment, because it is clear

that they must have known of the presence of such a large robber force in their vicinity.

Climatic circumstances oblige us to give the Persian Government delay of two to three months in which they can execute their punitive measures. If they prove incapable of carrying out such measures, I am most decidedly of opinion that steps should be taken to prepare an expedition that will be able to restore order and, if necessary, punish offenders on Shiraz-Bushire road.

No. 479.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 29, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegrams of the 1st and 12th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan, reporting details of the attack on Lieutenant Bullock and party on the road between Ahwaz and Ispahan on the 28th October, and on the subsequent death in hospital of Lieutenant Bullock's orderly.

In accordance with the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 13th instant, I have presented a claim for 1,000*l.* as compensation for the death of the orderly.

As regards the effects stolen from the travellers, I have brought the matter to the notice of the Prime Minister, who has promised to telegraph to his kinsman, Sardar-i-Jang, who is in charge of the Bakhtiari road, instructing him to do his utmost to recover the effects. Samsam-es-Sultaneh is adding that in the event of failure to do so, Sardar-i-Jang must pay the value claimed.

Should this not have the desired result, I shall present a claim to the Persian Government.

I should, however, be glad of your instructions as to whether I should present to the Persian Government, in any case, a separate additional claim for compensation, such as was addressed to the Persian Government in the case of Mr. Smart last January, as compensation for the wanton assault on a British officer who was proceeding along the road in question with the consent of his Government and the knowledge of the local authorities.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 479.

Consul-General Grahame to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Ispahan, November 9, 1912.

IN continuation of previous correspondence on the subject of the attack and robbery of Lieutenant R. S. Bullock (27th Punjabis) and party marching from Ahwaz to Ispahan at Sard Ab on the 28th ultimo, I have now the honour to transmit herewith enclosed copy of a detailed report of the incident handed to me yesterday by Mr. Bullock, together with a certificate now obtained by me from Dr. Marrable regarding the condition of Sepoy Gulab Khan (27th Punjabis), Mr. Bullock's orderly, now under treatment in the C.M.S. hospital.

I further enclose copies of correspondence regarding this incident between Sardar-i-Jang and myself.

I understand that for some weeks past caravans of merchandise and native travellers have been passing up and down the road unmolested.

The question which naturally suggests itself is why, with richer booty at hand, the robbers should have selected Mr. Bullock's insignificant party for such a determined attack.

It seems not improbable that this incident may have been engineered by some of the Bakhtiari khans interested in discrediting the Sardar-i-Jang.

I am communicating copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz.

I have &c.

T. G. GRAHAME.

Enclosure 2 in No. 479.

Lieutenant Bullock's Report respecting Robbery of October 28 near Sard Ab.

AT about half-past three o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th October, my party, consisting of myself, one Indian sepoy orderly, one Persian servant, and two Arab charvadars, were on the road between Shelil and Dopulun, about three farsakhs from the latter place. We were crossing a part of country known as Sard Ab, all riding close together. We had six mules and two donkeys. Suddenly from a sangar about 300 yards above us, on our right flank, a shot was fired followed by a volley. I looked up, and saw from twenty to thirty men. All appeared to be armed, and fired incessantly. The two charvadars replied to the fire with their Martinis and tried to drive the mules on. Almost immediately, however, one of them and my Indian orderly were wounded. I ran back to the latter who had fallen by the side of the road, and seeing that it was impossible to do anything, shouted to the Arabs to cease fire. The robbers then rushed down on us, stripped our coats from us, and leaving one charvadar and the Indian orderly by the roadside, surrounded the rest of us and began to hurry us off up the hill from which they had opened fire, taking the mules and donkeys with them. They did not open any boxes on the spot, but appeared to be in a great hurry to get us away out of sight. In order to hurry him on they soon began to beat my Persian servant and took his shoes from him. At first they behaved well to me, but shortly afterwards one of the robbers came up to me and struck me with his rifle. I knocked him down with my fists, and was then surrounded by three or four more with whom I fought for some minutes until felled by a big stone. Before I could get up one of them hit me over the head with the butt of his rifle, half dazing me and causing a lot of blood to flow. I tried to run for it, but my foot caught in a scrub and I fell, and while lying was hit three or four times by big stones which they threw. They then pushed and dragged me along for about two more miles, where in darkness they all halted near a stream. Here we found three Persian peasants who had been captured the day previous at Sard Ab and taken up here. The robbers then debated what to do with us, several wishing to kill me, the Feringhi, and constantly covering me with their rifles. Finally they all went away, driving off the mules and donkeys, and left us. It was bitterly cold. During the struggle my shoes and stockings had been taken from me, and I only had a thin khaki shirt and a pair of riding breeches, both soaked in blood. One of the Persians had matches, and we kept a fire going all the night, and when the sun rose started to make our way in what we guessed to be the direction of Dopulun. I myself with my servant and charvadar went together. I don't know what happened to the three other Persians. Our feet were badly cut by stones and thorns, and we were about exhausted when some villagers from Gandum Kar saw us and brought us to their house, fed us, and washed our wounds. Two days later mules arrived from Dopulun, where we rode to, and found the other charvadar and Indian orderly who had been taken in by a caravan the morning after the attack. Both were wounded in the leg. From Gandum Kar I had dispatched a messenger to the consul-general at Ispahan, informing him of what had happened, and in consequence of this a party of sowars, with riding mules for us, arrived at Dopulun two days later, and conveyed us another five farsakhs to the residence of Murteza Kuli Khan, where we stayed two days and were well looked after. From here my orderly and both charvadars were taken in by mules to Ispahan, and I myself, with my Persian servant, was driven in a victoria to the residence of the Sardar-i-Jang, where we stayed one day and were treated with great kindness, and I made an official report to the Sardar-i-Jang. Here a fresh party of sowars with supplies, clothes, and drugs arrived from Ispahan, whence they had been sent by Sardar-i-Zaffar at the request of the consul-general.

We then drove in to Ispahan, arriving three days later (7th November) and were received at the consulate-general by Mr. Grahame.

My orderly and the two charvadars arrived the same day and were at once admitted into the C.M.S. Hospital, where their wounds were attended to.

With regard to the tufangchis, or road guards, I should like to add that in only one instance did I meet any of them actually patrolling, and that at their posts they invariably crowd around passing travellers and demand bakhshish, and unless given something, make it difficult for anyone to pass them.

Enclosure 3 in No. 479.

Report by Dr. Marrable.

GHULAB KHAN (Mr. Bullock's orderly) at present a patient in the C.M. Hospital, Ispahan, is suffering from a bullet wound of the hips and pelvis. The bullet entered the hip on one side in front of the joint, traversed the lower part of the bladder and came out behind the hip joint on the other side. His condition while serious is not at present dangerous.

HAROLD T. MARRABLE, M.B.,
C.M. Hospital, Ispahan.

November 9, 1912.

Enclosure 4 in No. 479.

Consul-General Grahame to Sardar-i-Jang.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith enclosed translation of a report dated of the 28th October received by me yesterday morning from Lieutenant Bullock, an officer in the Indian army, regarding an attack made on himself and his caravan on the night of the 27th/28th October, near Sard Ab. I further transmit copy of a statement made in my presence of Ali Akbar of Ghandum Kar, the Kasid who brought me Mr. Bullock's letter.

On receipt of the report above mentioned, I at once telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister, and at the same time informed his Excellency Sardar-i-Zaffar.

Late last night I received his Excellency the Minister's reply, instructing me to concert with Sardar-i-Zaffar as to the best steps to be taken to send Mr. Bullock all the assistance of which he may stand in need.

His Excellency the Sardar-i-Zaffar informs me this morning that he had already last night written to you on this subject, and will do so again to-day. His Excellency, however, considers it advisable that I should myself write to your Excellency.

This letter will be conveyed to your Excellency by a party of Bakhtiari sowars which his Excellency is dispatching this morning to Dehkurd. I have handed to their chief a letter and a sealed bag containing clothes, drugs, and necessaries which Mr. Bullock had asked me to send him. I would request your Excellency to cause this bag and letter to be delivered to Mr. Bullock.

Mr. Bullock further asked me to send him money, but on the advice of Sardar-i-Zaffar, instead of doing so I would request your Excellency to supply Mr. Bullock with any money which he may require. Any receipts of Mr. Bullock's will be honoured by me.

I would add that His Majesty's Minister in his telegram above referred to expresses the conviction that he can rely upon the Bakhtiari khans to take proper steps to punish the offenders and recover the robbed goods. I trust that your Excellency will soon place me in a position to report to his Excellency the Minister that the robbed effects have been recovered and the robbers severely punished.

Ispahan, November 2, 1912.

Enclosure 5 in No. 479.

Sardar-i-Jang to Consul-General Grahame.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 2nd November. I am most deeply distressed about the misfortune which has happened to Mr. Bullock. From the time of my arrival in the Bakhtiari country till now I have been attending to the organisation and security of the caravan road, and have posted sufficient guards at all points to keep continually on the move with caravans and travellers. Unfortunately, this incident took place at Sard Ab, near Dopulun, a place which had been safe and protected, and the guards relying on the safety of those parts had not come with them (Mr. Bullock and party).

On receipt of this news, I immediately sent sowars and a little money, with numerous pack animals, on which they mounted Mr. Bullock and party, and brought

them before receipt of your letter, and the men whom I had at the bridge at Dopulun had received and attended to them, and had subsequently sent them to Shalamzar, where Murtaza Kuli Khan received them with every attention, and brought them himself to Dehkurd.

As Mr. Bullock was anxious to get to Ispahan as soon as possible, I gave a small sum of money for their expenses, sending Mr. Bullock by carriage, and his party by pack animals. I hope they will arrive speedily.

I have written to Saham-ul-Sultaneh, my nephew, to start with a large number of men for the Kuhgelui country and chastise the robbers who committed this crime. I hope that by God's help he will shortly deal retribution to the guilty and recover all Mr. Bullock's effects from them.

Rest assured that even if I have to go myself, I will do so, and give them such a lesson that hereafter they will be afraid to come into Bakhtiari territory.

Dehkurd, November 4, 1912.

Enclosure 6 in No. 479.

Consul-General Grahame to Sardar-i-Jang.

IN the matter of the robbery at Sard Ab on the 28th October of Mr. Bullock I have the honour to acknowledge receipt this morning of your Excellency's reply letter dated the 4th November, and to express my thanks for all the steps which your Excellency—as I learn from your letter—is taking for the punishment of the persons concerned in this attack, and for the recovery of Mr. Bullock's effects.

I understand from Mr. Bullock that a temporary list of his effects was handed to your Excellency at Dehkurd. I now transmit another list drawn up by Mr. Bullock at my request, in which he has indicated the approximate value of the effects robbed, amounting to 126l. 16s. (6,847.20 krans), and further lists of the effects of his orderly, Ghulab Khan, totalling 518.90 krans, and of his servant, Mirza Ismail, totalling 193.6 rupees (711.60 krans).

Mr. Bullock has himself written to your Excellency and to his Excellency Murtaza Kuli Khan, expressing his thanks for the kindness received by him from your Excellencies. I would request your Excellencies to accept my thanks also.

Ispahan, November 9, 1912.

Enclosure 7 in No. 479.

Consul-General Grahame to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Ispahan, November 11, 1912.

IN continuation of previous correspondence on the subject of the attack of Mr. Bullock's party on the 28th October, I have now the honour to transmit herewith enclosed copy of the certificate of the death of Sepoy Ghulab Khan (27th Punjabis, "B" Company), Mr. Bullock's orderly, signed by Dr. Marrable.

I have received a list of the effects stated to have been robbed from Mirza Muhammad Ismail (a Persian subject), servant of Mr. Bullock, with values as given by him amounting to 776.60 krans, not 711.60 krans as stated in the copy transmitted to you of my letter to his Excellency Sardar-i-Jang of the 9th instant, enclosed in my despatch of the same date, which letter was corrected before despatch to the Sardar.

I am now transmitting a copy of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's vice-consul at Ahwaz.

I have, &c.

T. G. GRAHAME.

Enclosure 8 in No. 479.

Report by Dr. Marrable.

I HEREWITH certify that Sepoy Gulab Khan (27th Punjabis) Mr. Bullock's orderly, died on the 11th November at the C.M. Hospital, Ispahan.

[1340]

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The cause of his death was heart failure following on pneumonia and peritonitis, the result of a bullet wound involving the bladder, and also subsequent exposure.

HAROLD T. MARRABLE, M.B., B.Ch.,
Surgeon-in-charge of C.M. Hospital, Ispahan.

Ispahan, November 11, 1912.

No. 480.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to chronicle the following recent movements of Russian troops in North Persia, as reported by His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Resht:—

On the 2nd November, 200 Cossacks with eight waggons and four carts containing ammunition and military stores left Resht for Kazvin.

About the same time, for several successive nights, an unascertained number of men arrived at Resht during the night from Kazvin by automobile, together with twenty-four carts containing stores and ammunition.

About the 1st November, sixty Cossacks with three officers returned to Resht from Talish, and encamped at Busar, 2 miles distant from Resht along the Pirebazar road.

On the 5th November, 160 Cossacks left for Russia, others taking their place. These seem to have joined forces with those at Busar, and 150 proceeded to Talish on the 11th November. Another 100 Cossacks and two officers left for Talish on the 28th November.

On the 19th November, forty-five Russian infantry arrived at Resht from Kazvin, and left for Russia on the 21st November. On the 27th November, 200 infantry and a few Cossacks arrived at Enzeli from Russia.

The Russian vice-consul at Resht informed Mr. Worrall on the 3rd November that whatever movements had taken place consisted merely of intergarrison changes, and that one half squadron of Cossacks had been withdrawn from Talish to proceed to Kazvin, an equal number from Kazvin being due to return to head-quarters in the Caucasus.

His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz reports, under date of the 24th November, that the regiment sent to Khoi had been replaced by ten companies of the 81st Apsheron Regiment (in all about 700 men), which had come from Khoi.

One of the first acts of the new colonel who is in command of the Tabriz garrison was to remove the Russian gallows from the ark.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

P.S.—The manager of the Imperial Bank at Kazvin reported on the 27th November that the Cossack force, which had been entirely withdrawn, has now been increased to 325 men. It appears to him that more Russian officers have been recently arriving.

His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed reports that the Russian troops in camp at Kara Su have returned to Astrabad.

W. T.

No. 481.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 5, 1912.

NUMEROUS reports having reached me of late respecting the state of affairs at Kermanshah and in the neighbourhood, which has caused an almost complete cessation of trade, I yesterday made a serious representation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I pointed out that the Bagdad-Kermanshah route is one of the few remaining roads that are open for the importation of British goods into Persia, and I said that the disorders reported on it caused most serious damage to British commerce.

Ala-es-Sultaneh replied that want of money was the cause of the whole trouble, and that the treasurer-general declares that he is unable to supply the Governor-General with the funds of which he stands in urgent need, and that the latter had consequently sent his resignation to the Imperial Government.

I replied that M. Mornard was somewhat justified in his hesitation to supply more funds to Farman Farma without a proper security that the money would be suitably spent.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 482.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 18, 1912.

MY telegram of 15th December.

I received further note from the Persian Government late last night detailing the measures taken by the Government here and by the Governor-General at Shiraz to punish the tribe guilty of the outrage which resulted in the death of Captain Eckford. These measures include a punitive expedition, with its base at Kazerun, as well as encircling movements entrusted to the Governor of Behbahan, Bakhtiari chiefs, and the Governor of Ispahan. Hope is expressed that within one month the persons implicated in the attack on Smart, as also authors of the recent outrage, will be captured and brought to justice.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I shall see later in the day, has especially requested me to inform you at once of the steps that are being taken to punish the robbers, who are actually now being pursued by 300 horsemen.

It is clear that a serious attempt is being made to punish the offenders, but the season of the year is very unpropitious, and it can hardly be expected that one month will suffice for the purpose. I am afraid that there is small hope that the various authorities called upon to take action will combine together sufficiently loyally to ensure success.

The Governor-General evidently intends to do his utmost to make reparation, and the British consul at Shiraz urges that he should be granted time to develop his plans. Considering all the circumstances of the case, it would perhaps be fair to give the Governor-General a chance of proving his worth. A successful Persian punitive operation would serve to establish his prestige, and to restore order generally.

No. 483.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 18, 1912.

MY preceding telegram of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just left me. His Highness expressed earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would allow Governor-General sufficient time to carry out punitive measures being prepared. He expressed confidence that they would be successful.

No. 484.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 18, 1912.

SAMSAM-ES-SULTANEH has telegraphed to the Regent offering his resignation. Regent's reply has not yet been received. It now seems probable that a strong Ministry may be formed under Ala-es-Sultaneh.

No. 485.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 18, 1912.

MY preceding telegram of to-day,
 Persian Minister will be instructed to call at the Foreign Office and offer suitable pecuniary indemnity for murder of Captain Eckford in the name of the Persian Government.

No. 486.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 20, 1912.

FOLLOWING from consul at Shiraz, 19th December :—

“I had another long conversation with the Governor-General last night, during which he again assured me that all possible steps were being taken to identify and punish the robbers. He says that he has dispatched a trustworthy agent with a small party of horsemen to Ardakā and other places, who is busily engaged in securing evidence regarding the identity of the robbers and in trying to trace the stolen goods. In addition to this, Daria Begi starts at once for Kazerun, where he will raise a small local force of some 600 men. Men will also be recruited at Kamarij. These two forces will have dual duty—firstly, of guarding the road for passenger caravans, and more especially of the party of gendarmes who will be returning shortly from Bushire with arms and ammunition, and, secondly, of taking active measures against Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, whenever the Governor-General considers that all preparations are sufficiently far advanced. The Governor-General is also in communication with Soulet-ed-Dowleh, from whom he expects assistance in the matter. It is not likely that these measures will produce any very definite result, but, at any rate, the general idea is sound, and if in the meantime the Governor-General continues his preparations here for the organisation of a regular force, it may be hoped that by the spring he will be strong enough to take decisive measures against Mohammed Ali Khan (whom he regards as by far the most serious offender), and also against the perpetrators of the last outrage.

“He tells me that he has prepared budget for expenditure of 15,000*l.*, which he promises to let me see shortly, but I do not suppose that much progress can be made in any question of finance until after the arrival of the new financial agent.”

Further telegram from consul at Shiraz of same date :—

“The identity of the robbers.

“I have been receiving information on this point during the last few days from a number of different sources. All informants agree that the band included a number of men of Mamaseni tribe, and I have lists of the names of the principal persons said to have been involved. It is also possible that, as the Governor-General avers, Boir Ahmedis also took part in the raid, but they were certainly well supported by the Mamaseni, and by some Kashgais. I conversed on this matter with the Governor-General last night. He agrees that it is quite possible, and, indeed, probable, that, besides the Boir Ahmedis, the band contained members of the Mamaseni and other tribes. In any case, he is anxious to make the punishment of Mohammed Ali Khan and the surrender of persons concerned in guilt of the attack on Smart the first plan in his programme. When that has been accomplished, it will be easy to deal with the other offenders.

“I have received reliable information to the effect that robbers lost two killed and three wounded.”

No. 487.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 20, 1912.

MY telegram of 20th November.

Negotiations are proceeding with Salar-ed-Dowleh on the basis of an allowance of 12,000 tomans, all his undisputed properties confiscated to be returned, titles of the

disputed ones to be impartially considered, and the Prince to be allowed to live here, but not to have a governorship at present. He has expressed dissatisfaction at the terms offered.

Russian Government consider the terms fair, and the consul at Astrabad has been instructed to warn Salar that, unless he accepts, influence will be used to detach Turkomans among whom he is living from his cause.

No. 488.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 23, 1912.*
 THE Persian Minister called on the 19th December, and informed Sir L. Mallet of the measures proposed by the Persian Government for the punishment of the Boir Ahmedis.
 Sir L. Mallet said that I had already received this information from you. The murder of a British officer in the very country as to the condition of which I had made such repeated representations was naturally viewed by His Majesty's Government in a most serious light.
 The Minister observed that the Persian Government fully realised this, that they were determined to make amends, and begged for time within which to take action.
 I am, &c.
 E. GREY.

No. 489.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 23, 1912.*
 THE Persian Minister called at this Office on the 16th instant to convey, by instruction, the regrets of his Government at the death of Captain Eckford.
 Mr. Norman, who received the Minister, thanked him for this communication.
 The Minister was charged with a similar message for Captain Eckford's family, whose address he enquired.
 I am, &c.
 E. GREY.

No. 490.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, December 24, 1912.*
 FOLLOWING from consul at Shiraz, 23rd December:—

“Punitive measures proposed against robbers.
 “Daria Begi started 22nd with force of about 100 Sarbazes. He will proceed to Kazerun and organise further force there, as already reported. The deputy governor informed me this morning that his latest information leads him to think that, although originally band of robbers consisted of Boir Ahmedis, they were reinforced by Mamasennis at the instigation of Mohammed Ali Khan. This exactly bears out the information which I have received from independent sources. Operations now proposed against Mohammed Ali Khan should therefore attain dual object of securing the surrender of persons implicated in attack on Smart and of punishing some, at any rate, of the perpetrators of the latest outrage.”

No. 491.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 24, 1912.

FARS finances.

Deputy governor has asked British consul whether expenses incurred on account of punitive measures being prepared cannot be defrayed out of the 15,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government. Consul has replied that money was especially advanced for administration, and that he deprecated its use for special purposes, and suggests that Persian Government be pressed to provide necessary funds from which money could be drawn.

As the Treasury is completely empty, it would be very hard to get any money for the purpose from Central Government. Suggestion to do so would certainly call forth a reply that part of the 15,000*l.* could well be employed for the purpose, and a refusal to agree to such a course would lead to a delay in the carrying out of the operations.

As it is most desirable that an attempt should be made to punish robbers, I would beg to suggest that some money should be given as soon as we know estimated cost of expedition, although it is probable that money will be wasted.

I should be glad of your early instructions.

No. 492.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 24, 1912.

YOU should present an additional claim against the Persian Government, as suggested in the last paragraph of your despatch of the 29th November. Please report what sum you propose to claim.

Your action in the matter is approved, also that of Consul-General Grahame.

No. 493.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1912.

FOLLOWING received from Tabriz, dated yesterday:—

“In a communication I received to-day from Sipahdar the latter informs me that all classes in Tabriz have been holding meetings lately to express their dissatisfaction with the present Cabinet and Bakhtiari political activity. Populace, he added, are prepared to disregard Government in office, but they would prefer change of Government with Saad at the head. Sipahdar concluded that above coincided with his own opinion.

“I believe that my Russian colleague received a similar letter.

“Whatever meetings there may have been have almost all certainly been organised by Sipahdar and Shuja. Except amongst their followers there is no feeling here for Saad.

“I learn from a good source that Sipahdar has received a telegram from Saad advising a policy of combined action. Immediately after the receipt of this, meeting was held in Sipahdar's house, attended by Shuja and other reactionaries and so-called representatives of all classes.

“Result was a resolution of unity in supporting Saad, and I understand telegram was sent to Tehran on 17th December to representative for Azerbaijan. It is evident that the presence of Saad in the country is being used here as a pretext for reactionary intrigues.”

No. 494.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1912.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD railway.

Though it is very difficult to get anyone to take decided action during the present political uncertainty want of money may compel the Persian Government to sign the railway concessions any day.

It is improbable that the Government can be induced to sign the contract as it stands. There are too many queries attaching to it and no answers forthcoming. Unless there is a negotiator here who is competent to discuss details, it appears to me to be hopeless to expect to conclude negotiations.

Under the circumstances the best course, I think, would be to obtain from the Persian Government an engagement in writing that the syndicate shall be allowed to construct the railway, the conditions being left for subsequent negotiation. There is some force in the objection raised by the Persian Government that they must be in a position to understand details more fully as it is they who are to run the risk of financial loss.

No. 495.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 25, 1912.

A DISGRACEFUL scene occurred at the Prime Minister's house yesterday afternoon. Treasurer-general was made the object of a menacing Bakhtiari demonstration on account of non-payment of arrears of pay. It is clear that Prime Minister and Minister of War were cognisant of what was to happen, and former summoned M. Mornard to his house by telephone.

The two legations have made an energetic remonstrance to the Prime Minister, who has promised suitable reparation.

Attitude of Bakhtiaris may lead to further disturbances, and I am somewhat apprehensive of a possible collision with gendarmes.

I propose to represent to khans that they will be held responsible for any disorders created by their unruly followers, and that they will risk forfeiting good-will of His Majesty's Government.

No. 496.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 16, 1912.

WITH reference to the recent telegraphic correspondence that has passed upon the subject of the deplorable incident which occurred near Dashtarjin, on the Shiraz-Bushire road, on the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit copies of certain correspondence to which allusion has been made in the above-mentioned exchange of telegrams, but which it seemed to me unnecessary to submit to you telegraphically.

I received the news of the disastrous encounter which resulted in the death of Captain Eckford, about 7 o'clock in the evening of the 11th instant, when I had just returned from calling upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs on his usual reception day. I at once sent Mr. Smart to the private residence of Ala-es-Sultaneh to communicate to His Highness the news. The Minister was greatly distressed, and requested Mr. Smart to ask me to convey to you his profound regret at what occurred. He expressed grave concern about the impression that the news might create in London, coming as it did so soon on the report of the murder of the Belgian customs official on the Turco-Persian frontier, but he expressed confidence in the tried forbearance and proved friendship of His Majesty's Government not to resolve upon any action until all the facts of the case had been ascertained and the matter fully considered.

The following morning Ala-es-Sultaneh called upon me in person and expressed, in his own name and that of the Persian Government, the deep regret at the unfortunate

incident which had resulted in the loss of life of a British officer at a moment when the Government had commenced to entertain genuine hopes that a new era of improvement was about to dawn in the province of Fars. His Highness assured me that no effort would be spared to trace and punish the criminals guilty of this fresh outrage, and again repeated his earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would once more be patient and give the Persian Government time to carry out the punitive measures called for by the occasion.

I thanked the Minister for his expression of regret that he had made in the name of the Persian Government, and said that I would not fail to convey to you, Sir, what he had said as to His Majesty's Government giving the Persian Government time to carry out the necessary punitive measures. I pointed out to His Highness that the incident was such a serious one that it was impossible for me to foretell what action His Majesty's Government would consider it necessary to take, and I reminded him that this fresh incident was only one more in a long chain of incidents, some of which had not been reported to the Persian Government, which served to show that the authorities in Fars are unable to protect the lives and property of foreigners. I added that I was convinced that, even though His Majesty's Government might feel themselves constrained to take energetic action on the spot, no effort would be spared to maintain the traditional friendly attitude of the British Government towards that of Persia. I subsequently addressed a note, of which a copy is enclosed, to the Persian Government reporting on the affair.

Upon the receipt of your telegram of the 12th instant I addressed a further note (copy enclosed) to the Persian Government, and the following day I received a reply from Ala-es-Sultaneh (of which I have the honour to enclose translation). The note merely summarises the telegraphic report of the incident received from the Governor-General, which forms a subsequent enclosure in this despatch, and states that a further communication will be sent me giving the nature of the reparation that the Persian Government are prepared to make.

An examination of the report made by Mukhber-es-Sultaneh will show that it does not differ in any material respect from the reports furnished by His Majesty's consul at Shiraz (which I have had the honour to submit telegraphically). It is not yet quite clear from the Governor-General's report about the presence of a caravan, or whether by the use of the word "caravane" the baggage train of the shooting party is intended. Mukhber-es-Sultaneh speaks of a small caravan, as if it were at one moment with the advanced party of Persian soldiers and gendarmes that had no connection with the British party, at another mixed up with the latter. Major Kettlewell reports that he had no knowledge of any caravan on the road at the time, and yet it is clear from Major O'Connor's telegram of the 14th instant* that there was a caravan on the spot, although reports differ as to its size. It would in any case appear clear that the British party was not acting as an escort to a caravan, and that if it was being escorted at all it was more likely to have been accompanying the considerable Persian force that appears to have been only quite a short distance ahead of the British party.

The robbers would seem to have allowed this force to pass unmolested, and to have attacked the British party as soon as their mules emerged into the open from the scrub. It does not transpire from Major O'Connor's report of what occurred that Captain Eckford was killed by the first volley fired by the bandits, although it is so stated in the Governor-General's report, which is also inaccurate as to the casualties among the gendarmes. Latest information shows that none were killed but that four were wounded. Presumably the gendarmes, who were a short distance in front of the British party with the hundred Persian soldiers, returned to their assistance when they heard the firing, since Mukhber-es-Sultaneh asserts that the combat lasted for five hours and was only stopped by nightfall, and that all the mules that had been carried off, but three were recovered and twelve Boir Ahmedis killed. The colonel of the gendarmerie has also received information from the commanding officer at Shiraz which would seem to show that the gendarmes took part in the encounter, since he reports that the Persian foot soldiers ran away immediately they heard the firing. Copies of two letters received from Colonel Hjalmarson, forwarding abstracts of telegrams from Major Siefert at Shiraz, are also enclosed.

It will be seen that the Governor-General states decidedly that the robbers were Boir Ahmedis, and that he has sent an expedition in pursuit. He also suggests that the Governor of Behbahan, a Bakhtiari, should be instructed to operate against the tribe on the western side of the mountains. The Assistant Foreign Minister who

* See No. 472.

handed me Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's report on the 15th instant, informed me that orders had been sent to the Governor of Behbahan and to the Bakhtiari leaders, Sardar Jang and Morteza Kuli Khan, who are now at Malanir, to co-operate against the guilty tribe, and the Persian Government are confident that the punitive measures that are being taken will result in the practical annihilation of the Boir Ahmedis, who are constant source of trouble on the trade routes between Ispahan, Yezd, and Kazerun.

I expressed great satisfaction that such energetic measures were being taken, but pointed out that the season of the year made it extremely difficult for such operations as those described to be taken, and added that, in my opinion, not only the actual culprits must be punished, but also the village headmen on the road, who were almost equally guilty in that they must have been aware of the presence of such a large marauding force in the immediate neighbourhood, and had not given notice to the local authorities.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 496.

Sir W. Townley to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Your Highness,

Tehran, December 12, 1912.

I HAVE the great regret to have to inform the Imperial Government, through the kind intervention of your Highness, that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, informing me that a party of twenty-six sowars of the Central India Horse accompanying Major Kettlewell and Captain Eckford, who were proceeding to Dashtarjin to shoot, were attacked on the morning of the 11th instant, between Khaneh Zinian and Dashtarjin by a large body of tribesmen estimated at from 200 to 300 men. Captain Eckford was most unfortunately killed, and one sowar slightly wounded, whilst nine mules belonging to regimental baggage were carried off. The party was proceeding with the approval of the Governor-General, and was within the region which is now guarded by gendarmerie.

It is not known at present to what tribe the robbers belonged, and I have no further details in my possession concerning this deplorable incident. I have communicated the facts as given above to His Majesty's Government, and must call your Highness's most serious attention to this fresh outrage on the important southern trade route, and to the fact that the shooting excursion was undertaken with the knowledge and sanction of the Governor-General.

Pending instructions from my Government, I must urge that the utmost dispatch should be used in tracing the miscreants, and in bringing to justice the authors of this dastardly attack upon a party of innocent British travellers. I am confident that your Highness will realise the full gravity of this most serious incident, and will take immediate steps to ensure suitable and complete reparation being made.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 496.

Sir W. Townley to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Your Highness,

Tehran, December 13, 1912.

IN continuation of the note which I had the honour to address to your Highness yesterday upon the subject of the unfortunate incident at Dashtarjin which resulted in the death of Captain Eckford, I have now to inform the Imperial Government, in accordance with instructions received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the news of the deplorable event which occurred on the 11th instant has been received by His Majesty's Government with the gravest concern. It is not possible for His Majesty's Government to pass over a situation which has been created by the murder of a British officer under conditions such as have been reported.

I am to state that the Imperial Government are requested to lose no time in setting forth the nature of the reparation they may be able to accord, and I am to add that the severe punishment of the guilty tribe must be included among the other conditions of reparation.

Should the Persian Government not find themselves able to afford such reparation as is considered suitable, it will be incumbent upon His Majesty's Government to examine the steps which it may be considered needful for them to take in order to themselves obtain reparation.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 496.

Telegram from Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, dated 22nd Ghauss, 1331.

À LA date du 27 zihadjeh le consulat de Sa Majesté britannique me faisait savoir que deux officiers anglais étaient sur le point d'entreprendre une partie de chasse dans le Dacht-i-Arjan accompagnés de vingt cavaliers. En me communiquant ce qui précède le consulat de Sa Majesté britannique me demandait de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour faciliter leur voyage. Étant donné que, depuis deux mois, la sécurité régnait dans les routes et que les caravanes les traversent chaque jour, l'excursion des officiers en question ne m'a point étonné et je n'avais aucune raison de m'y opposer. J'ai adressé les recommandations nécessaires aux cavaliers et aux gendarmes chargés de la garde des routes à traverser. En outre, j'ai fait accompagner les officiers anglais de deux cavaliers Hadavand et d'un officier persan. Les Anglais partirent le lundi, tandis que le samedi 100 soldats du régiment de Malayer, Montasserol-Mamalek, Mohammad Ali Khan, officier d'artillerie, et deux autres officiers, ainsi que 10 artilleurs et le Capitaine Nyström avec 30 gendarmes étaient déjà partis pour Kazeroun. Le Capitaine Nyström et le Gouverneur de Kazeroun ont devancé la petite caravane, mais les soldats et les artilleurs voyageaient par hasard avec la caravane. Le mercredi, les soldats ont pris le devant. Ils n'ont rencontré personne sur la route. La caravane suivait. Entre Khané-Zinan et Dacht-i-Arjan l'avant-garde et les cavaliers du Gouvernement marchaient environ un demi-kilomètre devant la caravane. La caravane, les cavaliers indiens et un officier anglais suivaient l'avant-garde. Les gendarmes ne rencontrent personne. Un officier anglais, avec un sowar hindou, ainsi que 3 gendarmes et un cavalier marchaient entre l'avant-garde et la caravane. Ils rencontrent les bandits, qui font feu. L'officier anglais et 3 gendarmes furent tués. Un cavalier fut blessé. Après quoi les cavaliers et les gendarmes retournent et ceux qui venaient en arrière s'avancent. Un engagement eut lieu, qui dura cinq heures. On constate que le nombre des bandits, de la tribu de Bouer-Ahmedi, dépassait 200. Ils étaient au nombre de 300 environ, comprenant tant des gens à pied que des cavaliers. En tout cas, l'officier anglais qui venait en arrière est sain et sauf aussi bien que les sowars. La caravane a été sauvée. Les Bouer-Ahmedis perdent douze hommes; ils avaient capturé plusieurs bêtes chargées de marchandises. Les gendarmes et les cavaliers leur reprennent ces bêtes. En somme les brigands n'ont pris que trois charges de marchandises. Enfin la nuit vient et les gendarmes et cavaliers ne se sentent plus à même de continuer la lutte. Le consulat de Sa Majesté britannique et le colonel affirment tous ces points. L'officier qui a été tué a commis une imprudence en se séparant de ses camarades et en s'aventurant trop loin. Cependant, on ne peut pas même trop l'accuser, car il n'y avait pas lieu de se douter de la sécurité de la route. L'incident est hautement regrettable. Mais ces accidents constituent des événements impossibles à prévenir—tout comme un coup d'orage.

Qu'est-ce que je pouvais faire en dehors de ce que j'ai fait? De quels moyens disposai-je, dans un pays de bandits et de brigands? J'ai fait tout ce qui était en mon pouvoir de faire. Mais le banditisme des tribus est connu. Une d'entre elles terrorise la route d'Abadeh à Sarhad. Une autre fait la terreur de la route de Bouchire. Je suis en train de rassembler une armée. Veuillez bien télégraphier au Gouverneur de Behbehan, en lui enjoignant de diriger le force de 200 hommes qu'il avait préparée pour attaquer Ayaz-Keikha, contre les Bouer-Ahmedis. Les Bouer-Ahmedis font essentiellement partie de la circonscription placée sous la surveillance du Gouverneur de Behbehan. Je travaille jour et nuit à l'organisation du pays et à la constitution d'une force armée. Je compte sur votre esprit d'équité pour me rendre justice. L'incident survenu est certainement regrettable, ayant tout pour moi-même. Mais tout homme intègre jugera bien qu'il s'est agi simplement d'un accident imprévu. La situation actuelle du pays n'exclut pas encore ces sortes d'accidents. Un mauvais hasard a voulu que la fusillade des bandits fût opérée devant la passage même de d'officier anglais et des gendarmes persans. J'espère fermement qu'un avenir très

prochain me mettra en état de venger l'accident qui nous occupe en même temps que l'attentat contre Mr. Smart. Ainsi que j'ai eu l'occasion d'en parler avec Mr. O'Connor, ce n'est pas la première fois que ces messieurs se sont rendus aux alentours de Chiraz. Ils avaient été une fois déjà à Takht-e-Djamchid; une autre fois à Band-Amir pour acheter des peaux de moutons, et cette partie de chasse a été la troisième.

(Translation.)

ON the 27th Zihadjeh His Britannic Majesty's consulate informed me that two English officers were about to make a shooting expedition to Dashtarjin accompanied by twenty mounted men. In making this communication the consulate asked me to take the necessary steps to facilitate their journey. Seeing that the roads had been secure for two months, and that caravans were passing along them every day, this expedition did not surprise me, and I had no reason to object to it. I gave the necessary instructions to the horsemen and to the gendarmes whose duty it was to guard the roads which would be traversed. I further caused the English officers to be accompanied by two Hadavand horsemen and a Persian officer. The Englishmen started on Monday, while on the preceding Saturday 100 men of the Malayer regiment, Montasserol-Mamalek, Mohammed Ali Khan, an artillery officer, and two other officers, with ten artillerymen, and Captain Nyström with thirty gendarmes had already started for Kazerun. Captain Nyström and the Governor of Kazerun went on in front of the small caravan, but the soldiers and artillerymen, as it happened, were accompanying it. On Wednesday the soldiers went on ahead. They came across nobody on the road. The caravan followed. Between Khaneh-Zinian and Dashtarjin the advanced guard and the Government horse were about $\frac{1}{2}$ -kilom. ahead of the caravan. The caravan, the Indian horse, and an English officer were behind the advanced guard. The gendarmes saw nobody. An English officer, with an Indian sowar, as well as three gendarmes and a mounted man, were between the advanced guard and the caravan. They came upon the robbers, who opened fire. The English officer and three gendarmes were killed and one of the horsemen was wounded. After this the cavalry and gendarmes fell back, and those who were behind advanced. There was an engagement which lasted five hours. It is stated that the robbers, who were Boir-Ahmedis, numbered over 200. They were about 300 in number, and consisted of men on foot as well as mounted men. The English officer who was in the rear is uninjured, and so are the sowars. The caravan was saved. The Boir-Ahmedis lost twelve men; they had captured several animals loaded with merchandise. The gendarmes and mounted men recaptured them. Altogether the brigands only secured three loads of merchandise. When night came on the gendarmes and horsemen found it impossible to go on with the fight. His Britannic Majesty's consulate and the colonel confirm these details. The officer who was killed was imprudent in leaving his comrades and advancing too far. He must not, however, be blamed too much, for there was no reason to suspect that the road was insecure. The incident is most regrettable. But these accidents are events which it is impossible to foresee—like a sudden storm.

What could I do more than I did? What means had I at my disposal in this country of robbers and brigands? I did all that was in my power. But the banditism of the tribes is well known. One of them is terrorising the road from Abadeh to Sarhad. Another is the terror of the Bushire road. I am collecting an army. Please telegraph to the Governor of Behbahan instructing him to send against the Boir-Ahmedis the force of 200 men which he had got ready to attack Ayaz-Keikha. The Boir-Ahmedis really belonged to the district which is under the Governor of Behbahan. I am working day and night to organise the country and to institute an armed force. I rely on your sense of justice to give me my due. The incident is certainly regrettable, especially for myself. But any just man will see that it was merely a question of an incident impossible to foresee. The present state of the country renders accidents of this kind possible. It was great ill-luck that the robbers opened fire just as the English officer and the Persian gendarmes were passing. I sincerely hope and expect that I shall in a very short time be in a position to exact retribution for this occurrence and at the same time for the attack on Mr. Smart. As I have mentioned to Mr. O'Connor, it is not the first time these gentlemen have been in the neighbourhood of Shiraz. They had already been once at Takht-e-Jamshid, another time at Band-Amir to buy sheepskins, and this shooting expedition was the third.

Enclosure 4 in No. 496.

Ala-es-Sultaneh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

December 14, 1912.

I HAVE received your Excellency's two notes, dated the 12th and 13th instant, respecting the regrettable incident of Captain Eckford, which has caused deep grief to the Persian Government. I have the honour to inform you of the following details of the incident received by me:—

In view of the security which has been established in these districts for the last two months, enabling caravans of merchandise to pass in safety, the British officers wished, with full confidence, to go on a shooting expedition, while 100 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 artillerymen with guns, accompanied by Captain Nyström and 30 gendarmes, were sent to Kazerun. The soldiers and the artillerymen above mentioned were on the way with a caravan of merchandise. Between Khaneh Zinian and Dashtarjin Captain Eckford, accompanied by an Indian sowar, three gendarmes, and one rifleman, leaves the party and goes ahead towards the caravan of merchandise. Suddenly, and most unfortunately, he meets with the attack and fire of the miscreants. Soldiers from behind and the gendarmes from in front come to the scene of the incident and begin to fight with the miscreants, who lost twelve men killed. The caravan, with the exception of a few loads which had been carried off by the robbers, was conducted by the force.

The Persian Government attach the greatest importance to this incident, and are prepared to make adequate reparation, the details of which will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as possible.

I avail, &c.

MOHAMMED ALI, ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 496.

Colonel Hjalmarson to Sir W. Townley.

A son Excellence le Ministre d'Angleterre,

Téhéran, le 12 décembre, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de remettre à votre Excellence la traduction de deux dépêches que je reçois à l'instant de Shiraz. Les dépêches ont été envoyées de Shiraz toutes deux hier, 11 décembre, l'une à 2 heures, l'autre à 3 heures de l'après-midi. Malheureusement elles ne concordent pas en ce qui concerne le fonctionnement satisfaisant de la gendarmerie.

En vous exprimant mon grand regret du malheur arrivé, je vous prie, &c.

H. HJALMARSON, *Chef Instructeur de la
Gendarmerie gouvernementale.*

(Translation.)

To his Excellency the British Minister,

Tehran, December 12, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency a translation of two telegrams which I have just received from Shiraz. They were both dispatched from Shiraz yesterday, the 11th December, one at 2 P.M., the other at 3 P.M. Unfortunately they do not agree with one another as regards the satisfactory working of the gendarmerie.

I desire to express to you my great regret at the disaster, and I beg you, &c.

H. HJALMARSON, *Chief Instructor of the
Government Gendarmerie.*

Enclosure 6 in No. 496.

Major Sievert to Colonel Hjalmarson.

Chiraz, le 11 décembre, 1912.

AU dire des caravanes arrivées ces derniers jours, la garde de gendarmerie fonctionne d'une manière satisfaisante entre Kazeroun et Chiraz. Les tofanghis ne perçoivent

pas d'impôts de route : ils collaborent avec les gendarmes. Le Gouverneur général a fait un travail méritoire et il montre beaucoup de prudence. De temps en temps on s'empare de brigands et des petits combats ont eu lieu, au cours desquels quelques brigands ont été tués ; mais il faut être prêts pour des attaques et des troubles plus grands. Le Major Brandel a fait une très bonne reconnaissance de la route et il a présenté un rapport très utile avec des esquisses. Son premier voyage a été extrêmement difficile. L'expédition de Nyström et Lundberg (pour escorter le Gouverneur général de Yazdikhast à Shiraz), pleine de difficultés ; il y avait des conflits avec les chefs de village. De cette route aussi j'ai un rapport détaillé et des esquisses.

SIEFVERT.

Pour traduction conforme :

H. HJALMARSON, *Chef Instructeur de la
Gendarmerie gouvernementale.*

(Translation.)

Shiraz, December 11, 1912.

THE caravans lately arrived report that the gendarmerie guard between Kazerun and Shiraz is performing its duties in a satisfactory manner. The tofangchis are not levying road taxes, but are working with the gendarmes. The Governor-General has done some good work and is showing much prudence. Every now and then brigands are seized, and there has been a little fighting in which some brigands have been killed ; but we must be prepared for more serious attacks and troubles. Major Brandel has carried out a very good reconnaissance of the road and has sent in a very useful report with sketches. His first journey was an extremely difficult one. Nyström's and Lundberg's expedition (to escort the Governor-General from Yazdikhast to Shiraz) was full of difficulties ; there was some fighting with the village chiefs. I have received a detailed report and sketches of that road also.

SIEFVERT.

Certified true copy :

H. HJALMARSON, *Chief Instructor of the
Government Gendarmerie.*

Enclosure 7 in No. 496.

Major Siefert to Colonel Hjalmarson.

Shiraz, le 11 décembre, 1912.

UN groupe de chasseurs, composé du Major Kettlewell du Capitaine Eckford et de vingt-quatre cavaliers indiens, a été attaqué par quelques centaines de brigands entre Khané Zenian et Dashtarjin. Eckford tué, un cavalier indien légèrement blessé, deux gendarmes tués, un tofangchi blessé. Une caravane de trente mulets a été pillée.

SIEFVERT.

Pour traduction conforme :

H. HJALMARSON, *Chef Instructeur de la
Gendarmerie gouvernementale.*

(Translation.)

Shiraz, December 11, 1912.

A MOUNTED party, consisting of Major Kettlewell, Captain Eckford, and twenty-four Indian horse, has been attacked by some hundreds of brigands between Khaneh-Zinian and Dashtarjin. Eckford killed, one Indian trooper slightly wounded, two gendarmes killed, one tofangchi wounded. A caravan of thirty mules robbed.

SIEFVERT.

Certified true copy :

H. HJALMARSON, *Chief Instructor of the
Government Gendarmerie.*

Enclosure 8 in No. 496.

*Colonel Hjalmarson to Sir W. Townley.*A son Excellence le Ministre d'Angleterre, *Téhéran, le 15 décembre, 1912.*

POUR faire suite à ma communication du 12 courant, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre l'extrait ci-joint d'une dépêche du Major Siefert sur l'attaque des environs de Chiraz. Je vous prie de me permettre d'attirer votre bienveillante attention sur ce fait qu'il y a si peu de temps en vérité, que la gendarmerie est installée sur cette route qu'on ne peut guère escompter encore que le service y soit bien réglé et qu'il s'y fasse avec ordre. De plus, les difficultés créées par certaines d'entre les autorités persanes ont empêché l'engagement dans cette région des forces prévues seulement pour la première période d'organisation : plus d'un tiers de ces forces manque encore.

Le Major Noren-Brandel est actuellement en route pour Bouchire, d'où il ramènera 100 recrues et une certaine partie des nouvelles armes* qui s'y trouvent depuis quelque temps.

Enfin, après que seront arrivées à Chiraz les forces que je prépare ici à Téhéran et dont les trois quarts sont déjà engagées, j'ai conviction profonde que de pareils événements ne se renouvelleront pas sur les routes où la gendarmerie sera installée.

En vous renouvelant tous mes regrets pour cet événement douloureux, je vous prie, &c.

H. HJALMARSON, *Chef Instructeur de la
Gendarmerie gouvernementale.*

(Translation.)

To his Excellency the British Minister, *Tehran, December 15, 1912.*

WITH reference to my communication of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying extract from a despatch from Major Siefert respecting the attack in the neighbourhood of Shiraz. I beg to draw your attention to the fact that the gendarmerie has been installed on this road for so short a time that one can hardly expect the service to be well organised. Moreover, the difficulties created by certain of the Persian authorities have prevented the engagement in this district of the forces for which provision is made even for the first period of organisation. Over a third of these forces is still lacking.

Major Noren-Brandel is now on his way to Bushire, whence he will return with 100 recruits and part of the recently imported arms,† which have been there for some time.

After the arrival at Shiraz of the forces which I am collecting here at Tehran, three-fourths of which have already been recruited, I am firmly convinced that such incidents will not recur on the road patrolled by the gendarmerie.

I wish again to express my regret at this sad occurrence, and I beg, &c.,

H. HJALMARSON, *Chief Instructor of the
Government Gendarmerie.*

Enclosure 9 in No. 496.

*Major Siefert to Colonel Hjalmarson.**Chiraz.*

CAPITAINE Lundberg‡ revenu escortant de grandes caravanes. D'après son rapport, les tcharvadars n'osent pas dire qui étaient les brigands ; mais les fourreaux des pistolets qui ont été pris sont des fourreaux turcs et d'autre part on a entendu les cavaliers parler turc. Un Kachgouli avec ses hommes se trouvant la nuit d'avant hors de Dashtarjin se rendirent à cheval au matin à Ardekan, d'après ce que l'on rapporte, et ils revinrent l'après-midi disant qu'ils avaient entendu parler d'attaque. La gendarmerie avait installé des postes sur les côtés de la route. Au dire des Anglais, les gendarmes se sont conduits excellemment. Les cavaliers indiens sur les collines n'ont pas non plus aperçu les brigands avant l'attaque. Cinq gendarmes blessés, dont deux gravement. Des gendarmes et des tofangchis occupaient quelques hauteurs, ce qui

* 1,500 carabines, 2 mitrailleuses, et 500,000 cartouches, le tout neuf.

† 1,500 carbines, 2 quick-firing guns, and 500,000 cartridges, all new.

‡ Le capitaine avait été envoyé à la poursuite de la bande.

sauva la situation; mais par erreur les Indiens aussi tirèrent sur eux. Cent soldats persans étaient aussi présents, mais ils prirent immédiatement la fuite. A son retour, le Capitaine Lundberg vit des patrouilles de gendarmes sur toutes les collines dominant la région.

SIEFVERT.

Pour traduction conforme :

H. HJALMARSON, *Chef Instructeur de la
Gendarmerie gouvernementale.*

(Translation.)

Shiraz.

CAPTAIN LUNDBERG* has returned, escorting some large caravans. He reports that the charvadars dare not say who the brigands were; but the holsters of the pistols captured are Turkish, and the horsemen were heard talking Turkish. A Kashkuli and his men, who were outside Dashtarjin the night before, rode to Ardekan in the morning, it is reported, and returned in the afternoon saying that they had heard an attack spoken of. The gendarmerie had posted some men along the road. The English say the gendarmes behaved excellently. The Indian troops also had failed to notice the brigands before the attack. Five gendarmes, wounded, two seriously. Some gendarmes and tofangchis occupied some of the heights which saved the situation. But the Indian troops also fired on them by mistake. A hundred Persian soldiers were also present, but they fled at once. On his return, Captain Lundberg saw gendarmerie patrols on all the hills dominating the country.

SIEFVERT.

Certified true copy :

H. HJALMARSON, *Chief Instructor of the
Government Gendarmerie.*

No. 497.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of to-day's date upon the subject of the recent occurrence in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, expressing his views as to the nature of the action that should be taken.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 497.

Consul O'Connor to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, December 16, 1912.

QUESTION of retribution to be exacted from tribe responsible for attack on Major Kettlewell and party.

As mentioned in my telegram of the 14th December,† this attack was not apparently deliberately aimed at our officers and sowars, but was made by ordinary marauding band with object of plunder.

It appears to me, therefore, that this last attack in no way alters the general political situation in Southern Persia, and does not necessarily call for any change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government did not consider it necessary themselves to exact retribution for the attack on Mr. Smart, or for any of the subsequent attacks made on their officers, and this last attack presents no features of special atrocity which would necessitate a change of policy now. Death of Captain Eckford, of course, gives this last outrage a tragic significance which, fortunately, does not attach to previous assaults. But this was merely an

* Captain Lundberg had been dispatched in pursuit of the band.

† See No. 472.

unfortunate chance which might just as well have happened in the case of other officers who were attacked from time to time.

I am therefore of opinion, unless His Majesty's Government think it desirable now, in view of repeated outrages and of the generally disturbed condition of Southern Persia, to send an expedition into the country to restore order, there is no reason why this last assault should *per se* necessitate their doing so. As I understand their policy it is to maintain the existing form of Government as long as possible, and with this object in view you have secured appointment to Fars of the best Persian governor obtainable, and His Majesty's Government are financing and otherwise supporting him in his difficult task of trying to restore order in his province. Experiment is in nature of forlorn hope, but if His Majesty's Government wish to persevere in their policy I know no special reason why they should now depart from it.

But, as the question has been raised, I venture very respectfully to invite your attention to the broad facts of the case as they present themselves to me. It is notorious that the whole of this part of Persia is virtually closed, and has for some time been in a state of anarchy, which tends to increase rather than to diminish as time goes on. In order to restore order and to protect their interests and subjects, His Majesty's Government are actually financing the Governor of Fars, and are retaining a more or less effective control of the money which they have lent him. In view of these circumstances it seems to me clear that His Majesty's Government have undertaken very definite responsibilities in Southern Persia, and that if they now desire to make their present policy a success, to restore order under a Persian governor; and eventually to withdraw their cavalry regiment, without being obliged to send a large expedition into the country, they must be prepared to face the necessity of adopting an even more definite and decided line of policy than that which they are now pursuing: I refer to more effective control of finances and of the military force which, as I have already reported, the Governor-General proposes to raise.

No. 498.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13, 1913.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a particularly able despatch which I have received from Mr. Smart, lately acting consul at Shiraz, reviewing the general situation in Fars during the six months immediately preceding the arrival of the new Governor-General of that province.

I would beg leave to call your attention to the lucid and thorough manner in which the aims, ambitions, and objects of the several warring factors in Fars have been classified and summarised. The despatch is a document of great value for anyone who is desirous of arriving at some understanding of the rival pretensions which make it almost impossible to foresee a satisfactory solution of the problem, as long as the representative at Shiraz of the Central Government is precluded by the weakness of the same from playing a bold part sustained by the force of arms.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 498.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Shiraz, October 30, 1912.

THE present lull, after the southward migration of the tribes and the arrival of the new Governor-General, would seem an appropriate time for a review of the general situation in Fars during the past six months.

The two months following the defeat of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his retirement to the lowlands around Firuzabad were a period of extraordinary calm as far as the neighbourhood of Shiraz was concerned. Indeed, I have never, during my two sojourns at Shiraz, known the vicinity of the town so peaceful. However, the improvement in the situation at and around Shiraz was not reflected on the trade routes or in the outlying districts.

This unexpected peace was due partly to the appeasement of the Kashgai-Khamseh

strife, partly to the skilful administration of Kawam-ul-Mulk, and partly to the salutary effect produced by the downfall of a chieftain, around whom a legend, highly detrimental to the authority of the Government, had grown up. But it soon became evident that this peace had no elements of stability in it. The main factors in its break-up were the question of the attacks on our troops and the pretensions of Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli. The ilkhani in the north was, with some severity, endeavouring to obtain a real control over the tribes. He had imprisoned Ayyaz Kiha, the kalantar of the Darashuri section of the Kashgais. This chief, responsible for many of the Kashgai robberies of recent years, was the last kalantar to abandon Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and his final submission was of doubtful value. He was replaced by Ali Penah Kiha, a strong partisan of the ilkhani, and the allegiance of the important Darashuri tribe was thus secured.

The majority of the Shishbulukis, who effectively guarded the Sarhad route, were loyal, and even paid some maliat. The chiefs of the Farsimadani tribe, which was retained near Shiraz, were also loyal, but their control over their followers, many of whom were far from loyal, was very slight. The Kashkulis, who controlled the upper part of the Bushire road, were perhaps the strongest supporters of the Government. The lesser tribes were easily kept submissive. Gradually the ilkhani was consolidating his position, endeavouring to collect maliat. He was obviously endeavouring to bring the Kashgai tribes under the control of the Government, which, however, was unable to lend him the necessary support for the attainment of this object.

Probably few of the kalantars viewed with favour this growing consolidation of the ilkhani's power, but there was one kalantar whom it gravely menaced. That kalantar was Mohammed Ali Khan. This chieftain had long been the mainstay of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and the withdrawal of his support from Soulet-ed-Dowleh had been the main factor in the latter's downfall. He is at present the most powerful of the Kashgai kalantars, though he has many enemies, even among the Kashkulis. He was quick to realise that the consolidation of the ilkhani's power would not only prejudice his advantageous position, but would even involve him in considerable personal danger. Kawam-ul-Mulk and the ilkhani were pressing him hard for the surrender of the culprits of the attacks on our troops. If the ilkhani were allowed to grow much stronger, this pressure might take the form of forcible action. Mohammed Ali Khan began to show signs of restlessness. He demanded the release of Ayyaz Kiha, knowing that it would strike a fatal blow at the ilkhani's power. Sardar Ihtisham and Kawam-ul-Mulk refused to entertain his request in spite of many menacing letters and veiled threats of secession to Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

I am inclined to think that the Persian Government missed their chance by postponing all action pending the arrival of the Governor-General. If at the end of June, when it became apparent that Mohammed Ali Khan would not surrender the culprits, the Persian Government had ordered Kawam-ul-Mulk and the ilkhani to proceed to punitive measures for their apprehension, it is just possible that the undertaking might have been successful. Mohammed Khan, cousin and bitter rival of Mohammed Ali Khan, expressed the opinion, in the course of a visit he paid me towards the end of August, that the most urgent need of the situation was not action against Soulet-ed-Dowleh, but action against Mohammed Ali Khan. The sequel was to show that this opinion, though prompted by personal animosity, was correct. At the beginning of July Mohammed Ali Khan's position had considerably weakened. Mohammed Khan could no doubt have detached a large part of the Kashkulis, and the other tribes, jealous of the predominance of the Kashkulis, could probably have been put in motion against Mohammed Ali Khan. Failure to seize the favourable moment gave Mohammed Ali Khan time to organise his plot, which resulted in the recovery of his power and the downfall of the ilkhani.

Meanwhile, Kawam-ul-Mulk was making arrangements to deal with the Khamseh tribes, whose lawlessness had passed all bounds. I strongly suspect that he had, through his deputy, Mirza Fazlullah Khan, sown discord between the Jabbara and Shaybani sections of the Arabs, with a view to facilitating punitive measures against the divided tribes. Unfortunately, his departure, long delayed by the refusal of the Persian Government to allow him to leave Shiraz, was rendered impossible by the forward movement of Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

About the middle of July Soulet-ed-Dowleh began to show signs of restlessness. His bands began to raid Kevar and to attack caravans of local produce going to and from Shiraz. A small force of Farsimadanis under their chief, Masih Khan, was sent to Kevar to watch these bands. At the end of July a mixed force, 500 strong, composed mainly of Surkhis and other Kumarrehis, of villagers from Firuzabad and other lowlands, under

the command of Hassan Khan Kashkuli, brother-in-law of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, advanced through Khojeh and drove the Government garrison of some fifty Kashkulis, under Ghulam Hussein Khan Kashkuli, out of Darangan. This development resulted in the closing of the Chenar Rahdar-Khan-i-Ziniyan stage of the Bushire road and the exposure of the Shiraz valley to periodical raids.

Kawam-ul-Mulk began to collect an expeditionary force to reoccupy Siakh, and, if possible, to pursue the marauders to Firuzabad. In reply to his summons, some 800 Arabs, under Mohammed Kuli Khan, brother of Asker Khan, the Shaybani chief, and 200 Baseris came into the town. They were followed by about 200 Kashgais, under Samsam-es-Sultan, a khan of the reigning family. Another 200 Kashgais—Farsimadanis and Kashkulis—were also in the town. Arrangements were made for the collection of another force of Kashkulis and Farsimadanis around Khan-i-Ziniyan. While this expedition was being organised Major Siefert with 260 gendarmes occupied Chenar Rahdar, with the object of watching the first stage of the Bushire road, of preventing incursions into the Shiraz valley from Siakh, and, if he considered it advisable, of subsequently co-operating with the Government army against Siakh. I have reported by telegraph the unexpected, single-handed move made by Major Siefert against Siakh, which resulted in the defeat of his men by Hassan Khan's force, posted in the fortified hillocks covering Darangan. The greater part of the gendarmes surrendered without much hesitation, and finally Major Siefert and Captain Nystrom with a few men had to beat a hurried retreat. They fortunately succeeded in escaping, though Major Siefert was slightly wounded in the stomach. The enemy released all the prisoners after stripping them. About 150 rifles and 16,000 cartridges fell into the hands of the enemy. One mountain gun, the breach of which had exploded, was abandoned on the field. The casualties were slight—two gendarmes killed and a dozen wounded, of whom two afterwards died in town. Soulet-ed-Dowleh subsequently expressed his regret at this incident, and promised to restore the captured arms and munitions, but he has not yet put his promise into execution.

This disaster had a deplorable influence on the situation. Had Major Siefert remained at Chenar Rahdar, he could have rendered the Government useful service in escorting caravans over the first and dangerous stage of the Bushire road, in deterring Hassan Khan's men from their frequent raids into the Shiraz valley. After the withdrawal of the gendarmerie, caravans had to proceed under expensive Kashkuli escorts by a *détour* through the Tang-i-Surkh, and on one occasion Hassan Khan's men actually raided the Shiraz valley between the town and Chenar Rahdar. Moreover, this defeat of a Government force greatly increased the audacity and prestige of the rebels.

Meanwhile serious discord had inopportunistically broken out among the Arabs. Over half the Arab contingent left Shiraz for the scene of the strife. The two parties, Jabbara and Shaybani, sat opposite each other in hostile formation around Murghab for a considerable time. However, both sides apparently decided that prudence was the better part of valour, and no further hostilities followed those which had marked the outbreak of the quarrel. Jabbaras and Shaybanis, in a state of armed and watchful distrust, began to migrate southwards, and gradually separated as their lines of migration diverged. Much bad feeling was occasioned among the Arabs by this discord, which they openly attributed to Mirza Fazlullah Khan, Kawam-ul-Mulk's deputy. The result of this inopportune outbreak was that Kawam-ul-Mulk was deprived of invaluable Arab support for his expeditionary force.

At the end of August Mohammed Khan Kashkuli arrived at Shiraz. His presence was urgently needed to set the expeditionary force in motion. He had been delayed by quarrels with Mohammed Ali Khan. On the 2nd September the Government force, consisting mainly of Kashgais, with a few "sarbaz," local sowars, and one gun, moved out of town. About the same date Soulet-ed-Dowleh appeared in person at Darangan. I doubt whether the full Government force numbered more than 600 men, and it varied considerably, many of the tribesmen coming and going according to the requirements of their private affairs. The army never got beyond Chenar Rahdar, developments in the north suddenly transferring the centre of interest from Siakh to Baiza.

The ilkhani had been collecting a force and was moving southwards. Soulet-es-Sultaneh, Soulet-ed-Dowleh's full brother, had in the spring, after many hesitations, thrown in his lot with Sardar Ihtisham and been appointed ilbegi. His loyalty was, however, dubious, and he was known to be ambitious of becoming ilkhani. At the beginning of September the ilkhani discovered that Soulet-es-Sultaneh was plotting to bring down some of the tribes to join Soulet-ed-Dowleh. Salar Hishmet, the ilkhani's full brother, attacked and utterly defeated Soulet-es-

Sultaneh near Asepas. Soulet-es-Sultaneh escaped with the utmost difficulty to Baiza, where several of the smaller tribes, who had revolted against the exaction of "malat," gathered round him. At this juncture the ilkhani showed a deplorable lack of decision and energy. Had he marched promptly to Baiza he could probably have dispersed with little difficulty the insignificant following then round Soulet-es-Sultaneh. Instead of taking such prompt action he advanced in a very dilatory manner, giving Mohammed Ali Khan, who had moved from Ardekan, time to join Soulet-es-Sultaneh. Negotiations for peace ensued, Mohammed Ali Khan all the while pretending to be neutral and actuated by the amiable desire of effecting a general reconciliation. It soon became evident, however, that Mohammed Ali Khan, with the help of Haji Mohammed Kerim Khan, the arch-mischiefmaker among the Kashgais, was plotting the ruin of Sardar Ihtisham. He and several lesser chiefs around Soulet-es-Sultaneh telegraphed to the Persian Government and Mukhber-es-Sultaneh that they were dissatisfied with Sardar Ihtisham. They asserted that they in no way supported Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and that they desired the appointment of Soulet-es-Sultaneh as ilkhani. In negotiating with Sardar Ihtisham, Mohammed Ali Khan insisted strongly on the release of Ayyaz Kiha, and at last the ilkhani weakly consented. This concession was fatal. The Kashgais saw that Mohammed Ali Khan was master of the situation and they began to desert to Soulet-es-Sultaneh. Negotiations continued for some time, and Mohammed Khan, leaving the Government army at Chenar Rahdar, proceeded to Baiza to support the ilkhani. At the request of Mohammed Ali Khan and Soulet-es-Sultaneh, Kawam-ul-Mulk dispatched Mudabber-es-Sultaneh, the deputy governor, to Baiza to assist in effecting a reconciliation. He was accompanied by Musteshir-ul-Mulk, a registered British subject, who had often acted as secretary to former ilkhani. They did not proceed beyond Guyum, the attitude of Mohammed Ali Khan and Soulet-es-Sultaneh inspiring them with little confidence. As they were returning to Shiraz they were attacked by Hassan Ali Khan, a minor Kashkuli chief. Mudabber-es-Sultaneh alone succeeded in effecting his escape. His sowars were disarmed, and Musteshir-ul-Mulk was made prisoner and handed over to Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who, wishing to extract from him a legal transfer of his properties round Firuzabad, long arbitrarily appropriated by Soulet-ed-Dowleh, sent him as a prisoner to a fort near Firuzabad.

Sardar Ihtisham had now apparently lost hope. Suddenly, without warning his partisans, he retired from his camp, while his brother, Salar Hishmet, handed over the tribes to Soulet-es-Sultaneh. Sardar Ihtisham arrived at Shiraz on the 29th September. He declared that the conditions which Mohammed Ali Khan and the other kalantars wished to impose on him were such as would have made him their servant. He said that if the Government would give him a moderate force he would, with the help of his supporters, march against Mohammed Ali Khan, whose overthrow he considered essential. Failing this he could not remain ilkhani with any profit to the Government or himself.

The part played by Soulet-ed-Dowleh in the Baiza developments is obscure. He undoubtedly had some sort of an understanding with Soulet-es-Sultaneh, but it seems evident that Mohammed Ali Khan, Haji Mohammed Kerim Khan, and some other Kashgai chiefs really cherished hopes of establishing Soulet-es-Sultaneh as a puppet ilkhani. These hopes were inevitably disappointed through the incapacity of Soulet-es-Sultaneh. A meeting took place between him, Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and Mohammed Ali Khan near Khan-i-Ziniyan, with the result that Soulet-es-Sultaneh agreed to accompany his brother to Jirreh. Mohammed Ali Khan and Mohammed Khan patched up a reconciliation one with another, and both proceeded to Shapur. Soulet-es-Sultaneh, though placed in charge of the Kashgais by the Persian Government, has been more or less superseded by Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who appears to be exercising a vague suzerainty over the tribes. Ali Penah Kiha and Samsam-es-Sultaneh suffered considerably, for their possessions were plundered by Ayyaz Kiha. Zeki Khan, the Farsimadani kalantar, has been dismissed by Soulet-es-Sultaneh or Soulet-ed-Dowleh, and has gone to Kamarij with his immediate retainers. Masih Khan, the other Farsimadani kalantar, and two of the lesser Kashkuli khans, went with Sardar Ihtisham to meet the Governor-General at Persepolis.

The lateness of the season was partly responsible for the hurried departure of the disturbing elements from the vicinity of the town. Also, no doubt, Soulet-ed-Dowleh, Soulet-es-Sultaneh, and Mohammed Ali Khan were anxious not to remain in the vicinity of the town on the arrival of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh. A refusal on their part, when they were so close to Shiraz, to come into town and pay their respects to the Governor-General would have savoured too strongly of revolt.

The news of Sardar Ihtisham's retirement and lack of funds caused the break-up of the Government army at Chenar Rahdar. The famous expeditionary force, after

absorbing the greater part of 20,000 tomans, melted away without having done anything effective.

The state of the Shiraz valley, after Hassan Khan's advance to Siakh at the end of July, grew more and more unsatisfactory. The tribal riflemen, Kashgai and Khamseh, summoned to form the expeditionary army, were more baneful to the Shiraz valley than the marauders they had come to repel. They robbed freely in and around the city, and their chiefs seemed to have little control over them. Kawam-ul-Mulk's restraining influence grew weaker and weaker. There were several daring assaults on Europeans, for whom the tribesmen had evidently lost their respect. But for the personally friendly dispositions of the tribal chiefs in the town towards the consulate, we might not have got through the tribal migration without more serious incidents. As it was, from the beginning of September, I had to warn the British subjects not to remain abroad after sunset. The raids of Hassan Khan's men from Siakh resulted in the interruption of the snow supply of the town at the very hottest period of the year, and rendered it dangerous for Europeans or townsmen to circulate at any distance from the city. This state of affairs continued until the tribes had passed Shiraz.

As the Kashgais moved southward, the Sarhad route, which had been safe all the summer, was naturally closed. Several large caravans came down in the wake of the Governor-General, and the squadron of the Central India Horse withdrawn from Ispahan to Shiraz. Otherwise caravan traffic with Ispahan has been practically suspended since the middle of September.

Since the end of July blocks on the Bushire road have been even more frequent than before, partly owing to the closing of the Chenar Radhar-Khan-i-Ziniyan stage after the occupation of Siakh by Hassan Khan, partly owing to chronic hostilities lower down the road, between Ali Mohammed Kamariji, one of the ringleaders of the attacks on our troops, who is still in possession of Rahdar, and the Kazerunis, helped by their allies of Kamarij, as well as between the Kamarajis, supported by Shabancara, and the adherents of Nur Mohammed Khan of Daliki, under the command of his brother, Hussein Bey, who is in possession of Konartakhteh. Hussein Bey, profiting by the death of Khurshid Khan, seized Cherum, a village belonging to Kamarij and lying on the road between Kamarij and Konartakhteh. The 70,000 cartridges consigned to the Fars Government and seized by Hussein Bey in August must have been very useful during the hostilities around Cherum. However, the Kamarijis succeeded in reoccupying Cherum, and peace has, at any rate temporarily, been made between the two contending parties. The extortionate exactions of headmen and roadguards from caravans have shown no signs of diminution, and the rates of transport are as exorbitant as ever. After the retirement of Sardar Ihtisham the road remained practically closed for several weeks, no one being responsible for its protection.

The districts which are of such importance for Shiraz trade have remained closed. South-eastern Fars, the most important outlet for merchandise imported to Shiraz, is, owing to the interruption of communications with Shiraz, being now largely supplied from Bunder Abbas. As a result of this state of affairs the present year has been the worst on record for Shiraz merchants, who have been unable to clear the goods brought up from Bushire at phenomenal rates of transport.

The director of the Indo-European telegraph department has no doubt kept you informed of the frequent interruptions to the telegraph wires. These interruptions and the assaults on, and robberies of, repairing parties have been far more frequent than in previous years, though the usual autumnal total interruption of the southern wires was less prolonged than in the last two years.

The events of the last six months have resulted in a considerable deterioration of the situation generally in Fars. The waning authority of the Government has been almost entirely broken up. Even more serious has been the dissolution of tribal authority. The control of the chiefs over their tribesmen has become largely ineffectual as a restraining influence. The Khamseh tribesmen, with possibly the exception of a part of the Shaybani Arabs under Asker and Mohammed Kuli Khan, are completely out of the control of their kalantars. The Kashgais, always more submissive than the Khamseh, still respond to a limited extent to the restrictions of their kalantars, but are tending to become more and more insubordinate. The kalantars have created for themselves a position of independence against which no ilkhani, under present conditions, can successfully assert himself.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

No. 499.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13, 1913.)

Sir, *Tehran, December 17, 1912.*
I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith two despatches which I have received from Mr. Smart, lately acting British consul at Shiraz, recording his appreciation of the services rendered to His Majesty's consulate by Colonel Douglas and his troops and by Mr. Smith and the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in Fars respectively.

Mr. Smith's services were brought to your notice by my predecessor in connection with the disorders at Shiraz which marked the summer of 1911. They were subsequently extremely useful in connection with the incidents of the attacks on our troops at the end of the year.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 499.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Shiraz, November 4, 1912.*
BEFORE leaving Shiraz I wish to record my grateful appreciation of the manner in which Colonel J. A. Douglas has facilitated my work in matters regarding the troops under his command at Shiraz.

The position of the troops here has not been easy or pleasant. Colonel Douglas's tact and forbearance, combined with his considerable experience of Persia, have largely contributed to smoothing away difficulties and to obviating regrettable incidents. In all the trivial cases necessitating negotiations with the local authorities he has consistently facilitated my task by his moderation. Several cases have occurred in which the men and their officers have, under misapprehensions, been fired at by villagers or local tufangchis. In such cases, realising that the shots were being fired under misapprehension, they have refrained from retaliation, which might have resulted in untoward complications, and have, after at some danger getting into communication with the villagers or tufangchis, averted bloodshed by timely explanations. Colonel Douglas has always refrained from attaching too much importance to such incidents.

Owing to the disturbed state of the Shiraz Valley during the greater part of the last ten months the free circulation of the troops, either in bodies or individually, in the neighbourhood of the town would in all probability have led to disagreeable incidents. Colonel Douglas, in spite of the great inconvenience involved, did much to obviate such incidents by circumscribing the movements of his officers and men according to the changing exigencies of the local situation. But for his tactful attitude, I doubt whether this year would have passed without serious incidents in connection with the troops.

