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UNITED STATES FOREIGN  
POLICY

*Isolation or Alliance*

COMPILED BY  
JULIA E. JOHNSEN



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## INTRODUCTION

Isolation is theoretically America's historic policy toward wars abroad, a policy supported at its origin by favoring geographical and other conditions. But the advance of science and progress long ago eliminated physical distance, and today American interest in the world is a very real concern, not only in view of worldwide trade, human ties and natural sympathies, but also in view of world principles of order, peace, justice, humanitarianism, and right. The world disorders, particularly since the rise of dictatorship nations and the defiance of international law in a recrudescence of power politics, have made the foreign policies of our country of special moment. Various measures have been proposed from time to time to coordinate our international policy with the enforcing of international law and the regulation of war-making nations. For the last few years we have had a legally constituted, altho not consistently enforced, neutrality policy, with the defined purpose of keeping our country out of foreign wars.

The special importance of America's foreign policy lies in her position as a leading world power, with resources and potentialities for leadership that could make her a world force. Along with other democracies abroad, however, her foreign policies have been, in a measure, indecisive and vacillating, while dictatorship nations have assumed a direct line of approach to their nationalistic ambitions and have proceeded to remake the world in accordance with their special interests. War potentialities have increased in frequency and gravity. Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria, China, and Czechoslovakia have become illustrations of the *fait accompli*, of the dominance

of might, and super-armaments have everywhere arisen as a concomitant to the new world psychology and fear. The situation following the agreement of Munich and the pacts enacted between democratic and totalitarian nations, followed almost immediately by new threats of impending change, is indicative of the present troubled and chaotic conditions of the world, and the imminent need for the application of the highest international principles of law and order that the world can offer.

Our Pan American policy has come to be increasingly stressed, both for itself and in relation to our proposed isolation from the European and Asiatic world. Pan Americanism is not a new concept. As "continentalism" and in other forms of aspiration, its roots can be traced back for more than a century. Conferences and other inter-relationships, treaties, agreements, accords, have marked a long series of years. The Buenos Aires Conference of 1936 marked a high point in measures designed to further American peace and solidarity, and the inter-American conference, now assembled at Lima, Peru, is expected to bring about further accord and to further implement the bonds of a continental unity.

Among the measures designed for the realization of a greater inter-American cooperation and accord have been a proposed American League of Nations, and a non-military alliance. Today stress is being placed predominantly upon a defensive alliance. Various influences have contributed to this. More immediate among these have been the general sense of world insecurity resulting from lawless policies abroad, crises such as that of Munich, the projected American super-navy capable of defending the western hemisphere from Canada to Cape Horn, the increased American amity resulting from the good neighborhood policy, new concepts of nationalistic equality, and multilateral, rather than unilateral, interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Probably not least among influences tending to concern for a greater

American solidarity in defense has been the totalitarian impenetration of Latin America in various forms, with its implication of a more or less veiled menace for the future.

The present number of the Reference Shelf has been prepared primarily for debaters, but is intended to present also a readable and impartial view for the general reader and student. The bibliography, given in two parts, embodying the isolationist and international discussion, and that relating more particularly to Pan-American relationships, both classified for greater convenience, presents the possibility of debates on each of the two aspects, as well as on the unified one here given. A summary of arguments is included. Discussion and references have been kept recent, so far as possible. References to additional and earlier articles in relation to the background of our foreign policy, will be found in earlier numbers of the Reference Shelf series dealing with international affairs in relation to war and peace. Among these may be mentioned the *Neutrality Policy of the United States, Peace and Rearmament*, and the *Anglo-American Alliance*.

JULIA E. JOHNSON

December 12, 1938

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# ISOLATION

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

### ISOLATION: AN OBSOLETE PRINCIPLE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE<sup>1</sup>

Of the three great principles declared by President Monroe, the two most famous—non-colonization and non-intervention—were directed at Europe. According to these principles, non-American states were forbidden to undertake further colonization or intervention on American soil. The third principle, on the contrary, is addressed to the United States itself. It lays down for the American government certain rules which seriously limit its activity in the field of foreign affairs. This is the rule against intervention in the affairs of Europe, the secondary element of the Monroe Doctrine. We hope to be able to demonstrate that this principle, in the form in which President Monroe defined it, did not contemplate absolute isolation, and was not opposed to a prudent policy of collaboration; that non-cooperation, the policy often adopted since then, and improperly associated with and called the Monroe Doctrine, is only a deformation of it, being based on a misinterpretation of the advice given by the Fathers of the Republic; finally, that today the clear tendency, despite strong hesitation and curious vacillation, is to return to Monroeism in its original form.

#### 1. THE ORIGINAL ISOLATION PRINCIPLE

*Monroe's Words.* Let us re-read Monroe's words in order to determine exactly his own view concerning isolation:

Our policy in regard to Europe . . . remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers;

<sup>1</sup> By John B. Whitton, Associate Professor of International Law, Princeton University. *International Conciliation*, 290:211-25. May, 1933.



to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every Power, submitting to injuries from none. . . .

In the wars of the European Powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence.

To summarize: no intervention is permitted in the internal affairs of European States, except when necessary to defend the rights of the United States. No intervention in their wars, unless they concern the United States. On the other hand, Monroe desires to maintain amicable relations with the States from across the sea; thus he certainly does not contemplate absolute isolation. So much for the third principle as it was conceived by Monroe himself. We must now attempt to determine its origins and rational bases.

*Origins of Isolation.* First, the origins. The conceptions just considered were already profoundly rooted in the country's traditions when the fifth President wrote his Message. Monroe only repeated the warning left by the Fathers, especially Washington, Adams, and Jefferson. Washington, in his Farewell Address, declared: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible." Jefferson said "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe." In short, ever since their Revolution the Americans have believed it imperative to have with Europe a minimum of political relations, and to remain apart from their disputes for fear of being entangled in their wars or engulfed in the whirlpool of the balance of power.

*Bases of Isolation.* Having suggested the origins of the principle, let us take up its rational bases, which

are three in number: legal base, logical base, political base.

*Legal.* First, the isolation principle is in full accord with international law. Let us note particularly the contrast between this rule and the principle forbidding the intervention of Europe in America, according to which Monroe proscribed all meddling, licit as well illicit, altho such a conception is not in accord with international law. On the contrary, the principle of American isolation permits the United States to intervene in Europe if her rights are injured or in danger. This conception is in complete harmony with the principles of international law.

*Logical.* The logical base is no less than the two spheres doctrine, a conception held by Washington himself, and accepted thruout the country years before Monroe's time. The following point should be emphasized: this conception never signified absolute isolation, for in 1800, and even to a less extent in 1823, the United States could not barricade herself against the foreign world like Japan before Perry's Expedition. The Fathers merely meant that the Republic should limit itself to commercial and non-political relations with foreign nations, and above all that she should not take part in their disputes, unless of course they concerned the United States. At Monroe's time, this policy was practicable, logical, and opportune. Practicable, for in 1823 America's geographical isolation was indisputable. Separated from Europe by a great ocean that could be crossed by sailing vessels only after a long, rigorous voyage, the American Continent was as secure, even more secure, than London before the invention of the aeroplane. America, furthermore, did not possess a square foot of land overseas. She was intensely interested in that immense problem, the civilization of her vast domains, and was not in the mood to dream of distant colonies. Besides, her financial and

economic interests were limited almost entirely to the seaboard. The thought that she might some day become the creditor of the entire world, possessing interests as widespread as Palestinian oil or trade in the center of China, probably never occurred to Monroe. On the one, hand, the elements kept America away from the rest of the world; on the other hand, no ambition, no interest, drew her away from home. In short, a policy of isolation was for the moment practicable.

Second, this policy was logical. The promise made by America to stay at home compensated for the interdiction she imposed upon Europe. The formula was "Europe for Europeans, America for Americans," and this has had a long life, for as late as 1895, during the Venezuela incident, Secretary of State Olney declared that the non-intervention of America in Europe presumed the non-intervention of Europe in America.

Third, the two spheres doctrine was opportune. Having few interests abroad, the young Republic could without inconvenience remain at home. Besides, this attitude was considered to be a veritable duty by the Americans. Their great problem was, we repeat, the settlement of their own country, a tremendous task which was enough to occupy all the energy, strength, courage, and ingenuity of the pioneers. If they did feel the desire or the need of expanding, the vast unsettled spaces of the West sufficed to satisfy these wants. Finally, this policy accorded perfectly with the requirements of security and national defense. This subject brings us to the third base of the isolation doctrine, the political base.

*Political.* Elementary prudence required that the new state should refrain from all adventure in Europe. Altho developing into a great power in 1823, in reality the Republic was still very weak from the military standpoint: she had at her disposal a relatively insignificant fleet and an army still less important. Thus it

would have been pure folly to become involved in European disputes. Here again we touch upon the cornerstone of Monroeism: the security of the United States. And, in our opinion, in order to safeguard the peace and security of America, close political relations with Europe were as dangerous in 1823 as they are necessary, if not inevitable, today.

*Analysis of the Original Principle.* It is necessary at this place to analyze the principle of isolation as Monroe conceived it. This is exceedingly important, for in the name of the so-called isolation doctrine certain "die-hard" politicians, also known as "one hundred per cent Americans," have opposed every kind of project for international cooperation, unfortunately with considerable success. At one time our membership in the International Red Cross was actually opposed in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. Let us first consider the ban against foreign alliances. This rule must be associated with the Monroe Doctrine; altho there is no mention of it in the Message, the fifth President certainly had it in mind, for it was accepted all over the country as something almost sacred. In fact, the influence of this conception was such that at the time of the Message America refused to join with England in making a common declaration against the designs of the Holy Alliance. The rule against alliances is thus part of the Monroe Doctrine; in fact American statesmen have almost always considered the two principles as part of the same rule. In order to find the origins of this ban on alliances it is again necessary to go back to George Washington, who said that the only veritable policy was to abstain from permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, while Jefferson favored peace, commerce and an honest friendship with all, but entangling alliances with none. But it must be emphasized that the dreaded alliance meant a military alliance, defensive or offensive, and that there was no

intention of opposing all action undertaken in common with other States. These early statesmen had too much practical sense to condemn such action. But the rule against alliances, which in itself, especially at the time, was a healthy and prudent policy, has since been deformed so as to be invoked against any kind of plan for close cooperation with other nations. It is certain that this doctrine, in its exaggerated form, was in part responsible for the abstention from the League of Nations and the World Court. In its primitive form, the rule against alliances has always been respected; but in its disfigured form, it has often been violated, this by the very necessities of the case. The result is that the foreign policy of the United States, in the field of cooperation, has been characterized by a most extraordinary instability.

In the next place, let us consider the rule against the intervention of America in Europe. According to the Message, the American government should in principle abstain from all interference in the affairs of European States. Here the important point is that this rule is not absolute; that above all, it does not connote complete isolation. This would be nonsense, given the fact that the United States already had sent diplomatic agents to the four corners of the earth, and had contracted treaties of commerce as well as other international accords. Furthermore, according to Monroe, even intervention was legitimate, if exerted for the purpose of protecting American rights which had been injured or seriously menaced. Consequently in certain cases the United States may cross the Atlantic in order to take political action; when her rights were threatened, she could, without violating any "isolationist" principle, exert political pressure on Turkey or send a fleet to bombard the barbarian corsairs in the Mediterranean. Again, when Germany violated the rights of the United States in 1916 and 1917, the United States declared

war against her, and sent her army and fleet to Europe, without violating the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, Monroe only spoke of intervention in the interior affairs of European States; he could hardly oppose all intervention in their foreign relations, for the Doctrine itself constituted such an intervention *par excellence*. This is evident, for Monroe tried to limit the sphere of action of European powers to a marked degree, by forbidding them the right to colonize or intervene in the New Hemisphere. Finally, Monroe implied that his government could take part in disputes between foreign European States if the question did not concern them alone, but likewise affected the interests of the United States.

*Scope of the Principle Summarized.* Let us review the scope of the original isolation principle. First, it opposes alliances, but this provision refers to a military alliance like the Holy Alliance, and by no means forbids every engagement, particularly one taken for the purpose of advancing the cause of peace thru cooperative action. Besides, Monroe expressly favors the establishment and maintenance of friendly relations with other states, and, like Washington, desires merely *as few political relations as possible* with Europe. Even the rule against intervention in Europe is not absolute; Monroe permits it, and does not ban war itself, if necessary to protect the rights of the United States. He implies likewise that it is permissible to take part in Europe's contests, if they concern the American Republic, and not merely the European States immediately interested. And while Monroe takes position against intervention in the internal affairs of Europe's States, he could hardly claim to proscribe all intervention in their external affairs, for the Doctrine itself is a remarkable interference of this category. Finally, in formulating his Doctrine, the fifth President tacitly implied the necessity of enforcing it, even by war itself; this is far from absolute isola-

tion! In fact, instead of inducing the Republic to abstain from relations with Europe, this Doctrine has been one of the principal causes of participation by the United States in international relations. Far from removing America from the community of States, the Monroe Doctrine envisages a prudent but useful policy of international collaboration.

## II. EVOLUTION OF THE ISOLATION PRINCIPLE

We may now realize that in the Message itself there is nothing which is opposed to a large measure of cooperation with the rest of the world. Unfortunately the Message has been greatly misunderstood and considerably deformed, so much so in fact that there is a strong tendency to veto, in its name, any project for international collaboration. It is not only Monroe, but also Washington and Jefferson, whose counsels have been wrongly interpreted, their arguments twisted and distorted. Opponents of international collaboration have emphasized the negative aspect of this program, representing the negative aspect as the only advice given by the Fathers, and at the same time confusing this part of their counsels with the real Monroe Doctrine. This absolute isolation policy, nevertheless, has never been more than an aspiration, for its strict application has proven to be impossible. This can readily be understood. But the aspiration persists, and even today it motivates and conditions American foreign policy, for in this country such traditions have an extraordinary vitality and prestige. The American people consider that their fidelity to the supposed counsels of President Washington is one of the causes of the long periods of peace and prosperity which have been so great a boon to the country. The Americans, whose critical sense is not particularly well developed, have a tenacious respect for popular slogans such as

"America for the Americans," or "no entangling alliances," which they apply to all sorts of situations without making a thoro analysis either of the slogan or of the situation. It is curious that a people in general so progressive, and so ready to accept new methods, should be, from this point of view, so conservative and obstinate.

### III. THE PRINCIPLE BECOMES OBSOLETE

If, up to 1900, a certain measure of fidelity to the principle of absolute isolation—deformation of the true Monroeism—was possible, this is no longer true today. In other words, strict isolation has reached a state of caducity. It has completely outlived its usefulness. It is absolutely impracticable, for, as Professor Hart has remarked, the eventual participation of America in world affairs was as inevitable as the flow of lava down the sides of an active volcano. In the following pages we will show why the United States cannot live apart from the great family of nations.

*Disappearance of Geographical Isolation.* In the first place, physical isolation, the *sine qua non* of political isolation, no longer exists. The onward march of inventions, the development of transatlantic navigation, the coming of the telegraph, the telephone, and recently the aeroplane and radio, have brought the two continents nearer and nearer together, until New York is no further from London today than Paris was distant from London yesterday. Today it is absurd to claim, as did Jefferson, that Nature, with benevolent care, has separated Europe from America by an immense ocean. Rather we are compelled to admit, with President Taft, that the Atlantic no longer separates us from Europe; *it ties us to it!*

*Disappearance of Political Differences.* Second, the political differences which formerly distinguished the



two continents were levelled long ago. Formerly the European political system was essentially different from that existing in America, for the New World was made up of republican states governing themselves freely, while the Old World was divided up into absolute monarchies governed by irresponsible authorities, most of them under the sway of the Holy Alliance. But Europe has become democratic and the Holy Alliance long ago disappeared. Those who love liberty may no longer, without discernment, condemn all monarchies and praise all republics.

*Impossibility of Economic and Financial Isolation.* In the third place, the material expansion of the United States has rendered isolation impracticable. In 1823 her foreign commerce was confined almost exclusively to raw materials: today, because of the prodigious development of her factories, the United States has become the first manufacturing country in the world. While the product of her factories, in 1850, was worth less than five billion dollars, in 1929 this figure was over seventy billions. In 1919 the excess of exports over imports was more than four billion dollars, which led to a search for new markets abroad, a movement which was inevitably accompanied by a more active foreign policy. Finally, the United States, creditors of almost the entire world ever since the Great War, to whom fifteen countries owe eleven billion dollars in war debts, cannot pretend to be isolated, or claim to be indifferent to what takes place in other countries. This was evident when, in 1931, President Hoover launched his project for a moratorium on debts and reparations, and Messrs. Stimson, Mellon, and Edge conferred officially with European statesmen, in Paris and London, on the financial condition of a far-distant European State! It is rather amusing to speak of isolation in the face of these facts. America's vital economic interests are at stake: they have bound her so closely to the other

states of the world that she cannot possibly ignore the political problems which thus far may have been discussed by European states alone.

*Effect of Colonial Expansion.* In the fourth place, absolute isolation has been rendered impossible by America's colonial expansion and the relations created thereby with foreign powers, even those in Europe. As the result of the Spanish war the United States acquired in 1898 Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. Soon after, she annexed Hawaii. Suddenly the nation awoke to find itself a world power, possessing important colonies on the other side of the Pacific. Hesitating at first and even somewhat perturbed by this unexpected deviation from a line of conduct thus far consistent, the Republic accepted that which seemed inevitable, with all its consequences. In an attempt to save appearances, however, the new acquisitions were never called "colonies," but bore the more innocent title "insular possessions." Nations, like individuals, know how to ease the qualms of conscience. With the acquisition of Pacific possessions, relations with Asia became inevitable, and in addition—this is the important point with respect to the Monroe Doctrine—closer connections with Europe also ensued. The government which had vetoed all propositions for applying the Monroe Doctrine in concert with other States, readily accepts the invitation to repress the Boxer revolt together with other great powers—especially European powers! The State which refused to sign the Act of Berlin in 1885 contracts nevertheless, in 1908, an understanding with Japan according to which the two powers recognize the existence of mutual "special interests" in Asia, and promise to respect the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity. This accord, negotiated personally by President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 was

of an analogous character. Furthermore, in the Washington accords of 1922, the United States contracted with other great powers a *political* accord concerning interests in the Pacific, an agreement which could never have been negotiated directly with European States over a European question without causing in the Senate the most noisy and obstinate opposition based on the claim that the Monroe Doctrine, and in particular the isolation principle, was being violated. In this matter a lack of logic on the part of the United States government is worth noting. It is true that according to the letter of the Message, intervention of the United States in Asia is not forbidden, for Monroe had only Europe in mind. But intervention in Asia is certainly contrary to the spirit of the Message, and at all events is a violation of its logic. The United States, at the same time that she warns Japan away from the American continent (see Magdalena Bay incident), does not hesitate herself to intervene in Asia and there exert political pressure which she would never have permitted on her own continent, on the part of an overseas power. The argument of reciprocity, or two spheres doctrine, usually valid as between America and Europe, cannot properly be cited as between America and Asia.

*Conclusion.* As a result of the changes which we have just traced, the principle of absolute isolation, like England's "splendid isolation," has had its day. Designed for a tiny nation, geographically isolated, and weak from every point of view—military, economic, political—this attitude ill befits one of the great world powers, inextricably and irresistibly bound to the rest of the world by moral, physical, economic, and even political ties. Isolation is impossible today. Even before the war, President Roosevelt backed up Japan in Asia, where he took sides against Russia. At the Algeiras Conference the American government momentarily ranged itself on the side of the Entente against Germany.

It had contracted a tacit agreement with Great Britain regarding the Caribbean Sea, and another tacit agreement with Japan concerning China. From 1914 to 1917, altho neutral in law, the United States, as President Wilson so aptly remarked, was in actual fact a participant in the war. And when she entered that conflict, she was drawn into every kind of entanglement imaginable. Since that time, despite desperate efforts to turn back the clock, isolation has become a myth, at times a mere electioneering hoax, a principle which it is quite proper to cry to the skies on the Fourth of July, and forget the next working day. While maintaining it in theory, the Americans constantly violate it in fact. Whether she likes it or not, the United States, on becoming a world power, has been obliged to assume some of the burdens which rest upon every member of the international society.

#### IV. THE ISOLATION PRINCIPLE TODAY

*The Vacillating Policy.* If, as a matter of fact, the isolation principle or rather *absolute* isolation, has outlived its time, its influence still persists. This formula remains so active that every government, when it is faced with a question of foreign policy, is required to accomplish a veritable *tour de force* in order to make the time-honored traditions harmonize with the realities of international life. It is necessary at once to respond to the exigencies of the international society—which requires collaboration—and to respect the myth of isolation. In short, an attempt is made to collaborate and remain apart at one and the same time—an insoluble problem. Caught thus in the play of two opposing forces, the United States policy is absolutely paradoxical; it consists of a series of forward marches alternating with a series of marches to the rear. We could give any number of examples of this curious phenomenon.

In 1902 a humanitarian interest induces the Republic to protest against the oppression of the Jews in Rumania; but in 1906, four years later, the same republic refuses to react against the persecution of Armenians by the Turks because, as Mr. Root, Secretary of State, explains, according to the customary law of more than a century, the participation in the aims, interests or responsibilities of Europe was forbidden! It is legitimate, then, to protest against the killing of Jews, but it is illegitimate to protest against the massacre of Armenians! In 1884 the American government sends delegates to the Congress of Berlin, devoted to the Congo question; in 1885, frightened perhaps by its own temerity, the government withdraws the Act of Berlin from the Senate, which thus cannot pass upon its ratification. In 1899 and 1907 the United States sends delegates to the Hague conferences, where they sign the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. It is well known that no obligation to accept arbitration was incurred by the signatory powers, and that nothing more than a pious wish was accomplished in this direction. Nevertheless the United States ratifies with a reservation which declares that nothing in the conventions should be interpreted so as to repudiate the traditional policy which forbids all interference in questions of policy or of internal administration of foreign states. An example even more striking of this vacillating policy is furnished by the Algeciras Conference. Altho the conference only considers questions which were purely European, the Washington government sends a representative who plays a part of first importance, and helps solve questions of the very greatest gravity. This time the Senate actually does ratify the treaty—the General Act of Algeciras—but perhaps in the effort to ease their consciences the Senators add the usual reserve declaring that they have no intention of abandoning the traditional principle

according to which all participation in the solution of purely European questions is forbidden.

It will be remembered also that when the American government was drawn into the World War, it did its best to save what remained of the isolation principle; thus it considered itself the *associate*, but never the *ally*, of the belligerents with whom it made common cause against the enemy. This careful use of words reminds us of the insistence of the government upon the term "insular possession," eschewing the word "colonies" for its distant dominions such as the Philippines. At the Washington Conference in 1922, the United States accept, in the Four Power Pact, the obligation to consult with the other signatories in certain circumstances, and this pact was the veritable basis for the reduction of armaments successfully negotiated at that time. But only eight years later, at the London Naval Conference, the American delegates come to Europe resolved to oppose any analogous plan concerning consultation. Now it is rather difficult to see why the Republican administration, having approved a certain policy with respect to the Pacific, could not do likewise with regard to the Atlantic, especially since in both cases the cause of effective disarmament depended upon it. Quite recently we have witnessed another curious right-about face: Mr. Hoover, in the month of June, 1931, takes the initiative of proposing a moratorium of one year upon debts and reparations, and thus makes an important step forward in the direction of international collaboration. But already in January, 1932, he turns about: impressed if not intimidated by the protests made by isolationists in Congress, Mr. Hoover can no longer see any connection between debts and reparations, and speaks no longer of moratoriums. Finally there is the extraordinary Manchurian affair. In September, 1931, the American government refuses absolutely to send a representative to the Council of the League of

Nations when the latter considers the Manchurian problem. In October, changing their minds, the American statesmen send a delegate to sit with the Council concerning the same problem. But when, in November, the Council again meets, the same American government finds that it can no longer be thus represented. What is legitimate in October is illegitimate both in September and in November. If Europeans throw up their hands in complete dismay after witnessing such a spectacle, they can hardly be blamed.