Although it may savour of presumption on my part, I cannot while on this subject refrain from expressing my appreciation of the attitude of the officers and men generally in their relations with the native population. Owing to the good-humour and tolerance of both officers and men the sentiments of the townsmen and villagers towards our troops have been of the friendliest nature.

I have, &c.
W. G. SMART.

Enclosure 2 in No. 499.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Shiraz, November 4, 1912.*
ON the eve of my departure from Shiraz I should like to express my gratitude for the invaluable assistance consistently rendered me during my two sojourns at Shiraz by Mr. J. C. Smith, assistant superintendent of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and his staff in Fars.

My predecessors and myself have often had occasion to allude to the advantages

accruing to this consulate from Mr. Smith's long local experience, the assistance he has always so willingly lent in dealings with tribal or village headmen, in helping to arrange for the passage of British travellers, in keeping the consulate informed of developments in different parts of the province. As the disorders have increased this assistance has grown more valuable. Moreover, Mr. Smith's coolness and prudence have rendered his co-operation peculiarly reliable. In the increasing difficulties of his departmental work, occasioned by the disorders and tribal destruction of the wires, Mr. Smith's ability and his skilful treatment of local magnates greatly reduce the number of cases necessitating the intervention of the consulate.

I would also mention Mr. Christmas, inspector of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, whose popularity among the tribesmen has often been of the greatest assistance to me in arranging for the passage of British travellers and in other matters necessitating negotiation with local headmen or tribal chiefs.

I have on a previous occasion referred to the great assistance rendered by Mr. Smith and his subordinates in the movements of troops. This assistance has latterly been of great value in the march of the Ispahan squadron to Shiraz and in arranging for the safe passage of caravans bringing supplies for the troops at Bushire.

I venture to hope that your Excellency will be able to bring this despatch to the notice of the competent authorities.

I have, &c.
W. G. SMART.

No. 500.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1912.

KERMANSHAH roads.

The Russian and Persian Governments have concluded an arrangement whereby the sum of 30,000 tomans (about 6,000*l.*) a-month will be guaranteed by the Russian Bank to the Governor-General of Kermanshah for an indefinite period for the expenses of the provincial administration and the maintenance of a military force.

It is hoped that, with the assistance of this assured monthly allowance, the Governor-General may be enabled to bring about a restoration of order on the roads where, at present, commerce is much hampered. In view of the large amount of British trade which enters Persia through Kermanshah, it is essential to obtain a restoration of security on the roads in that province.

The money lent under the above arrangement will be refunded from the next advance, or from the receipts of the northern customs when the existing advances have been paid off.

No. 501.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 27, 1912.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 20th December.

Salar-ed-Dowleh has replied that being a Kajar Prince he cannot accept conditions from the Bakhtiaris; he has therefore refused the terms offered. He adds that, were Saad-ed-Dowleh to become Prime Minister, it would be a different matter, as he could rely upon Saad to give him in due course the Governorship which he demands.

It is reported that Salar-ed-Dowleh is returning to Mazanderan.

No. 502.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 28, 1912.

TABRIZ and the Central Government.

My telegram of the 25th December.

I have received the following telegram, dated the 27th December, from His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz:—

"Letter has reached me signed by three leading ecclesiastics, who, however, cannot be regarded as representing public opinion at Tabriz, as most of the population are unaware of the nature of the meeting at the Governor's house reported in my telegram of the 24th December. The signatories inform me of the substance of telegram which they have addressed to Tehran, and copy of which they state was sent to you. They add that if the present Cabinet Ministers merely exchange offices instead of resigning they will decline to recognise them."

The telegram in question from the ecclesiastics comprises an attack on the Bakhtiaris, the Regent, and the present Cabinet, and concludes with the statement that the panacea for all evils is Saad-ed-Dowleh. So far as I can discover, only three of the signatories are men of any importance.

Ala-es-Sultaneh represented to me yesterday, through a third person, that the telegram makes the task of forming a Cabinet doubly hard. He also asked my opinion upon the telegram.

I answered that it was a sign that his Cabinet should be announced without a day's delay, and that no more shilly-shallying was possible. I added that I felt sure the support of the two Governments would be forthcoming to a Cabinet containing some of the leading men of the day, but I reminded his emissary that unless the railway concessions were granted there would be no advance of money.

On being assured that the Cabinet would be reinforced by Ain-ed-Dowleh, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, and Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik, who had already promised to join, I said that all these three would be most useful members of it, but that as Motamed-ul-Mulk and Mushir-ud-Dowleh (his brother) commanded the confidence of an important section of the people, the services of one of them would be very valuable. I added that some progress would be possible with such elements in the Cabinet, and given a sound constructive programme, and that it was quite possible that the Persian Government might then obtain a loan specially earmarked for distinctive services.

No. 503.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 29, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 24th December: Attack on Lieutenant Bullock.
I think that 500L. would be an adequate sum. Do you approve?

No. 504.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 18, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 16th instant upon the subject of the attack on a British shooting party near Khaneh Zinian on the Shiraz-Bushire road, which unfortunately resulted in the death of Captain Eckford, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of further correspondence.

Late last night I received the note from the Persian Government, of which a translation is enclosed, together with a summary in English, copy also enclosed, of a telegraphic conversation which had taken place between the Governor-General of Fars and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior. It will be seen from the translation of the note that it contains nothing more than a summary of the telegraphic conversation which relates to the steps which are to be taken to endeavour to obtain reparation for the outrage. The proposed measures are very thorough, and would have every chance of success, but for the fact that the season is most unfavourable for military movements in the mountains, and for the even more serious fact that it is extremely doubtful if the loyal co-operation of the parties whose assistance has been invoked can be relied upon. It is, I think, greatly to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's credit that he should have lost no time in preparing a punitive expedition, and in urging the Central Government to move the Bakhtiaris to come to his assistance by operating against the suspected tribe from the side of Behbahan. His Excellency would appear to me over sanguine in hazarding a belief that he can obtain reparation for

the last outrage, as also for the attack on Mr. Smart nearly a year ago, within one month.

Since Mukhber-es-Sultaneh shows such a praiseworthy determination to obtain reparation, it would appear to me but fair to give him a chance to do so within a reasonable space of time—say, four months. Should his Excellency succeed, his success would establish him as a powerful governor, and would go far to re-establish peace and order in the province. His Majesty's consul at Shiraz is strongly in favour of giving Mukhber-es-Sultaneh a fair chance.

Ala-es-Sultaneh called upon me this morning to ask me whether I was yet in possession of your views, Sir, as to the attitude His Majesty's Government should adopt in consequence of the recent regrettable incident. I gathered that the Persian Government are very nervous lest His Majesty's Government may decide on taking immediate steps to obtain the reparation they may doubt the capacity of the Persian Government to accord. The Minister detailed all the measures the Governor-General was preparing to take, as set forth above, and expressed an earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would grant a reasonable delay, in order to allow Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to carry out his punitive scheme, in the success of which his Highness expressed his fullest confidence. He added that the Persian Minister in London would be instructed to express the readiness of the Persian Government to make a suitable monetary compensation, and that he would consult you as to what would be considered a fitting sum. The Minister had also been instructed to express to Captain Eckford's family the deep regret of the Persian Government for what had happened.

I replied that I felt sure that you would much appreciate this spontaneous suggestion on the part of the Persian Government to make a monetary compensation. As regards the previous question, I said that I was not yet in possession of your views beyond those expressed in the note I had addressed to him under your instructions.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 504.

Ala-es-Sultaneh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

December 17, 1912.

IN continuation of my letter of the 4th instant (14th December, 1912), regarding the regrettable incident of Captain Eckford, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 6th instant (16th December) I and the Minister of the Interior had a telegraphic conversation with the Governor-General of Fars with a view to urging the execution of the orders which had been issued for the apprehension and punishment of the culprits. The Governor-General of Fars states that for the present 300 men of the Government riflemen of the town (Shiraz) and of those along the road have been sent in pursuit of the miscreants. Orders have also been issued to all the Government servants of those districts, and the Governor-General has drawn up a comprehensive plan for raising an army and surrounding the robbers, which plan the British consul has approved. From here (Tehran) also urgent telegraphic instructions have been sent to the Governors of Behbahan and Ispahan to dispatch cavalry and forces from both these places with a view to surrounding and thoroughly punishing the bandits. According to the hope expressed by the Governor-General of Fars, within a month the punishment of the culprits, both of the incident of Mr. Smart and also of this last incident, will be effected. The Governor-General is waiting for the arrival at Shiraz of the guns and rifles which have reached Bushire. Captain Noren Brandel has left Shiraz to bring these up from Bushire. When his armaments have been thus completed the Governor-General will be able to set this expedition in motion.

With these preparations, which have been devised and which will be quickly effected, I have the greatest hope that full reparation for this deplorable incident will be obtained.

I avail, &c.

ALA-ES-SULTANEH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 504.

Précis of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's Replies in Telegraphic Conversation with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior, December 16, 1912.

MR. SMART can bear testimony to the fact that on my arrival at Shiraz the town was practically besieged and the roads closed; now they are open to traffic, and caravans pass daily to and from Bushire. After a spell of forty days' complete calm, and the establishment of a gendarmerie post at Kazeroon, some British officers expressed the intention of starting on a shooting expedition; owing to the prevailing security I had no reason to offer any objection. I, however, suggested that a force should accompany them, but they refused on the ground of their own escort being sufficient. What happened afterwards was a pure accident due to the officer detaching himself from the main body and advancing too far; no harm came to the officer who remained behind with the sowars. The consul and the colonel themselves do not attribute this incident to any lack of security on the road, but merely to an unfortunate and unforeseen accident. I have not neglected any of my duties as Governor-General, and am taking the most stringent measures, but these steps can only be productive of a satisfactory result if carried out according to a well-concerted plan of action. It is not yet clearly established that we have had to deal with Boir Ahmedis exclusively; the base of operations must be at Kazeroon. I am devoting all my attention to the immediate transport of arms and ammunition lying at Bushire; I have sent instructions to all the local authorities, and am busy collecting riflemen that can be depended upon. I am holding a council to-day to study the situation. This is not a matter that can be rushed through. I have spoken with the consul, and he is in perfect agreement with my plan of campaign. We shall require a month to collect the necessary force here and at Behbahan, and to put them in the field in accordance with a definite scheme of operations. I hope that within that period of time adequate reparation for the Smart affair and this last accident will be forthcoming. This last incident is one of frequent occurrence in other parts of the world. Immediately upon receiving news of it from the consul, who has the telephone, I sent horsemen to pursue the brigands. I expressed my regrets in writing, and called the next morning to do so in person. The consul admitted that in the present state of the country it was impossible to expect that the unrest of forty days ago should suddenly yield place to a new order of things wherein no plundering and attacks could take place. In a province in which half of the inhabitants are wild and lawless tribesmen no one can deny that wonders have already been achieved, and at the present rate we shall soon reach a period of complete calm and tranquillity. According to a report just received it is now certain that the robbers were Boir Ahmedis, and that they have gone towards Dushmanziari. One of them has been killed there, but I have not yet received the report of the local kalantar. Three hundred horsemen are in hot pursuit. For good reasons the base of operations must be Kazeroon. I am busily engaged in collecting an efficient force, and will dispel all anxiety on the part of the Government. Amir Mujahid must be warned not to have recourse to the Kashgais.

Measures taken at Tehran.

Most stringent telegraphic instructions have been given by the Government to the Sardar Jang and other commanders at Ispahan, and to the Amir Mujahid at Behbahan, to dispatch forces immediately in concert with the measures taken at Shiraz by the Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, whose plan of operations must guide the movements of troops from three directions in order that a crushing blow may be inflicted on the Boir Ahmedis, and the most exemplary and signal punishment meted out to them. The Sardar Assad has also telegraphed in this sense.

Enclosure 3 in No. 504.

Consul O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, December 17, 1912.

I HAVE just had an interview with Governor-General. He tells me he is being pressed from Tehran to take immediate measures of some kind against the robbers, "in order to allay excitement in London and Calcutta." His view of general

situation coincides with my own. He deplors the tragic death of Captain Eckford and these constant robberies on the Bushire road, but he points out that the general state of order in Fars is decidedly better than it was before he took over charge of the province, and that occasional instances of robbery do not in any way alter the general political situation as it existed say a fortnight ago. He strongly deprecates being forced into premature action against the robbers. It is, of course, he says, quite easy for him to collect usual Persian rabble army and to dispatch it into the hills, but as he very reasonably points out result is a foregone conclusion. No success can possibly attend such ill-considered and unorganised efforts, and failure will leave situation worse than it is now, and will necessitate foreign occupation. He proposes, therefore, unless forced into unwilling action by insistence of his own Government, to continue methodical preparations for organisation of small but competent force on lines already indicated in my previous telegrams—that is to say, enlistment of about 1,000 picked men, whom he hopes to have armed and ready for active operations in about two months.

This is his general scheme, and if it at all meets with your approval I venture with the greatest possible respect to urge that it may at least be given a trial. As I have already urged, last incident cannot be regarded as altering fundamentally previously existing situation.

Enclosure 4 in No. 504.

Consul O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, December 17, 1912.

AS reported in my telegram of the 14th December,* only three mounted gendarmes preceded Major Kettlewell's party. There was no Swedish officer and no artillery. Question of identity of robbers still uncertain. Other sources of information do not bear out Governor-General's contention that they were Boir Ahmedis; see my previous telegram on the subject. Number of their killed unknown, but reports vary from one to twelve, the fact being that no one knows for certain. None of the stolen mules were recovered, but some loads dropped by robbers were picked up. Regarding part taken by gendarmes in the fight, I have now received the following particulars from Captain Lundberg, who has himself been out to the scene of action to make enquiries. He confirms Major Kettlewell's report, but says that, in addition to the three gendarmes who went on ahead in the morning and those who afterwards came out of Burj on the Sineh Safid, there were some others who form the daily road patrol from Khaneh Zinian. These latter took up a position on hillock on north bank of river, whence they fired at robbers, and four of the former were wounded. Some of them apparently followed the robbers for some distance, and returned in the evening; but there was nothing in the nature of cavalry engagement. Major Siefert estimates number of gendarmes engaged at about twenty altogether. I may add that gendarmes appear to have behaved very well, and to have done all they possibly could to assist Major Kettlewell's party and to drive off robbers.

No. 505.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram of the 25th December.

The action proposed by you in connection with the demonstration against M. Mornard has my entire approval.

* See No. 471.

No. 506.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 31, 1912.

YOUR telegram of 30th December.

The matter has been satisfactorily arranged; culprits have been punished, men assaulted indemnified, and a message of regret conveyed to M. Mornard from the Prime Minister by Sardar Ashja, who is about to proceed to Ispahan as Governor-General.

The khans have promised to pay sowars in future themselves, and to recover the money from the Government.

No. 507.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 2, 1913.

AZERBAIJAN.

My telegram of the 28th December.

I learn from Tabriz that a further telegram has been sent to the Cabinet by the mullahs and merchants, demanding that the Regent should not be permitted to come back to Persia, that the present Cabinet be dismissed, a new Cabinet being formed under Saad-ed-Dowleh, and the Bakhtiaris being got rid of; they also demand the dismissal of the Belgian financial officials.

Acting British consul adds that he has certain proof that Shuja-ed-Dowleh evolved the scheme, and that the Governor-General has lent his countenance to it. Mr. Cowan speaks highly of the Belgian administration.

A sharp message will be sent to Sipahdar by my Russian colleague to the effect that he is not to obstruct the Belgians. I think my colleague prefers to handle the matter alone, so, as his attitude appears quite correct, I am instructing acting-consul not to take any action unless he is directly approached by the Governor-General, in which case he should support action of Russian Minister.

No. 508.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 2, 1913.

AZERBAIJAN.

My preceding telegram of to-day.

A message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs requests me to represent to His Majesty's Government that the Azerbaijan situation is growing so serious that he is afraid that it may spread throughout the country, creating thereby a state of anarchy, unless steps are taken to restrain the authors of the movement, behind whom is Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

His Highness suggests that instructions might be sent by the Russian Government to their consul at Tabriz to take steps to discourage the movement. He hopes that His Majesty's Government may see fit to cause the necessary representations to be made at St. Petersburg to effect this.

My Russian colleague has, I understand, consented to telegraph in the same sense to his Government.

No. 509.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 24th December.

In view of your opinion that the punitive expedition proposed by Persian

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Government is likely to be a failure, I should not consider myself justified in recommending that we should advance money for this purpose.

Moreover, His Majesty's Government might incur responsibility for acts which they could not defend if they were to finance the expedition.

No. 510.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of the 2nd January.

Please ask M. Sazonof whether he would be willing to send to Russian consul at Tabriz immediate instructions as desired by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It appears that a serious situation will be created there if the present intrigues are not stopped.

No. 511.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 5, 1913.

AZERBAIJAN.

My telegram of the 2nd January.

His Majesty's acting consul at Tabriz telegraphs under date the 4th January, as follows:—

"I have communicated to the Governor-General message conveyed in your telegram of the 2nd January. His Excellency immediately began to discuss the political situation at an interview which I had with him, and he enquired what attitude His Majesty's Government would adopt. As the suspicion that he was playing a rôle in the present movement caused his Excellency some surprise, I informed him that, as a considerable share in the agitation had already been attributed to him by public opinion, it was not surprising that some suspicion should attach to him as he had taken no steps to contradict the report. I suggested that he should take steps to publish his disapproval of the actions of the agitators, and a disavowal of any connection with them. He hinted that were he to do this his life would be in danger; he therefore declined to take the measures I suggested, but finally asked me to convey the following message to yourself:—

"That while opposed to Bakhtiari supremacy he was not in favour of Saad-ed-Dowleh nor hostile to Belgians whom, on the contrary, he was helping with all the means in his power."

"A few weeks ago I could have assured you that the latter part of the message was true enough; it may be so still, in spite of Russian consul's opinion to the contrary. The rest of the message may be taken for what it is worth. The chief enemy of the Belgians here is Shuja.

"Although Sipahdar is powerless, his name carries some weight. Would it not be possible to have instructions sent to him through the Minister of the Interior to separate himself from the agitation?

"He contradicted report that an expedition was to be sent against Tehran.

"Bread agitation has, I am informed, failed."

No. 512.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1913.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 23, 1912.

THE recent unfortunate incident on the Bushire-Shiraz road occurred at a moment when the Governor-General had commenced the elaboration of schemes which are somewhat different in nature although ultimately intended to serve the same objects, namely, the restoration of order and the better collection of the revenues of the province,

The one scheme involves the creation of a military force, the other the elaboration of a budget. Since the military force would be employed to assist in the collection of revenue, the two schemes are closely allied, but I think it will simplify an understanding of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's aims if I deal with the two subjects in separate despatches, endeavouring at the same time to disassociate, as far as may be possible, what are intended to be permanent measures of administration from the special steps that are being taken to punish the authors of the assault on British troops that occurred on the 11th instant.

Almost immediately upon his arrival at Shiraz, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh realised that it would be impossible to establish his personal authority in the province and secure the collection of the revenues, unless he could create a military force that would be capable of operating wherever troubles might be found, and which would also be sufficiently numerous and efficient to administer a salutary lesson to any one of the more or less insubordinate tribes as occasion might require. His Excellency estimated that he would want a force of from 1,500 to 2,000 men, picked from the best material at his disposal, which would be independent of the gendarmerie, but, of course, ready to come to the assistance of the latter force if required. For the sake of his own personal position, the Governor-General would, not unnaturally, prefer that such a force should be attached to himself and be under his direct orders.

According to a telegram which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh is now busily engaged in the preparation of his military scheme, which would appear to have the cordial support of the principal landowners, who would naturally prefer to see order preserved by a Government force rather than be dependent upon the more powerful of the tribes for the time being. The consul states that the Governor-General now proposes to create a force of only 1,000 picked men, in order to keep within the bounds of his financial resources, reserving to himself the right to increase the numerical strength of the force in proportion as the means at his disposal may allow. Major O'Connor considers Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to be a man possessed of sound ideas and theories, but to stand in need of the guiding hand of an experienced adviser in matters of practical detail.

I have discussed the question of the Fars gendarmerie with Colonel Hjalmarson, who informs me that he has now a very considerable staff of Persian officers and non-commissioned officers at his disposal in a very efficient state of preparation. He says that he has always calculated upon having a force of 3,000 or 4,000 men in Fars, and that if the necessary funds were forthcoming he has plenty of material of the instructor class at hand to create a force of that magnitude in a relatively short space of time, more especially if Mukhber-es-Sultaneh would co-operate loyally with him in the recruiting of better men than those that have been obtainable in the Shiraz district hitherto.

Under such conditions it would perhaps be possible to organise the creation of a sufficiently large force under Swedish direction to allow of a part being devoted exclusively to the requirements of the Governor-General, whilst the remainder would perform the regular duties of the gendarmerie. An organised and well-drilled force of 4,000 men should suffice to restore complete order in the province, more especially if it was recruited from the excellent fighting material that the local tribes could supply.

Unfortunately, want of money will make it extremely difficult to carry out such a scheme. At the present moment 70,000 tomans (13,000L.) are due to the gendarmerie for the current Persian month. The treasury is entirely empty and M. Mornard is making vain endeavours to borrow the money where he can. The manager of the Imperial Bank is considering lending M. Mornard the money, although he has no security to offer but the surplus of the southern customs which the treasurer-general ought to be putting aside to meet the heavy payments due next March. Even should the money be forthcoming this time, it is not clear that there will be any chance of finding it next month as the treasurer-general has no source of settled income upon which he can rely.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 513.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, January 6, 1913.***SITUATION in Tehran.**

Though I am assured that, with a view to rendering the formation of the new Cabinet more easy, as well as to allay the violent feeling which has found expression in Azerbaijan against the Bakhtiaris, the Prime Minister and Minister of War have definitely resigned, the Cabinet crisis still continues.

Various reasons are given for the delay. One politician hesitates because his personal friend is not included in the Cabinet, another because no assurances are forthcoming that a large loan can be made. I believe, however, the real cause to be that politicians are afraid that the new Cabinet will draw down great unpopularity on its head by granting the railway concessions.

A programme of proposed reforms has been communicated to me by Ala-es-Sultaneh, the prospective Prime Minister. The programme entails a loan of about 3,500,000*l.*, spread over a period of five years, for the upkeep of the gendarmerie, the establishment in several of the principal towns of industrial institutions under foreign guidance, and the conversion of the pensions. Until assurances are received that money will be forthcoming from abroad for these purposes there is a reluctance on the part of certain important elements to enter the new Cabinet.

Good results might be anticipated from the first and third items of the programme, but it is difficult to give entire sympathy to the idea of establishing manufactories under Government control, as the experiment in this connection in more enlightened countries than Persia has hardly met with a sufficient measure of success.

No. 514.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 6, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 4th January: Intrigues at Tabriz.

M. Sazonof told me that he would instruct the Russian consul in the sense suggested. He asked me, however, to assure you that it was Persian public opinion that was opposed to the Bakhtiaris, not the Russian Government. According to the reports which reached him Sipahdar was behind the movement, for which Russia was in no way responsible.

His Excellency spoke in very pessimistic terms of the general situation in Persia. The military authorities wished to withdraw some of the Russian troops, but the present state of anarchy made this impossible. No Government could be said to exist at Tehran, no progress could be made with the question of the railway concessions, and when the representatives of the Comité d'Études went to Tehran, as they proposed doing next month, they would find no one there to negotiate with.

His Excellency insisted on the necessity of affairs in Persia being placed under the control of some really strong man.

No. 515.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, January 7, 1913.***SITUATION in Tehran.**

My telegrams of the 28th December and 6th January.

The author of the constructive programme of reforms, for the execution of which a foreign loan is necessary, is Motamin-ul-Mulk, the former president of the Medjliss. I had a long conversation with him to-day at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The object of the construction of public works (not factories as previously reported) in the various principal cities is twofold, namely, the construction of works of public utility and the employment of those persons who, when their pensions have been converted, will have no means of livelihood. The treasurer-general supports the programme cordially, and my Russian colleague sees good points in it, though he is

somewhat sceptical as to Persian thoroughness. My own opinion is that the programme marks a distinct step in advance, and I venture to hope that, provided that a capable Cabinet is formed which may be relied upon to carry it through with the moral assistance of the two Governments, His Majesty's Government will accord their cordial support.

Motamin-ul-Mulk is the pivot upon which the success or failure of Ala-es-Sultaneh to form a capable Cabinet turns. All the best available elements will enter if he consents to join, but, should he refuse, the formation of any sound combination is improbable. His hesitation in the matter is due to his desire to obtain assurances from the two legations that a loan of 5,000,000*l.* or 6,000,000*l.* will be made at an early date to meet the cost of execution of the programme of reforms and other demands, and that immediately the railway concessions are signed, an advance on the large loan of 500,000*l.* or 600,000*l.* will be forthcoming. It is proposed to devote one-half of this money to the gendarmerie and the other half to the beginning of the conversion scheme and the payment of arrears of salaries, because it is felt that if no funds are available for this purpose at the Persian New Year (21st March) the popular outcry will be so great that no Cabinet will be able to stay in office.

The future appears to be very black if it is found impossible to form such a Cabinet as Ala-es-Sultaneh is endeavouring to form. The Bakhtiaris are entirely discredited, and the reactionary and subversive movement in Azerbaijan will spread throughout Northern Persia; the nominal objective of such a movement is a Cabinet under Saad-ed-Dowleh, but its real goal would be Mohammed Ali Mirza, ex-Shah. The movement, which can hardly extend to Tehran without serious disorders ensuing, is being kept alive day and night by Saad's intrigues. There is abundant proof of Saad's activities. Disorders in Tehran may have far-reaching effects.

As you are aware, Motamin-ul-Mulk is one of the ablest and most enlightened men in Persia, and for the above reasons I spoke very earnestly to him. I said the two Governments could not give the desired assurances respecting a loan to a Cabinet which did not yet exist, but I assured him that the matter should be laid before you at once. I added that I felt sure a constructive programme would be honestly carried out if entrusted to the hands of himself and his prospective colleagues, and that I knew he could rely upon receiving the genuine sympathy of His Majesty's Government for any such programme which promised to be so carried out.

I venture to express an earnest hope that the matter may receive the serious and, if possible, favourable consideration of His Majesty's Government, as the moment is, in my opinion, an intensely critical one.

No. 516.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 7, 1913.

MY telegram of 5th January.

Russian Minister has telegraphed to Russian consul at Tabriz instructing him to tell Sipahdar and Shuja that they must put stop to subversive movement going on in Azerbaijan and clear telegraphic office of petitioners, who should not be allowed to send seditious telegrams to Tehran.

No. 517.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 7th January.

This should encourage Ala-es-Sultaneh, whom you should urge to announce his Cabinet without any further delay.

No. 518.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13, 1913.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 23, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

 Enclosure in No. 518.
*Summary of Events in Persia for four Weeks ending December 23, 1912.**Tehran.*

The Cabinet and Saad-ed-Dowleh.—Saad-ed-Dowleh's endeavours to form a Cabinet have, for the present, failed. Prolonged efforts made by leading Persian politicians to form a Cabinet without him and representative of the best elements available, exclusive of the Bakhtiariis, have not yet been successful, and Samsam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet continues to carry on the Government.

Salar-ed-Dowleh.—The Persian Government are negotiating with Salar-ed-Dowleh for his submission on the basis of a pension of 12,000 tomans a-year, and the restoration of his confiscated properties, the Prince to be allowed to reside at Tehran, but not to be given a governorship for the present. His Highness is dissatisfied with these conditions, but the Russian consul at Astrabad has been instructed to bring pressure on the Prince to accept the terms offered.

Governorship of the Town.—Sadr-ul-Memalik, formerly guardian of the shrine at Meshed, has been appointed Governor of Tehran *vice* Yemin-ul-Memalik, who has been appointed Governor of Mazanderan.

Dearness of bread.—There have been some slight bread disturbances in the town. Metin-es-Sultaneh, the Treasury official charged by M. Mornard with the control of the flour supplied by the Government to the bakers, is accused of conniving with the bakers to keep up the price of bread.

The "Dashnaksutivun."—This Armenian revolutionary society has issued a proclamation to the effect that it will no longer support the present "reactionary" Government.

Kazvin.

The Cossack force at Kazvin which had been greatly reduced has been increased to 325 men.

Three hundred men of the gendarmerie under two Swedish officers are now stationed on the Kazvin-Hamadan road.

Meshed.

On the 3rd December Mr. Meriton, Indo-European Telegraph Department, travelling from Meshed towards Tehran on line duty, was attacked by Turkomans near Maiomeh. The driver of the carriage and a servant of the Telegraph Department were killed, and the caravan was entirely looted, but Mr. Meriton succeeded in reaching Maiomeh in safety.

A brigand called Jehangir is levying blackmail from all travellers at Miandasht on the same road.

Robberies to the value of 5,000*l.* are reported to have taken place in the Turbat district.

Astrabad.

Salar-ed-Dowleh arrived at Khoja Nafas on the 11th November, and sent out letters to the Turkoman chiefs inviting them to join his cause.

The Russian troops, which have been quartered during the summer at Kara Su, have returned to Astrabad.

Ispahan.

The town has been quieter during the past month, but several bands of robbers have been operating in the neighbourhood. A party of Bakhtiari, sent out by the Governor-General, are reported to have come into collision with Kuhgelui tribesmen on the Shiraz road, and to have lost ten killed and wounded. The Bakhtiari khans in Tehran, however, state that they have no knowledge of this incident.

The Tehran road has been safe throughout the month and large caravans of merchandise have been passing.

A party of Boir Ahmedi, with several chiefs, are reported to have come to Yezdikhast with the object of escorting caravans, in order to gain the confidence of the Government.

Naib Hussein is again installed at Kashan.

Yezd.

An expedition has been dispatched by the governor against Marvas to chastise the robber bands emanating from that district.

Travellers report extortionate demands by road guards on the Ispahan route, in one case 4*l.* being asked for a single day's journey.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Mufakham has announced his resignation several times during the month, alleging that the Central Government would supply him neither with money nor with cartridges. Some 20,000 tomans have subsequently been paid over to him.

It is reported from Sirjan (*vide* monthly summary, 27th November) that an indecisive battle was fought between Sardar Nusrat and the combined Baharius and Farsis. The latter forces are said to have numbered over 6,000 men.

Seyyid Khan of Bam has collected a force to march against Nawab Khan, the chief of the Bameri tribe. Nawab Khan has concentrated his forces at Dalband, near Bampur.

Kermanshah.

During the month, discontent and robbery have been increasing in the town and prices have been steadily rising. There have also been rumours of a projected attack on the town by rebels. The state of the province has also been growing steadily worse. The Balawand tribe are raiding in the districts to the south. A section of the Galkhani Guran, under Kambar Sultan, have occupied a position on the Bagdad road and are looting all caravans. Another section of the Guran have been threatening the property of the oil company at Kasr Shirin.

No authority exists to cope with these disorders. On the 30th November Farman Farma officially notified His Majesty's consul that in consequence of the recall to Tehran of the 150 Cossacks, which constituted his sole remaining force, he had tendered his resignation. His Majesty's consul fears further disorders in the town as a result of their recall.

Seistan.

On the 17th December some 100 soldiers attempted to take bast in the consulate, complaining that their pay was in arrears, and that the Persian Government had telegraphed orders dismissing many of them without compensation and reducing the pay of the remainder. Among the troops dismissed were fifty camel riders for protecting the Kuhl Malik Siah road. Representations have been made by the legation to the Persian Government with a view to the retention of these latter and a settlement of the question of the arrears of pay.

Major Prideaux took charge of the consulate on the 26th November, on the departure of Captain Hunter.

Shiraz.

Major O'Connor, His Majesty's consul, arrived at Shiraz on the 5th December, in the place of Mr. Smart, transferred to Tehran.

On the 11th December a shooting-party, composed of Major Kettlewell and Captain Eckford, of the Central India Horse, accompanied by twenty-six sowars and

baggage caravan, were attacked by robbers on the Bushire road, between Khaneh Zinian and Dastarjin. In the firing which ensued, Captain Eckford was killed. The remainder of the party succeeded in returning safely to Shiraz.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh has appointed Soulet-ed-Dowleh ilkhani of the Kashgai.

Ahwaz.

The people of Behbahan refused to permit the sowars of the new governor, Amir-i-Mujahid, to enter the town until letters had been received explaining that the amir was "under the protection of the Sheikh of Mohammerah."

All the Kuhgelui tribes are reported to be opposed to the Bakhtiari régime in the Kuhgelui country. They are removing their property to the more inaccessible parts of their territory.

No. 519.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13, 1913.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 23, 1912.

UPON the receipt of your telegram of the 26th ultimo, informing me that a sum of 15,000*l.* had been placed to my credit at the Imperial Bank of Persia for the purpose of assisting the finances of the administration of Fars, I consulted the treasurer-general as to how best this money could be deposited in the bank in such a manner as to secure its being devoted to the purpose for which it was intended, and so as to offend as little as possible Persian susceptibilities, that are apt to be tender when an effort is made to control the expenditure of money advanced to the Government on which interest has to be paid.

After a verbal exchange of views with M. Mornard, and some private correspondence, which resulted in a letter from him dated the 1st instant, copy of which is enclosed, I had a private conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I then addressed a note to his Highness on the 10th instant, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, informing him that His Majesty's Government had consented to make a further advance to the Persian Government of 15,000*l.*, upon the same conditions as the previous advances made during the present year, to meet the pressing financial requirements of the province of Fars. By arrangement with Ala-es-Sultaneh, I sent his Highness the same day a memorandum privately explaining the arrangement made with M. Mornard for the control of the expenditure of this money. I on the same day addressed a letter to M. Mornard confirming the arrangement made, copy enclosed, and issued the necessary instructions to the manager of the Imperial Bank. I also had the honour to advise you of the steps that had been taken and of the Governor-General's acceptance of the arrangement made by my telegram of the 10th December. Acting upon the advice of the manager of the Imperial Bank, I subsequently sent a cheque for the 15,000*l.* to the treasurer-general. I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of his reply, acknowledging the receipt of the money.

Upon the arrival of Major O'Connor at Shiraz, he at once proceeded to the discussion of the financial situation with the Governor-General.

From Major O'Connor's telegram, dated the 20th instant, copy enclosed, reporting a conversation with the Persian representative of the treasurer-general, it would appear that he has formed a good opinion of this gentleman, to whom he gave valuable advice as to the manner in which the finances of the province should be handled. I have approved Major O'Connor's language used on this occasion. The 20,000 tomans referred to constitutes the first instalment drawn from the 15,000*l.* (say 82,000 tomans) advanced by His Majesty's Government. I sanctioned its transfer to the Bank of Shiraz at the request of M. Mornard, who was pressed by the Government to send money to Shiraz to meet the immediate expenditure likely to be required for the expedition to punish the authors of the Dastarjin incident. I have advised Major O'Connor that this money can only be spent with his approval.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 519.

M. Mornard to Sir W. Townley.

Cher Mr. Townley,

Téhéran, le 1^{er} décembre, 1912.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre, par laquelle vous voulez bien m'annoncer qu'une nouvelle avance de 15,000*l.* sera mise à la disposition du Gouvernement persan par le Gouvernement britannique à l'effet de faciliter l'organisation immédiate des forces appelées à rétablir l'ordre dans la province du Fars.

Vous avez bien voulu, en même temps, m'indiquer les conditions auxquelles Sir Edward Grey désirerait voir subordonner les paiements imputés sur le crédit de 15,000*l.* dont il s'agit.

En ce qui concerne le second point, j'estime avec vous qu'il est utile de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires afin que l'argent soit bien employé et qu'il serve réellement au but auquel il est destiné.

Pour atteindre ce résultat, je préconise la méthode suivante: le Gouverneur général établirait son budget pour un terme de trois mois de telle sorte que ses dépenses mensuelles ne dépasseraient pas 30,000 tomans.

Le projet du Gouverneur général serait attentivement examiné par le délégué du trésorier général à Chiraz et porté à la connaissance du consul britannique, qui, éventuellement, vous adresserait telles objections qu'il jugerait à propos de faire.

Je n'ordonnerais les paiements (environ 30,000 tomans par mois ou 15,000 par quinzaine) qu'après avoir pris votre avis. En attendant, les fonds seraient déposés à la Banque Impériale en compte séparé sous la dénomination "Trésorier général—Fars."

Ce système est à peu près identique à celui que vous recommandez, avec la légère différence que l'intervention du consul à Chiraz serait peut-être, en apparence, moins effective et ne froisserait pas certaines susceptibilités locales qu'il est, à mon avis, utile de ménager.

Kussitôt que les fonds dont il s'agit seront disponibles, je transférerai 10,000 tomans à son Excellence Mokhber-es-Sultaneh. (Il en a reçu 20,000 dernièrement.)

Veuillez, &c.

MORNARD.

(Translation.)

Dear Mr. Townley,

Tehran, December 1, 1912.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter, in which you inform me that a fresh advance of 15,000*l.* will be placed at the disposal of the Persian Government by the British Government, for the purpose of assisting the immediate organisation of the forces intended to re-establish order in the province of Fars.

You were good enough at the same time to specify the conditions which Sir Edward Grey wishes to govern the payments made out of the 15,000*l.* in question.

As regards the second point, I agree with you that it is desirable to take all necessary steps to ensure that the money is well spent and is really used for the purpose for which it is intended.

In order to effect this, I recommend the following method: the Governor-General would draw up his budget for a period of three months in such a manner that his monthly expenditure should not exceed 30,000 tomans.

The proposals of the Governor-General would be carefully examined by the treasurer-general's delegate at Shiraz and communicated to the British consul, who, if necessary, would inform you of any objections which he might have to make.

I would not authorise the payments (about 30,000 tomans a month, or 15,000 a fortnight) until I had consulted you. Meanwhile, the money would be deposited at the Imperial Bank in a separate account, called "Treasurer-General—Fars."

This plan is practically the same as that recommended by you, with the slight difference that the intervention of the consul at Shiraz would perhaps be, in appearance, less effective, and would not cause offence to certain persons on the spot whom I consider it desirable to conciliate.

As soon as the money in question is available, I will transfer 10,000 tomans to his Excellency Mukhber-es-Sultaneh. (He has recently received 20,000 tomans.)

I am, &c.

MORNARD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 519.

Sir W. Townley to Ala-es-Sultaneh.

Your Highness,

Tehran, December 10, 1912.

AS I had the honour to inform you some days ago verbally, His Majesty's Government, having learned that the administration of the province of Fars was in need of financial assistance to enable the Governor-general to carry out in a suitable manner the duties of his high office, have authorised me to advance a sum of 15,000*l.* to the Imperial Government for the special requirements of a province in which British interests are very considerable.

After consultation with the treasurer-general, I yesterday instructed the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia to place a kran equivalent of the above-mentioned sum to a special account, intituled "Trésorier général—Fars."

I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform your Highness that His Majesty's Government have made this further advance to the Imperial Government upon the same conditions as to interest, security, and mode of repayment as the previous advances that have been made during the current year.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 519.

Sir W. Townley to M. Mornard.

M. le Trésorier général,

Téhéran, le 10 décembre, 1912.

ME référant à la correspondance officielle qui a eu lieu dernièrement entre nous deux au sujet d'une nouvelle avance de 15,000*l.* que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire au Gouvernement Impérial afin de venir en aide à la situation financière de la province de Fars, je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que j'ai donné hier les instructions nécessaires au directeur de la Banque Impériale de Perse afin qu'il ouvre un crédit spécial pour le montant en kran de la somme susmentionnée, sous la dénomination de "Trésorier général—Fars." Je dois ajouter que Sir E. Grey m'a ordonné de faire savoir au Gouvernement persan que cet argent est destiné seulement aux besoins de l'administration de Fars, et qu'il est sujet aux mêmes conditions, quant au taux d'intérêt, garantie et mode de remboursement, que les autres avances qui ont été faites par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à celui de Perse dans le cours de cette année.

Quant à la façon dont on doit employer cet argent, j'ai l'honneur de vous dire que je suis d'accord avec la méthode expliquée dans votre lettre officielle du 1^{er} décembre. Je ne manquerai pas de faire connaître votre proposition au consul de Sa Majesté qui se mettra à la disposition de votre délégué à Chiraz afin d'examiner le plan qui sera élaboré par votre représentant et le Gouverneur général.

J'aurai le plaisir d'étudier avec vous le budget de la province qui vous sera soumis, avec l'aide des observations que le consul britannique jugera à propos de me fournir, et vous procéderez à ordonnancer les paiements suivant les nécessités du moment.

Veuillez, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

(Translation.)

M. le Trésorier général,

Tehran, December 10, 1912.

WITH reference to recent semi-official correspondence between us on the subject of a fresh advance of 15,000*l.* which His Britannic Majesty's Government has consented to make to the Imperial Government in order to assist the finances of the province of Fars, I beg to inform you that I yesterday gave instructions to the director of the Imperial Bank of Persia to open a special account to the amount in kran of the above-mentioned sum, under the denomination "Treasurer-General—Fars." I should add that Sir E. Grey has instructed me to inform the Persian Government that this money is intended solely for the needs of the administration of Fars, and that it is subject to the same conditions, as regards rate of interest, security, and manner of repayment, as the other advances which have been made by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Persian Government during the present year.

With regard to the manner in which this money is to be used, I have the honour to state that I concur in the plan explained in your semi-official letter of the 1st December. I shall not fail to communicate your proposal to His Majesty's consul, who will place himself at the disposal of your delegate at Shiraz for the purpose of examining the plan which will be prepared by your representative and the Governor-General.

I shall have the pleasure of studying with you the budget of the province which will be submitted to you, with the assistance of such observations as the British consul may think proper to offer, and you will then proceed to authorise the payments in accordance with the requirements of the moment.

I am, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 4 in No. 519.

M. Mornard to Sir W. Townley.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 17 décembre, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de vos lettres des 10 et 11 décembre courant et du chèque de 15,000L., qui accompagnait la dernière.

Conformément à votre désir, j'ai versé ce montant en compte courant spécial intitulé "Compte Trésorier général—Fars," lequel ne sera ultérieurement débité que de sommes transférées directement à l'agence financière de Chiraz, pour les dépenses gouvernementales de cette province, dont l'utilité et l'urgence auront été préalablement reconnues par la Légation britannique.

Je crois superflu d'ajouter que je partage entièrement votre manière de voir exprimée dans votre lettre du 10 décembre relative au même objet.

Veillez, &c.

MORNARD.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, December 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 10th and 11th instant and of the cheque for 15,000L. enclosed in the latter.

In compliance with your desire, I have paid this sum into a special current account, under the name "Account Treasurer-General—Fars," to which will be debited such sums only as are transferred directly to the Shiraz financial agency for the expenses of the Government of that province, the usefulness and necessity of which shall have been previously admitted by the British Legation.

It is unnecessary for me to add that I entirely share the views expressed in your letter of the 10th December on the same subject.

I am, &c.

MORNARD.

Enclosure 5 in No. 519.

Consul O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, December 20, 1912.

QUESTION of finance.

Mirza Mustapha Khan, inspector of finances in Fars, called on me last night to bring me telegram from Mornard, in which he is instructed to examine Governor-General's budget scheme for expenditure of borrowed money during the next three months, and to show it to consul before telegraphing it to Mornard. Telegram also states that the sum of 20,000 tomans will be sent. Mustapha Khan knows nothing about this latter sum, but presumes that it must be intended to meet extraordinary expenses of Governor-General's measures to punish the perpetrator of the recent outrage.

Inspector also showed me summary of budget prepared by the Governor-General. It consists merely of list of lump sums under various headings amounting in all to 99,000 tomans, and inspector is not aware how the total was arrived at, and whether the Governor-General has made any attempt to work the matter out in detail. He, therefore, proposes during the next few days to prepare detailed budget himself. He informed

me that there are considerable arrears due to the troops and police here, and asked whether it would be legitimate to include these in the new budget. I said that I thought not, as loan of 15,000*l.* was primarily intended to enable the Governor-General so to organise his province during the next three months as to start administration in ensuing financial year in such strength that he would be able to collect his revenue and maintain order throughout his province. I therefore advised inspector so to frame budget that its headings should include only such items of recurring and capital expenditure as might be regarded as lying within normal needs of the provincial administration, and that it might constitute model for ensuing years also; and to prepare also supplementary budget for such extraordinary expenses as arrears and special punitive expedition. Funds to meet these latter estimates would be forthcoming partly from 20,000 tomans promised by treasurer-general, and partly from such provincial revenues as might be collected before the close of the current financial year. If these resources were insufficient, further grant should be asked for from Tehran.

Inspector entirely agreed, and has promised to prepare budget on these lines. He seems to be a sensible man, and has impressed me very favourably.

Full details will of course be telegraphed to you for your approval as soon as I receive them officially. Meanwhile, I trust you approve generally of my advice to inspector. It seems to me that if we allow this 15,000*l.*, or any considerable portion of it, to be frittered away in purposes which can be of no permanent use to the province money will be wasted and Fars no better off than it was before. Whereas if the expenditure of this sum is so arranged as to place finances and forces of Fars on a firm basis, and to constitute model for future guidance, we shall have laid the foundations of real constructive policy upon which to build in future years.

No. 520.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13, 1913.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 24, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that an arrangement has been agreed to by the Persian Government under which the Cossack Brigade under Russian officers will be increased to about 4,300 men in all. Their present strength is about 1,800 men in Tehran and a newly constituted force of 650 men at Tabriz. The arrangement will necessitate the engagement of two or three more Russian officers. It is not to come into force until a loan of sufficient importance has been made to allow of the necessary funds being forthcoming. The pay of the men has also been augmented so as to equal that of the gendarmerie. This increase of pay will commence on the 1st January.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 521.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1913.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, reporting upon the condition of the road between the Turkish frontier and Kermanshah, and between the latter place and Hamadan.

On the receipt of Mr. Consul McDouall's despatch I spoke to my Russian colleague on the subject of the disgraceful state of affairs prevailing on the roads in question, as, if the figures given by Mr. McDouall are correct, the exactions reported appear to be worse than on the Bushire-Shiraz road. I then learnt that an arrangement had just been concluded between the Russian and Persian Governments under which the sum of 30,000 tomans (about 6,000*l.*) a-month will be guaranteed by the Russian Bank for an indefinite period to the Governor-General of Kermanshah, for the maintenance of a military force and the expenses of the provincial administration. The money will be refunded from the next advance or from the receipts of the northern customs when the existing advances have been paid off.

It is hoped that, with the assistance of this assured monthly allowance, the Governor-General may be in a position to secure a restoration of that order on the roads in his province, which is of such vital importance to British trade.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 521.

Consul McDouall to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Kermanshah, December 5, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that at present the exactions on the roads from the frontier to Kermanshah, and from the latter place to Hamadan, are very heavy, and there is no safety on the roads. I have reason to believe that the transporters would gladly pay a smaller fee once and for all if no further exaction were made. During the last year it is estimated that the roadguards have collected between 150,000 tomans (30,000*l.*) and 200,000 tomans (40,000*l.*) between the frontier and Kermanshah alone. One British subject, owning ninety-one camels on each trip, paid 18 krans (7*s.*) in all on each camel, divided between twenty different posts.

Rahdari on goods is abolished, but it seems impossible to prevent the collection of fees called karasurani or "salamat-rao" from the muleteers, and this may not be covered by the abolition of rahdari.

A proportion of the transporters are Turkish subjects; one man is a British subject and the rest are Persians. During the year Tanguz-il, according to the published customs statistics, 4,220,766 batmans of merchandise arrived at Kermanshah. The majority of the animals are mules, taking from 40 to 60 batmans, a number of camels taking up to 70 batmans, and some donkeys taking from 20 to 30. If we take an average of 40 batmans to the load we should have in round numbers 100,000 animals. On the return journey many of the animals are unloaded. Supposing 3½ krans per animal were collected on the journey to, and 1½ krans on the journey from Kermanshah, a total of 50,000 tomans (10,000*l.*) might be collected. From Hamadan to Kermanshah the same amounts might be collected on, say, 70,000 animals, making a total of 85,000 tomans (17,000*l.*) altogether, and there would be a further sum from passengers (mounted only) and internal traffic; this is a main pilgrim route. Details as to varying charge for camels, mules, and donkeys would have to be worked out, but the estimate of 40 batmans per animal allows for this.

It has been estimated that a sum of 80,000 tomans (16,000*l.*) should be sufficient to pay for a proper system of guards from the frontier to Hamadan. The service would have to be arranged under a European, say, a Swedish gendarmerie officer, who would raise local guards, but who should have a small nucleus of men from elsewhere. Receipts and expenditure would naturally be under the control of the director of customs and revenue. The fees would have to be collected at a fixed place, say, at the bridge of Zohab for the frontier, and at the Karasu bridge for the Hamadan road. A printed receipt would be given for each payment, and no other fees, except the grazing fees, would be permitted. It is doubtful if this could be arranged until the authority of the governor has been imposed on the tribes who are at present in an almost independent position.

I have, &c.

W. M. McDOUALL.

No. 522.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 7th January.

You should explain to Motamin-ul-Mulk that the question of a large loan is one for financiers to consider, and that His Majesty's Government cannot themselves promise that a loan shall be made. When, however, a strong and honest Ministry takes office His Majesty's Government will do what they can to facilitate a loan and to

furnish an immediate advance upon it. You ought to have no difficulty in convincing him of the good-will of His Majesty's Government.

I approve your language, as reported in your telegram, also the programme of reforms. The conversion of pensions would, I presume, form part of a general reform of the finances.

No. 523.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.

PLEASE communicate to M. Sazonof at once the substance of my telegram of to-day to Tehran.

No. 524.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 10, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 6th January.

Please take an opportunity of thanking Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for the instructions which his Excellency has sent to Russian consul at Tabriz.

You should inform him that I entirely share his view as to the grave nature of the Persian situation, which makes it necessary for the British and Russian Governments to decide at once as to their future policy. M. Sazonof is, I am sure, no less anxious than myself that the co-operation between the two Governments should continue with a view to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Persia. For this purpose our best course is, at the present moment, to give all possible support to Ala-es-Sultaneh and to encourage Motamin-ul-Mulk and men like him to join the new Ministry. I hope M. Sazonof may be willing to instruct Russian Minister at Tehran without delay to give assurances similar to those contained in my telegram to Sir W. Townley of yesterday, and generally to extend his cordial support to Ala-es-Sultaneh and Motamin-ul-Mulk.

Perhaps the Russian Government would also show their sympathy with the new Cabinet, as soon as it is definitely formed, by withdrawing a few of their troops from Persia and intimating that the remainder will be withdrawn directly order is restored. This would, I am sure, produce an excellent effect.

No. 525.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11, 1913.)

Sir,

Bushire, December 16, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 11th August, 1912, I have the honour to submit, for your information, a memorandum drawn up by Mr. H. G. Chick on the present condition of the Bushire-Shiraz road, especially in regard to rates of transport and transit impositions levied.

It is timely at this juncture, when the road question is in evidence, as demonstrating the extreme difficulty of the conditions with which trade to and from the interior has to contend.

As it reaches me just as I am leaving head-quarters for some days, I venture to leave it to tell its own tale, and to refrain from detailed comment.

I am sending a copy to His Majesty's Minister and to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, together with a copy of this communication.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure in No. 525.

Memorandum on the Bushire-Shiraz Road, from August to October 1912.

THIS note records conditions on the Bushire-Shiraz trade route for the period following that covered by my last memorandum up to the arrival of the new Governor-General of Fars at Shiraz, with some observations on prospects in the near future.

As fully explained in my last memorandum, the question of "rahdari," in its various aspects, is by far the most important feature of the disturbing situation created by the present anarchy and damage to British interests. Until it is completely rooted out, and the sedentary and tribal chiefs prevented by force from exacting it, the existing insecurity will continue. This fact is beginning to be more generally recognised in Persia, if not by the Central Government, at any rate by European interests and by the present provincial governors at Bushire and Shiraz. However, during the period under report, there were additional factors, increasing the anarchic conditions produced by "rahdari," and augmenting the difficult position in which trade in Southern Persia is now situated. These include hostilities between districts along the route, rates of hire, insufficiency of mules, and the state of the Shiraz-Ispahan and the Ahwaz-Ispahan roads.

"Rahdari."

According to the list included in my previous memorandum, totals of exactions by khans and tufangchis had risen :—

From—							Krans per
							Mule.
June 1907	3-70
January 1910	11-15
February "	9-75
March "	9-35
April "	7-10
To—							
September 1911	17-95
January 1912	28-12
March "	21-35
May "	27-50

Personal and careful enquiries from muleteers since August have shown me that exactions have been far more severe than previous to that date.

Specimen lists, giving in detail the sums taken at each place during August, September, and October, are appended. It will be noticed that four of them exceed 40 krans (14s.) per mule. The totals are :—

							Kr. sh.
August 1912	31 8
September 1912	44 17
October 13, 1912	47 6
" 1912	48 14
" 22, 1912	40 4

The position with regard to "rahdari" had therefore become more serious than ever by the time of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh's arrival at Shiraz, having nearly doubled since the spring of 1912.

After the incursion of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's followers on to the road about 20 miles from Shiraz, Kawam-ul-Mulk ordered that caravans should take a circuitous route from Shiraz to near Dashtarjin, but the Kashkuli khans, who were put in so-called charge of this short stretch, forced muleteers to pay 5 and 7 krans per mule while traversing it.

A further abuse is the 3 to 4 krans taken in Shiraz itself on each mule by the Kawam and his Kashkuli adherents, and the $\frac{3}{4}$ -kran at present taken by the Governor of Bushire at the town gate on the pretext that he is driven to it by the refusal of the customs to pay his allowances. It is true that the Governor undertakes to discontinue this impost as soon as his financial difficulties with the customs are adjusted. Meanwhile levies of this nature at Shiraz and Bushire afford a pernicious example to the headmen on the road, and make them the less inclined to forgo this lucrative source of income.

Mukhber-es-Sultaneh arrived at Shiraz in the middle of October fully acquainted with the urgent need of suppressing "rahdari" as the first item in the programme for re-establishing order along the road. He at once sent two Swedish officers and Swedish gendarmes, said to number 150, as far as Kazerun. They were to employ from villages along the road a further 100 tufangchis, who were to be paid by the gendarmerie, and they were to stop all "rahdari" between Shiraz and Kazerun. The Governor-General did not propose to deal actively with the road between Kazerun and Bushire, where the position of the tribal chiefs is far more solidly established than north of Kazerun, but he sent a mamur with orders to the khans in question to cease their exactions.

These two measures have been practically abortive. By the middle of November the Swedish gendarmerie were withdrawn; according to the Governor-General's own statement they had been unable to prevent the local chiefs from Dashtarjin to Kazerun from taking "rahdari" or from putting their own tufangchis along the road. From Dashtarjin to Shiraz, a distance of 40 miles only, "rahdari" was said to have been stopped, but it is doubtful whether this continues to be the case.

As for the special mamur between Kazerun and Bushire, he was, firstly, a man of very mediocre standing, an ex-artillery man from Bushire, and the letters which he bore from the Governor-General showed entire ignorance on his Excellency's part of the local situation.

Rates of Mule Hire to Shiraz.

Muleteers under the exorbitant exactions prevailing during the recent few months have of course incurred heavy expenses, but at the same time they have exploited their losses over "rahdari" and "alafi" in order to get merchants in Bushire to pay higher rates of hire. Of late these have been preposterous.

The following figures show the rise in rates, they are per 100 mans, *i.e.*, 775 lb., or roughly two mule loads:—

					Krans.
March 1907-08	160-120-110 90-140.
" 1908-09	140-160-170-220.
" 1909-10	200-250-300-310-240-200.
" 1910	200-150-210-145.
January 1911	110-120-150.
March 1911	130-120.
April 1911	160.
May-June 1911	170-190.
July-August 1911	190-180-200.
January 1912	310-320.
February-May 1912	310-290.
June 1912	340.
July 1912	410-440-480
August-September 1912	480-500.
October 1912	440-420.

(55 krans = 1*l.*)

Thus in the past fifteen months the rate has risen 20 tomans (nearly 4*l.* per 7 cwt.). Up till August 1911 the rate had never been known to exceed 20 tomans per 7 cwt.; up till January 1912 it had never passed 30 tomans; up till June 1912 it had never passed 40 tomans.

Not only has the rate touched 50 tomans (9*l.*) for general merchandise, but in October muleteers were asking 32 tomans (about 6*l.*) for each mule of a convoy of 160 mules to take supplies to the Central India Horse in Shiraz, the total bill, had not the rate been slightly beaten down, would have come to nearly 1,000*l.* Considering that the regiment requires constant dispatch of provisions, it will be seen how costly these rates, and the anarchy that has occasioned them, are proving for the British Government.

As for the way in which His Majesty's officers and Europeans are affected, it suffices to note that muleteers would not take two and a-half loads of wine for Mr. Smart in Shiraz under a rate which worked out at 70 tomans (13*l.*) per mule-load.

With rates of hire from Bushire to Shiraz never less than 40 tomans per 7 cwt., nearly 20*l.* per ton, during the past six months, and from Shiraz to Ispahan, 38 tomans or more per 7 cwt., it will be realised how hopelessly impossible it has been to put goods from the south on the Ispahan market at prices that would pay. It has not even paid to transport many classes of goods as far as Shiraz. Russian oil from the north,

with a land transit of over 800 miles to Shiraz, can be put on the market there cheaper than kerosene from the Gulf, only 185 miles away.

Shiraz merchants are feeling the strain very severely. The markets are congested, they are unable to sell freely or at good prices, and they are often hard pressed to pay transport hire.

The following figures, from Messrs. Lynch's weekly reports at Ispahan, show that the Ahwaz-Ispahan road supplied Ispahan with practically no goods from the Gulf during the period under review :—

						Packages.	
						Received Ispahan.	Dispatched Ahwaz.
1912—							
August	3	Nil	Nil.
"	10	16	"
"	17	Nil	"
"	24	"	"
"	31	227	"
September	7	98	"
"	14	34	125
"	21	Nil	336
"	28	"	704
October	5	"	94
"	12	"	358
"	19	"	34
"	26	21	Nil
November	2	Nil	40
Total						396	1,691

In the result, Ispahan is being rapidly cut off from British markets and from Southern Persia. Not only will the damage to British influence and to British firms engaged in Persian trade be enormous, but it is peculiarly unfortunate just as railway concessions are in course of discussion.

Since July the diaries of His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan point to a great increase of Russian trade to Ispahan from the north. I venture to append extracts covering the period under report :—

July 13.—There have been numerous arrivals from Resht and Kazvin.

July 20.—Numerous caravans continue to arrive from Resht and Kazvin.

August 3.—On the 27th July a large caravan, reported to amount to 600–700 head of transport, arrived from Resht with sugar, &c.

August 10.—Large caravans, amounting to about 1,000 head of transport, have left Ispahan for Resht during the week, chiefly laden with cotton.

August 17.—A large caravan with specie for the Russian Bank arrived on the 16th instant.

August 24.—On the 21st August twenty-three wagons, escorted by Persian Cossacks, arrived from Tehran. Twenty-one of these were laden with Russian piece-goods (335 bales).

On the same date eighty mules also laden with Russian piece-goods.

August 31.—Five more wagons, two with Russian piece-goods for Persian merchants, one of groceries, arrived. There have been numerous arrivals of mule and camel caravans with sugar from the north.

September 6.—There were some further arrivals of sugar from Kazvin at the beginning of the week.

September 14.—Very large caravans, reported to consist of 2,000–3,000 camels and 400–800 mules and donkeys, arrived from Resht, Kazvin, with sugar, petroleum, and silk.

September 4.—There have been further arrivals of caravans from Resht, Kazvin, with sugar and petroleum.

September 28.—Large caravans with sugar and petroleum continue to arrive from Resht, &c.

October 5.—Large quantities of petroleum and sugar continue to arrive from the north.

November 2.—About fifty-three bales of Russian piece-goods for Persian traders. Further arrivals of sugar also some tea.

For this very grave feature of the present condition of the Bushire-Ispahan route, I consider that extortionate rates of hire, and the failure of the Persian Government to grapple with the situation, are more to blame than insecurity from robbers on the telegraph route between Shiraz and Ispahan.

Hostilities along the Bushire-Shiraz Road.

In August, following the forward movement by Soulet-ed-Dowleh and robberies of petty caravans near Chenar Rahdar, the stage between Khaneh Zinian and that place, was thought unsafe for caravan traffic, and muleteers were obliged to make a considerable detour. At the same time fighting was in progress from Kazerun to the Tang-i-Turkan between Ali Mohammed, the Kumariji outlaw and Kashkuli protégé, who was implicated in the attack on the Central India Horse in December last, and, on the other side, the Kalantar of Kazerun and the Shabancara and Kumarij tufangchis holding the Kumarij district.

Directly hostilities were finished on the Kazerun side of the Tang-i-Turkan, the Kumarijis and Shabancara tufangchis became involved in a prolonged conflict, lasting all September and part of October, with the district of Konar Takhteh and the Khan of Daliki. The Konar Takhteh men captured Cherum, a village belonging to Kumarij, at the foot of the Kumarij Kotal. The Kumarijis reoccupied it in the middle of September, but caravans were exposed to rifle fire from the hostile watch towers commanding the village, and more than one muleteer was shot or attacked. Caravans were unable for a time to pass this point. For fourteen days in September no mules arrived at Bushire. Later, in the Konar Takhteh plain, part of the Kashkuli clan of the Kashgais joined forces with the Kumarij and Shabancara men, while on the opposite side the Khan of Borazjun sent 100 men to aid his ally of Daliki.

The villages of Jafferjin and Banaki in the Konar Takhteh plain have become particularly notorious for their ill-treatment of caravans, extortion, general turbulence, and insulting behaviour to Europeans. The telegraph inspector, a German merchant, the Central India Horse, and British officers have all made serious complaints of treatment received there in 1912, and, together with the district on the Kazerun plain, near the scene of the attack in December last, the Konar Takhteh plain requires early and drastic measures.

On the 1st October a convoy of supplies for the Central India Horse were held up for several days by the Khan of Borazjun at that town, and prevented from leaving though he knew well that they were hired by the British authorities. This khan has since 1909 taken every opportunity of showing hostility to British troops and interests. In addition, his blood-feud with the neighbouring district of Shabancara and his boorish character make his removal very desirable for the peace of the road.

Other caravans were held up at the same time, the Khan of Borazjun asserting that he was taking this action more particularly against Kazeruni muleteers in revenge for Borazjunis having been plundered near Kazerun, and for his Shabancara enemies being allowed to establish themselves in Kumarij, higher up the road.

The Kalantar of Kazerun ripoisted by detaining all mules for twelve days, until the Khan of Borazjun released caravans detained there on the 14th October.

The section of the road on the coast plain between Borazjun and Daliki was dangerous all October. Shabancara men made a raid and "lifted" the Daliki flocks; the Daliki khan lost three men, killed in a night fray in reply to theirs. The kedkhuda of one of the Borazjun villages and several men in both Shabancara and Borazjun lost their lives in similar night attacks.

At the end of October and early in November there were hostilities about 20 miles from Bushire, owing to a blood-feud between two villages, one in Tangistan, a little to the right of the caravan route.

By the 15th November it was the turn of the first stage between Bushire and Ahmedi. The principal chiefs of Tangistan, who have a blood-feud with the Khan of Ahmedi and were also annoyed with the Governor of Bushire, collected a force on the further side of the Mashileh, near Bushire, while a number of Tangistan riflemen entrenched themselves right on the caravan route, about 10 miles from Bushire, with orders to allow no caravans to pass. A good deal of shooting at long range ensued between them and the partisans of Ahmedi, while valuable caravans at Ahmedi, and all mules in Bushire, including a military convoy, were unable to move for five days.

It had already been sanctioned by Government that His Majesty's troops in Bushire should escort our military convoy across the Mashileh to Ahmedi, when the

Tangistanis returned to Tangistan, local influences having been exerted on them to withdraw.

The new Governor-General of Fars has now asked the Governor of the Gulf ports to undertake the Government of Dashti and Dashtistan, which includes a large part of the littoral behind Bushire. As the Governor of the Gulf ports has no forces to impose his authority on these independent chiefs, who have paid no revenue for years, the appointment is likely to remain purely nominal.

H. G. CHICK,
Commercial Adviser.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, December 15, 1912.

APPENDIX.

"Rahdari" Exactions.

	Shahbaz. Aug. 18, 1912.	Beruz Kazeruni, Sept. 17, 1912.	Meshed-i- Ewaz Buland, Oct. 13, 1912.
	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.
Shiraz	4 0	4 0	4 0
Kawakhane	1 5
Afabad	0 10
Chenar Rahdar	0 10
Bul Bardikar	0 10
Burj-Maserm	0 10
Mulla Kharna	0 10
Kala Nao	0 10
Zinian-Kuhne	0 10
Zinian Nao	0 10
Sar-i-pul Karaagaj	0 10
Through Tang-i-Surkh to Dashtarjin (to Ghulam Hussein Khan)	..	5 0	5 0
Kashkuli sowars	2 0	..
Burj Sine Sefid (Borj Timur)	0 10	0 10	1 0
Kaleh Mushiri	0 10	0 10	1 0
Sar-Changak	0 10	1 0	..
Caravanserai Mian Kotal	0 10	1 0	4 0
Dasht Barin	0 10
Abdui	0 10	1 0	..
Sar Kotal Dukhtar	0 10	0 10	1 0
Zir " "	0 10	..
Pul Abgineh	0 10	0 5	0 10
Kaleh Shua Sultaneh	0 10	0 10	0 10
Burj Kamon Keshi	0 10	0 10	..
Kazerun—			
Bagh, Seyyid Mohamed	0 10	..	0 10
" Sheikh Haji	0 10
Kawe Khane	0 10	..	0 10
Diris (5 places)	1 0	(3) 1 5	(2) 1 0
Caravanserai Rahdar (4 places)	2 0	(2) 1 0	(2) 1 0
Tang-i-Turkan (2 places)	0 4	(2) 1 0	0 10
Caravanserai Hakim Bashi (2 places)	0 4	0 10	(2) 1 4
Kumarij	2 0
Alafi	2 0
Kotal Kumarij	0 4	0 10	0 5
Dar Bannu (Zir-i-Kotal)	0 10	1 0
Cherum	0 10	1 0	0 5
Du-rahi Khisht	1 0	1 0
Takhteki	1 0	0 10
Jafferjin	1 0	1 0	1 5
Kamunkeshi	0 5	0 10	0 10
Banaki	1 0	1 0	1 10
Dawaguni	0 15	1 0	1 0
Sar-i-Kotal-Malu	0 3	0 5	0 5
Bunkurdi	0 4	0 5	0 4
Pul-i-Daliki	0 10	0 10	1 0
Namazgah	0 10	0 10	0 10
Daliki	1 0	0 10	1 0
(Nur Mohamed Khan)	..	1 0	..
Alafi	3 0	3 0
Tufanchis	0 10

	Shahbaz, Aug. 18, 1912.	Beruz Kazeruni, Sept. 17, 1912.	Meshed-i- Ewaz Buland, Oct. 13, 1912.
	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.
Ab-i-Gandu	0 10	0 10	..
Karaoul Khane	0 5	..	0 10
Jatta	0 5	..	0 10
Borajzun	1 10	1 0	0 10
Alafi	2 0	..
Diwani	5 0
Chah Khani
Kissar
Khushab	0 2	3 0	0 10
Isawand	0 2
Kawa Khane
Ahmedi	1 0	1 10	1 0
Chogadak	0 15	0 12	0 12
Bushire	0 15	0 15	0 15
Total	31 8	44 17	47 6

	Hussein Dawoni, October.	Raqir Kazeruni, October 22.	Shahbaz, November 18.
	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.
Shiraz	4 0	4 0	3 0
Asiab-i-Kawam	5 0	} 7 0	..
Dashtarjin	7 0		..
Sar Changak	0 5
Mian Kotal	2 0	..	0 5
Kalumi (4 places)	3 0	(4) 2 0	0 5
Kotal Dukhtar	0 4
Pul-Abgineh (2 places)	0 10	(2) 0 16	0 4
Kala Shua Sultaneh	0 10	0 8	0 4
Bagh, Seyyid	0 10	0 10	0 4
Borj, near Kazerun	0 10	..	0 5
Kawa Khane	0 10	0 10	0 5
Diris (2 places)	1 0	(2) 0 10	0 10
Tul Diris	0 10
Ramlaki	0 10	0 10	0 10
Jadis	0 10	..	0 10
Caravanserai (Khvajeh Ibrahim)	0 10	0 12	0 10
Rahdar	0 10	0 10	1 0
Tang-i-Turkan—			
North	0 10	0 10	1 0
South	0 10	0 4	..
Deh Kuhne	0 10	0 4	..
Kumarij (alafi)	2 0	2 0	2 0
Rahdar	0 10
Sar Kotal	0 4	..
Dar Banu	1 0	..
Cherum	1 0	0 4	0 10
Durah Khisbt	1 0	1 0	0 10
Takhteki	0 10	0 10	..
" south of	0 10	0 10	..
Jafferjin	1 0	1 10	1 0
Pul Bardi	1 0	1 10	..
Kanumkesbi	0 10	0 10	0 10
Banaki	2 0	1 10	1 10
Dawaguni	1 0	0 10	1 5
Sar Kotal	0 5	0 3	..
Bunkurdi	0 5	0 3	..
Pul Daliki	0 10	0 10	0 5
Namazgeh	0 10
Daliki—			
Alafi, &c.	2 0	3 10	0 5
Diwan	1 0	2 0
Tufangchi	0 10	..
Ab-Gandu	0 10	0 10	..
Karaoul Khane	0 10	..	0 10
Jatta	0 10	..	0 10

	Hussein Dawoni, October.	Raqir Kazeruni, October 22.	Shahbaz, November 18.
	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.	Kr. sh.
Borazjun	2 0	1 0	2 0
Alafi	0 15	..
Isawand	0 2	0 5	..
Khushab	0 2	0 5	0 5
Bagh Hissar..	0 4	..
Ahmedi	1 0	1 0	1 0
Chogadah	0 15	0 12	0 12
Bushire	0 15	0 15	0 15
Total	48 14	40 4	25 3

No. 526.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 9th January.

Ala-es-Sultaneh has succeeded in forming a Cabinet composed of Ain-ed-Dowleh, Minister of Interior, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, Minister of War, Kawam-es-Sultaneh, Minister of Finance, Motamin-ul-Mulk, Minister of Commerce, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Minister of Education, Momtaz-ed-Dowleh, Minister of Justice, Musteshir-ed-Dowleh, Minister of Posts. The last two were in former Cabinet, in which they did good work.

This Cabinet is as strong as can be formed, and there is good reason for hoping that they will be able to carry out serious constructive reforms, provided they are supplied with the necessary funds, and are supported by the two Governments.

No. 527.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 15th December: Murder of Captain Eckford.

The question of the policy which we should adopt in the event of the Persian Government being unable to punish the culprits has been engaging my attention, and I have carefully considered your recommendation that we should, in that event, prepare for an expedition of British troops to Southern Persia to exact reparation.

This proposal is, in my own opinion, open to grave objections.

Such an expedition would entail heavy expenditure, as the force dispatched would have to be large enough to make its success certain, and it would necessarily suffer considerable losses. A more important objection is, however, that we should probably be compelled, after the termination of the operations, to occupy permanently, or at any rate for a long period, a large part of Southern Persia. The independence of Persia would be finally destroyed, and our action would be the direct cause of the partition of the country.

I am strongly opposed to such a policy. I do not think there is sufficient ground at present for giving up hope of maintaining the independence of Persia. It would, I think, be more in accordance both with our interests as well as with the undertakings which have been given, to direct all our efforts towards establishing a strong Government in Persia and assisting the gendarmerie to perform its duties in a really efficient manner.

The administration may, of course, not be sufficiently strong for some time to establish order among the tribes and inflict the necessary punishment on them; but if we steadily pursue our object, the reckoning must come eventually, and our position will not be seriously affected by this delay.

The dispatch of an expedition should not be urged on the Governor-General of Fars until he is satisfied that there has been sufficient time for its proper preparation, and that it has every chance of being successful.

As regards the gendarmerie, have the funds now been supplied which I understand were needed for it? It would be better to spend money in strengthening this force than in dispatching an ill-equipped expedition; and I should have thought that, as the sum required is comparatively small, a special effort would have been made for this purpose.

No. 528.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 4th January.

As was anticipated, a month has elapsed since the attack on British shooting party near Dashtarjin, which resulted in the death of Captain Eckford, without the Governor-General of Fars being able to punish offenders. His Excellency should not, I think, be held to blame for his failure to do so, because task was an impossible one within time limit which he set himself at this season of the year.

From telegraphic information received from Bushire and Shiraz, it is clear that measures are being undertaken by Governor-General with co-operation of the gendarmerie to prepare such a force as may be able to operate against the suspected offenders in due course. Commander of Governor-General's military forces has gone with a small force to Kazerun, whence he has proceeded to Borasjun in search of more recruits, having assured himself of the assistance of 200 men at Kazerun and Kamarij respectively under trustworthy leaders.

One of the objects of the movement is to secure safety of Bushire road for passage of a consignment of arms and ammunition which two Swedish officers have gone to fetch from Bushire. These arms have been imported from Europe for gendarmerie, and it is only proposed to bring up a half of them at a time. Swedish officers cannot start from Bushire with caravan until a certain number of recruits have been enrolled, and sufficiently drilled to make them a force on which some reliance can be placed in case of an attack on the convoy, and they are also to be trained in handling of Maxims, of which there are two. It would appear probable that it will be a month before the recruits will be ready to take the road.

There was some difficulty at first at Bushire about the recruits, but it would seem that good offices of Sir P. Cox have succeeded in smoothing matters over, and that all is going well now.