*Attempt to Explain this Inconsistent Policy.* What should be said of this policy, now timid, now bold, tending here toward cooperation, and there toward indifference or isolation? Let us see if there is not some explanation for these fluctuations. It is certain that this policy is absolutely illogical; what is more, it is not even opportunist, that is to say, the most prudent policy given the circumstances of the moment. It depends fundamentally upon the hazardous play of two opposing forces: on the one hand, the negative pull of an old tradition, and, on the other, the push of international society. This latter force is due to the fact that the United States is today, willy-nilly, a great world power and a member of the Society of States. When the first current of opinion, absolute isolation, has the upper hand, we see America retire into its shell; thus for example, at the commencement of the Harding administration, the State Department refused even to respond to letters received from the League of Nations. Before that, however, under a Wilson, the other force, that of international collaboration, was so predominant that the government was even considering a plan for continentalizing the Monroe Doctrine, and the League Covenant only failed of ratification in the Senate by seven votes. Today, despite a rather strong reaction caused by the world crisis, there is a tendency to adopt a policy of closer cooperation with foreign nations.

Whatever may be said, it is indisputable that the American government is collaborating cordially with the League of Nations in almost all branches of its activity. Washington admits frankly that it intends to cooperate with Geneva in all matters other than of a political character, but it has even gone beyond this: for when the government acts in close cooperation with the League in an effort to solve both the Manchurian problem and the problem of disarmament, it shows that it does not always eschew political collaboration. When a state sends a delegate to sit with fourteen powers who are deliberating over a dispute whose theatre is at the other end of the world, it is difficult to speak of absolute isolation. In short, it seems that the present tendency is to return to the real Monroeism: the isolation principle as Monroe himself defined it.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS: AN APPEAL FOR PURE MONROEISM

In the coming years the United States will be obliged to assume her veritable rôle among the nations. Her policy is bound to develop; she will have to face the most difficult and delicate problems, whose solution will demand of her the most serious reflection. Her statesmen would do well to look deep into the experience of the past, where they will find a precious guide in the words of Monroe. For example, when it is necessary to decide whether the United States ought to adhere to the Permanent Court, or even enter into the League, the nation's leaders should have confidence in Monroe himself, who did not oppose international collaboration, but on the contrary approved it: he expressly counselled the establishment and maintenance of cordial relations with other states. And when the statesmen at Washington realize that disarmament is impossible without first creating thruout the world a general feeling of security, and if in order to achieve this purpose, a



proposal is made to them for a consultative pact, they should remember that Monroe, who only forbade military alliances, which is an entirely different matter, probably would have approved such a pact under the conditions which obtain today. Faced by war or danger of war, the government would do well to reflect that intervention by the United States is legitimate, according to Monroe, if the nation's rights are in danger, and that since the coming into effect of the Pact of Paris, all war or menace of war, whatever be its theatre, involves not only the interests but even the rights of the United States, and that consequently this country, in the name of the Doctrine itself, ought to give its support in order to find a solution to restore peace. And if the United States, in accordance with some plan like the Capper proposal, or that suggested by the Committee on Economic Sanctions, decides to take effective measures against an aggressor nation, such action would in no way violate the admonition of President Monroe who himself, also in the name of peace and security, went so far as to forbid all Europe from colonizing or intervening in America.

In Monroe's time this policy was a great pacific doctrine, but it was at the same time a negative policy. A president who desires to accomplish today, in different circumstances, a similar step toward permanent peace, ought to adopt a *positive* policy based on close cooperation, and in this respect the formula framed by the Fathers—as few political relations as possible—still remains applicable, but today, by the march of events, this minimum has become greatly enlarged, for every member of the Society of States is required today, whether it likes it or not, to carry on with other members, on a vast scale, all sorts of relations—political as well as commercial.

As a policy capable of serving both the cause of world progress and the cause of national interest, the

principle of absolute isolation is inadmissible under modern conditions: close relations with the rest of the planet are for the United States today absolutely necessary. The peace and security of the nations depend in large part on the attitude taken by the United States, and demand emphatically from that nation a prudent but generous policy of international collaboration. This policy, in our opinion, is none other than that indicated by President Monroe and by his celebrated predecessors, whose counsels, interpreted according to their exact sense, and in accord with the spirit as well as the letter, constitute today, as always, the best possible guide for the orientation and evolution of the foreign policy of the American Republic.

#### FORUM ADDRESS <sup>2</sup>

No one who lived thru the grave hours of last month can doubt the longing of most of the people of the world for an enduring peace. Our business now is to utilize the desire for peace to build principles which are the only basis of permanent peace.

It is becoming increasingly clear that peace by fear has no higher or more enduring quality than peace by the sword.

There can be no peace if the reign of law is to be replaced by a recurrent sanctification of sheer force.

There can be no peace if national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the threat of war.

There can be no peace if national policy adopts as a deliberate instrument the dispersion all over the world of millions of helpless and persecuted wanderers with no place to lay their heads.

<sup>2</sup> From radio address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. *New York Times*. p.13. October 26, 1938.

There can be no peace if humble men and women are not free to think their own thoughts, to express their own feelings, to worship God.

There can be no peace if economic resources that ought to be devoted to social and economic reconstruction are to be diverted to an intensified competition in armaments which will merely heighten the suspicions and fears and threaten the economic prosperity of each and every nation.

At no time in modern history has the responsibility which rests upon governments been more obvious or more profound.

I speak for a United States which has no interest in war. We covet nothing save good relations with our neighbors; and we recognize that the world today has become our neighbor.

But in the principle of the good neighbor certain fundamental reciprocal obligations are involved. There must be a deliberate and conscious will that such political changes as changing needs require shall be made peacefully.

That means a due regard for the sanctity of treaties. It means deliberate avoidance of policies which arouse fear and distress. It means the self-restraint to refuse strident ambitions which are sure to breed insecurity and intolerance and thereby weaken the prospects of that economic and moral recovery the world so badly needs.

You cannot organize civilization around the core of militarism and at the same time expect reason to control human destinies.

For more than twelve years the United States has been steadily seeking disarmament.

Yet we have consistently pointed out that neither we, nor any nation, will accept disarmament while neighbor nations arm to the teeth. If there is not general disarmament, we ourselves must continue to arm. It is a step we do not like to take, and do not wish to take. But,

until there is general abandonment of weapons capable of aggression, ordinary rules of national prudence and common sense require that we be prepared.

We still insist that an armament race among nations is absurd unless new territories or new controls are coveted. We are entitled, I think, to greater reassurance than can be given by words: the kind of proof which can be given, for example, by actual discussions, leading to actual disarmament. Not otherwise can we be relieved of the necessity of increasing our own military and naval establishments.

For while we refuse to accept as a permanent necessity the idea of force, and reject it as an ideal of life, we must be prepared to meet with success any application of force against us.

We in the United States do not seek to impose on any other people either our way of life or our internal form of government. But we are determined to maintain and protect that way of life and that form of government for ourselves. And we are determined to use every endeavor in order that the western hemisphere may work out its own interrelated salvation in the light of its own interrelated experience.

And we affirm our faith that, whatever the choice of way of life a people makes, that choice must not threaten the world with the disaster of war. The impact of such a disaster cannot be confined. It releases a flood tide of evil emotions fatal to civilized living. That statement applies not to the western hemisphere alone but to the whole of Europe and Asia and Africa and the islands of the seas.

### A WAY OF LIFE<sup>3</sup>

Though the United States has lived for two years under a Neutrality Act which expresses its wish to

<sup>3</sup> From editorial. *New York Times*. June 15, 1938.

remain at peace, the American people are not neutral now in any situation which involves the risk of war, nor will they remain neutral in any future situation which threatens to disturb the balance of world power.

American opinion today is openly and overwhelmingly on the side of China as against Japan. American opinion was just as definitely aligned against the seizure of Austria. It is as nearly unanimous today as it has ever been, in any question of foreign policy, in applauding the determination of Czechoslovakia to fight for its independence, if need be, instead of tamely going under. It will be just as nearly unanimous tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, whenever and wherever something that comes home to the inbred American conception of liberty and democracy is at stake.

The truth is that no act of Congress can conscript the underlying loyalties of the American people. These loyalties have in the past prevailed and may prevail again even over our desire to remain at peace, and statesmen abroad will do well to reckon with this fact. Americans have a habit of choosing sides the moment any issue basic to this country's faith is actually involved.

In the case of China's fight for self-existence against Japanese aggression, American sentiment is tapped by loyalties which come readily to the surface. We sympathize instinctively with the underdog. We cherish a special and longstanding friendship with the Chinese people. We resent the ruthlessness of Japan's attack. We are not ashamed of a frank commercial interest in desiring the continuation of the Open Door.

These considerations are responsible for the fact that American opinion has willingly supported Mr. Roosevelt in the maintenance of the elaborate fraud that no "war" exists today on the continent of Asia—since a finding that "war" is actually in progress would compel us to invoke sanctions of the Neutrality Act which would react to the disadvantage of China as against Japan.

Thus we have cast our influence against any possibility that Japan will profit from this adventure with our approval and support. And any American banker or industrialist who dared to propose American participation in any plan to develop the resources of China under Japanese administration would find the opinion of this country overwhelmingly against him.

To that extent, at least, we have aligned ourselves with China in her present struggle. To that extent, and more, we are partisans in Europe; for in Europe we find not only the issue raised by imperialism running wild, but also the issue of dictatorship against our own democracy.

The average American may not define in words the loyalties he shares with certain other people. But in the democracies of Europe—in the little democracies in the danger zones; in the more fortunate democracies of Scandinavia; above, all, in the great democracies of France and Britain—the average American finds a way of life which he knows instinctively to be the way of life which he himself has chosen.

He knows that these democracies are the outposts of our own kind of civilization, of the democratic system, of the progress we have achieved thru the methods of self-government. He knows that if these outposts are overrun by dictatorships of either Right or Left we shall find ourselves deprived of friends. He knows that, despite geographical remoteness and a traditional desire to avoid entanglement in other peoples' quarrels, we are inevitably the natural allies of the democracies of Europe.

The vast power of the United States is not used effectively today in defense of international democracy because the American people do not wish to commit themselves in advance to any policy which involves even a potential risk of war. We have adopted a Neutrality Act not primarily because we are at heart a neutral people—our whole history belies that designation—but

because we detest war, dread its human cost, and fear the consequences it might have for our own democratic institutions. With the other democracies we have trapped ourselves in a paradoxical situation in which our desire for peace is so evident that the aggressor nations are encouraged to resort to acts which bring closer the very war we fear.

It is evident that some of the sponsors of the American Neutrality Act are themselves dissatisfied with the way that law has worked in practice. There is reason to believe that an effort to repeal the law will be undertaken and will succeed in reaching its objectives when Congress reconvenes. Certainly that result is greatly to be desired, because the repeal of the law would permit the material resources of the United States to count on the side of international law and order. Britain and France would be in a stronger position to resist aggression and to counsel peace in Central Europe if their hands were strengthened by the ability to purchase in this country, in the event of war, the materials to which they have access thru their command of the Atlantic.

Beyond the recall of the Neutrality Act, however, no early change is likely in American policy. There is no reason to believe that the American people will agree at any time in the near future to be bound by commitments to help to maintain world peace. But the aggressor nations will make a mistake if they assume from our unwillingness to pledge ourselves to a specific course of action that it is safe to leave us out of their calculations. We shall be fully prepared, if war on a large scale envelops Europe, to choose the side of the democracies.

That will mean, at the very least, what it meant in the years from 1914 to 1916: an immense moral support which cannot be regarded as an unimportant factor in the winning of a modern war, and a deliberate policy of

favoring our friends in the interpretation of laws which control our relations with other countries and of traditions which govern our policies on the high seas. At most it will mean, as it meant in 1917, a decision on the part of the United States to intervene.

On two occasions during our history as an independent nation a "world war" has been fought. We were drawn into both of those wars because American interests became so deeply involved that it was no longer tolerable even for a peace-loving nation to remain at peace.

It is important that the statesmen of aggressor nations should realize that today, no less than in 1917, there are vital American interests in all parts of the world which would almost certainly be affected by war on a large scale. It is important that they realize the real depth of American loyalty to the whole set of principles and methods and traditions which goes by the name of democracy.

In any ultimate test of strength between democracy and dictatorship, the good will and the moral support—and in the long run more likely than not the physical power—of the United States will be found on the side of those nations defending a way of life which is our own, and the only way of life which Americans believe to be worth living.

#### AMERICA'S INTEREST AND BRITAIN'S POLICY<sup>4</sup>

Thru the years since the founding of the American republic there has been evolved a policy of isolation and non-involvement. It is a policy to which the average

<sup>4</sup> By Robert J. Kerner, Professor of Modern History and Chairman of the North Eastern Asia Seminar. *Pacific Affairs*. 11:263-7. September, 1938.



American instinctively turns when he thinks of foreign policy and the outer world.

Conscious of America's world position, Theodore Roosevelt was one of the first presidents to frankly face the practical problem of fitting American foreign policy into the world as it is. It is now known that he finally came to the conception that American security required a balance of power in Europe and Asia. This conception was at the base of his foreign policy and, as a matter of fact, this policy has also become instinctive with the average American citizen, altho he is not always aware of it. Whenever the balance in Europe or Asia has been threatened or upset, America has usually been found on the side against the disturbing power. Illustrations of this may be found in American sympathy and diplomatic cooperation with Japan in the events leading up to the Russo-Japanese War, when Russia's ambitions were upsetting the balance of Asia. The United States is now sympathetic to China and opposed to the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, and for the same reason.

Altho the average American citizen will agree that this in general accurately diagnoses his instincts and the consequent foreign policies of his country, he does not realize that the two ideas of isolation and non-involvement on the one hand, and balance of power in Europe and Asia on the other, are contradictory. If he analyzed himself he would find that he is constantly torn by the desire to stay aloof and to intervene, because both have to do with his security. He has not yet seen his way thru the dilemma. Some one has said that England's policy thru the centuries has been the balance of power on the basis of isolation in peace, entente in crisis, alliance in war. Will America work itself out of the dilemma into some such coordination?

Altho some may urge that the United States has always had its face turned toward Europe and its back to Asia, it is doubtful whether this view can be entirely

substantiated. A few recent examples may throw light upon this conception. Before it entered the World War, America was building a navy second to none. It had an eye to Asia as well as Europe. The Entente was concerned in keeping Japan in its fold. But as the United States entered the war, it felt it had to have assurances on Japan's behavior in Asia while America was involved in Europe. This gives the setting not only for the variously interpreted Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917, but the moves which led to American participation in the intervention in Siberia in 1918 and the International Consortium in 1919, as well as the Washington Conference in 1922. In all this there appears one line of thought—not to allow Japan to take advantage of the World War to upset the balance in Asia and the Pacific. At the Washington Conference, besides the well-known commitments to which Japan subscribed with regard to China and the Pacific, there was the following little-known commitment:

In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.

It is not generally known that this was the result of over three years' pressure upon Japan by American diplomacy. When one views this alongside the commitments "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and the Open Door in China, as well as the status quo in the Pacific and the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he is bound to conclude that America was applying a policy of balance of power in Asia. For Japan to dominate China, control Eastern Siberia, and build a fleet capable of threatening Amer-

ica's position in the Pacific would have menaced the security of the United States.

At the same time in Europe America decisively helped to defeat Germany and, altho it did not subscribe to the Treaty of Versailles, it did sign a treaty of peace with Germany which left the Versailles settlement untouched as to all the parts which affected American security. American opposition to French hegemony in Europe after the war belonged to the same category. The United States instinctively (as did the English) ranged itself on the other side. And now America is opposed to a Nazi Germany, which it suspects of having ambitions of dominating Europe.

The cycle of events which began in Manchuria in 1931 and is far from ended yet, resulted in the initiative in world politics passing from the democracies to the dictatorships. The democracies are clearly in retreat. The remedy for the situation is probably internal. It may be generalized as the crucial need for the average citizen of the democracies to give up wanting the impossible in our present romantic age. Expressed in terms of foreign policy, this romanticism means the hope of getting peace by paying any price for it.

Thru the centuries, England's policy has traditionally been one of balance of power, operated thru the tactics of isolation in peace, entente in crisis, alliance in war. At least one dominant faction of British statesmen saw the League of Nations as a useful instrument in this policy, even if others, like Eden, believed that the League supplied the basis of a new policy for England, namely, collective security. Ever since the creation of the League there has been conflict behind the scenes of British statesmanship about this. Now the one view and then the other appeared to have the upper hand, until Chamberlain delivered the final blow to the idea of collective security. This has left England with a choice between

the policies of balance of power, isolation, or "befriending the strong."

Isolation apparently is ruled out because the British Empire with its far-flung cares cannot stand alone in a crisis like the present. On the other hand, the policy of balance of power is instinctive in the British mind and it is the one to which it might be expected automatically to turn.

If we examine the application of this policy to balance of power, we find that until the end of the nineteenth century England dominated the seas and applied the policy in Europe with great success. Until then America and Japan did not play a decisive role in the situation. The domination of the seas and the absence of America and Japan were vital in the success of the policy. When the World War transformed the scene, England no longer dominated the seas, the United States was the greatest world power, and Japan loomed paramount in the Far East. The original basis which gave success to England's policy of balance of power has disappeared. This is a fact which has not yet been grasped with sufficient understanding. If Germany dominates Europe, Italy controls the Mediterranean and Red Seas, as well as northern Africa, and Japan is paramount in Asia and the Pacific, where is the basis of a policy of balance of power? Is it in a series of pacts with Italy, Germany, and Japan, virtually accepting this situation, or is it in closer understandings with France, Soviet Russia, the minor states of Europe, the United States, and China?

The Anti-Comintern Pact, which Baron Ida, its chief sponsor in Japan, intimated would lead to a world Fascist League of Nations, is being viewed increasingly, in spite of its allegedly harmless externals, as being aimed less against the comintern than against the interests in Europe and Asia of the non-Communist democracies. China has been invited to join it in the last terms

of peace offered by Japan. Austria and Hungary were invited to join it not long ago. It is reported that the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in a speech in the Diet invited the United States to adhere to the Pact. And Ribbentrop, while ambassador to London, extended the invitation to England.

Since there is good ground for assuming that the objectives of Germany, Japan, and Italy are approximately as stated above, how should the Chamberlain policy of "appeasement" be interpreted? It has already led to a pact with Italy on which it is reliably reported *vital* rights were yielded, while England retained only *essential* rights in the Mediterranean and the Red seas. Similar pacts with Germany and Japan are projected. In each case there must be vital concessions by England and deals on spheres of influence.

There are some who at first maintained that the policy of "appeasement" was essentially that of balance of power, with the ultimate objective of breaking the Berlin-Rome Axis. There are others who see in it a complete shift to one of "befriending the strong," on a class basis. They see England gradually becoming Fascist, while the Fascist powers fight it out with Soviet Russia, the desired result in this case being the break-up of Bolshevik Russia and the exhaustion of the Fascist powers, with England holding a mortgage on the latter.

It may be observed that the first interpretation lacks a sound basis, in that balance of power has little or no terrain on which to operate if vital concessions are made to Italy, Germany, and Japan. The Axis is being strengthened instead of broken. There is still too much to be gained by the Axis before it quarrels over the spoils. The other interpretation appears to be too clever and subtle. For Germany, Japan, and Italy to partition Russia would mean giving them virtual control of the natural resources of three continents. If they can accomplish that, it is doubtful whether England will get a mortgage on them.

Perhaps neither of these interpretations is the valid one. It may be that England is again muddling along, hoping against hope that as it completes its armament the situation somehow will turn in its favor. Perhaps the average English citizen does not agree with Chamberlain, but he is willing to let him try his solution for the dilemma on his own responsibility, even at the cost of peace at any price. In any case, the reverberations of this latest shift in British policy are likely to push America and Russia toward isolation, instead of parallel or cooperative action to make a stand somewhere before it is too late.

#### ISOLATED AMERICA? <sup>5</sup>

With the collapse of world peace machinery and the rise of military dictatorship abroad, the advance of isolationist sentiment in the United States has been inevitable. Nevertheless, the Roosevelt administration has given two striking examples of international cooperation—a foreign trade program and a Pan-American policy. In many ways it is remarkable that, in an era of unprecedented nationalism, a highly protectionist country such as the United States should lead a world movement to secure tariff reduction. But this program cannot succeed until the fear of war is reduced, for nations will not trade freely with each other today if tomorrow there is danger they may fight. If President Roosevelt wishes to assure the success of the foreign trade program, he must do something effective toward solving the problem of world political confidence.

Public opinion is unanimously declaring that the United States must not be drawn into another European war. One may sympathize with the sentiment while admitting that the task of keeping the United States out of such a war may prove extremely difficult. If the

<sup>5</sup>From pamphlet *Chaos or Reconstruction?* by Raymond Leslie Buell. p.33-40. Foreign Policy Association. New York. January, 1937.

next war finds the democracies of France and Britain pitted against Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and militaristic Japan, the cry of keeping the world safe for democracy will again make itself heard. The American belief in democracy and the hatred of fascism in many circles may give rise to a strong demand in favor of entering a war on the side of the democratic powers if they should be in danger of being overwhelmed by fascist opponents. Should Paris and London be destroyed by bombing planes and poison gas, and the civilization of European democracies be threatened by totalitarian states, would it be possible to "quarantine" American opinion so that it will remain completely "neutral?"

Furthermore, many Americans may come to believe that if the fascist states and Japan succeed in dominating Europe and the Orient, these states will inevitably turn greedy eyes on the western hemisphere—Latin America or even Canada—and thus injure the vital interests and security of the United States. Thinking individuals might declare that even if Britain or France went down to defeat, there would be little possibility that the victor would seize Canada, and that the United States should do nothing until Canada was threatened by invasion. An emotional public, however, is more likely to demand action to prevent such a danger from coming into existence.

The so-called neutrality legislation of 1935-36, prohibiting the export of munitions and extension of loans to belligerents, may reduce the economic incentive to enter the next war but can have little effect on the moral and humanitarian emotions of the American people; the legislation fails moreover to take into account the fact that a defeat of Britain and France might severely endanger the defenses of all the American nations.

Despite a professed desire for neutrality legislation, the United States today is spending more than Britain on naval, military and air forces, all of which are organ-

ized for offensive purposes. The American government does not propose to sign any agreement recognizing the hegemony of Japan in the Orient or agreement to naval parity with Tokyo. There is a strong undercurrent in favor of protection of the Philippines by the United States for an indefinite period. An American general, assisted by other officers, is serving as military adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth, where military conscription has been introduced. Altho a few years ago strategists assumed that the United States could not defend the Philippines on the outbreak of war, a number now believe that this is possible because of the new factor of air power, assisted by a local army and a strong American navy.

The United States is also prosecuting a trade policy which aims at increasing its economic ties. Both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have repeatedly professed their support of liberalism and democracy everywhere, asserting that the economic welfare of the United States is bound up with that of the rest of the world, and admitting that America cannot but be seriously affected by another general war even if technically it remains neutral.

These facts indicate that the United States does not intend to withdraw from the world.

Today the world is in one of its transitorial periods which inevitably involves great danger. This period is marked by an effort to liquidate the unequal provisions of the peace treaties imposed on Germany and the other defeated powers at the end of the war. In addition to this struggle, the world is confronted with acute international tensions arising out of the social transformations taking place in every country, and the breakdown of the old capitalist order. If this transformation is successfully completed, the result will not be a utopia, but it will be a better world, both from the point of view of economic stability and a more balanced standard of living. These



movements for the liquidation of the unequal treaties and for social transformation represent fundamentally optimistic trends, if peace can be maintained.

Altho a European settlement is by no means impossible, the American public has been led to believe that a general war is inevitable, no matter what policy the democracies adopt, and that there is a shelter in the "new neutrality." The proposals on behalf of mandatory embargoes would weaken international organization, sacrifice weak countries to aggressor states, and injure the struggle of liberalism to survive. All these results are fundamentally opposed to American character as expressed in the past, yet a policy producing such results has today become popular. If put into effect, the policy will probably break down even more rapidly than in Jefferson's time, especially since it also threatens the security and economic welfare of the United States. America cannot run very far from the international problem because there is no place to go; some day our conscience may revolt at a policy of retreating before international wrongdoing. If America cares about a civilization aimed at the full development of personality, rather than totalitarian power, it will not wish to contribute to the overthrow of this civilization in other countries. Eventually, we may learn that in the present technological era it is impossible for this or any nation to exist as an island of sanity in a world-sea of chaos. Some day we may assist in an effort to organize the world on a basis of justice and order—not for humanity's sake, but for our own best interests.

#### BRIEF EXCERPTS

The idea of binding ourselves irrevocably now as to what we will do or not do in case of any future war; a sort of national pacifist pledge not to fight, whatever

happens; like a man, fearing his own weakness, taking an unconditional temperance pledge before setting out on a road where he will have to pass a saloon: is this humorous or not? What shall one say? *James Harold Flye. Sewanee Review Ap-Je. '38. p. 146.*

As to the United States joining with all the other Americas in resisting with military force any aggression from outside the hemisphere in any part of the American hemisphere, I may say that I am, of course, opposed to committing the United States to foreign entanglements. I realize, of course, there might be situations that would have to be met as they arise. *Bennett Champ Clark. United States News. D. 7 '36. p. 2.*

The replacement of "dollar diplomacy" with a "good neighbor policy" is more than an achievement of American diplomacy—it is a great adventure in American idealism. The world needs an adventure in idealism. *A good neighbor policy, not in name only but in spirit and in truth, must enter into the inter-relations of all nations if the world is to be a fit place for neighbors to live in. Henry G. Ellis. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Virginia. Jl. 6, '37.*

The real meaning of Buenos Aires has little or nothing to do with Latin America at all. It is just a reflection of the deep anxiety felt in Washington about Europe, of the feeling that the United States should do something to help stop a European war coupled with the unshakeable determination of the American people that its government shall in no way get entangled or mixed up with the crazy politics of Europe. *W. N. Ewer. Labour. Ja. '37. p. 109.*

From the moment when the danger of a German invasion grew acute, the diplomatic representatives of

the United States have conducted themselves as tho this country were among the most immediately involved. To spectators in Europe, it must have seemed that the United States was preparing for war almost as openly and as immediately as Great Britain or France. *Christian Century*. S. 14, '38. p. 1086.

The position of the United States in world affairs is at this moment unique. We are affected by every large event, whether it takes place in Spain, in the Near East or the Pacific, to say nothing of South America. Our prestige remains as imposing as it was at the end of the World War. But at the same time we have avoided so far to commit ourselves, to one or another policy of the other great powers of Europe or Asia. *Adamantios T. Polyzoides*. *World Affairs Interpreter*. Jl. '38. p. 183.

Both countries (Great Britain and the United States) have, with others, subscribed to the principle that war should not be used as an instrument of national policy. Is this principle to be reduced to a nullity by a policy of complete neutrality, unconditional and undiscriminating? Or will that policy be so qualified as to enable the influence of the two countries, within the limits set by their respective traditions and public opinion, to be effectively used to discourage and prevent aggressive policy and action when they threaten the peace of the world? *Political Quarterly*. O. '37. p. 481.

As recently as the middle of last month spokesman on public policy expressed the opinion the United States was in good shape for the present, and added that plans were afoot to bring this country to an excellent military standing.

Then came the four-power conference at Munich, Hitler's complete victory for his current expansionist policy, and, as one result, rapid indications that a defense

program which seemed all right for the United States as recently as last month is considered inadequate and dangerous this month. *Charles W. Hurd. New York Times. O. 23, '38. Sec. 4. p. 7.*

There is a division, in this (isolationist) camp, as to how far "America" means the whole western hemisphere. The defence of America to most isolationists means just that—South as well as Central and North America. That fact, plus the "defensive" plans for a two-fleet naval system (Atlantic and Pacific), will almost certainly give the navy all that it asks for and the army most of what it wants. But it is an opinion which is strong enough—certainly in the Senate—to prevent Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull offering a joint policy to England, in the Pacific or anywhere else. Its spokesmen are the same old group. *W. Y. Elliott. Political Quarterly. Ap. '38. p. 175.*

Non-interference by the United States in the affairs of Europe, one of the cardinal provisos of the Doctrine, may now be defined as meddling whenever it is to the American interest and shirking the responsibilities attendant upon that meddling. The World War, the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations, the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, American diplomacy looking toward the control of a share of European and Near Eastern oil fields, even the present neutrality policy toward Spain, all are impressive monuments to American meddling in the affairs of Europe. But we Americans nevertheless inflexibly believe in the Monroe Doctrine, tho that aspect of it has far less reality than Banquo's ghost. *Carleton Beals. Political Quarterly. O. '37. p. 598.*

The American note to Japan, dated October 6 and released at Washington on October 27, carefully enum-

erated the methods by which Japanese authorities are squeezing out foreign economic interests. Exchange control, tariff alterations, monopolistic companies, censorship of mail and telegrams, restrictions on freedom of residence and travel by American nationals, and other measures are being employed by the various puppet régimes to break down foreign business rights in China. For the first time, this note hints at the possibility of reprisal by pointing out that the United States has not discriminated against Japanese nationals in its territory thru establishment of "embargoes, import prohibitions, exchange controls, preferential restrictions," and similar measures. This sentence formulates a legal basis on which the United States could move to restrict Japanese access to the American market, which has been furnishing Japan with the bulk of its war supplies. *T. A. Bisson. Foreign Policy Bulletin. N. 4, '38. p. 2.*

The present controversy or the major conflict in American foreign policy today relates, of course, to the question of whether the United States shall join in the effort to deal with the issues of international peace and national security on a world-wide basis by collective international-coercive action against aggression in case of need. That program is embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and is supported by the states faithful thereto. It is opposed by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and a Japan dominated by a militaristic group of diplomats and politicians, with perhaps one or more satellite states. The alternative to this program is heavy individual armament, every nation for itself except for any limited cooperative arrangements, always subject to disruption by war, abstention from any cooperative security action to check national aggression, and varying degrees of neutrality and isolation. No graver or more fundamental conflict of theory could develop than this. *Pitman B. Potter. World Affairs Interpreter. Ap. '38. p. 15.*

After all, "isolationism" is a very strong, an extreme, even an absolute term both in etymology and in the minds and mouths of its advocates. It really means complete non-participation, either on the assumption that we have no interests at stake in world affairs or on the basis of an argument that even if we have they are not and cannot be sufficiently important to warrant the risk their defense might involve. No such view ever captured official American policy even during the middle period when its politician advocates had comparatively free rein. The term has never been employed by any President or Secretary of State to describe our policy. On the other hand, if by isolationism were meant non-interference except when our interests justified action there could be no objection to such a position, but such a policy could by no stretch of terms be described as isolationism. In point of fact it is the sound rule of policy in all such matters and the one actually followed by the United States at all times by the compelling force of circumstances. *Pitman B. Potter. World Affairs Interpreter. Ap. '38. p. 17.*

The great problem for democracies today is to adjust themselves to facts. The old distinction between democracies and absolute monarchies has passed away. The distinction today is between representative government and dictatorship, and into one of those two classes the states of the world seem destined more and more to fall. Neither of those systems can possibly think well of the other, but unless they are to be locked in a mortal combat from which civilization itself might not survive, they must agree to differ and find a way of living in harmony. The dangers are as great on the one side as on the other, and aggression on either side will only widen the breach. Between British democracy and Italian fascism the differences are fundamental and ineradicable, but Mr. Chamberlain seems nevertheless to be finding a way to adjust important

controversies with Italy and is ready, apparently, to negotiate with Germany. Political theorists will find little to satisfy them in such arrangements, but their practical significance is immensely important for the peace of the world. Tolerance is not called for where there is accord; its function begins where there are differences. It is the lesson of tolerance that the world must somehow learn if it hopes to avoid war. *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. Ap. 16, '38. p. 2434.

There are two American "foreign policies," distinct and diametrically opposed; one congressional and one administration. Congressional foreign policy is based on the assumption that the United States should not concern itself with moral issues: it should maintain an impartial attitude toward treaty breakers and treaty keepers; both aggressors and victims of aggression should be placed on the same footing. Administration foreign policy is based on the opposite assumption; that the United States is most essentially concerned with moral issues, must bring moral pressure to bear upon treaty breakers and play an active part in upholding the rule of international law.

Congressional foreign policy, moreover, is based on the assumption that the prevention of war is no concern of the United States; her only problem should be how to keep out of war. Administration foreign policy is based on the assumption that the United States has a duty as a great power to work for world peace and, should war break out, to use her influence to shorten its duration.

Throught the past ten years these two foreign policies have jockeyed for position. *Anglo-American*, pseud. *National Review*. My. '38. p. 602.

After centuries of semi-isolation, self-sufficiency, and independence, nations now find themselves in close contact and interdependence with other nations. And they

have not lived as close neighbors in the modern conception of that term long enough to master the techniques and learn the procedures which individuals long ago had to learn in order to live together in approximate peace and harmony.

So we have the frictions, difficulties and offenses of individual anti-social, bad neighbors magnified to national scale. For spite fences, we have tariff walls; for private trespass, we have national expansion and aggrandizement complexes; for individual sharp practice, we have national monetary juggling; etc. And there is no corner policeman to step in—no central authority to restrain and control. So the bad blood grows worse and the danger of the world grows so much greater that a general conflict seems almost inevitable. Because of the smallness and interdependence of the modern world, the danger that threatens is the greatest that has ever threatened. *War has always meant economic and spiritual disaster for some part of the world: modern war must mean these for all the world. War has always meant chaos somewhere: modern war must mean chaos everywhere.* Henry G. Ellis. *Institute of Public Affairs. University of Virginia. Jl. 6, '37.*

Mr. Roosevelt's speech at Kingston, Ontario, and those which Ambassador Bullitt and Secretary Hull delivered in early September carried a clear intimation that the United States might not remain aloof in a war precipitated by fascist aggression. These statements were in line with the President's famous "quarantine" speech of last October and were noted in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo. Then, a week before Nürnberg, the President went out of his way to take back what he had previously said, declaring that we had no commitments of any sort in Europe. This statement, like Mr. Roosevelt's last-minute appeals, may have had little influence on events,



since Hitler was already convinced that he could out-bluff the democracies, but it destroyed any influence that the United States might have exercised in preventing or limiting the sell-out. It said, in effect, that none of the principles or issues at stake concerned us. When the most powerful democracy in the world, a nation which had played an important role in the establishment of Czechoslovakia and one which is not exposed to immediate aerial or other attack, intimated that it was indifferent to an assault on that country, its example could not fail to influence other nations less favorably situated. *Nation. O.* 15, '38. p.368.

All that is now left to us is the policy of special alliances. There is not at present any choice between collective security and special alliances. An examination of such alliances is not reassuring to one who hopes for peace, as they are able to keep the peace of the world only tentatively and partially and insecurely as long as they can secure and maintain a balance of power. This is a precarious feat, but it is all that is left. We have tried it before. That is the way the peace of the world was kept up until 1914. The difficulty in trying to keep the peace thru alliances is that each party to an alliance tries to make sure that the balance of power is on its side. There is a race for armaments and a struggle for power. Inevitably it becomes a struggle of groups in an anarchistic world. This balance of power, therefore, is not easily maintained. We saw it in the history of America when we tried to maintain a balance between the free and the slave states. When Kansas became a free state the balance was upset and war was inevitable. The same thing happened in 1914. Therefore, peace thru special alliances is only temporary. In fact, there is no peace at the present time. Italy, Germany, and Japan are said to have formed an alliance of their own in op-

position to the League. Hence a more realistic view of the situation shows that there are now in existence two groups, the League of Nations and the Fascist group. *Everett Dean Martin. Institute of World Affairs. Proceedings. 1937. p. 185.*

There is no question of the United States entering the hostilities, at least for the time being. American opinion is still firmly against participation in another European war, no matter what the issues. And a very large part of it—as we believe, an overwhelming majority—is in favor of adopting a course that will do the utmost to erect safeguards against our being drawn into war in the future. We are resolved not to be compelled to take part as we were virtually compelled to in 1917.

At the same time, American opinion is far more bitterly aroused against Germany than it was at any time between August, 1914, and April, 1917. There is no use in advising "neutrality of thought," as President Wilson did at the outbreak of hostilities. That would be completely unrealistic. We are not and do not want to be impartial in such a struggle as now seems to impend. If, in a strained effort to keep aloof, our government should do anything greatly to injure the cause of Hitler's opponents, public opinion would react and topple us bodily into the conflagration before many months had passed. It is necessary, therefore, to serve two aims at the same time—first, to keep out of war; second, to refrain from action which would materially injure the chances of success of those whose cause we favor. *New Republic. O. 5, '38. p. 228.*

Most Americans insist that their country retain its independent and unmortgaged judgment as to the merits of world crises as and when they arise. This viewpoint

has dominated the whole foreign policy of the United States and it endures to this day.

My country is unwilling to bind itself to any course of action in the future without an opportunity to examine the situation in the light which then envelops it.

It seems to me, to judge from conflicting and contradictory reports which reach us from abroad, that this attitude of the United States is not well understood. In some quarters it has been interpreted to mean that our country would not fight under any circumstances short of actual invasion.

That is not accurate, in my opinion, and it is a dangerous sort of misunderstanding to be current just now.

Others seem to imagine that the United States could never remain neutral in the event a general war should unhappily break out. That, I believe, is just as dangerously conceived a misapprehension as the other.

Both of these points of view have been expressed in Congress and elsewhere during the three years that our neutrality legislation has been under debate. But they emanate only from the extreme partizans on either side. The majority of our people, I believe, prefer the middle ground. *Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Mr. 26, '38. p. 1976.*

Czechoslovakia will mean more to American history than the theories of the isolationists would admit. Conceivably it will mean precisely the opposite of what the isolationists contend. Isolationism is only possible to a nation which is indifferent to the issues. The issue raised and determined at Munich is an issue to which this country can never be indifferent. It affects the existence of this nation as a nation and with it the national existence of every other state upon the American continents.

The issue is the issue of race. More specifically it is the issue of the relation of racial status to political status.

The partition of Czechoslovakia by and with the consent of France and Great Britain has established as a principle of international action the proposition that a man's racial derivation establishes his political adherence. Members of a given race belong as a matter of right to the country of their racial origin, and the claim of right—which may be made, it should be observed, from either end—overrides all other claims. It overrides not only the claims of common morality and the claims of self-respect but the claims also of treaties and international commitments.

The acceptance of that proposition by the two great democracies of Western Europe, and its elevation to a principle of international action, is not and cannot be a matter of indifference to the nations of the Americas. For the nations of the Americas were established and are still maintained upon a proposition totally different. They were established upon the proposition that citizenship was a matter of free choice, that immigrants from Europe left their race behind them upon the docks of Boston or Buenos Aires or Valparaiso, and that the New World was to be settled by men of many racial stocks who would beget among themselves not another race but a people. Whitman has stated the emotional content of that proposition. It has been accepted so long and so completely in the United States that it is taken as a matter of course. It is the American Principle. To challenge it is to challenge the civilization of this hemisphere. *Archibald Macleish. Nation. O. 15, '38. p.370.*

## AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION

### GREATEST SERVICE THE NATION CAN GIVE <sup>1</sup>

I found most nations in Europe convinced that we would be inevitably drawn into the next great war as in the last. Some people build confident hope upon it. But every phase of this picture should harden our resolves that we keep out of other people's wars. Nations in Europe need to be convinced that this is our policy.

Yet we are interested, vitally interested, in peace among other nations. The League of Nations, except as a most useful clearing house of economic and social information, is at least in a coma. Certainly the central idea that peace could be imposed by collective action employing military or economic force, is dead.

But these ideas of collective action now appear in a new form. I find in many quarters of Europe and some in America an insistence that, as democracy is endangered by the rise of dictatorships and authoritarian governments, therefore democracies should join in some sort of mutual undertaking for protective action. These ideas were greatly stimulated and encouraged by the word quarantine from these shores. Such proposals, if sincere, involve more than mere good words. Anything honest in that direction implies the pledge of some sort of joint military or economic action by the United States with other powers. We may as well be blunt about it.

If we join with the two other powerful democracies, Great Britain and France, we are engaging ourselves in

<sup>1</sup> From address of Herbert Hoover, former President of the United States, before the Council of Foreign Affairs. *Vital Speeches*. 4:407-12. April 15, 1938.

an alliance directed against Germany and Italy and all the satellites they can collect. But we are doing more than this. Great Britain has her own national and imperial problems and policies. Any commitment of ourselves will mean that we are dragged into these policies. France has her own special alliances and her own policies, including an alliance with communist Russia. We would be supporting Stalin.

But more than all this, we would be fostering the worst thing that can happen to civilization, that is, the building up of a war between government faith or ideologies. Such a combination of democracies would at once result in combining the autocracies against the democracies. It could have all the hideous elements of old religious wars.

We should have none of it. If the world is to keep the peace, then we must keep peace with dictatorships as well as with popular governments. The forms of government which other peoples pass thru in working out their destinies are not our business. You will recollect we were once animated by a desire to save the world for democracy. The only result that time was to sow dragons' teeth which sprang up into dictatorships. We can never herd the world into the paths of righteousness with the dogs of war.

While we should reject the whole idea of pledging our military or economic forces to any scheme for preserving peace by making war, we have both the obligation and the interest to organize and join in the collective moral forces to prevent war.

I know I will be told again that moral forces do not weigh much in a world of soldiers and battleships. But the greatest force for peace is still the public opinion of the world. That is a moral force. I will be told again that it has no weight. But I found everywhere an anxiety for the approval of world opinion. Every consequential nation supports at great expense a propaganda

bureau for that purpose. The dictatorships especially devote themselves to it.

And why? Because the desire of nations for the good opinion of mankind is not dead. Secretary Hull's eloquent denunciation of international lawlessness was echoed in every newspaper in the world. Decency is still news.

I believe there are methods by which the moral forces for peace and international cooperation for progress could be better organized than they are today. At this moment of despair in the world the problems of armament and economic degeneration press dreadfully for solution.

In the larger issues of world relations, our watchwords should be absolute independence of political action and adequate preparedness. That course will serve the world best. It will serve our interests best. It will serve free men best.

The protection of democracy is that we live it, that we revitalize it within our own borders, that we keep it clean of infections, that we wipe out its corruptions, that we incessantly fight its abuses, that we insist upon intellectual honesty, that we build its morals, that we keep out of war.

That is the greatest service that this nation can give to the future of humanity.

## COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEANS WAR <sup>2</sup>

The advocates of collective security under present conditions belong to two general groups. First, the liberals, the inheritors of the League of Nations tradition, who after the failure of the League in every major crisis still believe that it is possible to police the world

<sup>2</sup> From radio address by Norman Thomas, Socialist, January 8, 1938.

on terms of a status quo that divides men and nations into the House of Have and the House of Have Not. The idea is not only an over-simplification: it is completely opposed to logic and history. War is not an exercise of police force. It reduces nations which use it to about the level of the "criminal" nation whom they are trying to restrain. Moreover, capitalist nations never act as policemen for ideal ends. They act in their own national interest to maintain what they have as against the unsatisfied nations. Their success in war, as was proved in 1914-1918, may defeat a single aggressor but it leaves untouched and probably intensifies all those capitalist and nationalist forces which make for aggression and give us both war and fascism.

The second group of advocates of collective security and the most active propagandists for it among workers and students are the Communists and near Communists. It is one of the ironies of history that these professed followers of Lenin have at this late date gone over to the policies of Woodrow Wilson. But there is a reason for it, and that reason is their intense preoccupation in saving, not the revolutionary cause of the workers, but Stalin's Russia, their holy land. To do this they would sacrifice almost anything, at least temporarily, including Leninism, providing they could bring Roosevelt and capitalist America into war together with, or in behalf of Stalin's Russia. It is of course poor policy for Communist leaders to declare openly what they have on occasion admitted privately; namely, that under present conditions collective security or a quarantine against aggressor nations probably would mean America's entry into war and certainly America's preparedness for such entry. But they at least are intelligent enough and realistic enough to know that such are the facts.

I am often asked specifically why, under present conditions, collective security means war. Would not a complete economic embargo against Japan, Germany,



Italy, or all three of them, backed by the British Empire, the French Empire, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the smaller democracies or near democracies operate to restrain or crush the nation at which it was directed? The answer is yes, in time, provided such an embargo should be imposed and consistently enforced even against an armed attempt to break it. But at once to sober-minded men two things are evident: first, there is not the remotest chance of such an embargo. It was not imposed under easier circumstances against Japan in 1931 when she stole Manchuria. It was not imposed against Italy when Mussolini stole Ethiopia. Such sanctions as were belatedly imposed did not include oil and other materials which would have made it effective, and their only result was to make the Italian people hate England worse than they hated Mussolini. Of all utopian impossibilities the most fantastic is the notion that these mutually suspicious self-seeking nations for democratic ends will unite against the aggressor dissatisfied nations of the House of Have Not.

The second fact is that if such collective economic sanctions were miraculously imposed by the alliance of mutually suspicious nations the nations at which the embargo was directed would fight with the courage of desperation. This would be the inevitable psychological reaction and the nations would be justified in hoping that some chance, perhaps some break in the ranks of their enemies, might aid them in their fight. Specifically, effective sanctions against Japan, including oil, would lead to one or another or all of the following things:

An attempt to take oil by force from the Dutch East Indies.

An attack on the Philippines which could not be successfully defended.

The organization of an elaborate bootleg trade protected by the Japanese navy.

Deliberate attack upon American naval vessels, especially those now in belligerent waters helping the Standard Oil maintain its trade.

Any one of these things would logically compel the United States to go to war if the United States had been responsible for the sanctions which led to these actions. With the deepest respect for the moral passion and indignation of my friends who believe in collective security I must insist that to deny what I have just said is only possible on the basis of a refusal to face facts or a dangerous intoxication by wishful thinking.

As a matter of fact in our present day world there will be no collective security in behalf of democracy. There may be a more or less uneasy alliance of two or three non-Fascist powers which may drift together into war, let us say against Japan. That is frankly what the English government wants, with the Americans doing most of the fighting and the British getting most of whatever benefits would follow Japan's defeat.

We are quite likely to stumble or blunder into a new world war in pursuit of prestige or profit or as a consequence of some fresh Panay incident which we invite by our governmental insistence on staying in belligerent waters.

The tragedy is that the advocates of collective security while far from powerful enough to bring about genuine collective security or to guide governmental policy in war will be an important force in making the American people accept that war. We did not get into the World War to make the world safe for democracy, but in order to protect the economic interests of bankers and traders. We did not get into the War of 1812 to protect seamen—that was only a rationalization—but because a lot of influential Americans wanted to conquer Canada. Similar nationalistic reasons may get us into the next war, but their nakedness will be protected by the idealist cloak furnished by talk of collective security.

There might never be a formal treaty after a new world war. The world might degenerate into a cycle of wars which would end temporarily from sheer exhaustion. If there were a new treaty it would be a repetition of Versailles with the things that make for fascism and aggression intensified rather than diminished. This is the logic of war between capitalist states, as the first World War abundantly proved.

But some will say, the only alternative is to give a free hand to the fascist powers. This is not true. The alternative is to strengthen all those forces which by their nature are opposed not only to fascism but to the capitalist-nationalism which breeds fascism. It is not the blundering interference of an armed America which will eventually make China safe for the Chinese. It is the power of the Chinese masses supported as is very likely by Japanese workers, aided perhaps by some missionary work from Russia, which will break the power of Japanese militarism, a power already menaced by its own excessive extension. To my Communist friends whose preoccupation is the defense of Russia, let me say that today Russia is so strong by reason of her geography, climate, increasing population and military preparedness that she cannot be conquered by any alliance thrown against her unless, as I profoundly hope is not the case, the continuing purges are proof of an internal division in Russia which cannot be remedied by having Roosevelt conscript our sons for war in her behalf.

Fortunately the likelihood of a secure alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan for aggression is not great. There are too many disintegrating forces within them, there is too much suspicion between their rulers and there are too many conflicting interests for them to unite effectively unless under joint attack by other nations.

## IMPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY \*

We are once again presented with the demand made upon us in 1914. We are asked to align ourselves with democracy against autocracy. Only now it is presented as "collective security," a phrase just as euphonious as "making the world safe for democracy"—and just as futile.