Governor-General is very anxious to obtain possession of arms for the use of force which he is forming, but officer commanding gendarmerie at Shiraz objects, under instructions from here, that they are the property of the gendarmerie and cannot be handed over to anyone outside that force. This contention would appear correct, and yet Governor-General's efforts will be paralysed if he cannot obtain a portion of the arms, as he has no other source from which to arm his men. It may be possible to effect a compromise.

No. 529.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 12, 1913.

MY preceding telegram of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday morning to lay before me a scheme for policing of road from Yezdikhast to Bushire, which has been drawn up by Swedish colonel of the gendarmerie. Plan also provides for creation of flying columns, as it is realised that without the addition of such a mobile force it will be impossible to restore order in Fars.

Ala-es-Sultaneh pointed out that season of the year made it impossible to take any effective measures at present against the perpetrators of the Dashtarjin outrage, but that such preparations as he is in a position to make are being made by Governor-General to punish offenders, if possible, as soon as weather allows.

His Highness added, however, that Persian Government are of opinion that the only manner in which order can be permanently re-established is by scheme formulated by Swedish colonel, which provides for employment of a force of about 1,800 men on

road. Of these men he said that a considerable number have already been enlisted, and are undergoing a course of training which should allow of the dispatch of about 1,000 men to the south this spring. It is calculated that the first detachment will be able to start in about a month's time.

Want of money, his Highness said, is the great difficulty which besets the Persian Government in the creation of this force which it is estimated will cost about 350,000*l.* for three years. This period of time has been fixed because it is confidently believed that, should it be found possible to maintain force in Fars for that time, complete order would be restored in province, which would then be able more than to meet its financial requirements.

His Highness, with some natural hesitation, then asked me to approach His Majesty's Government with a view to ascertaining whether they would once more come to Persia's assistance by advancing this sum of money to be reimbursed out of the loan which it is hoped will be made shortly. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that not more than half of sum named would be required immediately, but that scheme could not be carried out unless Persia knew that expenses for three years were guaranteed. He gave me to understand that any conditions that might be considered necessary to ensure expenditure of money for the purpose intended would be accepted, and suggested that it should be placed at the complete disposal of officer commanding gendarmerie through the treasurer-general and entirely allocated to requirements of public security in Fars.

I am of opinion that gendarmerie under Swedish officers is the sole force to which we can look for a restoration of order and security on Persian highways. On roads where they are already exercising their authority order has been entirely re-established, or a very marked improvement is noticeable. I believe that in future, if money is forthcoming to enable them to establish necessary military force for protection of roads, 100,000*l.*, which could be paid monthly or in accordance with colonel's requirements, should suffice to meet expenditure for nine or ten months, and I would respectfully venture to recommend appeal to favourable consideration of His Majesty's Government.

No. 530.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 13, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 10th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day gave me an *aide-mémoire* in reply to the letter which I addressed to him. Following is an extract:—

While most anxious to see a strong Government established, Russian Government do not as yet feel convinced of the working capacity of the new Cabinet. Attitude of the Russian Government must therefore depend on results achieved by the new Cabinet and its good dispositions towards Russia. Russian Government continue to think large loan necessary and will co-operate in its conclusion, subject to necessary guarantees. They also agree to an advance on account of large loan without fixing the exact amount beforehand, after the railway concessions have been accorded. The Russian Government sincerely desire the recall of their troops, but as the latter in existing conditions offer the sole guarantee for security of Russian subjects and trade, they cannot at present diminish their numbers, nor can they fix a date for their withdrawal, which must depend on the re-establishment of order. They cannot express an opinion as to the Prime Minister's programme of reforms, not having yet seen the text.

In the course of our conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs said that you would find the Russian Government very accommodating, and that if the new Government proved capable of coping with the situation he would willingly give it his support. I could not induce him to consent to the withdrawal of small portion of the Russian troops. With regard to Shuja, his Excellency said that he was doing all he could to retain his services, as since he has been at Tabriz there have been no disturbances nor any loss to Russian trade.

No. 531.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 29th December : Attack on Lieutenant Bullock.

Compensation should be 500*l.*, as you suggest, in addition to the other claims which you mention in your despatch of 29th November.

Persian Government should be informed that a claim for this amount will be filed with the other claims outstanding.

No. 532.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 12th January.

You should inform the Persian Government that I am sincerely glad to learn that they contemplate taking serious measures for the re-establishment of order in the south, and that I will most carefully consider what His Majesty's Government can do to assist them financially in this task as soon as the railway concessions are granted.

A considerable part of any advance which we may make might, I think, be used for the restoration of order in Fars. It might be paid to His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, as required, and he could be instructed to see that it was profitably expended.

No. 533.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.

PLEASE inform M. Sazonof of the contents of Tehran telegram of 11th January, and say that I earnestly hope his Excellency will send instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Paris without delay to request the Regent, in concert with Sir F. Bertie, to sanction the new Persian Ministry as soon as possible.

I propose to instruct His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to convey a message of encouragement to Ala-es-Sultaneh and his colleagues, and I hope M. Sazonof will take similar action.

No. 534.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.

WHEN your Russian colleague receives his instructions you should approach the Regent of Persia as suggested in my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of to-day.

No. 535.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 15, 1913.

FARS finances.

The Belgian Treasury agent has now reached Shiraz, and has had long and satisfactory conversation with the British consul. He pointed out that, although judicious expenditure of 15,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government may enable the Governor-General to carry on his administration till the end of the current Persian year, his Excellency will find himself at the commencement of the new year, namely, towards the end of March, in an even worse position than at present, for this reason,

that he will have created a military force, and will have no funds from which to defray their salaries. The revenues in Persia are collected at the new year, but in Fars they are recovered during the month of April, May, and sometimes June, when the migrating tribes cross certain points, where they come more or less easily under the influence of the tax-gatherers. If he is unable to pay his troops, the Governor-General will have to contend with their complaints which may easily degenerate into disorders, and will have no force upon which he can rely to coerce tribesmen into paying the taxes.

The treasury agent estimates the cost of monthly administration at 40,000 tomans (rather less than 8,000*l.*), and the British consul is of the opinion that funds to carry on for from four to six months are necessary, although it is calculated that if all goes well it will be possible to recover about 90,000*l.* in revenue during the coming year. I am urging that cost of the administration must be cut down where possible. Expected improvement in security and prosperity of the province will not be sufficiently marked in short time at the Governor-General's disposal for it to be possible to make an arrangement with the imperial bank of Persia, such as is suggested in your telegram of 3rd December last.

I would, however, venture to suggest that it is most essential that the scheme of practical administration now being elaborated should be continued, whilst irreparable injury may be done if the march of progress is checked, if even for a short space of time, by want of funds. I am of opinion that 30,000*l.* should suffice to enable the Governor-General to place his administration on a thoroughly sound basis, as he would thus be provided with funds until nearly the end of June. I would beg to submit, for your most favourable consideration, that the above-mentioned sum should be advanced to the Persian Government, on the same conditions as the previous 15,000*l.*, or that it should be especially set aside for the above purpose out of the next advance.

No. 536.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 16, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 14th January to Paris.

The Regent's approval of new Cabinet has been received, and Ministers will be presented to the Shah on 18th January.

No. 537.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 13th January.

I am sorry that Minister for Foreign Affairs does not consider it possible to act as suggested in my telegram of 10th January, but I hope he will see his way, at any rate, to sending to the new Persian Ministry an encouraging message of some kind.

I note M. Sazonof's assurance that the Russian Government will join in an advance as soon as the two railway concessions which are now being negotiated are granted. This advance will have to be of a substantial sum if it is to be of any use, so I hope the Russian Government will agree to a sum of 250,000*l.*

It is important that Persian Government should have money to enable them to re-establish order in Fars and to punish the tribes guilty of the murder of Captain Eckford. I therefore propose, subject to M. Sazonof's observations, that, if delay is anticipated, the British share of the advance shall be paid immediately upon the grant of the two railway concessions.

No. 538.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th January: Fars finance.

Please see my telegram of to-day to St. Petersburg.

This is a matter which could be arranged when advance of 250,000*l.* is made.

No. 539.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 11th January: Situation in Southern Persia.

As you have decided that a military expedition is undesirable, I venture to submit that the only alternative policy should be energetically pursued by His Majesty's Government—the policy, I mean, of giving all possible encouragement to the gendarmerie and effectively supporting the central and local administrations specially connected with British interests.

I must emphasise the fact that no progress is possible unless both the gendarmerie and the Governor-General are liberally supplied with funds. If this is realised, I am sure that much could be done in a comparatively short time to restore order in Fars. The situation in that province is at present deplorable, perhaps more so than in any other part of Persia. Taxes have for some time ceased to be paid by the tribes, and if the latter are to be made to obey the laws and respect the authority of the Governor-General, it is essential that ample funds be supplied to provide for the requirements of the administration and to maintain a strong military force. If, besides this, it is realised that the British Government are giving their moral and financial support to the Governor-General, I am convinced that he will be able to win over to his cause the jealous and powerful chiefs who so seriously complicate the situation. To extricate the Governor-General from his financial embarrassments and then leave him alone would not now be enough; it is necessary to supply him with funds until he has had time to establish his position. The provincial revenues would then, I think, soon enable him to repay the sums advanced to him.

As regards the gendarmerie, there has in the last nine months been a distinct improvement in the bearing and physique of the men, and as times goes on the officers will acquire greater experience in dealing with oriental troops. They ought to make their mission a success, for they are all smart soldiers keen on their work. But the impoverished treasury cannot properly bear the maintenance of the force, which now numbers about 2,800 men, although the assistance of the Imperial Bank has made it possible to meet (after some unavoidable delays) all expenses up to date.

No. 540.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, January 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 16th January.

M. Sazonof informs me that he is quite prepared to give the new Persian Ministry a fair trial, and he will send them a message of encouragement.

As regards your proposal to advance the British share independently, M. Sazonof would like to consider the matter further before assenting. I said the only alternative was for Russian Government to join us in making the advance at once. His Excellency observed that it would be better if the two Governments acted together. He quite appreciates the reasons which make it desirable for His Majesty's Government to supply the Persian Government with funds without delay.

No. 541.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 21, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 27th December.

Salar-ed-Dowleh has accepted a satisfactory arrangement which the Russian Legation and the Persian Government have concluded under which the Prince will come to reside at Tehran, receive a pension, and recover his confiscated properties. The Russians wish him to be under their protection. It seems to me that such an arrangement provides a very valuable guarantee for his good behaviour, but the Persian Government are somewhat opposed to the idea.

No. 542.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 21, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* forwarding copies of two reports from Mr. Smart, late His Majesty's acting consul at that place, expressing his appreciation of the services rendered to His Majesty's consulate by Colonel J. A. Douglas and the troops under his command, and by Mr. Smith and the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in Fars.

I am to state that Mr. Smart's testimony to the services of the gentlemen in question has been read with much gratification at this Office, and to express Sir E. Grey's hope that the Marquess of Crewe may see his way to recommend their recognition in the proper quarter.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 543.

India Office to Foreign Office—(Received January 25.)

Sir,

India Office, January 23, 1913.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of Secretary Sir E. Grey, a copy of a telegram from the Government of India, regarding the reparation to be exacted for the attack on British officers near Shiraz.

I am to say that, as the question of the policy to be adopted in the future by His Majesty's Government in respect of southern Persia is now before the Cabinet, the Marquess of Crewe does not propose to offer any observations on the telegram enclosed.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 543.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.(Telegraphic.)
SHIRAZ.*January 17, 1913.*

We would urge that reparation for the attacks made on British officers must be exacted, but we think that Governor-General of Fars should be allowed a prolongation of period of grace, and be provided with money. We suggest postponement till the autumn of the question of an expedition.

No. 544.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 26, 1913.

ACCORDING to the latest reports from Tabriz, Sipahhar will leave for Europe in a few days, having obtained two months' leave of absence.

It is intended that Shuja-ed-Dowleh shall act as governor during Sipahdar's absence.

No. 545.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 26, 1913.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that the question of the railway concessions should be settled in a week's time or less. They are being discussed at meetings of the Cabinet held every day for the purpose.

His Excellency impressed on me very strongly that an advance of 600,000*l.* on the forthcoming loan is most urgently required. Persian Government hope that the amount of the loan will be 6,000,000*l.*, paid in five annual instalments of equal amounts.

In reply to my enquiry whether it was intended that the 300,000*l.*, which would be the British share of such advance, should include the sum asked for on account of the gendarmerie in Fars, the Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that the Government hoped the latter sum would be considered as a separate advance, to be repaid out of the second annual instalment of the loan, additional to the 600,000*l.* which was required at once for general purposes, and which should be regarded as an advance of half of the first instalment.

No. 546.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 27, 1913.

BRITISH consul at Shiraz telegraphs that Governor-General is in urgent need of 1,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds for his new force, and suggests that Government of India might be able to supply arms in place of the long Lee-Enfield, which is being replaced by short weapon of the same type. Minister for Foreign Affairs has sought my good offices in the matter, and considers rifle suggested suitable if not more expensive than the ordinary Mauser.

Governor-General can make no progress in formation of his new force without arms. Should the proposal be approved, I would suggest that resident at Bushire is in most favourable position to endeavour to arrange the matter with the Government of India.

I gather from authorities on the spot that safe conveyance of the arms and ammunition could be assured.

No. 547.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 27, 1913.

MY telegram of 26th January.

Wood is telegraphing fully lines upon which Persian Government are prepared to sign undertaking that Persian Railway Syndicate shall have right to construct Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway. In view of uncertainty as to cost of construction and prospects of financial success of the enterprise, the Persian Government reserve to themselves the right of choosing a contract or a concession after the survey has been completed.

Proposal appears to me to meet the requirements of His Majesty's Government.

No. 548.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 30, 1913.

MY telegram of 7th January.

Following from His Majesty's representative at Tabriz, 29th January:—

“Agitation at Tabriz.

“The crowd has now evacuated the mosque.”

No. 549.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 26th January.

We are prepared to advance a sum of 100,000*l.* for the Fars gendarmerie, subject to proper control of its expenditure, as soon as the 15,000*l.* advanced last December is exhausted. I propose that 8,000*l.* should be paid every month, until the total of 100,000*l.* is reached, for the protection of the southern trade routes (see last paragraph of your telegram of the 12th January).

As regards the advance for general purposes, it is necessary to await the decision of the Russian Government as to the amount they will supply. We will then advance an equal sum, as soon as the Persian Government have granted the two railway concessions.

No. 550.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* relative to the proposed supply by the Government of India of arms and ammunition for the force which the Governor-General of Shiraz desires to organise.

I am to suggest that, if the Marquess of Crewe sees no objection, the Government of India should be encouraged to give it their favourable consideration.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 551.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 2, 1913.

MY telegram of 21st January.

Salar-ed-Dowleh, without waiting for conclusion of arrangement being made with the intervention of the Russian Legation, has marched at the head of 200 men and Turkoman levies against Nardin. Result of the attack is unknown, but the Russian Minister told me last night that he believed that Salar had returned to the neighbourhood of Astrabad.

No. 552.

Note communicated by M. de Etter, February 4, 1913.

IL paraît que le groupe anglais de la Société d'Études hésite de participer aux délibérations du groupe français au sujet de l'emprunt persan et que le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas encore donné ses indications aux membres anglais de la Société d'Études à l'effet de l'expédition d'une délégation de la société à Téhéran.

En présence de l'urgence qu'il y aurait de procéder sans retard à l'échange de vues concernant l'emprunt et spécialement à l'envoi d'un délégué à Téhéran, le Gouvernement britannique jugerait peut-être possible d'engager le groupe anglais de ne pas se refuser d'examiner aussitôt que possible la question à Paris avec le groupe français.

*Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 4 février, 1913.*

(Translation.)

IT appears that the English group of the Société d'Études are hesitating to take part in the deliberations of the French group on the subject of the Persian loan, and

* No. 546.

that the British Government have not yet made known to the English members of the société their views as to the desirability of sending delegates to Tehran.

In view of the importance of commencing without delay an exchange of views regarding the loan, and specially of sending a delegate to Tehran, the British Government will perhaps find it possible to advise the English group not to refuse to examine the question at Paris as soon as possible with the French group.

Russian Embassy, London, February 4, 1913.

No. 553.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.

PERSIAN Railways Syndicate are telegraphing to-day to Mr. Wood regarding Mohammerah-Khoremabad line as follows:—

“Referring to your telegrams of 23th January and 3rd February. If the Persian Government definitely agree to give us option for either contract or concession, we accept Persian Government’s offer subject to (a) terms of contract or concession being settled before any expenditure on survey is incurred, and (b) Persian Government affording at their own expense adequate protection for survey parties. Foreign Office telegraphing to His Majesty’s Minister accordingly. Act in accordance with his views.”

The object of these conditions is to protect syndicate against futile expenditure. You should strongly urge Persian Government to agree in writing without further delay. After obtaining option we can discuss terms of concession or contract with Russian Government.

You may inform your Russian colleague of above.

No. 554.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 5th February.

Russian railway concession signed yesterday. Wood has seen Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed inability to accept proposals of British syndicate.

I hope to see Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon.

No. 555.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 5th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will to-morrow submit to the Cabinet syndicate’s proposals, which he thinks they will accept. His Excellency points out, however, that this will not further the question of the railway, since it is impossible for the Persian Government to give their consent to conditions of contract until they are furnished with certain information regarding details, the production of which is, according to the syndicate, impossible—presumably until after the completion of the survey.

It is the earnest desire of the Persian Government that an early start should be made with the work on the railway.

No. 556.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 8, 1913.

M. SAZONOF has just telephoned to say that Minister of Finance agrees to make advance of 200,000*l.* to the Persian Government.

No. 557.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 8, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

His Majesty's Government have learnt with much regret and surprise, from your telegram of the 7th February, that the syndicate's very moderate proposals for an option only have not been accepted by the Persian Government, although they have already granted the concession for the Julfa-Tabriz Railway. Such inequality of treatment is, in view of the great forbearance shown by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government, most regrettable. You should insist on their granting the option desired by the syndicate without further delay. When this is done, details of the concession or contract can be settled at once, as I am sure there will be no delay on the part of the syndicate, who are anxious to get this settled also.

No. 558.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 8th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has written letter to Wood in following terms:—

“Persian Government grant the right of option to Persian Railway Syndicate for construction of a railway from Mohammerah or a place adjacent thereto to Khoremabad, that is to say, either above-mentioned syndicate shall build railway in question by means of loan on conditions to be hereafter arranged as a State railway at the expense of the Persian Government, or the Persian Government shall grant syndicate a concession for construction of the above-mentioned railway on conditions to be arranged hereafter. In latter case syndicate shall build at its own expense and responsibility. In order to be in a position to choose one of the two above-mentioned methods and to draw up the necessary conditions a preliminary survey is necessary. Persian Government agree to commence this survey now in co-operation with syndicate, expenses of survey to be defrayed by Persian Government, on condition that if, after the completion of survey, Persian Government, by virtue of their right to select one of the two above-mentioned methods of construction, should decide to grant a concession to syndicate, the same shall refund to Persian Government expenses incurred in survey.

“Obviously Persian Government will provide at their own expense means for protection of engineers and surveyors.

“Period of this right of option is for two years from date of this letter.”

In communicating to me a copy of above letter, “chef de cabinet” was instructed to express hope that syndicate would be good enough to submit at as early a date as may be convenient a draft concession in order that conditions of the two draft proposals may be taken into serious consideration at once with a view to no time being lost in making selection between the alternative methods of construction.

No. 559.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 9, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

My telegram of the 7th February appears to have given you a wrong impression, which I much regret, of the attitude of the Persian Government in this matter. Before the Julfa railway concession was signed, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh repeatedly enquired whether an answer to his proposals had reached me, as he was (he said) most anxious to arrange for the British option to be granted first.

The present Ministers quite realise how valuable the support of His Majesty's

Government has been, and they have, during the later stages of the negotiations, evinced an earnest desire to devise a formula which, while ensuring that the work shall be commenced as soon as possible, would be acceptable both to the syndicate and to His Majesty's Government.

No. 560.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 16, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a report by Major A. M. Kettlewell respecting the attack on a party of the Central India Horse near Khan-i-Zinian on the 11th December, which resulted in the death of Captain Eckford.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 560.

Report by Major Kettlewell on the Movements of a Survey Party of the 39th Central India Horse marching from Khan-i-Zinian to Dasht-i-Arjan on December 11, 1912.

(THE party consisted of Major Kettlewell, Captain Eckford, Jemadar Soraiyan Singh, twelve men, including one surveyor of A squadron, twelve men of B squadron, two officers' orderlies, seventeen followers, and seventeen baggage mules.)

I started from Khan-i-Zinian at 7 A.M., half an hour after a party of about 150 Persian sarbazes (infantry), who were marching down the road.

I told off the twelve men of A squadron to act as baggage guard and to remain with the mules, and used the men of B squadron as an advanced guard and for scouting purposes.

Moving from the caravanserai down to the Kara Agach River I had scouts out on the low hills to the right of the road. These scouts had orders to rejoin the party at the bridge. This they did.

Until near the river I was accompanied by the Persian officer of gendarmerie with two sowars from Khan-i-Zinian. These then galloped on a-head to visit their post at the tower on the crest of the Sineh Safid Pass.

Almost immediately after the gendarmes had left me I sent Jemadar Soraiyan Singh and two sowars with orders to trot on to Dasht-i-Arjan, in order to arrive there before the sarbazes and secure accommodation for my men, about which I knew there would be some difficulty.

I then crossed the river, sending two scouts on to a small isolated hill (about 300 feet high), about 700 yards south-west of the bridge.

I then halted on the far bank for ten to fifteen minutes to close up my party before entering the strip of thorn and tamarisk jungle, through which the road passes for about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles.

I started on again at about 8 A.M. sending a scout to ride along the ridge (about 200 feet above the road), which rises some 400 yards beyond the isolated hill mentioned above. I sent forward two scouts to get up on to the next hill beyond this ridge, and two scouts to ride ahead on the road. The two scouts who had been on the first hill then rejoined me, and my advanced party then consisted of Captain Eckford, myself, our four orderlies, and five men of B squadron. At 8:20 A.M. this advanced party had got about 200 yards clear of the strip of jungle, and the leading baggage-mules were just appearing out of it when a hot fire was opened on us from the hills, 300 yards to our left. The advanced party galloped to get under the shelter of a hill about 350 yards to the left front, and the four leading mules and four followers joined it here. This hill is of convex section, so that on reaching it we were under cover. All the hills near are thickly covered with scrub jungle, so that so far we had seen nothing of our attackers. On reaching the foot of this hill we dismounted, and leaving two men with our horses began to climb the hill, which was frozen hard and very slippery. We had climbed about 40 yards up the hill, and I personally could still see nothing of the enemy, but some of the men must have done so, as they had fired a few shots in return to the fire which was falling all round us.

At this moment Captain Eckford was in the act of taking aim with his revolver, when he suddenly gave a lurch and fell. He was a yard away from me on my left. I went to him and he gasped out "They have hit me," and after that became quite unconscious. I left two men with him, and his servant who was down below came up to him.

I then with three remaining men moved a little higher up, and towards the east edge of the spur on which we then were. I could then (across a wooded ravine, which ran up into hills) see some of the enemy on the hill on the opposite side (this was the end of the ridge along which I had sent my scout), and as I reached the edge I saw from 150 to 200 of the enemy rush out from the bottom of the ravine and cross about 30 yards of open ground and disappear into the jungle beyond. The first fifty or so of these men had rifles, the remaining appeared to be unarmed.

I and the men with me fired at them, but I could not see whether any of them were hit.

Up to this time I had no knowledge of what had happened to the men of A Squadron and the rest of the baggage mules, but had seen several of the followers run off into the jungle directly the first shots were fired. From where I now was I could see some of the mules emerging from the jungle into the open bed of the river. They were quickly surrounded by Persians and taken out of my sight. I could also see one or two of the men of A Squadron who had got on the low hills north of the river. Shots were still being fired at us from the top of the hills on our side. My object now was to try and collect the whole of my men and to remove Captain Eckford. I went back to him and found that he was quite unconscious, but he seemed to still be breathing. I had him carried down the hill and put on a horse in front of one of the men, and then leaving three men to cover my retirement, with orders to rejoin me at a gallop as soon as I was about 400 yards clear, I proceeded with the mules and followers as fast as I could to the right (north) bank of the river. On the way I was joined by Jemadar Soraiyan Singh and the two men who had gone on with him. He reported to me that he had overtaken the Persian sarbazes about half way up to the tower on the top of the Sineh-Safid Pass (some 2 miles ahead); he had then heard the firing. He asked the Persian officer of the sarbazes to return, which he refused to do, and he himself then came back at a gallop along the bed of the river.

As I approached the right bank of the river one of the men of A Squadron galloped up to me and reported that his party with some followers and mules was on a hill just ahead. I joined them and found that one syce and several mules were missing; sowar Pooran Singh (the scout I had sent on to the ridge when I left the river after halting) was also reported to be missing, but was shortly afterwards reported to be present.

Having collected my party I placed the followers, left horse and mule in charge of Jemadar Soraiyan Singh, with orders to keep well under the left bank of the river and level with me; here they were absolutely under cover from the north, and had a certain amount of concealment from view on the south, afforded by a line of tamarisk bushes in the bed of the river.

The country to the north consists of low-rolling hills for several miles, with a few bushes here and there on them, but the watercourses which run into the river are fairly thickly covered with scrub.

I moved along these hills with my men in two sections, sending these sections forward alternately, and thus reached the road just beyond the bridge at 11:20 A.M. On the way I saw about fifteen to twenty mounted men on a ridge about 1,500 yards to the north and several men on foot in the ravines nearer to me with whom I exchanged shots, and saw at least one of them hit. I also saw fifty or sixty men with rifles on the bridge, but could not ascertain who they were. They eventually disappeared. Desultory shots were being fired most of the time from the hills south of the river, and I saw three horsemen moving along the hills from the direction of the Sineh-Safid Pass. These after a time I recognised to be Persian gendarmes. On nearing the bridge I saw thirty or forty men, some of them with rifles, on a small hill 400 yards in front of me, and was preparing to fire on them when they disappeared. Shortly afterwards about twenty men appeared without arms, and I went up to them. They were men from Khan-i-Zinian, and the telegraph ghulam was with them. Directly after my horses had crossed the bridge I was joined by the Persian officer of gendarmerie. He told me that he had had three or four men wounded, and asked me for help to bring them in, but took some of the villagers and riflemen from the village to do this. He then went off, and I did not see him again till about 5 P.M. I now mounted my

men and moved, with scouts out on the hills to the north, back to the caravanserai at Khan-i-Zinian.

On reaching the serai I found that one of my horses had been shot through the chest, one man had been slightly wounded in the heel, and one syce was still missing. The missing syce turned up at 2 P.M. He said that he had run off into the jungle and remained hidden. Nine mules with their loads had been carried off, and several followers had been stripped of their boots and some of their clothing.

As I left the serai in the morning there was a small party of Persians (consisting of three women, two children, with one or two attendants, two pairs of kajawas on mules, and three other baggage mules) getting ready to start. These must have followed close behind me or caught me up when I halted (though I did not see them), as they were robbed and their mules carried off by the tribesmen who attacked me. On reaching the river I saw a few of the sarbazes who had started in front of me resting on the far bank. They had disappeared before I got across. I saw no one else on the road either going out or coming back. The only other people in the serai the night before were a few charvardars with a small caravan going to Shiraz. On reaching the serai I connected my telephone to the telegraph line and tried to get into communication with Shiraz, but without success, so I waited until 2 P.M., which I knew was the hour for testing the line, and I then succeeded in reporting what had occurred.

During the afternoon four wounded gendarmes were brought in the serai. As far as I could ascertain these had been shot on the hills on the right bank (south) of the river. They had been stripped of their arms and ammunition. When I was working back along the left bank of the river I saw the tracks of the party who had attacked me. They had then cleared away to the north.

Defterdar Mohammed Zaman, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the baggage guard, states:—

As soon as firing started, the syces having fled, I collected my men and tried to drive the mules into shelter, but I was almost immediately surrounded by about 100 tribesmen, who came rushing down the hill and seized some of the mules. Fifteen to twenty horsemen also came up from behind. I then, with what mules I could get hold of, took my men across the river. As I was moving across about thirty to forty horsemen came out from the opposite bank. I got my men on to a small hill on the other side of the river and opened fire on the enemy, some of whom tried to make an attack on me with the object of carrying off the mules I had with me, but they were driven back by my fire. They then went off up a ravine towards the north, and were quickly followed by the others who had first seized the mules. I saw them carry off four men who had been hit. They carried off about fourteen mules altogether, *i.e.*, about five more than they had got from me. I saw no other mules anywhere in the neighbourhood. A short time after they had gone off I was joined by you.

No. 561.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the four weeks ending this day.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 561.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending January 22, 1913.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—After considerable difficulty and frequent delays Ala-es-Sultaneh has at length succeeded in forming a Ministry. His Cabinet, which is composed as follows, was presented to the Shah on the 18th January:—

Prime Minister, Ala-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister of the Interior, Ain-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister of War, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.
 Minister of Finance, Kawam-es-Sultaneh.
 Minister of Commerce, Motamin-ul-Mulk.
 Minister of Education, Mushir-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister of Justice, Momtaz-ed-Dowleh.
 Minister of Posts, Musteshar-ed-Dowleh.

The Regent signified his approval by telegraph during the week.

The Treasurer-General.—M. Mornard was made the object of an unruly demonstration on the 24th December. Being summoned by telephone to the house of the Prime Minister, he found himself surrounded by a crowd of menacing Bakhtiaris who demanded the settlement of their arrears of pay. Not content with commination, the Bakhtiaris assaulted M. Mornard's personal servants.

The matter was, with the aid of the two legations, satisfactorily arranged.

The Police.—A general strike of the police was declared on the 17th January. Some disturbance ensued as a result of an attempt by the strikers to force the gendarmes to join their ranks. A sum of money was subsequently paid to them on account of their arrears of salary.

The Electoral Law.—The Electoral Law Committee has decided that to possess a vote a man must have vested interests to the value of 100*l.* and pay a tax of 10*s.* a-year.

Resht.

Peace has temporarily been restored in the Talesh district.

Herr Haase, German military instructor to the Persian Government, arrived from Europe on the 31st December with war material, including several Maxims for the gendarmerie.

A contract has been signed with Khustarian for a service of motor cars on the Resht-Tehran road. It is expected that the service will be inaugurated in six months.

Astrabad.

Russian troops now quartered in the governor's house number 250 men with 4 guns.

Salar-ed-Dowleh returned to Khoja Nefas about the 12th January.

Seistan.

Major Prideaux, His Majesty's consul, arrived on the 26th November.

An agitation has been in progress at Birjand against the revenue officials. His Majesty's vice-consul at that town reports that the local director is a man of low origin and has been employing the scum of Birjand as his officials.

Kerman.

Major Lorimer, His Majesty's consul, arrived on the 10th January.

The expedition sent against Sirjan by the Governor-General returned to Kerman on the 8th December. From reports received it appears that the Bakhtiari irregulars indulged without restraint in plunder and rapine, razing villages and subjecting the inhabitants to the grossest indignities.

The Governor-General has abandoned his intention of visiting Persian Baluchistan on account of lack of funds.

Sardar Saïd Khan and Nawab Khan Baluch are preparing to wage war.

Shiraz.

M. Stas, financial agent of the Persian Government, arrived on the 11th January.

The Darya Begi reached Borasjun on the 4th January, and visited the local khans with a view to raising men to assist the gendarmerie in escorting to Shiraz a large caravan of arms and ammunition which have arrived at Bushire from Europe for the

gendarmerie. His efforts appear to have been unsuccessful. Major Siefert has, however, decided not to attempt to bring up the caravan for the present.

Several road robberies are reported from Kazerun, and the road guards at Tangi Turkan are still extorting heavy tolls from passing caravans, tampering with the loads, and molesting travellers.

On the 22nd December, Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli attacked and took a village near Kazerun. In the fighting which took place about thirty men were killed on both sides.

Ispahan.

Sardar-i-Zaffar left for Tehran and Europe on the 29th December, and Amir-i-Jang (a son of Sardar Assad) took up the Governorship in the absence of Sardar Ashj'a.

There has been a marked improvement during the past month in the condition of the town. Contributions have been coming in to the Revenue Administration in a satisfactory manner, and excellent relations exist between the deputy governor and the financial agent.

Caravans have been passing on the Ispahan-Shiraz road. The present safe conditions may however be attributed to the inclement weather recently experienced, which has driven the marauding bands off the road.

Reports from Abadeh show that the Governor-General of Fars is in negotiation with the Boir Ahmedi chiefs, who came into that town with a view to concluding an arrangement with them for the patrolling of a portion of the road between Abadeh and Aminabad.

Yezd.

The expedition sent against Marvas appears to have met with little success. Two hundred reinforcements left for the district on the 7th January.

The acting British consul reports that a feature of the past year has been the scarcity of caravans arriving from Bunder-Abbas. Merchandise from the north is gradually replacing British goods in the market.

Kermanshah.

The Sinjabi headman, Samsam-ul-Mamalek, has for long been engaged in cementing his alliances with the local tribes through marriage and intrigue to complete a confederation of all the Kermanshah tribes against the Kalhurs. The confederation in question was started early last year, and has since exercised a considerable influence on the trend of local politics. It would now appear that the allied tribes consider themselves strong enough to commence hostilities, and His Majesty's consul is of opinion that the Kalhurs will be unable to resist their forces. Samsam-ul-Mamalek has associated several notorious outlaws with the league, among whom one Mahmud Khan, Governor of Bisitun, upon whose establishment on the Bagdad road, in the event of the victory of the Sinjabis, Mr. McDouall looks with apprehension.

Farman Farma remains in the town, but repudiates all the responsibilities of an official position there.

The roads on all sides are very unsafe and little merchandise is being forwarded. The policing of the Hamadan road has been entrusted to the Kakawand tribe, the most notorious brigands in Kurdistan.

Bushire.

Early in November the Kalantar of Bushire, who throughout his ten years' tenure of the office has shown himself continuously obstructive and hostile to British interests, was arrested by the Governor-General. An agitation for his release was started by his supporters, and, when intrigue failed, two armed parties were sent out to entrench themselves on the Shiraz road outside Bushire. They there held up all traffic for several days. As a spread of these disturbances was feared, His Majesty's consul-general proposed to His Majesty's Minister that British troops should be used to clear the road. In the meantime, however, the governor's men succeeded in cutting the insurgents off from their supplies and in inducing them to withdraw.

Ahwaz.

Reports from Behbahan show that beyond collecting large sums of money from the town Amir-i-Mujahid has accomplished nothing. His Majesty's consul states

that it cannot now be hoped that he will gain any control over the Kuhgelui tribe. Difficulties have been created by an attempt of his Excellency to get possession of the revenues of the Lirawi districts which are not under his jurisdiction. The Sheikh of Mohammerah has, as a consequence, threatened to withdraw his support from the Amir.

Mohammerah.

Amir Khan, a British Indian subject, has been appointed inspector of finance for Arabistan, and arrives from Tehran at the end of November.

No. 562.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report the following movements of Russian troops during the month as recorded by His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Resht :—

On the 8th January, 100 Russian infantry of the Shemaskinski regiment arrived at Resht from Kazvin and left Enzeli on the following day for Russia.

On the 14th January, 300 Russian infantry arrived at Resht from Russia and left for Kazvin on the 15th January with a further 100 men who had arrived at Enzeli on the 15th January.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 563.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 10, 1913.

THE Government is becoming very hard pressed for money. Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed to me earnest hope of the Cabinet that you will use your good offices once more with the Russian Government to induce them to make a generous advance in return for very great sacrifice made in granting Julfa-Tabriz Railway concession. His Excellency hopes that His Majesty's Government will not delay their promised advance, as the Government counts with confidence upon their good-will.

No. 564.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 10, 1913.

MY telegram of the 21st January.

The arrangement respecting Salar-ed-Dowleh has not been carried out, because the new Cabinet, when they took office, decided that so dangerous an intriguer as the Prince should not be allowed to reside at Tehran in present circumstances. After much discussion it was decided, at the suggestion of the Russian Government, that he should be sent to Ghilan as governor of that province. Meanwhile Salar put himself at the head of a force and left Astrabad on a pillaging expedition, and is believed now to be marching on Meshed, having arrived at Sabzawar, on the road to that place.

The Government have sent a force in pursuit of him, and are inclined to revoke his appointment to Ghilan, on the ground that he has again taken up arms against them.

No. 565.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 10, 1913.

THE Cabinet have reopened the question of a small army. It is considered that the Central Government cannot make itself felt in the provinces without such a force

behind it. For the present it is only proposed to create a force of about 6,000 or 7,000 men. Nine foreign officers will be required as instructors. The Government would prefer Swedish officers, so as to make the army and gendarmerie more homogeneous, but they understand that there would be difficulty in obtaining more officers than will be wanted for the gendarmerie.

No. 566.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 11, 1913.

I HAVE obtained the following information respecting the concession for the Julfa-Tabriz Railway, and I believe it to be substantially correct.

The concession is for seventy-five years. Persian Government have the option to purchase after thirty-five years. The construction is undertaken by concessionaire at his own risk of loss, there being no financial guarantee on the part of either Russian or Persian Government.

It is a conversion of the former road concession, which had lapsed, and as such conveys the right to work all petroleum and coal mines within 40 miles of the line on each side. Benefit of Persian Government is as follows:—

1. Equal participation in profits of railway, after payment of 7 per cent. on the invested capital.
2. 15 per cent. of the net profits from the mines on State lands situated as described above.

The concession includes the right to construct an extension of the line to the northern end of Lake Urmia, and gives the company a preference to construct a railway between Kazvin and Tabriz on equal terms with those which any other company may offer in the future. Further, it carries with it a renewal of the old road concession under certain conditions in regard to the period of construction.

No right to establish preferential rates in favour of trade is conferred.

No. 567.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 11, 1913.

YOU will have seen from St. Petersburg telegram of the 8th February, repeated to you, that Russian Government have agreed to advance 200,000*l.* to Persia. I am approaching the Treasury with a view to an immediate advance of a similar amount by His Majesty's Government.

Meanwhile you should consult with the Russian Minister as to the question of security, interest, and eventual repayment of the advance, and let me have your views by telegraph with as little delay as possible.

You understand, of course, that this advance will be quite distinct from that to be granted for the purpose of Fars, as to which separate instructions will be sent to you.

No. 568.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1913.

MY telegram of 30th January.

You are authorised to inform Persian Government that His Majesty's Government are most anxious to assist them to restore order in Fars by means of the gendarmerie, and are prepared to contribute to the financing of the administration, apart from their contribution to an advance on account of the loan, on the following conditions:—

1. That the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 of your telegram of 10th December are observed.
2. That, subject to any observation you may have to offer, the gendarmerie budget

should be drawn up by Swedish commanding officer at Shiraz, and agreed to by His Majesty's consul and the financial agent in consultation, and, when this is done, that all actual payments should be made by the Swedish commander.

3. That all purchases for the gendarmerie should be put up to open tender.
4. That proper security and interest can be arranged.

Can some arrangement be made to secure this separate advance on the revenue of the province (see your telegram of 15th January, paragraph 2), and what can be done about interest?

I should be glad to have your final opinion as to what sum monthly will be sufficient to ensure the proper organisation and gradual increase of the gendarmerie force, as well as the amount of the contribution which will be required for ordinary administrative purposes by the Governor-General. We presume that 8,000*l.* a-month would suffice for all purposes.

No. 569.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 14, 1913.

THE Cabinet have addressed several telegrams to the Regent urging him to return to Persia, but his answers have been evasive and undecided.

No. 570.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, February 14, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs hears from representative of financial Russian group at Paris that moment is favourable for commencing negotiations with regard to large Persian loan. His Excellency therefore hopes that you will induce British group to send a representative to Paris.

No. 571.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 14, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the need for Great Britain and Russia to make a further pecuniary advance to the Persian Government before any big loan can be made by financiers connected with the Société d'Études of the Trans-Persian Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg has now informed him in a telegram of which a copy is enclosed,* that the Russian Government are now prepared to make a joint advance to Persia of 400,000*l.*

It is therefore necessary for His Majesty's Government to provide their share of the advance, viz., 200,000*l.*, the appropriation of which sum for the purpose has, as your department are aware, been sanctioned by the decision of the Cabinet.

In view of the urgency of the matter, I am to express Sir E. Grey's hope that the Marquess of Crewe will concur in his view that the British moiety should also be paid forthwith, and that in this case his Lordship will agree that half the British share of the advance shall be defrayed from Indian revenues, and will give directions that 100,000*l.* shall accordingly be held ready for immediate payment to the Persian Government.

I am also to express the hope that his Lordship will agree to advance from Indian funds one-half (50,000*l.*) of the extra 100,000*l.* which it has been decided to advance in monthly payments of 8,000*l.* solely for the purpose of restoring order in the south

* No. 556.

of Persia, and thus of avoiding the necessity of dispatching any of His Majesty's forces for that purpose, a course which would appear to be the only and far more costly alternative.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 572.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir,

Foreign Office February 15, 1913.

AS the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury are no doubt aware, the question of making a substantial advance to the Persian Government jointly with the Russian Government has engaged the attention of the Cabinet, who decided that if and when the Russian Government were prepared to proceed His Majesty's Government would do likewise, in order to enable the Persian Government to carry on the administration pending the eventual issue of a loan by certain financial houses connected with the Société d'Études of the Trans-Persian Railway.

His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg has now reported that he has been informed by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government are prepared to advance a sum of 200,000*l.* to the Persian Government, and Secretary Sir E. Grey is accordingly desirous to give effect to the decision of the Cabinet to make a similar advance at the earliest possible moment; and I am to express the hope that in the circumstances their Lordships will be able forthwith to place at his disposal a moiety of the 200,000*l.*, the other half to be paid by His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.

I am further to call their Lordship's special attention to the condition of Southern Persia, which is a matter of special and pressing concern to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of India.

Their Lordships are doubtless aware that in 1911 Mr. Smart, acting British consul at Shiraz, when returning to his post with an escort of 100 men, was attacked and wounded by tribesmen on the Shiraz road. For some days it was doubtful whether he or the British Indian force which was sent to his succour would be able to return to Shiraz, and the circumstances of the outrage seemed to point to the necessity of sending a military expedition of several thousand men to punish the tribesmen and keep the roads open.

Sir E. Grey was opposed to this course, as, in his opinion, it is a policy which might lead to the permanent occupation of Southern Persia and to the partition of the country, and involve His Majesty's Government in very heavy expenditure. Events disproved the exaggerated fears which were at first entertained, and Mr. Smart and the British detachment having reached Shiraz in safety, it was eventually agreed that His Majesty's Government should accept the assurance offered by the Persian Government and trust to their efforts and to the organisation of the gendarmerie under Swedish officers for the restoration of order.

Since that date the gendarmerie has made considerable progress, but it is not yet in a position to make its influence felt. According to the reports of His Majesty's consular officers, the southern trade routes are practically closed, to the great detriment of British trade, imports accumulating in the ports without the possibility of distribution.

British travellers, including officers in His Majesty's service, are unable to proceed along the road, and outrages of various kinds have been perpetrated on those who have been obliged to do so.

A recent event of tragic significance, namely, the murder by tribesmen of Captain Eckford at Dastarjin, has recalled public attention to the need for taking serious steps to assist in the restoration of order in the south of Persia. The military occupation of the Bushire-Shiraz road, of Kazerun and of Shiraz is urgently advocated in many quarters as the only means by which order can be restored on the southern trade routes. This view has been expressed by Sir Walter Townley, and although Major O'Connor, His Majesty's consul at Shiraz, takes a less pessimistic view of the results which the Persian Government might achieve with His Majesty's Government's assistance, it is clear that he considers that there is but slender hope of improvement unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to take the matter seriously in hand without delay and to provide the provincial administration with sufficient funds for ensuring the

maintenance and development of the gendarmerie force on present lines as well as to enable the Governor-General to meet ordinary expenses of administration.

His Majesty's Government, who have for some time past been faced with the choice of two alternatives, having made up their minds in favour of the course which appears to commit them least, must not hesitate to take the consequence of their decision, which will involve the loan before the 21st March of 100,000*l.* at least to be earmarked for the south in addition to the 200,000*l.* for general purposes.

Sir E. Grey is, as you will perceive from his telegram to Sir W. Townley of the 12th instant, enquiring what sort of security can be given for this loan, and has suggested the provincial revenues; but he is prepared for an unsatisfactory reply, and although he has little doubt that it will be possible eventually to recover the sum advanced to the Persian Government, he is of opinion that His Majesty's Government must on this occasion not enquire too closely into the nature of the security, but devote their attention to the proper control of its expenditure. The manner in which they hope to secure this is described in Sir W. Townley's telegram of the 10th December last and the above-mentioned telegram to him of the 12th instant.

Sir E. Grey trusts that their Lordships will appreciate the reasons which have led him to the conclusions advanced in this letter, and he is convinced that, if the present state of anarchy is allowed to continue, matters will go from bad to worse, and it will become impossible for His Majesty's Government to resist the despatch of an important military expedition to Southern Persia, with all its possible consequences. He considers that the only means of averting this necessity is by making sacrifices to maintain the authority of the Persian Government, and he is therefore reluctantly compelled to ask the Lords Commissioners to sanction with as little delay as possible the advances for which he is now applying.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET

PERSIA. No. 1 (1914).

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

(4)

A F F A I R S O F P E R S I A .

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 1 (1913)" : Cd. 6807.]

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
April 1914.*

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

[In continuation of "Persia, No. 1 (1913)": Cd. 6807.]

No. 1.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 15, 1913.

FINANCE.

Your telegram of the 11th February.*

As regards the question of the interest, security, and eventual repayment of the proposed advance to the Persian Government of 200,000*l.*, my Russian colleague seems to anticipate that his Government will attach to the new advance similar conditions to those attached to the advance of March last year, namely 7 per cent. interest, repayment out of the projected loan and security of the surplus of the northern customs receipts, such surplus to be devoted to the repayment of the advance as it becomes available. He is, however, still without definite instructions from St. Petersburg on these points. There is ground for thinking that the Persian Government will refuse these conditions as they will contend that it is of no advantage to them to pay 7 per cent. for the advance of their own money for such a short period; the more especially as they think they can get from other quarters more satisfactory financial assistance on less onerous terms by means of this same security. If there were a reasonable prospect to anticipate that a large loan will be negotiated at an early date the situation would of course be greatly changed.

Since receiving your telegram under reply I have not had an opportunity of seeing the Treasurer-General, but the southern customs surplus seems to be the only reliable security for the interest of the advance. I can only suggest that, pending the issue of a loan, repayment from the same source should be delayed for a specified period. I am also of opinion that His Majesty's Government would do well to state now whether they intend to detain the surplus of the southern customs from March on for the repayment of the advances already made.

It is argued by my Russian colleague that the Persian Government would be encouraged by such an attitude on our part to delay the conclusion of a loan. My own opinion, however, is that any delay in such negotiations would not be due to a want of alacrity on the part of Persia to borrow, provided onerous conditions outside the actual financial transaction were not demanded, but rather to the unwillingness of the financial world to lend money.

No. 2.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 12th February.†

I have sketched roughly to Minister for Foreign Affairs conditions under which His Majesty's Government are disposed to advance 100,000*l.* to Persian Government for special services connected with Fars. His Excellency expressed himself as quite ready to come to an arrangement on line suggested. Before proceeding further I would venture to submit certain observations on the proposals.

1. I am strongly of opinion that any financial assistance rendered to the gendarmerie scheme should be kept quite apart from any help that may be given for administration of the province, in spite of the fact that two schemes dovetail into each other and the one stands a poor chance of success without the other.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 567.

† See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 568.

2. I am of opinion that the Governor-General should also have a force of his own, and I consider Swedish officers or officers affiliated to gendarmerie should be employed for this force. I have suggested Colonel Merrill, an American, who stayed on after Shuster left.

3. Gendarmerie budget in Fars is estimated at close upon 8,000*l.* a-month, and administration budget at rather more than the same figure, so that it is evident that that sum would not suffice for all purposes. I think budget should be prepared here, but amended by officer commanding, Shiraz, in concert with financial agent and British consui, and that money should be paid under my sanction through the treasurer-general to colonel commanding here for transmission to Shiraz. This would ensure suitable and effective control. I am of opinion that the 100,000*l.* should be set aside for gendarmerie, to be paid in monthly instalments and, say, 30,000*l.* be advanced separately for Fars administration to enable Governor-General to carry on till end of June, or earmarked out of the advance of 200,000*l.* Minister of the Interior is of opinion that all efforts of Persian Government should be turned to the restoration of order in the south.

4. Question as to proper security and interest is receiving attention.

5. Governor-General is most anxious to receive your answer to request forwarded in my telegram of 27th January* for 2,000 rifles and ammunition, as he cannot proceed with training of his recruits without the arms.

No. 3.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 16, 1913.

FINANCE.

My telegram of the 15th February.

Russian Government have now sent my colleague instructions to make the fresh advance on the same conditions as that made in March last year. A communication in this sense has, I understand, already been made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Mornard is of opinion that the Cabinet may accept the advance without demur, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs is most anxious to conciliate Russia. He has himself urged that only a specified sum out of the surplus of the northern customs should be redeemable each half-year.

No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 9th February†: Mohammerah-Khoremaḃad Railway concession.

Syndicate are authorising Wood to accept offer of Persian Government, subject to following conditions :—

1. Sentence "in latter case syndicate shall build at its own expense and responsibility" to be omitted.

2. At end of letter, after words "for two years from date of this letter," the following to be added :—

"Within which time the Persian Government shall decide whether the syndicate shall build the railway as a State line or under a concession to be granted to them" (i.e., to syndicate).

I consider both these changes reasonable, and you should press Persian Government to accept them. The sentence referred to under (1) is redundant, as it is expressly stated in preceding sentence that conditions should be left to be arranged hereafter.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 546.

† See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 558.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th February.

The repayment of the advances already made should certainly begin from March next, if this can be arranged.

Will the surplus bear the further burden of the new advance—interest and repayment? If so, this is much the best solution. If a large loan is floated, all the advances can be repaid out of it.

No. 6.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 17th February: Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

Wood has already made the representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and has received the answer that Cabinet cannot eliminate sentence referred to under (1). I am making representations to Persian Government as instructed, but it would be easier to support my argument if I knew what other reason beyond redundant language syndicate has to urge against sentence in question which the Government wish to retain, because it follows the phraseology of Julfa concession.

Addition at the end of the letter is accepted provided that it is also stated that necessary data for arriving at conclusion shall have been obtained six months before the date of expiration of option.

No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram of to-day: Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

The reason against the sentence referred to under (1) in my telegram of 17th February is that it definitely binds syndicate to build at their own expense and responsibility, *i.e.*, without a guarantee, whereas preceding sentence leaves that point open for future settlement. To exclude definitely at this stage all idea of guarantee obviously renders the option nugatory and valueless. As to addition at end of letter, syndicate are prepared to accept wording of provision desired by Persian Government, as reported in the last paragraph of your telegram of to-day, but they must insist on the following further sentence: "If local political difficulties, of a nature to impede the operations of the survey party, arise, the period during which necessary data are to be submitted by the syndicate shall be correspondingly extended."

I consider the present desiderata of the syndicate eminently reasonable, and you should do your utmost to ensure their early acceptance by the Persian Government. The failure to reach a satisfactory arrangement is very regrettable.

No. 8.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

Sir,

India Office, February 18, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 14th February, 1913,* on the subject of loans to the Persian Government, I am directed to inform you that the Secretary of State for India in Council agrees to the immediate payment from Indian revenues of the sum of 100,000*l.*, being a moiety of the British share of the proposed Anglo-Russian advance of 400,000*l.* The sum in question will be held in readiness for immediate payment to the Persian Government.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 571.

The Secretary of State in Council also agrees to advance from Indian funds a further sum of 50,000L., being half the amount of the separate loan to be made by His Majesty's Government for the special purpose of restoring order in the province of Fars.

Lord Crewe assumes that these advances, like those made to the Persian Government in 1912, will bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent.

I am, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

No. 9.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 19, 1913.

MY telegram of 18th February: Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Cabinet consider retention of redundant sentence desirable, and point out that similar sentence in Julfa-Tabriz concession met with no opposition. He fears lest by deleting sentence Persian Government may be trapped into some financial obligations they could not encumber themselves with in existing circumstances. He seems to consider that previous words do not afford sufficient safeguard.

No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of to-day: Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

I am at a loss to understand the apprehensions of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Can you not convince his Excellency that the words "on conditions to be arranged hereafter" amply safeguard the liberty of action of the Persian Government? I do not see how, in those circumstances, the Persian Government could be trapped into financial obligations. All the syndicate ask for at this stage is that the question of a guarantee should not be decided in a sense unfavourable to them before the survey is made. When the survey is made the question can be examined on its merits; the phrase which syndicate desire to have eliminated would, if retained, preclude such an examination.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th February: Advance to Fars.

1. I agree.

2. If Colonel Merrill could be employed I see no objection.

Am I right in supposing that the expenses in connection with Governor-General's force are calculated in the estimate for administrative purposes?

3. I agree as to method of preparing budget and paying colonel.

At least 30,000L. should be earmarked from the general joint advance for the purposes of administration in Fars, and we could not advance more than the sums already indicated.

4. I shall be glad to hear further as to security and interest. If any means of repayment from provincial revenues could be arranged, it would facilitate discussion of matter, especially in view of advantageous arrangements made by Russia respecting repayment of last advance.

5. I hope to be able shortly to reply with regard to supply of arms and ammunition to Governor-General of Fars.

No. 12.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 22, 1913.

MY telegram of 16th February: Advance.

The Persian Government have made the following proposals to the two legations respecting the mode of repayment, security, and interest, in reply to the Russian offer of an advance of 200,000*l.* on the same conditions as the last one:—

The advances shall bear interest at 7 per cent. per annum, shall be secured respectively on customs receipts of the north and south, and shall be repayable out of the loan which it is hoped will be concluded shortly. If the loan has not been made before the 1st (14th) January, 1915, advances to be repaid by half-yearly instalments of 250,000 tomans (say 50,000*l.*) each out of the surplus of the northern and southern customs receipts commencing on the above-mentioned date. Should these receipts not suffice for the purpose, the Persian Government undertakes to make good any deficit out of other sources of revenue.

It is asserted that the Government does not propose to use any part of the advance for administrative purposes, but that it is essential that current revenue, of which customs surplus forms an important part, should be devoted to expenses of administration, and the Persian Government's hands be left free to devote proceeds of the advances to certain constructive projects. It is hoped that, if this important source of revenue is not impounded for repayment of advances for two years, much real progress may be made. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts that the Cabinet are of opinion that advance on the same conditions as the previous one can serve no useful purpose, and that it should not be accepted.

After much hesitation, my Russian colleague has consented to telegraph to St. Petersburg in the above sense, but he says that he is sure that the Russian Government will not accept the proposed method of repayment. Russian conditions of advance earmark a sum of rather more than 40,000*l.* for arrears of pay due to, and increase of pay of, Cossack brigade, which has been agreed to by the Persian Government.

No. 13.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 22, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 17th February.

Southern customs receipts amount to about 14,000*l.* monthly. This sum has to meet (1) service of the Anglo-Indian loan, which will now amount to 2,500*l.* a-month, and (2) interest on bank loan, viz., 5,200*l.* a-month. This leaves a surplus of little more than 6,000*l.* a-month, without making any allowance for other charges customarily met from this revenue.

His Majesty's Government have advanced 140,000*l.* to the Persian Government; if, therefore, they decide to appropriate the whole surplus, the repayment will take about two years, during which this revenue will be unavailable as security for even the interest on the new advance, which would amount to over 1,000*l.* a-month.

No. 14.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Julfa-Tabriz Railway Concession was signed at Tehran on Thursday, the 6th instant, by Vossuk-ed-Dowleh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the part of the Persian Government, and by M. Podgoursky, on the part of the Russian syndicate to whom the concession has been granted.

The duration of the concession is for seventy-five years from the date of the completion of the construction, with an option in favour of the Persian Government to

purchase the same after thirty-five years; and the work must be carried out within eight years from the commencement of the work of construction, which must be begun within two years of the date of the signature of the concession.

There is no financial guarantee either on the part of the Persian or of the Russian Government attached to the concession. The Persian Government and the shareholders will divide in equal parts all profits from the undertaking after 7 per cent. per annum has been paid upon the capital invested. There are no preferential rights attached to the transport of Russian goods. The concession carries with it the right to construct a branch line from some point on the Julfa-Tabriz line to a place on the north-eastern shore of Lake Urmia, but no navigation rights on that lake are secured. The concession also carries with it a preference for the construction at some future date, on conditions to be determined upon in due course, of a railway from Tabriz to Kazvin, on equal terms with the conditions put forward by any other company or syndicate. The right of constructing a carriage road from Tabriz to Kazvin is also renewed to the same company, the old road concession having lapsed, and upon the conditions of the said concession, on the understanding that the work of construction of the said road shall have been commenced within two years and concluded within eight years from the date of the present instrument.

The large mining rights over an area of 40 miles on each side of the line form part of the conditions of the old road concession. The Persian Government has succeeded in modifying the old conditions in the sense that 15 per cent. of the net profits of the working of the petroleum and coal mines in this area has to be paid to the Government, whereas under the original conditions of the road concession it received no share whatever. A clause granting the company the right to fell timber on Government lands within the same area has been cancelled.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 15.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 19th February: Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

The Persian Government have agreed to eliminate the sentence quoted in your telegram of 17th February. The following words are inserted, however: "By mutual consent" in each case after the words "on conditions to be arranged hereafter"; and at commencement of the second paragraph of the option, as quoted in my telegram of 9th February,* the words "in order to be in a position to choose one of the two above-mentioned methods" are changed to "in order to arrive at a decision in the matter," and, lower down, the sentence "by virtue of" to "construction" is omitted.

After the clause fixing the length of the duration of the option, proposed letter is worded as follows: "Within that period the Persian Government shall communicate its decision to the syndicate, but the result of the survey, with necessary data, must be submitted to the Persian Government six months before the end of that period. Should events of *force majeure* hinder operations of surveyors, the time which has been fixed for presenting the result of the survey will be prolonged for a period during which the above operations have been delayed."

In submitting to me the above amended proposal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to invite Wood to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and exchange original proposal for new one. I am replying that I have advised Wood to wait before doing so to see if the new proposals are acceptable to the syndicate.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has had very great difficulty in getting the Cabinet to agree to eliminate sentence respecting the syndicate building at its own expense and responsibility, and I have had to refuse several suggested alterations intended to safeguard the Persian Government against having to provide financial guarantee. During numerous long conversations I have had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the last few days, it has been made clear that the Persian Government fear they may be forced by terms of the option either to have a State railway built by the syndicate at a heavy loss, or to give the syndicate a guarantee of a most onerous nature.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 558.

No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 25, 1913.

THE Persian Minister called at the Foreign Office on the 20th instant to say that his Government were unable to accept the conditions upon which the Russian Government proposed to make them the advance of 200,000*l.*, comprising interest at 7 per cent., repayment within a year, and retention by Russia of the whole surplus of the northern customs in order to effect this.

Sir L. Mallet, who received Mushir-ul-Mulk, said that he understood that these terms were identical with those which the Persian Government had accepted for the last advance. The Minister admitted it, but said that this did not make the case any better.

Sir L. Mallet asked the Minister to send him a short statement of the Russian and Persian proposals which he could show me, and Mushir-ul-Mulk accordingly communicated to me, on the 24th instant, the accompanying memorandum.

Mushir-ul-Mulk also spoke of Salar-ed-Dowleh's appointment to Resht. Sir L. Mallet told him that I thought that the Persian Government would do well to raise no further objection, but wait and see how the arrangement worked.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Memorandum.

RUSSIAN conditions for the advance of 200,000*l.* (Russian portion):—

1. Hypothecation of the surplus of all the northern customs.
2. Repayment of the principal and interest at the rate of 7 per cent. at the end of the first year.

An advance on these conditions would be of no use to the Persian Government. The joint advance is not intended for current expenses. The Government desires to devote part of it to the payment of arrears of pay which is of immediate necessity. The other portion is to be set aside for the expenses of taking measures for the security of the country. So that the current expenses would have to be met from the existing sources of revenue, the chief of which is the surplus of the customs. If the surplus of all the northern customs be taken for this advance, it will be impossible to meet the daily and current expenses of the Government, so that it will involve the latter in fresh difficulties, and in view of this fact the Persian Government would prefer to dispense with the advance.

As the Persian Government are in urgent need of funds they would agree to the following conditions in order to meet Russia:—

1. 50,000*l.* (of the Russian portion) to be paid down, the remaining 150,000*l.* to be paid within three months at the rate of 50,000*l.* per month.
2. Whenever the large loan is concluded, this advance to be a first charge on that loan; in case of delay in the conclusion of the loan the Persian Government would pay interest on this advance at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum until 1915. From the 1st January, 1915, the Government would pay 50,000*l.*, on account of the principal every six months until the whole 200,000*l.* is paid.

No. 17.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 27, 1913.

FIRST detachment of gendarmerie, 450 strong, leaves to-morrow for Shiraz, where it is expected that they will arrive on or about the 1st April. Swedish colonel follows in about a week.

Two British officers of the Indian Army, who are at present at Ispahan, are desirous of accompanying the gendarmes from Shiraz to Bushire. I am not in favour

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of their doing so, as I consider that movements of gendarmerie should not be hampered by presence of non-combatants. I much hope that gendarmes will not be attacked, but one must be prepared for such a possibility, and were an attack to be made on them, presence of British officers among them would, in my opinion, be highly undesirable.

There are several persons of various nationalities who have expressed desire to accompany gendarmes to Bushire. I have advised Swedish colonel not to encumber himself with sightseers.

No. 18.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, February 27, 1913.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 15th instant,* in which Secretary Sir E. Grey submits proposals for certain further advances to the Persian Government, and I am directed to make the following reply:—

Under the terms of previous letters my Lords agreed to provide 100,000*l.* in all, and did actually transfer to the credit of the Secretary of State 75,000*l.*, for the purposes of advances, in conjunction with the Indian and Russian Governments, to the Persian Government. They understand that Secretary Sir E. Grey has still in hand, out of the latter amount, 5,000*l.*

In these circumstances, their Lordships have given directions for the transfer from the Treasury Chest Fund to the credit of the Vote for Diplomatic and Consular Services of 95,000*l.*, which, with the 5,000*l.* still in the hands of your department, will make up the 100,000*l.* required as the British share of the new advance of 400,000*l.* (by Russia, India, and Great Britain conjointly) agreed to by His Majesty's Government.

Their Lordships agree with the view expressed by the Secretary of State in his telegram of the 17th February to Sir W. Townley that this advance should be secured, if possible, on the surplus of the southern customs. They will be glad to know as soon as possible the exact terms proposed. They also agree that the repayment of the advances already made should begin from March next if practicable.

There remains the proposal for a separate advance (100,000*l.*) for Southern Persia; and on this I am to say that the representations urged by Secretary Sir E. Grey leave them no alternative but to approve this proposal also, on the understanding that, as explained in the letter from the Secretary of State for India of the 18th instant, one-half of the advance will be made by the Indian Government.

Their Lordships will then place 50,000*l.* at the disposal of your department as and when required, and the Secretary of State will doubtless inform them at the earliest date what arrangements he is able to propose as to the security and interest for the loan, the expenditure from which will be subject to the conditions outlined in telegram of the 12th February† to Sir W. Townley.

I am, &c.

ROBERT CHALMERS.

No. 19.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, February 28, 1913.

PERSIAN finances.

My telegram of the 10th February.‡

I am informed by the Prime Minister that, unless funds are forthcoming by the 21st March, Persian New Year's Day, it will be impossible for the Cabinet to continue in office.

My own opinion is that it is most desirable for the furtherance of British interests that there should be no change of Cabinet.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 572.

† See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 568.

‡ See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 563.

The Prime Minister much hopes that His Majesty's Government will lend their support in inducing the Russian Government to agree to the proposals put forward by the Persian Government respecting the mode of repayment of the advances.

No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

Sir,

Bushire, February 7, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your consideration the question of the reconstruction of the custom-house at Bushire, which is now under discussion between His Majesty's Minister, the Administrator-General, and the Imperial Bank of Persia at Tehran, and to submit copies of past correspondence on the subject.

The present customs premises at Bushire belong only partly to the Persian Government, the greater portion of the site and premises being claimed by Muin-ut-Tujjar, who leases them to the Administrator-General for more than 100*l.* per month. The wharf is in a very bad state, being constantly broken into by the sea, and during high tides goods lying on it are frequently damaged, and in some cases washed off. The terrain of the site being practically at sea level, and being inadequately protected by sea-walls, and the buildings contained in it having defective foundations, the whole property is, in consequence, periodically flooded, and great damage then accrues to goods lying inside the courtyards and in badly built warehouses.

The Customs Administration has for long been extremely dissatisfied with the buildings. In consequence of the growing outcry from Lloyd's, British merchants, and agents, the question of improvements was discussed locally in 1908 between British official and mercantile representatives and M. Wibier of the Central Customs Administration, when that gentleman was specially deputed from Tehran on a tour of inspection.

As regards subsequent dilapidation of the premises, damage to merchandise, and condemnation of the site, I reported at length to Sir George Barclay in a despatch dated the 24th January, 1911, an extract from which is attached under enclosure No. 1.

M. Mornard determined in March 1911 to proceed with reconstruction of the customs premises and quay, and to put the work in the hands of Indian contractors. Sir George Barclay telegraphed to me on the 12th March, 1911, that he had promised M. Mornard his strongest support, and had told him that he would probably be able to ascertain from the Government of India the names of firms capable of undertaking the construction. On the 28th July, 1911, M. Mornard telegraphed to the director at Bushire: "Quels que soient agissements Moin à Bouchir, construction de la nouvelle douane est désormais certaine."

A copy of my letter of the 17th October, 1911, to the Government of India on the subject of selection of a contractor in India is contained in enclosure No. 2.

In January 1912, while on duty with the Government of India at Calcutta, I was given to understand informally that the Public Works Department would *primâ facie* be ready when requested to depute an experienced whole-time overseer to take charge of the building work under the assistant-engineer of the Public Works Department, associated with this Residency for the charge of buildings in the Gulf.

In May 1912 the Central Administration of Customs instructed the local director that Messrs. Cossier and Co. (Limited), of Karachi, whose preliminary tenders had been accepted, should be summoned to Bushire in order to furnish their final proposals.

The firm went to the expense of sending up their works manager, who made detailed examination of the site and plans, and were assured that, as soon as their final estimates were sent to Bushire and accepted by the central administration, construction would begin. In December last their tender duly came to hand, was approved by the local director, and referred to Tehran for the necessary credits to be opened.

Enclosures Nos. 3 and 4 being copies of my telegrams of the 4th instant to Sir W. Townley, and his reply of the 15th instant, are attached.

It would now appear from Sir W. Townley's reply that the Imperial Bank of Persia is raising difficulties with regard to the allotment of the credit applied for by the Treasurer-General from the surplus revenues of the southern customs, and that these difficulties are connected, not with the payment of the coupons of the bank's own loans, but with possible repayment of the recent advances made by His Majesty's Government.

Sir W. Townley also alludes to the likelihood of the surplus revenues having to be utilised to cover past and impending advances, and, in view of that contingency, is inclined to allow the construction to remain in abeyance.

Great importance is attached locally to speedy reconstruction of the customs premises, and I think it will be clear to you from my statement of the case and the correspondence attached that there is a real need for expenditure on this project, which has been actively promoted by His Majesty's Legation, the Government of India, the Customs Administration, and this residency and consulate-general. It would consequently be a great set-back and disappointment if at the eleventh hour the relatively small funds required were withheld.

In this connection it is perhaps unnecessary to recall the fact that the construction of suitable customs premises is one of the reforms stipulated for by article 5 of our commercial convention with Persia; it therefore seems reasonable to hold that capital expenditure under this head should be regarded as debitable to the customs receipts prior to the net receipts being surrendered for the service of the Bank of Persia's loans. In any case this expenditure should at least be made a first charge on the surplus revenues, which will be available during this March quarter.

The sum required during 1913 would probably not exceed 10,000*l.*—less than that expended on the futile upkeep of the worn-out ships "Persepolis" and "Muzaffar," and the five customs launches, of which the Administration have failed to make really effective use; while the expenditure would greatly benefit the conditions of trade in the Gulf, which cannot at present boast of any custom-house fit to compare with that at Enzeli on the Caspian.

I therefore venture to urge that His Majesty's Government will be pleased either to decide that the cost of construction may be reasonably paid, as required, by the local director of customs out of the gross monthly receipts, as an item in the upkeep of the customs, or that a sufficient sum be earmarked from the surplus revenues in March next to provide for the inception of the project.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(Extract.)

Bushire, January 24, 1911.

IN May 1909 Lloyd's agents were requested to survey 418 bales of merchandise damaged by rain while lying in the small customs courtyard, and a heavy claim was put in to underwriters. This damage arose from the complete lack of drainage on the low spit of shore upon which the customs buildings are constructed.

M. Leleux was pressed subsequently to undertake the drainage of the courtyard, and was authorised to spend 150 tomans only.

There was an extraordinarily heavy fall of rain on the 19th December, 1909, which caused great damage to the customs warehouses and the goods contained therein. M. Leleux telegraphed to the Administration, estimating the damage to goods at 1,000 tomans (984 tomans had been refunded by the customs up to July 1910), and urging that no further rent be paid to Muin-ut-Tujjar till the premises had been made weathertight. The director of customs summoned a committee of Persian and British merchants, and the repairs were then estimated at 2,500 tomans,* and by July 1910, 1,100 tomans had been actually expended.

Next, in October 1910, M. Constant wrote to the consulate-general to say that Muin-ut-Tujjar was prepared to spend a sum of 20,000 tomans for reconstructing the premises belonging to him, but on condition that a higher rent, in proportion to the expenses of the repairs, should be paid by the Administration. He requested that a deputation from the British commercial community should visit him to discuss the amelioration of the customs premises.

The expert opinion of the engineer of the Public Works Department attached to the residency was obtained, and from the latter's report, also enclosed, it is clear that the raising of the level of the whole site is the most important question, as at

present it is impossible to store merchandise without fear of its being wetted and spoiled by flooding; further, that the raising cannot be done without rendering the warehouses useless, and, consequently, that he recommends, as the most economical method of procedure, that all the buildings should be pulled down and suitable premises erected.

Following immediately on this report there came fresh torrential rains in the middle of December 1910, which flooded several of the warehouses, and have left them in a most deplorable state. Fortunately there was little imported merchandise warehoused at the time, but a survey of the stores of the customs flotilla reports damage done to the extent of more than 8,000 rupees.

We may expect still further damage from rain during January, February, and March.

Opinion in Bushire is unanimous that, in view of the yearly increasing dilapidation of the buildings, the bad state of drainage, the heavier rainfall of the last years, the low level of the soil, which permits sea water to enter as well as rain water to collect, and of the constant damage to merchandise, the annual expenditure of such a sum as 500*l.* is useless waste, and the raising of the site, a measure involving the reconstruction of most of the buildings, is imperative.

Enclosure 2 in No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to the Government of India.

Bushire, October 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to request that, if they see no objection, the Government of India will be pleased to afford their good offices in the following connection.

2. As the result, in the main, of constant representations by this residency and consulate-general in the interests of the port and of British trade, the Persian Customs Administration have decided to build new and suitable premises at Bushire.

Co-operation has already been afforded by the residency to the local authorities in the preparation of designs and estimates, which have been finally approved, and the director now informs me that the Administrator-General has telegraphed to him in the following terms:—

“Am waiting for vote of budget submitted by the treasurer before I can authorise construction Bushire. Your proposals having, however, been approved, try to find a contractor and submit his terms.”

He goes on to ask my good offices in the direction of getting him placed in communication with a trustworthy and experienced contractor, who would tender for the building work, the estimated cost of which amounts to 11,000*l.*, including price of iron girders and framework to be ordered from Europe.

3. Apart from the fact that the satisfactory completion of the project will be greatly conducive to our commercial interests at Bushire, the contract for construction itself offers a profitable object for an enterprising Indian or Anglo-Indian contractor, and I therefore solicit the favour of the Government of India in recommending one or two contractors known to their Public Works Department or that of the Government of Bombay to be expert and reliable, to place themselves in communication with the provincial director of customs, Bushire, with a view to securing a contract for the work.

4. It would be well if any candidate were to intimate to me simultaneously the fact that he was sending a communication on the subject to the provincial director.

Enclosure 3 in No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 4, 1913.

CONSTRUCTION of new customs premises at Bushire of kind compatible with requirements article 5, Anglo-Persian Convention, 1903, has been continuously pressed by directorate of customs, and this residency.

Administrator-General early in 1912 proposed to buy out Muin and rebuild, but Muin's terms were so extortionate that Central Administration considered it far more economical to utilise the site of the old Government House, which is already Government property. Construction on this site has been definitely settled.

Administration called for tenders from British firms of repute in India, and asked that construction might take place under supervision of official of Public Works Department, to be specially deputed by Government of India, which has agreed in principle to loan his services in view important advantage for British commercial interests.

Sir George Barclay gave his full support to urgent reconstruction, and I have done my utmost here to hasten commencement of undertaking.

Cosser and Co. (Limited), of Karachi, were selected by Administration as contractors, and their works manager made survey in June 1912.

Customs director has recently received their contract tender, and has telegraphed Administration urging that tender be accepted as firm offers all guarantees, and better terms cannot be found.

I am in full agreement with Customs in this matter, and, as in view of article 5 above mentioned the project clearly has strong claim to be made first charge on balance customs revenues, I beg your Excellency afford your strongest support in arranging that funds shall be made available as required during expected period construction, two years.

Enclosure 4 in No. 20.

Sir W. Townley to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 15, 1913.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 4th January.

The bank manager has been asked by the Treasurer-General to open a special credit for the 110,000 tomans for two years, repayable monthly from the balance of the customs receipts.

Until His Majesty's Government decide with regard to their appropriation after March next of the surplus customs receipts for payment of their recent advances, the bank manager cannot well accede to the request of the Treasurer-General.

The question referred to is at present under the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

Moreover, after March next, an increase of 1,200L. will be made in the service of the Anglo-Indian loan, and, as you are aware, a further advance, in certain eventualities, by His Majesty's Government is in contemplation, which, pending the conclusion of negotiations for a big loan, will have to be secured on the southern customs, upon which the Imperial Bank of Persia also have claims in respect of certain advances which they have recently made to Mornard.

There seems to be some danger of this revenue being overloaded, leaving nothing available for the expenses of the civil administration of the Gulf ports, and for this reason I should be inclined to let the question of the provision of a new custom-house stay over for a month or two until the probable trend of events becomes more evident to us.

No. 21.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 3, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday handed Wood an amended letter of option containing all the alterations and additions made by the syndicate and the Persian Government. The original letter was returned to Minister for Foreign Affairs by Wood.

The question is thus definitely settled pending the necessary later negotiations.

No. 22.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 3, 1913.

MY telegram of 28th February.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent note to the two legations pointing out that it is of the utmost importance that the Persian Government should know within a week the decision of the two Governments in the matter of the conditions attached to advances, and adding that they cannot accept the same conditions as were attached to the advances last March respecting repayment out of the customs.

I am of opinion that if it is really intended to help the Persian Government it can only be done by giving them two years' grace before calling upon them to commence repayment of advances. I have also good reason to believe that they are aware that they can get advance of at least 200,000*l.* from other British sources if given a free hand to borrow the money.

No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.

FARS gendarmerie.

I concur entirely in views expressed in your telegram of 27th February.

The two officers in question should not accompany the force, and any other British subject who may wish to do so should be dissuaded. You should instruct His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan to that effect.

You should advise Swedish colonel to run no risks and impress upon him the bad effect any mishap will have.

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.

YOUR telegrams of 28th February and of 3rd March: Advance to Persia.

We shall be able to reply in two or three days. Our conditions will not be unduly onerous, but it is impossible to arrange details without proper consideration, and the Persian Government must have patience.

No. 25.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 5, 1913.

MY telegram of 3rd March: Mohammerah Railway.

Wood has officially accepted option offered by Persian Government in the name of syndicate.

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.

IT is very desirable that the Central India Horse should return to India, and now that spring is approaching the roads will become more passable. Under existing conditions, I do not consider it fair to keep the regiment any longer.

Withdrawal of regiment may be rendered difficult by tribal migration. I fully realise this aspect of the question, and before any decision is taken with regard to

departure of regiment to Bushire I should be glad to learn whether you, His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, and acting British consul at Shiraz consider that this could be safely effected.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 5, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th February: Advance for Fars.

We can hand over the money for this purpose as soon as the Persian Government gives the required assurances and agrees to the arrangements for the control of the monthly advances.

No. 28.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 6, 1913.

FARS.

Your telegram of the 19th February: Fars.

The Cabinet argue that they knew, when they assumed office, that they must grant the two railway concessions, but maintain that they have no authority, pending the convocation of a Medjliss, to discuss any other conditions affecting the national status of Persia. I have therefore had great difficulty in persuading them to even look at the conditions attached to the advance by His Majesty's Government of 100,000*l.* for the Fars gendarmerie.

I thereupon represented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that if no funds were available for the maintenance of the gendarmerie a most grave situation could not fail to be created. In consequence of my representations his Excellency told me to-day that, after discussing the matter three times in the Cabinet Council, he thought it might be possible to make an arrangement as to the control of the expenditure which would meet your requirements.

It will be easy to arrange to have the purchases for the gendarmerie put up to open tender.

The Treasurer-General is of opinion that when order is re-established in Fars some source of revenue in the province might be considered as a suitable security for the loan. At the present moment there is none. Whether the interest of the loan can or cannot be secured on the customs revenues of the south depends entirely upon the extent to which the said revenues are to be charged for the existing and future advances.

No. 29.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 6, 1913.

WITHDRAWAL of British regiment from Shiraz.

Your telegram of the 5th March.

Please see my despatch of the 16th February,* which should shortly reach you, and which deals with above-mentioned question.

The gendarmerie are proceeding from Shiraz to Bushire early in April to fetch arms and ammunition; the proposal put forward is that the Central India Horse should accompany them down the road. There is no objection on the part of the Swedish colonel to the proposed arrangement.

I am entirely of your opinion as to the desirability of withdrawing the regiment; Colonel Douglas does not seem to think that there are any serious objections to the movement being carried out in the manner suggested, considering the great difficulties which are inseparable from the movements in a mountainous country of a cavalry regiment encumbered by a large baggage train.

* See No. 50.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.

MY telegram of 11th February* and your telegram of 22nd February.

You may inform the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government agree to their proposal that the advance of 200,000*l.*, the British share of the joint advance, should bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent., and be secured on the surplus of the southern customs, be repaid out of the next large loan, and if no loan is concluded by 1st January, 1915, by half-yearly instalments of 50,000*l.* I presume that 50,000*l.* will be paid in respect of each half of the total advance of 400,000*l.*

The advance of the 100,000*l.* for the gendarmerie must be treated in the same way.

You state that the total surplus of the southern customs available is 6,000*l.* a-month. The interest on the advance already made absorbs 817*l.* a-month. The interest on 300,000*l.* more will absorb 1,750*l.*, which makes a total of 2,570*l.* a-month, leaving at the outside 3,430*l.* a-month.

Properly speaking, His Majesty's Government might impound the whole of this surplus to provide for repayment of the advances, but I recognise that insistence on this course would unduly embarrass the Persian Government.

I should be disposed to forgo for the present repayment of the first advance (namely, of the 140,000*l.*) if the Persian Government could give some further security for the repayment of both advances (the 140,000*l.* and the fresh 300,000*l.*). It seems improbable that the southern customs would bear from 1st January, 1915, the payment of 50,000*l.* half-yearly, in addition to repaying the 140,000*l.*, or are the Persian Government counting on a great expansion of the revenue?

I am informing the Russian Government that I am accepting the Persian proposals and expressing the hope that they will do the same.

No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 22nd February.

Inform Russian Government that I am agreeing so far as British contribution is concerned.

I understand that, as regards interest and security, the Russian Government are already agreed with us, and I trust that proposed mode of repayment will recommend itself to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Pray ask Russian Government to communicate their concurrence to Persian Government as soon as possible.

No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 6, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 27th January†: Arms for Fars.

Government of India hold the arms and ammunition immediately available.

You are authorised to make direct with Government of India necessary arrangements for the supply to be delivered at Bushire with all possible dispatch.

As regards payment, in case a big loan is not possible in near future, might it not be made from sum which His Majesty's Government are about to advance, and be so earmarked, in addition to the 30,000*l.* for the administration in Fars? We have not yet been informed of the price, which you should ascertain from the Government of India.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 567.

† See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 546.

No. 33.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 7, 1913.

SAMSAM-ES-SULTANEH and Sirdar Motashem have jointly handed me 126*l.* in settlement of Bullock's claim for actual loss incurred.

Payment was made on behalf of their son and brother, who are responsible for security of the Bakhtiari road.

No. 34.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 7, 1913.

EX-SHAH.

News has reached the Persian Government that the ex-Shah has quitted Odessa, and has gone to Vienna, ostensibly to do a cure somewhere. The Cabinet are anxious about his real movements, as there are repeated reports of activity among His Majesty's partisans in Europe, and they fear that the influence of Shuja-ed-Dowleh would secure his reception in Azerbaijan with open arms.

Reports of the arrival of suspicious persons disguised as dervishes on the Turco-Persian frontier of Kurdistan are constantly coming in. Though my own information is that Shoa-es-Sultaneh has been seen recently at Paris and Nice, there are people who think it may be that Prince in disguise.

No. 35.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 6th March.

Russian chargé d'affaires has received instructions, which he will execute to-morrow, to inform the Persian Government that the Russian Government are prepared to advance their share of the 400,000*l.* on the following conditions:—

1. Interest of 7 per cent. per annum, payable half-yearly, on 30th June and 31st December.

2. Repayment to be made in equal half-yearly instalments, to be spread over three years, commencing 1st July, 1914.

3. Repayments to be made out of the surplus of the northern customs.

4. Should the above resources not suffice, deficit to be made good out of other sources of revenue.

5. In the event of a loan being negotiated, such portion of the advance as has not been refunded to be repaid out of the first instalment of the loan.

No. 36.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Odessa, March 7, 1913.

EX-SHAH, with family, left for Berlin on 5th March.

It is said that he will spend spring in the south of France.

No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 7, 1913.

WITHDRAWAL of Central India Horse from Shiraz.

Preparations should be made at once for withdrawing the troops, provided that

Colonel Douglas concurs in the view you express in your telegram of the 6th March that the moment is favourable. The Secretary of State for India hopes to hear shortly from Viceroy of India, with whom he is in communication. You should inform Viceroy, if you have not already done so, of your views and those of Colonel Douglas.

No. 38.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

Sir,

Bushire, February 12, 1913.

WITH my covering despatch of the 16th December, 1912,* I had the honour to enclose a memorandum, by my commercial adviser, Mr. Chick, on the subject of the existing means and rates of transport for merchandise on the Bushire-Shiraz road. In that memorandum was demonstrated the seriousness of the prospect involved in the continued insulation of Ispahan and the markets of Central Persia from trade communication with the Persian Gulf, owing to the insecurity of the southern routes.

It was also shown, however (though it is no doubt merely another offspring of the general chaos prevailing), that the recent inflation of the rates of mule hire was now no less responsible for the above state of things than the risk of loss from actual highway robbery.

Mr. Chick's present memorandum treats of the working of a local scheme, the inception of which, I may mention, is entirely due to his initiative, for checking the rapid inflation of mule hire and gradually restoring the rates to a normal scale.

It will be seen from the details given in the enclosure that though there have been difficulties to overcome in the working of the scheme, we have been fortunate in securing the steadfast co-operation of the governor, Mowagar-ed-Dowleh, who, indeed, has not been slow to quote the arrangement to higher authority as evidence of his own laudable efforts to assist in ameliorating the situation.

The statistics evolved by Mr. Chick demonstrate the substantial advantage to commerce generally, resulting from the reduction in the rates of hire.

I report the development as I think His Majesty's Government will be gratified to see any tangible step tending to improve the existing conditions under which trade is carried on.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure in No. 38.

Memorandum by Mr. Chick.

Transport from Bushire to Shiraz: Reduction of Rates of Hire.

THE serious position which affected British imports into Persia, viâ Bushire, in the latter half of 1912, through exorbitant increases in the rates of mule transport to Shiraz, and again from Shiraz to Ispahan, *vis-à-vis* the increased import of Russian goods from the north into the markets of Ispahan and Central Persia, has been set out at length in my memorandum forwarded to the Foreign Office under cover of Sir Percy Cox's despatch of the 16th December, 1912, and in the Bushire Trade Report for 1911-12.

The ruinous prices of transport of goods to the interior has indeed damaged British trade from the south almost as much as insecurity on the caravan route, and in the province of Fars.

Briefly, whereas up till four years ago, the cost of forwarding to Shiraz piece-goods (other goods are higher in proportion) was from 5*l.* 19*s.* to 8*l.* 5*s.* per ton at a minimum, from August 1912 onwards it ranged from 27*l.* 5*s.* to 21*l.* 15*s.* per ton.

Simultaneously, rates on the Shiraz-Ispahan road had mounted very considerably, the highest rate communicated being 412 krans (22*l.* 10*s.*) per ton.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 525.

Such prices made the forwarding of goods from Bushire to Ispahan either impossible or exposed them to be undersold by similar goods from Russia.

As regards the Bushire-Shiraz road, the causes of the rise in rates were :—

(a.) "Rahdari," or blackmail, extorted from muleteers amounting to nearly 1*l.* per mule for the journey, and other methods employed by the khans of the road for extracting money, such as monopolies on sale of fodder, &c.

(b.) The none too plentiful supply of mules leaving Bushire, viz., 2,500–3,000 per mensem, for the transport of goods up country.

(c.) Jealousy between Persian forwarding agents at Bushire as to who should do the largest forwarding business, and secure the most mules. This was encouraged by mule-brokers. In this way, instead of competing to forward at lower prices than his neighbours, each merchant used to cap the prices which he was told they were offering. As the goods generally belong to merchants up country, not to themselves, and the Bushire forwarding agents took commission on their disbursements, many Bushire merchants had no inducement to cut rates, while the British merchants were forced to pay the same rates as Persians in order to secure mules at all.

(d.) Muleteers exploited the "rahdari" and ill-treatment on the road, and their losses thereby to keep rates constantly rising.

Muleteers were deriving enormous profits from forwarding under such conditions ; it was hopeless to expect the Persian merchants of their own accord to remedy this state of affairs, or to expect the governor of the Gulf ports to do so ; for, besides having little interest in such economic questions, he had apparently spoken to one or two merchants on the subject, and received a rebuff.

On the other hand, it was commonly recognised that the rates would not be allowed to fall by the parties interested, unless a combination of merchants could be arranged.

The position being so serious for British trade, I interviewed all the leading Persian and British forwarding agents, with the exception of one or two likely to be hostile, and found them individually keen to see the rates reduced, and crying out about the loss of trade. They showed me letters from Shiraz merchants, blaming Bushire forwarding agents for disregard of their interests. But such was their mutual suspicion and jealousy that they begged me to assure myself of common action by their fellow merchants before any meeting was called.

Finally all merchants agreed :—

1. That a reduction from 44 to 30 tomans per 100 Bushire men should at once come into force, and be the maximum rate of hire for a period of two months.
2. That all mule contracts should be based on delivery at Shiraz within sixteen days.
3. That the system called "du-kesh," by which muleteers dropped their loads half-way to Shiraz, and returned to Bushire for more, thereby keeping a large amount of goods lying about the road, and delaying their arrival, should be abolished.
4. That only three-fourths of total hire to Shiraz should be paid in advance at Bushire, instead of 95 per cent., to muleteers.
5. That the Governor should take strong measures against the mule-brokers to prevent intrigue by them.

I called on the governor of Bushire with the sanction of Sir Percy Cox, and after explaining the position asked him to call a meeting of all merchants interested in the forwarding business.

In this meeting, held on the 7th December, 1912, when nearly all merchants interested in forwarding attended, it was recalled that in the last fifteen months the rate of hire to Shiraz alone had risen more than 20 tomans per 7 cwts. (about 12*l.* per ton). Up till August 1911 the rate had hardly ever been known to reach 20 tomans ; by January 1912 it had reached over 30 tomans ; and after June 1912 it passed 40 tomans. It was agreed that there was no justification for these inflated prices. There had been no large robberies of mules during those fifteen months, and the number of head of transport available was materially the same as eighteen months previously, when rates were below 20 tomans ; nor had trade doubled, or even increased by a-half during that period.

The five proposals mentioned above were put to the assembled merchants by the governor and adopted unanimously. The British merchants in my presence agreed likewise.

The governor announced his intention of telegraphing also to the Governor-General of Fars regarding this agreement between merchants to reduce the rates of hire, and of asking him to take similar steps in Shiraz.

The governor, in conclusion, addressed merchants in a similar sense to that which I had previously explained to him, warning them that goods were coming down to Ispahan from the north, that if they were not careful they would lose the markets of Fars also; that they were losing ground through lack of unity and jealousy.

On the proposition of some merchants present it was decided that mules available for transport should be divided daily and proportionately in accordance with merchants' requirements, otherwise it would be impossible to prevent bickerings and the reinflation of rates, and the whole agreement from being wrecked. In order to secure a proper control over mules leaving the port, the governor proposed to institute a forwarding department of the town under his own control in the Government House.

He has since employed a special clerk with proper ledgers to receive applications from merchants for mules, and to allot the daily number in proportion. This system of division prevailed for over a month, when complaints were made by a British firm that the Persian merchants were taking unfair advantage of those who were working honestly, in that they were preventing them securing their requirements by applying for excessive numbers of mules. A second meeting of all forwarding merchants was held, attended by British merchants interested and myself, when all reiterated their approval of the decision to keep rates down, and of the utility of the "forwarding department," though one British firm still objected to their forwardings being under Persian control; but it was agreed that the division of mules would be fairer if made on a basis of the number of packages which each merchant in Bushire had on hand. These were to be ascertained by counting, and the numbers thus arrived at added to as fresh goods arrived, by presenting the customs import passes to the forwarding department.

Action was taken accordingly, and during January-February 1913 distribution of mules was made on this basis.

It was further decided to leave rates as they were till the middle of February, or till the grazing season began in March, when it was hoped to convoke another meeting to decide on still lower rates of hire (about 20 tomans) nearer the normal conditions of former years. All merchants, including the British representatives, signed the agreement.

During December and January, the two months since this hire agreement has been in being, the number of mules leaving for up-country has been estimated as follows, and shows a marked increase on the previous months, a result, no doubt, of the stipulation for transport to Shiraz within sixteen days contained in the agreement:—

								Mules.
August 1912	2,770
September 1912	1,847
October 1912	3,193
November 1912	2,486
December 1912	3,924
January 1913	3,492

The reduction of about 15 tomans per 775 lb. in rates during these last two months has resulted in a total saving of 55,620 tomans, or 10,100*l.*, on the rates, which had been bolstered up from August to November.

This sum represents not only a saving to all Persian and British importing firms, but, more important still, it means that goods forwarded under these reduced rates can be forwarded to Ispahan with better prospects of competing with the prices of goods imported from Russia and the north.

This movement in Bushire to bring back prices of transport from the south to normal level is entitled to our strongest support. With only one exception, British representative agents are strongly in favour of the continuance of the system of control of rates of hire. This policy is dictated also by our position in Central Persia, and it certainly should not be deviated from, should any single firm, for motives of private advantage, be inclined to dissent.

H. G. CHICK.

No. 39.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.—(Received at Foreign Office, March 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, March 7, 1913.

March 8, 1 A.M.—I have to report with deepest regret that to-night, as M. Constant, Belgian Director of Customs, and Mme. Constant were driving themselves home in dog-cart from an entertainment in Bushire town at which whole European community, including ourselves, were present, they were stopped and fired at at close quarters by an unknown Persian with a revolver. Mme. Constant was killed and M. Constant was wounded through the thighs. He was able to drive on to house of residency surgeon close by. Please inform M. Mornard with my deep sympathy. Will wire further details in morning.

No. 40.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.—(Received at Foreign Office, March 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, March 8, 1913.

ASSAILANT was a single individual who ran alongside trap on Constant's side, while he fired four shots. One bullet pierced Mme. Constant's chest, severing her spine and killing her instantly; second entered her thigh and lodged there; a third hit Constant through thighs. He is suffering from pain and shock, but in absence of complications is believed not to be in danger.

No. 41.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 8, 1913.

EX-SHAH.

Telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa of 7th March, and Sir W. Townley's telegram of 7th March.

M. Sazonof will no doubt send instructions to frontier officials to be on the look-out in case the ex-Shah makes another attempt to enter Persia. Have the Russian Government any information other than that the ex-Shah has actually left Odessa?

No. 42.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 8, 1913.

ODESSA telegram of 7th March.

Please report if ex-Shah arrives in Berlin.

No. 43.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 6th March: Russian advance to Persia.

Memorandum from Russian Government recapitulates conditions specified in Tehran telegram of 7th March.

Russian Government add that the Russian Minister at Tehran, who is here, considers this arrangement quite acceptable to the Persian Government.

No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 9, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs yesterday handed me an *aide-mémoire* respecting option to the Persian Railway Syndicate for the construction of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

Memorandum states that provision as to the cost of survey being defrayed by the Persian Government is open to serious objection on account of precarious position of the Persian Treasury, and the Russian Government think it would be preferable that the syndicate should bear the cost of survey.

Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that he would have made no difficulties had it not been for critical state of Persian finances.

It is true that, though the Persian Government eventually recover cost of survey, they may be out of pocket for a considerable time.

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 8th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs knows nothing about the future movements of the ex-Shah. He would, he said, have much preferred that he should have remained at Odessa. Russian Government will do all they can to prevent his returning through Russia, but they cannot guarantee his not getting through in disguise, as there are so many routes by which he may pass.

No. 46.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, January 26, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the arrangement referred to in my despatch of the 29th ultimo,* under which the administration of the province of Kermanshah was to be financed for six months by the Russian bank, on the security of the surplus of the northern customs revenues, has fallen through.

An arrangement has since been made by the treasurer-general under which the funds necessary for the above purpose will be supplied by the Imperial Bank of Persia.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 47.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 4, 1913.

I HAVE just received a copy of Sir Percy Cox's despatch of the 16th December† to the Foreign Office, submitting a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Chick on the present condition of the Bushire-Shiraz road.

I understand from Mr. Smart, lately acting-consul at Shiraz, that the gloomy picture portrayed by the writer of the memorandum faithfully represents, in his opinion, the conditions which prevailed on the road in question from August to November last, though the figures of the "Rahdari" seem a little exaggerated. These figures are presumably compiled from the statements of muleteers, who would naturally exaggerate the exactions of the road-guards in order to justify their own excessive rates of hire.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 521.

† See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 525.

With regard to the abuse mentioned by Mr. Chick of a levy of 4 krans in Shiraz itself on each mule by the Kavam-ul-Mulk and his Kashkuli adherents, Mr. Smart expresses the opinion that the money levied went entirely to the Kashkuli khans, and that the Kavam got nothing.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 48.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 15, 1913.*
IN continuation of my despatch of the 22nd ultimo,* I have the honour to report that the acting British vice-consul at Resht has recorded the following movements of Russian troops during the past four weeks:—

On the night of the 25th January two officers and eight infantry, with three two-wheeled carts containing arms and ammunition or military stores, left Resht for Kazvin; on the night of the 26th January a further detachment of 250 infantry arrived in Resht from Russia, and marched on the following day for Kazvin; on the 30th January 100 infantry arrived at Resht from Kazvin, and left for Enzeli and Russia on the following day.

A correspondent at Kazvin, writing under date the 29th January, reported that 500 fresh Russian troops had arrived there recently, making the total strength of the Russian garrison about 2,200 men. The new men appeared to be recruits.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 49.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 16, 1913.*
I WOULD venture to represent that it would appear to me that the constant comparison in Parliament and in the public press between the condition of the roads in Southern and Northern Persia, to the great disparagement of those in that part of the country where British interests are chiefly represented, is hardly fair. It is true that there is almost complete security on the two important trade routes by which Russian products enter Persia, and that the Russian customs regulations debar other European trade from using those roads in a large measure. I refer, of course, to the Enzeli-Kazvin-Tehran road, and to the Julfa-Tabriz-Kazvin-Tehran road. On the other roads in the northern sphere the security is little, if any, greater than it is on the southern roads. The route from Kazvin to Hamadan was until quite recently infested by brigands, and it is now only gradually being cleared by the strenuous efforts of the gendarmerie, whilst its continuation from Hamadan to the Turkish frontier is in a deplorable state. The exactions on this section of the so-called road-guards would appear to be even more excessive than on the Shiraz-Bushire road, whilst caravans and travellers are constantly plundered. The Meshed-Tehran road has been practically impassable for months on account of the presence of Turkoman raiders. Mr. Meriton, of the Indo-European telegraph department, was attacked and roughly treated, two of his attendants being shot, near Meiomah only a short time ago, whilst Mr. Nelson, of the Imperial Bank of Persia, was forced to retrace his steps about the same time, and proceed to Meshed by way of Asterabad. The Tehran-Ispahan road is guarded by the gendarmes as far as Kum, and from thence onwards is in charge of Naib Hussein and his men.

In the meanwhile, trade has been proceeding briskly on the various southern roads, the reputation of which has unfortunately been sadly tarnished by the attacks on Lieutenant Bullock on the Bakhtiari road and on Captain Eckford on the Shiraz-

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 562.

Bushire road, incidents that had a loud echo in Europe. The winter season is of course largely responsible for the present relatively satisfactory state of the roads in the south, and it is much to be feared that with the return of spring we may see a recrudescence of the old trouble, unless the presence of close upon 1,500 gendarmes at Shiraz under Swedish officers suffices, as is hoped, to secure a better state of things.

The object of this despatch is to point out that there is but little difference in the state of security of the roads in the north and south, except in that particular part of the country which is strongly occupied and dominated by Russian troops.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 50.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 16, 1913.

AS you are aware, Colonel Hjalmarson, commandant of the Swedish gendarmerie, has the intention of proceeding himself to Shiraz in the early spring with the contingent of his force with which it is hoped to maintain order and security on the southern main road. An officer of the gendarmerie, Captain Brandel, has been for some time at Bushire collecting recruits and taking delivery of a quantity of arms imported for the use of the Fars gendarmerie. He will await at Bushire the arrival of Colonel Hjalmarson at Shiraz, whose contingent of gendarmes will enable a detachment of that force to march south and join hands with Captain Brandel, thus providing a presumably sufficient escort to bring the arms in safety to Shiraz.

Major O'Connor, strongly supported by Colonel Douglas, has represented to me that this movement will afford a suitable opportunity for the withdrawal of the Central India Horse from Shiraz. He points out the false position in which the regiment is placed, and the possibility of future unfortunate and embarrassing incidents to which its prolonged stay exposes the officers and men. He also indicates the local military measures which might be taken to effect this combined movement of the British Indian and the gendarmerie forces with the smallest amount of risk. I consulted His Majesty's resident at Bushire in regard to Major O'Connor's and Colonel Douglas's proposals, and Sir Percy Cox replied that he considered that the question of the withdrawal should depend entirely on the policy of His Majesty's Government, and could not be treated from a detached and local standpoint; that if His Majesty's Government decided that they would take no action in the spring, but would wait on events until the autumn, the regiment should remain until that season.

The policy of the withdrawal of the regiment was discussed very fully with you last summer, and the decision was taken to give time to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to restore order and to exact reparation for the attack on Mr. Smart and his escort. Since then little change has occurred in the situation excepting the added seriousness resulting from the murder of Captain Eckford, and there has been no political development sufficient to justify my pressing on His Majesty's Government a course which almost necessarily entails an immediate decision with regard to their more general policy. The main consideration now advanced for an early withdrawal of the forces, viz., the military well-being of the regiment itself, appears to me one which should be more fitly urged on the Imperial Government by the Indian military authorities than by myself, however much I appreciate its importance and soundness; while my final views had better be reserved for any points on which His Majesty's Government might wish to consult me if they are ready, at the instance of the Government of India, to reopen the question at the present moment.

I have accordingly advised Major O'Connor and Colonel Douglas in this sense, and the telegraphic correspondence has been submitted by Sir P. Cox to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 51.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir, *Tehran, February 17, 1913.*
 I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the four weeks ended 17th February.

I have, &c.
 WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending February 17.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—The new Cabinet, which, on the whole, is approved by popular opinion in the capital, is negotiating with the two legations for an advance. It has given a concession for the Julfa-Tabriz Railway, with extension to the north of Lake Urumia and preferential right to construct a railway from Tabriz to Kazvin to the Banque d'Escompte, the concessionnaire of the Julfa-Tabriz road. It has granted to the Persian Railways Syndicate a two years' option for the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway, on the understanding that a joint survey will be made by the Persian Government and the syndicate, on the conclusion of which the Persian Government shall be at liberty either to grant a concession to the syndicate for the construction of the railway, or to commission the syndicate to construct a State railway for the Persian Government.

Tehran, February 17, 1913.

Asterabad.

Salar-ed-Dowleh left Asterabad in the middle of January and proceeded with a Turkoman force against Nardin. He does not appear, however, to have entered that town, but to have turned southwards and joined the Tehran-Meshed road at Meiomei. He reached Sabzawar on the 7th February and was joined by the brigand Jehangir. He is now reported to be marching towards Meshed.

One hundred families of Russian subjects are reported to have arrived at Shirenk, some 20 miles east of the town, and to be colonising the region.

Kazvin.

The Sipahdar has arrived at Baku from Tabriz.

Five hundred Russian troops arrived at the end of January at Kazvin, bringing the strength of the Russian force stationed in the town up to about 2,200. No men appear to have left Kazvin lately.

Meshed.

The quarantine against Afghanistan has at last been abolished. The deputation by His Majesty's consul-general of Captain Wilson, I.M.S., to Karez, and the region of the supposed epidemic, appears to have contributed not a little to this satisfactory step.

Seyyid Mirza Husein, Izz-ul-Mamalek, a member of the Meshed Karguzari, has been appointed to Birjand. He has not yet, however, quitted Meshed.

Seistan.

On the 16th December five officers and 100 sowars attempted to take sanctuary in His Majesty's consulate to demand the arrears of their pay, and to protest against the reduced scale of payment which has been instituted for the future. The five officers were allowed to enter the consulate to represent their grievances, and remained

in bast for forty-eight hours. On the 18th His Majesty's consul was able to give them satisfactory assurances on the authority of the local Belgian director of finance. It would not appear, however, that a definite settlement of the question has been reached. On the occasion of guards being required to escort a caravan of British goods to Meshed, the local authorities were obliged to furnish temporarily engaged men.

It is reported that the Shaukat-ul-Mulk has become reconciled to the Hashmat-ul-Mulk. This rapprochement may well account for the decrease in the number of Baluch raids during the season.

Shiraz.

The expedition sent from Yezd under Salari Bahadur against Marvas started at the end of January to ravage the district of Baunat. As the Bakhtiaris subsequently entered Fars territory and threatened Dehbid, His Majesty's consul at Shiraz telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister suggesting that urgent orders should be sent to Salari Bahadur to retire. The necessary representations were made by the legation to Sardar Assad. It appears, however, that the expedition has succeeded in effecting the capture of the Tutaki freebooters, which was its object. These brigands have for long harassed the Yezd-Meshed-Kerman roads and molested the Indo-European Telegraph Department's lines. The expedition has now returned to Marvas.

The Kavam-ul-Mulk recently returned from a tour amongst the Arabs in Sarbistan. The object of his expedition was to endeavour to secure some formal expression of allegiance from the chiefs of the Khamseh tribes, to patch up a reconciliation between the Shebani Arabs and his son, Nasr-ed-Dowleh (who last spring shot one of the Shebani chiefs), and to collect revenue. On the surface the results of his tour would appear to be satisfactory; all the various Khamseh chiefs, with the exception of the Baharloos, signed a formal declaration of allegiance to him and paid their homage, the Nasr-ed-Dowleh-Shebani affair appears to have been settled, and a certain amount of money collected. Little importance can, however, be placed on these formulæ of good-will and fealty, which cloak, but do not cover, the decay of the old feudal influences in Fars—a decay in which more than any other the authority of the Kavam is involved.

The Darya Begi returned to Kazerun on the 25th January, his mission to the khans of Dashtistan having proved a complete failure. His party was at one period in danger of being ambushed by Mahomet Ali Khan Kashkuli at Tangi Turkan, but escaped by strategy.

Caravans are passing freely to and from Shiraz, but heavy tolls are still being levied between Tangi Turkan and Kazerun.

Kerman.

His Majesty's consul arrived on the 10th January. On the road Captain Lorimer had interviews with Zargham-i-Nizam and Sa'id-i-Nizam. They showed themselves friendly and willing to co-operate with the Governor-General.

Amir-i-Mufakham has appointed persons of his suite as Governors of Sirjan, Rudbar, Aqta, and Afshar.

The Bunder Abbas road appears to be safe, and travellers and caravans are passing up and down without molestation.

Kermanshah.

On the 25th January the Governor-General attacked the ilkhani, Mahmud Khan Hajizadeh, in a village outside Kermanshah, to which he had allowed him to retire from the town. Hajizadeh's son was killed, but the ilkhani himself escaped and proceeded to Bisitun.

There has been no improvement in the condition of the town. Murder and robbery under arms appear to be almost nightly occurrences. On the night of the 2nd January goods to the value of some 120*l.* belonging to a British firm of Manchester were stolen from a caravanserai; on the 18th January thieves entered the house of the Belgian Director of Customs, disarmed the sowars, and killed the customs watchman. The guilty in both these cases were well known in the town, but Farman Farma has refused to take action on the ground that their arrest would cause fighting. His Majesty's consul states that the province has been brought into a state which will render it difficult for any successor to the present Governor-General to restore even the most elementary conditions of order.

Ispahan.

The town has been quiet during the last month, and burglaries have been less frequent. Sardar Ashjaa arrived on the 15th January, and since that date has been co-operating cordially with the financial director. His Majesty's consul-general also reports that all references regarding British interests made to the Karguzari meet with prompt and, in most cases, satisfactory attention.

Large arrivals of caravans from Tehran and Kazvin with Russian goods, and from Shiraz with British piece-goods are reported. Information from Abadeh shows that the road in that region is safe, and caravans passing freely in both directions. The Boir Ahmadis continue to escort these, and appear to be doing excellent work, their chief, Mullah Ghobad, forbidding them to levy any illicit dues. The post-office is about to re-establish a postal waggon service between Ispahan and Shiraz.

Ahwaz.

Ali Mohammed Khan Teybi, a notorious brigand, has been captured, and some 100 of his men have been killed by Amir Mujahid, Bakhtiari. The disappearance of this outlaw should contribute to a restoration of order on the Ahwaz road.

Disturbances are reported from Behbahan. Several tribes of the Kuhgilui appear to have risen against the Amir Mujahid and to have looted several villages in the vicinity of the town. Sardar-i-Jang is collecting and dispatching reinforcements to Amir Mujahid.

Reports show a greatly increased volume of traffic on the Ahwaz road, despite the unfavourable conditions of the weather.

Yezd.

The friction that has been growing between the Financial Department at Yezd and the governor culminated on the 24th January when Sardar-i-Fatteh, Bakhtiari, detained the local director and sealed up the doors of the revenue office. This step was followed by a proclamation stating that all revenues were henceforth to be paid to the governor's agents.

Trade is reported to be at a standstill.

No. 52.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 18, 1913.

THE President of the Council called upon me this morning for the purpose of passing in review the present political situation of the country, and seeking my views on certain points.

Ala-es-Sultaneh commenced by expressing the warm appreciation of the Persian Government of the language used in the House of Commons by Mr. Acland on the 14th instant in speaking of Persian affairs. His Highness said that the Cabinet are fully alive to the value and importance of such a public declaration on the part of the British Government, which demonstrated not only the genuine interest taken in Persia's welfare by His Majesty's Government, but recorded a just acknowledgment of the efforts the present Cabinet at Tehran are prepared to make to improve the situation. Ala-es-Sultaneh pointed out, however, that the remark made about the summoning of a Medjliss at an early date did not quite coincide with the views of the Persian Government. He and his colleagues are persuaded that it is most desirable that a Medjliss should be called together at the earliest possible date convenient, because they feel that the presence of a legislative assembly will strengthen the hands of the Government, give great satisfaction to the people of the country, and help very materially in the work of restoring order and prosperity. His Highness added that the Cabinet felt convinced that the time had now come when it was desirable that a Medjliss should be summoned, and they were confident that an assembly would be elected that would render real service to the State, and be devoid of those well-meaning but obstructive elements that had rendered the work of previous assemblies in Persia more or less sterile and generally unsatisfactory.

Ala-es-Sultaneh then passed to the question of the Regent, and said that the Cabinet had invited Nasr-ul-Mulk to return to Persia, and that it was much hoped that he would do so at no distant date, although his Highness had returned an evasive answer to the Cabinet's telegram.

The conversation now turned upon Salar-ed-Dowleh. The Prime Minister asked me to represent the case to you. His Highness explained that Salar-ed-Dowleh's recent behaviour in putting himself at the head of a rebel force whilst the terms of his pardon by the Persian Government were under consideration absolved the latter, in his opinion, from the offer that had been made to him through the Russian Legation, which insisted upon his being given the Governorship of Gilan, with the command of the most-frequented means of access to Persia, by the port of Enzeli and Resht. Ala-es-Sultaneh pointed out that the last Cabinet had suggested that Salar should reside at Tehran, but that since that proposal was made the situation had changed very materially.

From this topic we passed on to the conditions of the new advance proposed by Russia. Ala-es-Sultaneh stated that the Russian Minister had informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government asked for the same conditions as accompanied the advance made last March, namely, that it should be repayable out of the loan when made, should carry 7 per cent. per annum interest, should be secured on the northern customs, and should be recoverable out of the surplus of said customs at the end of each half-year, that is to say the surplus should be pledged in totality for the repayment of the advance. Ala-es-Sultaneh said that it would be impossible for Persia to accept such conditions, adding that the Government proposed to ask the Russian Government to accept a fixed half-yearly sum out of the surplus of the northern customs in gradual repayment of the loan, since the financial life of the country would be stifled if the entire surplus was seized half-yearly until the advance was paid off. His Highness asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government as regarded their share of the advance, were Persia to be unable to accept the Russian proposals. I replied that it would be well to await the Russian answer to the request for easier terms about to be put forward by Persia before raising the question.

Since seeing Ala-es-Sultaneh I have received the visit of the secretary-general of the Foreign Office who has explained, in the name of the Minister, that the Cabinet are about to request the Russian Government to agree that the advance shall be repayable out of the impending loan, but that in the event of the loan negotiations not maturing, the advance shall be repayable by half-yearly instalments out of the northern customs surplus to the amount of 250,000 tomans (50,000*L.*) commencing on the 1st (14th) January, 1915. It is represented that Persia must have two years free to use the customs surpluses for purposes of administration, or the advances will do her no good. Interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum will be guaranteed on the customs revenues. If the customs do not suffice to make up the 500,000 tomans (roughly 100,000*L.*) yearly refund promised, other revenues will be devoted to the purpose. It is earnestly hoped that His Majesty's Government will accept a similar arrangement.

Ala-es-Sultaneh also impressed upon me the earnest desire of the Persian Government that the Russian Government should mark their appreciation of the friendly attitude adopted in the matter of the Julfa-Tabriz railway concession, which had been granted most unwillingly, by withdrawing some part of their troops now on Persian soil. His Highness considered that the state of the country justified such a step, which would go far to assist the Cabinet in getting the public to swallow the bitter pill of the Julfa-Tabriz concession, for the granting of which they were being roundly abused on all sides. They could check this abuse if they could show that they had at least secured the withdrawal of some of the Russian troops in exchange.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 53.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 19, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 12th January,* I have the honour to report that Colonel Hjalmarson has now sent me a new programme of his general gendarmerie

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 529.

dispositions which he has submitted to the Minister of the Interior, and in which his estimates of the number of men and amount of funds required for the Yezdikhast-Bushire section are somewhat enlarged. The men stationed on the road are to number 1,501, while the mobile column will be gradually raised to a strength of 1,796. The ordinary expenses for each of the next two years for the Fars stationary gendarmerie is placed at about 400,000 tomans (80,000*l.*), while the mobile column increases from 141,000 tomans (28,000*l.*) in the first year to 460,000 tomans (92,000*l.*) in the second. Extraordinary expenses to the amount of 321,000 tomans (64,000*l.*) are to be incurred on these two divisions of the Fars force during the two years (presumably from the 21st March next); making a total expenditure for that period of about 344,000*l.*

With regard to the rest of Persia, Colonel Hjalmarson proposes a considerable extension in the sphere of his operations, including an Ispahan contingent to link up the Tehran and Fars forces, a Kermanshah station, a Kum-Sultanabad contingent, and a commencement of the Meshed road (Eivanikeif-Semnan), &c. For these purposes, which anticipate the increase of his force to nearly 8,000 men, Colonel Hjalmarson states that he requires to augment the number of Swedish instructors by six, and asks the Minister of the Interior to take the necessary steps to obtain an authorisation for him to bring the total number of Swedish instructors up to twenty-eight. He estimates the expenses of his somewhat ambitious plans at no less a sum than 2,000,000 tomans, or 400,000*l.*, for the first year, including 64,000*l.* for the purchase of arms and ammunition.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 54.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 2, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to state that in the course of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, I enquired how the Russian Government proposed to raise the capital necessary for the construction of the Julfa-Tabriz Railway, and whether there would be anything in the shape of a Government guarantee.

His Excellency replied that the railway would be a very cheap one to build, as for a considerable distance all that it would be necessary to do would be to lay the rails on the existing road. It was, moreover, certain to prove a paying concern. A Government guarantee would therefore not be necessary, as it would be quite easy to raise the money from private sources. While his Excellency explicitly stated that there was to be no guarantee, he gave no indication as to the sources whence the money was to be procured.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 55.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 10, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from Bushire:—

“*March 9.*—Funeral of Madame Constant took place last night at Roman Catholic church; residency and governor's flags were half-masted during service and funeral, which was attended by governor and European community and friends. I learned yesterday that Mr. and Mrs. Kay, of Messrs. Dixons, who were driving home also with a horse recently purchased from Constant, were a few hundred yards in front of Constants when their horse shied just short of Constant's house at shadows cast across road by group of several men seated under shadow of trees at side of road, who suddenly rose and hailed their 'syce,' who was driving. Apparently seeing who it was, they let trap pass, but horse bolted, ran up slope, and trap was overturned and occupants badly shaken, but not seriously hurt. While getting up they heard shots some distance behind, but were too shaken to pay much attention, and were able

to reach their house further on. Foregoing seems to indicate assailants, who were located a few hundred yards on town side of Constant's house, were waiting for him and no one else. Constant progressing well."

No. 56.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 10, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram.
Following from Bushire, 9th March :—

"Many rumours are afloat to account for the murder, each element adopting the one which best suits its point of view. At present there is no tangible evidence in favour of any particular one. The governor is of course inclined to consider that it has been engineered by Dariabegi's partisans (connected with and unconnected with the gendarmerie) in order to make trouble for himself. Others put it down to personal revenge on the part of some smugglers or dismissed employé. Constant himself, with whom I have had a long conversation last night, is convinced that he was attacked as the representative of the treasurer-general, and that he will continue to be pursued.

"He expressed the view that the outrage was prompted by the same spirit which caused the mobbing of M. Mornard and the murder of Dumez in the north.

"He is at present lying at the residency surgeon's house, and I have placed sepoy guard there. Constant begs, however, for a British guard on return to his own house, saying that he would not have faith in any Persian riflemen or sowars.

"This is question which needs to be specially considered as an item of policy. At present there is inevitably an abnormal number of armed rascals in the place in connection with enlistment for the gendarmerie, but it is to be hoped that this evil will disappear as soon as force moves on to the road; this, however, will not be for another month or six weeks, and meanwhile we have to reckon with the fact that the governor's small force of riflemen is greatly outnumbered by the above element, and that our own men are the only real source of security."

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 10, 1913.

MOVEMENTS of ex-Shah.

You should suggest to Minister for Foreign Affairs that he might enquire at Odessa where the ex-Shah has gone. I trust that his Excellency will cause all possible precautions to be taken in the Caucasus and elsewhere on the Russian frontier to prevent his attempting to return to Persia either clandestinely or otherwise.

No. 58.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 11, 1913.

MY telegram of 6th March.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the Persian Government agree that a special account shall be opened at the Imperial Bank of Persia for the gendarmerie of Fars. Secondly, that expenditure shall be controlled by treasurer-general, who shall authorise all payments to be made from fund after consultation with Swedish colonel. Thirdly, that I shall pay treasurer-general the entire sum in one cheque. Fourthly, that necessary funds shall be remitted to the financial agent at Shiraz by treasurer-general for transmission to Swedish officer commanding there. Fifthly, that monthly budget shall be drawn up by colonel commanding at Tehran with the assistance of the treasurer-general and after consultation with officer in command at Shiraz, who will on his side take counsel with the financial agent there. Sixthly, that system of purchase by open tender of supplies for gendarmerie shall be established.

I have replied that my instructions only permit me to make monthly payments, but I would point out that if this plan is adhered to it will be hard to call upon the Persian Government to pay interest on the entire sum from date of its payment to Persian Government. All the moneys will pass through European hands, and both I and consul at Shiraz will be able to make our opinions heard, should it be necessary without this appearing in a document in a manner that might lay the Government open to criticism.

No. 59.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 10th March.

I spoke again to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed.

His Excellency learns that the ex-Shah has gone to Nice. It had, he said, been impossible to retain him longer at Odessa, as he was not a prisoner. His Excellency assured me that all the necessary precautions would be taken, but repeated that now that the ex-Shah had left Russian territory he could not accept responsibility for his future movements, and that it would not be his Excellency's fault if he succeeded in evading the vigilance of the Russian authorities.

No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 7th March: Advance to Persian Government.

Have the Persian Government accepted the Russian proposals?

We are only waiting for that to advance the 200,000*l.*, of which 30,000*l.* must be earmarked for the administration of Fars.

No. 61.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 9, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of to-day, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum which M. Sazonof handed to me yesterday in regard to the Mohammerah-Khoremabad railway scheme.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Memorandum communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonof.

LE chargé d'affaires de Russie à Téhéran vient de télégraphier au Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères que le Gouvernement persan a accordé à un syndicat anglais le droit d'option pour la construction d'un chemin de fer depuis Mohammerah jusqu'à Khorremabad à certaines conditions; entre autres, le Gouvernement persan s'engage à procéder sans délai avec la coopération du syndicat, mais à ses propres frais, aux travaux de tracement du chemin de fer en question.

Le Gouvernement Impérial pense que cette stipulation présente de graves inconvénients, vu qu'elle entraînera après elle des dépenses considérables et très onéreuses pour le Trésor persan, dont la situation extrêmement précaire est bien connue. D'autre part, le Trésor persan est appelé à subvenir d'urgence à toute une série de mesures administratives dont le besoin se fait impérieusement sentir, dont l'importance et l'utilité pour la Perse sont de beaucoup supérieures à celles du chemin de fer dont il s'agit et qui exigeront de grands sacrifices pécuniaires.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement russe estime qu'il serait préférable de ne pas imposer au Gouvernement persan des obligations comme celle dont il est question plus haut, mais de proposer au syndicat d'opérer les travaux de tracement à ses propres frais.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 23 février (8 mars), 1913.

(Translation.)

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran has just informed the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs by telegraph that the Persian Government has granted to an English syndicate the right of option for the construction of a railway from Mohammerah to Khoremabad, on certain conditions; amongst others, the Persian Government undertake to begin without delay, with the co-operation of the syndicate but at its own expense, the work of the survey of the railway in question.

The Imperial Government are of opinion that this condition has serious drawbacks, seeing that it will involve an expenditure not only considerable in itself but very onerous on the Persian Treasury, the position of which is well known to be extremely precarious. Further, the Persian Treasury is called upon to meet at once the expense of a whole series of administrative measures, the need for which is making itself urgently felt, the importance and usefulness of which to Persia are infinitely greater than that of the railway in question, which, moreover, will require great pecuniary sacrifices.

The Russian Government, therefore, take the view that it would be preferable not to impose on the Persian Government any obligations such as that referred to above, but rather to propose to the syndicate that they should carry out the work of survey of the railway at their own expense.

No. 62.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 12, 1913.

FIRST and last paragraphs of your telegram of 6th March.

50,000*l.* will be paid in respect of each half of total advance of 400,000*l.*

Treasurer-general is very confident that, unless any unforeseen events occur entailing large calls upon the State finances, such as reappearance of the ex-Shah, there will be a considerable expansion of revenue as the financial administration makes itself felt throughout the country, but there is at the present moment no security that can be specially set aside for repayment of 140,000*l.* in addition to 300,000*l.* about to be advanced.

M. Mornard is somewhat optimistic, and, failing a loan, I am extremely doubtful if funds for repayment of advances will be available from any source other than the customs, which may not suffice to provide the entire 100,000*l.* per annum as guaranteed. Should such prove to be the case, there will be nothing to be done but to spread the repayment over a longer period.

Am I now to act on your telegram of 6th March, omitting the 100,000*l.* for the gendarmerie, or do you propose to adopt Russian method of repayment, which will, I think, prove acceptable to the Persian Government?

The Russian chargé d'affaires has not yet made any communication to the Persian Government, but the conditions proposed have been telegraphed from St. Petersburg. The money is urgently required before 21st March.

No. 63.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith some notes by His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan on the condition of the roads in his province during the quarter ending the 31st December, 1912.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Ispahan Trade Report for December Quarter, 1912.

ROADS.

DURING the quarter under report the condition of the roads, speaking generally, was better than in the September quarter, the improvement on the Ahwaz road in November and December being particularly marked.

Ahwaz Road.

At the beginning of October, apparently as the result of the measures taken by Sardar-i-Jang for the restoration of order on the road, a considerable quantity of merchandise, property of Persian owners, which had been detained in Ram Hormuz, began to reach Ispahan, and there were some despatches during the first two or three weeks of the month, but it was not till the last week in October that goods began to arrive for British firms.

On the 28th October a British officer and party travelling from Ahwaz to Ispahan were attacked at Sardab, near Doupulan, by a band of Kuhgelouis, severely maltreated and stripped of everything.

Two of the muleteers of the party and an Indian orderly were wounded, the last succumbing some days later to the effects of his wounds and subsequent exposure.

About the middle of November the Bushire post was robbed near Ram Hormuz. With the exception however of these two incidents the road was in a satisfactory condition.

Traffic throughout November and December was very brisk, about 3,184 packages being received from, and 1,633 despatched to Ahwaz by Messrs. Lynch.

The prospects of the continuance of traffic throughout the cold weather were good, Messrs. Lynch reporting that though considerable falls of snow had taken place at some points on the road, the snow had been well trampled down by constant passage of caravans. Muleteers after their long enforced idleness were anxious to work.

Posts came in somewhat irregularly, occasionally robbed, but in most cases safely, the mails being conveyed as before by Kasids.

At the end of November the Ispahan post office authorities notified that the postal service between Ispahan and Dehkurd (Chahar Mahal), which had hitherto run once a week only in both directions, would thenceforth run twice a week.

Shiraz Road.

The insecurity reported as prevailing on the Shiraz-Abadeh-Ispahan road at the close of the September quarter had caused southward-bound caravans to delay moving from Ispahan pending a favourable opportunity. This was furnished by the departure from Ispahan for Shiraz of "A" squadron of the 39th Central India Horse on the 5th October, when caravans numbering 100 to 200 head of transport left for Shiraz in its wake.

With this exception there was practically no caravan traffic during the first half of the quarter, the road being in a very insecure condition. The post which arrived from Shiraz on the 10th October was held up a few miles north of Kumisheh by a band of nine or ten footpads who, after examining the mail bags and finding nothing worth robbing, allowed the post to proceed. On the 11th November a party of pilgrims was attacked on the Orchini pass (some 20 miles south of Ispahan) by a large band of Kuhgelouis, and in view of the menacing attitude of these tribesmen the Ispahan authorities found it necessary to despatch to that point a detachment of Bakhtiaris from Kumisheh and another from Ispahan. In a skirmish which ensued between Kuhgelouis and Bakhtiaris there were several killed and wounded on both sides.

Between the 21st and 24th November caravans numbering about 400 head of transport (chiefly laden with piece-goods) arrived from Shiraz accompanied by large escorts and reported the road safe.

Throughout December—despite occasional disquieting reports of incidents on the

road, more particularly in the vicinity of Kumisheh—traffic was brisk, some 800 head of transport laden with local produce being despatched from Ispahan during the first week of the month, nine wagons and about 200 mules with piece-goods, &c., arriving from Shiraz safely on the 21st December.

The latter part of the month was marked by a curious feature, viz., the presence in the neighbourhood of Abadeh of several Boir Ahmadi chiefs with their followers intent on gaining the public confidence, and the approbation of the Fars authorities as guards on the section between Abadeh and Aminabad.

Throughout the quarter under report mails continued to be carried between Shiraz and Ispahan somewhat erratically by Kasids, who were occasionally robbed or held up by tribesmen.

Tehran Road, &c.

Throughout October and November the condition of the Tehran and other northern roads was good. There were constant arrivals from Tehran, Kazvin, and Resht of Russian merchandise, e.g., sugar, petroleum, glass, tea, &c., including a considerable quantity of piece-goods (about 280 bales). There were frequent despatches to the north of cotton and other produce.

During December the condition of these roads was even more satisfactory, and weather conditions being unusually favourable for the time of year, traffic in both directions was maintained briskly. A caravan of specie for the Imperial Bank arrived from Tehran on the 11th December viâ the Kashan-Natanz road without incident of any kind. The conductor in charge reported the portion of the road between Tehran and Shourab patrolled by the gendarmerie quite secure, and the road service well managed; the tract thence to Murchikhurt, patrolled by sowars of Naib Hussein in somewhat irregular fashion satisfactory, though there were occasional complaints against these men for petty exactions from small caravans and defenceless travellers.

Throughout the quarter the postal service between Tehran and Ispahan continued to be highly unsatisfactory; mails which were carried by wagon over the roundabout route Kum-Sultanabad (there were no post horses on the Natanz-Kashan road) taking from fifteen to nineteen days between Tehran and Ispahan. Towards the end of November there was some improvement, time being reduced to about 12/14 days.

Yezd Road.

In October and November conditions on this road were unfavourable to caravan traffic. There were constant rumours of robbers at various points principally Nou Gumbaz and Mazraa'-i-Mullah Ahmed. On the 7th October a large caravan from Ispahan was robbed at the former place, and another attacked near Sagzi in the beginning of November. The presence for a time of large bands of Kuhgelouis in the vicinity of the road, and of Naib Hussein and his followers on it added further risks. Notwithstanding these conditions caravan traffic was fairly well maintained. Throughout December the road was reported safe, but the cold weather having set in caravan traffic fell off.

Posts throughout the quarter were irregular, and took on an average about ten days to cover the distance (about 190 miles) between Yezd and Ispahan.

Sultanabad-Kermanshah-Hamadan Roads.

Throughout October and November caravan traffic was fairly well maintained on these roads in spite of two robberies of pilgrim caravans in the beginning of October, one near Khonsar, the other near Douletabad, and of the insecurity prevailing in November in the environs of Sultanabad owing to marauding by Lurs.

In December there was a marked increase in traffic more particularly on the Hamadan and Kermanshah roads, caravans of merchandise and pilgrims arriving at frequent intervals.

Traffic fell off somewhat at the close of the month, snow lying deep on the roads.

Posts throughout the quarter arrived fairly regularly. Time about fourteen days between Kermanshah and Ispahan, five to seven days between Sultanabad and Ispahan.

At the end of November the Sultanabad posting company advertised a direct service from Ispahan to Tehran viâ Sultanabad at through rates.

No. 64.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

Sir,

Tehran, February 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Lieutenant Bullock arrived here from Ispahan on the 18th February and left for India on the 24th February.

During his stay in Tehran I again pressed the Bakhtiari khans to settle the claim arising out of the attack on him at the end of October. My representations, however, proved unsuccessful, and there appeared no alternative but to leave the claim on file against the Persian Government.

Subsequently Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the late Prime Minister, called upon me and agreed to pay the amount of the loss incurred by Lieutenant Bullock, namely, 126*l*. His Excellency added that if I ordered him to do so he would pay the entire claim.

I replied that it was not my place to order the khans to do anything, but that it appeared to me that it was in their interest to do so, because their good name ran a risk of suffering somewhat severely in British opinion if they allowed a young officer to be robbed in their country without coming forward spontaneously to make good his loss.

Samsam-es-Sultaneh said that the question of the 500*l*. claimed as personal compensation should receive attention after communication with Sardar Jang, whom the khans held to be responsible for the incident, and the proper person to pay the indemnity demanded, but that meanwhile he would himself pay the amount of the actual loss suffered.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 65.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 13, 1913.

FOLLOWING from Bushire, 12th March :—

“I have to report that 168 men of the gendarmerie enlisted here, mostly Tangistanis, after going on strike against certain punishments inflicted on two of their number, and after demanding and obtaining their pay up to date, have resigned. They have not yet left the island, but the governor thinks that they will do so quietly.”

No. 66.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 13, 1913.

PARTIES of raiders some 300 strong are committing excesses in Bunder Abbas district. Lingah also reports strong forces of tribesmen collecting near Lar, with express intention of attacking Bunder Abbas.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire has asked admiral to send ship to Bunder Abbas for a few days to keep a watch on events.

No. 67.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 13, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 11th March.

The Russian chargé d'affaires communicated the text of the Russian proposals verbally yesterday afternoon, and subsequently sent in a note to the Persian Government.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw after he had seen the Russian chargé d'affaires, told me that he presumed that the Cabinet would accept the proposals, but

said that he could not give a definite opinion before consulting his colleagues, more especially as the Russian chargé d'affaires had informed him in communicating the proposals that his Government considered that, in consequence of their conciliatory attitude, the Persian Government should agree to take into favourable consideration, with a view to arriving at a satisfactory agreement, the question of a concession to Julfa-Tabriz Railway Syndicate for navigation of Lake Urmia.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it would be impossible to persuade the Cabinet to add this concession to the other responsibilities that had been assumed. It was raised, he added, when the railway negotiations were opened, and dropped in consequence of the refusal of the Persian Government to negotiate the two concessions at the same time.

The Russian chargé d'affaires assures me that this expression of the desires of his Government will not in any way delay the payment of advance, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed afraid that the money would not be forthcoming without the promise sought.

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 12th March : Joint advance to Persia.

As I stated in my telegram of 6th March, you may accept Persian proposal, but, pending settlement of conditions, the 100,000*l.* cannot be advanced.

The 200,000*l.* will be placed at your disposal immediately, and I am informing Russian Government that, as the Persian Government are in urgent need, I propose, unless they see any objection, to pay it over at once.

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 11th March : Advance for Fars.

As far as I can judge, it is essential that you should have some consultative voice as to control of expenditure and know what is being spent. The consultation can be unofficial. I hope the Persian Government will make no further unnecessary difficulties.

No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th March to Sir W. Townley.

You may inform M. Sazonof that I have accepted the Persian conditions, as I am anxious to make matters easy financially for the Persian Government, and that I propose to pay over my share (200,000*l.*) at once, unless he sees any objection.

No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

YOUR Excellency will see from Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 11th instant, a copy of which has been sent to you, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has learnt that the ex-Shah of Persia has left Odessa and gone to Nice, where, it is understood, a considerable number of his adherents are to be found.

I have accordingly to request your Excellency to inform me as soon as he actually arrives at Nice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 13, 1913.

SIR P. COX'S despatch of 7th February.

We cannot possibly allow this charge to be made on the surplus customs, which are fully mortgaged.

Cannot M. Mornard find 10,000*l.* out of the joint advances—not, of course, out of the 100,000*l.*, which must all go to the gendarmerie? or would it be practicable to make a temporary surcharge on the imports at Bushire to be devoted to construction of new custom-house?

No. 73.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 13, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

The Regent has telegraphed to the Cabinet protesting against Salar's appointment to Resht, adding that as long as the late rebel remains Governor of Gilan (should his appointment there be confirmed) he will be unable to return to Persia. The question has thus become active again while the Prince is actually on his way to take up the appointment.

The Persian Minister in St. Petersburg was instructed by his Government to make a direct communication to the Russian Government on the subject; the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he would consult M. Poklewsky, but he did not see how he could go back on his word given to Salar.

No. 74.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 14, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th March.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire:—

“His Majesty's ship is at Bunder Abbas. The town and vicinity are quiet, though raiders are still in the district.”

No. 75.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 14, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th March.

Sir P. Cox reports a little sniping at Major Brandel's house 11th March, and wounding of one of that officer's sowars on 12th March.

Sir P. Cox informed the governor that, if he judged it desirable, he might tell the strikers that if they did not leave the island quietly British regiment would be called out.

The governor seems to be doing his utmost to prevent trouble, and states that all the dangerous men have left the island. It is of course impossible to be certain of this.

No. 76.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 14, 1913.

MY telegram of 10th March.

Consul-general at Bushire reports that a man has been arrested on suspicion of being the perpetrator of the outrage on M. and Mme. Constant. The individual in question was discharged from Customs service some time ago for embezzlement, and it is known that Constant had been endeavouring to get him discharged from the gendarmerie, in which he had lately enlisted.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

Your despatch of 9th March and your telegram of 9th March.

Critical state of Persian finances is well known to His Majesty's Government, and by forgoing the repayment of our last advance we have shown our appreciation of their difficulties. But the fact that British syndicate has only obtained an option whereas Russia has obtained a contract for her railway has already caused some criticism here. I consider that it would be too late to reopen question of allocation of the cost of survey with Persian Government.

No. 78.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 14, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th ultimo, on the subject of an Anglo-Russian joint advance of 400,000*l.* to the Persian Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for the information of the Marquess of Crewe, that a letter has been addressed to the Imperial Bank of Persia, forwarding an order on His Majesty's Paymaster-General for the Imperial share of that amount, viz., 100,000*l.*, and I am to express the hope that his Lordship will now cause the Indian share of the advance to be remitted to the Imperial Bank with a similar request.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 79.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 14th March, 1913, regarding arms for Fars.

India Office, March 15, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.)

March 14, 1913.

ARRANGEMENTS are being made for immediate dispatch to consul-general, Bushire, of the arms and ammunition referred to in your telegram of the 10th instant.

No. 80.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 13th March.

I can easily make a private arrangement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which will ensure my having a consultative voice in the spending of the money on the gendarmerie. You may rest assured that I shall know how the money is spent.

No. 81.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 15, 1913.

FOLLOWING from the Government of India, addressed to Secretary of State for India, 14th March :—

“ Shiraz.

“ We consider proposal to withdraw Central India Horse should be approved in principle, and that details of withdrawal and route to be taken should be left to local authorities.”

May I in the circumstances inform the Persian Government of the intention to withdraw the Central India Horse? I think it desirable that they should learn this from me rather than from outside sources.

No. 82.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 13th March.

The Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me to-day an *aide-mémoire* in reply to the communication which I made to the Minister yesterday.

It states that the Imperial Government has not yet received the reply from the Persian Government to the conditions which it attached with regard to the repayment of the advance, and that in order to preserve Anglo-Russian solidarity in this matter it would be preferable that our share should only be paid in simultaneously with the Russian share.

His Excellency assured me that this would be done as soon as the Persian Government assented to the term proposed by the Russian Government for the repayment of the advance.

No. 83.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 14th March : Salar-ed-Dowleh.

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am prepared, if his Excellency will act similarly, to urge the Prince to leave Persia if Persian Government will increase his pay.

No. 84.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 6, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 3rd March, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the note addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the two legations on the 2nd March urging an early reply in the matter of the conditions attached to the advances.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No 84.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

March 2, 1913.

YOU are of course aware that when the formation of the Cabinet was under discussion the present members of it made their acceptance of office conditional on a loan sufficiently large to bring about the restoration of order and peace as well as to admit of the execution of such necessary reforms as were of immediate need. They also considered the assistance of the English and Russian Governments in arranging this loan necessary. Your Excellency, as well as M. Poklewsky-Koziell, the Russian Minister at Tehran, approved of the views expressed by the members of the Cabinet before its final formation in regard to the loan, and promised the assistance of the two Governments in the matter. In order to facilitate the efforts of the Ministers to put the above-mentioned intentions successfully into execution an immediate advance on account of the loan was proposed by you both. In reality, one of the causes of the formation of the present Cabinet was the hope entertained of the fulfilment of that promise, and, indeed, since the formation of the Ministry I have repeatedly reminded you verbally of this question, and have heard you confirm that promise. The utmost that you and your colleague stated was that the settlement of the loan question depended upon the arrival of the representative of the syndicate which had to arrange the loan; but you agreed to the immediate need of the advance, and recognised the difference of opinion between my Government and the Russian Legation—my Government expecting a sum of 600,000*l.* in view of the parity of the amount with the instalments of the future loan; while the Russian Legation thought the payment of that amount difficult—but as at the time the question of the concession of the Julfa-Tabriz Railway, and the option of the Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway were under discussion, my Government afforded first a satisfactory termination to those questions, and did not refrain from rendering an assistance which it considered to be beyond its sphere of duty. After the conclusion of the concession the Russian Minister informed me that his Government was only prepared to give an advance of 200,000*l.* to the Persian Government on the same conditions as the advances made in 1911 and 1912 bearing interest at 7 per cent., and that before the loan was made the Russian Government wished that the surplus of the customs revenues of Northern Persia should be assigned for the repayment of the above-mentioned advances.

After consultation in the Cabinet, I, being under the impression that the same conditions would be proposed by the British Government in connection with the advance, informed you and your Russian colleague, through the Mouhaver-ul-Mamalek, Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, of the views of my Government, of the difficulties of the conditions, and the impossibility of my Government taking advantage of such an advance. In the meantime I submitted the conditions under which the Persian Government could accept the advance in question and profit by it. Your Excellency concurred personally with the views of the Cabinet and myself in the matter, and promised to telegraph on the subject to your Government and obtain a satisfactory answer for me. His Excellency M. Poklewsky-Koziell and M. Sabline, the Russian chargé d'affaires, promised me their assistance in bringing my proposals, with the same object, to the notice of their Government. Up to this date, although more than ten days have elapsed since I made the above-mentioned proposals, no answer has been received from you or from the Russian Legation.

Under these circumstances I have considered it necessary to draw your attention

in writing to the verbal negotiations which have passed between us, and the views of my Government in connection with the immediate need of an advance under the conditions I have already proposed, and to impress on you the difficulties of the Persian Government in the event of delay occurring in the settlement of the matter. At the same time I do not consider it superfluous to draw your attention to the fact that, in view of the approaching New Year, the Persian Government consider it necessary that they should know the decision within a week.

I appeal to your Excellency's good offices in this matter to obtain a reply from your Government within the fixed period and inform me of the same.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 85.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 17, 1913.

ON 10th March Sir P. Cox telegraphed to the Government of India that the European community at Bushire was greatly scared by outrage upon Constant, that gendarmes (since disbanded) were not very reliable force, and that the governor had only some fifty or sixty riflemen, who were not sufficient for him to make any effective provision for safety of Europeans.

For the above reasons, in order to be able to supply sepoy guard to such families as might ask for one, and to demonstrate that some notice was being taken of the recent outrage, Sir P. Cox suggests that the 2nd Rajputs should be transferred from Jask to Bushire, leaving only a small detachment at the former place.

Sir P. Cox now informs me that the Government of India has adopted his suggestion, and that one officer with forty sepoy and one Maxim gun will be left at Jask.

I request instructions as to whether or no I should make a communication to the Persian Government, basing the movement on the exceptional circumstances which have rendered it necessary.

No. 86.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 17, 1913.

MY telegram of 14th March.

The raiders, who had retired to the hills on 15th March, attacked Bunder Abbas on the morning of 16th March; further hostilities anticipated. Senior naval officer reports the position therefore somewhat critical, and British subjects have been invited to take shelter at the vice-consulate. Twenty rifles and two Maxims have been landed to reinforce the guard at the vice-consulate, and His Majesty's ship has gone to Jask to bring up fifty more men with British officer.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 17th March: Bushire.

When do gendarmerie contingent arrive at Bushire?

No. 88.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 18, 1913.

MY telegram of 17th March.

Bunder Abbas reports one officer, forty-one men, and two Maxims landed 18th March. Raiders are attempting vainly to negotiate. The situation is better.

No. 89.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 18, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH and Governorship of Resht.

My telegram of the 13th March.

I have been requested by the Prime Minister to call your attention again to this question. His Highness states that this lunatic Prince has now renewed his demand that, during his tenure of the post offered to him, a Russian Cossack guard shall be attached to him. Ala-es-Sultaneh expressed the earnest hope that Great Britain and Russia might yet succeed in inducing him to go to Europe, as it was impossible for the Persian Government to confirm the appointment of a man who insists upon such an outrageous condition.

The above story is confirmed by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who tells me that Salar demands a guard of 200 men with 2 officers. He has reported the matter to St. Petersburg.

No. 90.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 17th March.

The gendarmerie should reach Bushire about the end of April.

No. 91.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th March: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, while reserving his definite answer, said that he feared that he could not act as you suggest.

No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 15th March: Joint advance.

You should point out to Persian Government that the delay in making the joint advance is now with them.

No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th March: Shiraz force.

You are authorised to inform Persian Government of the intention of His Majesty's Government to withdraw the regiment.

You should impress upon the Persian Government that the withdrawal of this force without His Majesty's Government taking any steps themselves to secure the order upon the road that is essential to British trade makes it incumbent upon the Persian Government to make no further difficulties about the loan of 100,000*l.*, which is necessary to enable the Persian Government themselves to protect the trade route.

No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

Persian Railways Syndicate are dispatching party of four engineers to Mohammerah, where they will arrive about 10th April, to conduct reconnaissance of lower portion of Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway, and to make arrangements for main survey party, who will commence work September next.

Present party will only undertake such work as they can safely do until more definite arrangements are made for their protection, presumably only as far as Dizful.

You should inform Sir P. Cox, and instruct him to give the party every assistance in his power, and, if he has no objection, to direct Captain Wilson to accompany the party.

No. 95.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the latter's letter of the 14th instant regarding the joint Anglo-Russian advance to the Persian Government, is directed to inform him that the sum of 100,000*l.* was paid by the Accountant-General of this Office to the Imperial Bank of Persia on the 15th instant.

India Office, March 18, 1913.

No. 96.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 19, 1913

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Shiraz, 19th March:—

“Major Siefert has informed Colonel Douglas that he cannot leave Shiraz for Bushire before 15th April. This date, in the opinion of Colonel Douglas, would make movement rather later than desirable, and, moreover, movements of gendarmerie may be subject to alterations and unforeseen delays. Colonel Douglas therefore would prefer to leave Shiraz first week in April and to march down independently of gendarmerie.

“In accordance with the wishes expressed by Government of India, I consulted Governor-General on the matter last night, and he has expressed the opinion that there is no objection to regiment marching down independently. For various reasons which he explained to me at length, he thinks Kazerun route preferable to Firuzabad route, and is convinced that no attack will be made on the regiment and that movement will be perfectly safe.

“Colonel Douglas and I are both prepared to accept his views as correct, and Colonel Douglas therefore proposes leaving here the first week in April viâ Kazerun.

“In order to enable us to make all necessary arrangements, collect transport and supplies, which just now present certain difficulties, we would request that definite orders may be issued with least possible delay.”

I consider proposed arrangement preferable to withdrawal in company with gendarmerie.

No. 97.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 18th March.

The Persian Government have protested to Wood that it would have been more in accordance with meaning of the option had the syndicate dispatched one or more

engineers to Tehran to discuss question with Persian Government, and to decide upon nature of and object of survey to be made, expense to be incurred, &c.

It is pointed out that Persian Government only undertook cost of a preliminary survey, and that syndicate appears to expect that an exhaustive survey is to be made.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is ill, and I shall not be able to see him in all probability until after New Year festivities, that is, in a week's time.

No. 98.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 20, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 15th March.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me to-day memorandum stating that the Persian Government, desiring to put an end to the struggle with Salar, proposed a reconciliation with him on certain conditions, of which one was the promise to appoint him Governor of Gilan. These pourparlers were conducted through the Russian Legation, which guaranteed faithful execution by the Persian Government of the obligations contracted in favour of Salar. So long as the latter does not infringe the terms of this arrangement with the Persian Government, the Russian Government will be obliged to insist on the strict observance of that arrangement, and will not be able to allow the principal stipulations thereof to be entirely changed. Moreover, Gilan being in the Russian zone, the Russian Government think that they will always be able to exercise their influence on Salar and to keep close watch on him.

I told him that I gathered, from what the Persian Minister had said to me, that Salar had put forward some new conditions which were unacceptable. His Excellency replied that if this was really the case the situation would be somewhat altered. Salar, however, would very soon get tired of Gilan, so that the matter was of no great consequence.

No. 99.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 21, 1913.

MY telegram of 15th March.

Russian chargé d'affaires is instructed to pay in Russian share as soon as Persian Government have accepted conditions as to its repayment.

No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 19th March: Withdrawal of Central India Horse.

Proposal approved.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

You may inform M. Sazonof of substance of Sir W. Townley's telegram of the 18th March, and say that Salar-ed-Dowleh is evidently not fit for an appointment of such importance.

No. 102.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 23, 1913.

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram of 9th March.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me to-day anxiety of the Persian Government as to the present whereabouts of ex-Shah. His Excellency said that he cannot ascertain that His Majesty has been either to Vienna or Berlin, although British consul-general at Odessa reported his departure for latter place.

His Excellency would be very grateful for any enquiries His Majesty's Government might see fit to make.

No. 103.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 18th March.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, 20th March :—

“ Wilson leaves Bushire on 24th March for Ahwaz and will make all necessary arrangements for survey party. He anticipates no serious difficulty in arranging for their safety as far as Dizful. As regards arrangements for work beyond Dizful, Wilson anticipates no insurmountable difficulties in making satisfactory arrangements with tribes, but expresses the conviction, with which I concur, that best chance of securing the safety of the parties is to arrange directly with tribes concerned and secure their consent and co-operation. Any attempt to impose survey party on tribes by force, Persian or otherwise, will be fraught with considerable danger, and will in all probability be unsuccessful.

“ He trusts, therefore, that in interests of survey party he will be instructed himself to make necessary arrangements with tribes, and that no attempt will be made by survey party or syndicate to deal with them or with other local authorities through the Persian Government or its official agents.”

I entirely agree with views expressed by Sir P. Cox.

No. 104.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 22nd March : Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I have communicated substance of Tehran telegram of 18th March to Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency explained that it was at the instance of the Persian Government that he had first consented to Salar's appointment, and that, having done so, he had been unable to go back on it. If, however, Salar put forward such a preposterous condition he would wash his hands of him, and if he would go to Europe his Excellency would be very glad. I asked him to send instructions in above sense to Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran, but he said that before doing so he must await latter's report on the matter.