In the first place, with whom are we to line up? With England that replaced Eden with Halifax? With France that rejected every reasonable settlement of the German question for twenty years while there was still time? With Russia whose dictatorship is just as bloody as any of them, and whose petroleum fed the Italian tanks in Ethiopia the while her dupes abroad, including the Union Square comrades, shed crocodile tears over fascist brutality? With China whose corrupt and venal chieftains have kept it divided for a thousand years, and for the last hundred years in the face of continuous aggression by England, France, Russia, et al? With Poland that ditched its ally, France, for a smile from Hitler, and that pursues the blackest policy against its minorities rather than meeting squarely its genuine agrarian and labor problems?

If, however, we are to shut our eyes to all of that and still pursue the chimerical "collective security," how are we to effect such a line-up? Shall we subscribe to treaties that insist upon the status quo? Shall we create a tribunal that will determine for us at each move on the international checkerboard if there has been aggression and who is the aggressor? And is this to be implemented by economic and military sanctions against such aggressor?

\* From article by James Lee Randolph. *Dynamic America*. 6:10-12. July, 1938.

If this is the objective of those who preach "collective security," may we not ask why those proposed European allies do not effect such an organization first? England, France, and Russia together with the smaller peoples moving in their orbits constitute a population of about 225 million, compared with, say 130 million in Germany and Italy. Even when Japan is added, the total is still below the other side; and this completely disregards colonial possessions. These countries are far richer in resources than the German-Italian-Japanese triumvirate. Why, then, don't they enter a "collective security" pact irrespective of us? Is it just barely possible that they do not trust one another? Is that the type of bed-fellows we are asked to choose? Are we not likely in such case to end up by holding the bag as we did splendidly during the late unpleasantness and thereafter?

Do we approve then of the philosophies and methods of Mussolini, Hitler and the Japanese militarists? No. Most Americans abhor them and their works. So do millions, yea, tens of millions, in Germany, Italy and Japan. The fight against dictatorship will have to be waged by these people themselves. Liberty cannot be handed to a people on a silver platter. It has to be fought for, won and preserved by those immediately concerned; otherwise, it is built on sand and will not last.

Are we in the meantime to practice isolation? Have we pursued an isolationist policy since the days of Washington because we did not join "collective security" pacts? Only once, in 1917, we did meddle in Europe. Did we accomplish anything? And, into the bargain, were we not despised by the very people who exploited our naivete?

If we, as a people, are outraged at the gang in Germany who use governmental decrees to rob whole groups

of their possessions, persecute them in the most sadistic fashion, and permit them neither to live like human beings nor to use their own means to emigrate; if we are sickened by the so-called war machines of Italy and Japan that exterminate defenseless civil populations—and we undoubtedly are—must we keep quiet? Most assuredly not. During our “isolationist” history we protested most vigorously thru our government and as groups of citizens against frightfulness on a much lower scale. There are plenty of precedents for even severing diplomatic relations with governments which commit atrocities against groups within their boundaries or against others.

But such acts on our part do not involve “collective security” agreements. They would represent our own attitude and would for that very reason be more effective. They would show, moreover, that we do not oppose their national interests against others; that our quarrel is not with the men, women and children of those nations, but with the madmen in control and the policies they pursue. Such protests would strengthen the forces within those countries which are waiting for a chance to assert themselves against the beastly regimes, their own oppressors.

Finally, our vital energies, instead of being frittered away following a phantom “collective security,” could be directed intensively toward fundamental improvements in our own economic, political and social life. We could preserve complete sanity in our own collectivism to serve as a living example in a world gone mad with infantile bombast, boundless jealousy, flaming hatred and horrible cruelty. This may be conceived as the greatest service we could render the cause of true democracy and humanity.

CONCERTED ACTION AGAINST THE  
FASCIST STATES<sup>4</sup>

I have spoken of this "concerted action" as perhaps to be undertaken by the "democracies." The prevailing war slogan is, "The democracies must unite against fascism." It would be profitable to analyze this slogan while we may. Who are these "democracies" that beckon us? They are the British empire, the French empire, and Russia, an imperialist-communist bloc, now pitted against three other nations, Germany, Italy, and Japan, who are challenging their supremacy in Europe and the world.

Great Britain is a democracy, but the empire is not a democracy; and it is the empire that is arousing the envy of its aspiring rivals. The same is true of the French empire which includes a great part of Northern Africa and a slice of China, taken before Japan thought of imperial expansion. Russia is the third member of the combination, a communist dictatorship in which only one party is permitted to exist. By my definition, this is no more a democracy than is fascist Germany. This slogan, like all war slogans, is false to the very core. Our government is being invited in reality to join in Europe's endless game of international poker, power politics, in which the chips of the players are the wealth and young manhood of nations. The President of the United States must not be allowed again to play this game which resulted so ruinously for our people last time, and with no benefit whatever to the rest of the world.

All that I have said hitherto regarding the folly of this highly academic theory of peace when jointly administered, applies with much greater force to unilateral action on the part of the United States. It would not

<sup>4</sup>From debate by Frederick J. Libby, Executive Secretary, National Council for Prevention of War. *New Masses*. 27: Special Section, 10-12, May 24, 1938.

stop the dictators, since they could and would get their supplies elsewhere; it would not overthrow the dictators but would establish them more firmly in power since they control the means of communications within their countries; it would stimulate fresh aggressions to the degree that the boycott became effective; and, for the psychological reasons to which I have alluded, it would lead our nation on the road straight to war, not with one nation but with three.

War, by which I mean the resort to the war method, has become the supreme enemy of mankind. Just follow thru a war with Japan, such as the advocates of concerted action ask us to risk. Military experts tell us that it would be an extremely difficult war to wage and a difficult war to win. It would necessarily be fought mainly if not entirely on Japan's side of the Pacific Ocean. Without going into the technical details to explain the almost insuperable problem of landing troops for the conquest of Japan and the neighboring portion of Asia, suffice it here to say that official estimates are that it would last five years or more; that it would cost us from forty to fifty billions dollars and an incalculable number of lives; and that victory, in the sense that Japan is trying to win a decision now in China, might not even then be won.

But assume for the sake of argument that we did win the war ultimately, both in the islands of Japan and on the adjacent continent. Our boys would want to come home when the war was over. We have no desire to annex any part of Asia with its vast poverty and age-old problems. When they came home, what improvement would they have made in the condition of the lands that they had conquered? They would leave behind them a land wasted and desolate, facing starvation and chaos. Whether communism or fascism would be their lot would be of little moment. Probably communism from Russia would sweep over Asia; but with nothing but misery to share.



To what conditions in America would our boys return? What system of government would they find here? The War Department's Mobilization Plan, of which the Hill-Sheppard Bill and its equally fascist successor, the May Bill, are significant expressions, is our answer. Our War Department has planned it all out for us. With the outbreak of any major war we go fascist. A totalitarian organization of the entire nation under a war dictator is to be our portion, with everybody in the army, from the farmer on his farm and the worker and manager alike in the factory, to the preacher in his pulpit. What is more, our War Department looks realistically beyond the period of the war and plans for the depression that will follow war. When the soldiers have been discharged from the army and the workers from the munition factories, when the bottom has dropped out of the world and when our dollar has lost its value as the German mark did after the World War, then our choice will be, or rather, the choice before our dictator will be, whether to let the nation sink down into a vast depression and chaos or to continue the control indefinitely to which we shall have become accustomed. Most well-informed men believe that the fascism of the war will remain as the fascism of the peace.

The futility of the war method of stopping dictators or promoting democracy or any other spiritual value ought by this time, with the World War and the present wars going on in Spain and China as our object lessons, to have sunk into our souls. Under no circumstances whatever has our government the right to involve us in another foreign war, whether in Asia or in Europe.

The best informed military experts agree that our country cannot be successfully attacked. Just as it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for us successfully to attack Japan and land troops there for its conquest, so is it even more difficult and probably quite impossible for Japan or any other nation or combination of nations, during any period that can be foreseen, to make a suc-

cessful attack upon the United States. This important fact having been clarified, we face next the question whether we can keep out of the wars of Europe and of Asia if we take reasonable precautions. We have the authority of our present ambassadors to Great Britain and Germany and of our former president, Herbert Hoover, to the effect that we definitely can. Norway and Sweden have not had a war for more than a hundred years. They stayed out of the World War for four-and-a-half years. So did little Denmark and Holland, with a war raging in their front and back yards. So did Switzerland. What is more, they are all making preparations and plans to stay out of the next war. So is Belgium. So is Poland. And so is Great Britain unless her vital interests are involved. It was Anthony Eden and not Neville Chamberlain who announced this fact in the House of Commons to the world.

When the nations of Europe are planning to remain neutral if war breaks out on their continent, why do the advocates of "concerted action" in our country preach a fatalistic doctrine that regards our involvement as "inevitable"? Even Canada intends to stay out of a European war if possible, whether Great Britain stays out or not, so Sir Herbert Marler told the Canadian Club of New York last fall. "Canada does not maintain that she can prevent war," he said. "She does intend if possible to avoid war."

What are the precautions that we must take to stay out? Briefly they are: (1) maintain and strengthen our neutrality law and elect an administration that will obey it; (2) pass the La Follette or some tighter war-referendum bill and add the war referendum to the Constitution of the United States; (3) establish a line in the Mid-Pacific beyond which our navy would have no responsibility, its recognized business being the defense of our soil from invasion; (4) set up an advisory commission for the State Department *now* to plan the steps necessary

to maintain our neutrality in any war that may break out anywhere. The War Department has its War College planning with it how to win a war. Is it not high time that our State Department took the peace of the United States seriously and made its plans in advance for winning the peace?

### AMERICA AND EUROPE<sup>5</sup>

If proposals, modest or ambitious, for association between America and Europe are to get very far, in the present state of public opinion, in my view the following conditions must be observed:

1. They must clearly be in America's own, individual interest (however much they are also in the world's, or in Europe's interest), and this American interest must be the motive which is stressed.

2. They must be sponsored not by Europeans but by Americans, and if possible not by Americans who may superficially appear Europeanised by travel, education, or financial and other contact, but by 100 per cent Americans, who have in no way lost their native character, or sense of self interest.

3. They must clearly defer to the overwhelming American desire not to be drawn, directly or indirectly, into foreign wars, or into the League, the World Court, or other international machinery involving a risk of war; and there must not be an attempt indirectly and quietly to edge America towards such, to her, dangerous commitments.

4. They must not involve any taking sides by America in foreign disputes.

<sup>5</sup> From address by Dr. Frank O. Darvall, British Lecturer, Member Royal Institute of International Affairs. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. Charlottesville. July 7, 1936.

5. They must impose upon any foreign countries which are to benefit by them a burden and risk, *vis-à-vis* America, at least as great as the burden and risk thrown upon America, *vis-à-vis* Europe.

I do not personally object to these conditions. They are, I think, proper conditions. They are inevitable conditions if European-American relationships are to be natural, candid and equal.

Europe has been too much in the past a suppliant, though not a very humble one, in its relations to America, demanding, as of right, American assistance.

America has been too much a donor, suspecting with some justice that the suppliants would, if not carefully watched, get away with more than was proper, and never imagining that relations with Europe, and American assistance to Europe, might be vitally important, and equally profitable to her.

What is needed today is a policy conceived by each continent in a spirit of enlightened self interest and asking of the other only what is in its genuine self interest, and what is proportionate to the advantages to be obtained.

Europe must ask of America only what she would offer to America, were the roles of the two halves of the western world reversed.

America must expect of Europe only what she would wish to have expected of herself, were she face to face with Europe's problem of historic scarcity, rivalry and lack of central authority.

For the moment I am inclined to think that all that can be expected, and usefully worked for, is this—an agreement on the part of the two continents not to get in one another's way.

The United States has already, by unilateral action, (powerfully supported in earlier days, when the United States of America was weak, and the United Kingdom strong, by British concurrence) secured this object so far as the organization of the Americas is concerned.

The Monroe Doctrine, acquiesced in by European powers, does give to the American countries the opportunity, if they should wish to take it, of building up in this hemisphere, a system of collective defence, and for the peaceful settlement of disputes, free from external interference.

The United States, and the other American countries, without sacrifice of the fundamental tradition of their continent, and without disproportionate risk and cost, might be inclined to grant Europe the same opportunity.

If the European countries, in their attempt to construct a genuine and effective collective system, could be certain that the coercive measures they might undertake against an aggressor (whether those measures take the form of financial and economic, of diplomatic, or of military, naval and air sanctions), would not be opposed, or nullified, by the action of any American country, they would be freed of a great anxiety. Many of them, notably the United Kingdom, would be infinitely more inclined to live up to their obligations as members of the League.

It may not be easy to induce the United States to depart even so far from its traditions. As debates in the last Congress on neutrality legislation showed, many Americans resent giving up the old conceptions of neutral rights in time of war, and many others, who are willing to give up such rights, resent giving to the President the discretionary authority to maintain trade with the innocent, majority members of the collective system, while stopping it with the aggressor.

It might, however, I think, be possible to secure such American action, which would free Europe of an anxiety which has haunted it ever since the idea of collective coercion was first considered, on two conditions:

1. That a united Europe asked for it, and that it was thus apparent that the collective system was not to be in practice a guarantee for the "Haves" against the "Have Nots".

2. That a united Europe, and also the supporters of the policy within America, made it clear beyond a shadow of a doubt, that they were not seeking, by negative cooperation of this kind between America and Europe, gradually to involve America in positive, military cooperation.

This last suspicion, as I think too frequently in the past a justified suspicion, must be eradicated if any progress is to be made. For so long as it lasts it makes opponents of any cooperation, and advocates of complete isolation, out of multitudes of people who would otherwise be opponents only of American military intervention or taking sides in Europe, and advocates only of enlightened nationalism.

I feel strongly that, if they could thus get out of one another's way, and ceasing expecting, or fearing, too much from one another, Europe and America might, each in its own hemisphere, make great progress in the vital matter of preventing violent, and ensuring necessary and peaceful, changes in the status quo.

So long however as Europe and America are at cross purposes, and so long as Europe hopes vainly to enlist America quickly and fully in its internal arrangements, and therefore postpones the reorganization of the continent, neither, I fear, will make much progress.

Let America face its regional responsibilities, free from fear of European interference, and Europe face its regional responsibilities free from uncertainty as to America's attitude.

Let each continent become more tolerant and understanding, and less suspicious and demanding, of the other.

#### BRIEF EXCERPTS

The Czech settlement may increase the strength of two "isolation" groups in America: 1. "Isolationists"

who say we should "mind our own business" and keep out of European affairs; 2. Others who are disgusted with the "double-crossing" of Czechoslovakia and insist that we cannot cooperate with Britain and France. *Scholastic. O. 15, '38. p. 15S.*

Today the slogan is to fight fascism abroad to preserve democracy. War will not achieve this end in 1938 any more than in 1914. War to save democracy resulted in sowing the seeds of the fascist regimes of today. If we went to war against fascism we would get only the equivalent of fascism at home thru such measures as the proposed Industrial Mobilization Plan. *James K. McWhirter. Breaking the War Habit. O. '38. p. 4.*

The appeal of President Roosevelt to Hitler and the powers expressed the sober judgment of all citizens that war would be a catastrophe of fatal consequences to every nation. We can stay out, and we will, if only to preserve one oasis for the rebuilding of civilization in a shattered world. But because we are a democratic people, our influence will be thrown on the side of decency and humanity, against the Hitlers and their brood whose Stone Age creed is looming to bestride the world. *Scholastic. O. 8, '38. p.2.*

Dr. Gallup's most recent polls show that 95 per cent of us are determined to keep out of war; that 70 per cent of us believe it was a mistake to have entered the last war; that 68 per cent of us favor a referendum before Congress declares war; and that 69 per cent of us oppose greater presidential discretion in foreign affairs. Here is the clue to a genuine American policy, a realistic policy that would capture the allegiance of a large part of the American people. *Raymond Moley, Newsweek. O. 10, '38. p.44.*

We should all do what we can to preserve the peace of Europe, but, in the words of President Roosevelt: "even if those hopes are disappointed, we can assure each other that this hemisphere at least shall remain a strong citadel wherein civilisation can flourish unimpaired." And that cannot be done by going to war and joining in the destruction of Europe. If a just and happy society for all mankind be our aim, we shall contribute more to its realisation by trying to build such a society in the New World rather than by wasting our national strength in the perennial and perennially wasteful conflicts of the Old. *G. M. A. Gruber. Canadian Forum. O. '38. p. 199.*

We see dark years ahead for Europe, dominated by figures like Hitler and Mussolini, or the men who may carry on their rules. Should we step in to rescue Europe from the terror which the dictators have brought upon it? The results of our previous attempt at intervention forbid it. We know all too well that many of the very wrongs out of which have come a Hitler, and this Czech crisis, and the other crises that are still to follow, resulted in large measure from our previous attempt at rescue. We see even less chance today than there was in 1917 to set up a new rule of justice and abiding peace in Europe by resort to war. We will be fortunate enough if we can preserve an island of sanity in this western hemisphere, until the madness has burned itself out in Europe, and the dark age there passes to give birth to a new age of promise. *Christian Century. S. 28, '38. p. 1151.*

British foreign policy has deliberately turned its back on the League; its action on Manchukuo, Abyssinia and Spain has with ever increasing certainty put the League out of action; the Chamberlain policy—he has openly declared the League to be dead—is nothing less than a



deliberate abandonment of collective security and League methods, and a return to the old balance-of-power politics, to secret diplomacy and the determination of the fate of Europe by consultation between the great powers alone. It is in terms of that policy, not of collective security, that we (Canadians) should be appealed to for help. To answer that call would not be to support collective security; it would be to reward those who have done away with it and who, after the war (if there were any Europe left), would interpret their victory as a proof that collective security ideals are useless, nor lift a finger to build the League anew. *G. M. A. Grube. Canadian Forum. O. '38. p. 197.*

If war comes, the Neutrality Act should at once be invoked. Its discretionary cash-and-carry provisions should be called into play to cover all war trade, outside of the actually embargoed munitions. We should seriously consider removing from the embargoed class to the cash-and-carry class military airplanes and their parts. We should at once set up an agency to regulate the liquidation of foreign-owned securities in this country. We should prepare to install other controls to protect our economic equilibrium. This line of action would serve a double purpose. First, it would give notice of our intention not to fight; second, it would allow the anti-fascist allies to do their utmost to prevent even a tiny trickle of American economic resources from reaching their enemies, without protest or interference from us, while it would permit them to use their own enormous purchasing power here for whatever they required—with only such restrictions as would tend to prevent serious derangement of our economy.

If war does not come now, Hitler and Mussolini should recognize that such a program represents the possible extreme of our "isolationism" and that it makes us virtually an economic ally of their enemies. Any

important modification would surely be in the direction of active participation in war. *New Republic*. O. 5, '38. p. 230.

The policy desired by the majority of the American people—that is, avoidance of any serious risk of going to war in order to protect foreign investments or trade, and abstention from participation in the quarrels of other nations—is often called by its opponents “isolation.” Isolation is then interpreted to mean a futile attempt to build a Chinese wall around the United States, and the cessation of all foreign trade and communication. The conclusion is drawn that since isolation is impossible, this country is certain to be drawn into any world war, and consequently it must take a full part in the diplomacy and hostilities of Europe and Asia in a precarious effort to prevent such a war. All these conclusions are reached without any careful study of the specific measures that would lessen the chance of our being involved in a foreign war, or of the cost of such measures.

Yet it is possible to adopt devices that reduce the risk of participation in war without being completely “isolated.” A better term to describe this policy is striving to achieve immunity from infection by war contagion, rather than complete isolation. The Neutrality Act of 1937 is the expression of just such an endeavor. A committee of experts sponsored by the National Economic and Social Planning Association has made a study of measures of this type. Their report indicates that while measures aimed at non-participation in a general European war would be difficult, they would probably be far less difficult or costly than the measures sure to be necessary if we became involved in such a war. *New Republic*. Mr. 30, '38. p.249-50.

The first fundamental truth to realize is that the more successful European countries are in solving their own problems the more cooperation they may get from America in the task, and that the further they are from this, the stronger will be the forces making for American isolation.

If Europe solves four-fifths of its problems, American participation is likely to be forthcoming to crown its efforts. If Europe is divided into two or more groups of not very unequal strength, with a grave danger of war between them, America will draw back and the extent of any practicable cooperation will be much more limited.

In political action the opportunities for cooperation are likely for the present to be rare and limited in scope. There is one line, and one line only, upon which cooperation is likely to be practicable on a considerable scale, and that is in economic and financial policy. It is evident that both the President and Mr. Cordell Hull would like to do something to ease the world tension. It is equally evident, that whatever they might personally wish, their power to exercise an influence by direct political action is restricted, indeed, practically annihilated, by the strong isolationist and neutralistic opinion in Congress and the country. This in part accounts for the importance which both the President and Secretary of State attach to the extension of the trade agreements for the reduction of tariffs to other countries, in particular Great Britain. *Arthur Salter. Political Quarterly. O. '37. p. 477-8.*

The so-called isolationists are isolationists *only as to war*, and are opposed only to such measures of international cooperation as would lead to war. We favor increased cooperation at Geneva with the International Labor Office and all the philanthropic and reform activities of the League of Nations. We favor an immediate

economic conference devoted specifically to the removal as rapidly as possible of the economic causes of war, especially to the lowering of tariffs everywhere and the abolition of all other trade barriers, such as quotas, embargoes, export bounties, and the like. Some of us even favor an autonomous International Commercial Organization, similar in structure and function to the International Labor Office, to promote a just and peaceful development of world economy. Needless to say, we favor international action to outlaw bombers and submarines.

Indeed, we urge a new and really democratic League of Nations in which all nations shall be on equal terms and in which there shall be no obligatory, forcible sanctions against offending nations. We desire that the whole question of colonies be discussed at a specially called conference, not for the purpose of returning some to Germany, but in order to establish the principle of international control with free access to raw materials for all. I need not stress how much we favor a world disarmament conference; none would be necessary today if the so-called democratic nations—with which we are so earnestly urged to make common cause—had lived up to the solemn promises to disarm which they gave to the world at Versailles as their excuse for disarming Germany. There is no form of activity, I repeat, in which we are not willing to cooperate with all nations, save only where such cooperation would set us on the road to war, or give to such governments as those of Chamberlain in England and Daladier in France authority to go ahead with good or bad policies, relying upon the pledge that we shall stand by them if thru follies or blunders or good deeds they get themselves into war. *Oswald Garrison Villard. Nation. Jl. 2, '38. p. 18.*

Hitler in *Mein Kampf* laid bare his aims and his strategy, and so far he has followed his program with extraordinary precision. It was, first to enlarge German

territory by expansion to the east, and then, with the essential resources of eastern and southeastern Europe behind him, to attack the western democracies and win world supremacy.

The long series of successful threats that Hitler has employed constitute a guarantee that he will proceed along his appointed course; never again will he believe that anyone dares seriously to resist him. His prestige at home will be unassailable. This crucial victory will in the end yield him most of the resources he needs with which to strike westward. Any promises that are elicited from him by the present surrender will of course be ignored when the proper time comes; he himself has in his book proclaimed the usefulness of lies and of pledges made to be broken. And why should anyone rely on his word, when the French themselves have proved faithless to Czechoslovakia? Nothing is more amazing in the recent collapse of the French Ministers than their apparent intention to rest their security on the pledge of a sworn enemy at the very moment that they were breaking a pledge to a friend. It seems to us a childish day dream that the present sacrifice has done anything but make war more certain in the future.

It is a reasonable prediction that the fascist regimes will gain immensely both in prestige and in physical power. The western democracies of Europe have been proved, in the eyes of the world, inferior to the dictatorships either in belief in themselves or in capacity to defend that belief by shrewd judgment, courage, steady nerves and good faith. Neither we nor anyone else can in the future rely on their pledges when these pledges conflict with self-interest or involve a major risk. *New Republic*. S. 28, '38. p.201.

America is preparing for war today. This we see and know, all too well. Among our ranks are thousands of workers, with families to feed and clothe, who are

now being absorbed into the armament industries. While innumerable manufacturing centers or plants are idle and their workers starve, there is great activity in airplane factories, shipyards and other munition works. Indeed, we hear this preparedness justified as a means of providing employment.