No. 105.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 18, 1913.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 14th of this month, I have the honour to state that I took the occasion of a conversation which I had with M. Sazonof yesterday to inform him that it was now too late to reopen the discussion with the Persian Government of the allocation of the cost of the survey of the Mohammerah-

Khoremad Railway. As his Excellency still contended that this charge ought to be borne by the syndicate and not by the Persian Government, I pointed out that, as the former had only obtained an option for the line and not a concession like Russia in the case of the Julfa-Tabriz Railway, they could hardly be expected to incur such expenditure before the terms of the contract or concession had been settled. I further reminded him that we had shown our consideration for the financial difficulties of the Persian Government by forgoing the repayment of our last advance, whereas the Russian Government had recouped themselves out of the surplus of the northern customs. M. Sazonof replied that they had had a perfect right to do so, and that it was owing to the measures which they had taken for the maintenance of order that there was any surplus at all in the northern customs. Eventually, however, his Excellency consented to allow the question to drop.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 25, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 23rd March: Mohammerah-Khoremad Railway.

I agree, and Wilson should be instructed accordingly.

No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 25, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 19th March: Mohammerah-Khoremad Railway.

Wood has telegraphed to his syndicate as follows:—

“Referring to your telegram of 15th, Persian Government objects to procedure, pointing out is not in keeping with spirit of option, and hope that surveyors will come here in order to consult them and their representative before embarking on survey, which is intended to be cursory and inexpensive.”

Syndicate have replied in these terms:—

“Impossible send surveyors Tehran if work to be completed within period option, nor is it necessary, as surveyors are only technical men, with no authority discuss questions with Persian Government. Persian Government option letter states Persian Government agree commence survey now. It is necessary commence reconnaissance immediately if we are to complete preliminary survey by end of next cold weather, and unless preliminary survey then completed we cannot submit result to Persian Government six months before expiry option. Therefore, to comply with Persian Government letter, they must send their surveyor at once Mohammerah co-operate with ours.”

I concur in views expressed in telegram sent to Wood.

You may use these arguments to Persian Government in reply to their protest and urge them to send a surveyor at once to Mohammerah.

No. 108.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 26, 1913.

MY telegram of 18th March.

Bunder Abbas reports that raiders have left the neighbourhood, and that conditions are now normal.

No. 109.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, March 26, 1913

MY telegram of 21st March.

Memorandum from the Russian Government states that they attach great importance to Lake Urmia concession, which also presents great advantages for the Persian Government. The Russian Government express hope that His Majesty's Legation at Tehran will, as far as possible, support the Russian Legation with a view to obtaining that concession.

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.

MY despatch of 13th March.

Please enquire whether the ex-Shah has yet arrived at Nice.

No. 111.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 27, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 22nd March.

Acting British consul at Shiraz requests permission to accompany the regiment as far as Kazerun, where he will also have an opportunity of making the acquaintance of Soulet.

I agree with the acting consul that his presence with the regiment is likely to be of assistance to them, and I propose, with your approval, to sanction his accompanying them.

No. 112.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, March 27, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 26th March.

It is believed that ex-Shah was at Venice a few days ago. Nothing known of his arrival at Nice.

No. 113.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 13, 1913.

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Bushire has furnished the following information respecting the movements of caravans during January and February:—

1. Mules arriving and leaving Bushire: January, 3,492; February, 1,594. Also donkeys: January, 826; February 900.

2. Borasjun reports the following departures to Bushire: January, 2,945 mules; February, 2,096 mules; and arrivals there from Bushire: January, 3,760 mules; February, 2,856 mules.

There are no donkey returns as these animals go viâ Firuzabad.

Acting British consul at Shiraz reports as follows:—

Arrivals from Bushire: February, 2,815 mules, 1,300 donkeys; and departures to Bushire: about 2,300 mules.

Arrivals at Shiraz from Ispahan numbered 450 mules, and departures from Shiraz to Ispahan about 938 mules.

Acting British consul at Shiraz reports also the following robberies during the month of February :—

February 14.—Near Kazerun, a donkey caravan ; subsequently recovered by Darya Begi.

February 20.—At Takhtitaous, a mule caravan conveying cash and miscellaneous goods *en route* to Shiraz.

February 22.—At Kamin, a caravan was attacked by Lashanis, who were driven off by village headmen ; but the caravan lost three loaded mules and three ponies.

February 23.—At bridge near Siwand. Kurdshulis carried off goods and animals from a caravan going to Shiraz.

February 27 and 28.—Robberies of sheep and donkeys near Kazerun by Bulvardis. I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 114.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 28, 1913.

MY telegram of 17th March.

Following from Sir P. Cox to Government of India, 27th March, repeated to me :—

“Governor of the Gulf Ports now suggests at the eleventh hour that arrival of more men at Bushire by sea, just as the cavalry are starting from Shiraz, is undesirable as being calculated to give an impression of designed concentration, and, perhaps, arouse suspicions of the people on the road.

“I think myself that the governor is mainly prompted by the idea that the necessity for sending men here is an indirect slur on his own régime. But, as he pressed the above view and asked me to communicate it, I am not prepared to say that he or the Persian Government might not use the arrival of sepoys as an excuse for any unfriendly feeling shown to the cavalry on the way. This being so, if the Rajputs have not already started, perhaps the Government of India will consider the desirability of the movement being postponed until the arrival of the cavalry. It might be feasible for transports, which come up to take the cavalry away, to bring the infantry with them.”

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 27th March : Shiraz.

Are you satisfied that the acting consul will run no risk on his return journey, and that a visit from him to Soulet will not embarrass the Governor-General and be misinterpreted by Soulet?

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 28, 1913.

THERE is reason to believe that the ex-Shah was in Venice a few days ago.

We should be much obliged if the Italian Government could let us know whether he is actually in Venice, and for any information as to his movements.

No. 117.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 29, 1913.

I AM repeating your telegram of 28th March to Shiraz for acting consul's observations.

Visit to Soulet, who has been reinstated by Persian Government, has the approval of the Governor-General, and gendarmes should be on road in force when the consul returns.

No. 118.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 29, 1913

MINISTER of the Interior having mentioned two days ago intention of the Persian Government to collect force amounting to 8,500 men, 5,000 for Fars and 3,500 for Burujird, where disorders are threatened, I yesterday told Minister for Foreign Affairs that a force of this size would be small army, and should be under foreign officers.

His Excellency agreed, and said that it had been decided to engage Danes, but that he would much prefer in the circumstances greater development of gendarmerie.

This appears to me a more satisfactory scheme under the present financial conditions. I have said that I should deprecate dispatch of the usual disorderly rabble which makes a Persian army, to Fars, and have urged that every assistance should be given to the Governor-General to form local force capable of offering some resistance to tribal pressure that may be expected in a month or two, and to support gendarmerie if necessary.

Situation in Luristan is threatening for Sultanabad,* where there are considerable British interests. No gendarmerie force is available, and there is nothing for it but a force under native officers this spring.

No. 119.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, March 26, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 26th March, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the memorandum which I have received from the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in regard to the Lake Urmia navigation concession.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Memorandum.

AINSI qu'il a été constaté dans l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade britannique en date du 8 (21) mars courant, le Gouvernement Impérial n'avait pas posé comme condition de l'avance à faire au Gouvernement persan le consentement de ce dernier à la concession de navigation sur le lac d'Ourmiah. Toutefois, vu qu'une concession importante avait été faite par le Gouvernement russe quant aux modalités du remboursement de l'avance, le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran avait été instruit d'exprimer l'espoir que le Gouvernement du Schah ne manquera pas de son côté de mener à bonne fin, dans un temps aussi bref que possible, la question ci-dessus mentionnée. M. Sabline ayant inclu ce souhait dans sa note au sujet de l'amortissement de l'avance, le Gouvernement persan l'a prié d'en faire l'objet d'une note séparée. Le Chargé d'Affaires a été

* 50 miles north-east of Burujird.

autorisé à satisfaire à cette demande, et il faut espérer qu'il n'y aura plus de difficultés à procéder immédiatement à la signature de l'arrangement au sujet de l'avance.

Le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir ajouter qu'il attache une grande importance à la concession de navigation sur le lac d'Ourmiah, qui présente en même temps de grands avantages pour le Gouvernement persan, vu que dans l'état actuel des choses ce dernier ne tire aucun profit de cette entreprise. Il serait par conséquent désirable que la Légation britannique à Téhéran prêtât dans la mesure du possible son appui à la Légation Impériale pour la réalisation de ce projet.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 11 (24) mars, 1913.

(Translation.)

AS stated in the memorandum from the British Embassy of the 8th (21st) instant, the Imperial Government did not demand the consent of the Persian Government to the concession for the navigation of Lake Urmia as a preliminary condition of the advance to be made to that Government. At the same time, in view of the fact that an important concession had been made by the Russian Government as to the instalments of the repayment of the advance, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran was instructed to express the hope that the Government of the Shah would not fail on their part to find a satisfactory solution to the question referred to above, with as little delay as possible. M. Sabline having included this wish in his note on the subject of the repayment of the advance, the Persian Government have requested him to make it the subject of a separate note. The Chargé d'Affaires has been authorised to comply with this request, and it is to be hoped that no further difficulties will prevent the immediate signature of the agreement regarding the advance.

The Imperial Government think it right to add that they attach great importance to the concession for the navigation of Lake Urmia, which at the same time offers great advantages to the Persian Government, seeing that in the existing state of affairs the latter derive no profit from that enterprise. It is therefore desirable that the British Legation at Tehran should support the Imperial Legation as far as lies within their power, in order to secure the carrying out of this project.

St. Petersburg, March 11 (24), 1913.

No. 120.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, March 31, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 28th March.

Following from acting consul at Shiraz :—

"I do not think that I should run any risk on my return journey. Accidents are always possible in this country, but that applies to every time I go out. During the last three months I have been moving about freely all round Shiraz to a distance of 20 to 30 miles without ever encountering the smallest difficulty, and I am sure that such movements on the part of the consul are productive of good feeling and tend to facilitate his work in the province."

No. 121.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, March 31, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 28th March.

Prefect of Venice reports that ex-Shah is not and has not been there.

No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 31, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th March : Bushire custom-house.
Secretary of State for India and Government of India urge that funds be found for this very necessary work.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 31, 1913.

IN your despatch of the 28th February I read that, after paying 126*l.*—the loss actually incurred by Lieutenant Bullock—Samsam-es-Sultaneh added that, if you so ordered him, he would pay the entire claim, and that the question of the 500*l.* claimed as personal compensation should receive attention after communication with Sardar Jang.

I have to request you—unless you see any great objection to such a course—to inform the Bakhtiari khans that His Majesty's Government are disappointed that after five months, they have neither punished the culprits nor paid the further claims in the matter still outstanding.

Should any settlement now be made, the amount will of course be deducted from the claims against the Persian Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 31st March : Major O'Connor's visit to Soulet.
In these circumstances I approve.

No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 29th March : Forces for Fars and Luristan.

I fully concur in your view that this is not a moment to send an ill-disciplined rabble to Fars, and you may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I entirely approve suggestion that all support should be given to Governor-General to form local force.

As regards Luristan, you will doubtless act with Russian Chargé d'Affaires in tendering advice to the Persian Government as to the best steps that can be taken in the circumstances. The question appears to be pressing.

No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 26th March : Urmia Lake concession.
I will instruct Sir W. Townley to support the Russian demand.

No. 127.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 2, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from Shiraz :—

“Gendarmerie arrived Shiraz 31st March.”

No. 128.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 2, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 31st March.

M. Mornard is of the opinion that much the best course to pursue is to earmark 10,000L. out of the advance for construction of the Bushire custom-house. There are so many applications for money out of the advances that he would have great difficulty in retaining this money unless the same was specially earmarked by His Majesty's Government.

I would venture to recommend that I be instructed to notify this in note forwarding the British share of the advance.

No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 2nd April : Bushire custom-house.

I authorise you to act in sense of proposal in last paragraph.

No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 2, 1913.

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram of 27th March : Ex-Shah.

I now learn that the ex-Shah has not been in Nice and is not at Venice, and I do not know where he is. Please ask M. Sazonof whether he has any means of ascertaining his whereabouts, as it is most important that we should not be taken by surprise.

No. 131.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 3, 1913.

FORCE for Luristan.

Your telegram of the 1st April.

I have discussed question of a force for Luristan with Russian Chargé d'Affaires. He has expressed an opinion, which I share, that an irregular Persian force is more likely to add to the confusion and sufferings of the people than to do good. He thinks that more use should be made of the Cossack brigade, which costs the Persian Government a large sum of money and is of small practical value. He suggests that, as the gendarmerie is not at present strong enough to send a force, 300 or 400 Persian Cossacks under Persian officers should be sent. They are a drilled force, and, if need be, a Russian officer could easily go to Sultanabad from time to time to see that all is well. It is generally recognised that Russia is behind the Cossack brigade; this knowledge, and the fact that the force is disciplined, should render it sufficiently strong for the purpose in view.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires also told me that 100 Russian Cossacks have been sent to Sulduz, where the disorder, since the Persian Government took over the administration after the evacuation of the district by the Turks, has become unbearable. Persian Cossacks are also being used on the Tabriz-Akher road in order to support certain tribes who are threatened by the Shahsevans in consequence of the assistance they rendered the Russian expedition last year.

No. 132.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 2nd April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that ex-Shah is ill in a sanatorium near Dresden.

No. 133.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 4, 1913.

MY telegram of the 28th March.

I have consulted Sir P. Cox, who is of opinion that it is imperative that sepoys at present at Bushire should remain there; if they were removed, he would accept no responsibility for the security of the European community. He considers that the hinterland, Bushire, and other Gulf ports are in a profound state of anarchy and that the local authorities are dangerously impotent. He adds that there is at present a considerable foreign element in the Gulf ports, including families fresh from Europe and quite strange to conditions as they exist.

I concur with Sir P. Cox in his appreciation of the situation in the hinterland, Bushire, and Gulf ports, and I also agree with him that the Governor would be quite helpless with the force at his disposal were serious rising to occur.

No. 134.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 4, 1913.

MOHAMMERAH-KHOREMABAD Railway.

In answer to communication of syndicate referred to in your telegram of 25th March, Minister for Foreign Affairs returned formal protest against the sending of surveying party without reference to Tehran, and refused to recognise it or be responsible for its safety. I induced his Excellency to take letter back and to substitute a more conciliatory one, accepting the surveyors as making a reconnaissance and expressing a hope that one or two of the engineers could come here in May with a view to seeing if arrangements could be made without further survey. To this, syndicate has replied that engineers will not be able to spare time to come to Tehran, and the Persian Government should send an engineer to Mohammerah at once.

The Persian Government contend that they only agreed under the option letter to meet expenses of a preliminary survey, and that if they are expected to pay for work to be undertaken by syndicate's engineers it would at least have been courtesy on the part of the syndicate to have entered into communication with them before sending the surveyors to Mohammerah, that they are left in complete ignorance of approximate cost of proposed reconnaissance, and do not even know if this is intended to be the preliminary survey which they undertook to carry out in co-operation with the syndicate.

They have no engineer whom they can send to Mohammerah immediately, and they assert that heat in the south will make surveying operations there impossible until September or later.

No. 135.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 2nd April to St. Petersburg.

Persian Government learn that ex-Shah went from Odessa to Dresden to consult specialist. Thence he went to Vienna. He is said to be about to do a cure of waters.

No. 136.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 18th March.

I will send in note as instructed.

Acting British consul at Shiraz telegraphs that colonel of the gendarmerie is pressing for money.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has agreed to an arrangement to be made with Treasurer-General which will secure my supervision of expenditure.

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 4, 1913.

I HEAR that ex-Shah has been in Vienna recently.

You should tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would be grateful for any information as to his present whereabouts.

No. 138.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 3rd April: Cossack brigade.

I quite approve, and you may support Russian Chargé d'Affaires in his advocacy of employing Cossack brigade under Persian officers.

No. 139.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 6, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from Shiraz, 6th April:—

"Central India Horse and detachment 7th Rajputs left this morning for Chenar Rahdar. I propose to join column to-morrow at Khanizinian* and to accompany it to Kazerun." †

No. 140.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7)

Sir,

Tehran, February 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed on the subject of Turkoman raids on the Tehran-Meshed road.

* About 25 miles from Shiraz.

† About 70 miles from Shiraz.

I have addressed a letter to the manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia here requesting him to convey an expression of my cordial thanks to Mr. Nelson for the information which he has placed at the disposal of His Majesty's consulate-general at Meshed.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Consul-General Sykes to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Meshed, January 22, 1913.

MR. NELSON, of the Imperial Bank of Persia, has just reached Meshed from Tehran after a long and interesting journey, during the course of which he has collected some valuable information which I propose to give in this despatch.

He left Tehran with Mrs. Nelson by carriage, reaching Shahrud early in December. He was detained at this half-way town for some days owing to the difficulty of arranging for an escort, and then proceeded to Meimeh, some 40 miles further east. There he was horrified by the arrival of Mr. Meriton, the telegraph inspector, in a half dead condition. This unfortunate man had been attacked by a Turkoman while driving in a waggon. The driver had been shot, and had fallen across him, so that he could not pull up the waggon, and the Turkoman, thinking that he was trying to escape, kept shooting at him. He was partially stripped, and consequently Mr. Nelson's aid in the matter of clothes must have been singularly opportune.

Mr. Nelson, after remaining for some days at Meimeh, where he heard that the Turkoman were on the watch for the "Rais-i-Bank," who is popularly believed to be especially well worth robbing, determined not to play into their hands and returned to Shahrud. There he obtained full details of the seizure of the followers of the Salar-ed-Dowleh by a piece of treachery. The Amir Azam, the Governor, pretended to be a partisan of the Persian prince and invited the leader of his party, which was 400 strong, to an entertainment. With extraordinary gullibility Mussab Khan told his men to leave their arms before going into the town, and the Persian official by a concerted plan accused them of creating a disturbance and had them seized. His booty included 33,000 tomans, 500 rifles, and 200 horses and mules. He reported his success to Tehran and asked, in the first place, for funds to maintain the prisoners pending their disposal, and, in reply to a remark about the money seized by him, swore that he had not found 100 tomans. The Persian Government finally said that no money would be sent, and consequently the prisoners were stripped and released to join the numerous bands of brigands.

From Shahrud Mr. and Mrs. Nelson crossed the Elburz in deep snow to Astrabad, which was reached on the 19th December, and where they remained for nine days.

Mr. Nelson states that the Turkoman were unwilling to join the Salar-ed-Dowleh, but offered to raise 12,000 men if the ex-Shah appeared. The Salar pretended to send messages to his brother inviting him to return, but he probably did not do so.

Finally he dismissed the Turkoman whom he had enlisted, as he was, I imagine, engaged in pourparlers with Tehran and making terms with the Persian Government. With typical mendacity he stated that the ex-Shah was once again on his ancestral throne, and that he had been appointed Sadr Azam.

I have, &c.
P. M. SYKES, Major.

No. 141.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 16, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Cowan, acting British consul at Tabriz, reporting on the administration by the Belgian officials of the finances of the province of Azerbaijan.

I would beg to call your attention to the favourable results obtained from the

Belgian administration of the provincial finances in question, results which may permit one to hope that there may be a considerable increase of the revenue throughout the country in due time, if the Belgian administration meets with a fair measure of support.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 141.

Consul Cowan to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Tabriz, February 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour of submitting an account of the administration by the Belgian officials of the finances of Azerbaijan.

The Belgian staff at present stationed in Tabriz consists of four persons: M. Ransquin, the director of customs and taxation, M. Lejeune, M. Piret and M. Denis. M. Ransquin himself is a man of great industry and conscientiousness. M. Lejeune is extremely forceful and energetic. To his great efficiency he unites a considerable amount of intelligence.

The other two Belgian employés are assistants with no experience of this country.

In order to make clear the work which the Belgians have achieved and are achieving, it is necessary that I should explain the financial arrangements of the province and their condition when the Belgians took charge of them. The annual revenue amounts to between 13,000,000 and 14,000,000 krans, made up as follows:—

								Krans.
Maliat	11,000,000
Excise	500,000
Crown lands	1,500,000
Other sources	500,000
Total	13,500,000

The maliat is paid roughly half in cash and half in kind. The excise includes, besides the taxes on opium, wines and spirits, the tax of 1 kran on all slaughtered animals. The "other sources" comprise telegraph receipts and sundries.

The annual expenditure of the province averages between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000 krans. This year, however, it will amount to over 13,000,000 krans, on account of the expedition against the Shahsevans, which was paid for out of the provincial revenues.

It must not, however, be imagined that in past years the sum of 13,500,000 krans appeared in the Government accounts as the revenue of Azerbaijan. Probably 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 krans would represent what was stated in Government returns, and Azerbaijan, instead of being self-supporting or paying a balance to the Central Government, has for many years been in receipt of a subsidy. As an example of what used to happen I may mention that M. Ransquin has been able to sell the grain of the Government at an average price of 10 tomans per kharvar. His predecessors used to sell at the same or a higher rate, but in their returns stated that they sold it at 5 or 6 tomans.

Again, this year M. Ransquin has succeeded in raising 1,000,000 krans from the excise, chiefly through the tax on slaughtered animals, whereas at the time when the guts of slaughtered beasts were taken by the Government as a tax in kind, it was a notorious fact that Azerbaijan, one of the richest provinces in this respect, showed no revenue under this heading.

This year the maliat has, upon the whole, been paid fairly well. Even the Khan of Maku, who for several years has paid nothing, has been obliged to make a certain, if insufficient, payment. Most of what is still due from him is, I fancy, mainly maliat in kind, for which he declares he has not transport.

As a result of his success with the maliat, M. Ransquin computes that for this year Azerbaijan will be self-supporting, and that next year, should no heavy incidental expenditure fall on the province, he will be able to remit about 500,000 krans to the Central Administration.

This is an excellent result for one year's administration, especially when it is borne in mind that no revenue has been exacted from the districts occupied by the Turkish troops, and that the province had to pay the heavy charge of the Ardebil expedition, swollen by the cupidity of Sardar Rashid and Shuja-ed-Dowleh. But to my mind, the achievement which does M. Ransquin most credit is his solution of the

bread question. In the face of great opposition on the part of the landowners, and great difficulty in obtaining transport, he exacted and brought to the Government store-houses almost all the maliat in kind. This he has kept under his control, and, by selling discreetly, has been able to prevent large holders of corn from forcing up the price, and, moreover, by superintending the bakeries, as he was authorised to do by Sipahdar, he has kept the quality of bread at a high standard. The result is that bread is cheaper and better than it has been in previous years, but M. Ransquin has made enemies among the landowners, who have been obliged to pay their taxes, and have been prevented from filling their pockets. It was this resentment which occasioned the anti-Belgian discourses which I have already reported. As was to be expected, the movement failed, for, although men may be preached into boycotting tobacco, they cannot be expected to boycott bread which is cheap and good in favour of that which is dear and bad. The movement is, however, remarkable, as it was an attempt to raise fanatical feeling against Christians, and, had it succeeded, might have led to serious disturbances.

The number of Belgians is insufficient for the amount of work they have to do. At present they are all overworked, and have not been able yet to take over the postal administration, as it was intended they should do, for want of a proper staff. M. Ransquin proposes that there should be six Belgians permanently stationed at Tabriz, and two Belgian inspectors to travel about the province. At present there are no inspectors, for since the death of M. Dumez M. Ransquin is loth to send out any more inexperienced young men, and experienced men are not available. It is true that for financial purposes the province has been reduced, and Ardebil put under the Talish administration. I know from experience that Ardebil is in much closer touch with Gilan and Talish than with Tabriz; still it seems a mistake to place it financially in one province, and for administrative purposes to leave it to the other. As it is the director of taxation at Astara has to apply to the Governor-General of Azerbaijan whenever he wants administrative aid at Ardebil. It would be much better to cut it off entirely from Azerbaijan.

I asked M. Ransquin what scheme he proposed for the reorganisation of the finances of the province. He stated that the existing scheme was a good one, and that all that was needed was a new assessment, which he hopes to make when his staff is increased. The existing system is based on a poll tax for human beings, and a tax per head on horses, cattle, sheep, and goats. There is also a professional tax (which at present is never paid), which stands in lieu of an income tax. Besides these there is a house tax, based upon value, and a tax on landed property. These taxes, if properly assessed and honestly collected, would greatly increase the revenue of the province. At present it is impossible even to guess at the probable increase, but a rise of 1,000,000 krans would not seem excessive.

In order to administer this taxation M. Ransquin suggests that the province should be divided into districts with a Belgian or a trustworthy Persian at the head of each, and that Persian tax-collectors should be placed in each village to collect the taxes, and keep a register of the inhabitants and their stock. Of course, this is only a very rough outline of a scheme which is unlikely to come into force for a long time, and which would require elaboration and alteration in details before it could be got to work, but the main idea seems excellent, and I believe it is more in keeping with the nature and condition of the people than a more modern scheme would be.

When it is remembered that the customs administration of Tabriz entails much heavy work, and that this all falls on the Belgians in addition to their financial duties, I think it will be admitted that the work they have already done is worthy of admiration, and that it is in the interest of the province that the Belgian financial staff should be increased as M. Ransquin proposes.

I have, &c.
N. PATRICK COWAN.

No. 142.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the first detachment of the gendarmerie proceeding to Shiraz left Tehran on the 28th ultimo and 1st instant, 468 men strong with three Swedish officers. The men were at full strength with the exception of one

corporal, who fell ill just before the start, and who will follow with the second detachment at the end of next month, and one bootmaker, who deserted. In communicating to me the above details the colonel commanding informed me that no difficulty whatever had been experienced in the selection of men for the expedition, since the men had outvied each other in their desire to form part of it. Colonel Hjalmarson followed himself by motor-car on the 11th instant.

Unfortunately, since the departure of the detachment unsatisfactory news has been received from Bushire, where 168 men, practically the whole force that had been recruited there, have resigned their commissions, leaving the two Swedish officer instructors with only about thirty or forty men who accompanied them from Shiraz. The actual cause of the trouble would appear to have been the severity or nature of a punishment inflicted upon two of the recruits. The incident is an untoward one, as the men had been enrolled for the purpose of escorting a caravan of arms and ammunition up to Shiraz as soon as Colonel Hjalmarson had occupied the road in sufficient force. Sir Percy Cox telegraphs that this disappearance of the gendarmerie at Bushire would appear to be destined to delay indefinitely the transport of the arms and ammunition. He would appear to attribute the incident to the want of knowledge of Orientals possessed by the Swedish officers, but it would seem to me, from the description of these men previously given by Sir P. Cox, that they would have proved most unreliable material, upon which, I know, Colonel Hjalmarson set but little store. They were disbanded, disarmed, and dismissed from the island without causing undue trouble, though the night before their departure some shots were exchanged with the guard stationed at the quarters of the two Swedish officers.

Before his departure for the south I discussed the situation fully with Colonel Hjalmarson, who has a very delicate and difficult task before him, which has not been rendered more easy by the nature of the instructions and advice given him by the Minister of the Interior, who appears to labour under the old Persian misapprehension that a rebellious chieftain is a much more valuable asset alive than dead. This is true if one only considers the pocket of the Governor-General, to whom he would pay ransom for his life.

I told Colonel Hjalmarson that, in my opinion, should a chieftain come in and surrender after an encounter, he should be handed over to the local authorities after a court-martial had drawn up a report upon his case; but that it would be much better that he should be made to fight for his life, as a warning to others. The Minister had represented that the death of a chief would be the signal for the whole tribe to rise and revenge him. There may, of course, be some risk of this, but it would hardly appear that the tribesmen of to-day are imbued with any deep feelings of affection and fealty for their leaders. In any case, if any real impression is to be made certain risks will have to be run, and it is desirable that the old principle of paying to live and fight another day should be abolished.

It is possible, though generally considered here improbable, that this well-organised and powerful force will be recognised as the striking power of the Central Government, and that there will be no fighting. I was glad to find that Colonel Hjalmarson appeared to realise the dangers ahead of him, and did not make light of them. He expressed confidence in his men, who are of different type to the unwarlike townsmen he had had to enrol at first, and he expressed a belief that he could rely upon the present stuff to stand firm under fire.

I impressed upon the colonel that he would find many difficulties ahead of him other than purely military ones; that he would no longer enjoy the immediate support of the two legations, as he had done here, when he found himself in a difficulty; although he could count upon the whole-hearted support of Major O'Connor and Sir P. Cox. He would, I added, find nearly all, if not all, the local officials, openly or secretly opposed to him, and I urged that he should put himself into close communion with the Governor-General. Colonel Hjalmarson promised me that he would do his best to study the susceptibilities of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh.

It is impossible to disguise from oneself that this forward move of the gendarmerie marks a most critical stage in the execution of the scheme for the regeneration of Persia by means of the restoration of order. Very much indeed will depend upon the success or failure of the expedition. If it succeeds, the position of the gendarmerie will be established. Already an important work has been done around Tehran in a very short space of time, and such confidence has been inspired that it is now possible to enrol thirty or forty really good-class recruits daily instead of having, as at first, to have recourse to the weaklings of Tehran, who make poor fighting material. Failure will

mean considerably more than the creation of a position in the south of Persia that will require careful consideration, and probably call for energetic action on our part. For this reason it is unfortunate that the condition of affairs in Fars made it almost imperative that the force should take the field before it is really fully equipped for the hard task that may lie before it.

Once assembled at Shiraz, it would, I think, be bad policy to delay matters. The situation resembles in a way that of a Governor-General when he arrives at his post. If he is strong enough to take energetic action at once his position is assured, and he makes himself felt and respected; if he dallies much he is soon suspected of weakness, and he becomes a failure. So with the gendarmerie. If they sit at Shiraz they will engender contempt, and they must go out on to the road, unless they feel themselves much too weak for the task. The result in this case would probably be equally bad with that caused by a defeat, and there would be many defections in the ranks. The Swedes are more likely to be rash than over-cautious, and one can only sincerely hope, with no small misgiving in one's heart, that they will be as successful as they deserve to be, as a return for all the pains they have taken to make soldiers, at a moment's notice, of the material at their disposal.

It will be a real misfortune for Persia if the gendarmes meet with any serious reverse, because I have had recently striking illustrations of a growing belief in their capability to restrain lawlessness. From Kermanshah, Luristan, and Seistan representations have been made to me that the situation in those places can only be saved by the presence of gendarmes, and a requisition for their services has been recently made for the Kazvin-Resht road, where several caravans have been robbed of late. For the present there are, unfortunately, not enough gendarmes to go round, and the general restoration of order under their auspices can only be proceeded with in accordance with the amount of money that can be put at their disposal.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 143.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the four weeks ending the 17th March.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 143.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending March 17.

Tehran.

Diplomatic Movements.—M. Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian Minister, left Tehran for Russia on the 23rd February, leaving M. Sabline in charge. M. de Giers, first dragoman of the Russian Legation, left with M. Poklewski, and M. Lissovsky is at present acting first dragoman. Captain Klein, military attaché to the German Legation, left Tehran on the 28th February with the 1st Gendarmerie detachment for Shiraz. He proposes to travel to Bushire and Bagdad, whence he wishes to return to Tehran via Kermanshah. M. Lecomte, French Minister, left with Colonel Hjalmarson on the 11th March for Shiraz. They are proceeding by motor-car as far as Abadeh, whence they will march with the gendarmerie detachment to Shiraz. M. Lecomte wishes to visit the neighbourhood of Kazerun and then return to Tehran via Ispahan. Colonel Hjalmarson proposes to return to Tehran via Bagdad and Kermanshah.

Gendarmerie.—The 1st detachment—468 strong with three Swedish officers—of the Fars expeditionary force left Tehran on the 28th February for Shiraz.

Police.—The three Swedes who arrived at Tehran in the middle of February to reorganise the police have not yet been able to begin operations, mainly owing to the obstruction of the Minister of the Interior.

The Regent.—The Cabinet has been negotiating with the Regent for his return and proposes to send the Minister of War to Paris to reassure Nasr-ul-Mulk.

Ex-Shah.—Some anxiety is felt in Tehran regarding the movements of the ex-Shah, and it is feared that he may be meditating another descent into Persia.

Tehran, March 17, 1913.

Resht.

Considerable alarm has been caused in the town by the report of the appointment of the Salar-ed-Dowleh to the Governorship of Gilan.

Asterabad.

Salar-ed-Dowleh arrived at Asterabad from Sabsawar on the 13th March.

The following particulars have been received respecting the colonisation of the village and neighbourhood of Shirenk :—

The villages purchased by the Russians and colonised by them are :—

								Families.
Shirenk	150
Marakalateh	60
Bagharabad,	50
Fazilabad	40
Nukan	60

Some 360 families have arrived and settled up till now in the region.

Meshed.

After protracted negotiations Salar-ed-Dowleh agreed to proceed to Gilan. One of the reasons given by his Highness for his departure from Sabsawar was that the tobacco in that region was too bad for him to smoke. The Belgian director of customs at Meshed paid over a sum of 4,000 tomans (800*l.*) for his expenses on his journey to Resht.

Ispahan.

The town has been quiet throughout the month and traffic has been maintained on all the roads. Caravans have been arriving from and leaving for Shiraz, and reports show that the Boir Ahmadis in charge of the track between Abadeh and Aminabad are doing excellent work.

The relations between the Governor and the agent of the Treasurer-General remain satisfactory, and M. Kornelis is confident of being able to pay all salaries due and a considerable proportion of the pensions out of this year's revenue.

Yezd.

The Governor-General continues his usurpation of the Finance and other Departments, and is himself collecting the revenues from the province.

Salari Bahadur, who was in command of the Marvasi expedition, returned to Yezd on the 15th February.

The Persian Government have recently complained to His Majesty's Legation with regard to conduct of certain British Indian subjects (Afghans) in the province.

It appears that these men, who were the victims of robbery some years ago, remained on in Yezd in the hope of obtaining compensation, and became engaged in an illicit traffic of arms.

Seistan.

Considerable dissatisfaction has been caused amongst the Sardars and agriculturists of Seistan against the Belgian Director of Finance and his subordinates for attempting to collect the arrears of the past two or three years at one season, and making insufficient allowance for injuries to the old crops.

His Majesty's consul has warned the Director against taking any precipitate action, but it appears that M. Paquet has applied for sanction to raise a force of 100 sowars wherewith to coerce them.

It is reported from Birjand that a Baluch raiding party of 200 men has attacked a caravan near Naiband, killing eight men and carrying off 300 camels.

Kerman.

The Governor-General started out on his expedition to Bam, Narmashir, Rudbar, Rafsenjan, &c., on the 9th March. His Majesty's consul believes that this foray will contribute more than any other measure now possible to restore order in the province and on the roads.

A large robbery occurred at the beginning of February in which thirteen guards were killed, and merchandise belonging to Hindu merchants to the value of some 1,300 tomans was looted.

Kermanshah.

The town is still disturbed and burglaries are of frequent occurrence. Goods, however, continue to arrive by the Kalhur road, where the exactions of the road guards are less exorbitant than on the main road.

A disease resembling plague broke out recently in the Kalhur district. The doctor of the Russian Consulate has been sent to investigate and report.

It is reported that Farman Farma intends to make an expedition to the frontier, and to enforce the payment of indemnities from the disaffected tribes.

Shiraz.

The acting British consul reports unfavourably upon the results of the inactivity of the Governor-General.

Everywhere intriguers and mischief-makers are, he states, becoming bolder and more impudent. Meetings are being regularly held with the object of enabling the land-owners to refuse to pay any taxes for the last year, and of embarrassing the administration in other ways. Only some seventy or eighty men from the Governor-General's new regiment have so far been recruited, and of these some are unsuitable and some have already deserted.

During the month the telegraph line was wrecked by adherents of Mahommed Ali Khan Kashkuli, near Kazerun. The telegraph employés were prevented, for some time, from effecting any repairs.

Some 100 men of the Darya Begi's took "bast" on the 8th March in the telegraph office at Kazerun demanding arrears of pay.

Some fighting is reported from the Mamasenni country between the tribesmen and the troops of the Deputy Governor, in which the latter were defeated by the Mamasennis, who captured two guns, one of which was taken to Mahommed Ali Khan Kashkuli.

Bushire.

Mme. Constant, the wife of the Belgian Director of Customs, who was returning with her husband from an evening party at Bushire, was shot on the 7th March. M. Constant, who was seriously wounded, was conveyed to the house of the Residency surgeon, where he has continued to make satisfactory progress.

On the 12th March all the gendarmes, who had been enlisted by the Swedish officers in Bushire since their arrival on the 18th December, deserted as the result of a quarrel with one of the officers. Sir P. Cox reports that it was only by the merest good fortune that a very serious disturbance in Bushire was avoided.

The Swedish officers in Bushire have now only the men brought with them from Shiraz, and it is most unlikely that any further attempt at enlisting will be made locally.

Ahwaz.

More favourable reports have been received from Behbahan of Amir Mujahed's activity. In conjunction with Sardar-i-Jang active measures have been instituted against certain sections of the Kuhgilu, and several forces are operating in the field against them.

The Lynch road continues passable to mules, and merchandise is passing freely.

Bunder Abbas.

News was received at His Majesty's Legation on the 28th February that Mr. Greene had been robbed by a raiding party near Jillabi, between Bunder Abbas and Jask.

Following on this report came the news on the 12th March that a party of 200 armed Baharlu raiders had entered the Bunder Abbas district, and had raided villages 4 miles east and west of the town. Mr. Greene's party was attacked at Dehnan, but succeeded in driving off the tribesmen. Simultaneous reports from Lingah also showed that a large force was being collected near Lah with the intention of attacking Bunder Abbas.

His Majesty's ships arrived off Bunder Abbas on the 14th March, but notwithstanding their presence an attack was made on the town on the 16th March. The senior naval officer reports (the 17th March) that the position is somewhat critical, and that British subjects have been invited to repair to the consulate. One officer, forty-one bluejackets, and two Maxims have been landed to reinforce the consular guard, and fifty more men are being brought up from Jask.

No. 144.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 17, 1913.

WHILST peace and tranquillity are apparently reigning in Azerbaijan, the news from Kermanshah and Luristan is far from reassuring. The trade route from Khanikin to Kermanshah is said to be infested with robbers and road guards, who exact even more onerous tolls than on the Shiraz-Bushire road. The Governor-General, Farman Farma, professes to have no funds wherewith to pay proper road guards, though it seems from the reports of His Majesty's consul that His Highness is reaping a fine harvest out of the fines that penitent personages who have sided against the Government forces have to pay, in order to recover grace. Rumour says that Lur marauders are most threatening in the neighbourhood of Burujird and Sultanabad, and the promises the Government have made to send military forces to their assistance are likely to remain unfulfilled. Even on the much-frequented road between Kazvin and Resht, caravans have been robbed lately, showing that no road can be considered really safe from the robber epidemic that is ruining the trade of the country.

With the approach of spring robberies have commenced again on the main central caravan roads, though during the winter months the trade routes have been kept fairly well open. The news from Shiraz is not very reassuring. The Governor-General does not appear to have succeeded in establishing his authority, and Kavam-ul-Mulk seems to play a part which is little, if any, less influential than that of the Governor-General himself. It is too early yet to judge of the temper of the tribes, but dealers in forecasts appear to anticipate a very disturbed spring as soon as the migration commences. Kavam-ul-Mulk has been deputed by Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to lead an expedition against certain Arab tribes that require a lesson, as an example to others. The Governor-General himself so far has no force, it would seem, with which he could operate against the Kashgulis or other troublesome Kashgai tribes; whilst Soulet-ed-Dowleh, though restored to Government favour and once more Ilkhani of the Kashgais, would appear to be either sitting on the fence or to have lost his former authority. The Government profess great faith in the assurances of Soulet, and much count upon his co-operation in the work the gendarmes have to perform, but it seems hard to believe that he will assist very genuinely in spoiling his own game.

Little is heard from Kerman where the Governor-General has started on an expedition intended to impress his personality on the people at the same time that arrears of revenue are collected. This silence means, it may be hoped, that the situation is quiet. From the south-western provinces come rumours that the Bakhtiari and the Sheikh of Mohammerah are on bad terms, and that hostilities between them are threatened. In the telegrams sent from Behbahan by Amir Mujahed, he reports that with the assistance of a force of some 3,000 men sent by Sardar Jang from Malamir, he has succeeded in inflicting severe defeats with heavy loss upon Kuhgiluis and Boer Ahmedis. While doubting the Bakhtiari figures respecting the killed and the captured, the Government are inclined to believe that repressive measures have

been carried out on a fairly large scale, such as may allow hope to be entertained that the robber tribes have had a lesson that will keep them off the Ahwaz-Ispahan road this summer.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 4th April: Advance for Fars.

You may draw on Imperial Bank of Persia and may pay over first month's instalment of Fars advance, subject to the conditions of which you are already aware and tender system for purchases.

Arrangement arrived at regarding your supervision of expenditure is sufficient.

No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 4th April: Ex-Shah.

You should express to Minister for Foreign Affairs my thanks for this information.

No. 147.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, April 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 4th April.

I asked the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday whether he had any information as to the ex-Shah of Persia being at present in Austria. He told me that he had none, but he promised to make enquiries on the subject from the police, and to let me know.

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 4th April: Troops at Bushire.

You are authorised to take necessary steps for transfer of headquarters of Rajputs to Bushire, if possible in R.I.M.S. "Dufferin," as Sir P. Cox considers reinforcement from Jask imperative on departure of cavalry from Bushire.

You should also inform Persian Government that the situation in hinterland is reason of the transfer.

No. 149.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, April 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 7th April: Advance for Fars.

Am I to understand that the whole 100,000*l.* has been placed to my account at the Imperial Bank of Persia, but that I am only at liberty to authorise use of 8,000*l.* a-month? Please see my telegram of 11th March.

No. 150.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 27, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to state that the robbery of a consignment of goods, mostly the property of Messrs. Ziegler, has been reported to me by the acting British consul at Shiraz.

Representations have been made to me by the agent of the company here.

I have addressed a strong note to the Persian Government pointing out the gravity of the incident, and requesting that immediate instructions may be issued to the local authorities for the prompt pursuit of the culprits and the recovery of the stolen goods.

Messrs. Ziegler's Tehran agent has suggested that the gendarmes now on the road should be dispatched in pursuit, but the question is obviously one for the colonel commanding the gendarmerie, who is now on the spot, to decide.

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a recent telegram from the acting consul at Shiraz showing that there is the usual regrettable recrudescence of unrest on the southern roads which marks the beginning of the spring tribal migration.

A further telegram from Major O'Connor shows that, immediately upon the receipt of the news of the robbery, the Governor-General of Fars dispatched a small body of horsemen under persons having influence with the tribes believed to be concerned, with a view to effecting the recovery of the stolen property.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 150.

Consul O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, March 20, 1913.

CARAVAN of 198 mules proceeding to Ispahan was carried off by Boir Ahmedis between Shulgistan and Yezdikhast on the 17th instant.

Muleteers on Bushire road have struck work, and there are said to be 1,700 mules idle on lower half of road. Head muleteers took bast yesterday in telegraph office at Borasjun and demand abolition of illegal exactions along road which deprive them of their profits.

No. 151.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 11, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from acting British consul at Shiraz yesterday :—

“Troops arrived safely Kazerun, 10th April, without incident. They continue march 11th April. No trouble anticipated.”

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 9th April : Advance for Fars.

The 100,000L for Fars is being paid into your account, and there is no objection then to your handing it over in one lump sum, so long as you are satisfied as to its expenditure, which should not exceed 8,000L a month.

No. 153.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 13, 1913.

FOLLOWING from acting British consul at Shiraz (actually at Kazerun), 13th April:—

“As far as I can gather from all available sources of information here, the gendarmerie will be confronted with formidable task in taking over the road between Kazerun and Bushire. The temper of riflemen and chiefs along the road is truculent to a degree, and I regard it as practically certain that they will not relinquish their present lucrative monopoly without a struggle.

“The gendarmerie’s present plan, as far as I can gather, is to march some 400 to 500 men to Bushire to bring up arms and ammunition. It seems certain that they will be opposed on the way, and I have written to Colonel Hjalmarson indicating the difficulties which may be expected, so that he may not be unprepared.

“The task now confronting the gendarmerie is not really of a very serious military difficulty. The first step should be to take over the section of the road from Kazerun to Rahdar, about 10 miles, and then to move up the Shahpur valley and to crush Mohammed Ali Khan before proceeding further.

“These measures would involve considerable fighting, but the gendarmes could rely on the assistance of Kazerun and Kamarij riflemen, and perhaps of Soulet.

“Sufficient force would thus be raised, and under suitable leaders would undoubtedly succeed.

“But I feel very doubtful whether, under present conditions, the undertaking will succeed. We can, however, only await the result of the operations, and meanwhile I have impressed on all local persons concerned the necessity for co-operating loyally with the gendarmerie.”

No. 154.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 13, 1913.

FOLLOWING sent to acting British consul now at Kazerun:—

“Your telegram of 13th April represents the situation as I had foreseen it, and for which I had prepared the colonel commandant before he left Tehran. If the gendarmerie can count on the loyal support of local levies and of Soulet their task should not be an impossible one, but it appears to me from your description of the state of the road that a small force without guns will run a very considerable risk of suffering defeat. Such a fatal contingency should be avoided by all possible means, and for this reason you should, if there is still time, get into touch with the colonel, explain to him the situation as you see it, and seek his opinion as to whether it would not be better to await the arrival of reinforcements from here with guns before risking too much. He might perhaps content himself with occupying the road as far as Kazerun in force for the present. It would appear to me that a further delay of a month or two before bringing up arms and ammunition would be preferable to risking a disaster. It is not for me to endeavour to influence the colonel’s decision, but it is our duty to put the situation clearly before him if possible. I had hoped that he would have awaited your return to Shiraz before starting for Bushire, but I gather that he has already marched.

“I entirely approve steps which you have taken to endeavour to secure the co-operation of such local forces as there is some reason to trust.”

No. 155.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 13, 1913.

REGENCY.

The Minister of War is leaving shortly for France to attempt to induce the Regent to return to Persia. But it is evident that his mission is expected to be a failure. I

was told by the Minister for Foreign Affairs last night that the Government had received a telegram from the Regent suggesting that it would be quite justifiable, without infringing the Constitution, to consider the young Shah of age now and in a position to assume the reins of government. His Excellency argued that His Majesty may be said to have commenced his 18th year at the Persian New Year (21st March last), and he appeared to view the idea with favour.

When there was a possibility of Saad-ed-Dowleh becoming Prime Minister I was opposed to the above solution of the Regency question. Now that the present Cabinet is in office the same objections no longer exist, though the text of the Constitution would be somewhat strained by such a solution. However, were Nasr-ul-Mulk to resign there would be a Regency crisis, and his Highness's present suggestion would, I think, be the lesser evil.

No. 156.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 13, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH and Resht.

I am told by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the question of the appointment of Salar to Resht is again causing the Government very serious anxiety. It appears that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has advised them to allow Salar to take up the appointment, whereas they had been hoping that the Russian Government intended to support them in their efforts to induce the Prince to proceed to Europe. It was represented to me by the Minister that the conditions laid down by the Government have not been accepted by the Prince; that the inhabitants of the province of Gilan have reiterated their opposition to the appointment, and that it is now realised by the Cabinet that, as it is evident that Salar has in no sense made his submission, a most serious situation may be created if he goes to Gilan.

No. 157.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 14, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th April.

Following from the acting British consul at Shiraz, now at Kazerun:—

“I had a long conversation with Soulet on 13th April. I gave him the best advice in my power, namely, that his two principal duties were, first, loyalty to the Persian Government and its representative in Fars in the person of the Governor-General, and secondly, maintenance of order amongst his tribe.

“He was prolific in assurances as to his willingness and ability to follow my advice in these respects. Regarding the question as to the surrender of persons guilty of attacks on our troops, Soulet declared himself able to produce the principal offenders, but only on the understanding that they should be handed over to the consul as a proof of Soulet's good-will towards the British Government. I explained to him that I had no authority to accept such a condition. I pointed out that, although no doubt His Majesty's Government and you would be duly appreciative of any sign of his efforts, he is above all a servant of the Persian Government, and owes his allegiance and obedience to them.

“Soulet was manifestly disappointed at my attitude, but he is, I think, genuinely anxious to prove his loyalty to the Persian Government.

“He has promised to give full support to the gendarmerie in their task of taking over the road. I also spoke to him regarding the prevention of damage to the telegraph line.”

No. 158.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 4th April: Survey for Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

Mr. Maclean, who has gone to Tehran to represent syndicate, and is due to arrive about now, is in possession of all information as to their point of view and of all arguments in support of it, so that it is unnecessary to telegraph these at length.

You should obtain all information from him and most strongly support syndicate's contention, which I consider perfectly sound.

No. 159.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 16, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH and Resht.

~~My~~ My telegram of the 13th April.

I have again been urgently requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to bring this question to your notice. Great pressure is being used by the Russian Government to persuade the Cabinet to send the Prince to Resht at once. The Cabinet argue that Salar has not accepted their conditions and that he shows himself to be in no sense submissive to their authority. They say that they cannot therefore execute the Russian demands and they seek your advice.

No. 160.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, April 16, 1913.

REGIMENT arrived Bushire all well.

No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1913.

MY telegram and your telegram both of 6th March: Fars advance.

Treasury enquire what security has been or will be given by Persian Government for repayment, and what amount is proposed for the sinking fund instalments.

No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1913.

BUSHIRE telegram of 16th April: Central India Horse.

Please instruct Sir P. Cox to express to Colonel Douglas and the regiment under his command my sincere congratulations on the termination of their most arduous duty.

I much appreciate the tact and self-restraint shown by the regiment in trying circumstances during eighteen months in Persia.

No. 163.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 6, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 13th March, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire has furnished the following information respecting the movements of caravans during the month of March :—

						Previous month.
1. Mules arriving and leaving Bushire	181	1,594
Donkeys (by Firuzabad route)	6,655	900
2. Borasjun reports :						
Mules to Bushire	97	2,096
„ from Bushire	144	2,856
3. Kazerun reports :						
Mules to Bushire	1,571	..
„ from Bushire	404	..

The Acting British consul at Shiraz reports as follows :—

					Mules.	
Arrivals from Bushire	400	2,815
Departures to Bushire	803	2,300
Arrivals from the North	1,038	450
Departures for the North	963	938

Major O'Connor adds that there were robberies on the Ispahan road on the 3rd, 6th, 8th, 12th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 25th, and 28th. That of the 17th, near Kadirabad, included the loss of the British firm of Ziegler. No robberies are reported on the south road, except of sheep, &c., from villagers around Kazerun.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 164.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 17, 1913.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, 16th April :—

“Colonel Douglas informs me that they were shown every civility and attention by headmen of Daliki, Borasjun, and Ahmadi. It is true that they had nothing to lose in giving the regiment good passage ; nevertheless, I would suggest that O'Connor and I be permitted to give the local authorities at Shiraz and Bushire an expression of your appreciation of their cordial co-operation in explaining matters to headmen.”

I have made a verbal communication to the Persian Government in this sense.

No. 165.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 17, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH and Resht.

My telegram of yesterday.

I have again been pressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs for my opinion as to what reply the Persian Government should make to the demand put forward by the Russian Government that Salar should proceed to Resht immediately.

I said that I had taken the opportunity yesterday of discussing the matter with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, and that it seemed to me now advisable that the Cabinet should yield to the Russian demand.

No. 166.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 16th April : Advance for Fars gendarmerie.

Acting on instructions contained in your telegrams of 2nd April and of 11th April, I yesterday addressed a note to Minister for Foreign Affairs, offering the 100,000*l.* for the gendarmerie in Fars.

I stated that it is understood that the advance will be repaid out of a loan as soon as one is made, and that this further advance will be secured and refunded in the same manner as the other advances, out of the surplus of the southern customs revenues, interest at 7 per cent. being guaranteed from the same source. There is no other revenue available as a security.

I added that the entire 100,000*l.* would be deposited at the Imperial Bank of Persia, but that the money should only be used in monthly instalments of 8,000*l.*

No. 167.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 17, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH and Resht.

My telegram of this morning.

A messenger has just come to me from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is at a Cabinet Council, to say that, rather than confirm Salar's appointment, the Cabinet have practically decided to resign. A letter was also shown to me which the Government have just received from the Regent urging the Ministers to resist Salar's appointment to the utmost of their power, and protesting vehemently against it.

I observed that the initial mistake had been made when the appointment had been agreed to, and that it was difficult to bring any argument to bear when the Cabinet were now only being pressed to fulfil an assurance given. I added that there must, however, be no question of resignation.

The messenger replied to this that Salar had never made his promised submission, and that since the appointment was first reluctantly agreed to in consequence of the recrudescence of the reactionary propaganda the situation had entirely altered.

Public opinion is most hostile to the appointment, and the question is therefore becoming a crucial one for the Cabinet.

No. 168.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 18, 1913.

JOINT advance to Persian Government.

I addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 14th April, offering British share of advance, namely, 200,000*l.*, to Persian Government, on terms as instructed.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replies accepting the advance, but points out that the intention of the Persian Government, when making verbal official communication respecting the method of repayment, was that they would commence on 1st January, 1915, to put money aside, and that the first actual payment would be made on 1st July, 1915.

I apparently misunderstood communication, as did, I think, my Russian colleague.

May I pay in the money on the conditions as now explained?

No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 17th April : Fars advance.

Please see Treasury's second question.

If no loan is made both the general advance and this Fars advance are repayable

from 1st January, 1915, from surplus southern customs, the former in instalments of 50,000*l.* each half-year.

Surely an additional payment of that amount for the Fars advance is out of the question. If so, what will be the amount payable half-yearly for the Fars advance?

No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 18, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

Please inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sir W. Townley's telegram of 17th April, and say that it would be most regrettable if, in consequence of pressure on the part of Russia to appoint Salar-ed-Dowleh to the Governorship of Gilan, the Persian Government resigned.

I much hope that M. Sazonof will be able to consent to the suspension of the appointment and to Salar-ed-Dowleh leaving for Europe for a time, and thus meet the wishes of the Persian Government.

No. 171.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 19, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th April: Gendarmerie.

Following from acting consul at Shiraz:—

“Your telegram of 13th April missed me at Kazerun, and I only received it last night (16th) after my return here. I do not think, however, that I could have done anything more to influence Colonel Hjalmarson's plans. As reported in my telegram of 13th April, I wrote to him from Kazerun giving him a résumé of the situation as it presented itself to me, and emphasising the necessity for employment of guns and explosives in the event of towers or caravanserais having to be attacked. This letter was handed to the colonel on the 14th, the day before he left Shiraz. I met the colonel again yesterday on the road and discussed matters thoroughly with him. Besides this it must be remembered that the gendarmerie have ample sources of information of their own, and have had every opportunity during the last four or five months of acquainting themselves in detail with the state of the road and with the attitude of the various headmen, &c.

“The colonel realises the difficulties of the undertaking, but seems confident and is prepared for eventualities. He hopes to meet Soulet and other chiefs at Kazerun, and to discuss the situation with them. He will of course try to arrange peaceful journey to Bushire and back, and will, I presume, modify his present plan of operations should the circumstances seem to require him to do so.

“Soulet promised me that he would prevent Mohammed Ali Khan's men from opposing the gendarmerie, and would guarantee that the latter should be given peaceful possession of that section of the road. I can scarcely credit his ability to make good these assurances, but I trust at any rate that he will use his influence on the side of the gendarmerie. I do not think that I could properly have said or done anything further, and only trust that the situation may prove less serious than it appeared to me at Kazerun.”

It is clear that the acting consul has made the situation quite plain to the Swedish colonel, who will, I hope, exercise caution. I have also explained the state of things to the Persian Government, who at once telegraphed a report of my conversation to the Governor-General.

No. 172.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 19, 1913.

FOLLOWING from acting British consul, Shiraz, to-day:—

“Reports from Kazerun indicate that journey of gendarmerie as far as Kamarij,* at all events, will be effected without opposition. Swedish colonel left Kazerun this morning accompanied by Daria Begi, and will visit Mohammed Ali Khan on the way to Kamarij. Troops under Major Siefert start to-morrow.”

No. 173.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 18th April: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

M. Sazonof having gone to the country for a few days, I have spoken to M. Nératof in the sense of your instructions.

The latter pointed out that the position of the Russian Government was a very difficult one. The Persian Government both knew and had approved of the pledge which Russia had given to Salar, who had now renounced the other conditions which he had at first demanded. At Astrabad Salar was surrounded by Turkomans and other partisans, and it was most desirable from the point of view of the Russian Government to remove him from that town, where he might easily create trouble. He would have no supporters at Resht, and the position was quite different there; moreover, Russia would be prepared to consent to his appointment being cancelled and to assist the Persian Government in removing him from Resht in the event of his attempting to provoke disorders there. He would, however, refuse if Russia now insisted on his leaving Persia, and troops would have to be sent to compel him to do so. M. Nératof said that his personal opinion was that the best thing to do was to allow Salar's appointment as Governor of Gilan to stand. M. Sazonof would, however, return on the 21st instant, when the memorandum which I had brought with me would be submitted to his Excellency and his decision communicated to me.

No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 13th April: Regency.

Provided that the Russian Government were favourable to the idea, if the Persian Government themselves propose that the Shah should be considered of age, and if they think that His Majesty is equal to this task, I should not object.

No. 175.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 14th April: Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

If, as Major O'Connor thinks is the case, Soulet-ed-Dowleh desires to prove his loyalty to the Persian Government and his good-will to us, he should be urged to hand over the chief culprits. Would there be any objection to their surrender to His Majesty's consul for delivery to the Persian authorities?

* Kamarij is about 15 miles from Kazerun and 80 miles from Shiraz.

No. 176.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 21, 1913.

MY telegram of 13th April: Gendarmerie.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, 19th April:—

“I have no special information indicating that any definite scheme to oppose the gendarmerie is on foot, but I fully share the view expressed in your telegram that it would be better to reduce the risk by awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. This being so, and as your telegram reached Kazerun too late for communication to the commandant, I have told Major Brandel the purport of it. He appears to concur with your view, and proposes to communicate it to Major Siefert, and the commandant for consideration, adding that, should it be definitely decided to take the risk, and attempt to bring arms up at once, he suggests certain arrangements to safeguard transit of arms from Bushire to Borasjun.”

No. 177.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 18th April: Fars advance.

Failing a loan, the only method of repayment of advances, which, with Fars advance, will amount to 440,000L., will be by annual instalments of 100,000L. paid half-yearly, commencing on 1st January or 1st July (see my telegram of 18th April), as is finally decided. Southern customs will certainly not produce more than 100,000L. a year, if so much, though at the present moment returns are very healthy. No provision has been made for a sinking fund for Fars advance, as there is none provided for the other advances. To ask Persian Government to make any arrangement tending towards liquidation before 1915 would seriously embarrass the Exchequer.

I am fully aware of the very unsatisfactory nature of such an arrangement as that proposed, but the financial position of the country would not appear to permit of a more favourable one being made.

No. 178.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 23, 1913.

FOLLOWING is summary of telegram from consul-general at Bushire:—

Colonel commandant of gendarmerie has reached Bushire. He interviewed Mohammed Ali Kashkuli and leading headmen as far as Borasjun, and derived the conviction that they realised that the chief object of the gendarmerie is the prompt and complete suppression of rahdari, which would entail annihilation of their handsome incomes and lazy livelihood of their dependents. He represented that, so long as this belief existed, they may be expected to fight for their living, and admits that gendarmerie are not at present in a strong enough position to deal with road question in the circumstances. All are agreed that main thing to be avoided is a disaster to gendarmerie, which would practically seal their fate. Colonel urges that gendarmerie must conciliate headmen by conniving at rahdari at reduced rates, and by fixation of prices current for supplies in agreement with the chiefs. Colonel hopes by this means gradually to establish gendarmerie on road without opposition, and to be able to reduce exactions little by little as their hold becomes firmer, until finally suppressed altogether.

On the other hand, adoption of such a course would lead to amiable relations between the gendarmerie and Mohammed Ali Kashkuli, but this may be held to be acceptable logically on the ground that gendarmes are responsible for the present condition of road and settlement of past accounts with above-mentioned headman can be

left with Governor-General. Colonel will have to stipulate that no action against this chief will be taken at present, leaving it to us to demand such action later on when the gendarmes are firmly established.

Sir P. Cox replied that such a plan of action had not previously been discussed, but it appeared to him clearly impossible that we could agree to any official recognition or legalisation by Persian Government of rahdari, which it was the object of the gendarmerie to exterminate, but he added that primary reason was to secure adequate security for trade, and reasonable immunity from extortion as soon as possible, and real reparation for attacks on Smart and Eckford within a reasonable time. Speaking personally, Sir P. Cox added that he was of opinion that, provided that it was understood that connivance of gendarmerie at the levy of rahdari was to be temporary, and in view of fact that gendarmerie are not at present in a position to take any more drastic measures, proposal appeared to him to be one which could be taken into consideration on its comparative merits.

Sir P. Cox expressed opinion that, if headmen are possessed of the above conviction respecting the aim of the gendarmerie, it is obviously unsafe to endeavour to transport arms and ammunition now at Bushire to Shiraz, and he fails to see how the colonel can remove above impression without giving them assurances which he is not in a position to give until he knows the views of His Majesty's Government.

As Colonel proposes that the arms caravan should start 25th April, Sir P. Cox said he must do so at his own risk, as he could not hope to receive instructions before that date.

It would appear to me that some such scheme as that proposed by the colonel is the only feasible one, since it is clear enough that small gendarmerie force at present available would be quite incapable of taking effective action against these powerful headmen. A second detachment that presents a very workmanlike appearance is leaving for Shiraz to-day. They number about 600. Even after their arrival in a month's time gendarmerie will not, I think, be sufficiently strong to attempt any coercive measures, but they may be able to establish themselves sufficiently firmly to do so in the autumn.

No. 179.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 25, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

St. Petersburg telegram of the 19th April.

The "chef de cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs came to see me this morning. He said that the question of Salar-ed-Dowleh was still causing the Cabinet much perplexity, and that they could not decide which was the lesser of the two evils which confronted them—to send an expedition against him, or to send him to Resht.

Should the Prince go to Resht they are afraid that he may place himself at the head of a reactionary movement, and be joined by many of the disaffected Persians who are at the present moment in Europe, such, for instance, as the Sipahdar. The Cabinet point out that he is certain to make himself impossible at Resht in a short space of time, and say that it is hardly fair on Persia to insist upon the appointment of such a man. They argue, moreover, that it is impossible to foresee what may be the result of his being placed in such an important position. They further assert that, as he has not disarmed his followers, and has at the present moment 400 or 500 armed Turkomans, under a notorious bad character, he has not fulfilled one at least of the most important conditions laid down by the Persian Government. They add that, however dissatisfied the Cabinet may be with a Governor-General, it is much more difficult to dispossess him than M. Nératof makes out. They say that past experiences have taught them the truth of this.

They seem, on the whole, inclined to choose the alternative of despatching an expedition against the Prince; they express confidence in their power to make an end of him.

It seems clear that the majority of the Cabinet would rather resign than agree to his going to Resht, though the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself appears to favour the idea.

No. 180.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 25, 1913.

MY telegram of 23rd April: Gendarmerie.

Following received from Bushire to-day:—

“Brandel and Nyström with their small detachment left this morning with arms and equipment caravan of 300 mules. Will be met across the Mashila by 150 sowars from Siefert's party, now at Borasjun.”

No. 181.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 26, 1913.

MY telegram of 23rd April.

Following from acting British consul at Shiraz, 23rd April:—

“Reference to Sir P. Cox's telegram. I entirely agree with Sir P. Cox that for the gendarmerie to connive in any way at collection of rahdari would be to admit thoroughly vicious principle, and I should deprecate their doing so in any circumstances. I have already discussed this question with the Governor-General, and he tells me that his idea is that, in order to induce the khans and riflemen peaceably to relinquish illicit profits, the only feasible and legitimate plan is to engage the latter in considerable numbers as road guards, to be regularly paid from provincial budget grants through the medium of the gendarmerie, as is already being done on Shiraz-Kazerun section. He tells me that Khan of Borasjun has already agreed to this arrangement.”

Following also from acting British consul at Shiraz, 25th April:—

“It is recognised both by the Governor-General and by the colonel that the line of least resistance in taking over the road is to get the villagers on the side of the gendarmerie by engaging them in moderate numbers and paying them regularly, thus making for gendarmerie friends instead of enemies and converting local riflemen from masterless robbers into paid servants of the State, partly responsible for the security of the roads and safety of caravans. The system has been adopted wherever the gendarmerie have established themselves hitherto in Fars, and has worked with marked success. I was especially struck with the smooth working of the system on my recent journey to Kazerun, when I found the gendarmes and village riflemen working together in most friendly relations all along the road; the latter, all wearing Government badges, are apparently quite contented. And from careful enquiries which I have been making since the gendarmes took over this road, I have not heard of a single case where rahdari has been exacted, although there have been some petty demands for sugar, &c. It is proposed to continue and extend this system according as the gendarmerie extend their sphere of influence.

“As already reported to you, provision for a certain number of these riflemen was made in provincial budget for the last three months of the last financial year to number fifty-seven for the whole province. Of these only a limited number are actually in receipt of payment, as it has been found practically useless to employ them except under the control of the gendarmerie. But the same number has been included in provisional budget estimated for current year, and their distribution is merely a matter of detail. Under the present scheme only eighty-six are allotted for the section from Kazerun to Bushire. This is, I think, insufficient, and I have already suggested to financial agent that he should ask Major Siefert to prepare details of the number which he considers necessary at each stage. Realisation of this scheme depends of course, as indeed does every other detail of provincial expenditure, upon provision of funds, of which there are none at present. But supposing that some means are found for carrying on the administration at all, there is no reason why provision should not be made for payment of an adequate number of riflemen in the provincial budget. The number can be reduced afterwards when once the gendarmerie are firmly established. I cannot say what will be the attitude of the local khans in the matter, but the Governor-General is hopeful that they may be induced to accept the arrangement.”

The suggestion made by the acting British consul at Shiraz would certainly appear very preferable to a system which would wink at levy of illicit tolls if it can be made to work. It seems to me doubtful if the local headmen interested will consent to an arrangement which must bring less grist to their mills than that at present existing, and it will be a most satisfactory result of the arrival of the gendarmes if it succeeds. I entirely agree that the only chance of success is to associate the villagers and their chiefs in those measures to be taken, but it seems hard to believe that the latter will fall in as readily as appears to be anticipated with the scheme.

No. 182.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 26, 1913.

MY telegram of 19th April.

I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago about Salar, and his Excellency has now sent me a memorandum stating that the Russian Government are unable to change their former attitude in regard to his appointment, for the following reasons:—

1. That the Russian Government, having contracted, as His Majesty's Government are aware, certain moral obligations towards Salar, cannot admit that the Persian Government should not fulfil promises it had given to the Prince through the intermediary of the Russian Legation.
2. If Salar is not appointed to the Governorship of Gilan serious disorders are likely to arise in the north-east provinces of Persia on the Russian frontier, which would compel Russia to take measures for the protection of her interests.

No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 26, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 25th April: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

It will be most unfortunate if the Persian Government are compelled to send an expedition against Salar.

Your Excellency should use every possible argument to induce M. Sazonof to modify his decision, as the Persian Government are evidently in a most difficult position.

The fact that Salar-ed-Dowleh retains several hundred Turkomans under arms and has not fulfilled one of the principal conditions of the offer is surely a sufficient reason.

No. 184.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 27, 1913.

AZÉRBALJAN.

My telegram of the 3rd April.

His Majesty's consul at Tabriz telegraphs as follows under date 26th April:—

“On the 21st April about 300 Russian Cossacks left Tabriz for Sujbulak.

“I am informed by my Russian colleague, who confirms generally the above information, that the step was taken at the recommendation of the Russian consul at Sujbulak. There was continued unrest among the Kurdish chiefs, and it was thought desirable that the existing consular guard, which had already had a good effect on the chiefs, should be increased. It would seem that the despatch of a detachment from Urmia to Sujbulak is only intended as a demonstration, as, according to my Russian colleague, it was only intended that it should visit the district.

"A detachment of 100 Persian Cossacks has also left Tabriz for Sulduz. The principal object of this measure would appear to be to supplement the Persian soldiers there by a better class of men. Matters appear to be quiet in that district."

No. 185.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 25th March: Survey of Mohammerah-Khoremabad Railway.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent me a message this morning to the effect that he understood that surveying party had left Nasiri for Dizful, and that Minister of the Interior had warned him that if the surveyors intended to proceed beyond Dizful in the direction of Khoremabad they would be entering a most disturbed district in which Persian Government could not guarantee their safety without having had more time to make necessary arrangements with Lur chiefs.

Captain Wilson is presumably with surveying party or in touch with them, and I am repeating this telegram to Sir P. Cox in order that he may ascertain intentions of the surveyors and learn Wilson's views as to the desirability of their proceeding beyond Dizful at the present moment.

No. 186.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 26th April: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs. He seems more inclined to modify his attitude, and asked me to send him a short memorandum recapitulating my arguments.

No. 187..

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 29, 1913.

MY telegram of 27th April.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires so far confirms British consul at Tabriz's information that he says that 125 Cossacks with 5 officers have been sent to Sujbulak, whilst at the present moment Russian force there consists of about 650 men, as 500 men who have been making demonstration from Urmia, intended to overawe the Kurds, are spending Russian Easter at Sujbulak. These men will return to Urmia to-morrow. The new force stationed at Sujbulak is intended to strengthen force of Persian Cossacks recently sent to Sulduz, but special care has been taken not to infringe conditions under which Turkish evacuation was agreed upon.

No. 188.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, April 29, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs asked me to-day what was the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the proposal to declare young Shah of age. On my telling him what you had telegraphed to Sir W. Townley (see your telegram of 19th April to Tehran), he said that he would raise no objection were the Persian Government to take the initiative. He thought our two Ministers ought to consult together on the subject.

His Excellency then told me that Shoa-es-Sultaneh had telegraphed to former private secretary of the ex-Shah to enquire whether the Russian Government would support ex-Shah if he returned to Persia. He added that he would in that case encourage him to return, but that ex-Shah was in Baden for his health, and quite lacking in energy. Private secretary had been instructed to reply that ex-Shah must expect no support from Russian Government, and that latter would do nothing except in agreement with His Majesty's Government.

No. 189.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, April 30, 1913.

MY telegram of 21st April: Advances to Persian Government.

Financial situation of Persian Government having become acutely critical, and there being some danger of disturbances, I have to-day paid in the British share of the joint advance, namely, 200,000*l.*, to the Treasurer-General, after having received the assurance of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the first instalment of the liquidation shall be paid on 1st January, 1915, in the event of His Majesty's Government deciding that the above-named date must be adhered to, in spite of the fact that it was the intention of the Persian Government to propose 1st July, 1915, as the date upon which the first payment should be made. Russian share has not yet been paid in because Russian Bank is making unacceptable conditions about the rate of exchange, which would cause Persian Government to lose about 4,000*l.* compared with rate at which Imperial Bank of Persia will negotiate transfer.

No. 190.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 30, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 29th April: Regency.

Your Excellency should thank M. Sazonof for communicating to me his reply to Shoa-es-Sultaneh respecting the ex-Shah, whose return to Persia would have the most serious results.

No. 191.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 1, 1913.

MY telegram of 25th April: Gendarmerie.

Following received from Shiraz, 30th April:—

“I hear from Kazerun that gendarmerie arrived there safely, apparently without incident.”

No. 192.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 1, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from Bushire, 30th April:—

“Remainder of Central India Horse left in ‘Dufferin’ yesterday. Colonel Douglas begs me to express appreciation of himself and regiment for message from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of 16th April.”

No. 193.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 1, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from Bushire, 29th April :—

“Wilson reports that company's engineer in charge of survey, having been informed by him that survey on Dizful-Khoremabad section was not possible this spring, has decided to confine himself to Mohammerah-Dizful section.”

No. 194.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 1, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of the 28th April.

It is announced officially that the forces of the Governor of Mazanderan have totally routed the Turkomans who were reported to have risen in support of Salar-ed-Dowleh. In the engagement which took place between Sari and Ashraf the Turkomans lost eight killed and twelve wounded. Their leader, a well-known mischief-maker, was among the latter.

The Persian Government had proposed to the Prince, prior to receiving the above news, that he should come to the capital and live here for a time before receiving a Government appointment. The Prince is said to seem prepared to entertain this idea favourably.

In this case it may be that the Government will appoint Sipahdar as Governor of Resht. He is expected back in Persia shortly. The Government would be kept in a state of constant uneasiness were he to take up his residence at Tehran.

No. 195.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 30th April : Advance.
Your action approved.

No. 196.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of 30th April : Advance.
You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.

THE India Office state that they receive many complaints from Indian firms as to the insecurity of the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road.

Is it proposed to give anything from the advance for the needs of Kerman, and when is it likely that the gendarmerie will be extended to Kerman?

No. 198.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.

SIR W. TOWNLEY'S telegram of the 30th April.

His Majesty's Government are instructing Sir W. Townley that they agree to postponement of repayment of advances. I hope that the Russian Government will adopt a similar course.

No. 199.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 3, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 2nd May : Kerman.

Nothing has been set aside for Kerman out of the advance. I did not feel justified in pressing this upon Persian Government, who accepted earmarking of 10,000*l.* for Bushire custom-house building with great reluctance.

Imperial Bank of Persia has, however, made an arrangement with M. Mornard to advance 19,000 tomans (3,800*l.*) a-month for Kerman on security of revenues of the province, from which I continue to receive satisfactory reports of the steps taken by the Governor-General to restore order.

It is impossible to foresee when the gendarmerie will be extended to Kerman. They are becoming so popular that their services are in great request in the northern sphere, where Russia has also a call on them, as some 200,000*l.* of the advances is to be set aside for gendarmerie.

No. 200.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 9, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to your telegram of the 8th instant, copy of a note which I have this day addressed to the Persian Government respecting the transfer of the 7th Rajputs from Jask to Bushire.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 200.

Sir W. Townley to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, April 9, 1913.

I AM directed by my Government to inform the Imperial Persian Government that, in view of the state of anarchy prevailing in the hinterland of Bushire and other Gulf ports, it has been decided to transfer the headquarters of the 7th Rajputs, which are now at Jask, to Bushire for the time being.

This step will be taken as soon as the cavalry regiment which is now on its way from Shiraz to Bushire has left the latter place for India.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 201.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my despatch of the 28th February last, copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's

consul-general at Meshed, respecting the identity of the Turkoman assailants of Mr. Meriton.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 201.

Major Sykes to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Meshed, March 28, 1913.*
I HAVE much pleasure in informing you that I have at last succeeded in tracing the Turkomans who attacked Mr. Meriton on the 3rd December, 1912, and murdered his driver and gholam.

2. Their names are :—

Mami Kolek Shikh and Kolek Tekke, of Band-i-Ajan, in the Goklan country ;
Abba Kur and Jan Mohammed, of Kari Kala, on the River Sumbar ;
Dui ;
Sheikh Mohammed Khoja of Khiva ;
Sirdar Tekke.

My informant, who is quite reliable, states that Mr. Meriton's property is still in their tents. At the same time the band may have included other raiders.

3. M. Grigorief recently came to see me on the subject of the Turkoman raids, as my remarks to him had been embodied in a letter to M. de Klemm, who has asked him to obtain further details from me about the participation of Russian subjects in these raids, and also about the attack on Mr. Meriton. M. Grigorief says that the general accuracy of my statements is not doubted, but that, in existing circumstances, it will not be easy to make any improvement in this undesirable state of affairs.

4. It appears from the above that the Russian Government is ready to take up the matter, and consequently I venture to hope that the information I have collected may bring these cowardly miscreants to justice, and also prevent similar outrages in the future.

I have, &c.
P. M. SYKES, *Major, His Britannic Majesty's
Consul-General and Agent to the Govern-
ment of India in Khorasan.*

No. 202.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

Sir, *Tehran, April 15, 1913.*
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the summary of events in Persia for the four weeks ending to-day.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 202.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending on April 15, 1913.

Mujaheds.—A band of some fifty mujaheds, having furtively left Tehran, attacked and robbed a gendarmerie post at Robat Kerim. A force of gendarmerie, sent from Tehran, pursued the band as far as Hamadan territory and then abandoned the pursuit. The band is still at large, terrorising the countryside. The Government propose now to send Bakhtiaris after the marauders. Major Glimstedt, who is acting as commandant of the gendarmerie during Colonel Hjalmarsen's absence from Tehran, at once arrested two of the principal leaders of the mujaheds in the capital and proceeded to disarm the

mujaheds generally in Tehran. One of the arrested leaders, having claimed Russian nationality, was released at the demand of the Russian consul-general, who, however, promised to produce him for the enquiry which Major Glimstedt wishes to hold with a view to ascertaining the instigators of the Robot Kerim incident.

The Cabinet.—Mutemim-ul-Mulk has several times tendered his resignation, which has not hitherto been accepted. He and his brother Mushir-ed-Dowleh, who has requested permission to travel for his health to Europe, take little part in the Government. Saad-ed-Dowleh, who is actively intriguing for the Regency or Premiership, appears to be counting on the speedy break up of the present Cabinet.

The Regent.—Mustaufi-ul-Memalik has not yet left Tehran on his mission to the Regent, who is said to have instructed him to delay his departure until the receipt of a letter which Nasr-ul-Mulk has despatched by post to the Persian Government.

Tabriz.

Mujallel-es-Sultan, who has been a fugitive since his defeat at the hands of the Government troops last May, arrived at Tabriz destitute on the 18th March, and was placed in confinement by Shuja-ed-Dowleh.

Resht.

Salar-ed-Dowleh has not yet taken up his duties as Governor-General of Gilan; but his munshi, one Mirza Agha Khan, arrived at Resht on the 12th March.

The property of three local notables, Amid-us-Saltaneh, Sardar Muhyi, and Mirza Kerim Khan, which was pledged to the Banque d'Escompte de Perse, has been attached by the Russian consul-general.

Meshed.

The presence of Salar-ed-Dowleh in Khorasan last March increased the general insecurity usually prevalent in the province. Mahommed, the notorious Nishapur brigand, joined him, and their combined followings are reported to have burned two or three villages in the Sabsawar district, and to have disarmed and robbed the men of the Karai regiment stationed in Sabsawar itself. After this raid Mahommed returned to Nishapur. Salar-ed-Dowleh eventually moved to Bender Gez, where he still is. He has refused the latest offer of the Central Government to accept a pension and leave Persia, and is unwilling to take over the Governorship of Gilan.

In accordance with instructions received from Tehran, M. Leleux, the agent to the Treasurer-General, has demanded one-tenth of the revenues of the shrine. The shrine officials, however, have so far refused to make this payment.

Ispahan.

The relations between the Governor and His Majesty's consulate continue to be most cordial, and his Excellency has of late been helpful in the settlement of British cases. His Excellency's relations with the Treasury agent are also satisfactory, and as a result the latter is gradually recovering the arrears of revenue due to the Treasury.

A caravan of 198 mules carrying skins, the property of Russian subjects, was robbed by a party of Boir Ahmedis near Yezdikhast on the 17th March. According to information received by the Central Government, the Kalantar of Yezdikhast pursued the robbers and recovered the goods.

Several burglaries and acts of aggression are reported to have taken place in the town of late.

Yezd.

As reported in last month's summary, the Governor continues to usurp the provincial revenues, and the Treasury agency is to all intents and purposes inoperative. The Kashi road-guards have not been paid for some time, and are consequently levying an ever-increasing toll on caravans.

Taimur, a notorious bandit, who was captured by a force of Bakhtiari in the early part of last month, was brought into Yezd in chains, together with seventeen of his comrades, on the 15th March. Since then the local merchants have been agitating for his execution, but His Majesty's vice-consul thinks it probable that he will be bought off and allowed to escape.

Shiraz.

The 39th Central India Horse and the detachment of the 7th Rajputs left on the 6th April *en route* to Bushire.

The first detachment of the Government gendarmerie, consisting of three Swedish officers and some 450 men, arrived from Tehran on the 7th April; and a few days later Colonel Hjalmarson, the commandant of the corps, M. Lecomte, the French Minister, and Captain Klein, the German military attaché, arrived.

Colonel Hjalmarson proposes to leave shortly for Kazerun with 600 of the gendarmerie.

The tribesmen have commenced their spring migration, and small parties are reported to be disturbing the main roads and outlying districts.

According to information received by the Central Government, a Bakhtiari force has punished the Boir Ahmedis who took part in the fighting near Mamasenni in February.

Seistan.

No outrages on any of the roads have been reported of late, but Sardar Jehil Khan has collected a "lashkar" to attack the Seistan Brahuis. A Baluchi raiding party is said to have started for the Kainat, and a force of 100 Afghans has crossed the border on its way to the coast.

Kermanshah.

The town is quiet, but there have been several small raids made on villages in the neighbourhood. The roads are reported safe; but, owing to the scarcity of fodder and to the exactions of the road-guards, the number of caravans is very small and trade is unsatisfactory.

Bushire.

Towards the end of last month the muleteers on the Bushire-Shiraz road struck work as a protest against the exactions of Ghazanfer-es-Saltaneh, the Khan of Borasjun, and trade consequently suffered. However, on representations being made to the Central Government, orders were sent to Ghazanfer-es-Saltaneh to desist, and on the 5th April the strike ended.

Ahwaz.

The sheikh has dismissed the forces he was collecting for possible operations against the Bakhtiari, as the danger of a conflict in the near future has passed.

No. 203.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 16, 1913.

ALTHOUGH there may be said to be less suppressed tension than marked the political situation at the date when I wrote my despatch of the 17th ultimo, public confidence does not appear to be really restored. The news that Mohammed Ali Mirza had arrived at Vienna in an apparently bad state of health has somewhat comforted the Government, which feels that there is now no immediate danger of his reappearance on Persian soil.

In proportion as the uneasiness respecting Mohammed Ali's whereabouts and intentions has decreased, there has been a marked recrudescence of anxiety relative to the future movements of Salar-ed-Dowleh. The members of the present Cabinet bitterly reproach their predecessors for leaving them such an undesirable legacy as the half-finished negotiations connected with the official forgiveness of this unreliable and insubordinate Prince. They appear to forget that their predecessors agreed with M. Poklewsky that the half-repentant rebel should come and live in the immediate neighbourhood of Tehran, and that to their fears lest he should associate himself in intrigues with certain disaffected factions is due the present situation, which finds the quondam rebel and pretender to the Throne awaiting at Bender Gez the confirmation of his appointment as Governor-General of Gilan and a sum of money to enable him to take up his post.

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Reports from the south are conflicting. The Government and the Bakhtiariis affirm that a strong force under Amiri Mujahid, Bakhtiari, Governor of Behbahan, has attacked and inflicted severe loss on the Boir Ahmedis and Mamasennis who are held to have been responsible for the attack on the British officers last December that resulted in the murder of Captain Eckford. One was reluctant to credit for a time these stories which emanated from Bakhtiari sources, but later advices received by the Government and which are in a measure confirmed by our consular officers, tend to show that there must be some good foundation for the report, although it is possible that they may have been considerably embellished.

It would not appear that the execution of these punitive measures has had much effect on the road as the acting British consul at Shiraz telegraphs that, though it was cleared of ruffians to allow the Central India Horse to pass, it filled up again immediately afterwards with a crowd of truculent bandits who have openly announced their intention of opposing the gendarmerie on their way down to Bushire. It may well be that they will do so as the establishment of the gendarmes on the road in force would mean the end of their lucrative trade, which consists in wringing exorbitant blackmail out of muleteers and passengers and in carrying off, from time to time, a rich caravan of goods that can be readily disposed of. It is possible that some bluff has been indulged in with a view to frightening the gendarmes, but I have deemed it desirable to instruct Major O'Connor to put the situation, as he sees it, plainly before Colonel Hjalmarson since a defeat of the gendarmerie at the present moment would practically entail the failure of the entire scheme and might lead to results which it is the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to avoid. For this reason it has seemed to me that the exercise of caution, until the arrival of the powerful reinforcements about to leave Tehran, would be preferable to running the risk of a disaster.

What leads one to suppose that the state of the road may, in reality, be less dangerous than it has appeared to Major O'Connor is that there is good reason to believe, from reports that have reached me, from various quarters, that both Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Mahommed Ali Khan, Kashkuli, are seeking to enter into grace by initiating proposals for the surrender of the men guilty of the attacks on Mr. Smart and Captain Eckford. That these powerful chiefs should consider that the present moment is a favourable one for endeavouring to make their peace may indicate that they understand that the arrival of a powerful Government force means the end of their reign of terror.

Without any fuss, and almost before any news of what was on foot became generally known, the gendarmes have recently disarmed the mujahid at Tehran. It has for some time been a puzzle how to disarm these irregular troops now that they are no longer required for the Government service. More or less by accident the Swedish officers got to know that there was some sort of subversive movement brewing, and that arms and ammunition were to be found in certain localities. Without awaiting definite orders they proceeded to seize the arms and to arrest and imprison the persons, mostly men of some position, in whose houses the arms were found. A small force of mujahids escaped from the town and have started pillaging. They escaped a gendarmerie force that was sent after them and were last heard of near Saveh on the Kazvin-Hamadan road. It is not unlikely that they may do some considerable mischief before they are dispersed, but the disarming of these truculent soldiers of fortune of various nationalities, who threatened to become a pest to the town, was a noteworthy achievement and one that has served largely to increase the prestige of the gendarmerie, as is proved by the number of disarmed mujahids who have since presented themselves as recruits.

There have been constant rumours of disunion in the Cabinet of late and I am afraid that all the members do not pull together quite harmoniously, but so far anything in the nature of a crisis has been avoided.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 204.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a reply which I have received from the Persian Government to the note which I addressed to them on the receipt of your telegram of the 8th instant, stating that, in consequence of the disturbed state of the hinterland of the Gulf ports, His Majesty's Government had decided to transfer the headquarters of the Rajputs from Jask to Bushire.

The Persian Government in their reply point out that the proposed movement may have an adverse effect on the arrangements which they are now themselves making to restore order, and they express a hope that His Majesty's Government may refrain from carrying out their intention.

I have no reason to suppose that Sir P. Cox has changed his opinion, given after careful consideration of the question, and I have, since receiving the reply in question, pointed out verbally that the measures now being taken by the Persian Government will not reach the district in question, and that the force at the disposal of the local authorities is quite inadequate to protect the lives and property of foreigners should an emergency arise.

I consider the protest of the Persian Government as being merely made *pro formâ*, and that no further answer is required.

I may add that I have informed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires of the step to be taken.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 204.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir W. Townley.

Your Excellency,

April 16, 1913.

I HAVE taken note of the contents of your note of the 9th instant, and have the honour to point out that you state therein that it is in view of the state of anarchy prevailing in the hinterland of Bushire and the Persian Gulf that the 7th Rajputs are to be stationed in that town. It is hard to reconcile this measure with the steps taken by the Persian Government for the maintenance of order in the south, with the completion of which the Persian Government is now engaged, and with the recall from Shiraz of the consular reinforcements, by which a further proof of friendship has been given to the Persian Government and the hope raised among the inhabitants of those regions that former promises, for which they are grateful, would be fulfilled. The present measure has not only disappointed the Persian Government, but it will also strike a blow at the hope entertained by the inhabitants of Fars.

If the anarchy mentioned in your note is to be taken to mean the disturbances at Bunder Abbas by the Baharloos, I beg to state that, as your Excellency is perfectly aware, the Persian Government has taken the necessary steps to put an end to the disturbances by the Arabs and others, and the Governor-General of Fars is making efforts to annihilate the disturbing elements. If your Excellency means something else I am still unable to see the justification of the measure in question. There have been no incidents in the neighbourhood of Bushire and on the coast of the Persian Gulf that could necessitate such a step at the present moment, when the people of Persia are finding in the recall of the British forces a proof of the desire of His Majesty's Government to assist Persia, and the attention of foreign countries is being directed on the proof of the good-will and benevolence of the British Government towards Persia.

I therefore hope that you will warn your Government of the harm this measure will cause to the Persian Government and prevent it from being carried out. In this way the measures being taken by the Government for the extermination of the Baharlus will be furthered and success will be sooner achieved.

I avail, &c.

VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 205.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 18th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith, copies of the correspondence exchanged with the Persian Government relative to the advance of 200,000*l.* and to the mode of its repayment.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 205.

Sir W. Townley to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, April 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I duly communicated to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the proposal made to me verbally in your Excellency's name by the Mashaver-ul-Mamalek on the 21st February last as to the manner in which the Imperial Persian Government suggested that the advance amounting to 200,000*l.* which the British Government was prepared to make to Persia should be refunded, namely—

That the advance shall bear interest at 7 per cent. per annum, shall be secured on the customs receipts of the south, and shall be repayable out of the loan, which it is hoped will be concluded at no distant date; that should such loan not have been made before the 1st January, 1915, the advance to be repaid by half-yearly instalments of 250,000 tomans each out of the surplus of the southern customs receipts, commencing upon the above-mentioned date. That should these receipts not suffice for the purpose, the Imperial Persian Government undertakes to make good any deficit out of other sources of revenue.

I am now authorised by Sir Edward Grey to inform your Excellency that the above detailed scheme of repayment is acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and I am prepared to pay the sum of 200,000*l.* into the account of the Treasurer-General, at the Imperial Bank of Persia, upon condition that 30,000*l.* of the above-mentioned sum be specially set apart for the financial requirements of the administration of the province of Fars, where British interests are so considerable, that an early restoration of law and order is a matter of paramount importance, and that a further sum of 10,000*l.* be specially devoted to meeting the cost of the construction of new custom-house premises at Bushire, where the present unsatisfactory condition of the buildings is a serious hindrance to trade.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 205.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir W. Townley.

Your Excellency,

April 16, 1913.

I HAVE received your Excellency's note of the 14th instant respecting the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the suggestion made by the Persian Government and communicated to you verbally by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the 21st February last regarding the advance of 200,000*l.*, and I am grateful for the goodwill shown by His Majesty's Government in that matter.

I now have the honour to state that the conditions for the security and interest for the advance are as stated in your note under reply, but the mode of repayment of the instalments suggested by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the proposals made by the Treasurer-General was that, should the loan contemplated by the Persian Government not have been negotiated by the 1st January, 1915, the Persian Government would from that date be prepared to repay the advance by half-yearly instalments of 250,000 tomans,* thus completing the repayment in two years. The first instalment would be paid on the 1st July, 1915, and the other instalments at intervals of six months.

To avoid any misunderstanding I have considered it expedient to put on record these explanations.

In your note under reply you have suggested that a sum of 30,000*l.* out of the above sum should be set aside for the financial requirements of the province of Fars. The Persian Government had already decided to allocate a sufficient sum for the expenses of that province, and now that your Excellency has made this suggestion, the Persian Government will set apart the above-mentioned sum for the purpose.

With regard to the Bushire customs building, the Persian Government has no

objection to set apart a sum of 10,000*l.* for the construction of the building, and to deposit the money at the Imperial bank of Persia so that it may be spent on the new building for the customs after necessary investigation.

I avail,
VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

No. 206.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 6, 1913.

THE acting British consul at Shiraz reports that tribal migration is proceeding under much quieter conditions than have prevailed for some years past, and that brisk trade is being carried on.

He adds that Kavam's force, which has swollen to 7,000 or 8,000 men, has met with some success, some section of the Baharloos having submitted, whilst the majority of the chiefs have fled and are being pursued. Force has reached Darab, famous for defeat of a Government force some four years ago.

It is also reported that a small force has been sent to recover goods stolen on the Ispahan road 20th March, that of the two principal robbers one has been killed and the other captured, and that there is hope that the goods may be recovered.

No. 207.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 6, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 13th March: Fars advance.

I am to-day placing the 100,000*l.* advanced for the gendarmerie of Fars to the account of the Treasurer-General, having received a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepting the advance under the conditions required as to repayment and control.

No. 208.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 6, 1913.

MY telegram of 1st May: Gendarmerie.

Gendarmes arrived at Shiraz safely from Bushire 5th May, with arms and ammunition.

No. 209.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, May 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 26th April.

Russian Government have sent me the memorandum in regard to Salar's appointment, of which following is summary:—

“According to information received from Russian consul at Astrabad, Salar, in view of evident intention of Persian Government to disregard its moral obligations towards him, has once more collected mixed followers and already occupied town of Sari.* His action has provoked disorders in Turkoman Steppes and provinces of Astrabad and Mazanderan, and is menace to lives of Russian subjects and to Russian economic interests in these districts. For this Persian Government is entirely responsible by having attempted to go back on its engagements to Salar. In spite

* Sari is 100 miles north-east of Tehran and 80 miles south-west of Astrabad.

of contrary assertion of Persian Government, Russian Government declare that in last March Salar fulfilled his obligations to former and disbanded his followers. In view of above Russia cannot but lay responsibility for losses incurred by Russian subjects through Salar's action on Persian Government itself, and may be compelled to take measures for protection of her interests.

"In the meantime, as possible solution of present difficulty, Russian Government suggest that Persian Government should propose to Salar not to take up appointment as Governor of Gilan personally, but to nominate, by mutual consent with Persian Government, representative to rule province on behalf of Prince. Latter could in that case go on leave. This arrangement could be supported by Russian consul at Astrabad, but in the event of Salar not agreeing to it Persian Government must then take decisive steps to disband his troops and restore order.

"Russian Government trust that His Majesty's Government will not refuse to advise Persian Government to adopt this solution as alone calculated to avoid further serious complications."

In a conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon I pointed out that there was slight contradiction in memorandum, as in one place it affirmed that Salar had disarmed his detachment in March, while in another it stated that Persian Government must take steps to destroy bands.

His Excellency explained that Salar had two months ago fulfilled his obligations and disbanded his followers, but that Persian Government had not carried out their part of the bargain. It was entirely owing to their failure to do so that Salar had re-formed his escort.

No. 210.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 25, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 4th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of the note which I addressed to the Persian Government on the 4th April, informing them that His Majesty's Government had decided to withdraw the British Indian troops from Shiraz.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 210.

Sir W. Townley to Vossuk-ud-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, April 4, 1913.

IN accordance with instructions which I have received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have decided to withdraw from Shiraz the British Indian troops that have been stationed in that town for some time past. These troops consist of three and a-half squadrons of the Central India Horse under the command of Colonel Douglas, and of an infantry detachment of sixty men of the 7th Rajputs under one British officer. These troops will leave Shiraz *en route* for Bushire and India on the 6th instant.

I am instructed by Sir E. Grey to impress upon your Excellency, in making this communication, that the withdrawal of this force without His Majesty's Government taking any steps themselves to secure the order on the road that is essential to British trade, makes it incumbent upon the Persian Government to make no further difficulties about the conditions attached to the loan of 100,000*l.* which the Persian Government have sought from His Majesty's Government for the maintenance and development of the gendarmerie, which is necessary to enable the Persian Government to protect the trade routes.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 211.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 28, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegrams of the 23rd and 26th instant on the subject of the attitude to be adopted by the gendarmerie towards the levy of illicit tolls on the Bushire-Shiraz road, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a telegram on the subject from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, which may be of assistance in understanding the suggestion made by Colonel Hjalmarson and Sir P. Cox's views thereon.

I should like to make it quite clear that, in taking into consideration these suggestions for the improvement of the condition of the Bushire-Shiraz road, there is no intention of advocating the official recognition of the illicit levy of tolls known as "rahdari."

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 211.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, April 25, 1913.

REFERENCE to your comment and O'Connor's on my telegram of 23rd April.

This was the position :—

Commandant in the first instance put forward his suggestion as a course to be officially recognised by the Governor-General of Fars and ourselves. I replied, "If you make the proposal in that way, on lines which constitute official sanction of rahdari by the Persian Government and ourselves, it seems to me out of the question on the face of it. On the other hand, we are risking our money on your success, and if, as the result of your examination of the situation on the spot, you tell us frankly that you cannot tackle the question on combative lines without every probability of disaster, but you think that by the adoption of this expedient you will in all probability succeed in the end, then my view of the practical position is that as long as they can get their goods up with safety and regularity our traders will not cry out at the continuance for a time of a reduced measure of rahdari under control."

From the point of view of principle and Persia's treaty obligations it is of course indefensible, but it would seem better to put up with it on the above lines than to force the gendarmerie on to a course which is foredoomed to failure.

The mixture of tufangchis with gendarmes is an unpleasant idea, though from what O'Connor says it does not seem to work badly on the Shiraz side; the incidence of cost, however, is a difficulty which needs circumvention.

No. 212.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 21st April: Fars advance.

Surely estimate of southern customs surplus as 100,000*l.* or less is far too optimistic.

Your telegram of 22nd February shows that only 4,800*l.* a-month would be available if whole receipts were appropriated by His Majesty's Government. Interest on Fars advance will now reduce it to 4,200*l.* a-month, or approximately to 50,000*l.* a-year only.

Treasury urge, therefore, that security of revenues additional to southern customs be obtained for repayments of capital, beginning in 1915.

No. 213.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 9, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 1st May.

The Persian Government announce that the Prince has now placed himself openly at the head of the Turkoman movement, and that his troops have occupied Sari. They have also received bombastic telegrams which he had sent to Tehran, in which he boasts of what he will do against the Central Government. A Bakhtiari force is being prepared here to be despatched to the assistance of the Government forces, which are holding a strong position some 20 miles from Sari. The Minister of the Interior asserts that if the Prince does not receive any assistance the Government can easily dispose of him. The Prince has also been joined by the small force of Persian Cossacks stationed at Astrabad; their loyalty has always been suspected, and these suspicions are thus confirmed.

The Persian Government naturally wish to avoid the expense of sending an expedition if possible, and I have advised them to await the result of the negotiations now proceeding at St. Petersburg, though they should continue their preparations in the meantime.

No. 214.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, May 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 2nd May: Advance to Persian Government.

Memorandum from Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Minister of Finance has sent instructions to Russian Bank to pay in Russian share of joint advance, namely, 200,000l., and to fix 1st July, 1914, as date for payment of first instalment of liquidation in accordance with desire expressed by Persian Government.

No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 9, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

I should be glad to receive your observations on Russian memorandum summarised in Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of 7th May; the solution proposed by Russian Government seems a possible way out of the difficulty.

Has news in your telegram of 1st May been confirmed, and has the Prince renounced his claim to a Russian escort?

No. 216.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 11, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

M. Sabline has telegraphed to the Russian Government that the suggested appointment of an Acting Governor of Gilan while Salar proceeds to Europe on leave of absence is not likely, in his opinion, to prove an acceptable solution. He informs me that he has put his views very frankly before the Russian Government, and has said that the Prince is quite an impossible person, that he never really disbanded his followers nor made his submission to the Persian Government, whom he has constantly treated with great discourtesy and disrespect, that in all probability he never had any intention of proceeding to Resht, and that at present, at any rate, his aims are much higher ones.

He has suggested in conclusion the adoption of some arrangement for the creation of a Cossack brigade at Resht, or else that the Russian Government should leave the Prince to fight his own battles with the Persian Government without any support from St. Petersburg.

No. 217.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 11, 1913.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram of 9th May: Joint advance.

Reference to my telegram of 13th March will show that Persian Government accepted a Russian counter-proposal that commencement of repayment of Russian advance should be made on the 1st July (o.s.), 1914, and that advance should be paid off in six half-years' instalments instead of in four, starting one year later, as in our case.

No. 218.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 8th May: Advance for Fars.

M. Mornard says he is very hopeful that near future may see an important augmentation in southern customs receipts. They have increased very appreciably since the date of my telegram of 22nd February.

I represented that it would appear that more than pious hopes based on a possible amelioration of the general situation are required, and asked whether any other security is available.

M. Mornard replied that he could offer opium receipts of the south as an additional guarantee, as also excise of spirits. He estimates the opium receipts at between 50,000*l.* and 60,000*l.* a year for Kerman, Fars, and Arabistan, but said that Lecoffre estimates the receipts of Kerman alone at 400,000 tomans (about 75,000*l.*). Revenue derived from this source in north has much exceeded M. Mornard's estimate, and produced 700,000 tomans (about 127,000*l.*) last year.

No. 219.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 2, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Major Glimstedt, who is in command of the Swedish gendarmerie here in the absence of Colonel Hjalmarson in the south, giving particulars of the force which started for Shiraz on the 23rd and 24th April.

Copy of a memorandum by the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation reporting on the inspection held on the 21st ultimo is also enclosed.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 219.

Major Glimstedt to Sir W. Townley.

Excellence,

Téhéran, le 24 avril, 1913.

JE m'empresse de vous faire connaître qu'hier et aujourd'hui est partie la deuxième expédition des forces de gendarmerie destinées à Chiraz, soit :—

14 officiers persans.

472 gendarmes, dont—

278 à pied (1½ compagnies).

169 à cheval (1½ escadrons).

25 hommes pour la section de mitrailleuses.

3 officiers-instructeurs suédois.
 1 interprète.
 10 chevaux de réserve.
 6 ordonnances à cheval.
 19 fourgons attelés de 4 chevaux.
 1 charrette.
 70 mulets, dont 10 pour la section de mitrailleuses.
 1 section de mitrailleuses avec 2 mitrailleuses Maxim.
 2 Schneider montagne 7½ centim. ; 40 cartouches.
 200 cartouches pour les canons autrichiens 8 centim.
 300 cartouches pour les canons autrichiens montagne 7 centim.

Tous les gendarmes de l'expédition, gendarmes à cheval et gendarmes à pied, sont armés de carabines modèle 88.

Le nombre total des carabines emmenées par l'expédition est de 550.

Enfin, l'expédition emmène des cartouches au nombre de 400 par carabine, plus 18,000 dans les caisses.

Veuillez, &c.
 (Faisant fonctions Chef-Instructeur de la
 Gendarmerie gouvernementale) :
 Le Major GLIMSTEDT.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, April 24, 1913.

I HASTEN to inform you that the second part of the force of gendarmerie intended for Shiraz left yesterday and to-day, viz. :—

14 Persian officers.
 472 gendarmes, viz.—
 278 unmounted (1½ companies).
 169 mounted (1½ squadrons).
 25 men for the machine-gun section.
 3 Swedish officer-instructors.
 1 interpreter.
 10 spare horses.
 6 mounted orderlies.
 19 four-horse wagons.
 1 cart.
 70 mules, of which 10 are for the machine-gun section.
 1 machine-gun section, with 2 Maxims.
 2 7.5-centim. mountain Schneiders ; 40 rounds.
 200 rounds for the Austrian 8-centim. guns.
 300 rounds for the Austrian 7-centim. mountain guns.

All the gendarmes of the expedition, both mounted and unmounted, are armed with model 88 rifles.

The total number of rifles carried by the expedition is 550.

Lastly, the expedition is taking 400 rounds for each rifle, in addition to 18,000 in the ammunition wagons.

I am, &c.
 GLIMSTEDT, Major
 (Acting Chief Instructor of the
 Government Gendarmerie).

Enclosure 2 in No. 219.

Memorandum by Military Attaché to His Majesty's Legation respecting Inspection of Government Gendarmerie for Fars.

THE party of Government gendarmerie, strength about 170 cavalry and 280 infantry, with a machine-gun section, which left Tehran for Shiraz on the 23rd and 24th April, paraded for the inspection of the Shah on the 21st April.

The exercises consisted of battalion drill and movements in extended order by the infantry, regimental drill and mounted and dismounted action by the cavalry, and finally a march past.

The steadiness of the men on parade, their workmanlike appearance, and the manner in which the various exercises were performed, showed that as high a standard of efficiency had been attained as could reasonably have been expected in the time the Swedish officers have had to instruct the men. The training and discipline of the Persian ranks should enable them to adapt themselves readily to local conditions in Fars, and, provided they possess the proper military spirit, to render a good account of themselves in the field.

After the parade a visit was paid to the officers' school, where everything pointed to the progress made by the Swedish instructors in their endeavours to form an efficient corps of officers for the gendarmerie.

No. 220.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 14, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 11th May.

I have just been told by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that Salar-ed-Dowleh has changed his attitude; he has practically made his submission to the Persian Government, and has asked leave to settle on one of his estates until it is considered desirable by the Central Government to utilise his services. He has also asked permission to come to Keredj, near Tehran, where he will have an interview with the Minister of the Interior.

No. 221.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 16, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of 14th May.

The Prince appears to be behaving in his usual high-handed manner, and to be issuing decrees, impounding the customs receipts, appointing Governors, and augmenting the number of his followers. He is said to have now extended his operations as far as Barferush.

The Persian Government are, in the circumstances, by no means confident of the sincerity of His Highness's assurances that he wishes to make his peace with them. Though they have telegraphed that they accept his proposal to come to terms, they are also sending out an expedition of 400 Bakhtiaris. This expedition will take military action against the Prince should it be found, as would now seem to be not improbable, that he is merely tricking them with fair words. In any case the expedition will encourage the loyal adherents of the Government, who, seeing that Salar is levying taxes with impunity, are wavering in his favour.

No. 222.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 8, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 28th ultimo respecting the attitude of the gendarmerie towards the levy of illicit tolls on the Bushire-Shiraz road, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further telegram which I have received from the Acting British consul at Shiraz on the same subject.

There is good reason to believe that the gendarmerie detachment now on the road to Shiraz contains even better material than that which Major Siefert found satisfactory.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 222.

Acting Consul O'Connor to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Shiraz, May 7, 1913.

SITUATION on road, Kazerun-Bushire, is as follows:—

Rahdari is nominally suppressed from Kazerun to Tangi Turkan, but Mohammed Ali Khan's men at Rahdar caravanserai still extort money from the muleteers on various pretexts, and small party of gendarmes is not strong enough to put a stop to this. In Kamarej territory khan has promised to abolish rahdari, but I do not yet know if he has done so. Below Kamarej matters are as before. Siefvert is of opinion that no rahdari should be allowed when once the gendarmerie have taken over the road, but merely employment of local tufangchis. Both Siefvert and the Governor-General think that this can be arranged without fighting, but Khan of Borasjun makes exorbitant demand for employment of over 200 of his men at double rate of pay. Khan of Konar Takhteh is most truculent of all, and may give trouble. On the whole, Siefvert thinks that he will be able to take over road without fighting when the second party of gendarmerie arrive.

Return of gendarmerie from Bushire with arms and ammunition has done much to raise their prestige. Siefvert speaks highly of his new men.

No. 223.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 22, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 12th May: Security for advances.

Treasury consider that, as southern customs receipts cannot be relied on to produce more than 50,000*l.* a-year, and opium receipts are estimated at 50,000*l.* a-year, or a little more only, both opium receipts and excise should be accepted as additional guarantees.

You should inform Persian Government accordingly.

No. 224.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 24, 1913.

LATEST news from Shiraz is less reassuring, and there would appear to be reason to fear that more peaceful situation lately prevailing there may be disturbed.

Late ilkhani, who has left Shiraz secretly, seems to be bent on stirring up trouble for Soulet by creating rumour of tribal differences among Kashgai. Acting British consul reports that he cannot succeed without the support of the Government, which I believe to be well disposed towards Soulet. I have advised Bakhtiari khans, who support the late ilkhani, and they have promised to use their good offices in persuading him to desist from attitude.

Troubles have also occurred at Shiraz, which, it is feared, may cause Shebani Arab tribe to cause disturbances. This tribe is now located east of Sivend,* on the Ispahan-Shiraz road, to the safety of which they are a constant menace. The Governor-General, after consulting the major commanding the gendarmerie and the acting British consul, has decided that operations should be undertaken against the tribe at once by the gendarmerie detachment now at Sivend, on their way to Shiraz. Force of 100 gendarmes and some sowars, under Darya Begi, commander of the Governor-General's forces, has been sent from Shiraz to strengthen detachment, intention being to secure complete submission of the Shebani and protect road from their depredations.

* About 50 miles north of Shiraz.

No. 225.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 25, 1913.

EXPEDITION against Tangistan coast.

In 1911 the natives of Tangistan committed an act of piracy on a Debai pearling boat, for which no compensation has yet been obtainable. His Majesty's Resident at Bushire has been consulting Government of India and admiral for some time past as to sending an expedition against the coast villages in order to exact reparation.

It was feared that any such action might interfere (1) with the work of the Swedish officers at Bushire, who were recruiting in the hinterland for the gendarmerie, and (2) with the safe journey of the Central India Horse from Shiraz to the coast. The local horizon being, however, now clear, the plan of action is to appear off the Tangistan coast and seize all sailing craft the property of the inhabitants from the village of Dilwar to that of Karri. The villagers would then be warned that we would detain the boats for one month pending payment of the compensation demanded on account of the said act of piracy in 1911, as well as the surrender of the culprits, or, in the event of the villagers preferring not to surrender the guilty parties, payment of double compensation instead. Boats would be sold or burnt if payment is not forthcoming.

As soon as the boats had been seized they would be removed to Bushire, but, in the event of the Governor fearing that their presence there might lead to trouble, they would be beached at the island of Kharag, where one of His Majesty's ships would mount guard over them.

It seems to me desirable that punitive measures of some kind should be carried out. I should be glad, therefore, if you would authorise me to convey to Sir P. Cox the authority which he requests in his following telegram dated the 23rd May:—

“There is now no local impediment to execution of our plans, and both senior naval officer and I are ready for action. It is of course most important that inhabitants of Tangistan coast should not get wind of our plans. As soon as Government of India and your Excellency give us permission to act we propose that two of His Majesty's ships should proceed to the Tangistan coast to make certain that no dhows leave the villages, and that a third ship of war should then come to Bushire; whereupon I would inform Governor of the Gulf Ports of what we intend to do, and invite him to send a representative or a Persian vessel to take part in the operations. The Persian Government would also be warned at that stage by your Excellency at Tehran. All that we require at the present moment is definite authority to proceed on above lines.”

No. 226.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

Sir,

Paris, May 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the Regent of Persia called at the Russian Embassy to-day by appointment. The Russian Ambassador and I had a conversation with His Highness on the subject of the desire of the Persian Government that he should return to Tehran.

Nasr-ul-Mulk expressed his willingness to return to Tehran, but desired to await the arrival of a member of the Persian Cabinet who should accompany him to London and St. Petersburg to discuss various questions with His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government. I pointed out to His Highness that such a course would create unnecessary delay, and I suggested that he might, if he pressed for the consent of the British and Russian Governments to receive him and they assented, ascertain for himself their views on the questions which he desired to discuss without the presence of a Persian Cabinet Minister. His Highness said that it would not be constitutional to do so.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 227.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 28, 1913.

SIPAHDAR.

Government circles are not a little perturbed by the return of the Sipahdar to Tehran. I do not, however, think that he has any intention of causing trouble. I have just had a long conversation with him, in the course of which he spoke of the Cabinet in friendly terms.

No. 228.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 28, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 16th May.

News having been received of the seizure by Salar-ed-Dowleh of the customs at Meshedi Sar and Bendergez, instructions have been sent by the Russian Legation to the consul at Astrabad to take possession of the offices with a military force, and, since the customs receipts are pledged as security for Russian loans, to see that customs operations are carried out on behalf of the Persian Government.

It would seem that action of the nature commanded by Russian Chargé d'Affaires was most necessary. Belgian customs officials report that Salar's brigands have treated them very roughly.

The Government expedition against Salar, composed of Bakhtiaris, is on the point of leaving Tehran.

No. 229.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram of the 25th May: Tangistan piracy.
Proposed action against villages is approved.

No. 230.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 15, 1913.

HIS Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz report the following caravan statistics during the month of April:—

Bushire:—					Previous month.
Mules arriving and leaving Bushire	6,319	181
Donkeys (via Firuzabad)	3,587	6,655

Sir P. Cox adds that the reports received from Borasjun are unreliable, as traffic is passing by night:—

Kazerun reports:—					
Mules to Bushire	1,199	1,571
Mules from Bushire	2,268	404
Shiraz:—					
Arrivals from Bushire	1,069	400
Departures to Bushire	837	808

Major O'Connor reports that there was no traffic on the spahan road during the month under review.

He adds that there were robberies on the Bushire road on the 5th April by Boir

Ahmedis near Khaneh Zinian, and on the 21st and 27th April near Kazerun by Mohammed Ali Khan's men; on the Ispahan road, near Dehbid, on the 4th April; near Abadeh on the 11th April; and near Eghlid on the 21st April.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 231.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 31, 1913.

MY telegram of 24th May.

Expedition was entirely successful and encountered practically no opposition. Majority of Arabs fled before the arrival of the gendarmerie, as did also principal Arab and Lashani chiefs and brigands. Various villages and tracts have been occupied on behalf of Persian Government which had been forcibly occupied by Arabs for several years past. Portion of merchandise stolen in robbery on 20th March has also been recovered (see my despatch of 27th March).

It is to be hoped that success of expedition will have excellent effect amongst Arabs and tribes generally. Most recent advices are, however, to the effect that last detachment has suffered much from heat on march down to Shiraz, and that major commanding is now in favour of putting off entire occupation of the road until autumn, when men will have had time to recuperate and acclimatise themselves. British consul at Shiraz reluctantly approves of this proposal in the circumstances, and thinks that men can be well employed in neighbourhood of Shiraz collecting revenue and strengthening the position of Governor-General. I will report further after consulting colonel commandant, who has just reached Tehran.

No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 31, 1913.

HIS Majesty's consular officers at Mohammerah and Ahwaz think that Kuhgeluis may raid oilfields this summer.

Oil company enquire what steps His Majesty's Government propose to take.

Can anything be done?

No. 233.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith some notes which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Ispahan, on the condition of the roads in his province during the quarter ending the 31st March last.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 233.

Ispahan Trade Report for March Quarter 1913.

Road.

THE condition of the roads in the Ispahan province during the March quarter was, speaking generally, satisfactory, the robberies reported being few and of comparatively small importance.

This amelioration was reflected in the transport rates which on most routes showed a diminution, on some a very marked diminution.

Ahwaz Roads.

Weather and other conditions during the quarter were abnormally favourable for the season.

Messrs. Lynch's transport reports for the quarter show that nearly 100 per cent. more merchandise arrived from Ahwaz during the quarter under report than in the corresponding quarter of 1912. On the other hand, the despatches to Ahwaz were only about 66 per cent. of those in the corresponding quarter of 1912.

The exact figures are as follows:—

Number of packages received from Ahwaz.	Loaded on.			Number of packages despatched.
	Mules.	Donkeys.	Camels.	
March quarter, 1912— 1,119	528	March quarter, 1912— 1,159
March quarter, 1913— 2,103	1,000	4	21	March quarter, 1913— 762

During the first two or three weeks of January the road was reported in excellent condition. Merchandise continued to arrive from, and leave for, Ahwaz in considerable quantities.

It was not till after the third week that reports of snow on the road were received. This however was not sufficient to stop, though in places it somewhat impeded, traffic. Caravans continued to come in satisfactorily up to the end of the first week in February, when it was reported that heavy snow in the hill-districts (notably at Barramurdah and Suljan) had rendered it necessary to beat down a track at those places by causing unloaded mules to pass backwards and forwards several times, an operation in which several animals died and two muleteers had their feet frost-bitten. Arrivals and despatches now began to fall off, and during the latter part of February were practically nil. In the first week in March traffic began to revive, despite further heavy falls of snow, which from time to time blocked the road at several points in the hill-districts for a while, but never to such an extent as to cause an actual cessation of traffic. For the next two weeks merchandise continued to arrive at and leave Ispahan in somewhat limited quantities. There were large arrivals at the end of the quarter.

Shiraz Road.

A lull in traffic in the first week of January was followed during the rest of the month and the first part of February by large arrivals of caravans from the south with British piece-goods, &c., and despatch southward of a considerable amount of local produce, the road being reported in excellent condition, and the Boir Ahmadis, under Mulla Kobad, who had pressed their services on the Fars authorities for policing the portion of the road between Abadeh and Yazdikhast, doing good service. Conditions during the latter part of February were less satisfactory, difficulties having arisen regarding the further employment by the Fars authorities of these Boir Ahmadi volunteers, and considerable tension existing between Mulla Kobad and Salar-i-Nizam, the Deputy Governor of Abadeh, the latter of whom was reported to be practising much extortion on caravans.

While these conditions affected the road south of Abadeh they did not render the tract between that place and Ispahan insecure. Two large caravans from Shiraz arrived safely during the first half of March, but not without paying very heavily for road guards, &c. Despatches southwards during this period were nil, and in consequence of rumours of increasing insecurity, several caravans which had started for Shiraz, returned to Ispahan or Abadeh, awaiting the expected passage of a large detachment of the "gendarmerie gouvernementale."

The departure from Ispahan on the 16th March of this detachment (200 mounted and 300 gendarmes on foot), under the command of Colonel Hjalmarson, charged to carry out a scheme for the policing of the Bushire-Shiraz-Ispahan road, was watched with pessimistic interest by native traders.

One caravan left Ispahan for Shiraz in its wake. With this exception there were no departures from, or arrivals at, Ispahan of caravans during the latter half of March. The postal service throughout the quarter was very slow, irregular, and unsatisfactory.

Tehran Road.

Traffic on this, as also on the roads from Kazvin and Resht, was brisk throughout the quarter, large quantities of Russian merchandise, more particularly kerosene oil, sugar, and piece-goods coming in.

On the 23rd January a large caravan, with property of one of the Zil-es-Sultan's sons, on its way to Tehran, was attacked near Shourab and robbed of horses, fire-arms, and effects to the value—as reported—of about 10,000 tomans, the four escorting gendarmes being stripped. Subsequently all the property carried off was restored to the owner by Naib Hussein, who was credibly reported to have instigated the robbery for his own ends.

The postal wagon, which traversed the road at the same time, and a large bank caravan of specie, which left Ispahan for Tehran on the 22nd January, passed over the road unmolested.

No other robberies of importance on the Tehran or other northern roads were reported during the quarter.

At the close of January there was a marked amelioration (which was maintained till the end of March) in the postal service, mails taking 5 to 6 days to accomplish the journey between Ispahan and Tehran.

Yezd Road.

Caravan traffic on this was brisk during the first fortnight in January. A robbery occurred near Yaghmish on the 18th-19th January, when some 50 camels with their loads were reported to have been carried off by a band of about 150 robbers (Kumishehis and others). The merchandise carried off was subsequently reported to have been found at Abarqou, in Fars territory, the authorities of which were reported to be taking steps for its recovery. Caravans continued to ply, though in somewhat fewer numbers, up to about mid February, when traffic was again normal and continued so till the end of the quarter, the road being reported safe, and no incident occurring except on the 22nd-23rd March, when three sowars (apparently men in the employ of Seyid Daood of Akda, the sub-contractor for the road) held up the down-post near Nou Gumbaz, carrying off all parcels and tearing up letters.

The postal service, which was affected by the "kasids" mounted on animals owned or hired by them, was unsatisfactory, mails frequently employing ten to twelve days to traverse the distance (about 200 miles) between Ispahan and Yezd.

Sultanabad-Kermanshah-Hamadan Roads.

These were in normal condition during the first fortnight of January, after which arrivals and departures of merchandise fell off for two or three weeks, but pilgrim caravans continued to arrive from Kermanshah. There were large arrivals from Hamadan during the first week in February. Transport conditions continued normal up to the middle of March. A robbery occurred on the 13th March at Ab-i-Anjil (some 12 miles north-west of Ispahan), when twenty-three mules and sixteen loads were reported to have been carried off by a small band of robbers on foot. The Ispahan authorities failed to recover the goods, though they claimed to have obtained a clue to their whereabouts. This robbery and the report received about the same time of an extensive robbery under the very eyes of the Burujird authorities near that place, the merchants of which enlisted the support of those of Ispahan in telegraphing a protest to the Central Government, caused an almost total cessation of transport of merchandise over these roads during the last half of March.

No. 234.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 10, 1913.

FROM all the reports that have reached me from the acting British consul at Shiraz, and which have been forwarded on to you telegraphically or by post, it would

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appear that there is at the present moment some ground for hope that the not distant future may bring a real change for the better in the local situation in Fars which has been such a constant cause of anxiety for a long time past. The unfortunate incident that occurred on the 11th December last near Dastarjin, which cost the late Captain Eckford his life, may be said to have brought home to the Persian Government that no more time must be lost in taking steps to endeavour seriously to bring about a restoration of order.

It is hard to point to any definite action, or even scheme of action, on the part of the Persian Government which may be held to have contributed directly to the establishment of a better state of affairs, but a concatenation of events would appear to have combined to work for this end. Shortly before the deeply-regretted outrage, to which allusion has been made above, a new Governor-General, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, had arrived at Shiraz. His Excellency was fortunately free from all trammels of local incidence, and was consequently in a position to examine the problem with a dispassionate eye. He was perhaps lucky in that he arrived at a moment when the lately imposed Ilkhani of the Kashgais, Sardar Ihtesham, had been forced to resign that post, a fact which enabled him, without unduly creating bad blood, to recommend the reinstatement of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, who has now made his submission to the Government and has promised to perform faithful service to them. This solution of a thorny tribal question was at the same time facilitated by the change of Cabinet at Tehran, which placed Ain-ed-Dowleh at the Home Office, that Kajar Prince having long had a close understanding with Soulet.

As you are aware, there has long been a blood feud between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Kavam-ul-Mulk, who is probably the most powerful local magnate in Fars, and who had occupied the post of Acting Governor for many months previous to the arrival of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh. The new Governor-General must have often chafed under the position of semi-inferiority in which he found himself as towards Kavam-ul-Mulk, whose position was such that persons who desired to enter into relations with Mukhber-es-Sultaneh sought his approval before doing so. The Governor-General was fully alive to this, and complained to the acting British consul of his anomalous position, but his Excellency would appear to have displayed admirable patience and self-control, in the hope that the Central Government might find some suitable post for Kavam outside Fars. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior declared themselves genuinely desirous of doing this, but stated that no post was vacant. Behind this excuse may well have been the feeling of uncertainty as to whether or no Mukhber-es-Sultaneh would prove a success, coupled with the wish, in the event of his being declared a failure, to keep on the spot the one man capable of carrying on the administration pending the appointment of a new Governor-General.

Seeing that there was no probability of Kavam's leaving the province, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh wisely made up his mind that he would be safer and better employed in doing some active work outside Shiraz than in remaining idle in the city, where he could not fail to be a centre of intrigue. His Excellency, therefore, fell in with a plan, suggested originally by Kavam himself, by which that useful but disturbing personage was put at the head of an expedition under the ægis of the Governor-General, the duty of which would be to punish certain Khamseh tribes, more especially the Baharlus, who frequent the south-eastern and eastern districts of the province. It would appear that this expedition has met with no small measure of success, and has retrieved a disaster to Government arms that took place near Darab some four years ago, since which time all semblance of Government authority over the districts in question had disappeared. There is, of course, a danger that Kavam-ul-Mulk, when he returns as a conqueror, may become a more dangerous factor than before, but there would appear reason to believe that the Governor-General, who has now won the assured support of the Central Government and the co-operation of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, may, on Kavam's return, find himself so securely established as to be able to assume his proper position and make full use of Kavam's services. As a means to this end rumour has it that a reconciliation has been effected between the two important chiefs, a truce that will, presumably, only last as long as it is in their mutual interests that it should continue to do so, or, in other words, as long as the Governor-General, by virtue of his own personality or of the open support of the Central Government and His Majesty's Legation, is recognised as the most important factor in the province.

The arrival of a strong force of 1,000 gendarmes will do much to confirm the Governor-General's prestige, and there is good reason to believe that the fact that they have marched down to Bushire and brought back an important caravan of arms and ammunition has made a great impression locally. This feeling cannot fail to be

increased after the arrival of the detachment now on its way to Shiraz from Tehran, whose military bearing was most favourably commented upon here. Provided that the Swedish officers do not show themselves over-zealous, and exercise patience and tact in their dealings with the Governor-General, there is, I think, sound reason for hoping that the gendarmerie may not only win the confidence of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, and by so doing disarm his Excellency's innate suspicion of foreign interference, but may assist materially to restore order and facilitate the collection of revenue. As you are aware, Sir, I impressed very earnestly on Colonel Hjalmarson, before he proceeded to Shiraz, that it was in the highest degree essential that he should work in co-operation with Mukhber-es-Sultaneh.

It was generally agreed, I think, by all persons who know the true situation on the Shiraz-Bushire road that it would be almost impossible for the gendarmes to bring back the arms caravan from Bushire unless some understanding were come to between the colonel commanding and the headmen on the road, and much of the anxiety connected with the safety of that caravan, upon which the immediate failure or success of the Swedish Mission may be said to have hinged, was due to a not unnatural doubt as to whether or no the colonel would prove himself diplomatically, as the French would say, "à la hauteur de la situation." It would appear, in my humble opinion, from all the information in my possession, that the colonel fully rose to the situation. Before leaving Tehran he furnished himself with letters from important personages outside the Government, recommending him to the good offices of the leading men with whom he was likely to be brought in contact in connection with the road. It is clear from Mukhber's attitude towards him that he must have sought and acted upon his advice, and best of all he kept his own counsel. He refrained from divulging the actual nature of the arrangements he had made, or proposed to make, in his conversations with His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz, and it would appear that he did not even confide to his own second in command what he had actually done.

The acting British consul at Shiraz and the Governor-General were, however, of opinion that a better solution of this difficult question could be arrived at by enlisting the services of a certain number of the dependants of the khans as road guards, who would be paid by the gendarmerie and be to a certain extent controlled by them. This system has been established on the section between Shiraz and Kazerun, and would appear to be working satisfactorily. I am advised, however, by Mr. Smart, until recently acting British consul at Shiraz, that there are no big headmen on this part of the road, and that there must be some doubt as to how far the more powerful khans lower down the road will accept an arrangement that must affect their pockets, unless the payment of the road guards enlisted is made through them. In this case they would, doubtless, take care to deduct sufficient from their men's pay to recoup themselves, with the inevitable result that the men themselves, being underpaid, would again resort to robbery. Major Siefert, the officer in command of the Fars gendarmerie, would appear to favour the scheme for the enlistment of road guards, and to have already put it into practice on certain sections south of Kazerun, and also to have placed gendarmerie posts on the southern half of the road. It is reported that certain of the headmen are demanding the appointment of an inordinate number of road guards at an exorbitant rate of pay. This was but to be expected, and it is improbable that any hard and fast scheme can be put in practice all at once; but there would seem reason to hope that we may see a marked improvement before long, and that as the gendarmerie acquire a firmer hold the abuses which have militated so seriously against British trade may tend to gradually disappear.

It would be unreasonable to expect that order will be created out of chaos at a moment's notice, and we must wait some months yet before security is really established; but I must own that I have been most agreeably surprised at the reports I have received, whilst not allowing myself, in this country of disappointments, to build too much upon what the future may have in store for us. Major O'Connor reports that the tribal migration is passing off in an orderly and quiet manner unprecedented in late years, and that brisk trading is being carried on. I think it is but fair to attribute his full share of credit to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh for this improved state of affairs, although, as far as I am aware, it would be hard to point to any actual fact that has revealed his skill as an administrator. It would, perhaps, be just to his Excellency to credit him with working quietly and unostentatiously to reconcile the diverse interests at variance and generally promote the welfare of the province.

Some short time ago an announcement was made in the London press by the Persian Legation, to the effect that the Bakhtiaris under Amir Mujahed, Governor of Behbahan, had totally defeated the Boir Ahmadi, Mamasenni, and others of the

Kuhgilui tribe that had been the authors of the outrages on Mr. Smart and Captain Eckford, had destroyed their towers, and generally administered condign punishment. I have alluded to these feats of arms in previous despatches, and have stated that the Persian Government appeared to believe in their reality. The Bakhtiari khans have repeatedly reproached me for my air of scepticism about these reports, to which I have always replied that I accepted them with an open mind, but that the figures of killed and wounded appeared to me excessive, and that I must await a confirmation of the good news before giving it full belief. It is clear that the force despatched by Amir Mujahed must have done some work, although, beyond rumours, and despite the fact that the tribal movement should have allowed confirmation of the Bakhtiari reports of victories gained to be confirmed, I have received nothing that allows me to place too much faith in the seriousness of the measures executed—indeed, I notice a distinct tendency on the part of Captain Grey, the vice-consul at Ahwaz, not to attach much credence to these tales from beyond the mountains.

Finally, I should like to state that I feel convinced that the small sum of 15,000*l.*, which His Majesty's Government advanced last December for the financial requirements of the Fars administration, was of incalculable value in assisting Mukhber-es-Sultaneh to maintain his administrative activity. The actual money was of the greatest assistance, but it is probable that the knowledge that the Governor-General had the support of His Majesty's Government was of even greater value, on account of the moral effect produced. Time will probably show that the determination to withdraw the Central India Horse and the Rajputs will bear even more important fruit in the pacification of the province. Thanks to the excellent bearing of the men, they would appear to have made themselves quite popular at Shiraz, but they nevertheless remained a foreign force in a foreign land, and no small credit must accrue to Mukhber-es-Sultaneh in public estimation for the fact that the troops were withdrawn under his auspices, even if it is realised that the fact had nothing to do with him. It is argued here, and probably still more strongly at Shiraz, that the withdrawal took place because there was no longer any need for the presence of the troops. This assertion necessitates a belief that no small measure of order had been re-established, and, when once such a belief gains ground, it is not impossible that the belief will grow into a reality.

Although it is possible that the name of Ain-ed-Dowleh may have lost some of its quondam power in the provinces, still I am of opinion that his presence at the Home Office has been in no small measure responsible for the improvement that is noticeable in the south, as in other parts of Persia. I was struck, during a recent conversation with His Highness, about certain differences that have sprung up between Mukhber-es-Sultaneh and Movagger-ed-Dowleh, the Governor of Bushire, with the confident manner in which he spoke of his ability to effect a reconciliation, as if he realised that, in spite of constitutional changes, he could count upon the word of Kajar Prince and former Sadr Azam obtaining a hearing.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 235.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 12, 1913.

AS you have been made aware by recent telegraphic correspondence, the Salar-ed-Dowleh question threatens to again become acute and it is much to be feared that its settlement will cost the Persian Government money that can ill be spared. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the whole history of the case with which you are familiar, but it is worth noting that His Highness was actually once more a rebel in arms at Sabsewar on the road to Meshed when he decided that the game was up and that for the time being, at all events, his best policy would be to agree to the Persian proposals, accept the Governorship of Gilan and return to Asterabad. At the moment that the Prince reached this wise decision he was at the head of an infinitesimal force of badly-armed followers and Amir Azam dominated him with a much superior force of Government troops.

Even then Salar did not accept the situation with a good grace but returned to Asterabad in a very sullen frame of mind and without in any way having made a

genuine act of submission to the Government, which he has never ceased to treat with contumely and disrespect. Once arrived in safer quarters, the Prince made various quite unacceptable demands concerning the presence of a large escort of Russian Cossacks in attendance upon him during all the time he should remain at Resht and, though he nominally disbanded his followers, he let it be clearly known that they would follow him to Resht overland. The Russian consul at Asterabad reported most unfavourably about him, and the feeling grew on all sides that he would prove an impossible Governor, whilst protest after protest reached the Government against his appointment which was practically vetoed by the Regent.

It was most unfortunate that the Government ever allowed themselves to be persuaded into agreeing to appoint the ex-rebel to Resht but they did so under great pressure, whilst I do not think that it can fairly be maintained, when all the facts of the case are known and impartially examined, that His Highness did really carry out the conditions made, although a good case can be made out in his favour if no count is taken of his persistent discourtesy and want of submission to the Tehran Government.

I am personally of opinion that he never intended to go to Resht, and I think the Government made a mistake in not forcing his hand by making it easier for him to proceed there. It is clear that he has now much loftier ambitions and would not accept the post except under strong Russian pressure, under which it is also probable that he would proceed to Europe.

Unfortunately the situation would now appear to necessitate the despatch of an expedition from Tehran to subdue the Prince and restore order among the disaffected Turkomans that have rallied to him. Such an expedition is now being prepared. It will be composed of 450 Bakhtiari horsemen under the command of Salar Bahadur, and will be assisted by two Schneider and two Maxim guns. The Government were most anxious that Sardar Bahadur should put himself at the head of this force but he has been obliged to decline to do so as he cannot leave Tehran at the present moment on account of urgent private and official affairs that demand his presence at the capital. Were he in command of the Bakhtiari force it would guarantee both the military efficiency of the same and the good conduct of the sowars. He assures me that the khan put at their head is quite able to conclude the operations successfully and, in answer to my representation, guarantees that the sowars will behave themselves and will not acquire such an undesirable reputation for pillage as has been won by former Bakhtiari detachments.

Alternative proposals have been put forward in order to avoid, if possible, the despatch of an expedition, but as the success of either of them would entail the departure of Salar for Europe I have small hope of their coming to much. One idea is that Salar should leave an Acting Governor at Resht and go on leave, the other entails a more compulsory departure from Persian soil in return for which the Persian Government would agree to the establishment of a Cossack detachment at Resht, but they also stipulate that in this case the Russian troops in Talishi, Resht and Kazvin shall be withdrawn. I am of opinion that under existing circumstances there is no longer any need for the presence of the troops at Kazvin as, with the growth of the gendarmerie and the reorganisation of the police under Swedish instructors, there is to-day much less reason to fear disturbances at Tehran than has been the case in the past. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires does not entirely share this view although he agrees that the situation is more assured whilst the streets are no longer infested by truculent mujaheds ostentatiously handling Mauser pistols.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 236.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of the note which I addressed to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 16th April, offering the Imperial Government an advance of 100,000*l.* for the financial requirements of the Fars gendarmerie. My action in this matter has been based upon the instructions contained in your telegram of the 11th April and previous telegraphic instructions. I have also the honour to enclose translations of the replies received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and copies of the letters that I subsequently addressed to the Treasurer-General and the manager

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of the Bank of Persia, advising them of the arrangement made, together with copies of their answers.

The advance to the gendarmerie has raised a question concerning the financial requirements of that administration which will require careful examination. As you, sir, are aware, Ala-es-Sultaneh gave me to understand last January that he had ascertained, after consultation with Colonel Hjalmarson, that a sum of 350,000*l.* would be required to finance the Fars scheme for three years. Having ascertained that this figure was considered to be more than sufficient for the purpose, I suggested that an advance of 100,000*l.* would serve to meet the requirements of the first year. Barely a month later, Colonel Hjalmarson produced a new scheme designed to cover an increase of the gendarmerie for the whole of Persia, raising the numbers of the force to 8,000 men, and entailing an annual expenditure of 400,000*l.* Under the new scheme, the force to be employed in Fars was raised to 3,300 men, at a cost of 344,000*l.* for two years.

The new scheme received somewhat cursory attention because it was not supposed that it would be put into execution without the approval of the Persian Government, which I thought would certainly hesitate before agreeing to a proposal that made such a heavy demand upon the slender financial resources of the country. It is more than probable that the project was never examined closely, and in any case no answer was returned. The Swedes taking silence as equivalent to consent, or not being willing to wait the usual six months for a Persian answer, have at once set to work to recruit on the increased scale, and have presented financial requisitions in accordance with the new budget, which would appear never to have been submitted at all to the Treasurer-General.

The Government are quite prepared to put a large sum aside for the gendarmerie out of the joint advances, which may serve to supply the necessary funds for six or eight months, but it is hard to see from what quarter the money for the upkeep of the enlarged force will come when the money laid aside from the advances is finished. The Treasurer-General is of opinion that there cannot be too many gendarmes, and is optimistic about finding funds for their maintenance. I entirely agree with M. Mornard that the gendarmerie force should be as large as circumstances will allow, but it appears to me that some caution must be exercised or we shall run the risk of finding a force that promises to render invaluable assistance, suddenly brought to naught for want of money. Regular pay has proved so far the secret of their success.

I propose to go into the whole matter fully and carefully after the return of Colonel Hjalmarson to Tehran, and shall have the honour to report to you further on the subject.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 236.

Sir W. Townley to Vossuk-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, April 16, 1913.

AS your Excellency is aware his Highness Ala-es-Sultaneh called upon me on the 11th January last for the purpose of requesting me to urge His Majesty's Government to make an advance of 350,000*l.* to the Imperial Government for the purpose of establishing and maintaining for three years a gendarmerie force in the province of Fars capable of establishing order upon the important trade-route that runs through that province. His Highness suggested that the advance should be repayable from the large loan that the Persian Government hoped to negotiate at an early date. His Highness intimated that this money would be set aside by the Treasurer-General of Persia at the complete disposal of Colonel Hjalmarson, the chief instructor of the gendarmerie, and would be entirely allocated to the requirements of public security in Fars, and expressed a hope that His Majesty's Government would make an immediate advance of half the sum required.

I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that I am authorised by Sir E. Grey to place 100,000*l.* at the disposal of the Imperial Government. The money to be placed to a separate account at the Imperial Bank of Persia entitled "Trésorier général : Gendarmerie de Fars" and to be available in monthly instalments of 8,000*l.* to be remitted by the Treasurer-General to the competent gendarmerie officers by arrangement with Colonel Hjalmarson.

It is understood that this advance will be repayable out of the large loan when negotiated; that it will be secured upon the surplus of the Southern Customs; that it will bear interest at 7 per cent. per annum; and that, in the event of no loan being made, it will be repayable from the surplus revenues of the above-named Customs in due course, and after the previous advances made by His Majesty's Government amounting in all to 340,000*l.* have been liquidated.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 236.

Vossuk-ed-Dowleh to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

May 1, 1913.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your note of the 16th ultimo, respecting the visit your Excellency had received from His Highness the Ala-es-Sultaneh on the 11th January last, requesting an advance for the special expenses of the Fars gendarmerie, and beg to state that I am grateful for the good-will shown by His Britannic Majesty's Government in making the advance of 100,000*l.*, the whole of which will be devoted to the gendarmerie in Fars and what is necessary for the general security of that province. The Persian Government accept the mode of expenditure, and the method of repayment, and the security for interest on the advance as laid down in your note, and it is trusted that the amount in question will be placed at the disposal of the Persian Government as soon as possible in order that it may be spent on the objects stated.

I avail, &c.
VOSSUK-ED-DOWLEH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 236.

Sir W. Townley to M. Mornard.

M. le Trésorier général,

Téhéran, le 6 mai, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que je viens de mettre à votre disposition à la Banque Impériale dans des conditions indiquées en dessous une somme de 100,000*l.*, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a avancée au Gouvernement Impérial de Perse pour les besoins financiers de la section de la gendarmerie gouvernementale spécialement désignée pour opérer dans la province de Fars, dans le but d'y rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité sur la grande route commerciale qui traverse la province susmentionnée.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est déclaré d'accord que cette somme soit mise dans un compte à part à la Banque Impériale de Perse intitulé "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars," qu'elle ne sera disponible que par versements mensuels de 8,000*l.* chacun, et que cet argent sera remis mensuellement par vos soins aux officiers compétents de la gendarmerie, d'accord avec le Colonel Hjalmarson, instructeur en chef de la gendarmerie gouvernementale. Il a été aussi convenu que l'usage de cette argent sera placé sous votre contrôle et que vous autoriserez les paiements qui doivent se faire après consultation avec le susmentionné instructeur en chef.

Cette avance sera remboursable dès qu'un gros emprunt sera réalisé par le Gouvernement persan; elle est assurée sur l'excédent des revenus des douanes du sud et portera intérêt au taux de 7 pour cent par an. Dans le cas où un emprunt ne serait pas négocié, l'avance sera remboursée de l'excédent des douanes du sud en temps utile, et après que les autres avances récemment faites au Gouvernement persan par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique (dont le montant est de 340,000*l.*) auront été liquidées. Le remboursement se fera de la même manière, soit à raison de paiements semestriels de 50,000*l.*, que celle qui a été établie pour l'avance nouvellement faite.

Je vous prie, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

[1111]

H 4

(Translation.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 6, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have just placed at your disposal at the Imperial Bank, under the conditions indicated below, a sum of 100,000L., which His Britannic Majesty's Government have advanced to the Imperial Persian Government for the financial requirements of the Government gendarmerie specially intended to operate in the province of Fars, in order to re-establish good order and tranquillity upon the great trade route which crosses that province.

The Imperial Government have declared their readiness that this sum shall be placed in a separate account at the Imperial Bank of Persia entitled "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars," that it shall be only available in monthly instalments of 8,000L. each, and that this money shall be remitted monthly through your good offices to the competent officers of the gendarmerie, with the approval of Colonel Hjalmarson, chief instructor of the Government gendarmerie. It has also been agreed that the use of this money shall be placed under your control, and that you shall authorise the necessary payments after consultation with the above-mentioned instructor-in-chief.

This advance will be repayable as soon as a large loan has been obtained by the Persian Government; it is secured on the surplus of the southern customs revenues, and will bear interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum. In the event of no loan being negotiated, the advance shall be repaid from the surplus of the southern customs revenue in due course, and after the other advances recently made to the Persian Government by His Britannic Majesty's Government (amounting to 340,000L.) have been liquidated. The repayment shall be made in the same manner, namely, by half-yearly payments of 50,000L., as that arranged in the case of the newly-made advance.

I am, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

 Enclosure 4 in No. 236.
M. Mornard to Sir W. Townley.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 8 mai, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 6 mai courant ainsi conçu :—

[Here follows the whole of the letter which forms Enclosure No. 3.]

En vous marquant mon accord complet sur les conditions posées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, tant en ce qui concerne la façon dont l'avance de 100,000L. doit être utilisée sous mon contrôle, qu'au sujet du mode de remboursement ultérieur, je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que la Banque Impériale a déjà crédité la Trésorerie générale du montant en krans de la susdite avance, en compte spécial intitulé "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars."

Je vous prie, &c.
Le Trésorier général,
MORNARD.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 8, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, which runs as follows :—

[Here follows the whole of the letter which forms Enclosure No. 3.]

While hereby putting on record my complete approval of the conditions laid down by His Britannic Majesty's Government, both as regards the method in which the advance of 100,000L. shall be utilised under my control, and as regards the method of eventual repayment, I hasten to inform you that the Imperial Bank has already credited the Treasury-General with the amount in krans of the above-mentioned advance, in a special account entitled "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars."

I am, &c.

MORNARD, *Treasurer-General.*

Enclosure 5 in No. 236.

Sir W. Townley to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Tehran, May 6, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to request you to place to the credit of the Treasurer-General in a separate account as described below the sum of 100,000*l.*, which you have lately received as per your letter of the 16th ultimo to my order. This money has been advanced by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government to meet the financial requirements of the gendarmerie employed in the province of Fars. It has been agreed that it shall be placed in a separate account denominated "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars," and that it shall be only available in monthly instalments of 8,000*l.* each. The money is repayable out of a loan when made, is secured upon the surplus of the Southern Customs, out of which interest at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum is to be paid. In the event of no loan being made before 1915, this advance will become repayable after the advances previously made, which amount to 340,000*l.*, have been liquidated, and by the same half-yearly instalments of 50,000*l.*, as has been established for the repayment of the former advances until such time as the whole sum shall have been repaid.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 6 in No. 236.

Imperial Bank of Persia to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

May 6, 1913.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of to-day's date, the contents of which have had our attention.

The amount of 100,000*l.* has now been placed to the credit of an account, "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars," and we note that the amount is only available in monthly instalments of 8,000*l.* We shall, however, be greatly obliged if you will kindly inform us when the first transfer is to be effected, and under whose order. Please also inform us if the interest at the rate of 7 per cent. is to be charged on the whole amount of 100,000*l.* as from to-day.

Thanking you in advance, we have, &c.

D. BROWN, *Acting Chief Manager.*

Enclosure 7 in No. 236.

Sir W. Townley to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

Tehran, May 6, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of even date, upon the subject of the manner and date upon which the first transfer of the 100,000*l.* placed to the credit of the Treasurer-General in a separate account, entitled "Trésorier général: Gendarmerie de Fars," is to be effected, I beg to state that from this date M. Mornard, the Treasurer-General, has full authority to draw upon this account for the sum of 8,000*l.*, and that on the 1st June and 1st of each succeeding month he will be entitled to draw upon the account up to the sum of 8,000*l.*, until the total amount deposited shall have been exhausted. As I understand the wishes of His Majesty's Government, interest at 7 per cent. per annum will be charged upon the whole amount of 100,000*l.* as from to-day, but M. Mornard will be at liberty to make such an arrangement with you as he can respecting the interest on that portion of the gross sum as will remain in your hands on deposit.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 237.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the summary of events in Persia for the four weeks ending to-day.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

 Enclosure in No. 237.

Summary of Events in Persia for the four Weeks ending May 13, 1913.

Tehran.

MR. NADALNY, an official of the German Foreign Office, sent from Berlin on a special mission to Urmia to investigate the claims of Mr. Neumann, a German subject, paid a short visit to Tehran after the accomplishment of his mission and left for Berlin on the 5th May.

The Cabinet.—The resignations of Mushir-ed-Dowleh and Mutemin-ul-Mulk have become definitive, but they have not yet been replaced at the Ministries of Education and Commerce respectively. Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh has also resigned the portfolio of Justice, but he remains in the Cabinet, and will probably exercise the nominal functions of Minister of Commerce. There has been considerable discord in the Cabinet, mainly between Ain-ed-Dowleh and his adherents and Vossuk-ed-Dowleh and his adherents. At present peace has been, at least outwardly, restored.

Gendarmerie.—The second detachment of the gendarmerie expeditionary force for Shiraz left Tehran, with Swedish officers and Maxim guns, on the 23rd April. The detachment, about 500 strong, was reviewed on the Cossack parade ground a few days before its departure in the presence of the Shah, the Cabinet Ministers, and the diplomatic corps. The review aroused much enthusiasm among all classes of Persians, who had watched a Persian Cossack review on the previous day with marked indifference.

Mujaheds.—The mujaheds, who had left Tehran on a free-booting expedition, have returned to the capital and surrendered their arms in return for a promise of amnesty and employment in Government service. This settlement was largely effected by Ain-ed-Dowleh.

Gilan and Mazanderan.

It was reported last month that Salar-ed-Dowleh had sent a small force to Sari, the capital of Mazaderan. Though this was subsequently officially denied, and though it was said that the force is in the neighbourhood of Barfarush, the rumour that Salar had captured Sari proved correct. The Central Government is making arrangements for the despatch of a Bakhtiari force of 450 men from Tehran to operate against the rebels in Mazanderan.

Meshed.

Colonel Drozdovski, who has been in command of the Russian troops since last August, has been replaced by Colonel Khakandov, a former commandant of the Turkoman division.

The party of Indian cavalry, while *en route* to Meshed to relieve the consular escort there, captured and brought into Meshed one Seyyid Hasan, a brigand, and five of his followers. His Majesty's consul-general, in conjunction with his Russian colleague, is trying to ensure a proper trial.

Ispahan.

Robberies and acts of aggression in the town and environs are reported to be on the increase. This apparently is to a great extent due to the inefficiency of the police,

who are underpaid. It is alleged that the Governor-General appropriates a large portion of the sum paid by the Central Government for the maintenance of the police for his private use.

The party of Government gendarmerie, strength about 170 cavalry and 280 infantry with a machine gun section, which left Tehran on the 23rd and the 24th April, has passed through Ispahan *en route* to Shiraz.