Has our civilization become so bankrupt spiritually and socially, that we must feed our workers by having them create the tools of their own ultimate destruction? We say, No! We believe the churches of America can follow no other course but to join us in saying, No!

We are convinced that we must keep America out of war. We are convinced that we can keep America out of war. From the working brotherhood of labor we appeal to the brotherhood of the church to help carry out this resolve.

We have seen our brothers in many foreign lands slowly succumb to the propaganda pressure of dictators and diplomats. We have seen churches become helpless vassals of military power. At home we see sentiment for another holy war being cultivated in many quarters. We see the beginnings of that war hysteria which says it is inevitable that we crush somebody. Against all of this we seek to unite with you in the brotherhood of those who would save civilization from the destruction, demoralization and the fascism that will surely come if we permit war. *Labor Anti-War Council. Christian Century. Ag. 17, '38. p.998.*

The isolationist position requires less description than that of the internationalists, because, for one thing, it represents a passive, inactive policy, and for another, its concrete program has been before us for two years in the form of the neutrality legislation debates. A few words will serve to relate the isolationist program to the Far Eastern scene.

The isolationists, seeing little hope of preventing another major war in Europe or the Far East and having little faith that the League of Nations as at present constituted can prevent such an outbreak, are primarily concerned with keeping the United States isolated from the next war when and wherever it may occur, and only secondarily with maintaining world peace.

With respect to the Far East the isolationists see no point in continuing our traditional policy of diplomatic intervention which proved so futile following the Mukden incident in 1931, and which, they feel, has no chance of becoming effective today. They favor the withdrawal of American naval forces to a defense position on a line extending no farther westward than the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal. They favor the independence of the Philippines, associated with a commercial arrangement with this country favorable to the economic welfare of the Islands, and with an international treaty guaranteeing or at least observing their neutrality.

With respect to Japan the trend of American isolationist opinion is to negotiate measures which will relieve tension existing between the two countries and at the same time to do what can be done to alleviate Japan's own problems and thereby strengthen the domestic position of the civilian over the military elements. The isolationists do not consider that it is any of our business to assist China to fight her own battles against Japan, but many of them believe that the alleviation of Japan's difficulties elsewhere will reduce Japanese pressure on China, thereby improving the whole Far Eastern position.

Even though this policy should fail, the isolationists do not consider that our economic and commercial interests in the western Pacific are sufficiently great to justify a policy of interference which they believe must rest on naval superiority. They consider it an inherently dangerous policy which at any time may lead us into a major conflict across the Pacific. Many isolationists,

therefore, though I think not the majority, would grant Japan naval parity. *Frederick V. Field. Annals of the American Academy. Jl. '37. p. 10-11.*

At least four inescapable facts thrust themselves out of the map which the premiers drew last week. First, Czechoslovakia has been dismembered. At the command of the Nazi dictator, backed with fascist guns, this well governed, progressive democracy, which Sir Archibald Sinclair called "the pass of freedom in central Europe," has been torn asunder. Not only have the Sudeten regions been turned over to Germany, but the Teschen district has been grabbed by Poland . . . Czechoslovakia is reduced to a puppet state. Both her political policy and her economic life must henceforth be guided from Berlin.

Second, Russia has been isolated. Europe has been rearranged as Hitler has always insisted it should be, with all the powers of the western portion of the continent in a single camp, divided from and at least potentially opposed to the Soviet Union. The most significant fact about the Munich conference was the absence of Russia.

Third, and complementary to the isolation of Russia, the fascist bloc has been reinforced by the collaboration of Great Britain and France. It will be objected, of course, that this is not true; that France and England remain democracies and so cannot, by their very nature, forward the purposes of the Berlin-Rome axis. But this is to mistake the word for the reality. By the Munich agreement, England and France have not only passed the diplomatic leadership of Europe into fascist hands, but have left themselves in a position where they cannot challenge that leadership without again subjecting their peoples to the threat of war, and war on vastly less favorable terms.



Finally, greater Germany dominates Europe. Having worked its will in Czechoslovakia without firing a shot, and having thereby demonstrated to the minor states of Europe the illusory nature of any reliance upon France or Britain or the League, Hitler's Reich can now proceed to gather the spoils.

Obviously, the basis on which American relations with the powers of the continent have been conducted no longer exists. Mr. Hull's precise division between nations which keep treaties, which rest "upon the foundation of cooperation, justice and morality," and nations which break treaties and fail to measure up to a high ethical level, no longer means anything. A new Europe is in process of formation; Munich marks as important a turning-point in the history of the continent as Versailles. Until that new Europe is more clearly defined, until it has settled down into something approximating a lasting order, wisdom dictates that the United States shall keep from any further implication in the fateful drama. *Christian Century*. O. 12, '38. p. 1225-6.

## NEGATIVE DISCUSSION

### SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW <sup>1</sup>

There was never a time in our national history when the influence of the United States in support of international law was more urgently needed than at present—to serve both our own best interests and those of the entire human race. The world is today in the grip of a severe upheaval, the outcome of which will affect profoundly the future of mankind.

There is again abroad, in more than one part of the earth, a spirit of international anarchy. Solemn contractual obligations are brushed aside with a light heart and a contemptuous gesture. Respect for law and observance of the pledged word have sunk to an inconceivably low level. The outworn slogans of the glorification of war are again resounding in many portions of the globe. Armed force, naked and unashamed, is again being used as an instrument of policy and a means of attaining national ends thru aggression and aggrandizement. It is being employed with brutality and savagery that outrage and shock every humane instinct.

In the face of these grim developments, there are some among our people who would have our nation withdraw into its own shell and isolate itself from the rest of the world. They would have us seek safety and security in a hermitlike existence among the nations of the world—in a voluntary surrender of legitimate rights and interests, which we have regarded for generations as essential to our national welfare, and a voluntary

<sup>1</sup>From address by Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, before the Bar Association of Tennessee, June 3, 1938. p.12-19.

abandonment of our support of international law and of the instrumentalities for its application, which alone can make us secure in the exercise of such rights and the enjoyment of such interests.

Those who counsel this course of policy and action should pause in their fervent crusade to cast up an account of the possible benefits and injuries that its pursuance would entail.

On the side of benefits which, it is alleged, would accrue to our people from a policy of isolation would be, we are told, an assurance against our being called upon to engage in war. The proponents of this policy argue that by withdrawing from participation in world affairs, we would avoid conflicts or entanglements with other nations and would be free to pursue the tenor of our national life in peace and safety.

There is no worthier desire than to assure for our people the blessings of peace. But long and unmistakable experience offers abundant proof that the attainment of this precious end thru a policy of national isolation is wholly outside the realm of possibility.

It is my firm conviction that national isolation is not a means to security, but rather a fruitful source of insecurity. For while we may seek to withdraw from participation in world affairs, we cannot thereby withdraw from the world itself. Attempts to achieve national isolation would not merely deprive us of any influence in the councils of nations, but would impair our ability to control our own affairs.

Deliberate renunciation by us of any participation in international affairs would make for an easier triumph on this planet of lawlessness, brute force, and war. In a world growing internationally more and more disordered and chaotic, we would be compelled to increase our armed defenses on a scale that would impose a truly crushing burden on our people. And even so, we would have to live in constant danger that the rising

wave of international anarchy would, sooner or later, reach and batter down our own walls and engulf us as well as the rest of mankind.

In this respect, a nation is not different from an individual. When a citizen declines to take an interest in the affairs of his community and refuses to cooperate in promotion and support of law and order, he helps to open the way for the forces of lawlessness to take control. Let us not forget that the present spread of lawlessness in international relations is a direct consequence of the recent drift toward national isolation.

As against the unattainable benefits claimed for the policy of isolation we must visualize the costs of such a policy. By embarking upon a policy of national isolation we would doom our nation to conditions of life under which it would inevitably become economically poorer, intellectually impoverished, morally decadent. We would deliberately deprive ourselves of the benefits of those numerous international relationships which have nourished the stream of human progress and enriched the lives of all peoples, including our own. Neither our political structure of democratic government nor our social and economic structure of free enterprise and individual freedom under law could long survive the material and spiritual decay which national isolation would inescapably impose upon the nation. Like the individual who would seek safety and security for himself thru escape from the responsibilities of organized society into hermitlike isolation, a nation pursuing a similar course—even if it were to succeed for a time in avoiding assault by and conflict with other nations—would soon find its dream of safety and security a bitter illusion.

The search for national isolation springs from the counsel of despair and an admission of defeat. Not thru a sudden and craven abandonment of our national traditions nor thru attempts to turn our backs upon our

responsibilities as a member of the family of civilized nations, can we advance and promote the best interests of our people. That we can do only thru renewed devotion to those traditions; thru an ever more resolute determination to be guided by them in the ordering of our national affairs and our international relations; and thru a courageous facing of the facts by a united nation actuated by a vigorous, alert, and informed public opinion.

The task is not easy. Under conditions such as now prevail, disillusionment and despair are not unnatural human reactions. But mankind's progress has always been slow and its road has always been strewn with difficulties, interruptions, set-backs, temporary disappointments, and repeated, though transitory, reappearances of ghosts which seemed to have been laid forever.

Some of these ghosts are rising today. Two decades ago the concept of peace based upon competitive armaments seemed to have been buried under the wreckage caused by an otherwise utterly destructive world conflict. Out of that purgatory there emerged a profound realization that a new basis must be found for relations among nations. There arose a faith and a hope that a new spirit and a new system would come to prevail in the international structure of the world. The negotiation of numerous multilateral treaties and agreements, and the creation of appropriate regional and even world-wide organizations, were important steps in the direction of a system of true international cooperation—of a world order based upon international law; upon the principles of equality, justice, fairness, and mutual respect among nations; upon progressive disarmament; upon a determination to substitute for war as an arbiter of international relations, observance of the pledged word and willingness to compose international differences by pacific means.

The fact that today these efforts to establish, thru international cooperation, a world order under law are being challenged again by the doctrine of armed force and lawless self-aggrandizement, leads many people to the belief that the idea and principles of a peaceful and orderly world have proved to be unworkable. This belief is the product of a dangerous and unfortunate weakening of confidence. The challenge itself has arisen because the recent years have been characterized by a disastrous lowering of standards of conduct on the part of both individuals and nations—by a relapse in the spiritual and moral strength and driving power of vast masses of mankind and a consequent faltering of the march of human progress. Such relapses and such falterings have occurred before. That they are temporary in nature is amply attested by the lesson of history.

In the circumstances of today, it is a part of wisdom and prudence for a great nation like ours to provide adequately for its national defense. Security is essential, and peace is better than war, even when, under conditions of grave emergency, it has to be temporarily assured by adequate national armaments. But peace thus maintained is precarious and unenduring, a makeshift, at best. Stable and durable peace can be achieved only thru the universal enthronement of the spirit of respect for law and thru a resumption of determined efforts toward international cooperation, both of which in our lifetime have revealed themselves as attainable realities. Not until it is proved that these are no longer effective world forces will there be any justifiable grounds for the belief that armed force—and armed force alone—will rule international relations and that, therefore, the outlook for peace, progress, and civilization is devoid of all hope.

In the years which lie ahead, the chances that international anarchy and lawlessness will be replaced by order under law will largely depend upon the sincerity

and firmness with which some nations, at least, maintain their devotion to the principles of international law, resting in turn upon the foundation of cooperation, justice, and morality. I can wish for our country no more glorious course than to be a leader in devotion to these principles and in service of their preservation and advancement.

### AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY<sup>2</sup>

During the past few years, and particularly during the past few months, events have taken place which challenge the very existence of international order and, indeed, the very fundamentals upon which alone a Christian civilization can be built. Territory has been invaded, homes have been destroyed, property has been seized, and innocent people have suffered untold horrors under no shadow of right or possible justification except superior brute strength. The supreme question which we and all the world face today is whether or not we are to live henceforth in a world of law or a world of international anarchy.

It is a matter which goes deeper than the conflict between forms of government. It goes deeper than the conflict between liberal ways of life and regimented, narrowly constricted ones. It is a challenge which goes to the very roots of what our civilization holds most precious. Nations today are caught between two profoundly conflicting ways of life—on the one hand, the primal law of tooth and fang and, on the other, the way of cooperation and moral restraint and human brotherhood. The power of superior brute force may be immediately conquering and temporarily profitable. But civilization can be built only upon moral foundations.

<sup>2</sup> Radio address by Francis B. Sayre, Assistant Secretary of State, June 6, 1938.

Mass killings, the taking of others' property by force, the flouting of the pledged word, undermine and threaten all human progress. Free men cannot tolerate a world of lawlessness, for freedom is built upon law.

In a world torn between these two fundamentally conflicting ways of life, what is to be the position and the policy of the United States? As one of the strongest and richest nations of the world, in what direction are we going to throw our influence and our power?

The cornerstone of American foreign policy is our people's profound and passionate desire for peace—peace that is lasting and stable, not mere respite from war. Stable peace does not come by chance. It must be won by thought and toil and struggle. Under a rule of tooth and fang, stable peace can never be won, for in a world where might is alone supreme every shift of strength may mean new outbreaks of war. Stable peace cannot be had except it be built upon a rule of law.

Our country, therefore, has a burning and vital interest in upholding and strengthening the rule of law—in taking a resolute and unflinching stand for the sanctity of treaties, the obligations of international law, the restraint of might by principles of humanity and fundamental justice, the gradual upbuilding of an effective and potent international morality. Here is the guiding star of America's foreign policy.

How practically can this be done? The individual, concrete moves must be worked out as each new crisis arises. But certain controlling principles seem clear.

*First.* Objectives such as these cannot possibly be gained thru a policy of isolation. The gradual building up of a generally accepted code of law and of morality among nations is essentially and necessarily a community enterprise which cannot possibly be achieved by isolated units which won't cooperate. Refusal to cooperate with other nations is not the way to achieve human



progress. Political and economic isolation is the direct pathway toward war.

*Second.* Law depends upon more than mere superior force plus the intent to do justice; it presupposes a well-defined code of justice, impartial courts to apply it, and above all a well-developed community will to accept and enforce it. These in the international world exist in but rudimentary form. The task of mankind is to develop and establish them.

*Third.* The building of a rule of law presupposes a certain degree of international cooperation. Each nation's freedom depends upon restraint on the part of others; international law depends upon common agreement and upon acceptance by all of certain fundamentals as rules of international conduct. This is the only possible way to stable peace; security can be built upon no other foundations. Furthermore, if law is to be effective and peace enduring, they must be upheld by the combined strength of the law abiding, acting singly on parallel lines or in concert; and as confidence comes to be established the way of progress must lie thru organized rather than haphazard cooperation.

*Fourth.* The strengthening of a rule of law comes not thru supine inaction. When forces of lawlessness are abroad supine inaction in effect means siding with the evil against the good; the strongest encouragement which can be given to lawless aggressors is to make it quite clear that they have nothing to fear from those with power to withstand them. The United States cannot afford to be a cipher at this crucial moment of the world's history. We must be resolute and prepared if necessary to withstand the aggression of the lawless.

*Fifth.* It must be clear that the general acceptance of a code of law and of morality among independent nations can never be brought about thru force, for this is essentially a thing of the spirit. The present task of the law abiding is to save the world from being delivered

over into the hands of the lawless—to prevent the shipwreck and annihilation of what we have been toilsomely building for centuries. Force is often necessary to withstand attack. But beyond this the road to the high objectives we seek lies not thru force.

If we are to gain peace we must build for it moral foundations. The breakdown which we see all around us is the breakdown of external organization supported by material force. The whole world today is in a state of gross materialism. Selfishness and greed and corruption and war are the natural fruits of materialism. The seemingly insoluble national and international problems that close us in on every side are largely the direct result of materialism. The only direction in which I can see hope for reaching permanent solutions is the way of Christianity. Christ understood human hearts and fathomed the deeps of human life as no one else before or since. Until we have the courage to apply more fearlessly the principles He taught to our national and international problems, we are like children groping in the dark.

Among individuals we have learned thru the slow course of centuries that the sacredness of obligations lies at the very foundation of the trust and confidence vital to the continuance of modern civilization. But in the international world treaty obligations are flouted as though nothing but self-interest should rule the world. Among individuals we have learned that thievery and robbery shake the very foundations of our security, and we have built up standards which will not tolerate such conduct. But among nations we have not yet built up an ethical standard of sufficient potency to restrain it. Killing among individuals we abhor; killing under the command of governments or nations, if by ourselves or our allies, we applaud.

It is time we awoke to the fact that civilization depends upon accepted moral standards among nations no

less than among individuals. It is time that we realized that materialism and greed produce suffering as surely among nations as among men. It is time that we learned that security and happiness in the world, as well as in the home and in the nation, depend upon the restraints that are born of moral and spiritual concepts.

America's magnificent heritage is the vision of this great destiny—that we should constitute the hope of an old war-weary world. To the cause of right above might and of law over anarchy our interests and our civilization commit us. In no other way can lasting peace be made secure. To this great end our country's foreign policy is dedicated.

#### HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES AID IN MAINTAINING PEACE? \*

The quarrels of Europe are not so meaningless as they sometimes appear. And even if they were, the isolationist attitude would be definitely impossible for the United States as we know it and as most of us wish to see it maintained. To everyone who realizes how intimately the very fiber of our society is connected with the outside world, it is evident that this country must, in its own behalf, do something in behalf of international solidarity. What it can do is another question.

One of the factors which make isolation impossible—the economic factor—has already been touched upon at some length by other contributors. There is no need to labor that point. It is abundantly clear that the preservation of what we are pleased to call the American standard of living, probably even the preservation of the present social order in this country, imperatively demands continuous and improving commercial coopera-

\* From article by Felix Morley, Editor, *Washington Post*. Washington, D.C. *Annals of the American Academy*. 192:113-22. July, 1937.

tion with the outside world. It is perhaps theoretically possible for the United States really to withdraw within its own borders as the isolationists seem to desire. But it is certain that such a withdrawal could be accomplished only at the expense of revolutionary changes. There is little reason to suppose that such changes would stop short at the sharp curtailment of national income and the sharp increase in hopeless unemployment which would be inevitable.

The financial factor, though often discussed as though it were merely a part of the general economic picture, provides separate evidence that isolation is an impossible course. When we read that the death penalty has been decreed in Germany for those who violate the rules of financial autarchy, we realize both how primitive and how impossible of success is such an attempt. Real financial isolation, like economic isolation, would bring consequences far beyond the imagination of those who talk of its theoretical feasibility.

The impossibility of either economic or financial isolation really answers the question of whether or not political isolation is a practical issue. But there are many who have no realization of this. An eminent Republican Senator has recently been advocating mandatory neutrality legislation as "insulation" for the United States. The phrase is reminiscent of the practice of those terrified burghers who in the Middle Ages locked their doors and shutters to keep out the plague. There is no insulation by legislation against the infiltration of political ideas.

The United States would go fascist or communist far more quickly by seeking to cut off all contacts with the outside world than it would if with rising unemployment, the government were to pay propagandists of these two systems to advocate them from the public platform in this country. One of the most dangerous attitudes in the United States is that which assumes that the set-

ing up of barriers of one kind or another will maintain the virtues of our civilization while excluding the vices of others. That was the policy of the Chinese, our chief rival in an attitude of naïveté towards foreign devils.

There is also a moral factor—and it is important—which makes our participation in the effort to maintain peace inevitable. Even if it were economically, financially, and politically possible, many Americans would be unwilling to fold their hands while the world sinks into a period comparable to the Dark Ages. If one asks why this is the case, at least two answers can be given.

In the first place, it is not in character for the American people to be indifferent to the world about them. Our curiosity may not always be productive, but at least it is always sincere and insatiable. In the second place, there is a growing national realization that power and responsibility are inseparable. Very few of us, in the last analysis, would be willing to see the United States slip back into the position of a second- or third-rate nation. Many of those who are unwilling to see such a development fully realize that the maintenance of power demands an increasing acceptance of political responsibility in the world community.

It seems foreordained, therefore, that the United States will continue to work for peace. Nor is there anything essentially discouraging in the fact that we are now in a period where our past endeavors in this line have proved relatively fruitless, and where we are undecided and uncertain as to what new endeavors can profitably be made. Evidently what we need is a new diagnosis. That diagnosis is not difficult, though curative efforts afterwards may well prove to be so. But diagnosis comes first.

Our national interests are so closely bound up with the preservation of peace that our failure to visualize peace as an integral problem from which this country cannot be successfully dissociated is doubly tragic. We

have unconsciously slipped a long way back from the position which we took at the time of the Kellogg Pact.

Then, as a result of our leadership, nearly all the nations agreed to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. That was a magnificent gesture which we failed completely to follow up. And of late, far from endeavoring to implement the Kellogg Pact, we have been steadily receding from the position we reached in 1928. Our present neutrality legislation says in effect that a country which violates the Kellogg Pact, a government which employs war as an instrument of national policy, can be sure that it will not receive even moral censure from the United States.

In a truly craven manner, which comports ill with both our traditions and our national strength, we practically invite violations of the treaty which we were instrumental in initiating. To aid in maintaining peace we must do something to reestablish the sanctity of the Kellogg Pact. And this clearly means a very different neutrality policy from that which at the present time appears to be desirable to the American people. I say "appears to be" because I am convinced that this neutrality legislation was only put across thru the fallacious argument that it would guarantee us immunity in the event of another war. There is no intelligent student of the subject who believes in his heart that this is true.

I do not believe the United States should embroil itself in every political entanglement outside its borders. But it does seem to me a reasonable part of a "good neighbor" policy, which we claim to be following, to draw some moral distinction between an aggressor and the victim of aggression. If that is too much, it is at least essential to demand that we should not in advance serve notice that no such distinction will be drawn.

## OUR BONDS WITH THE BRITISH\*

How would America be affected if the British Empire were destroyed, the Royal navy removed from the international stage, and Great Britain herself reduced to the status of a second class power?

It seems reasonable to hold that the Third Reich would play the predominant part in any conclusive defeat of Great Britain. How would German annihilation of British power affect the United States? This question can best be considered from four separate angles.

The British navy would no longer be able to prevent a German challenge to the Monroe Doctrine or German expansion across the Atlantic. The United States would lose, in consequence, one of the basic elements in its present national security. This conclusion, which may seem at first sight startling, requires some explanation.

As long as Britannia rules the European waves, no continental power can conduct a naval campaign against our hemisphere without the acquiescence of the British government. Geography, strategy, and relative ratios of sea strength give the British battle-fleet an absolute veto over any attack on either of the Americas, and enable it to function as an effective bulwark of the Monroe Doctrine and our Atlantic security, without firing a gun.

The German, French or Italian fleets cannot sail far westward with aggressive intent as long as the British navy, secure in its home bases and Gibraltar, can at any time cut off their communications, their supplies and their safe return home. British seapower, consequently, plays a decisive role in the eastern Atlantic, setting a definite limit on the westward activities of any continental fleet or combination of fleets.

\* From article by Livingston Hartley, *United States Foreign Service. North American Review*. 245:95-110. Spring, 1938.

This virtual guarantee of our Atlantic security by Great Britain is, of course, entirely voluntary, but, since it is based upon self-interest, it is none the less effective. Great Britain cannot afford to allow a potentially hostile European naval power to establish Atlantic bases which might threaten her imperial communications.

We experienced the protective value of British sea power a generation ago, when the German navy was far stronger than our own. At that time, when the Kaiser was seeking a "place in the sun" wherever one could be seized, the sun was shining brilliantly on a tempting array of places in South America. Yet German imperialism never went further in the western hemisphere than an abortive attempt to collect by force some debts from Venezuela in 1902. The Berlin government never dared challenge the Monroe Doctrine, altho its naval and military power was then sufficient to have permitted a successful attack on Brazil in the face of our navy. A controlling factor in this German restraint towards our southern neighbors was the attitude of Great Britain, which was opposed to German expansion in the western hemisphere. With the superior British battle-fleet sitting securely on her front doorstep, Germany could not afford to risk an oceanic clash in the Atlantic.

It is easy to see, accordingly, how the elimination of the Royal navy would affect the Atlantic security of the United States. We should have to undertake its direct protection ourselves, and prepare to face at any time an expansive drive of a triumphant Germany in either the north or south Atlantic. We could then no longer concentrate our fleet in the Pacific as we do today. We should have to strive instead to maintain a margin of naval supremacy over potential enemies in two widely separated oceans, a task we might or might not prove able to accomplish.

The reduction of British seapower would also change fundamentally the position of the United States on the



Pacific. It would bring to a sudden end the support we now receive from the British in the Far East, a region in which we have long undertaken more direct protection of our interests than we have in Europe.

The defeat and subsequent disintegration of the British Empire would leave the Dominions, so rich in resources but so poor in population and military strength, adrift on exceedingly stormy international seas. Their fate would be of vital interest to the United States for two reasons: first, because they of all nations are closest to us in their attitude towards world affairs, and hence constitute a powerful influence on our side of the fence in any crisis we may face; second, because their conquest by aggressive, expanding powers would strike a serious blow at our own strategic situation.

The world-wide galaxy of heterogeneous territories that now form the dependencies of the British Empire would create an analogous problem for America. If Great Britain were crushed by Germany, what would be the fate of India, Malaya, British dependencies in Africa and the Near and Middle East and British naval bases in all parts of the globe? It is obvious that these territories could not remain independent, but would be absorbed by other powers. It is also obvious that the foreign powers best able to absorb them would be the victorious German Reich and an imperialist Japan which was eager to capitalize the new Far Eastern supremacy she had gained from Germany's defeat of Great Britain.

What policy would the United States pursue towards these territories? Would we enter the race to seize them at the risk of war and in opposition to our historic policy of avoiding such entanglements in other continents? Or would we remain passive and detached, while Japanese empire builders moved southward on Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies and eastward half way across the Pacific, and while Berlin pushed the swastika east towards India and south towards Capetown?

The German "inheritance" of the West African coast, which would seem certain to follow a military defeat of Great Britain and France, would be of direct and compelling interest to the United States. The eastern point of Brazil is thirty-five hundred miles from our Atlantic coast, but less than eighteen hundred from Dakar. If a German dictatorship which surveyed South American resources with a greedy eye were free to stud the bulge of Africa with modern naval bases, the strategic foundation of the Monroe Doctrine would be seriously undermined. Even if we proved able then to hold our own in naval power in the north Atlantic while simultaneously building up to Japan on our other ocean, our ability to furnish protection to distant South American republics would be reduced near to the vanishing point.

The above brief survey shows how vitally the existence of the British Empire serves America today. It suggests that the continuance of this Empire is a fundamental requisite for our present detachment from European politics, which would come to a sudden end if it were destroyed.

Should such a catastrophe occur, we should lose not only our best customer and foreign friend, a world wide political entity containing half a billion people to whom we are bound by unique ties of exceptional strength and magnitude, but also our present position in world affairs. We should be pushed overnight into the maelstrom of power politics, forced to play a high-pressure role we have never contemplated in overseas regions, and compelled to dedicate our national energies to armaments in order to safeguard our national future.

#### WORLD FEDERATION <sup>5</sup>

At the close of the World War the need of a world organization to maintain international peace was uni-

<sup>5</sup> By Oscar Newfang, Author of *The Road to World Peace, World Unity*. 11:163-5. December, 1932.

versally recognized. This statement is proved by the fact that more than fifty nations have joined the League of Nations, which now includes every important country in the world except two.

Twelve years' experience with the League has made it abundantly clear, even to the warmest friends of that organization, that the loose, confederate structure of the League is not strong enough to prevent a breach of international peace, especially when a first-class power adopts military measures to attain its ends.

The experience of every confederation of states that has existed in history has invariably shown that, before permanent peace between states could be achieved, it was necessary to develop the confederation of states, the alliance of governments, into a true federation. That was the experience of the United States between 1777 and 1787; it was the experience of Germany in 1870; it was the much earlier experience of Switzerland, which led the Swiss cantons to form the Swiss Federation, finally crystallized in the constitution of 1848.

How would world problems be solved by developing the League of Nations into a Federation of Nations?

*International peace* could be firmly established by means of a world court with original and compulsory jurisdiction in all disputes between states, a court whose decisions would be peacefully enforced by reason of the existence of a world executive with military power superior to that of any state or group of states. About seventy-five disputes between American states have been settled peacefully by the United States Supreme Court and the federal executive. In Switzerland people of three languages, whose mother countries have been among the most pugnacious on the continent, have been successfully welded into a peaceful federation.

*Disarmament* of member states could be readily achieved when all states were guaranteed against military aggression by the superior force of their federation.

The great empire state of New York is satisfied with a handful of police motor boats to protect its world-famous harbor, because it can rely upon the federal navy for protection.

*The chaotic currencies* of the world could readily be eliminated by the establishment of a single gold reserve in the Bank for International Settlements and a world currency based on this reserve. That would eliminate the endless scheming and anxiety in every country about favorable or unfavorable trade balances. Financial New York has no more worries about the balance of trade across the Hudson River than it has about the direction of the wind across the Hudson.

*The unshackling of trade* thruout the world could be achieved, because countries would not, in fear of attack, insist on autarchy. The benefits of world-wide free markets can be appreciated by all who trade in the vast free markets of the United States. The British Empire, following the American federation, is even now working toward empire-wide markets for its industries and its agriculture.

Of the only two important nations outside the League Russia is even now ardently in favor of a world federation (altho with the proviso that the states forming the world federation must be soviet states). The United States is familiar with the benefits of a federal union after its century and a half of experience with this form of union. If the United States should see that the whole vast League territory was to be a great free market, it would be very likely to see that its interest lay in getting inside the garden instead of being outside the garden wall, in the same way that Rhode Island finally saw the light when the American federation was formed.

How shall we go about developing the League of Nations into a Federation of Nations? If the peace societies in the principal countries can be persuaded to get back of this definite program of the necessary devel-

opment of the League into a federation of nations, these societies could very probably induce the League authorities to appoint a committee for a thoro study of the problem of federation as shown in the histories of the existing federations in Switzerland, the United States, Germany, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and elsewhere. This committee would naturally report to the Assembly a draft of a federal constitution to supercede the League covenant after adoption by the member states.

It would be advisable to persuade the League to submit this draft for adoption, not to the executive governments of the members, but to the whole citizenship of the members, since the executive governments would be very loth to accept an arrangement that would diminish their supreme importance.

### BRIEF EXCERPTS

The Japanese always have mental reservations about America. What they are really counting on is not American "understanding" so much as American isolationism. If they capitalize on that, while simultaneously taking advantage of Great Britain's defeatism and Russia's immobilization, they may be able either to proceed with the reduction of all China or a victorious peace with Anglo-French connivance. *Nathaniel Peffer. New York Times. O. 23, '38. Sec. 4, p. 19.*

The policy of strict neutrality has not served to keep the United States out of war, and it has been considered by both statesmen and jurists as incompatible with the spirit of the Pact of Paris, as well as with the terms of the League of Nations Covenant, in cases where one of the belligerents has been found to have gone to war

contrary to these instruments and the other is an innocent victim of such aggression. *Quincy Wright. "United States and Neutrality."* p. 26. *Univ. of Chicago Press.* '35.

Is there a way of escape from the paralyzing grip of power economy now stealing over the world? There is only one, in a world as close together and as integrated as ours. There has always been one way of escape, and thus far we have refused to use it effectively enough to meet our ever growing needs. That is the way of world organization, political and economic. We citizens of the modern world, facing the problems raised by a recently acquired interdependence, are having to develop new social and political institutions on a world-wide base. *Eugene Staley. Annals of the American Academy. Jl. '38. p. 13.*

Is it too much to believe that the human intellect is equal to the problem of designing a world state wherein neighbors can live without molestation in collective security? It does not matter what the state is called; give it any name you please—League of Nations, Federated Nations, United States of the World. Why should there not be a *world* police, just as each nation has a national police force?

Many former obstacles have been cleared away. Science has overthrown barriers and given egress in all directions. Man is now able to navigate the atmosphere, plumb the deep seas, travel in three dimensions of space, move anywhere at a speed unimaginable to our fathers. Willingly or unwillingly, he has become a world citizen, and the duties of that citizenship cannot be evaded, duties calling for the whole-hearted cooperation of every man and woman alike, joined in mind and purpose to promote the good and advancement of all. *Viscount Allenby. Service in Life and Work. S. '36. p. 187.*

The crises in Europe, Africa, and Asia during the last decade may all be reduced to the single question: "To what extent are the democratic nations prepared to support the principles to which they are committed, not merely by their treaties, but by their form of government?" Unless we are capable of giving an adequate answer to this question, international law, collective security, neutrality, even democracy itself, are simply empty verbalisms, synonyms of weakness, as the strong-boys of power politics know only too well.

If the history of the world means anything, the only adequate answer to the will-to-power is force. To remind an arrogant nation of her treaty obligations, to write notes, to invoke the sweetness and light of the Kellogg Pact, to apply the gilded reed of pacifist diplomacy—in all these things did the Chinese trust! *W. F. Kerman. American Mercury. Mr. '38. p. 264.*

If it were once known for certain that the Covenant of the League of Nations meant that if any one of the States Members of the League were attacked all the others would come to its assistance, by force if necessary, there would be no more war. No country today would take any action, the certain consequences of which would involve it in war with the rest of the world. The risk of war arises from the countries which hope and believe that they can make war on a weaker state without risking a conflict with any other.

When using this argument to a party of Americans, who were attending a summer school in England last July, one of my audience asked me if I could mention any case in the history of the world where this theory of collective protection had been put into practice. "Yes," I said, "I will give you two examples. One is provided by the British Empire and the other by the Monroe Doctrine of the United States of America." *Earl of Lytton, Christian Science Monitor, Weekly Magazine Section. D. 8. '37. p. 2.*

There is a general distrust of European diplomacy, particularly British, which is blamed for the failure to follow America's lead in the Far Eastern crisis of 1932, and the attempted betrayal of the League at the time of the Hoare-Laval proposals.

The very nature of such sentiments suggest the means by which they may be changed. Self-preoccupation and distrust of European motives can be overcome only by a convincing expression of readiness among the peace-loving nations to couple resolute opposition to aggression with frank discussion of means to settle grievances and disputes in a peaceful manner. The United States must be made to feel that her support, moral and material, would not be used to satisfy individual ends and to preserve any injustices that may exist in the status quo, rather than for the appeasement of Europe as a whole. A large part of this appeasement is a matter of economics, and freer trade would not only go far to improve the discontents of Europe, but would emancipate America also from the fear of a coming depression. *Statist. O.* 16, '37. p. 504.

What does our present attitude, as represented in the principles and beliefs which produced the neutrality legislation, really signify? Certainly it is not an effort to stop war and maintain peace; at most it is an effort on our part to keep out of war. But our problem is, how to stop war, for even if we keep out of war we suffer by it. Now, war is, in the mind of the average man, a crime; we attempted to say this legally in the Pact of Paris. Yet, though we made the Pact of Paris, we now encourage war. We say to the warmaker: go right ahead; we will not interfere with you, nor with your conduct of war; any insult or injury to us we will swallow, just so we can keep out of war! We say to American citizens: stop your ordinary activities and stay at home, so the warmaker will have a free hand. Why do we not stop war—the crime—instead of stopping



innocent trade and business? Civilization has never reached its present stage thru such surrender to crime as this! And I am not talking morals alone; it is material self-interest which led men to fight for law and order in the past, and which demands that we stop war today. *Clyde Eagleton. Institute of World Affairs. Proceedings, 1936. p. 163-4.*

If we are to achieve real security, we must not be supine and inert. There is a graver danger than the temporary barbarism of war: namely, the all-devouring and forcefully ingrained and enduring barbarism of the fascist state. To avert this great danger, we must risk the lesser. We must rally to our free republican institutions and be prepared to fight for them.

This appeal is not addressed to those who do not believe in our American tradition or in the humane ways of civilization; nor is it addressed to those who will not believe that there are worse ignominies to the spirit and worse cruelties to the flesh than killing or being killed. The time for action is now. The place is the United States. The people to do it are the great mass of free, self-governing, liberty-loving Americans. Gather together your strength and prepare for action. Strike first against fascism; and strike hard. But strike. *Lewis Mumford. New Republic. My. 18, '38. p. 42.*

What we see in the world today is the inevitable result of the isolation of nations. The dictatorships of today are a return to anarchism. Every dictatorship abolishes constitutional government and thereby destroys the basis of peace. Nobody is secure, nobody is free. Dictatorship is the inevitable result of national isolation, for the reason that in the world as we know it today nations cannot live in isolation. To do so they must regulate their consumption and production according to the particular needs of the nation. The government

must interfere everywhere. It must limit production and regulate consumption in some way, and have a planned economy. And if there is a planned economy, there must be somebody to enforce that plan. All other plans must be subordinated. People must be mobilized and regimented, and that means destruction of civil law and pacific relationships. It is inevitable that any nation that tries to live by itself will pay the penalty in losing its liberty and its own peace under law. That is what is happening to the world today. There is no peace without law and no peace without collective security. *Everett Dean Martin. Institute of World Affairs. Proceedings. 1937. p. 184.*

The foreign policy of the United States embodies three very definite divisions. They are as follows: First, a policy of isolation from the entangling alliances of Europe as was first established in 1796 by George Washington in his Farewell Address. We have deviated from this policy only once, and it brought us the disastrous results of the World War; second, the Monroe Doctrine which was formulated in 1823 by President Monroe following the suggestion of Great Britain that Great Britain and the United States should combine to stop France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria from restoring the newly created republics of South America to the Spanish crown. When President Monroe declared that the United States would protect these countries without the aid of Great Britain, the second great part of the foreign policy was established. Third, in 1900 Secretary of State John Hay gave us our third division in the Open Door policy in China. This means that all nations should have equal commercial interests in China, and that China should not become the victim of European colonization. *Harold E. Gibson. School Activities. O. '38. p. 57.*

We want to live in a world which is at peace; in which the forces of militarism, of territorial aggression, and of international anarchy in general will become utterly odious, revolting, and intolerable to the conscience of mankind; in which the doctrine of order under law will be firmly established; in which there will no longer be one code of morality, honor, justice, and fair play for the individual in his relations with other individuals, and an entirely different code for governments and nations in their relations with each other. We want to live in a world in which fruitful and constructive international relationships can serve as a medium for disseminating thruout the world the benefits of the material, spiritual, and moral progress of mankind.

To that end we will continue to give full and sincere adherence to the fundamental principles which underlie international order; we will continue to urge universal acceptance and observance of these principles; we will continue, wherever necessary and in every practicable and peaceful way, to cooperate with other nations which are actuated by the same desires and are pursuing the same objectives; we will persevere in appropriate efforts to safeguard our legitimate rights and interests in every part of the world; and we will, while scrupulously respecting the rights of others, insist on their respecting our rights. *Cordell Hull. Address. Mr. 17, '38.*

Do not let us delude ourselves. The truth is that each recurrent crisis brings us nearer to war. We come ever closer to the abyss. Even only last week it must have seemed to many that we have been on the very brink.

Under such conditions the world cannot progress. Trade which relies upon confidence cannot prosper. The conditions of the people in any country cannot improve. Under such conditions the best that the world can hope for is an uncertain peace with soaring armaments and

shrinking trade, leading ultimately either to war or to general disintegration.

Foreign autocracies are no novelty to us. Always, in the ultimate event, we have been obliged to call a halt. We have stood firm for those twin conceptions of liberty and law which to Englishmen and Americans alike provide the only firm basis of true civilization.

For our own people this issue becomes terrifying. They desire peace ardently and sincerely. They are ready to make sacrifices in order to strengthen the foundations of peace. They seek freedom of thought, of race, of worship, which every week become more restricted in Europe.

The conviction is growing that continual retreat can only lead to ever-widening confusion. They know that a stand must be made. They say, "Let it be not made too late." *Anthony Eden. Vital Speeches. O. 1, '38. p. 744.*

It is obvious that by consolidating peace at home, we of this continent are helping world peace at large. But it is equally evident that if we are also to serve humanity it is not enough for us to be at peace among ourselves; we must also join hands with all who wish to live in peace anywhere in the world. For when world peace is threatened, the peace of America is also being placed in jeopardy, whether we believe it or not. In a world where the interdependence of nations becomes stronger every day, no continent can safely dream of living in peace if the rest of the world is afire.

Frequently, distinguished American writers deal with this topic, energetically denouncing Europe's troubles and referring to Europe as a "mad continent." We must not forget that the old continent, which cradled the civilization we further developed on this side of the Atlantic, cannot go mad in a day. Instead of closing our eyes to the outside world; instead of ignoring the

dangers which may threaten us at any time, let us put aside our continental "superiority complex" and seek the causes of world unrest. We have used the political experience of Europe in building up America and I know that any one of Europe's evils could arise among the nations of this continent if the favorable conditions which we find today on this side of the Atlantic, should suddenly be modified. *Francisco Castillo Nájera. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Virginia. Jl. 7, '37.*

If China be dominated by Japan, we shall have in all probability an unstable and war-breeding situation in the Far East which for generations will obstruct all efforts to develop world security and peace. America would be peculiarly involved if this were to be the outcome of affairs in the Orient.

It is because we have been controlled by conceptions of this sort that for forty years America has labored to assist China in her gigantic task of adjustment and cultural reconstruction. Since the turn of the century, the initiative of the United States has counted for more in the Far East than the influence of any other western nation. The Open Door policy, the consortium agreement of the international bankers by which political loans to warlords was stopped, the Washington Conference, and the Nine Power Treaty were all acts in which we played the leading role. They were developments which also carried in them the promise of a new approach to international problems. If the present drive of Japan is successful, it will undoubtedly mean the nullification of these forty years of constructive American effort for peace and world organization.

In short, I believe that a long-range view of American interests reveals that we do have a real stake in the outcome of the present struggle in the Far East, a stake sufficiently important for us as a nation to justify some risk and effort. In a sense, the Chinese people, in their

poorly equipped, but heroic, stand against the onslaught of a nation able to use the lethal weapons of mechanized warfare against them, are fighting our battle as well as their own. *John L. Childs. Social Frontier. D. '37. p. 83-4.*

A responsible statesman must uphold the rights and interests of his people: for what other purpose does the state exist? The extent to which he should go in this effort varies with circumstances; but Secretary Hull does not in the least suggest that the United States should resort to coercion in support of her claims. To do so would run counter to American opinion, and in any case would be premature and unnecessary. Nevertheless, the time will doubtless come when the American people will be forced to take such a question into serious consideration. When righteous men stand aside and permit the unjust man to have his way, the result is not only that the unjust man increases his capacity for evil, with corresponding danger to the righteous man, but also that moral standards deteriorate and the whole social organism becomes diseased. This is the lesson of history; and never has it been more clearly demonstrated than in recent years. When the community of nations permitted certain states to violate treaty and law, these states were encouraged to other illegal steps; and now we have increased armaments, aggression, broken treaties and law, even piracy, and a general let-down of confidence and morale in the community of nations. The seed sown in 1931 is now bearing fruit lushly, not only in the Far East but in Europe; and the community of nations, as a result of its passivity, must now suffer. Submissive acceptance of violence never stops violence; it only leads to more. This was the conclusion reached recently by the British Labor Party, which abandoned its policy of pacifism and now demands that aggressors be confronted with "emphatic superiority of armed

force." *Clyde Eagleton. American Journal of International Law. O. '37. p. 668-9.*

I do not suppose that the American people will again be ready to assume their share of the common responsibility for world peace until world war and world depression have again swept over the earth. But let us consider, for one moment at least, what the effects upon the nations would be if at this critical moment we should declare as follows:

We give notice that henceforth our vital interest in world order is to be defended. We do not promise to send our army or navy anywhere, but hereafter our influence will be thrown consistently on the side of law and order. We shall not permit our traders to aid aggression in any quarter and we shall consistently do nothing to interfere with those who are trying to resist it.

With these understandings we propose to enter the League of Nations and to work actively not only against war and conquest, but for peaceful change, for a freer distribution of raw materials, for limited changes of national boundaries in a few troubled areas and for such world-wide lowering of tariff barriers, along with the voluntary limitation of populations, as will enable all nations to live in reasonable security.

If the United States took counsel with its long future and made such a declaration, what would the effect be? Is it to be supposed that the British Empire, Russia, France and the United States, united in the League of Nations and backed enthusiastically by fifty small and middle-sized nations, would be defied by any one of the three nations which now threaten everyone's security? Is it to be supposed even that Italy, Germany and Japan together would insist upon taking the path of blood, separated by distance as they are? *Denna Frank Fleming. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Virginia. Jl. 17, '37.*

The stark question forces itself: Can the world of nations exist on a basis of anarchy of force any more

than can a group of individuals? The answer is no. Nowhere at any time has any tribe of men been willing or able to live under a regime of individual anarchy of force. Such life is intolerable and impossible. Either the anarchy destroys the tribe, or men find ways of curbing the anarchy. It must be so. The tribe may be small—apparently it was always so at first—but within the group order has uniformly been found. And *the history of developing civilization is the history of enlarging the area within which law and order prevail*. The clans of Scotland, the seven Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of Britain with their multitudinous wars have long ago disappeared within the larger unions, first of Scotland and England, then of the United Kingdom. Only on such basis can life advance.

The problem before the world is fundamentally crucial to the continued existence of civilization itself: How shall we organize the nations, as eventually we must, within one scheme of law and order? If we cannot so organize, civilization threatens its own existence. And for America this is no question simply of idealistic or unselfish altruism. It is our own vital concern. We cannot evade the issue.

As we of this country face this issue—and in an increasingly interdependent world there can be no denying it—the immediate question becomes that of finding next steps to take. Someway, somehow *the world must move in the direction of a collective concern for law and order*. Our problem becomes then: How to begin? Where to take hold? How to help our people give up a selfish and dangerous isolation? How to move wisely and effectively toward world cooperation? This is the real question. *William H. Kilpatrick. Social Frontier. My. '38. p. 242-3.*

The World War showed conclusively that American problems cannot be separated from European and Asiatic problems. Therefore even the best sort of organization



and cooperation thruout the two Americas is not enough unless it be made equally cooperative with the rest of the world. The United States has shown its appreciation of this fact in its cooperation with Europe and Asia in naval limitation of armament and in its ardent support of an all-embracing world peace pact. For the same reasons all of the American nations should join both the World Court and the League of Nations and give their support to every practicable program for the maintenance of world peace.

Such a policy is not an idealistic utopia, it is the quintessence of enlightened selfishness. In a famous speech made at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. Secretary of State Elihu Root made one of the greatest expositions of the vital need of mutual and sympathetic understanding among the American nations: "No nation can live unto itself and continue to live. Each nation's growth is a part of the development of the race—There is not one of all our countries that can not benefit the others; there is not one that will not gain by the prosperity, the peace, the happiness of all—let us help each other to show that for all races of men the liberty for which we have fought and labored is the twin sister of justice and peace—so shall come security and prosperity, production and trade, wealth, learning, the arts, and happiness for us all." No better international bill of rights could be drawn for the nations of the two Americas in their more intimate and complex relationships under the coming world order. *Graham H. Stuart. World Unity. Ja. '31. p. 276-7.*

Examine the isolationist logic in evaluating the recent resignation of Eden from the British government, and Chamberlain's open conciliation with fascist aggression. One and all, the isolationists denounce the British course as a crime against humanity, and a proof that they were always right when they said it was impossible to establish a "united front of the democratic nations" that would

include Britain; and then, in the same breath, they proceed to "prove" by the British example, that the only correct course for the United States is one closely copied after that of Chamberlain—that is, to hell with the rest of the world, make our own arrangements, and above all keep out of the way of the bandit nations, the fascist aggressors, and speak softly to them.

All groups of isolationists are agreed that the United States is, under all circumstances, incapable of pursuing an effective peace policy in collaboration with other nations. They disagree only in their explanations why this is so. Some of them look upon the United States as equally a bandit nation with the fascist governments; the only way to keep the United States from doing mischief is to keep it from doing anything at all. Others, like many of the pacifists, think that on the contrary, the United States is of a Christian purity of morals, which can only be preserved by cutting off all contacts with other nations. Still a third, and the largest, group is convinced that even with the best intentions in the world, the United States goes into world affairs mortally handicapped by the superior abilities of other nations, especially Great Britain, to trick the United States out of our very shirt and pants; we are like the country boy going to the city, sure to be sold a gold brick by the city slickers. But however much they differ as to the reasons, all isolationists are agreed upon the conclusion that the United States must at all costs keep out of world affairs and make no difficulties for the bandit nations. *Earl Browder. New Masses. Mr. 8, '38. p. 4.*

There is the danger that the United States should forget its share of responsibility for the present crisis and believe that we can escape from a European war by adopting a policy of negative isolation.