Yezd.

According to the Treasury agent the Governor-General has completed the collection of last year's revenues, and has now commenced collecting those for the current year. A party of 160 Kashi sowers have lately arrived in Yezd, and His Majesty's vice-consul thinks it probable that the Governor will employ them in collecting taxes.

There appears to be a certain amount of friction in the Parsi community, as cases are now frequently taken to the Mahommedan courts instead of to the Anjuman as formerly.

The fate of the brigand Taimur, who was captured last March, has not yet been settled.

Shiraz.

The 39th Central India Horse and the detachment of the 7th Rajputs, who left Shiraz on the 6th April, reached Bushire without incident, and a caravan of some 1,500 rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition for the Government gendarmerie, arrived safely at Shiraz from Bushire at the end of last month.

The scarcity of bread in Shiraz has been prevalent for some time past, and on the 9th May, the mob outside the bakers' shops became so unruly that ten women and children were crushed to death. The crowd, carrying the bodies, then proceeded to the Governor's house, and afterwards to the consulate, where they asked to be allowed to take bast. The acting British consul promised to represent their grievances to the Governor, and they went off quietly.

The acting British consul reported on the 8th May, that fighting was proceeding between Mahommed Ali Khan Kashkuli and his nephew, in the neighbourhood of Tangi Turkan.

Seistan.

The Baluchi raiding party, mentioned in last month's summary as having started for the Kainat, is reported to have looted a caravan of some 80 to 100 camels and to be still at large. Also, a flour convoy, accompanied by some servants of the Telegraph Department, was attacked by robbers near Koarak. The department servants were kept as prisoners for seven days, but were not otherwise ill-treated.

Since Noruz, owing to the introduction of new taxes and to the enhancement of existing ones, there has been a great deal of discontent against the Belgian officials. On the 29th March this culminated in a large mob of towns-people and villagers collecting outside the custom-house and breaking the windows. M. Paquet, the Customs director, asked His Majesty's consul to use his influence to appease the people. The crowd, which was perfectly friendly to His Majesty's consul and his party, allowed him to enter M. Paquet's house, where he was later joined by the Deputy Governor, the karguzar and two of the leading mullahs. The Deputy Governor's guard of some sixty to seventy men dispersed the crowd; and thanks to the intervention of His Majesty's consul and to the influence of the mullahs, the people decided, for the time being at any rate, to take no further active measures. Matters, however, seem to have reached an impasse, unless the Customs authorities are satisfied with the collection of revenue at the old rates, as the revenue gendarmes are not strong enough at present to enforce payments on the new system.

Kerman.

The Governor-General, with a force of 800 men and three guns, is on tour in the province. He is reported to have left Bam on the 6th April.

Kermanshah.

The state of the town and province is the same as reported in last month's summary.

On the 10th April, fifteen Turkish soldiers arrived at Kermanshah as a consular guard, without the permission of the Persian authorities. At their first attempt to cross the frontier, they were arrested and disarmed; but Farman Farma gave the Persian frontier guards orders to restore the arms and to conduct the Turks back into their own territory. This was done, but the Turks made a detour and evading the frontier guards managed to reach Kermanshah.

There has been some fighting of late between Arabs and Sinjabis in Turkish territory; but, according to the latest information, the Kaïmakam of Khanikin, and Samsam-el-Mamalek, who is in charge of the Kasr-i-Shirin district, have arranged a truce between the contending parties.

Bushire.

The Central India Horse and the detachment of the 7th Rajputs arrived at Bushire on the 16th April, and the former left for India a few days later.

No. 238.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 3, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 31st May: Possible raid by Kuhgeluis on oilfields.

At the end of March, British vice-consul at Ahwaz, in discussing this question, advocated arming of staff. Their position is suitable, as they are situated on an isolated hill with a storage tank for water, and they have two houses capable of being put in a state of defence.

Sir P. Cox concurred, but wished no action taken for the time being.

In reply to my telegram, repeating to him your telegram under reply, he says:—

“There being no captured rifles available, Government of India are willing to loan seventy Martini-Metford carbines with ammunition. Meanwhile I am asking the Government of India to have arms despatched to consul concerned.”

No. 239.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 3, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

The Prince has suddenly landed near Resht with a force of some seventy men, having taken ship from a port on the Caspian. It is possible that he will enter Resht to-night or to-morrow. The Persian Government maintain that, as Russian troops are in occupation of Resht, they are unable to send a force against him themselves. The Regent will, of course, refuse to return to Persia if Resht falls into Salar's hands, and it may even be that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is now *en route* for Resht, will be caught by the enemy.

The fact that the Russian Government have just consented to the appointment of a Governor-General for Gilan complicates the situation.

A grandson of Sipahdar was killed by Salar's followers near Tounekabun whilst disputing with his men the passage of the rebels through that district, much of which is the property of Sipahdar.

No. 240.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 8th instant and to my telegram of the 26th April upon the subject of the measures to be taken by the gendarmerie to endeavour to restore order and abolish abuses on the Shiraz-Bushire road, I have the honour to report that I have been in further telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's

consul-general at Bushire and the acting British consul at Shiraz on this subject. It appears that Sir Percy Cox is sceptical about the ultimate success of the gendarmerie, whereas Major O'Connor would appear to entertain hopes that the scheme that has been elaborated with the assistance of the Governor-General, the financial agent, and himself will prove successful. There must of course be no small element of doubt about the carrying out of such measures as those contemplated under the peculiarly difficult conditions, but I am disposed to think that it augurs well for the future that the plan has been thought out by all the authorities in Shiraz most competent to tackle the problem, and it appears to me especially satisfactory that full advantage should have been taken, as it has been, of the Governor-General's knowledge of the situation and of the Persian mind, and that all arrangements should have been made in consultation with his Excellency. Major O'Connor is of opinion that the Swedish officers have not neglected their opportunities, and have benefited by the experience they have gained.

I had a long conversation to-day with Sardar Assad upon this subject. He has now become totally blind, and was somewhat despondent about the divisions in the Cabinet, but he expressed a firm belief in the early restoration of order on the Shiraz-Bushire road, based upon faith in the gendarmerie and upon the fact that his latest information went to show that the potency for harm of the Baharloos, Arabs, and Boir Ahmediş had received a severe check at the hands of Kawam-ul-Mulk and Amir Mujahed, whilst all parties were rallying to the side of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh now that they realised that his Excellency has the genuine support of His Majesty's Government. Were that relaxed, he said, the present Cabinet would be as lukewarm in backing him up as were the preceding feeble Administrations.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 241.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 4, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 3rd June.

The Persian Government announce the practical annihilation of Salar-ed-Dowleh's forces. The battle is reported to have been carried on during three days. Sipahdar's grandson was killed during the fighting. Salar made his escape to Resht, but did not enter the town, and subsequently continued his retreat in the direction of Talish and Ardebil. His followers only numbered thirty. The Persian Government say that they are determined to finish with the Prince this time, and they are preparing an encircling movement in which the Cossacks and Bakhtiari are engaged with a view to preventing his return either to Mazanderan or Kurdistan.

No. 242.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 5, 1913.

PERSIAN Transport Company have been warned by Ispahan agent of impending trouble in Bakhtiari country by Kuhgeluis, and suspension of traffic is strongly recommended.

In view of appointment of Sardar Jang for protection of road, shippers have regarded risk as minimised, and large quantity of goods are now in transit.

You should urge on both Persian Government and Bakhtiari khans the need for securing safety of road.

No. 243.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 6, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 5th June: Kuhgeluis and Ahwaz-Ispahan road.

I have already made strong representations respecting the maintenance of order

on the Bakhtiari road, and urgent telegrams have been sent to khans responsible for the road by senior khans here. Amir Mujahid would appear to be the chief cause of danger, as he is stirring up trouble for Jang, and is believed to be inciting the Kuhgeluis to raid the road. At my instigation imperative instructions have been sent to him to come immediately to Tehran.

I am not personally pessimistic about the state of the road, which Jang, with whom I am in direct communication, assures me will be kept open, but I cannot speak hopefully or encourage anything but caution in view of reports received from the British vice-consul at Ahwaz, now at Ispahan.

No. 244.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 7, 1913.

ACTING British consul at Tabriz telegraphs as follows under date of the 6th June:—

“I have the honour to report the arrival here from the Caucasus on the 4th June of General Irman, commanding the 3rd Army Corps. The general, who is on a tour of inspection, will leave for Urmia on the 7th June and will travel by Maragha, where Shuja-ed-Dowleh is reported to have ordered great preparations for his reception to be made.”

No. 245.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 8, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

My telegram of the 4th June.

It would appear that Salar is trying to return to Kurdistan and Kermanshah; as he is making for Zenjan. He is said to have a very small following, and the Persian Government say that they will make a determined attempt to cut him off. But it is not improbable that this elusive Prince may escape yet another time to create disorders among the tribes of Kurdistan, who would still seem to place some faith in his ultimate success.

No. 246.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 9, 1913.

EXPEDITION against Tangistan coast.

Your telegram of the 30th May.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire telegraphs as follows:—

“It has been arranged that His Majesty's ships will take action to-morrow as proposed. I have informed the Governor, who tells me officially that, as Tangistan has not yet been placed under his jurisdiction, he does not think it advisable to send a representative.

“I am therefore bringing our intended action to the notice of the Governor-General of Fars.”

I have to-day addressed an official communication to the Persian Government informing them of our plan of operations.

No. 247.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 9, 1913.

BAKHTIARI road.

My telegram of the 6th June.

Captain Grey, in camp at Ispahan, telegraphs under date of the 9th June :—

“Sardar-i-Jang begs me to assure you that the road will remain safe. He writes to me from Malamir under date of the 30th May to the effect that he was then awaiting the arrival of 300 Bahmai and Tebi guards, whom he will station on the Malamir-Shalil section of the road. Bakhtiari guards will be stationed on the Shalil-Depoulan section.”

No. 248.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, June 11, 1913.

REGENT.

I have received memorandum from the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing his willingness to receive the Persian Regent informally at St. Petersburg, provided that his visit takes place as soon as possible, and at any rate not later than towards the end of June.

No. 249.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 12, 1913.

MR. O'BEIRNE'S telegram of 11th June: Regent of Persia.

You should inform the Regent that I am prepared to receive his Highness informally at an early date, and on the distinct understanding that he returns to Persia directly after the interviews and does not defer his return.

No. 250.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 13.)

Sir,

Paris, June 12, 1913.

WITH reference to your telegram of to-day, I have the honour to acquaint you that the Russian Ambassador having informed me yesterday that M. Sazonof would be willing to receive the Regent of Persia informally, I arranged with his Highness that he should meet me at the Russian Embassy.

I told the Regent that you would consent to receive him informally on the distinct understanding that he would return to Persia directly after the interviews with yourself and with M. Sazonof, who, as the Russian Ambassador stated, would be ready to receive him also informally on the same condition.

M. Iswolsky said that M. Sazonof would not be at St. Petersburg until after the 15th instant.

I asked the Nasr-ul-Mulk whether I could assure you on his behalf that he would return to Persia immediately after the interviews, and whether he would be accompanied to London and St. Petersburg by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, his Highness had told the Russian Ambassador and myself, was on his way to Europe. The Regent replied that he had been in telegraphic correspondence with the Persian Government in regard to the visit to Europe of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it appeared that his Excellency had no political mission. His visit was solely for reasons of health. Such being the case, he (Nasr-ul-Mulk) had no cause for awaiting the Minister's arrival, the date of which was uncertain. His Highness further made the remark that there seemed to be an idea, quite a mistaken one, that he wished to avoid, or at all events had no particular desire for, a return to Persia.

I pointed out to Nasr-ul-Mulk that there was no reason for any further delay, for he would not be awaiting the arrival of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the 15th instant was so near that if he went in the course of the next few days to London he could continue his journey to St. Petersburg almost immediately, and not arrive there at too early a date for his interview with M. Sazonof, and thence he could go direct to Persia.

His Highness said that he would go to London early in next week.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 251.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, June 14, 1913.

REGENT of Persia left for London to-day.

No. 252.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 1, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th May, and to my telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to state that I have received a telegram from the acting British consul at Shiraz reporting that, in view of the health of the troops and the heat prevailing, the major commanding the gendarmerie there has been reluctantly compelled to change his plans with regard to the immediate entire occupation of the Bushire-Shiraz road.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 253.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 16.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 16, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 14th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 253.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

June 16, 1913.

FOLLOWING report received from senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, as to question of taking punitive measures against Tangistan :—

“ On afternoon of 12th June sent two armed cutters and a steamboat to bring off four dhows lying off small village, 2,000 yards inland, apparently Dilwar.

“ Thirty or forty of natives opened fire, without result, on the cutters, which replied by Maxim and returned to ship after dhows hauled up.

“ Senior naval officer delivered ultimatum next morning, demanding natives who had fired on cutters should be at once surrendered. Natives again opened fire, without result, on boat conveying ultimatum.

“ No information as yet as to result of ultimatum, but if by 6 P.M. on 13th June compliance therewith not intimated, senior naval officer proposes to commence bombardment of Dilwar on the 14th June at break of day, and to send detachment from ‘ Philomel,’ ‘ Sphinx,’ and ‘ Pelorus,’ to number of 250 men, to take necessary action against village and get dhows off.

"Dilwar practically at extreme range of guns and doubtful what success will attend bombardment.

"Proposals of senior naval officer approved, Political Resident, Persian Gulf, concurring, but at his suggestion, 'Philomel' is to bring detachment of 200 from Bushire. Party to return to ship before nightfall, and, pending arrival of detachment, no landing to be made."

No. 254.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 16, 1913.

MY telegram of 31st May: Gendarmerie expedition against Arabs.

Governor-General considers it absolutely necessary in order to put an end to these Arab troubles that their ringleader, Mohammed Kuli Khan, should be captured or killed or forced to submit.

Gendarmerie force at Karak was therefore reinforced by 120 cavalry and 2 Maxims from Shiraz, but failed to accomplish desired result. They returned to Shiraz 11th June, leaving only small garrison at Karak and some sowars as escort for financial agent's revenue collectors.

Governor-General then sent Kavam to Karak with following result:—

Following from acting consul at Shiraz, 16th June:—

"Mohammed Kuli Khan has surrendered himself to Kavam and has been put in chains. Kavam is at present at Mervedasht, and will tour amongst Arab summer quarters further north before returning to Shiraz. Result of his expedition has been to subdue Arabs thoroughly and to restore order in districts east of Shiraz. Financial agent now has his agents out over most of the country collecting grain."

No. 255.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 18, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated the 17th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 255.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

June 17, 1913.

REPORT from senior naval officer, Persian Gulf:—

"Proceeded 13th June on steamboat, with first Assistant-Resident, Bushire, to enquire into rumour about ten dhows which were lying off Oomari village, on coast, some distance down. Natives opened fire when steamboat 500 yards off. Rejoined ship after returning fire from Maxim. Was fired on while proceeding along coast, but suffered no casualties.

"In accordance with the programme decided upon for operations against villages concerned in Debai piracy case, decided to deal first with Oomari, which would not involve landing men, and was within range of guns, whereas Dilwar would not be within range till 19th June, and landing party at above village could not be re-embarked on the same day.

"Accordingly three warning shots were fired at 4 P.M., 14th June, and all ships opened fire on village at 6 P.M. Again on 15th, at noon, fire opened on village and flanks by all ships. An hour later Assistant-Resident and senior naval officer, with all available men from 'Sphinx,' 'Pelorus,' and 'Philomel,' went ashore to take

possession of dhows. Sharp fire opened on them by natives when they came near the shore, and regret following casualties occurred, viz., one killed and five wounded.

"The enemy retreated when our men landed and threw out cover, and we then took up positions to cover those men who were to launch the dhows, of which fifteen in all were found. They were drawn so far up on the beach that further landings would have been required had it been decided to launch them, and they were accordingly scuttled as further landings would have involved casualties out of proportion to their value.

"Informed by Dilwari envoy that forty of that tribe took part in attack on landing. Dilwar suffered considerable damage, village deserted, and about thirty wounded. Have made suggestions to Resident as to reparation to be demanded. If this not made all dhows on coast will be destroyed and Dilwar bombarded on the 19th."

No. 256.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 17, 1913.

FOLLOWING received from consul at Kerman yesterday :—

"Caravan proceeding to Bunder Abbas from Kerman, variously stated at 1,400 to 1,500 animals, reported to have been entirely carried off near Doulatabad, uncertain whether place and robbers belong to Fars or Kerman. Eastern Rug Company have lost about 300 loads of carpets; other sufferers not yet ascertained.

"Governor-General knows, and is said to have telegraphed to Tehran and Shiraz, which probably means that it will be asserted that Governor-General of Fars is responsible."

No. 257.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 18, 1913.

BAKHTIARI road.

My telegram of the 9th June.

Following from Captain Grey at Ispahan, 17th June :—

"Sardar Jang writes to me as follows: He has posted the Kuhgilu guards on the road and has paid them part of their wages in advance; he has also made an arrangement whereby subsequent payments are to be made to them out of the bridge toll receipts. If the reported arrangement, which seems highly satisfactory, continues, there is little danger of organised raids on the part of the Kuhgilus."

No. 258.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 18, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

According to a report which has reached His Majesty's consul at Kermanshah, the Prince has already reached Kurdistan, and is some 50 miles north of Senneh. If this report prove correct it will confirm the belief which is generally held here that this slippery customer would succeed in getting back to his old haunts, though reported to have been wounded.

The Bakhtiari force, which previously was to have gone to Mazanderan, will be sent to Hamadan in pursuit of the rebel Prince, who will also be followed up by the Cossacks originally intended for Zenjan.

No. 259.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 19, 1913.

MY telegram of 9th June : Tangistani piracy.

Following from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, 18th June :—

“Operations of His Majesty's ships on Tangistan coast have been a good deal hampered by bad weather and are still in progress. Their boats have been subjected to hot fire every time they approach the shore, but they have been successful in accounting for number of dhows with loss of one seaman killed and three shot through the hand when rowing, two slight flesh wounds.”

No. 260.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 25, 1913.

MAY I inform the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government accept 1st July, 1915, as the date upon which the first payment on account of 1913 advances shall be made?

No. 261.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 25, 1913.

EXPEDITION against Tangistan coast.

My telegram of 9th June.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports as follows under date of 24th June :—

“It was decided to punish the village of Dilwar, which is the principal port of Tangistan where arms are smuggled, for having assisted in attack on the 15th June on our boats and landing-party, and for having taken no steps to surrender either dhows, or pirates, or compensation, or to comply with our ultimatum. The following report of the attack on Dilwar has been sent by senior naval officer to admiral and Government of India :

“ June 22.—Village was occupied this morning by combined force of 230 men of 2nd Rajputs and 200 men landed from His Majesty's ships. Landing was effected at 5.30 this morning. The enemy made no opposition. It was found that shelling had done little damage owing to thick mist. We destroyed the village.

“ Whilst we were carrying out work of demolition, enemy, estimated at 350 men, of whom 100 were mounted, opened heavy fire on covering parties on front and right flank. They were, however, driven back out of sight. All our party returned to ships at 5 P.M., having sustained no casualties.”

No. 262.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 26.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 25, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 25th instant, relative to affairs in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 262.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

June 25, 1913.

SENIOR Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, reports that combined force landed at Khor Khorweir 24th instant, 7 A.M. Fired a few rounds at some natives who came in sight, and succeeded in launching fishing dhow and four other dhows. Troops will be disembarked at Rishahr this evening. All ships now proceeding there.

No. 263.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 26, 1913.

SWEDISH gendarmerie.

To fill up vacancies which have occurred, and to allow of the carrying out of an extension of the gendarmerie service, Persian Government have decided to apply to the Swedish Government for sixteen more officers, four of whom are destined for Ispahan, five for Kerman, and the others for Hamadan. The Central Government would appear to have learnt a lesson from recent events in Kerman and on the Kermanshah road, and are determined to lose no time in extending the service in those directions, whilst it is of paramount importance to make good the gap at Ispahan on the Tehran-Bushire road.

When telling me yesterday evening of this decision of the Government the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed an earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would approve of and support their request. He said that he had already spoken to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who did not appear to anticipate that his Government would oppose the application.

No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 26, 1913.

TRANS-PERSIAN Railway.

I have informed the Russian Government that I maintain the undertaking given to M. Sazonof to apply in co-operation with them for an option for a trans-Persian railway; and when M. Sazonof proposes that the application shall actually be made, I will send you definite instructions.

No. 265.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 27, 1913.

THE acting British consul at Shiraz reports that Soulet has sent in to consulate two unimportant participators in outrage on Smart. He refused to receive them, and warned the Governor-General, who caused one of the men to be arrested, whilst the other escaped. Soulet appears to wish to make conditions for the surrender of culprits, viz., that they shall be handed over to the consulate and not to Persian authorities, and that they shall not be executed.

Acting consul and the Governor-General are of the opinion that the time has gone by for making conditions, and that Provincial Government is now strong enough to seize the real culprits in due course. Plan would appear to be to wait until the gendarmes have occupied Bushire road in the autumn, and then attack Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli in force in his stronghold at Shapur, break up his power, which has for so long worked for evil on the road, and mete out punishment to various other minor rebel chiefs at the same time.

The fact that the Governor-General feels himself strong enough to meditate such punitive measures appears to me most healthy sign. Acting British consul approves, and I am strongly in favour of it should it meet with your approval.

No. 266.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 27, 1913.

MY telegram of 26th June: Extension of Swedish gendarmerie.

Colonel commanding the gendarmerie tells me that he has made application for eight executive officers, two accountants, two doctors, two cartographers, and one veterinary surgeon. An additional executive officer will probably be required to replace Colonel Merrill, who is to be transferred to the command of the force of the Governor-General of Fars in accordance with his Highness's special request.

The Swedish colonel added that he is preparing to send a force of 150 men from here under his second in command, and another Swedish officer to Kerman at the end of next month, to commence the organisation of a gendarmerie force in that province.

No. 267.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St Petersburg, June 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 26th June to Sir W. Townley: Trans-Persian Railway.

In course of conversation yesterday Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would instruct Russian representative at Tehran to apply for option as soon as he heard Sir W. Townley had received his instructions.

I told him you did not intend to send him such instructions until his Excellency had proposed that application should be actually made. His Excellency expressed concurrence, and said he would send instructions to Russian Ambassador on this subject.

No. 268.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 29, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 22nd May: Advance to Persian Government.

Persian Government agree to opium receipts and excise of spirits being considered additional security.

No. 269.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 7, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the caravan figures recorded by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire for the month of May are as follows:—

				Previous month.
Mules arriving and leaving Bushire..	1,081	6,319
Donkeys (via Firuzabad)	1,197	3,587
Borasjun reports—				
Mules to Bushire	1,900	
Mules from Bushire	2,089	
Kazerun reports—				
Mules to Bushire	7,350	1,199
Mules from Bushire	4,908	2,268

The acting British consul at Shiraz reports the departure of—

Animals to Bushire	7,212	337
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and the arrival of—

Animals from Bushire	8,293	1,069
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He states that the departures to Ispahan numbered 62 animals, and that the only arrivals from Ispahan were animals belonging to the gendarmerie. He adds that no robberies were reported during the month under review.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 270.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 8, 1913.

YOU have been kept informed by the various telegrams that I have had the honour to send you of the latest developments of the movement under Salar-ed-Dowleh in Asterabad and Mazanderan. I have been unable to ascertain that the Prince succeeded in collecting a large force, but it is clear that he had a sufficient following to cause the representatives of the Persian Government in those provinces considerable uneasiness. The Governor of Mazanderan judged discretion to be the better part of valour and escaped to Resht, *en route* for Tehran. The Governor of Asterabad, who came more directly under the Prince's influence, would appear to have gone over to the enemy. The reports of the movements of the rebels were strongly coloured according to the source whence they were derived, and one cannot place implicit confidence in them. It is clear, however, that Salar acted in his usual high-handed manner, collected revenue, named and deposed Governors, and seized the custom-houses at Meshedi Ser and Bender Gez, showing but scant civility to the European employes.

The possession of the custom-houses secured for Salar much needed funds, and it must have been a fatal blow to his hopes when, under instructions from the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, which were subsequently confirmed from St. Petersburg, the Customs were occupied by Russian troops in the name of the Persian Government, on the score that the revenues are pledged to Russia, and people who had been paid moneys derived from this source were obliged to refund the same. Realising probably that he could expect no support from Russia, Salar-ed-Dowleh took ship, with some seventy men, for a port in the neighbourhood of Resht, thus avoiding having to pass through the properties of Sipahdar Azam.

Unfortunately for Salar's cause, his men, who were following him towards Resht overland, were confronted on entering the immense domains of the Sipahdar by an armed force, which disputed their passage. In the combat that ensued Sipahdar's grandson, a boy of 14, was killed. The battle lasted for three days, at the end of which time the boy's father claimed to have totally routed Salar's following, killing sixty men and taking forty prisoners, among whom are said to be some notable Kurdish chieftains. Salar, who took no part in the conflict, then fled to Resht, which town he was not permitted to enter, thanks to the resolute attitude of M. Sabline.

His Highness remained but a short time in a garden outside the town and then proceeded towards Talish-Dulab, whence it is said that he is now making his way towards Zenjan, apparently with the intention of endeavouring to return to Kurdistan. An effort is to be made to cut him off at Zenjan, and Cossacks are to be despatched thither for the purpose.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 271.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 10, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 24th ultimo on the subject of the arrangements made for restoring order on the Shiraz-Bushire road by means of the gendarmerie, I have the honour to report that Colonel Hjalmarson has now returned to Tehran and that I have had a long conversation with him. It is clear that Colonel Hjalmarson acquired considerable knowledge of the difficulties of the road during his journey down it, and he would seem to have formed a very true estimate of the points that present special danger.

I cross-questioned the Colonel as to the nature of the assurances he had given to

the headmen on the road. In reply he stated that he had given no definite assurances, and that he had explained to the various chiefs that he had no authority to give any assurances, though he seems to have given them to understand that their interests would not be neglected in the steps that will have to be taken to ensure a restoration of order and the abolition of illegal exactions and tolls.

The Colonel told me that he had seen all the leading khans on the road and had found them all, with one exception, apparently most reasonable in their attitude. They owned that they had formerly made their living out of the proceeds of agriculture, but that of late the lands had gone out of cultivation, the tillers of the soil having abandoned their peaceful avocation and adopted the more adventurous, but more lucrative, profession of robbers. They explained that were steps to be now taken to put an end at a blow to their new profession, they would have to fight or starve, but they declared themselves ready to return to the land provided that a certain number of their young men were employed as roadguards. It would seem that some of their pretensions as to the number of men that should be employed and the pay they should receive were rather exaggerated, but on the whole Colonel Hjalmarson would appear to have derived the impression that the inhabitants would not be sorry to return to agricultural pursuits provided they could feel sure of a ready market for their products, and that a certain number of their young men would find employment and regular pay on the road.

It would appear to me that we cannot expect that all improper exactions will cease immediately upon the gendarmes taking possession of the road, and it would seem hardly desirable that we should enquire too closely into the methods they may employ. As I understand the object of their mission, they are to restore order and suppress vexatious and illegal blackmail. They appear to me to have set about their task in the right way, and I think it would be unfair to them to press them to take at once such repressive measures as would bring down on them the hatred of the people, before they have had time to feel their way and make the necessary dispositions to ensure the ultimate success of their mission. We can always come forward and demand more energetic action in the event of our being dissatisfied, after they have been given a reasonable time to prove themselves, with the progress made.

It is reported that the last detachment from Tehran suffered very much from heat on the road, and the officer commanding at Shiraz has expressed the opinion that on account of the heat it will not be possible to take possession of the entire road south of Shiraz until the autumn. Colonel Hjalmarson is much distressed at receiving this opinion, and has telegraphed to say that at least a start must be made with certain buildings that will have to be erected at some of the posts, in order that the people may realise that the gendarmes are really coming. He is of opinion, and I share his view, that any delay in putting in an appearance now might easily be attributed to fear and have a bad result, whilst he is most anxious to take practical possession of the road before the tribes return in the autumn. For this reason he regrets the necessity that arose for taking action against the Arabs near Sivend and Kaftrak, because his intention had been to leave the road north of Shiraz until after the autumn migration, so that on the return of the tribes next spring they may find the road in the occupation of the gendarmes, in the same way as he still hopes to occupy the southern road during the present summer migration to the more northerly pastures.

Whilst these operations are being carried out in the south, preparations are being pushed on here to ensure the early despatch of gendarmerie detachments to Kermanshah, Sultanabad, and Zenjan, in all of which centres their presence is earnestly needed. It is hoped that it will be found possible to send 200 men to each of the places named in the course of the next two months.

In the course of a conversation with the Minister of the Interior yesterday, I impressed upon his Highness the necessity for according the gendarmes all possible support. His Highness spoke in flattering language of the good work they have done, and what may be expected from them in the future. He urged that they should not go too fast, and expressed his desire that they should acquire the affection rather than the dislike of the people, adding that he regretted to see signs that they were making themselves rather unpopular by the brusqueness of their methods.

I replied that they were sure to gain the enmity of those whose unlawful trades it was their duty to suppress, and pointed out that there must be a steady forward movement maintained, and that overcaution seemed to me more dangerous to the prestige of the corps than a display of energy. I added that there is no time to lose in securing such a show of a restoration of order as may make an impression in Europe, because until it was believed that something really serious was being done in this direction

there would be small chance of Persia being able to borrow any of the money of which she stands in great need. I also reminded his Highness that the money which had enabled the gendarmerie to do what has been done has been derived from foreign sources, which naturally look for some return for their money.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 272.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 11, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 272.

Summary of Events in Persia for the Four Weeks ending June 11.

Tehran.

The Cabinet.—The dissensions in the Cabinet reported in the last summary have continued, and culminated in Vossuk-ed-Dowleh's departure for Europe on the 1st June, on sick leave. He was accompanied by Muktadir-ul-Mulk and Mushar-ul-Mulk, the former on his way to take up his post as Persian Minister in Rome. Vossuk-ed-Dowleh was considerably alarmed, when approaching Resht, to find that Salar-ed-Dowleh was in such close proximity. He therefore pushed on to Enzeli with all haste, and took the boat of the 5th June for Baku. During the Foreign Minister's absence the Foreign Office has been placed in the charge of Ali Kuli Khan, Mushaver-ul-Mamalek, the principal Under-Secretary of State.

The Ministries of Justice and Education are still vacant. Momtaz-ed-Dowleh is nominally Minister of Commerce.

Gendarmerie.—Colonel Hjalmarson returned to Tehran from his mission to the south, viâ Bagdad and Kermanshah, arriving at Tehran the 31st May.

Sheikh Mahmood Veramini.—This notorious follower of the ex-Shah was lately arrested by gendarmes at Veramin for plotting with brigands and refusing to pay taxes. He was brought to Tehran and imprisoned at Bagh-i-Shah, the headquarters of the gendarmerie. The Russian Legation claimed him as a Russian protégé, and insisted that he should be tried by the Foreign Office Tribunal. On the night of the 5th June, however, the sheikh was shot by gendarme sentinels. It is said that he was endeavouring to escape.

Sipahdar.—The above arrived in Tehran from Europe on the 24th May.

Gilan and Mazanderan.

During the last week in May, Salar-ed-Dowleh left Barfarush with a small party and took ship from Bendar Gez to Rud-i-Ser, robbing the custom-houses at Bendar Gez and Meshed-i-Ser *en route*. From Rud-i-Ser he went overland to Resht, where he arrived on the 3rd June, and after halting there a few hours moved on in the direction of Ardebil.

In the meanwhile the bulk of his followers attempted to pass through Tunkabun, where they came into conflict with Amir Assad, the son of the Sipahdar-i-Azam. Amir Assad defeated Salar-ed-Dowleh's followers, but his son was killed in the engagement.

Some 300 Russian troops, belonging to the Kazvin garrison, passed through Resht *en route* to Baku during May.

Intisar-i-Sultan, a nephew of the Sipahdar-i-Azam, has been appointed Governor of Lahijau, Langerud, and Delaman.

Meshed.

Some six weeks ago the manager of the Russian bank at Sabsawar, when travelling with an escort of Cossacks, was attacked by brigands near Kuchan, and two of his escort were wounded. The Russian consul-general at Meshed thereupon demanded the dismissal of the Governor, but as the Governor-General refused to comply with this request, Prince Dabija had the Governor of Kuchan arrested and deported to Meshed, where he was handed over to the Persian authorities.

Captain Wilson, the medical officer attached to His Majesty's consulate-general, who left Meshed for Askhabad on the 6th May, reported that there were several parties of robbers on the road.

The 13th Turkestan Rifle Regiment has left Meshed for Russia. When this movement has been carried out, the Semirechia Cossacks will be the only Russian troops in Khorasan.

Seyyid Hassan, the brigand who, together with five others, was captured by the Indian cavalry consular escort moving in relief to Meshed about two months ago, has accused Adil-ed-Dowleh, the Governor of Turbat, of having been the instigator of his crimes. As there appears to be little doubt as to the veracity of this statement, Adil-ed-Dowleh has been summoned to Meshed. His Majesty's consul-general has made arrangements for Seyyid Hassan's trial by a representative of the Governor-General, the Treasury agent, and the Karguzar, and has agreed to hand over the gang to the Persian authorities when the sentence passed has been confirmed from Tehran.

The road to Shahrud has been unsafe for the past fortnight owing to the presence of a party of 600 Turkomans.

Ispahan.

Reports as to the condition of the town and environs during the past four weeks have been more satisfactory than they have been for some months past. The price of foodstuffs is on the decrease, and the main roads are open to traffic.

Yezd.

One hundred of the 160 Kashi sowars who arrived in the town last month have been drafted to the Ispahan and Meshed roads, and caravans are reported to be passing freely along these routes.

The town has continued quiet except for some minor disorders created by the Kashis still remaining, and for a small outbreak against the Parsi element.

Shiraz.

There have been no disturbances in the town of late except those in connection with the arrest and execution of Hashim Khan, an Arab chief. On the 16th May it was brought to the notice of the authorities that Hashim Khan had taken refuge with one Sohrab Khan, and steps were taken to arrest him, as he was wanted for his share in the looting of certain villages in the neighbourhood. Sohrab Khan assisted him to resist the police, and in the fracas which ensued some four or five police were killed and wounded. Hashim Khan, however, was captured and hanged on the following day, but Sohrab Khan escaped to the shrine of Seyyid Hadji Gharib, and being well provided with ammunition defied all attempts made to take him. On the night of the 22nd May he escaped from the shrine, after having killed and wounded fourteen people.

The Kavam-ul-Mulk, who is attempting to restore order in the Fasa district, learning that the Shebani Arab chiefs Askar Khan and his brother, Mahommed Kuli Khan, were plotting against him, ordered their arrest. The chiefs resisted the Kavam's men, and although Askar Khan was arrested and his nephew killed, Mahommed Kuli Khan escaped.

As these chiefs have been the instigators of most of the robberies committed by the Shebani Arabs for some time past, and as the incident was likely to increase the unrest among this section, the Governor-General decided to undertake operations against them. With this object orders were given to the party of gendarmes marching from Ispahan to Shiraz to halt at Sivend, and reinforcements, consisting of 100 gendarmes and some of the Darya Begi's sowars, were despatched from Shiraz.

The Government force met with some success, but Askar Khan, who was placed on parole and broke it, and Mahommed Kuli Khan, are still at large.

The acting consul reports that the Government gendarmerie have established themselves on the section of the road between Shiraz and Kazerun in a most satisfactory manner.

Seistan.

Several parties of Baluchi robbers have been at large in the Sarhad and Kainat during the last month. On the 15th May one of these parties intercepted the Inspector-General of Customs, who was travelling with four of his sowars between Alibad and Neh, and took away their horses and rifles. On the following day another party attacked Neh, but failed to enter the village. On the 25th a line guard of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was kidnapped and some stores in his possession destroyed. He was, however, released a few days later.

In the Western Kainat and in the neighbourhood of Birjand, large numbers of camels and sheep are reported to have been carried off by Baluchis.

There is also some probability of trouble in the Kuh-i-Malik Siah district in the near future, as Sirdar Khudadad Khan is urging the local chiefs to support him in defying the revenue administration of the Belgians.

Kerman.

A Baluch lashkar, estimated at 500 strong, entered the Bam district early last month. The Governor of Bam left for Regan in order to repel the raid, but the Baluchis evaded him, and on the 15th May looted several villages in the vicinity of Bam, including the offices of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Tahrud, and a few days later robbed a caravan in the neighbourhood of Sarvestan, and carried off some telegraph stores and goods belonging to British subjects.

The Governor-General of Kerman, who is making a tour through his province, visited Rudbar early last month. The Governor of Rudbar, Zaghām-i-Nizam, came to terms and undertook to pay up all arrears of revenue due.

From Rudbar the Governor-General passed on to Jiruft, and thence into Sirjan, without incident.

Kermanshah.

The Central Government has removed Kurdistan from the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Kermanshah, and appointed Zaffer-es-Sultaneh as Governor. The new Governor, however, has not yet left Tehran for his post.

No. 273.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 30, 1913

YOUR telegram of 27th June : Smart incident.
I approve.

No. 274.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 2, 1913.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire :—

“Punitive measures against Tangistan are now finished as far as His Majesty's ships are concerned. As the result of the attitude of the inhabitants twenty sailing craft had to be destroyed, and eleven are held to ransom for a further fortnight under Rajput guard at Kharag. As senior naval officer is leaving the Gulf, I beg to express my high appreciation of his cordial co-operation with myself and officer commanding troops and of judicious and effective arrangements made in spite of combination of heat and rough sea. I am sorry that any loss of life should have occurred, but I believe that wounded are doing well, and we are really lucky to have suffered so little.”

In advising the Persian Government of the satisfactory conclusion of the punitive operations I am urging them that opportunity should not be lost of taking necessary steps to enable Governor of Bushire to assert authority of the Central Government in district by means of armed force, which his Excellency can raise if he receives the necessary financial assistance from Tehran. The district in question is properly under the Governor-General of Fars, but as he is unable under present circumstances to exert his authority in Dashti and Dashtistan and collect revenue I am suggesting that these districts should be handed over, pending a settlement of the question of their allocation to Shiraz or Bushire, to Governor of Gulf Ports.

Both Sir P. Cox and the acting British consul at Shiraz advocate this course, which appears to have the approval of the Governor-General and the financial agent.

No. 275.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 4, 1913.

THERE has been an affray between Russian troops and Kurds in Mergewar district. Russian vice-consul at Urmia appears to have been making unimportant tour in contested zone; he was accompanied by small Cossack escort and several horsemen belonging to a Kurdish chief. Another Kurdish chief, with whom the latter was at feud, attacked consular party. Small Russian detachment at Syr with their guns were summoned as reinforcements and enemy's village was bombarded. Other Russian troops were summoned from Urmia in case of need. All Russian troops were eventually withdrawn to their respective posts at Syr and Urmia.

Russian casualties were one officer wounded, two gunners killed, and five men seriously wounded; six Kurds were picked up dead, and it is thought enemy carried off others.

Affair, which was probably due to local intrigues and jealousies amongst Kurdish chiefs, was of small importance.

No. 276.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 2nd July: Tangistan.

I approve.

No. 277.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 7, 1913.

MERGEWAR incident.

My telegram of the 4th July.

The recent incident on the frontier has been represented to the Russian Government by my colleague as proving the failure of the system whereby the Russian Government have subsidised certain Kurdish chieftains to maintain order in the Urmia and neighbouring districts. Inter-tribal jealousy has invariably been the outcome of such an arrangement, as has been seen elsewhere.

M. Sabline has advised that a post of Persian Cossacks under Russian officers be created at Urmia; a part of this force would be mobile, and would be used to patrol the frontier. The matter is under consideration by the Russian Government.

A recent request from Salar-ed-Dowleh to the Russian consul at Kermanshah to obtain the recall of the Russian officers from the Cossack force which had been sent against him shows the value of the presence of Russian officers. Salar humorously observed that if the officers remained with the force he would be compelled to flee to Luristan, but that if the officers were recalled he could make his own terms with the Cossacks.

No. 278.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 10, 1913.*
 I HAVE received your despatch of the 10th ultimo reporting a long conversation which you recently had with the Swedish colonel of gendarmerie on the subject of the force.

I am glad to hear so good an account of the gendarmerie, and request you to inform Colonel Hjalmarson unofficially that I am following his work with great interest and approval.

I am, &c.
 E. GREY.

No. 279.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

Sir, *Tehran, June 29, 1913.*
 WITH reference to my telegram of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th ultimo requesting that the opium receipts and excise of spirits should be included as additional security for the recent advance made by His Majesty's Government, together with copy of the reply received from the Persian Government on the 28th instant.

I have, &c.
 WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 279.

Sir W. Townley to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Tehran, May 24, 1913.*
 ON the 30th April I had the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government consider the advance of 200,000*l.* recently made to the Imperial Persian Government secured upon the surplus of the southern customs receipts.

His Majesty's Government are, however, now of opinion that the surplus of these customs receipts is not sufficient guarantee for the repayment of the numerous advances already charged thereon, amounting in all to 440,000*l.*

I am therefore instructed to inform the Persian Government that my Government desire additional guarantees, and they request that the Imperial Persian Government will agree to the southern opium receipts, as also the excise of spirits being considered as the additional security which they deem necessary.

I have, &c.
 WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 279.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir W. Townley.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Tehran, June 28, 1913.*
 THE contents of your note of the 24th May, 1913, regarding the security for the advance of 200,000*l.* recently obtained from the British Government have been communicated to the Ministry of Finance. In reply, the Ministry of Finance has informed the Foreign Office that in the event of the southern customs receipts proving insufficient guarantee for the payment of the above-mentioned advance, the opium receipts and the excise of spirits will be considered an additional security.

I have, &c.
 MUSHAVAR UL MAMALEK.

No. 280.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 13, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 12th February* : Fars.

Acting British consul at Shiraz states that there is considerable difficulty in financing the Fars gendarmerie on hard-and-fast principle of 8,000*l.* a month, though force of close upon 2,000 men can be maintained on 100,000*l.* advanced by His Majesty's Government for one year, provided more latitude can be exercised in the matter of spending the money. Larger purchases have to be made at some seasons of the year than at others : as, for instance, at the moment it is most essential that forage and firing for whole year should be bought, because prices will rise very considerably in a month or two. Expenditure of money is entirely in hands of acting British consul, Swedish officer commanding, and Belgian financial agent, reference being made to colonel commandant, M. Mornard, and myself, so that there is no danger of money being diverted to other purposes.

For above reasons I would beg to recommend for your favourable consideration that money should be made available for year without tying it down to 8,000*l.* a month. Acting British consul would hold himself responsible for proper expenditure of money in such a manner that it will suffice for year.

No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 13th July : Fars advance.

I approve your recommendation.

No. 282.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 18, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

The Russian officer commanding the force of Persian Cossacks sent to operate against Salar in Kurdistan has succeeded in his mission, and the Prince has tendered his surrender. He is being treated as an honoured prisoner whose personal safety is guaranteed. It is expected that he will be brought to Tehran. In addition to this capture the force has done good work in collecting revenue from tribes who have not paid the land tax for years.

M. Sabline thinks, and I entirely agree with him, that the Persian Government should agree to pay Salar a pension compatible with their resources ; that he should be sent to Europe as soon as possible after his arrival here ; and that he should be warned that if he returns to Persia he will receive no foreign support.

There is no great need, in my personal opinion, for Salar to come to the capital at all.

No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 19, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 28th June : Option for Trans-Persian Railway.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to Russian Ambassador that he had not intended to send further instructions to Tehran, but that he now sees no objection to an application for an option at Tehran.

* See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 568.

You should therefore propose to his Excellency that, in the first instance, the two representatives at Tehran should be instructed to ask the Persian Government to grant to the Société d'Études an option for the construction of a railway traversing Persia from north-west to south-east. Details could be settled later by consultation between the two Governments and the Société.

The two representatives must also be eventually instructed to inform the Persian Government of the proposed despatch of an Anglo-Russian Commission to survey that part of Persia through which the southern part of the line will run with a view to recommend which alignment should be adopted, and to ask their consent. This step might be deferred till the Persian Government have replied to the application for the option, but in any case it would be well that the two Governments should proceed without delay to appoint the members of the joint commission, so that it may be ready to begin work as soon as Persian Government have consented to its despatch.

No. 284.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 21, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH.

It is most satisfactory to learn of success by the Persian Cossacks reported in Sir W. Townley's telegram of 18th July.

No. 285.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 21st July to St. Petersburg: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

The Russian officer commanding the Persian Cossacks would appear, from the latest information, to have been duped by Salar. The Prince has not surrendered, and is on the way again to attack Kermanshah. The Governor-General has been warned, and Cossacks are pursuing Salar.

The statement about the collection of the land tax was also hasty, as it is now clear that the tribes refuse to pay the same, while the officer above mentioned states that force under his command is not large enough to enable him to exercise pressure on well-armed tribesmen.

No. 286.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 23, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 21st July: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that you had heard with much satisfaction of Salar's capture, and asked what he proposed should be done with him.

His Excellency at first spoke of leaving him at Tehran under surveillance, but on my telling him that this would not meet with your approval and that you thought that if he received a pension he ought to be sent abroad and to forfeit pension if he returned, he expressed concurrence. He would, he said, instruct Russian Chargé d'Affaires to do nothing without previous arrangement with Sir W. Townley, and suggested that our two representatives might be left to deal with the matter.

No. 287.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 24, 1913.

MY telegram of 23rd July: Salar-ed-Dowleh.

Salar, after remaining four days in the Cossacks' camp, tricked the Russian officer

commanding. He obtained permission to visit sick friend, giving his word of honour that he would return the same evening. Instead of doing so he sent a message to say that he had determined to try his luck again. It would appear that he has collected a considerable following of well-armed tribesmen. Governor-General at Kermanshah has been warned, and is believed to be preparing to oppose him. He has quite lately received considerable reinforcements in men and military stores, and Cossacks are stated to be pursuing Salar closely.

No. 288.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 4, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note that I have addressed to the Persian Government, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me in reply to my telegram of the 25th June, informing them that His Majesty's Government accept the 1st July, 1915, as the date upon which the first payment on account of the moneys advanced in 1913 shall be made.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 288.

Sir W. Townley to Persian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, July 3, 1913.

ON the 30th April, I had the honour to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should let his Excellency know at a later date the views of His Majesty's Government respecting the date upon which the first instalment of the liquidation of the advance of 200,000*l.*, made on the 30th April by His Majesty's Government to the Persian Government, should be paid by the latter.

I am now authorised by His Majesty's Government to inform your Excellency that they accept the 1st July, 1915, as the date upon which the first payment on account of the moneys advanced in 1913 shall be made.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 289.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 4, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 2nd July respecting the operations undertaken by His Majesty's ships against the Tangistan coast, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two memoranda which I have addressed to the Persian Government in this connection.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 289.

Memorandum communicated to Persian Government, June 25, 1913.

AS the Imperial Persian Government are aware, His Majesty's Government have recently been compelled to undertake punitive operations against certain Tangistan coast villages.

This action should prove of great service, firstly, to the customs administration by dealing a severe blow to smuggling, and secondly, to the administration of the Gulf Ports by placing the natives of Tangistan in a considerably weaker position *vis-à-vis* the local authorities.

If the recommendations of the Governor of the Gulf for the provision of a local

force or for funds for the creation of such a force had already been adopted by the Central Government, the governor would now have been able to place a garrison of his own at the chief Tangistan port in co-operation with the customs administration, the advantages of which will be apparent to the Imperial Government.

His Majesty's Legation understand that the governor is of opinion that he could even now do so, pending the creation of a proper force, provided that the Central Government would give him the necessary authority to do so and sufficient funds for the maintenance of about 200 men.

It is in the highest degree important that his Excellency should be placed in a position to take full advantage of the recent British expedition against the Tangistanis, and His Majesty's Legation have the honour to request that the Imperial Government may see fit to send the Governor of the Gulf immediate telegraphic instructions to raise a force of 200 men, to be employed as suggested, and that, at the same time, sufficient money for the upkeep of such a force may be remitted to his Excellency.

Gulahek, June 25, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 289.

*Memorandum communicated to Persian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
July 3, 1913.*

HIS Britannic Majesty's Minister presents his compliments to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and, in continuation of the memorandum he had the pleasure to hand to his Excellency on the 25th ultimo, begs to state that he learns from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire that the punitive measures which it was found incumbent to take against Tangistan, in order to obtain reparation for a gross act of piracy, have now been satisfactorily concluded as far as His Majesty's ships are concerned. Sir P. Cox states that as a result of the hostile attitude assumed by the Tangistanis it was found necessary to destroy twenty sailing craft whilst eleven other vessels are held to ransom within a fortnight under a Rajput guard at Kharaj.

Sir Walter Townley takes this occasion to remind his Excellency Mushawar-el-Mamalek that it would appear most important that the occasion should not be missed of enabling the Governor of the Gulf Ports to establish the effective authority of the Imperial Government in this disaffected district. He would beg to suggest, for the consideration of the competent authorities of the Imperial Government, that it is desirable under existing circumstances that the districts of Dashti and Dashtistan should be placed, for the time being at all events, under the Governor of the Gulf Ports. His Excellency may be able, should he receive the moral and financial support of the Central Government, upon which Sir Walter Townley feels convinced he may count, to recover the revenue which the Governor-General of Fars confesses himself unable to collect with the force now at his disposal.

His Majesty's Minister understands that the suggestion concerning Dashti and Dashtistan has the approval of Mukhber-es-Sultaneh and of the Financial Representative of the Imperial Government at Shiraz, and for this reason permits himself to recommend its adoption to the urgent and favourable consideration of the Imperial Government.

No. 290.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Previous month.

Mules, 1,081.

Donkeys, 1,197.

Mules, 1,900 to
Bushire.

Mules, 2,089 from
Bushire.

8,293. 7,212.

None but
gendarmerie
animals last
month.

Sir,

Tehran, July 7, 1913.

HIS Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that a total of 2,039 mules and 309 donkeys arrived at and left that place during the month of June, the donkeys moving viâ Firuzabad.

A report from Borasjun states that 3,056 mules left for, and 2,341 arrived from Bushire.

The acting British consul at Shiraz reports 3,141 arrivals from Bushire, and 2,268 departures for that port.

Major O'Connor adds that 900 animals arrived from, and that 2,270 left for, Ispahan there is, however, some doubt respecting the latter figure, as a sub-report from Dehbid states that only 900 animals passed towards Ispahan.

All the figures which reach me from Shiraz are admittedly only approximate, and donkeys and mules are not enumerated separately.

Major O'Connor has no robberies to report for the period under review.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 291.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 8, 1913.

ON the 5th May His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed informed me by telegraph that the consulate relief escort on the way to their post from India had captured and brought to Meshed a gang of Persian robbers led by one Seyyid Hasan.

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a full report on the whole matter which I have now received from Major Sykes.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure I in No. 291.

Major Sykes to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Meshed, June 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report on the capture of Seyyid Hasan and his gang of five men by the relief escort of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

2. The escort, fourteen in number, was travelling between Birjand and Turbat-i-Haidari, and a large caravan had joined it for protection. At Robat-i-Kumai, some 40 miles from Turbat-i-Haidari, a man came out of a tower, erected for the use of road guards, and asked the pilgrims for supplies. They informed Duffadar Sher Mohammed, who had previously done a tour of service in Persia, that the tower was held by robbers. Sher Mohammed went towards the tower and talked to Seyyid Hasan, who threatened him with his Mauser pistol. Meanwhile, the other sowars had seized the first-mentioned robber. They then moved their camels to a safe distance, and taking cover in the ruined caravanserai opened fire on the robbers. The latter dared not show their heads above the wall, and fired off their rifles into the air and so Sher Mohammed and another sowar were able to approach the tower. They wounded a robber slightly, and broke open the gate when the gang surrendered. There were no casualties on our side. At Turbat-i-Haidari, the Adil-u-Dola was most anxious to have the prisoners handed over to him, but the Governor-General and I finally decided to have them brought to Meshed, where they were placed in the consulate prison.

3. I venture to think, Sir, that Duffadar Sher Mohammed and the members of the escort displayed considerable initiative and courage, which has produced a good political effect, and that to have left the Persians who had trusted to their protection to be robbed would have been unworthy of the traditions of the British army.

4. Upon being examined, Seyyid Hasan confessed to various robberies. He declared, however, that throughout he was acting under the orders of the Adil-u-Dola. As previous reports had corroborated this, and as M. Leleux possessed similar information, I discussed the matter with my colleague, and it was decided to ask the Governor-General to summon the Adil-u-Dola from Turbat-i-Haidari. It was also decided that the Seyyid should be examined by three officials, namely, a representative of the Governor-General, M. Leleux, and the Karguzar, and that representatives of both consulates should be present.

5. At the examination the attaché stated, on my behalf, that my desire was for the Seyyid to have a fair trial, and to see whether there were any extenuating circumstances. The result of the first sitting of the enquiry was to show that if it were continued, the Adil-u-Dola would be proved guilty of instigating the Seyyid. The Governor-General sent the Karguzar to me with a message to the effect that having been twenty years in Persia I was bound to know that the Governor was in league with robbers, and that he would do exactly what I wished. What was finally settled was that Seyyid Hasan and his gang should be flogged and imprisoned and be released on

security. The Governor-General also wrote me a letter of thanks for the capture of the gang, which I attach.

6. A résumé of one of the robberies is instructive, and I hope of interest. The Governor instructed the Seyyid to rob a certain Haji Kazim of Baiq, and stated that he would detain him at Turbat-i-Haidari settling his revenue account until after the robbery. The gang broke into their victim's house, forced his strong box and took 4,700 tomans. Of this 3,000 tomans were sent to the Adil-u-Dola, and the Governor-General informed me that he was aware of this.

I have, &c.
P. M. SYKES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 291.

Governor-General of Khorasan to Major Sykes.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

June 12, 1913.

WHILE expressing my sincere gratitude to you for your kind assistance which you always have rendered me in the performance of my duties, I write to thank the Indian sowars of the British Consulate-General who seized the famous brigand Seyyid Hasan and brought him to Meshed. I request that the British Consulate-General may bring their services to the notice of the authorities concerned.

No. 292.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Gulahek, July 8, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the usual summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 292.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending July 8.

Diplomatic movements.—The Turkish Ambassador, Emin Bey, took leave of the Shah on the 28th June, and has returned to Constantinople.

The Cabinet.—Mustafi-ul-Mamalek left for Paris on the 16th June.

Prince Reza Khan, Arfa'-ed-Dowleh, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople and Minister at St. Petersburg, has been invited to return to Tehran, and it is understood that he will be offered a portfolio in the Cabinet. His candidature for the post of Foreign Minister is mentioned.

The Medjliss.—During the past four weeks there has been a considerable movement, fanned chiefly by Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the former Prime Minister, and a number of persons renowned for their reactionary proclivities, directed towards the re-establishment of parliamentary institutions. A letter was addressed on the 18th June by these people to the Cabinet asking for a Medjliss and Senate. The Cabinet replied favourably on the 21st, and a committee was formed to go into the matter.

Cossack Brigade.—A force of about 450 Persian Cossacks under Russian officers left Tehran on the 12th June in the direction of Zenjan to deal with Salar-ed-Dowleh. This force has since proceeded towards Kermanshah.

Gilan and Mazanderan.

Although some of Salar-ed-Dowleh's personal following were captured after his departure from Resht on the 3rd of last month, the Prince himself managed to evade such parties as were sent in pursuit and escaped into Kurdistan, where he still is.

Amir Assad, on defeating Salar-ed-Dowleh's Turkomans near Touna-Kabun, as

reported in last month's summary, is said to have robbed the custom-houses at Rudisar and Chumkaleh, but on pressure being brought to bear by the Russian authorities the money was returned.

A Russian officer with fifty Persian Cossacks arrived at Resht at the end of June and took over command of the detachment of the Cossack Brigade, which now numbers about 200.

Meshed.

The road between Meshed and Shahrud is still unsafe owing to the presence of Turkomans in the neighbourhood of Abbasabad and Meiomai, where they have been committing various depredations during the past month.

Some six weeks ago Juju, a notorious bandit, joined forces with one Musir Khan, an ex-Governor of Shirwan, and, after pillaging several villages in the Kuchan district, commenced interfering with travellers and caravans on the main road. The commandant of the Russian troops in Khorassan thereupon left Meshed with a party of eighty Cossacks, and, coming up with the robbers near Kuchan, surrounded them. In the fight which ensued, Juju and seven of his followers were killed and twenty-one were captured. The Cossacks suffered no casualties.

During the past two months over a hundred families of Hazaras, amongst whom are several old soldiers of the Indian army, have emigrated from Afghanistan and arrived at Meshed. They state that they have been compelled to leave Afghanistan owing to the tyranny in that country being intolerable.

There are rumours of another outbreak of plague on the Afghan frontier near Karez, but as there appears to be some doubt as to whether the disease really is the plague, the Conseil sanitaire have not yet declared quarantine.

The Russian consul-general has informed the Governor-General that, unless a new Governor is sent to Kuchan to replace the Governor deported last May, the Russian authorities will be compelled to appoint one themselves.

The enquiry into the robberies perpetrated by Seyyid Hassan and his gang showed that the Adil-ed-Dowleh was implicated, and it was finally agreed not to pass death sentences on the gang, but to flog and imprison them.

Ispahan.

The condition of the town and environs is once more far from satisfactory. His Majesty's consul-general reports that encounters between the police and gangs of thieves take place almost every night in the town, and that the environs are a prey to an organised band of Seichani robbers numbering about 120 men, the majority of whom are well mounted and well armed. On the 28th June an attempt was made by the local authorities to round up a portion of this gang, but the result was not very successful.

The relations between the Governor-General and M. Kornelis, which hitherto have been satisfactory, appear to have reached a critical point owing to the refusal of the Governor-General to desist from collecting revenue on his own account.

A large caravan was robbed near Garpeeseh, on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, last month, and upwards of 100 mules were carried off by the robbers, who are believed to have been Bakhtiari. His Majesty's consul-general has made the usual representations regarding the protection of this portion of the road, which lies in Ispahan territory.

The people of Kashan complain that Naib Hussain's sowars, who are paid by the Central Government to guard the roads in the district, oppress the local inhabitants and rob travellers and caravans.

On the 17th June about sixty inhabitants of the village of Mahabad took refuge in the Indo-European Telegraph Department's office at Ardistan as a protest against the action of four seyyids of that town, whom they accused of having appropriated the sum of money granted by the Central Government as compensation for losses suffered at the hands of Naib Hussain's followers in 1912. On the following day a counter-demonstration was made by the Ardistanis, and a collision between the two parties was feared. However, on the matter being reported to the Governor-General of Ispahan, the four seyyids were arrested and a reconciliation was effected. The Mahabadis are now reported to be returning to their homes.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Sultanabad reports that, owing to the inability of the local authorities to maintain law and order, the majority of the roads in the district are unsafe, and that the condition of the town is going from bad to worse.

Yezd.

In spite of the absence of road guards along certain sections of the road, owing to the non-receipt of pay and to the scarcity of water and fodder, and in spite of the ever-increasing rates of "rahdari," most of the routes in the districts are open to traffic.

The fate of Taimur, the brigand who was captured last March, still remains unsettled. Several notables, who for reasons of their own desire his release, are said to be offering bribes to the Governor of Yezd in the hopes that he may be liberated.

Shiraz.

The Kavam-ul-Mulk, after subduing the Arabs and restoring order in the district east of Shiraz, moved against the Shebani Arabs. Two of their chiefs, Askar Khan and Mahommed Kuli Khan, who had been plotting against the Kavam, surrendered, and were brought into Shiraz. Askar Khan was hanged on the 11th June, and Mahommed Kuli Khan on the 20th.

News has been received from Darab that Sheikh Zachariah, a turbulent Sarkuhi Arab chief, has been killed.

The removal of these chiefs has greatly enhanced the prestige of the Kavam, and should facilitate the eventual settlement of the eastern districts of Fars.

Caravan traffic on the road to Ispahan is recommencing, and the Bushire road continues to be safe.

Seistan.

Although the various parties of robbers mentioned in last month's summary are still at large in the Kainat and the Sarhad, no further depredations are reported during the past four weeks.

There has been some intertribal fighting in the district to the south of Seistan, but apparently without any very serious results.

The branch of the Russian Bank at Birjand has been definitely closed, and its outstanding claims made over to the Imperial Bank of Persia.

Kerman.

Amir-i-Mufakham, the Governor-General, is still on tour. He is at present in Sirjan, where, out of the four notables chiefly responsible for acts against his authority, two have come to terms with him and two are still at large. Raschid-us-Sultan, one of those who has made his peace with the Amir-i-Mufakham, has been appointed Deputy-Governor of Sirjan.

Etemad-ul-Mulk, who was appointed Deputy-Governor of Kerman by the Minister of the Interior, left Tehran for his post without the knowledge of His Majesty's Legation; but, as he was not considered suitable for the post, steps were taken to cancel the appointment.

Kermanshah.

A force of some 250 Persian Cossacks, under a Russian officer, has reached the neighbourhood of Kermanshah with a view to capturing Salar-ed-Dowleh, who was last reported as being about 50 miles to the north of the town.

An affray took place on the 3rd July near Mergavar between two parties of Kurds, one of whom was acting as an escort to a Russian consular officer. Russian troops were summoned from Urmia to the assistance of the escort, and the assailants were driven off. The Russian troops afterwards returned to Urmia.

Bakhtiari Country.

Sardar-i-Jang has telegraphed to the khans at Tehran and to the British Minister that he cannot continue to carry on the Governorship of Bakhtiaristan; but he has given no reason for his action, although pressed to do so. The khans have sent two influential members of the clan to try and induce him to retain his post, but up to the present he maintains his determination to resign.

No. 293.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 8, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 26th ultimo, in which I had the honour to inform you that the Persian Government have decided immediately to extend the scope of the operations of the national gendarmerie under Swedish instructors to the province of Kerman, and in other directions, I have the honour to report that a letter has been addressed to the Minister of the Interior by Colonel Hjalmarson, in which that officer repeats a request formerly made for an increase of the numbers of the Swedish military instructors in the service of the Persian Government.

The first point made in Colonel Hjalmarson's letter to Ain-ed-Dowleh concerns the section of the Tehran-Bushire road between Kashan and Yezdikhast. It is clearly most desirable, if the necessary funds are forthcoming, that this gap in the chain of police protection on this most important trade route should be filled up as soon as possible. For this purpose Colonel Hjalmarson considers that the services of four additional instructors are required.

The colonel then proceeds to show reason why it is necessary that the staff of instructors at Shiraz should be increased by two officers, a doctor, and a veterinary surgeon. The experience of the recent march to Shiraz has proved that it is not sufficient to rely upon the skill of Persian practitioners. On that march several lives were lost that could almost certainly have been saved had the force been accompanied by a competent European doctor.

Further, it having been decided by the Government that it is desirable that the gendarmerie should be established in the province of Kerman as soon as may be possible, Colonel Hjalmarson asks for three executive instructors, an accountant, and a doctor for the organisation of the force to be raised there. In conversation Colonel Hjalmarson has told me that he proposes to send a force of 150 and 200 men to Kerman at the end of the present month when the somewhat longer and cooler nights will make marching possible. The force will be commanded by two tried officers who have been some time in Persia, and have a knowledge of the language and people.

I have discussed the question of the increase of the European staff of the gendarmerie with the responsible Cabinet Ministers and also with the treasurer-general, as, of course, with my Russian colleague. I have represented that though the gendarmerie have proved their great value most fully, and though it is highly desirable that their numbers should be increased as far as may be possible, the question of expense should not be overlooked. It would be a most unfortunate thing were the Persian Government to find themselves one day with this large force, officered by Europeans, on their hands and without the necessary funds to maintain them.

In this matter of the gendarmerie we find ourselves face to face again with the same difficult problem that makes the solution of all Persian questions, if not impossible, at least most laborious. The good results derived from the gendarmerie are indisputable, but one cannot make bricks without straw or gendarmes without money, and it is extremely difficult to know to what extent financial risks may be run. A check to the development of the gendarmerie would be most unfortunate at the present moment, and yet it would seem fool-hardy of the Persian Government to run too great risks until there has been more time to judge of the extent to which the resources of the country will be increased by the gendarmerie. A marked improvement is noticeable in the districts where the gendarmerie have been posted, not only on the actual roads but in the general situation, due to the fact that their presence has served to bring home to the people that the Tehran Government are not devoid of all means of making themselves felt.

In a recent conversation with Colonel Hjalmarson about the future of the gendarmerie, that officer informed me that, though some of his brother officers have announced their intention of going home at the end of their contract, others will remain, and that there will never be any trouble about securing more officers. I gathered that he himself would be willing to remain, if he got six months' leave in which to perform his regulation military duties in Sweden.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 294.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 9, 1913.

FROM recent conversations with the Prime Minister it would seem that the Government have decided to proceed to elections for a third Medjliss. It appears that the elections are to follow the procedure laid down in the Electoral Law passed by the second Medjliss which amounts practically to manhood suffrage. There is some uncertainty in certain quarters as to whether the Regent ever endorsed the law in question. This doubt is apparently based upon the fact that, when affixing his signature, Nasr-ul-Mulk, added a rider to the effect that as time pressed he had not read the law, but had signed it and passed it on unread to the Minister of the Interior.

My Russian colleague and I have represented to the responsible Ministers that great care must be taken to ensure the return of more suitable members to Parliament than was the case on the two previous occasions. Some anxiety has been expressed as to the attitude that might be adopted in Azerbaijan and the northern provinces towards the elections, but the Government seem now to have satisfied themselves that Shuja-ed-Dowleh at Tabriz intends to co-operate loyally with them.

The President of the Council asserts that the Cabinet has for some time past been determined to proceed to new elections, but it is very doubtful if such a step would have been taken had not Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the former Prime Minister, put himself at the head of a movement having this object in view. There have been several meetings held at various places, and threats have been uttered that, if the Government continue to neglect the wish of the people, recourse will be had to the pressure of a large "bast" of leading people in the Medjliss building. I have represented to Samsam-es-Sultaneh and others that such a proceeding would be most severely condemned, and I have called upon him to use all his influence to prevent the occurrence of any incident that might tend to disturb public order. Samsam and his followers lay great stress upon the necessity for the new assembly to take the necessary constitutional measures at once for the formation of a Senate. Previous experiences of National Assemblies in Persia have not been very successful, and I am of opinion that it would therefore be desirable to try the effect of a second Chamber on the present occasion. Preparations in this direction are being made by a special commission appointed for the purpose.

On the whole, it appears to me that the time has come when it is desirable that a new Medjliss should be summoned, but it must be somewhat of a lottery and one can only hope that a more suitable class of representatives may be chosen than on the former occasions, that they may be more reasonable in their views, and that some measure of control may be established by the early formation of an upper Chamber. I frankly do not anticipate that the work of endeavouring to assist Persia in the restoration of a normal condition of affairs will be facilitated by this fresh recourse to a legislative assembly, but one must hope for the best.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 295.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 9, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. H. W. MacLean, showing the present state of Persia's finances. I have been fortunate in securing the views upon this subject of such a competent authority as Mr. MacLean, who is especially well fitted to review the financial situation, both by reason of his technical knowledge of finance, and of his long acquaintance with Persia. His interesting and comprehensive memorandum will be found, I think, to contain all available knowledge on the subject in question.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 295.

Memorandum by Mr. MacLean on Persian Finances.

CERTAIN statements prepared by the Treasurer-General of Persia of the receipts and disbursements of his administration for the year to 20th March, 1913, are before me. They are interim statements, not closed accounts, and he expressly points out that they will be subject to great modification before being rendered in final form. Moreover, he claims that the delay in rendering closed accounts, which will not be available before August, is unavoidable as he has to collect from his provincial agencies the materials for this return the first annual statement of the revenue and expenditure of Persia. I accept that claim. Under these circumstances there is no room at present for criticism of the Treasurer-General or his administration.

The statements before me are accounts of receipts and disbursements—they are not full statements of revenue and expenditure, nor do they convey in definite form information regarding the financial position of the Empire. But they are, in case of need, a valuable base on which to found budget or financial investigations.

The statements are appended in abridged form to this memorandum.

The first statement (Table A) gives the receipts on account of revenue, indicating a gross revenue for the year of 2,040,000*l.* M. Mornard expects that restoration of order in the provinces will enable Government to collect during the current year from the same sources of revenue 2,400,000*l.*, independently of any new taxation. This estimate probably includes recoverable arrears of land tax at the close of 1912–13 of about 92,000*l.*

The statement of disbursements (Table B) is much less complete. It shows only the payments made by the Treasurer-General 1,598,000*l.*, leaving a difference of 442,000*l.*, to be “justifiée” by Treasury agencies in the provinces, or by certain departments which make payments from their own revenues such as the customs, posts, telegraphs, and consulates. As the Government was evidently in straitened circumstances at the end of the financial year, there can be little hope that any part of this difference represents a surplus.

There is little use in following in detail figures which are subject to so great adjustment, and I pass to other matters of comment.

In Table C I have endeavoured to collect together the more important particulars of the Foreign Debt of Persia with such accuracy as the time at my disposal for this memorandum permits. I find that the foreign loans of the Persian Government extant at 20th March, 1913, amounted to 6,254,000*l.* New loans to the extent of 500,000*l.* have been since negotiated.

Of these loans 4,750,000*l.* has been contracted with Russia, and 2,004,000*l.* with the British Empire, the first security in each case being respectively the northern and the southern customs revenues. Four loans aggregating 5,000,000*l.* are on a gold basis at 5 per cent. interest with long terms of amortisation. 1,100,000*l.* is on a silver kran basis at 7 per cent. interest, with a sinking fund redeeming it in fifteen years, and the remainder are of the nature of temporary advances at 7 per cent. awaiting opportunity for consolidation.

The sterling gold loan of 1911 is quoted on the London Stock Exchange at 90 to 95, which shows that Persia cannot expect to raise money on the open market at less cost than 5½ per cent. per annum with the best security she can offer. Consequently the relief to revenue from a consolidation of these temporary advances would not exceed 25,000*l.* per annum in interest, but the smaller sinking fund necessary for a long dated loan would set free large sums now hypothecated to the repayment at short date of these advances. In other words, if Persia can offer good enough security for a long loan of 2,000,000*l.* at 5 per cent. interest at an issue price of 87½, she could pay off the 1,750,000*l.* of debt bearing 7 per cent. interest, and the service of the new debt would be met by an annual payment of 110,000*l.*—which is 10,000*l.* less than the sum in kran at present required to pay interest and sinking fund on the kran consolidated loan of 1911. Of course she would in that case accept the risk of converting into gold a debt of 6,000,000 tomans now payable in silver. But that is a reasonable risk to accept.

It is obvious that the possibility of consolidation on such terms must depend on the security which can be offered.

The first security which occurs to anyone conversant with the affairs of Persia is the revenues of the customs administration. In annex I, I have set out the net customs revenues for the year 1912–13, a total of 711,000*l.* This has been adapted

to suit my purposes from a return furnished by the administrator of customs. I have distinguished between southern and northern customs; the former comprises the revenues of all southern ports from Baluchistan to Dizful, and the latter all other customs revenues. The southern customs produce slightly less than five years ago, the northern show progressive increase.

It is worthy of note that the geographical position of Persia is such that the great centres of production and consumption are naturally a little more accessible to European trade by way of Batoum than by way of Bushire or Mohammerah, and that a considerable part of the trade, even with Great Britain, adopts the southern instead of the northern route, simply on account of the transit difficulties imposed by Russia, and which she can modify at pleasure. The power which Russia can exercise in this direction is well illustrated in the tea trade; at one time a great part of the tea consumed in Khorassan was landed at Bunder Abbas. Russia granted transport facilities through her territory, and the tea from India and China forthwith went to Batoum.

In annex II, I have shown how the customs revenues of Persia are affected to the service of the existing foreign loans. Assuming the revenue to remain constant, the position as regards the southern customs is that after providing for the service of the two gold loans of 1910 and 1911, forming first charges on the revenues, there is an available balance till 1915 of 55,000*l.*, and thereafter of 49,000*l.* The British advance of 1912 is entitled to absorb the whole of this surplus, and would be liquidated therefrom in 1916. The British advance of 200,000*l.* of 1913 would require a service of nearly double the then available balance of 49,000*l.*, and the Persian Government in order to meet it punctually, would have to provide about 35,000*l.* per annum for two years from 1916 from other sources. The remaining advance of 100,000*l.* of 1913, and arrears of interest would be liquidated by about 1920 from the available surplus which would then be freed to the Persian Government.

The northern customs are sufficient to meet all the foreign claims secured upon it. These are the Russian loans of 1900-02, 1911, and 1913, and certain annual charges for maintenance of the Cossack Brigade and allowances to the ex-Shah amounting together to 90,000*l.*, and ranking next after the 1902 loan. The free balance of northern customs revenues is 100,000*l.*

The present position therefore is that the southern customs are pledged for a larger annual sum than they can immediately satisfy, and that the northern customs are pledged to an extent which affords an annual free balance of 100,000*l.* for other purposes.

If the consolidation I have suggested were effected, the customs revenues of 711,000*l.* would have to bear a total annual service for foreign loans and other secured charges of about 475,500*l.*, leaving an annual free balance of 236,000*l.* for other purposes, or a margin of 50 per cent.