Today it is the fashion to believe that we can avoid being drawn into a new European war by adopting so-

called mandatory neutrality legislation and giving up foreign trade with warring nations. In fact, there are at least three reasons why the United States would find it difficult to keep out of a European war if it lasts very long :

First, the debates in our last Congress demonstrate that the United States is not willing to abandon its old doctrine of the freedom of the seas. We are not willing to give up all of our neutral rights or our foreign trade—which is necessary if we really hope to insulate ourselves against war.

Second, the American belief in democracy and liberty and the hatred of Fascism in many circles will give rise to a strong demand in favor of America's entrance into a war on the side of the democratic powers, should they reach the point of being overwhelmed in a war by fascist opponents.

Third, an even larger number of Americans will probably come to believe that if the three fascist dictatorships succeed in dominating Europe and the Orient these states will inevitably turn greedy eyes upon the western hemisphere—Latin America, the Caribbean, and even Canada—and thus injure the vital interests of the United States. From this standpoint, the British Empire and, to a lesser extent, France constitute the first line of defense in North America. Should this line begin to crumble, many Americans who now oppose war in the abstract would demand entry into the war as a measure of self-defense.

The adoption of neutrality legislation which will weaken France and England in their struggle against the three world dictatorships will increase pressure within America to come to the aid of the democracies; and thus, paradoxically enough, hasten our entrance into the next war. *Raymond Leslie Bell. Vital Speeches. F. 15, '37. p. 272.*

It has been said that international cooperation will inevitably align the United States on the side of Soviet Russia against the so-called fascist powers. But Russia is not today and never has been a democracy. The ruthless blood purge now going on in that unhappy, terror-stricken land should certainly be sufficient warning against any sort of united front with a government that is now at war against its own nationals.

Everything should be done, in our opinion, to destroy the fallacious notion that Europe can only be regarded as permanently divided into two hostile camps. We are far too prone to regard the Rome-Berlin axis, for example, as an eduring alliance that neither concessions, blandishments nor threats could possibly weaken. Furthermore, it has been our observation—and we offer it for what it may be worth—that communism breeds fascism and that fascism, in turn, nourishes the communist spirit of revolt. Something can be done in the field of international relations to uproot the menace of both communism and fascism. America can play an honorable and effective part in that necessary enterprise.

Approaching the issue more closely, we observe that during the past year special emphasis has been rightly placed upon the very great importance of cooperation in the United States between government and business, between capital and labor, between labor groups themselves, between races, between the three major faiths which affirm belief in a Supreme Being. We subscribe to the sound American thesis that we should not permit legitimate differences of opinion as to political events or policies to create mutual suspicions of insincerity or issue in unfriendly relations among the many religious and racial groups that compose our common citizenship. We champion the principle of the brotherhood of all men based upon the Fatherhood of God.

Why should these principles be circumscribed by our territorial frontiers? Why should we advocate coopera-

tion in national affairs but shrink from the extension of these same principles to the field of international affairs? The essential brotherhood of all men should not be interpreted in the very narrow sense of including North Americans and Latin Americans but not Europeans. We are not advocating blind cooperation with all powers under any and all circumstances; but we do feel that there does exist a Christian and democratic code of mutual helpfulness which should receive the support of all nations interested in the maintenance and preservation of the decent, civilized way of life.

But what of that nation which has flagrantly violated fundamental American rights? We are convinced that firm measures are necessary at this time in order to preserve our country against much greater dangers later on. A policy of retreat, such as the fantastic Ludlow resolution, would, in the words of Chairman Pittman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "destroy the prestige of our government and would encourage every military power, bent on conquest, to continue encroachments on the liberty of our citizens and their rights within the world to the point where physical resistance would inevitably result." *Commonweal*. - Ja. 7, '38, p. 282.

# PAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

### AN AMERICAN LEAGUE OF NATIONS <sup>1</sup>

The characteristic feature of international life in the western hemisphere is that peculiar and strong sentiment of unity and solidarity that has been manifest from the beginning of the struggle for independence in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

As early as the end of the eighteenth century and about twenty-five years before any revolutionary movements broke out in South America, we find evidence of the continental conscience in the words of the Brazilian Maia that "since we are inhabitants of the same continent, we are, in some sort, compatriots." The same sentiment is expressed later on in the messages and letters of the early presidents, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe; in the historic toasts of General Wilkinson, confidential envoy of Jefferson, and of Foch, Spanish Governor of West Florida; in the plans for a New World Confederation proposed by Miranda, the Venezuelan warrior, and by William Thornton, the versatile American; in the proposals put forth by the Chilean Juan Egaña and the Honduran José Cecilio del Valle for the holding of a continental congress and the organization of an American Union; in the impassioned pleas for unity and solidarity by Juan Martínez de Rosas and General O'Higgins in Chile; by Bernardo Monteagudo in Peru; in the doctrine proclaimed by Artigas in Uruguay that his country would consider as an enemy of her own the enemies of any of the States of America; and finally, in the achievements

<sup>1</sup> From article by Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, Former President of the Republic of Panama. *World Affairs*. 101:158-65. September, 1938.

of the two precursors who converted their thoughts into action and brought about the first concrete manifestations of Pan Americanism: Simon Bolivar in the South, Henry Clay in the North.

When we recall what all those men said and did, we can see that from the shores of the Potomac to those of the River Plate, unity was the *leit motif* of all political thought. When the Liberator Bolivar laid the cornerstone of Pan Americanism at the Isthmus of Panama in 1826, he gathered, shaped, and drove into international action ideas that were latent in the conscience of the New World, forces that had their source in the very nature of things.

The sentiment for a free and united America which underlay the Congress of Panama continued to assert itself in the several proposals of Mexico between 1831 and 1840 for the holding of another continental conference; in the congresses assembled at Lima in 1847, at Santiago, Chile, in 1856, at Lima again in 1864 and 1877, at Montevideo in 1888, and finally in the International Conference of American States convened by Secretary Blaine at Washington in 1889, the first of the series of Pan-American gatherings which have given shape and life to our present-day continental relationships. In that conference was created the organ of Pan Americanism: the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, which subsequently took the name of Pan American Union and developed into the center of inter-American activities which it is today.

The history of Pan Americanism shows that its birth and development are characterized by the following ideological factors:

1. That as inhabitants of the same continent we have a common interest and a common destiny which call for mutual cooperation.
2. That the American nations, which acquired their political liberty must adopt effective methods to maintain it.



3. That in order to protect themselves against aggression the nations of America must be united by strong ties of international solidarity.

That among the South American nations solidarity has always been conceived under the aspect of alliances, leagues or political unions, while in the United States the traditional policy has been one of avoidance of political entanglements.

The tendency to make closer the association between the republics of the new world by means of political ties has grown to the point where proposals for the creation of an American League of Nations were discussed at the Buenos Aires Peace Conference in 1936, and a formal project is now being considered by the governments of the continent, which will be acted upon by the Eighth Pan American Conference to be held at Lima next December.

As in the course of time the Pan American Union grew in importance and the joint action of the republics of the continent became more vast and complex, a vague desire began to manifest itself that the Pan American Union, as a council of the sovereign nations of America, should be able to act in an effective manner in the great crises of our hemisphere. Especially, there was a feeling that the Union should be empowered to function as a body of conciliation in inter-American conflicts. That desire and that feeling continued to increase, and the organization of the League of Nations by the Versailles Treaty awakened in America the idea of erecting in the New World a regional league fashioned after the Geneva model.

In a lecture given by Dr. Baltasar Brum, President of Uruguay, at the University of Montevideo in April, 1920, he advocated publicly the organization of an American League. In January, 1923, he published a complete draft of a statute, and for this reason Dr. Brum has generally been considered the originator of the project.

This is not the case, however. Apart from the fact that the basic idea of an American League of Nations is found in the Panama Congress of 1826, in more recent years the first to propose the formation of a political Society of American Nations was President Wilson. In the speech he made at the closing session of the Second Pan American Scientific Congress held in Washington in 1916, President Wilson outlined his conception when he said:

If America is to come into her own, into her legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundations of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them. . . . It will be accomplished in the first place *by the States of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolutely, political independence and territorial integrity.* In the second place, and as a necessary corollary to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amicable process. . . . These are very practical suggestions which have sprung up in the minds of thoughtful men, and I, for my part, believe that they are going to lead the way to something that America has prayed for for many a generation.

The proposal of President Wilson was formally presented to the Foreign Offices of the Latin republics, in the terms of a circular-telegram addressed to the American Embassies and Legations, January 24th, 1916, which reads as follows:

It is proposed to embody, in a general convention to be subscribed to by all the American Republics, the following provision, in four articles, in which the several Republics agree:

I. To guarantee their territorial integrity and political independence.

II. To settle all boundary disputes by amicable arrangement or by arbitration.

III. To submit all differences between any two of them, excepting those affecting honor, independence and interests of third parties, to a permanent international commission, which will render a decision within one year, and if decision be unsatisfactory, to submit such differences to arbitration.

IV. To prohibit the departure of military forces, arms or ammunition from their territory to revolutionists in other Republics.

This matter was referred to by President Wilson in his speech to the Second Pan American Scientific Congress on Janu-

ary 6 and has already been accepted in principle by a majority of the Republics represented at that conference.

Should the Chief Executive or the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country to which you are accredited broach this subject to you, you may informally express the interest taken in this proposal by the President of the United States and the hope of this Government that a treaty to this end may be signed by all the American Republics.

The idea enunciated by Wilson in 1916 did not materialize in the New World. It crossed the ocean and bore its fruit four years later in the Old World.

President Brum was hopeful that his project would be considered by the Fifth Conference, held at Santiago in 1923. The agenda contemplated discussion of the topic and his Secretary of Foreign Affairs and collaborator, Doctor Buero, was elected Rapporteur. The plan however, did not receive consideration beyond the reading of the Buero report and no decisive action was taken by the conference.

In 1926, a Congress was held in the city of Panama to commemorate the centenary of the famous Congress of American Nations convened by Bolivar in that same city on June 22nd, 1826.

That commemorative Congress passed a resolution containing *inter alia* the following paragraphs:

The expediency of constituting an Association of American Nations, which within the modern conception of international law, and upon the basis of the juridical equality of the states should correspond to the ideals of union and justice which brought to life the Congress of Panama, is hereby recognized.

It is recommended therefore that the Governments of the American countries make arrangements to convene a Congress of Plenipotentiaries which will exclusively take up the drafting of the Covenant of such an Association.

It will be incumbent upon the Government of Panama to carry on preliminary negotiations with the American Foreign Offices for the calling of the proposed meeting.

Notwithstanding these earnest terms, the Sixth Pan American Conference, which met at Havana two years later did not have on its agenda the League topic. No

government showed any interest in it. Moreover, the Havana Conference signalized itself by showing fundamental opposition to clothing the Pan American Union with conciliation powers or with any shadow of political powers, and when the Convention of the Pan American Union was discussed, the following iron-clad provision was adopted:

Both the Governing Board and the Pan American Union shall discharge the duties assigned by this Convention, subject to the condition that they shall not exercise functions of a political character.

By reason of this opposition to any form of political ties in the international set up of the American republics, the league idea remained dormant.

The Seventh Conference of American States met at Montevideo in December, 1933. It was announced at that time that the Salvadorean government would make a new proposal for the organization of an American league. The press reports did not materialize and the issue did not come up at that meeting.

It was in December 1936, when President Roosevelt convened the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires, that the league project received fresh impetus. When the different governments were consulted with reference to the topics of the agenda, Salvador and Guatemala proposed the conclusion of a general treaty of solidarity and cooperation. Haiti suggested an "International American Union" on the basis of the mutual guarantee of the political independence and the territorial integrity of the states of the continent. Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic made a definite proposition that the question of the organization of an American League of Nations be discussed at the parley. The subject was included in the agenda in the chapter on "Organization of Peace," under this title: "Consideration of other measures tending toward closer association of the American Republics and

of measures of cooperation with other international entities."

Two projects were submitted to the Buenos Aires Conference, one by Colombia, the other by the Dominican Republic. The two drafts differed widely in certain details, but they coincided in the following fundamental points: that all the American nations shall, in their own right, be members of the Association; that the seat of the central organ of the Association, be it called Congress or Council, shall be movable and not permanent; that the central organ shall have periodic meetings once a month; that it shall be competent to initiate conciliation proceedings and that each state shall have one vote in the deliberations. The two projects also coincide in incorporating in their texts those juridical principles which are necessary bases of the institution, such as the guarantee of the territorial integrity and the political independence of the member states, the condemnation of violence to solve territorial controversies or to acquire special advantages, the limitation of armaments, the repudiation of war, and the pacific solution of conflicts.

The two drafts show differences of detail on several points but there is one fundamental difference on a point of manifest importance. The Dominican plan does not contemplate sanctions, except expulsion from the League, and does not renounce neutrality in the event of a war of aggression. The Colombian project on the contrary, defines the aggressor in a concrete manner; enumerates the sanctions applicable to the aggressor and contains a commitment that the states members of the Association shall forsake neutrality in case of a war of aggression and bind themselves to side with the victim of the aggression. (Art. 13.) These two drafts are now replaced by one joint draft agreed upon by the Colombian and Dominican governments, which was formally presented last March to the Pan American Union, and which adopts the general structure and main features of the Colombian project.

The proposal to create an Association of American Nations gives rise to two interesting questions, to wit:

1. The future status of the Pan American Union as an organ of the American Republics; and
2. The relations of the American Association with the universal institution of Geneva.

So far as the joint draft is concerned, the status of the Pan American Union would be determined by the following provisions:

Art. 2. The organs of the Association of American nations shall be the following: The Pan American Congress, the Permanent Secretariat and such other organisms as the Association may create in the future.

Art. 31. All Pan American international bureaus established by collective agreements prior to the ratification of this treaty shall be placed under the dependency of the Association of American Nations.

In accordance with these provisions, the Pan American Union as a non-political, central and sole organ of the nations of America organized as a moral union, would cease to exist, as it would be replaced by another body, which would be the political organ of the nations of America organized as a political Union. For, as I will develop further on, that is the gist of the problem: whether the American nations shall organize themselves as a political union or whether they will continue to conduct the common, ordinary and general activities of their international life under a non-political organization, leaving those questions which require the exercise of political powers to be disposed of in accordance with such special treaties as may be agreed upon between them.

As to the interesting point of the relations of the American League with the Geneva institution, the consensus of opinion at Buenos Aires apparently was that a regional organization, far from being incompatible with the universal association, is explicitly contemplated by Article 21 of the Covenant of the League, according to

which, "nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration, or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

It may be said *en passant*, that the drafting of this provision is unfortunately poor, and that at the time the Covenant was signed the Monroe Doctrine was neither an international engagement nor a regional understanding, but simply and purely a unilateral declaration of policy of the United States. But it is evident that the scope and intent of the provision is to make the Covenant compatible with any sort of regional treaties, understandings or agreements aiming at securing the maintenance of peace, and that advocacy of the American League idea at Buenos Aires was predicated upon its coexistence and harmonization with the World League.

### ROOSEVELT'S LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY \*

Everyone no doubt has heard of the principal policy of the United States with reference to Latin America, namely, the Monroe Doctrine. The American people have not only heard of it, but they regard it with veneration. It is as sacrosanct as the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence. Like the Ark of the Covenant, it must not be touched. Nevertheless, many of us have no very clear idea as to what it means. This is due in part to the fact that its meaning has changed from time to time.

When first promulgated, over a century ago, it was a notice to Europe to keep hands off the independent states of the western hemisphere. At that time, there was no thought that the United States itself would intervene in the affairs of Latin America. This particular develop-

\* From article by John M. Mathews, University of Illinois. *American Political Science Review*. 29:805-20. October, 1935.

ment or extension of the Monroe Doctrine was brought about by President Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the present century. It was the outgrowth of disturbed conditions in certain Latin-American countries which led to threats of European intervention for the maintenance of order and the collection of debts. If Latin-American countries allowed their affairs to fall into such a condition of chaos and disorder that they apparently could not be straightened out except thru the intervention of some other power, the United States was faced with three possible courses of action. We could stand idly by and permit European nations to intervene. But this did not seem to be a correct attitude for us to assume, because it would clearly constitute a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In the second place, we could maintain the dog-in-the-manger attitude of not allowing European intervention and also not intervening ourselves. This course seemed to hold out no hope for a betterment of conditions. The third possible course was for the United States itself to intervene. This was the course which President Theodore Roosevelt adopted. In his annual message to Congress in 1904, he declared:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

President Theodore Roosevelt further stated that "it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet refuse itself to take any such steps."

Thus was glossed over with fair words expressing a high moral purpose a policy, which in its essence turned out to be one of imperialism, of what the Germans call



*Machtpolitik*, or of what in this country is sometimes called the policy of the Big Stick.

In accordance with this so-called extension or corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, we required the government of the Dominican Republic to enter into an agreement with us whereby we established a customs receivership there, under an American fiscal officer named by the President of the United States and acting under the protection of the United States navy.

This positive interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was continued in force until the middle of the Hoover administration and led to interventions by the United States in several Latin-American countries in the Caribbean region, the most conspicuous instances of which were those in Nicaragua and Haiti. These countries in that region came to be regarded as a game preserve set aside for exploitation by American business interests assisted by our government in accordance with the principles of "dollar diplomacy." With reference to our controversy over the Mexican land laws, President Coolidge stated in 1927 that "the person and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the nation even when abroad." Altho subject to different constructions, this statement may be interpreted as an assertion of the extraterritoriality of American investments in Mexico. This breathes the spirit of imperialism as embodied in concessions, protectorates, and spheres of influence and is antagonistic to the rising tide of nationalism in so-called backward countries. As late as 1928, at the Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana, the United States insisted on maintaining the right of intervention.

About midway the Hoover administration, however, there was a change of heart on our part, due no doubt in large part to realization that the world-wide economic depression, instead of being a mere temporary set-back in the march of prosperity, had assumed the proportions of a major disaster. The famous Hoover moratorium of

1931 on intergovernmental debt payments was the event which signalized the end of the era of *Machtspolitik*. It was at about that time that President Hoover and Secretary Stimson were led to the conclusion that the United States should as rapidly as possible lighten the load of our commitments in Latin America. Among the incidents showing the adoption of a policy in this direction were: (1) When a revolution occurred in Panama in 1931, the United States did not intervene, in spite of our right to do so under the treaty of 1903. (2) When El Salvador defaulted on her bonds in 1932, the United States State Department acquiesced and made no move to assist the bankers by establishing a customs receivership. (3) In Nicaragua, the number of American marines were gradually reduced and finally, early in 1933, those remaining were withdrawn altogether. (4) In a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine prepared in 1930 by J. Reuben Clark, undersecretary of state in the Hoover administration, the Roosevelt corollary to the Doctrine was declared unwarranted and the Doctrine itself was characterized as a policy of the United States toward Europe and not toward Latin America.

In spite, however, of various steps taken by the Hoover administration showing a more conciliatory spirit toward Latin America, one of the worst mistakes of the Hoover régime, namely, the Smoot-Hawley tariff act, still remained uncorrected at the end of the administration. This caused retaliation towards us thruout the world, including Latin America. Several countries seriously considered carrying on this economic warfare thru the establishment of a South American customs union.

It is true that when President Franklin Roosevelt came into power in 1933, the high protective tariff was not lowered. He was not altogether uninfluenced by nationalistic considerations, and his primary interest was in domestic recovery. He clung to the high tariff, speaking generally, as a means of raising prices, which, in

turn, was deemed to be a necessary means of overcoming the depression at home. But he supported the policy of Secretary Hull in lowering some rates thru bilateral trade agreements on the basis of reciprocal tariff concessions.

Altho some progress had been made under Hoover in the direction of a more conciliatory policy toward Latin America, President Roosevelt has carried out this policy more fully and, in his official utterances, has made it more clear-cut and explicit. In his inaugural address, he enunciated his policy of the good neighbor as follows:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize, as we have never realized before, our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well.

This is an elaboration of the statement made many years earlier by Secretary John Hay that American foreign policy may be summed up in "the Monroe Doctrine and the Golden Rule." It indicates a desire of the United States to treat other nations as we should like to be treated if our respective positions were reversed.

In his address on Pan American Day in April, 1933, President Roosevelt declared:

This celebration commemorates a movement based upon the policy of fraternal cooperation. Never has the significance of the words "good neighbor" been so manifest in international relations. Never have the need and benefit of neighborly cooperation in every form of human activity been so evident as they are today. The essential qualities of Pan Americanism must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely, mutual understanding and, thru such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view. It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up a system of which confidence, friendship, and good-will are the corner-stones.

In his appeal of May, 1933, to the nations of the world represented at the Disarmament Conference, the

President called upon them to agree not to send an armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers.

The definite stand of the Roosevelt administration against intervention in Latin America came in December of the same year. Secretary Hull, head of the American delegation at the Seventh Pan American Conference at Montevideo, declared that "every observing person must by this time thoroly understand that under the Roosevelt administration the United States government is as much opposed as any other to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations."

Finally, in his address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation at Washington on December 28, 1933, President Roosevelt declared explicitly:

The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention. The maintenance of constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.

This statement represents a fundamental change in the application of the Monroe Doctrine as it had been understood since the time of Theodore Roosevelt. It adopts a continentalized interpretation of the Doctrine for the first time in an official presidential utterance. In this statement, President Franklin Roosevelt substituted the Soft Word for the Big Stick.

This suggestion that the Doctrine was now to be limited so that intervention, if it should take place, would be a cooperative and collective step brought a ready response from Latin America. Even Mexico, which, at the time it joined the League of Nations in 1931, refused to recognize the Monroe Doctrine, described in the Cove-

nant as a regional understanding, has now approved the idea of making the Doctrine a joint policy of all the independent American states.

### LATIN AMERICA, THE LEAGUE, AND THE UNITED STATES<sup>3</sup>

Before the World War, generally speaking, Latin America was on the periphery of international relations. It did not exert much influence in international affairs, and its foreign relations were mainly with the countries of the western hemisphere, particularly the United States. For the other countries of the world the blue ribbon position in diplomacy might be the ambassadorship in Paris or London; for the Latin American countries it was at Washington. The economic interests of some of the Latin American countries were largely with Europe, but the political relations of all of them with Washington were of vital importance. In comparison, those with other countries were relatively unimportant, with the possible exception of the relations of Argentina with Great Britain.

As the result of the great war-time demand for their cereals, meats, sugar, nitrates, and manganese, Latin Americans were led to change their attitude of mind towards the rest of the world. They discovered that their countries occupied an important place in world economy, and this greatly increased their pride in their own continent and also their self-confidence. Then immediately after the war they were invited to join the League of Nations on a footing of equality with all other nations of the world, including the great powers of Europe. This further enhanced their self-esteem, courage, and prestige. During the colonial

<sup>3</sup> From article by Stephen P. Duggan, Director of the Institute of International Education. *Foreign Affairs*. 12:281-93. January, 1934.

period the Latin American peoples had been absolutely dominated by Spain and Portugal (except for French rule in Haiti). After their achievement of independence and during the nineteenth century they lived largely in the shadow of the United States. Today they have a growing determination, and it is particularly strong on the part of the stronger and more progressive states, to lead their own lives without acknowledging the tutelage of any other people or state.

The wars of the French Revolution and those waged by Napoleon compelled the European nations to concentrate attention upon the problems of their own continent. This gave opportunity to the Latin American nations to secure their independence. There developed in the early nineteenth century among all the republics of the western hemisphere a widely diffused sentiment in favor of what was called continentalism. That was the romantic period in the literature of all the American peoples, north and south. Much was made of the recent struggles for independence, of the adoption of republican institutions, of the establishment of new civilizations founded upon liberty and the rights of man. It was felt that these things formed a spiritual bond which in a way united all the nations of the American continent as against Europe, from which it was geographically separated. The attitude was strengthened by the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument of defense for all the American nations against any attempted aggression by Europe.