But obviously any such consolidation might have to be effected in two parts, proportionate to the respective British and Russian debts to be paid off. In that case the Russian consolidated loan would be 1,500,000*l.*, with an annual interest and sinking fund of about 82,500*l.*, and the British consolidated loan would be 500,000*l.*, with an annual interest and sinking fund of about 27,500*l.*

The northern customs would then have to bear a total annual service of 349,700*l.*, and would show a free annual balance of 213,000*l.*, or 61 per cent. margin, and the southern customs would have to bear a total annual service of 126,300*l.*, and would afford a free annual balance of 21,500*l.*, or a 17 per cent. margin. The former seems to be a good margin on an improving security, the latter an unsatisfactory margin on a weak security.

There are records, however, of certain annual payments noted at the foot of annex II, which by habit or necessity are levied on the customs revenues. I have not found opportunity to study these items, but the first three cannot be in any sense essential to the administration of the customs, and in any case are easily met out of the free balance of the northern customs, whilst the following three items, if chargeable to the southern customs, would entirely absorb the free balance.

The remaining considerations in this connection are:—

1. Whether other sources of revenue of a satisfactory nature can be pledged in support of the weak security available for the existing British advances.

2. Whether the relief to Persian finances gained by passing on part of the immediate liabilities to future generations, would enable the Government to meet annual expenditure out of income, and to secure a stable and progressive administration.

These are questions which would demand a more exhaustive examination of the material supplied by the Treasurer-General than I have had opportunity to make. It seems to me unnecessary to offer uninstructed opinion on them now, as there is promise of more complete accounts being shortly available.

H. L. MACLEAN.

July 5, 1913.

TABLE (A).—Provisional statement by the Treasurer-General of Receipts by the Financial Administrations during the Year to the 20th March, 1913.

(A.)	£
1. Customs	794,250
2. Land Tax*	693,210
3. Crown domains (Khalaseh)	119,600
4. Licenses (on factories, business shops, &c.)	4,410
5. Excise (opium, spirits, wine)	129,930
6. Slaughter-houses and offal taxes	28,280
7. Mines and oxide, iron.. .. .	6,030
8. Mint	12,800
9. Land register ("cadastre")	160
10. Tolls (included in land taxes)
11. Sundry taxes (brickmakers, auctions, pawnshops).. .. .	1,580
12. Sundry dues (tobacco, "régie," transport agency, Baluchistan telegraphs, oil company)	2,170
13. Fortuitous receipts	1,390
13a. Receipts from financial agencies	5,210
	1,799,020
(B.)	
14. Passports	31,680
15. Chancery receipts, included in passports..
16. Court fees, &c. (Ministry of Justice)	3,540
17. Religious endowments (public works)	1,250
18. Posts	67,290
19. Telegraphs	50,900
20. Navaghal (Tax on transport animals, &c.)	22,880
21. Lambskins	9,300
22. Fruits (fresh) and raisins	1,990
	1,987,850
In a subsequent note Mr. Mornard says that receipts will exceed these figures by 55,000%	55,000
	2,042,850

* NOTE.—For the southern provinces of Burujird, Kerman, Shiraz, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and Arabistan this tax produced 98,960%.

TABLE (B).—Provisional statement of Disbursements by the Treasurer-General, Tehran, for the Financial Year to 20th March, 1913.

	£
Interest and sinking fund on loans (see Annex III)	536,400
Expenses of Ministries (see Annex IV)	678,300
Expenses of Treasury-General (see Annex V.)	25,900
Expenses of administrations	66,000
Other Government expenditure (see Annex VII)	111,700
Grants to financial agents (see Annex VIII).. .. .	159,200
Audit of current accounts (see Annex IX)	4,800
Payments made on account of Arbab Jamshid (Annex X)	16,300
	1,598,600

NOTE.—This statement shows only the payments made by the Treasury-General.

TABLE (C).

Foreign Debt of Persia at June 30, 1913.

(Krans converted at 54 to the £, and roubles at 9.45 to the £.)

1. Date of loan, 1900. Sinking-fund, 75 years. Earliest date repayable, the 1st January, 1910. Original amount 22,500,000 roubles. Rate of interest 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 1,156,288 roubles. Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, uncertain—at least 22,000,000 roubles.

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Gold loan 1900. Secured on customs receipts of Persia, excepting those of Fars and Persian Gulf ports. All revenues to be paid into bank at Tehran, and surplus to be released by them to Persian Government. Control, and in last resort, administration in default. Persia not to make new foreign loans without Russia's consent whilst any part of this loan outstanding.

Remarks.—Issued at 85 per cent. Any bonds issued are to bear full guarantee of Russian Government. The bank receives $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. commission on amounts collected for interest and sinking fund.

2. Date of loan, 1902. Sinking fund, 75 years. Earliest date loan repayable, 1st January, 1912. Original amount, 10,000,000 roubles. Rate of interest, 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 514,006·20 roubles.* Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, uncertain, but nearly 10,000,000 roubles.

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Gold loan 1902. Secured as above (1). Whilst loan outstanding Persia cannot contract for new foreign loan without consent of Russia.

Remarks.—Issued at 85.

Total of above two loans—

Original amount, 32,500,000 roubles, equals, at 9·45, 3,439,000*l.*

Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 1,670,294·20 roubles, equals, at 9·45, 176,700*l.*

Remarks.—The present value of the sinking funds of these two loans is roughly estimated at 65,000*l.*, thus making amount of loan outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 3,374,000*l.*

3. Date of loan, 1910. Sinking fund, 15 years from 1913. Earliest date loan repayable, 21st March, 1928. Original amount, 314,281*l.* 16*s.* 4*d.* Rate of interest, 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 30,278*l.* 12*s.* 7*d.* Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 314,281*l.* 16*s.* 4*d.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. Indian gold loan, sterling, secured firstly on revenues of Caspian fisheries, then on revenues of posts and telegraphs, and in ultimate resort on customs receipts of Fars and Persian Gulf ports, including Mohammerah and Ahwaz. No alteration can be made in mode of payment without mutual consent.

Remarks.—Issued at par. Interest only (15,714*l.* 1*s.* 10*d.*) is payable till the 20th March, 1913.

4. Date of loan, 1911. Sinking fund, 15 years from July 1910. Earliest date loan repayable, 1925. Original amount, 1,111,100*l.* Annual amount needed for interest and sinking fund, 120,800*l.* Amount of loan outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 976,100*l.* (see Remarks).

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Krans consolidated, 60,000,000. Secured on customs receipts of Persia, excepting Fars and the Persian Gulf ports, but ranking after the gold loans of 1900 and 1912, and also after allocation to Cossack brigade and ex-Shah's civil list of together about 102,000*l.* per annum. The profits of the Imperial Persian Mint are pledged as a second security.

Remarks.—The annual amortisement is 6,524,559 krans. The value of the sinking fund at the 20th March, 1913, is roughly estimated at 135,000*l.*

5. Date of loan, 1911. Sinking fund, 50 years from 1916. Earliest date loan repayable, 1st January, 1917. Original amount, 1,250,000*l.* Rate of interest, 5 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 68,470*l.* Amount of loan outstanding at the 30th June, 1913, 1,250,000*l.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. Gold bonds sterling. Secured on customs revenues of Persian Gulf ports, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammerah, and Ahwaz, which are to be paid into the bank without other deduction than customs administrative charges. The free surplus to be handed back monthly. The telegraphs are a second charge up to 1928 in case of deficit. All these charges are subject to prior lien of 1910 loan.

Remarks.—Issued at 87½ per cent. Sinking fund estimated. Only interest is payable (62,500*l.* per annum) till 1916.

6. Date of loan, 1912. Sinking fund, years. Earliest date loan repayable, . Original amount, 140,000*l.* Rate of interest, 7 per cent. Annual amount needed for interest and sinking fund, (surplus southern customs revenue). Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 140,000*l.*

* NOTE.—The total is obtained from a Persian customs return; the amortisation of 1902 loan is deduced therefrom.

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. Anglo-Indian advance, March, August, October. Secured on Southern customs. Is to be repaid out of approaching loan, and until then the entire surplus of southern customs receipts is to be applied to amortisement.

Remarks.—Apparently only interest has been paid up to the 20th March, 1913. A similar Russian advance of 125,000*l.* appears to have been paid off in 1912–13. No arrears at 20th March, 1913.

7. Date of loan, May 1913. Sinking fund, 3 years. Earliest date loan repayable, . . . Original amount, 200,000*l.* Rate of interest, 7 per cent. Annual amount needed for interest and sinking fund, 75,000*l.* (a rough estimate). Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 200,000*l.*

Particulars.—Banque d'Escompte de Perse. Russian Government advance in roubles at 9'45½ per £. Secured on surplus of customs receipts of Persia, excepting Fars and Persian Gulf ports. Repayment to be made in six half-yearly instalments.

Remarks.—Nil.

8. Date of loan, May 1913. Sinking fund, 2½ years from July 1915. Earliest date repayable, . . . Original amount 200,000*l.* Interest, 7 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund, 92,500*l.* (*vide* Remarks). Amount of outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 200,000*l.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. His Britannic Majesty's Government advance. Secured on southern customs, and repayable out of proposed loan. If no loan made by the 1st July, 1915, the advance to be repaid by half-yearly instalments of 250,000 tomans each, beginning on that date out of surplus southern customs receipts, and in case of insufficiency to be met out of other revenues by the Persian Government.

Remarks.—(92,500*l.*), with amortisement of 92,500*l.* per annum, *i.e.*, 500,000 tomans per annum, the debt will be extinguished in about 2½ years. Presumably interest 14,000*l.* per annum will be paid till the 1st July, 1915.

9. Date of loan, May 1913. Sinking fund, . . . years. Earliest date repayable, . . . Original amount, 100,000*l.* Interest 7 per cent. Annual sum needed for interest and sinking fund (blank, originally 46,300*l.*, with a note "on the assumption that no customs revenues will be available till July 1918, and that the same proportional allocation is then made"). Amount of loan outstanding at 30th June, 1913, 100,000*l.*

Particulars.—Imperial Bank of Persia. His Britannic Majesty's Government advance for gendarmerie purposes. Secured on surplus of southern customs. To be repaid out of projected loan, and if no loan made, then repayable out of surplus of southern customs revenues after previous British Government advances of 340,000*l.* have been paid off.

Remarks.—Nil.

Totals.

	Original amount.			Annual amount needed.			Outstanding.		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Loans (1) and (2) ..	3,439,000	0	0	176,700	0	0	3,374,000	0	0
Loan (3)	314,281	16	4	30,278	12	7	314,281	16	4
Loan (4)	1,111,100	0	0	120,800	0	0	976,100	0	0
Loan (5)	1,250,000	0	0	68,470	0	0	1,250,000	0	0
Loan (6)	140,000	0	0	(surplus Southern customs revenue)			140,000	0	0
Loan (7)	200,000	0	0	75,000	0	0	200,000	0	0
Loan (8)	200,000	0	0	92,500	0	0	200,000	0	0
Loan (9)	100,000	0	0	?			100,000	0	0
	6,754,000	0	0*	563,600	0	0†	6,554,000	0	0

* 6,754,000*l.* shows total at March 20, 1913.

† And surplus southern customs revenues till British advance 1912 and 1913 paid off.

ANNEX I.—*Persian Customs Revenues for the Year 1912-3.*

(A.) Southern customs—

Revenues of Persian Gulf Ports, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammerah, and Ahwaz. Revenues for 1912-13, less administrative charges (amounting in all to 20,440*l.*)—

	£
The south (Persian Gulf)	80,310
Extreme south and Mekran (Bunder Abbas)	24,380
Arabistan	43,140
	147,830*

(B.) Northern customs—

Revenues of Persian customs other than southern customs as above. Revenues for 1912-13, less administrative charges (amounting in all to 57,970*l.*)—

	£
Azerbaijan	140,470
Talesh, Astara, Moghan	30,990
Gilan	186,150
Mazanderan	42,800
Astrabad	25,480
Khorasan-Seistan	63,310
Kermanshah-Kurdistan	69,100
Tehran	10,660
	568,960
Deduct Central Administration—	
Expenditure	8,470
Receipts	2,890
	5,580
	563,380'
Total net revenue, 1912-13	711,210

	1906-7.	1907-8.	1911-12.
* Net revenues.. .. .	£ 142,200	£ 189,800	£ 164,500
† Net revenues.. .. .	322,200	368,800	547,400
Totals	464,400	557,600	712,900

ANNEX II.—*Memorandum of Sums secured on the Persian Customs Revenue.*

(A.) Southern customs—

	£
Net revenue, 1912-12	147,830
Interest and sinking funds on external debt—	
Anglo-Indian Loan, 1910	£ 30,278 12 7
Sterling Gold Bonds, 1911 (interest)	62,500 0 0
(68,470 <i>l.</i> after 1915)	
Balance available	55,051 7 5
	147,830

NOTE.—This balance, if maintained, would serve to pay off in 1916 the British advance, 1912, 140,000*l.*, and the reduced amount (49,000*l.*) available after 1915 would liquidate by 1928 the remaining British advances, 1913, of 300,000*l.*, with arrears of interest.

(B.) Northern customs—

Net revenues, 1912-13	563,380
Interest and sinking funds on external debt, and allocations for	
Cossack brigade and ex-Shah's allowance—	£
Rouble Loans Gold, 1900 and 1902	176,700
Cossack Brigade	65,500
Ex-Shah's allowances	25,000
Krans Consolidated Loan, 1911	120,800
Sterling Loan, 1913 (terminates 1916)	75,000
	463,000
Balance available	100,380

Note of sums said to be customarily paid from customs revenues—

	£
European pensions and salaries	22,000
Sanitary Council	5,180
German school	2,200
Service of eight steamers	16,600
Coast Guard Gulf	2,960
Dues of Governor, Bushire	3,700
Dues of ports and customs officers, Meshed, Fars, and Astara	2,680
Cost of transferring customs funds from south	2,770
	58,400

ANNEX III.—Interest and Sinking Funds on Loans.

Banque d'Escompte—

	£
Gold Rouble Loans, 1900–1902	181,200
Krans Consolidated	120,800
Gold Loan, 1912 (principle?)	125,100
" " (interest)	5,400
	432,500

Imperial Bank of Persia—

	£
Gold Loan, 1911	64,700
Gold Loan, 1912 (interest)	7,900
Indian Gold Loan	17,000
	89,600
Floating debts to banks (interest)	5,000
Sundry debts (Daria Begi, Jehanian, &c.)	9,300
	536,400

ANNEX IV.—Expenses of Ministries.

1. National Assembly—	£
Travelling and other expenses	1,330
2. Prime Minister—	
Salary (2,000 <i>L.</i>), staff-office expenses	4,540
3. Ministry of War—	£
Central administration and European staff (2,400 <i>L.</i>)	6,200
Guards (Imperial, Regent's, legation, &c.)	7,450
Bakhtiari contingent	25,450
Arrears (of expenses)	3,250
Expeditions, sundry	81,300
Brigade, allocations and allowances	65,500
Army (arsenal, artillery, arms, accoutrements, &c.)	27,890
	217,040
4. Ministry of Interior—	
Central administration and M. de Morgny (1,240 <i>L.</i>)	8,860
Governorships (Tehran, 2,830 <i>L.</i> ; Ispahan, 2,030; Kerman-shah, 6,400 <i>L.</i> ; Kerman, 11,730 <i>L.</i> ; Shiraz, 22,400 <i>L.</i> ; Azerbaidjan, 16,700 <i>L.</i> ; and nine others, 7,930 <i>L.</i>)	65,170
Arrears	2,400
Civil guard (Nazmieh) (Tehran and provinces, 49,000 <i>L.</i> ; arrears, provincial, 1,930 <i>L.</i>)	50,930
Tehran Municipality	2,730
Extraordinary and other expenses	10,120
Imperial hospital	2,960
Sanitary council (allocation)	5,200
	148,370
5. Gendarmerie	154,730
6. Ministry of Finance—	
Staff (4,820 <i>L.</i>), Expenses (1,050 <i>L.</i>)	5,870
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs—	
Staff	13,740
Embassies (21,100 <i>L.</i>), and consulates (2,130 <i>L.</i>)	23,230
Pension (1,410 <i>L.</i>) and other expenses	6,550
	43,520
(Passport and chancery dues are collected, but not accounted for).	
8. Ministry of the Court—	
Court	50,600
Regent	5,850
Persian functionaries (3)	1,570
European " (4)	1,820
Grain deliveries (2,900 <i>L.</i>), travel, and motor expenses	4,210
	64,050

9. Ministry of Education—		£	£
Central administration		4,800	
Schools		5,160	
Students in Europe		3,375	
Teachers, European		3,440	
German school		2,220	
Other expenses and arrears (15%)		995	
			19,990
10. Ministry of Justice—			
Staff and M. Pernay (820L.)		14,310	
Expenses, travel, &c.		550	
			14,860
11. Ministry of Public Works—			
Minister (900L.), staff (880L.), M. de Brucq. (1,040L.)		2,820	
Construction, public service, and other expenses		1,180	
			4,000
Total			678,300

ANNEX V.—Expenses of Treasury-General.

		£
Staff		20,080
Buildings and furniture		1,290
Expenses, general		4,530
		25,900

ANNEX VI.—Expenses of Administrations.

I. Posts—		£
M. Molitor (1,300L.) and staff		4,530
Despatch of mails		11,200
Debt to Banque d'Escompte		1,050
Other expenses		6,010
		22,790
2. Telegraphs—		£
Staff (Mr. New, 800L.)		13,500
Adjustments (Indo, 6,400; posts, 3,040L.)		9,440
Materials, repairs, and other expenses		5,920
		28,860
3. Mint—		
Administration (salaries and allowances)		1,690
Working charges (wages, materials, &c.)		5,910
Upkeep (buildings, machinery, &c.)		1,700
Sundries		360
		9,660
4. Crown Domains (Khalisseh)—		
Staff (1,130L.) and other expenses (1,970L.)		3,100
5. Concessions committee—		
Allocations for eleven months		120
6. Ormuz oxide mines—		
Customs charges, Bunder Abbas		1,190
7. Customs administration—		
Payment to Sardar Seyed		280
		66,000

ANNEX VII.—Other Government Expenses.

Pensions—		£
Civil pensions (monthly)		19,740
Pensions on Tangouzil list		23,250
Pensions on 1912-13 list		9,960
Sundry pensions		5,580
Pension, ex-Shah		13,900
Advance, „		11,110
Pension of European employes (included arrears, 2,170L.)		7,120
		90,660
Extraordinary expenses (honorariums, indemnities, &c., for robbery)		2,400
Lamb-skin tax (Alioff's dues)		7,400
Marine service		3,400
Refund of robberies (Imperial Bank of Persia and Nazarguloff)		3,200
Other expenses (transfer of funds, &c.)		4,640
		111,700

ANNEX VIII.—Grants to Financial Agencies.

Provincial—		£	£
Azerbaijan	1,860	
Ispahan	2,330	
Kerman	2,230	
Kermanshah	5,560	
Meshed	2,130	
Shiraz (940 <i>l.</i>) and five other provinces	1,480	
			15,590
Tehran—			
Treasury-General (central)	14,190	
Opium	1,340	
Royal gardens	460	
Stamps	753	
Lamb-skin tax, offal tax, inspections	310	
Government grain stores—			
Cereals	55,150	
Flour	69,540	
Transport, commission, &c.	1,870	
		126,560	
			143,610
			159,200

ANNEX IX.—Audit of Accounts Current.

Toumaniantz Frères—		£	s.	d.
Amount due, March 21, 1912	20,733	4	3
" " 21, 1913	18,115	1	7
	Paid		2,618	2 8
Djehanian—		£	s.	d.
Amount due March 21, 1912	3,910	14	0
" " 20, 1913	1,688	9	8
			2,222	4 4
			4,840	7 0

ANNEX X.—Payments on account of Arbab Jamshid against the Government Drafts and Requisitions not yet in order.

		£
Payments to the Banque d'Escompte	14,785
" Ismail Khan	185
" Imperial Bank of Persia for interest due on the account of Arbab Jamshid (I.B.P. account, 180,000 tomans equals 33,333 <i>l.</i>)	1,330
		16,300

No. 296.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 28, 1913.

CUSTOMS receipts for first three months Persian year show increase of 41,247*l.*, or 20 per cent. over those for same period last financial year.

Increases are Northern Customs, 31,550*l.*, Tehran, 410*l.*, and Southern Customs, 1,287*l.*

No. 297.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 19th July: Option for Trans-Persian Railway.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether we were to understand that Russian Chargé d'Affaires would not be instructed to ask for option until

question of composition of joint commission had been settled. His Excellency replied in affirmative, but said that if we wished that option should be applied for at once he would consult Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

No. 298.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 1, 1913.

ON occasion of birthday Salaam to-day Shah announced it was proposed to hold elections for new Medjliss immediately: provincial Governors have been advised of this intention. I will report further upon issue of proclamation, which is announced for to-night.

No. 299.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 3, 1913.

MERGEWAR incident.

Mr. Smart telegraphs as follows from Tabriz, under date the 2nd August:—

“I have the honour to report fighting between Russian troops and Kurds in Mergawar district. One Russian officer and several soldiers have been killed. A large force of Russian troops is in the field, and the operations seem to be of an important nature.

“I am informed by my Russian colleague that Kurds had fired on and wounded some Russian soldiers in the vicinity of Urmia. The responsible chief was ordered to surrender the culprits, but, as he refused to do so, the present expedition was despatched against him.”

As reported in my telegram of the 7th July, the policy of entrusting the care of the evacuated area on the Turco-Persian frontier to certain local chieftains has, in the opinion of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, proved a failure.

No. 300.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 8, 1913.

MY telegram of 27th June.

A few days ago twelve gendarmes deserted at Shiraz. They were mujahids* who had joined the gendarmerie after the mujahids were disarmed at Tehran. Before escaping they broke into the arsenal and carried away several thousand rounds of ammunition as well as their rifles. They have taken refuge with Mohammed Ali Khan Kashkuli, who has been the chief instigator of all the troubles on the Bushire road. He refuses to surrender fugitives. As already reported, it is intended to conduct serious operations against this brigand in the autumn. It is clear that there will be no peace until he is wiped out.

No. 301.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 8, 1913.

STOCKHOLM telegram of 11th December last.†

Swedish Legation enquire whether His Majesty's Government have any objection to employment of three (or perhaps four) additional Swedish officials for Tehran police. I suppose there is no objection? Will your Russian colleague agree?

* Armed men.

† See "Persia, No. 1 (1913)," No. 465.

No. 302.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 28, 1913.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram of to-day's date, the customs receipts for the first three months of the Persian year show an increase of 41,247*l.*, or 20 per cent. over those for the corresponding period last year.

In the short statement, herewith enclosed, of the receipts of the various provinces, I would beg leave to call your attention to the very considerable increase in the Kermanshah figures; a satisfactory state of things, doubtless due to the fact that during the period in question the province enjoyed a lull from the rebellion which had done so much to hamper trade in North Persia.

It is especially satisfactory in view of the fact that a large volume of British trade enters Persia through that province.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 302.

Statement of Persian Customs Receipts.

	First 3 months of last year.	First 3 months of this year.	Increase
	£	£	£
Azerbaijan	36,111	43,920	7,809
Astara	8,779	9,624	845
Gilan	45,022	50,252	5,230
Mazanderan	13,056	13,252	196
Astrabad	8,500	9,137	637
Khorassan	19,646	23,908	4,262
Kermanshah	12,736	25,307	12,571
Total	31,550
Bushire	24,088	26,197	2,109
Arabistan	14,367	18,071	3,704
Abbassi	5,936	9,410	3,474
Total	9,287
Tehran	2,122	2,532	410
Grand Total	41,247

No. 303.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 29, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. George Anderson has made a sworn statement to the British vice-consul at Sultanabad concerning a recent attack on him in the district of Hamadan.

He states that on the 3rd June he and his servant travelled from Hamadan to Sultanabad by carriage, picking up the post and postman *en route*. About 2 miles out of Kerdakhond, about 10 p.m., several shots were fired at the side of the road and Mr. Anderson made the carriage stop. The carriage was then surrounded by men with rifles, and Mr. Anderson was forced to get out and kneel; his pockets were rifled, his coat taken, and the carriage ransacked. When he attempted to speak he was struck. Some fifteen minutes later the robbers left and Mr. Anderson was able to proceed. He did not see all the robbers himself, but his servant and the postman state that they were twelve in number, ten on foot and two mounted.

As soon as the incident occurred the British vice-consul at Sultanabad made the

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necessary prompt representations to the local authorities, who appear to have shown considerable zeal in endeavouring to recover the cash and effects which had been stolen, the value of which has been sworn at 91l. 6s.

My latest advices are that Mr. Moir hopes to get the claim settled in a few days' time.

I would propose, subject to your approval, to present to the Persian Government a special claim for 100l. as personal compensation for the wanton attack on Mr. Anderson, thus following the precedent set in numerous other cases of a similar nature.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 304.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 13, 1913.*
I HAVE received your despatch of the 29th ultimo, regarding the assault on Mr. G. Anderson near Sultanabad on the 3rd June last.

I approve your proposal to present to the Central Government a special claim of 100l. for personal compensation to Mr. Anderson on account of the wanton attack made on him.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 305.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, August 22, 1913.*
YOUR telegram of 8th August.
I see no objection to the request, and I understand from Russian Chargé d'Affaires that Russian Government have consented.

No. 306.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

Sir, *Tehran, August 2, 1913.*
I HAVE the honour to report that on the occasion of his birthday His Majesty the Shah held a reception of the Corps Diplomatique yesterday at his summer residence of Sahib Keranieh.

In his reply to the doyen's speech of congratulation in the morning, His Imperial Majesty alluded to the general improvement in the condition of Persia during the past year and drew attention to the remarkable increase in foreign trade as shown by the customs figures for the first three months of the year.

After stating that neither he nor his Government would spare any efforts in the direction of progress with a view to bringing about the regeneration of Persia on Constitutional lines, His Majesty announced that it was proposed to hold elections for a new Medjliss immediately.

I have, &c.
WALTER TOWNLEY.

* The value of the goods stolen from Mr. Anderson has since been refunded to him.

No. 307.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 4, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 307.

*Monthly Summary of Events in Persia.**Tehran.*

Diplomatic Movements.—Sadr-ed-Din Bey, the new Turkish Ambassador, arrived at Tehran on the 15th of July and presented his credentials to the Shah on the following day.

Shah's Birthday.—The Shah's birthday was celebrated on the 1st August in the usual manner.

General Elections.—A proclamation was issued by the Government on the Shah's birthday announcing a general election for the Medjliss and foreshadowing the opening of a Senate as well. The elections are to begin shortly after the 4th September at Tehran.

The Cabinet.—Prince Arfa'-ed-Dowleh has arrived at Tehran, but the question of his post in the Cabinet is still in suspense.

Treasurer-General.—M. Mornard proposes to go to Europe on short leave, but has not fixed the date of his departure yet.

Resht.

M. Ovseenko, formerly Russian consul at Kazvin, has been appointed Russian consul-general at Resht in the place of M. Necrassof.

Owing to M. Necrassof's pending departure, the Sheriat Medar has left with his family for Russia; also Mufakher-ul-Mulk, who has been the Rais-el-Nazmieh for the past twenty months, has resigned his appointment, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants. Muffaher-ul-Mulk was appointed Russian consular agent for Talish, but, as he was given so hostile a reception at Kerganrud while on his way to take up his post, he returned to Enzeli.

Meshed.

The Turkomans, who for some time past have been in possession of the road between Shahrud and Abbasabad, have withdrawn across the border, and some of the Amir-i-Azam's sowars have taken over this portion of the road, ostensibly as road-guards. These men are unpaid, and are said to be demanding "rahdari" at extraordinary high rates.

In spite of the Russian commandant's successful action against Juju and his following, as reported in last month's summary, the Kuchan and Sabzewar districts are apparently again beset by parties of robbers.

The Russian Bank has entered into negotiations with the present holder of the concession for the Meshed-Askhabad road, with a view to buying him out and constructing a new road from Meshed to Kuchan, and thence viâ Darragez to Artik on the Central Asian Railway.

The Adil-ud-Dowleh, who was found to have been implicated in various robberies in the neighbourhood of Turbat, has been dismissed from the Governorship of that place.

No fresh cases of supposed plague have been reported from Karez since the 23th June.

Ispahan.

The condition of the town remains much the same as reported in last month's summary, but that of the environs is apparently becoming worse owing to the notorious

Seichani gang. Although the band lost two of their ringleaders in an engagement with some of the Governor's sowars on the 28th June, a week later they robbed a caravan only six miles from Ispahan and carried off 5,000 krans and some merchandise. The Governor-General has sent out parties of sowars to round up the robbers, but so far without success.

Owing to the general insecurity prevailing in the environs and to the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Julfa, His Majesty's consul-general is urging the removal of the present "Zabit" of Seichan and Julfa, as he is not only incapable of maintaining order in the district under his jurisdiction, but is also in league with the robbers.

The majority of the roads in the province itself appear to be secure, with the exception of the roads in the vicinity of Sultanabad and the road between Kumisheh and Mahyar.

Three local Persian firms started an issue of bank-notes some three or four weeks ago. As this was an infringement of the concession granted to the Imperial Bank of Persia, His Majesty's consul-general brought the matter to the notice of the authorities and demanded the withdrawal of the notes.

The unsatisfactory state of affairs in Sultanabad and in the outlying district still continues, but as the Government gendarmerie has lately established a post in the town an improvement in the situation may be expected.

The people of Kashan are very much distressed on account of the treatment they receive at the hands of Naib Hussain and his followers, and especially at the latest act of aggression committed by Naib Hussain's son, namely, the kidnapping of one Agha Ali, a mullah, whose whereabouts are still unknown.

Shiraz.

The Kavam-ul-Mulk returned to Shiraz on the 3rd August after a very successful expedition against the Arab tribes who, for some time past, have been the chief factors in promoting anarchy in the province.

The roads to Bushire and Ispahan are open, and, in the opinion of the acting British consul, the present state of Fars generally is as satisfactory as could reasonably be expected.

On the 24th June an incident occurred showing that Soulet-ed-Dowleh's assurances regarding the handing over of the men implicated in the attack on the Central India Horse are not to be taken too seriously. Two of the men who took part in the attack, and whose surrender had been demanded, were brought to the gate of the consulate by some of Soulet-ed-Dowleh's sowars. The acting British consul refused to admit them as he feared they would demand "bast," but telephoned to the Governor-General and asked him to take the necessary steps to apprehend them. The Governor-General sent his ferrashes to the consulate to seize the two men. In the meanwhile, however, one Kaferidun, a man of some importance, rode away with the assent and connivance of Soulet's sowars. The other man remained behind and was taken into custody by the ferrashes.

On the night of the 31st July twelve gendarmes deserted, taking with them their rifles, horses, and several rounds of ammunition. A party has been sent out in pursuit, but has not yet been able to locate the whereabouts of the deserters.

Seistan.

As it has transpired that Hissam-ed-Dowleh and his son, Hashmat-ul-Mulk, are the instigators of the Baluch raids and other acts of aggression in Seistan and in the Kainat, His Majesty's Legation is pressing the Central Government to expel them from the district. They are at present residing at Birjand with Shaukat-ul-Mulk, the Governor of the Kainat. The Minister of the Interior, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister, has summoned all three to Tehran, but, as they have so far not obeyed these instructions, further pressure is being brought to bear upon them.

Kerman.

The Amir-i-Mufakham, the Governor-General, has returned to Kerman on completion of his tour through the province. He apparently has come to some understanding with several former recalcitrant chiefs, and has succeeded in collecting a certain amount of arrears of revenue.

Etemad-ul-Mulk, whose appointment as Deputy-Governor of Kerman was cancelled (*vide* last month's summary), reached Kerman, in spite of orders from the Minister of the Interior to return to Tehran. On hearing that Etemad-ul-Mulk was actually on his way to Kerman, His Majesty's consul proposed that one Amir-i-Hashmat should be appointed Deputy-Governor. The Governor-General agreed, and the Central Government confirmed the appointment.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh surrendered on 17th July to the Russian officer commanding the force of Persian Cossacks, which the Central Government despatched against him from Tehran. Two or three days later Salar asked the Russian officer for permission to visit his camp on parole. The permission was granted, and Salar broke his parole and escaped.

The prince's present whereabouts are not known, neither is there any information at hand as to whether the force of Cossacks is pursuing him or not.

Bakhtiari Country.

The two Bakhtiari khans sent from Tehran to Sardar Jang, to reason with him and to try and induce him not to resign his appointment as Governor of Bakhtiaristan, were successful in their mission.

No. 308.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 4, 1913.

THE proclamation regarding a general election, announced by the Shah in his speech to the Diplomatic Body on the 1st instant, as reported in my despatch of the 2nd instant, has now been published.

It is prefaced by two firmans dated the 23rd December, 1911, one in the name of the Shah and the other signed by the Regent.

The proclamation, which is dated the 1st August, 1913, and is signed by his Highness Ain-ed-Dowleh, the Minister of the Interior, refers to the necessity of the deputies of the Medjliss being given a mandate by the country for the revision of the Constitution. There is as yet no machinery by which it would be possible to gauge the preponderating balance of public opinion for or against a modification of the fundamental laws, which were originally framed for the purpose of clipping the wings of a despotic and much hated sovereign. I refer, of course, to Mohammed Ali, the ex-Shah. At any rate, this proclamation will empower the next Medjliss to proceed to the much-needed modification of the fundamental laws.

The proclamation goes on to foreshadow the convocation of a Senate, the regulations for which will, it is announced, be prepared beforehand and presented to the Medjliss for ratification as soon as the Assembly meets.

The elections will be conducted on the basis of the last electoral law, a translation of which was enclosed in Sir G. Barclay's despatch of the 22nd November, 1911.*

The proclamation finally announces that the committee for the supervision of the elections will be formed in Tehran on the 4th September, and in the provinces a month after the receipt of the necessary instructions and documents.

It may be presumed, therefore, that the election should be in full swing towards the end of September, and that in October or early in November there should be a quorum in Tehran which would permit of the opening of the Medjliss to be followed by the Senate.

But it should be remembered that the present electoral law provides for only 15 members for Tehran, while Azerbaijan is given 19, Khorassan 15, Mazanderan 5, and Gilan 6, or a total of 45 for the extremely doubtful northern provinces, the rest

* See "Persia, No. 4 (1912)," No. 297.

being made up chiefly of deputies who have come from outlying places, such as Fars, Arabistan, Kerman, &c.

It seems, therefore, justifiable to be somewhat sceptical as to the possibility of a quorum of sixty-nine members being able to meet at the capital before the end of the year, unless resort is had to a former practice of choosing the majority of the deputies from among the professional politicians of Tehran, of whom there are always a great number available.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 309.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 5, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the caravan reports from His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz for the month of July:—

Bushire—	Previous month.
Mules arriving and leaving Bushire	2,511
Donkeys arriving and leaving via the Shahi road	1,036
The Borasjun sub-report shows a movement of—	
Mules to Bushire	2,767
Mules from Bushire	2,633
Shiraz—	
Animals arriving by the Bushire road	2,535
Animals left by the Bushire road	1,566
Animals left Shiraz by the Ispahan road	2,120
Arrivals at Shiraz by the same road	594

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports a robbery of three bales of piece-goods, value 352 tomans (about 75*l.*), belonging to Messrs. Sassoon, on the Dilam-Behbahan road in the Zeidun district, the robbers being a well-known band living on the Konar Takhteh Plain.

The acting British consul at Shiraz reports no robberies on the main roads, but states that there has been some pilfering of local traffic round Abadeh.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 310.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 8, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 5th instant, reporting caravan statistics from His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz for the month of July, I have the honour to report that Major O'Connor now informs me by telegraph, that during that month a British-Indian subject travelling to Shiraz from Bushire was robbed at Jaafferjin of all his personal belongings.

It was reported from Abadeh on the 5th August that the postal sowar from Ispahan had been robbed by Shishbulukis 2 miles south of Yezdikhast; the robbers took his horse and post-bags and stripped him of everything.

The Swedish officer in command of the gendarmerie at Shiraz has, in consequence of this incident, sent a small force of about fifty mounted men to Abadeh to patrol the main road in that neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 311.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 28, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH has reached Kermanshah, and has taken bast at the Russian consulate.

No. 312.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 7, 1913.

MY telegram of 3rd August.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires tells me there has been a sharp skirmish at Tergavar in territory on Turco-Persian frontier recently evacuated by Turkey between Turkish regulars, who had crossed frontier, and Russian troops. Kurdish tribal chiefs appear to be at the bottom of the mischief, which Russian Chargé d'Affaires anticipates will easily be arranged, as both Russia and Turkey are ready to withdraw their support from rival brigand chiefs, who have misused the same.

No. 313.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 12, 1913.

I HAVE received following telegram from the acting British consul at Tabriz of the 12th September:—

“Five fedais who recently returned to Tabriz have been arrested by Shuja-ed-Dowleh, and one of them was executed on the 10th September. Motive of their return appears to have been simply their families and possessions, which are here. There is nothing to indicate that they took any especially prominent part in former events, or had any intention of stirring up trouble in Tabriz.

“When the news of the execution reached me, I visited Russian consul. Subsequently I sent my mirza to Shuja's secretary to ask why the man had been executed, and whether the Governor-General intended to hang any of the other four prisoners. I added that I sought this information in order not to send an incorrect report to my legation. In reply I was informed that murders and not political grounds were the reason of the execution, and that none of the other prisoners would be killed.

“I have to-day written to Russian consul, who returned yesterday to the country, urging him in the name of humanity to exercise his great influence to restrain the Governor-General. A painful impression is created among the European colony here by such executions of fedais forced probably by want to return to their homes.”

No. 314.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 14, 1913.

MY telegram of the 12th September.

I have received following further telegram from the acting British consul at Tabriz of the 13th September:—

“Russian consul has answered my letter in a very friendly spirit, assuring me that he will do his best to dissuade Shuja-ed-Dowleh from ‘useless severity.’

“My enquiry appears to have alarmed Shuja, for he quite gratuitously sent a representative to the consulate last night to convey to me assurances of his affection. I think we have now reason to hope that no further executions will take place.”

I venture to suggest that I may be authorised to approve Mr. Smart's action in this matter.

No. 315.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 14, 1913.

CAPTAIN WILSON leaves for Hamadan to-morrow. Reports recently received from Burujird show that province of Luristan is in state of great disorder, but Captain Wilson is sanguine that he can get through all right.

I have impressed on him that he should examine situation very carefully on his arrival at Burujird, and that he should not proceed further unless he can satisfy himself that he can do so without running undue risk.

No. 316.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 15, 1913.

TWO hundred gendarmes, with two Maxims under three Swedish officers, left to-day for Kerman viâ Ispahan and Yezd.

No. 317.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 16, 1913.

AN unfortunate incident has occurred at Shiraz. A gendarme killed a Seyyid on the night of the 10th. The murderer was arrested by the police, and was condemned to death by the civil court, after a travesty of a trial at which no Swedish officer was invited to be present. Hearing that the man would probably be executed, Captain Lundberg called on the Governor-General and requested that nothing should be done until his Excellency had seen the Swedish officer commanding. This was agreed upon and an hour fixed for interview. Upon Major Uggla's arrival at the time appointed, he learnt that the man had already been executed. Much incensed at this breach of faith, the two Swedish officers marched a body of gendarmerie into the citadel, and one of them with a number of armed Persian officers of the gendarmerie entered the Governor-General's presence and demanded the corpse, which was handed over. For this breach of etiquette the Swedish officer commanding has apologised to the Governor-General in the presence of the acting consul.

No. 318.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 17, 1913.

REGENT reached Enzeli this morning.

No. 319.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 17, 1913.

PRIME Minister informs me that an arrangement has been made between Persian Government and Russian Legation under which Salar-ed-Dowleh is to receive a pension of 10,000 tomans, about 1,800*l.*, per annum, an outfit allowance of 600*l.*, and is to reside in Switzerland, where his pension will be paid to him through Russian Legation. He forfeits his pension and Russian good-will if he returns to Persia. He has only one large property remaining, which is mortgaged to Russian Bank for a debt of about 50,000*l.* It is further secured on guarantee of a bankrupt Parsee banker whose affairs have been taken over by Persian Government.

I understand that Prince will be deported with Russian assistance if he does not accept the conditions made for him.

No. 320.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram of the 14th September: Tabriz.
Acting British consul's action approved.

No. 321.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 18, 1913.

MY telegram of 16th September: Shiraz incident.

Colonel commanding the gendarmerie here asserts that Seyyid's death was the result of an accident, and he was not deliberately murdered.

The Prime Minister tells me that members of the Cabinet consider Governor-General's own report of the incident shows him to have acted wrongly.

No. 322.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 25, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a most unfortunate affray between Bakhtiaris, police, and gendarmes occurred in Tehran on the 7th instant, with the loss of several lives on each side. It has been evident for some months past that the presence of this armed force in Tehran claiming to be in the service of the Government would lead to trouble, sooner or later, with the official representatives of public order, who, in the performance of their duties, have on various occasions been brought into conflict with the somewhat undisciplined Bakhtiaris, whom the Government were loth to coerce, in view of the signal services they have rendered the State in the immediate past.

A trivial incident in which some Bakhtiaris sided with a disturber of the public peace on the previous evening brought about the collision. It is not of vital importance as to which side was right and which wrong on that occasion, although the khans are ready, I believe, to admit that their men were in the wrong. The incident occurred, unfortunately, at the beginning of Ramazan when the people, who have fasted all day, are prone to excesses at night. What was significant of the state of tension between the two parties was the rapidity with which recourse was had to the use of fire-arms. Although one or more Bakhtiaris were killed and a policeman wounded, the night affray appeared destined to have no more unfortunate results.

Soon after the day broke it was, however, clear that the news of what had occurred had spread among the Bakhtiaris, and had created a spirit of bitter resentment. The streets became full of armed tribesmen galloping about in great excitement. Policemen and gendarmes were attacked and beaten, public order being so seriously threatened that the Swedish police officers, feeling that their newly-organised levies were unable to cope with the situation, applied to the gendarmes to come to their assistance. Unfortunately they neglected to inform the Minister of the Interior of the step they had taken, and consequently the subsequent demonstration of the gendarmerie was made without the knowledge or approval of the responsible authorities of the Government. Colonel Hjalmarson, who was lying ill in the French Legation in the country, was not in Tehran at the time. His orders were sought by one of the senior Swedish instructors, but he was only able to judge of the gravity of the situation by the report given to him of what was occurring.

It is clear that the Persian authorities were fully alive to the situation, because the Under-Secretary of the Interior and the Governor of the town went to the house of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, the chief Bakhtiari khan in Tehran, before noon, and arranged with his Excellency that the Bakhtiari horsemen who were massed in the neighbourhood of his house should be ordered to disperse and return peacefully to their dwellings. Meanwhile, in ignorance of what had occurred at Samsam's house, the Swedish

gendarmerie officers had decided that a demonstration must be made with all their force, supported by Maxims. I understand from Colonel Hjalmarson that the intention was to seize certain strategic points in the town, and hold them until order had been completely restored, and that no resistance or attack was anticipated for a moment. To effect this purpose the troops from Bagh-i-Shah entered the town by the western gate, whilst those from the other barracks at Jusefabad entered by a north-western gate. Both parties advanced by an encircling movement on the quarter of the town inhabited by the Bakhtiariis.

As the troops from Bagh-i-Shah marched down to the gun square they were fired upon by Bakhtiariis ensconced in a caravanseraï. One or more gendarmes fell dead, and the order was issued to capture the caravanseraï. This was done with a loss to the Bakhtiariis of two killed, and ten taken prisoners. As soon as the firing was heard street fighting between the two parties became general, and it is wonderful that the loss of life was not much greater. After unsuccessful pourparlers with Sardar Mohtashem, ex-Minister of War, and Sardar Bahadur, a son of Sardar Assad, who won his spurs under the late Yeprim Khan, who had hurried to town from Shimran on the receipt of news of the disturbance, Major Glimstedt, who was in command of the gendarmes, threatened to bring up the Maxims unless peace was restored, under a condition that all the Bakhtiariis should surrender their arms by a certain hour. As the time approached he proceeded to the house of Samsam-es-Sultaneh, whither the other khans had preceded him, causing meanwhile Maxims to be trained on the house, and his men disposed for a general assault on the Bakhtiari quarter.

The conditions were accepted a few minutes before the limit expired, and all the Bakhtiariis present with arms in their possession were disarmed by their own khans, such of them as had pistols, &c., that they had not given up being relieved of the same by the police and gendarmes. A delay of two days was given within which the Bakhtiariis in Tehran should surrender their arms to their chiefs. The fact that guns were actually trained upon the house of the late president of the Council under the very walls of the British Legation, and that when the disturbance was over the gendarmerie band paraded the main street of the town, in which are the residences of the leading Bakhtiari khans, caused much resentment.

As soon as we heard of what had happened, M. Sabline and I took council together as to what would be the best course to pursue, in order to secure a satisfactory settlement of the incident, and to safeguard against a repetition of a similar one. We decided that Mr. Churchill and M. Lissovsky, the Oriental secretaries of our respective legations, should call upon the Bakhtiari khans the following morning, and represent to them our regret and astonishment that the Bakhtiariis should have come to blows with the representatives of public order. We instructed Mr. Churchill and M. Lissovsky to use forcible language in making this communication to the khans, in order that they might fully understand that the gendarmes had the support of the two legations. They also impressed upon the khans that the conditions imposed by the Swedish instructors must be carried out, and that the khans would be held responsible for any further disturbance that might occur, since it had now been clearly shown that it was most undesirable that armed men, whether in the employment of the Government or not, should continue to parade the streets of Tehran. The Swedish officers were for the most part of opinion that the ten Bakhtiariis who had opened fire upon the gendarmes and had subsequently been taken prisoners should be shot. M. Sabline and I were unable to share this opinion, not because we did not agree that an exemplary example ought to be made, but because we considered that such an act would intensify the bad feeling between the Bakhtiariis and the gendarmes, and might lead to reprisals and further disturbances in other parts of the country.

The khans who were naturally somewhat sore in consequence of the incidents of the previous day, refused to recognise that their men had been to blame, but after some argument, agreed that the conditions made the previous afternoon should be carried out to the letter, and that the final settlement of the question should be left to the Government. There is reason to believe that the khans resented the severity of the language used, but it was a moment for plain speaking, and in the heat of the exciting immediate events the khans themselves failed to realize what a disastrous situation would have been created for Persia had their men defeated the gendarmes. Their thoroughly correct attitude during the subsequent proceedings showed that, in calmer moments, they grasped the extreme gravity of the unfortunate affair.

As it appeared to M. Sabline and to myself that it was our duty to keep the Cabinet advised of the step we had deemed it desirable to take, we instructed Mr. Churchill and M. Lissovsky to call upon the president of the Council and the

Minister of the Interior at the Shah's summer palace, where the Cabinet was assembled, to consider what action should be taken. Their visit was well-timed, because the members of the Cabinet were naturally somewhat perplexed as to which course to pursue. On the one side stood the powerful Bakhtiari, who have recently done so much to establish the constitutional régime in Persia, and whose chieftains have occupied and are still holding some of the most important positions in the State; on the other side stood the Swedish gendarmerie instructors, who have already done such valuable work in restoring order, and thereby enabling the resources of the country to come in. It was most inexpedient, impolitic, and ungrateful to offend the one, whereas not to support the other meant undermining the foundations of the slender edifices on which so much hope has been placed for the future regeneration of Persia. A rebuff to the gendarmerie under the circumstances must have entailed the resignation of all the Swedish officers, and the total loss of all the money that has been spent during the last two years on an administration that gives fair promise of future success.

The Minister of the Interior showed great resentment that he had not been advised on the previous day of what the gendarmes proposed to do, but after considerable hesitation he accepted the explanation that there was no time to inform his Highness of what had occurred after the gendarmes had been fired upon by the Bakhtiari. Any hesitation at such a moment would have spread dismay in the ranks of the gendarmes, and a disaster with most far-reaching consequences might have resulted. Ain-ed-Dowleh still grumbled about the indifference to their official superiors shown on this and many previous occasions by the Swedish officers, but when his Highness understood that the two legations considered that the gendarmerie must be supported, he changed his attitude, and agreed that this most recent incident had proved conclusively that it constituted a danger to peace and order for armed men to ride and walk about the streets of Tehran, when not on duty. It is perhaps not surprising that the tone of the Cabinet was hostile to the gendarmes, when the two Oriental secretaries reached the palace, but after the opinion of the two legations was known, a more statesmanlike view was taken of the situation.

The Prime Minister called upon me on the following afternoon and expressed himself as extremely apprehensive of what might happen. His Highness appeared much perturbed about threats made by the Bakhtiari khans of leaving Tehran with all their men, one of the most influential of them having declared that he would become a brigand and highway robber. I said that his Highness must not pay too much heed to threats uttered at a moment when the warlike khans must necessarily be very sore at an incident which had resulted in the framing of a condition that no Bakhtiari, when off duty, could any longer carry arms in the streets of Tehran. I pointed out that such a condition, however necessary they might feel it to be, could not be other than galling and humiliating to this proud tribe, but I expressed my conviction that when tempers got cooler the khans would regret words spoken in haste, and that it would be found that they would be quite as ready as before to continue to render valuable service to the State. I added that I had asked them all to meet me at the house of Sardar Assad that very evening, and that I would keep him informed of what passed. Ala-es-Sultaneh replied that he too was due to go there directly after his visit to me, but that, as I was going, he would postpone his visit until the following day.

Occasion had been taken on the previous evening to impress upon the Swedish officers in the presence of the Cabinet that they must not forget that they are servants of the Crown, and that they must observe proper respect for the Minister from whom they depend. I called on Colonel Hjalmarson after seeing Ala-es-Sultaneh, and explained to him that it appeared to me that the only way of ensuring the success of the gendarmerie was for the instructors to consult and concert with the local authorities. The colonel expressed his agreement with this view.

I had previously arranged with M. Sabliné that I would call upon the Bakhtiari khans alone, but what I proposed to say to them had his full concurrence. Upon my arrival at Sardar Assad's country house, I found the Sardar himself with Samsam-es-Sultaneh, Sardar Mohtashem, and Sardar Bahadur. The opening stages of the conversation were not easy, because the chieftains were clearly still much incensed about what had occurred, and resented bitterly the humiliation which they felt they were suffering. Each in turn endeavoured to show that the gendarmes, and not the Bakhtiari had been in the wrong. I explained what had occurred, as it had been reported to me, and made them understand that the question of right or wrong was not the vital one. What was clear was that the Bakhtiari had opposed the official representatives of order in the execution of their duty, that most regrettable loss of life had ensued, and that it appeared to me almost a miracle that more valuable lives had not been sacrificed in a

foolish fratricidal affray between Persians. This incident, following upon previous ones, and the generally truculent attitude of their horsemen, which amounted not infrequently to insolence and menace towards foreigners, had made it clear to me that the Bakhtiaris must no longer frequent the streets of the town armed. They had proved that they could not be trusted, and they must be punished. This embargo against carrying arms in the streets should apply to all and everyone, I added, and not to the Bakhtiaris alone.

After a somewhat lengthy, but entirely friendly conversation, Sardar Assad suddenly exclaimed "We will abide by what the British Minister tells us to do."

I at once answered that the matter had already received my serious consideration; that there was no need for me to assure them that, in arriving at the conclusion to which I had come, I had been influenced by my deep feelings of friendship for themselves, tempered by my conviction that the future of Persia depended in no small degree upon the success or failure of the gendarmerie scheme. I reminded them that I had warned them before through Samsam-es-Sultaneh that a repetition of the affrays between gendarmes and Bakhtiaris must inevitably result in the departure of the latter from Tehran. Now, after what has occurred, it seemed to me that they must agree that no Bakhtiaris, when off duty, should be seen armed in the streets; that their numbers in Tehran must be largely reduced; that the actual number should be fixed by the Government, and that it appeared to me immaterial whether they were 200 or 300; that those who remained should be formed into a regular regiment under their own officers, with one or more foreign instructors if considered desirable; that they should live in barracks or caravanserai outside the town; that their arms should be kept in an armoury when not required for drill or parade; that until such time as the armoury was ready the rifles, &c., should be kept in the houses of the khans themselves, who would be held responsible that they were not used improperly; that each khan should be allowed to have a suitable armed escort to accompany his carriage or himself on horseback; that the Bakhtiaris in Tehran over and above the number fixed by the Government as necessary should return to their own country; that the manner of their departure should be arranged subsequently, but that they must leave in small parties under the command of responsible khans; that they should be allowed to carry arms on the road since they would otherwise be at the mercy of their many enemies, but that the khans should go guarantee for their good behaviour.

I then said that they were probably aware that the Swedish officers considered that the ten men captured in the caravanserai should be shot as rebels, in accordance with military law. I added that my Russian colleague and I were of opinion—which had been confirmed by my Government—that these men should not be shot, but we considered that they should be suitably punished. On being asked what I considered would be a suitable punishment, I replied that I was not sufficiently conversant with Persian customs to commit myself to an opinion, but that it was a question that would be better settled when the excitement of the moment had settled down.

The khans at once declared their readiness to comply with the suggestions put forward, and sought my good offices to ensure the regular payment of the salaries of the men kept at Tehran. A perusal of the accompanying translation of the conditions finally drawn by the Cabinet, and accepted by the khans and the colonel commanding the gendarmerie, will serve to show that the former loyally abided by the assurances given me. They have been as loyal in the manner in which they carried out the disarmament of their men, and the first detachment of thirty Bakhtiaris duly left Tehran on Monday, the 18th instant, followed by second and third detachments at the intervals agreed upon. No mention is made in the agreement of the housing and payment of the 300 men left, but I understand that the necessary arrangements are being made.

Both the khans and the Cabinet realised how important it was that an agreement should be reached without loss of time. Telegraphic reports received from the provinces showed that no small effervescence had been caused at Ispahan, Yezd, Kerman, and in Bakhtiaristan by the receipt of the news of what had occurred at Tehran. Any delay might have created a most serious situation, as from the telegrams above referred to it was evident that preparations were at once set on foot for taking reprisals on the gendarmes, and for despatching considerable bodies of men to Tehran. It may be hoped that all danger of further collisions at Tehran between the gendarmes and the Bakhtiaris has been averted, but there must continue to be some fear that incidents may occur in the provinces, unless the Swedish instructors exercise considerable tact. The Bakhtiari khans have repeatedly assured me how fully they realise the importance that the gendarmerie should succeed. I believe in the genuineness of their assurances, but it is too much to expect that the rank and file will readily

forget an incident that has, in their opinion, humiliated a tribe that has of late years made itself all-powerful, and furnished the only fighting force upon which the Government could rely.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 322.

Conditions drawn up by Persian Government.

(Traduction.)

A SA séance de la veille du 10 Ramazan, 1331, en présence de MM. les Sardars Mohtachem et Bahadour et le Colonel Hjalmarson, le Conseil des Ministres a approuvé les dispositions suivantes :—

1. Cinq cent cinquante cavaliers bakhtiari de la force actuelle de 850 rentreront dans leurs foyers, et le contingent stationné à Téhéran sera restreint au chiffre de 300.

2. Les détachements de Bakhtiari quittant la capitale se composeront, chacun, de trente hommes au plus. Le premier groupe se mettra en marche le lundi 27 asad, et chaque unité subséquente de trente hommes partira une fois tous les deux jours, c'est-à-dire le 29 asad, le 31 et ainsi de suite. Ces détachements ne devront pas se concentrer dans une localité quelconque avant d'avoir rejoint leur tribu. Ils seront tenus de quitter Téhéran par la route de Hazraté Abdol Azim, et au moment de franchir la barrière un laissez-passer leur sera remis par les soins de la gendarmerie. Chaque Bakhtiari sortant de la capitale par cette voie portera au moins un fusil ; il aura même le droit d'avoir avec lui d'autres armes. Leurs chefs s'engagent, cependant, à veiller à ce que les Bakhtiari ne troublent pas en route la sécurité publique.

3. L'effectif de la cavalerie bakhtiari à Téhéran ne dépassera pas le chiffre de 300, à moins que le Conseil des Ministres n'en décide autrement. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement édictait l'augmentation du nombre de ces cavaliers, cette décision devra être signalée, au préalable, par l'entremise du Ministère de l'Intérieur à l'Administration de la Gendarmerie. Les armes et les cartouches des cavaliers bakhtiari seront déposées et mises sous clef chez leurs Excellences Samsam-es-Saltaneh, Sardaré Mohtachem et Sardaré Bahadour dans un délai expirant le jeudi 23 asad, et leurs Excellences s'engagent personnellement à ne point remettre lesdites armes aux Bakhtiari ou autres sans l'autorisation du Conseil des Ministres. Dans le cas où le Conseil décidait à faire remettre aux Bakhtiari les armes précitées, cette résolution sera communiquée d'avance par les soins du Ministère de l'Intérieur aux Services de la Gendarmerie et de la Police. Le port d'armes en ville et dehors de la ville est en général interdit, à moins que les Bakhtiari ne soient envoyés en mission par ordre du Conseil des Ministres, et dans pareille éventualité la mission qui leur serait confiée sera préalablement notifiée à la gendarmerie par le canal du Ministère de l'Intérieur. Les chefs bakhtiari disposeront en tout de vingt-cinq cavaliers armés, qui leur serviront d'escortes, et chaque khan n'aura pas plus de quatre cavaliers armés à sa suite. La gendarmerie et la police auront le droit de confisquer les armes portées par des Bakhtiari autres que les escortes susmentionnées.

4. Dans le cas où les agents de police ou les gendarmes, soit en ville, soit en dehors de l'enceinte de la ville, se trouvaient obligés de réprimer un désordre quelconque, les Bakhtiari n'auront pas à intervenir, même s'il s'agissait de leurs camarades.

5. Si la gendarmerie et la police se procuraient la certitude que les chefs bakhtiari ou leurs cavaliers agissaient contrairement aux stipulations des articles 1^{er}, 2 et 3 ci-dessus, le service de la gendarmerie aura le droit de contrôler lui-même le dépôt des armes en question.

(Translation.)

AT a meeting on the eve of the 10th day of Ramazan, 1331, in the presence of Sardars Mohtashem and Bahadur and of Colonel Hjalmarson, the Cabinet approved the following arrangements :—

1. Five hundred and fifty Bakhtiari horsemen of the present force of 850 shall return to their homes, and the contingent stationed at Tehran shall be limited to 300.

2. The detachments of Bakhtiari leaving the capital shall each be composed of thirty men at the most. The first group shall march on Monday, the 27th Assad, and each

subsequent unit of thirty men shall leave every two days, *i.e.*, the 29th Assad, the 31st, and so on. These detachments shall not join together anywhere before rejoining their tribe. They shall leave Tehran by the Hazrate Abdol Azim road, and on passing the barrier a free pass shall be handed them by the gendarmerie. Each Bakhtiari leaving the capital by this road shall carry at least a rifle; he shall also have the right to have with him other arms. Their chiefs undertake that the Bakhtiari shall not disturb the public peace whilst on the road.

3. The effective force of Bakhtiari horsemen at Tehran shall not exceed 300 unless the Cabinet decides otherwise. In the event of the Government deciding upon an increase in the number of these horsemen, such decision shall be communicated beforehand to the headquarters of the gendarmerie through the Ministry of the Interior. The arms and cartridges of the Bakhtiari horsemen shall be handed over and locked up at the houses of their Excellencies Samsam-es-Saltaneh, Sardaré Mohtashem, and Sardaré Bahadur within a period ending on Thursday, the 23rd Assad, and their Excellencies personally undertake not to hand over the said arms to the Bakhtiari or others without the authorisation of the Cabinet. Should the Cabinet decide to have the above-mentioned arms handed over to the Bakhtiari, such decision shall first be communicated by the Ministry of the Interior to the gendarmerie and police forces. The carrying of arms both within and without the town is generally forbidden, except in the case of Bakhtiari sent on a mission by order of the Cabinet, and in such event the mission entrusted to them shall first be notified to the gendarmerie by the Ministry of the Interior. The Bakhtiari chiefs shall retain twenty-five armed horsemen in all, who shall be employed as their escort, and each chief shall not have more than four armed horsemen attached to him. The gendarmerie and the police shall have the right to confiscate any arms carried by Bakhtiari other than the escorts mentioned above.

4. Should the police or gendarmes find themselves compelled, either within or without the town, to quell any disturbance, the Bakhtiari shall have no right to intervene, even should their own comrades be concerned.

5. If the gendarmerie and the police should be able to prove that the Bakhtiari chiefs or their horsemen are acting against the provisions of articles 1, 2, and 3 above the gendarmerie service shall have the right to take over the control of the arms in question.

No. 323.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 22, 1913.

YOUR despatch of 25th August: Bakhtiari and gendarmerie.

Your action approved.

I congratulate you on successful result of your efforts.

No. 324.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 3, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

Enclosure in No. 324.

Summary of Events in Persia for four weeks ending September 3, 1913.

Tehran.

Diplomatic Body.—M. de Romero Dusmet, the first Spanish representative at Tehran, who up till now has held the rank of Chargé d'Affaires, presented his credentials as Spanish Minister on the 20th August.

Bakhtiaris and Gendarmerie.—Hostilities broke out at Tehran on the 7th August between the Bakhtiaris and gendarmes, led by their Swedish officers. During the afternoon skirmishing took place in the streets and a number of men were killed and wounded on both sides. Ten Bakhtiaris were taken prisoners by the gendarmes and are still in custody. The British and Russian legations took joint action the next morning, and matters were eventually arranged as reported fully in a separate despatch.

The Cabinet.—On the 16th August, Ain-ed-Dowleh informed the Oriental Secretary to His Majesty's Legation that he had definitely resigned the post of Minister of the Interior.

The Regent.—A telegram was received from the Regent on the 27th August saying that he would leave Vienna on the 10th September and arrive at Enzeli on the 15th.

Fire at the Ministry of the Interior.—On the night of the 18th August a fire broke out at the Ministry of the Interior, in the precincts of the Shah's Palace at Tehran. The Swedish officers quickly brought their gendarmes and prevented the spread of the conflagration to the adjoining Ministry for Foreign Affairs and other buildings, but the fire was not completely extinguished until 3 A.M. the next morning, having entirely destroyed one of the most important buildings of the palace and practically all the archives of the Ministry of the Interior. Incendiarism is strongly suspected.

Salar-ed-Dowleh.—News of Salar-ed-Dowleh's surrender to the Russian consulate at Kermanshah reached Tehran on the 28th August.

Resht.

M. Ovseenko took over the duties of Russian Consul-General on the 2nd August from M. Necrassof, who left for Russia on the following day.

On the 6th August, on the arrival of Namak Bey, the new Turkish consular representative, the consulate was raised to the status of a consulate-general.

Kazvin.

It is reported that the Russian authorities intend constructing barracks at Kazvin for the accommodation of their troops.

Meshed.

No serious robberies have been reported during the past month on any of the principal roads in Khorassan other than the looting of a valuable caravan on the road between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari at the commencement of last month.

Negotiations between the Russian Bank and the Rais-u-Tujjar, the present holder of the concession for the Meshed-Askhabad road, have resulted in the latter agreeing to give up his concession in return for 15 per cent. of the profits of the new road. Two Russian engineers, who arrived recently from Askhabad, have commenced work on the inspection of the section between Kuchan and Darragaz.

Ispahan.

Although the holding up of small caravans and of travellers still continues, there has been an increase in the traffic on the main caravan routes of late. Also, owing to the action taken by the local authorities against the Seichani gang, the condition of the environs, though still far from satisfactory, has improved.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that there are no signs of any diminution in the number of the "bank notes" issued by the three local firms, as reported in last month's summary. After repeated representations on his part, the local authorities informed him that they could take no action until they received instructions from Tehran, as the Imperial Bank had had the matter referred to the Central Government.

The state of affairs in the Sultanabad and Kashan districts appears to be much the same as reported in last month's summary.

Shiraz.

The general improvement in the condition of the province continues. Revenue is coming in well; the main roads are, as a rule, open to traffic; and trade between

Shiraz and the outlying districts in Eastern Fars, which has been at a standstill for so long, is reviving. Traffic on the Ispahan road is comparatively small, owing to the presence of robbers about Abadeh and Yezdikhast; but, as fifty mounted gendarmes have been sent from Shiraz to patrol this section, an improvement may be expected in the near future.

The culprit Kaferidum, who made his escape after having been brought to the gate of the consulate, as reported in last month's summary, has been recaptured by order of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and handed over to the Governor-General.

The party sent out in pursuit of the twelve men of the gendarmerie who deserted on the night of the 31st July, returned to Shiraz on the 7th August and reported that the deserters had taken refuge with Mohammed Khan Kashkuli, and that he refused to hand them over.

Seistan.

The Sarhad, Seistan, and the Kainat have been overrun by parties of Baluchis for the past month or so. Several of these parties appear to be concentrating in the Sarhad with a view to making an expedition into Narmashir, while a "lashkar" of about 500 tribesmen, after raiding some villages north of Birjand and carrying off a large number of camels and sheep, is reported to be moving towards Kerman. In addition to these Baluch "laskars," a party of fifty Afghans, escorting an arms caravan, is reported to have looted a large caravan near Kuh-i-Malik Siah, and to have robbed and ill-treated postal sowars and telegraph gholams.

An incident occurred last month which may possibly lead to the exodus of the Gurgis, a tribe of Sunni Baluchis, into Afghanistan. This tribe, which owns villages in both Afghan and Persian Seistan, owing to a long-standing grievance in connection with the handing over of one of their villages to a Shiah tribe some two years ago, seized the village in question by force and killed the headman and some of the inhabitants. The local authorities sent a force of 700 men against the Gurgis, and in the fight which ensued, the Gurgis, who seemed to have run out of ammunition, fled into Afghanistan after having inflicted some loss on the Government troops.

Kermanshah.

Salar-ed-Dowleh came into the town on the 27th August and took bast in the Russian consulate. Negotiations are in progress with a view to bringing the Prince to Tehran in order to settle the questions relating to his property, pension, and future residence.

No. 325.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 2, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH, as I had the honour to inform you in my telegram of the 28th ultimo, is in "bast" in the Russian consulate at Kermanshah, whither he was escorted by a Russian officer of the Persian Cossacks, a representative of the Russian consul, and a delegate from the Governor-General who was away in camp. There is reason to hope that the question will be now settled once and for all. M. Sabline is of opinion that Salar should be given a pension, have his sequestered lands restored to him, and go to Europe without coming to Tehran. The Russian consul would appear to have promised him the governorship of a province, but M. Sabline argues that a man who has taken "bast" is no longer in a position to make conditions, and must accept the terms made for him by the country under whose flag he has taken sanctuary.

The Governor-General of Kermanshah has approached me through His Majesty's consul with the evident intention of seeking my support to secure Salar an appointment as Governor of Zenjan. I have replied that the Prince refused our good offices some time ago when they were offered in conjunction with Russia, that the matter is now in the hands of the Russian Legation, and that he will have to accept the conditions made for him.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 326.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 22, 1913.

REGENT has arrived at Tehran.

No. 327.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 24, 1913.

MY telegram of 17th June.

Following from Kerman, of 23rd September :—

“Owing to efforts of Kerman Governor-General all goods have been recovered except sixty-five bales carpets, five large carpets, three odd carpets, two bags gum, and one bale carpets, aggregate value about 2,000*l.*, plus 8,000 dollars.

“Shiraz authorities seem to have done nothing. Only hope of further recoveries rests with them.”

No. 328.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 11, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the caravan statistics which I have received from His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire and Shiraz for the month of August.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire reports that 1,925 [2,511]* mules and some 3,624 [1,036] donkeys arrived and left that place during the month.

The sub-report from Borasjun enumerates 2,300 [2,767] mules to Bushire, and 3,730 [2,633] animals (including donkeys) from Bushire.

The Kazerun sub-report records 1,230 animals to Bushire, and 2,380 (including donkeys) from Bushire.

The acting British consul at Shiraz reports as follows: departures to Bushire, 933 [1,566]; arrivals from Bushire, 1,226 [2,535]; departures to Ispahan, 821 [2,125]; arrivals from Ispahan, 363 [594].

Robberies: 4th August, post, 2 miles south of Yezdikhast; 10th August, near Sivand, ten donkeys; at Kadrabad, three chests of tea; 17th August, near Fesa, servants of British subject robbed of property valued at 1,500 tomans. Various small robberies committed by Kashgais near Guyum, &c.

I have, &c.

WALTER TOWNLEY.

No. 329.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 26, 1913.

MY telegram of the 14th September: Luristan.

The Governor-General at Kermanshah has telegraphed to the Foreign Office here strongly deprecating Captain Wilson's journey to Burujird in the circumstances prevailing. His Highness says that he can guarantee his safety in his district, but disclaims all responsibility for what may happen beyond, as he says that Malamir sowars cannot enter Burujird district.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has requested me to instruct Captain Wilson not to proceed.

There can be no doubt that Luristan is in a most disturbed state, and it would be

* Italic figures in brackets refer to preceding month's traffic.

useless to pretend that there is no risk attaching to the journey. At the same time such competent judges as the Bakhtiari khans have expressed the opinion that Captain Wilson may well get through safely, if there is urgent necessity that the journey should be performed now.

I have telegraphed to Hamadan, where I believe Captain Wilson to be, and shall be glad of your early instructions.

No. 330.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 27, 1913.

IT is stated that the Regent has succeeded in temporarily reconciling the differences in the Cabinet, which has been reinforced by the return of Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek.

No. 331.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 27, 1913.

I HAVE received following telegram dated the 26th September from the acting British consul at Tabriz:—

“Telegram sent by notables of Tabriz to the Persian Government has doubtless been brought to your notice.

“If the Governor-General succeeds in defying the Central Government and stopping elections from being held Azerbaijan will become virtually autonomous. He is now frankly disloyal in his language in public.”

Telegram in question was one of protest against the elections. There seem to be many obstacles in the way of the elections, although the Regent hopes to be able to arrange matters. His Highness is of opinion that the announcement was made too hastily, and that it was a signal error to put the declaration into the mouth of the young Shah on his birthday. If he is not old enough to reign it is to be presumed that he is not old enough to make such an important pronouncement. This argument may very probably be used if it is decided to postpone the elections.

Russian Chargé d’Affaires says that he never thought that it would be possible to hold elections at Tabriz, where the memory of the effects of the last political agitation are still fresh in people’s minds. He added that there was nothing to show that the elections would not take place in other northern provinces, and that the Russian Government would greatly disapprove of an autonomous régime in Azerbaijan.

No. 332.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 27, 1913.

SITUATION in Fars.

Acting consul at Shiraz reports that Kavam has been appointed Governor of Laristan, Sabeh, Juyim, Bidchahr, Sabeh, Rudanah, Ahmedi, Fesa, and the Khamseh tribes for two years. Revenue of above districts is 207,765 tomans per annum. Kavam is let off 73,000 tomans for the first year and 53,000 tomans for the second. Arrangement sounds good one. It is well that Kavam should be actively employed in a sphere where he may do good work.

No. 333.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 27, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 26th September: Captain Wilson's journey to Burujird.

While Captain Wilson's journey is urgent, it is of course essential to avoid unnecessary risk.

If, with local knowledge and advice and any opinion you may obtain from Captain Wilson himself, you consider journey should be abandoned, you are authorised so to instruct him, informing Persian Government at the same time that in the circumstances period of option must be extended until journey is practicable.

No. 334.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram of 27th September.

Captain Wilson has reached Burujird and is apparently continuing his journey to Khoremabad, where telegrams will be sent by special messenger from Douletabad. Difficulties of his journey have been increased by a sudden attack on Lurs by a force of 250 gendarmerie under Swedish officers from Sultanabad. Force occupied Burujird before Captain Wilson arrived, and retired in early morning day after his arrival. They are reported to have killed some Lurs and to have taken many prisoners. Captain Wilson says they will have done more harm than good unless they can return to Burujird in strength, as they have committed local authorities to action against the powerful local chiefs, who are already preparing reprisals. I had no idea any such movement was intended, and believed intention was merely to defend Sultanabad against a threatened attack. Gendarmerie not sufficiently strong to hold Burujird and their line of communication, but there are 600 Cossacks at Hamadan and Kermanshah which may co-operate.

I fear any military operations may affect Captain Wilson's plans adversely. He says that several relations and friends of the chiefs upon whose friendship he is relying have been killed.

No. 335.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 30, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 28th September: Luristan.

Withdrawal to Sultanabad was intended to draw Lurs on; further operations are in preparation. The rapidity with which the blow was struck and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy by such a small force have created the utmost astonishment and have greatly enhanced the prestige of the gendarmerie in the eyes of the Government. This will probably be reflected throughout the country.

It is unlucky that the movement was made just at the moment of Captain Wilson's journey, of which the colonel knew nothing.

No. 336.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 5, 1913.

MY telegram of 27th September: Persian elections.

I understand that all idea of proceeding with election has been abandoned for the present.

No. 337.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 5, 1913.

ACTING consul at Shiraz proposes to take a trip down the road to Kazerun, &c., at the end of present month, when the gendarmerie have taken over the whole of the road. He would utilise opportunity to acquaint himself at first hand with all local problems, to examine gendarmerie disposition, and to inspect their new block-houses, &c.

I see no objection to proposal, and beg to recommend acting consul's request to your favourable consideration.

No. 338.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 5, 1913.

FOLLOWING from Shiraz, 4th October:—

"Five Boir Ahmedis arrested by Governor-General on suspicion of implication in Eckford affair were handed over to gendarmerie for conveyance to Shiraz. They were carelessly guarded and escaped *en route*.

"Officer commanding is investigating case."

No. 339.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, October 7, 1913.

SALAR-ED-DOWLEH left Kermanshah 5th October, under escort of Russian officer with Persian Cossacks, for Resht and Europe.