The first serious blow to continentalism was our war with Mexico. Since then a series of unfortunate incidents in our relations with some of the Latin American countries has so diluted the old ideal of continentalism, more recently termed Pan Americanism, that little of it remains. As time passed, the elements of dissimilarity and division between them and the United States became more pronounced than the elements of resem-

blance and unity. Moreover, in the century of slow development after the Latin American countries secured their independence there was little cooperation among them. Indeed, in the course of time a good deal of rivalry developed among the stronger ones, especially Brazil and Argentina, for leadership in Latin America.

The outbreak of the World War resulted in a considerable revival of the spirit of Pan Americanism and of the tendency to follow the leadership of the United States. After the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, thirteen of the twenty Latin American republics also either declared war on Germany or broke off diplomatic relations with her. Ten of these specifically stated that they were animated in so doing by the principle of American solidarity. The community of feeling with the United States, however, did not survive the war. The rejection of the Covenant of the League of Nations by the United States Senate was regarded by Latin America generally as a moral betrayal. The enthusiasm roused by the idealistic speeches of President Wilson rapidly waned and was soon succeeded in some states by a feeling of fear because of the enormously increased power of the United States resulting from the war. Formerly, economic ascendancy in South America lay with Great Britain and Germany. After the war it passed to the United States, which became dominant both politically and economically.

All the Latin American nations save Ecuador eventually joined the League of Nations. In doing so they were animated in part by different motives; but undoubtedly there were certain ideals and principles which inspired all of them. Throughout the nineteenth century the Latin American nations were weak states from the standpoint of military power. They have always strongly supported methods of arbitration, cooperation, and judicial settlement of international disputes. They regarded the Covenant of the League of

Nations as giving universal application to their own traditional policies. This was a source of great pride to them.

Actual membership in the League of Nations strengthened this feeling of pride and self-reliance. In the Council and Assembly of the League the Latin American states sat on a footing of equality with the representatives of the great powers, and in course of time their representatives were elected to preside over those bodies and often acted as chairmen of important committees. This was in sharp contrast to the Pan American conferences, where the United States dominated and the Latin American states felt that they occupied a place of inferiority. In fact, there can hardly be any doubt that one of the motives which animated a considerable number of the Latin American nations in joining the League was the belief that it would act as a counterpoise to the United States. Article X of the Covenant, guaranteeing the political independence and territorial integrity of League members, which was largely responsible for causing the Covenant to be rejected by the United States, made a strong appeal to some of the weaker Latin American countries.

The League, on the other hand, aiming as it did at universality, profited by having the Latin American states as members. They helped make up for the absence of the United States and Russia. The eighteen Latin American states which joined the League formed almost one-third of its total membership and went far to relieve the League of the charge that it was essentially a European organization.

Collectively the Latin American states have followed certain policies within the League. One has been to continue to pursue an American continental policy with reference to matters of general American interest and to settle disputes among themselves at the Pan American



conferences rather than at the meetings of the League. Disputes between Latin American states might readily be submitted for settlement to League organs. But as a matter of fact they seldom are. The Latin American nations may not approve the Monroe Doctrine, but they whole-heartedly believe in the tradition behind the Doctrine that non-American states should not interfere in purely American affairs. In the boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica in 1921, as well as in the recent Chaco and Leticia disputes, the League Council drew to the attention of the disputants their commitments under the Covenant, but the disputants themselves did not at first voluntarily submit their disputes to the Council.

#### RESULTS OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONFERENCE <sup>4</sup>

During the course of its sessions the conference adopted eleven treaties and conventions, and sixty-two resolutions and declarations. I will limit myself to listing very briefly what I conceive to be the outstanding instruments to which the nations represented at Buenos Aires subscribed. First of all, let me cite the "Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace". This convention establishes in contractual form the obligation on the part of the American republics to consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful cooperation in certain contingencies. These contingencies are as follows:

1. Whenever the peace of the American republics is menaced, whether that menace arises thru threat of war between American states or whether it be of any other nature whatsoever; and

<sup>4</sup>From address of Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State. *Academy of Political Science. Proceedings.* 17:297-308. May, 1937.

2. "In the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American republics", in order to "determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some pacific action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent".

This convention provides the following new factors in inter-American relationships: first of all, the mechanism for consultation, namely, the respective foreign offices; second, the scope of the consultation provided for, namely, the finding and adopting of methods of peaceful cooperation; and third, the practical method for the mobilization of public opinion on the American continent in behalf of the maintenance of peace. In the event that the peace of the Americas is threatened in any of the ways above indicated, and the twenty-one governments, upon the demand of any one of them, consult together, I believe that public opinion in every one of the republics will insist that the governments consulting together find the peaceful solution. Furthermore, this convention makes it possible for the peaceful solution to be found at the outset of a controversy--at the moment that the threat to peace first appears upon the horizon. That in itself is a major safeguard.

As an additional protocol the conference unanimously declared "inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any one of the other parties" and agreed likewise that "the violation of the provisions of this article shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment."

In close relation to the convention and protocol just referred to is the "Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of Existing Treaties between the American States". This convention refers specifically to the five peace instruments to which the American republics are already parties: the Gondra

Treaty of 1923 to avoid and prevent conflicts; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928; the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, 1929; the General Treaty of American Arbitration, 1929; and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, known as the Anti-War Pact, of 1933. It recognizes the obligations of the American nations undertaken in those earlier treaties to settle by pacific means all disputes which may arise between them. Thru this convention the American republics likewise agree that, when an emergency arises affecting their common interest in the maintenance of peace, they will, thru consultation and cooperation, assist the other American republics in fulfilling existing obligations for pacific settlement, while at the same time recognizing the general right of each American state to individual liberty of action. Should any dispute arise between two or more of the parties, and should consultation on the part of the American republics take place, the parties in dispute agree that they will have no recourse to hostilities nor take any military action whatever during a period of six months. Moreover, those states which may be involved in some controversy, and which have been unable to solve the controversy by diplomatic negotiations, agree not only to have recourse to one or more of the peace instruments above cited, but also to report the method for pacific settlement which they adopt, and the progress made thereunder in the adjustment of their dispute, to all of the other signatory states. Finally, in the event that any American republics should fail to carry out their obligation to settle solely by pacific means the controversies which may arise between them, the signatories agree to "adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude", to consult immediately with one another, and to "consider the imposition of prohibitions or restrictions on the sale or shipment of arms, munitions and implements of war, loans or other financial

help, to the states in conflict, in accordance with their municipal legislation and without detriment to their obligations derived from other treaties", in order to discourage or prevent the spread or elongation of hostilities.

Another signal contribution to closer relationships between the American republics, and to the creation of that unprejudiced and friendly understanding which is one of the surest foundations for the maintenance of peace, was the "Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations", by which the American governments each agree to award fellowships in some one of their universities or colleges to two graduate students or teachers from each other American country, and to receive an exchange professor from each of the other American republics to lecture and to teach in appropriate institutions of learning.

Furthermore, the American governments unanimately joined in demanding the abolition of economic barriers to peace. They recommended the reduction of excessive or unreasonable prohibitions and restrictions upon international commerce, and that this policy be carried forward thru the conclusion or revision of bilateral commercial agreements and treaties. They likewise recommended the suppression of all discriminatory practices in their commercial policy, including those arising in connection with import license systems, exchange control, and bilateral clearing and compensation agreements, and called upon the other nations of the world to join with them in the removal of those economic barriers which so gravely menace today the maintenance of world peace.

Finally, I will list among the outstanding achievements of the Conference the "Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation" adopted by the Conference upon the initiative of the five repub-

lics of Central America. The text of this declaration is as follows:

The Governments of the American Republics, having considered:

That they have a common likeness in their democratic form of government, and their common ideals of peace and justice, manifested in the several Treaties and Conventions which they have signed for the purpose of constituting a purely American system tending towards the preservation of peace, the proscription of war, the harmonious development of their commerce and of their cultural aspirations demonstrated in all of their political, economic, social, scientific and artistic activities;

That the existence of continental interests obliges them to maintain solidarity of principles as the basis of the life of the relations of each to every other American nation;

That Pan Americanism, as a principle of American International Law, by which is understood a moral union of all of the American Republics in defense of their common interests based upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal respect for their rights of autonomy, independence and free development, requires the proclamation of principles of American International Law; and

That it is necessary to consecrate the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental conflicts, especially since those limited to the American Continent should find a peaceful solution by the means established by the Treaties and Conventions now in force or in the instruments hereafter to be executed,

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace declares:

1. That the American nations, true to their republican institutions, proclaim their absolute juridical liberty, their unrestricted respect for their several sovereignties and the existence of a common democracy thruout America;

2. That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, executed at this Conference; and

3. That the following principles are accepted by the international American community;

(a) Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence, no acquisition made thru violence shall be recognized;

(b) Intervention by one state in the internal or external affairs of another state is condemned;

(c) Forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and

(d) Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or full arbitration, or thru operation of international justice.

I know of no relationship existing between nations of the world today which is on a higher plane than that proclaimed by the American republics by means of this declaration. If the twenty-one republics carry out the terms of this declaration in spirit as well as in letter, they will indeed be able to mark the new era in inter-American relationships which I believe to be before us as arising from the date of the signing of this declaration.

#### PAN-AMERICA IN THE COMING WORLD ORDER \*

The western hemisphere is fortunate in that not only has it fewer rivalries and hatreds of the past to forget but it possesses a common heritage of tradition and a fairly well established community of interests inclining towards a friendly cooperation in the future. The fact that all of the twenty-two American states were at one time colonies of Europe, that all except Canada obtained their independence within less than half a century's time, that all have constitutions based upon approximately the same ideals of democracy gives them what might be called a kindred background. Such a situation cannot be otherwise than advantageous in establishing a system of inter-American relationships based upon a sound foundation of mutual understanding and goodwill.

But the disillusioned post-war world exhibits little interest or belief in things merely because they ought to be. The high sounding generalities and optimistic platitudes of the politician are blown away by the cold wind of facts and actualities. Enlightened selfishness is regarded as a more potent and satisfactory basis of permanent cooperation than ignorant idealism.

\* From article by Graham H. Stuart, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. *World Unity*. 7:265-77. January, 1931.

For this reason any attempt to visualize a new era of successful international relationship for the states of the western world requires an unbiased and accurate survey of the conditions which militate against satisfactory cooperation as well as those which encourage it. The difficulties of the problem must be given even more consideration than the factors working for it. The present article endeavors to sketch the existing situation in the American continents, pointing out the barriers to a satisfactory and successful political and economic relationship as well as the many avenues of approach which may make its achievement possible. A clear statement of the problem is the first step to its solution.

Perhaps the outstanding difficulty militating against successful political cooperation in the western hemisphere results from the preponderant situation which the United States occupies in population, wealth, and power. Altho with the inclusion of Alaska, the United States possesses less than one-fourth of the total land in the two western continents, it has more than half the people, three-fourths of the wealth, and its power is practically immeasurable. Even Canada and the A.B.C. powers are oftentimes fearful and suspicious of their puissant and dominating neighbor. How much more difficult is the position of the weak states of the Caribbean, situated in what the United States has long asserted to be its sphere of influence?

Nor has the United States in word or deed followed a policy such as to exonerate it entirely from reasonable suspicions on the part of its neighbors. Mexico can hardly be expected to forget the annexation of Texas and California, Colombia has only recently and grudgingly accepted the loss of Panama, and the entire Caribbean region is still on tenter hooks as to when and where the United States will intervene next. If,

as Mr. Olney once said, "the United States is sovereign on this continent, its fiat is law upon subjects to which it confines its interposition" and the United States continues to be the sole interpreter of such a doctrine, a spirit of absolute confidence will never be established between the United States and her less powerful neighbors.

On the other hand even the most pessimistic chronicler of the relations between the United States and the other nations of the Americas can find few evidences of irretrievable wrongs. Texas had achieved her independence before she was annexed to the United States and Mexico exerted the most nominal control over the territories which she lost in the war with the United States. It has never been proved that the United States actually instigated the Panama revolution and the construction of the canal has benefited Colombia as much as it has the other west coast states of South America. Cuba is not satisfied with the Platt Amendment but rather because of a feeling of "amour propre" than because of any abuse of its provisions on the part of the United States. The United States has intervened often in the Caribbean region but the interventions have always been temporary except in the case of Haiti, and even here its word has been pledged to withdraw by 1936. Canada has settled every boundary dispute with her more powerful neighbor by arbitration and several of them with some considerable profit to herself. In fine, altho the position and power of the United States make it a potentially dangerous neighbor, and its statesmen from time to time give utterance to doctrines of manifest destiny and American hegemony, in actual practice the policy of the United States has not been such as to prevent the realization of a Pan-American cooperation based upon mutual respect and fair dealing.



## PAN AMERICA, PEACE AND PERSONNEL \*

On the Right (at the Buenos Aires Conference) was the Argentine Republic, or to be more accurate, her Foreign Minister, whose delegation led the pro-European bloc, so to speak, which consisted of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. These nations are members of the League of Nations; Argentina and Uruguay have strong bonds with Great Britain; and all three have had or have strong traditions of animosity to the United States.

The principles these nations stood for in the conference were universalism, leaguism, and pacifism. This meant that they opposed the creation or formulation of "American" international law, regional understandings, expressions of continental solidarity, united American fronts, an American League of Nations, the "continentalizing" of the Monroe Doctrine, permanent Inter-American Courts of Justice, and all moves and movements which might isolate America from the rest of the world. They all fought against new associations which might enhance the power and prestige of the United States on the continent, against all tendencies to weaken their ties with European nations; they refused to have their own self-esteem lessened by any agreements which must place them on a basis of equality with smaller and less powerful states.

All three, but notably the Argentines, have extremely nationalist peoples. Chile and Argentina have had until the 1920's remarkable histories of political stability; and since 1919 Uruguay has been one of the leading nations of the new world in its social and political legislation. And today the economic and financial position and progress of the Argentine Republic is unique. Prosperous, solvent and progressive, Argentina leads

\* From article by Paul Vanorden Shaw, Sao Paulo University, Brazil. *North American Review*. 243:24-41. March, 1937.

the Latin American world economically and commercially.

This Right was successful in forcing the United States and other delegations to repeat constantly that they had no intention of isolating America altogether or of damaging the Geneva League. The Right failed, however, to carry thru its desire to "universalize" or generalize all the pacts formulated at the conference. As matters stand, only when an instrument itself provides for such adherence can non-American states sign it. The Right wrung admissions that international law is one and universal but was unable to alter the opinion of the majority which postulated constantly that there are purely American problems for which purely American solutions are preferable. It failed to quash the proposals for an American League of Nations and a permanent Inter-American Court of Justice and succeeded merely in shunting them to Lima for consideration in the eighth Pan American Conference which meets in 1938. But the Right, in last analysis, compromised, as did all the other delegations, and signed every project.

At the other extreme were the nations which stood for a larger degree of isolation from Asia and Europe, for a common program of neutrality in the case of wars abroad, for a stronger and more binding political and juridical union of the Americas and for "continental solidarity." The Dominican Republic proposed and fought consistently for the most radical measure: the creation of a League of American Nations. Colombia followed suit with the project of an American Association of Nations which was to implement and not substitute the Geneva body. The five Central American nations, in collaboration, proposed a treaty on continental solidarity and cooperation with the famous clause to the effect that any offense to one American nation must be considered an affront to all the others.

These same nations, Panama, Mexico, and Peru, proposed the creation of a permanent Inter-American Court of Justice. The final blow to interventions came from the Mexican delegation which, with Venezuela, also suggested the desirability of one single peace code.

The purpose of the "left-wingers" of the conference was to establish the principle of equality amongst the American states and in this they were supported by the United States. Also to insist that there are "purely American problems and interests" and that European courts and jurists do not have the requisite knowledge and information for solving them properly; and to organize, organically and functionally, the twenty-one independent American nations into a solid, compact bloc which would function as a unit in case of wars abroad or against an American state and in the solution of questions which might arise in America.

There is irony in the fact that most of those nations which accepted the United States, at Buenos Aires, as an equal and with confidence and friendship, and which proposed new organic bodies where the United States, because of her size, population, wealth and power, must play a dominant role, were the very nations which have received the brunt of her former imperialistic activity. The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua only yesterday complained of the khaki-clad professors of self-government which Uncle Sam camped on their doorsteps. Day before yesterday Colombia was howling about the "theft" of the Panama canal and Panama about an iniquitous treaty. Less than a decade ago Mexico growled at the United States across the Rio Grande and did all she could to foment Pan Latinism as against Pan Americanism. But 1928 and 1933 are ancient history. The bitter enemies of those years are the strongest friends of today.

The Left was not defeated, because in most respects these nations represented the majority of Americans.

Many of their ideals, however, were not mature enough for the day. The Left symbolized the old Latin America of unbounded idealism and it was this idealism which led the left-wingers to accept compromises and postponements. Sportsmen, and chivalrous thruout the conference, they earned the admiration of practically all the other delegates for the persistent, consistent and courteous manner in which they fought like bull-dogs for their projects.

The middle-of-the-road nations, or those of the Center, were the United States, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela.

#### BRIEF EXCERPTS

Now, after Munich, after China, after the breakdown of what little remained of collective security in Europe and in Asia, opinion in this country strongly favors a closer partnership among the American nations in defense of their own interests. *Editorial. New York Times. N. 25, '38. p. 22.*

Perplexing situations have arisen already in Mexico and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Chile and Argentina. Without wishing to be alarmists there are certain well informed observers in this country and in European chancellories who believe, though they do not express their opinions openly, that the United States will have a difficult task in maintaining the "good neighbor policy." Some even think the Monroe Doctrine itself may be challenged if Germany succeeds in becoming the dominant European power. They maintain that it is not without the bounds of possibility that a final and major battle will be waged between the United States and Germany, and it may come thru attempted German penetration in South America. *James S. Carson. Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. Jl. 5, '38.*

There is an abundance of machinery available for the peaceful settlement of disputes among the American states, and practically all are bound up by a network of treaties requiring it. For example, disregarding the obligations under the League of Nations, Argentina is bound by 33 arbitration treaties, Brazil by 42, Chile by 23, Peru by 17, Uruguay by 31 and the United States by 45. All the American states except Costa Rica and Honduras have signed the Hague Convention. Two-thirds of the American states have signed the protocol of the World Court, and half of these have accepted the optional clause. Canada and sixteen of the Latin American states are members of the League of Nations, and all of the states of the western hemisphere except Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia have signed the Kellogg-Briand pact for the renunciation of war. *Graham H. Stuart. World Unity. Ja. '31. p. 274.*

The principles embodied in this document (The Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation) mark not only a new day in inter-American relations, but perhaps a brighter day as well in the history of the world. When the twenty-one nations of the New World proclaim "the existence of a common democracy thruout America;" state "that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects the peace of each and every one of them" and justifies consultation between them; and (in the third article) proclaim their faith in the most enlightened practice possible in the dealings of one state with another—that declaration of policy not only gives assurance that we of this hemisphere can maintain peace among ourselves, but also holds out hope to war-weary peoples in other parts of the world that right and justice and fair dealing and liberty still exist and have not yet vanished. *Sumner Welles. Foreign Affairs. Ap. '37. p. 448.*

There is no greater safeguard for democracy as we live it here in the United States, and as we understand it today, than international security. The example which the American governments gave the world at Buenos Aires, that a quarter of a billion of human beings, the citizens of twenty-one independent republics, can agree together to maintain peace between themselves, in order to advance their common good as well as their individual interests, is one from which the peoples of the rest of the world have already taken renewed hope and courage. To quote a phrase used not long ago by the distinguished President of Columbia University, the American democracies can be and have shown themselves to be a "stabilizing factor" in the universe of today. That, I believe, is the destiny of this New World. *Sumner Welles. Academy of Political Science. Proceedings. My. '37. p. 36.*

Four factors are responsible for the unusual importance attached by the rest of the American nations to the Buenos Aires conference. The first is the desire to make permanent and to clarify the new United States policy of "the good neighbor." The second is to evolve common measures of protection in the event of war in Europe or the Far East. The third is anxiety to provide a political basis for security among the nations themselves, perhaps in the form of a Pan American League of Nations. Without this, the intolerable financial burden of increasing armaments, which costs South America some \$200,000,000 a year, cannot be lifted. Fourth, members of the conference wish to escape from economic warfare, such as the tariff conflict now being waged between Argentina and Peru. Most South American states have depended substantially upon customs duties for their revenues and, as a consequence, trade has been virtually choked. *Current History. Je. '36. p. 25-6.*

Altho Canada has full Dominion status and has individual membership within the League of Nations, it is generally agreed that participation in war by Great Britain would require the Dominion to intern enemy ships, to abstain from trade with the enemy and to cooperate with the British navy. Being thus a belligerent technically, it might be difficult for Canada to refrain from direct participation.

Confronted with great lack of unity internally and uncertain imperial obligations, the Dominion is anxiously debating her future, while imitating us in trying to dodge the issue. What will her policy be? An attempt to follow the United States in a program of isolation by a declaration of neutrality? Recognition of the bonds of empire and the demands which loyalty would make upon her foreign policy? Or the adoption of a formula of collective security based upon the desire to defend democracy against fascism? *Ryllis and Omar Goslin. Scholastic. O. 22, '38. p. 28S.*

One of the major aspects of the current South American scene is the campaign for economic and political penetration of the continent by the three great "outlaw" nations of the modern world—"outlaw" being used simply to connote imperialistic adventure in defiance of the treaties and other instruments of the post-World War status quo.

Ever since the first important overturn of the status quo appercart, by Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931, Germany, Japan and Italy—in the order named—have been exceedingly active in South America, altho Germany did not begin operations until after the triumph of Hitler in 1933. So far, sufficient success has not been achieved by any of these powers to justify alarm in either South or North American quarters, but neither have developments been so negligible as not to warrant apprehension for the future. Germany in particular has made marked

strides in Brazil, and the general South American trend toward fascism creates a condition for rapport beyond the ideological with Berlin and Rome. *Wilbur Burton. Current History. N. '37. p. 54.*

The chief European opposition to the growth of Pan Americanism has not come from friends of the League. The opposition has come, instead, from two highly important sources. First, the European and Asiatic merchants who compete for the American market. These interests have been busy throwing cold water on the conference ever since it was called. They have used radio and newspaper propaganda to try to arouse Latin American suspicions as to the motives of the United States. But even though the European population of the Latin American countries is large, it is believed that President Roosevelt's "good neighbor" policy has made too many friends to give their efforts much success.

Secondly, a force which tends to hamper cordial United States-Latin American relations is the "battle of ideas" which, far from being confined to Europe, is sweeping thru the entire world today—the bitter struggle between Communism and Fascism. Because of this struggle and the fact that advocates of these irreconcilable doctrines are actively propagandising for followers in South America as elsewhere, some observers see the present conference as a crucial test of whether or not Latin Americans will turn their backs on both extremes and look to the United States for a democratic, middle-of-the-road solution to political and economic problems. *Arthur Gorman. Scholastic. D. 12, '36. p. 4.*

If an outsider attacks Canada or one of the 21 American republics, the first attack probably will be by sea. The navies of this hemisphere would be the first line of defense.



For all their vast area and population, the other countries in this hemisphere have only one fighting vessel for every seven that the United States possesses. The American defense program now under way will rapidly widen this gap.

The following table, based on latest official figures, shows naval strength of the 22 nations in this hemisphere with and without the United States:

	With U. S.	Without U. S.
Battleships .....	24	5
Destroyers .....	283	34
Cruisers .....	54	14
Submarines .....	126	20

Two-thirds of Latin American countries have no navy at all. Many of the war vessels below the Rio Grande date from Spanish-American war days.

Military and naval experts expect that the second line of defense, in case of outside aggression in this hemisphere, would be the air force.

Combined air fleets of all other countries to the north and south of the United States total less than 600 air-planes, mostly antiquated and unfit for modern warfare.

The United States, on the other hand, has about 3,000 military planes, not all up to date. Many more are scheduled to be built.

The final line of defense in case of war to the finish with some invader would be the army. Here the combined strength of active and trained reserve forces totals almost two million men, including the United States Army. The United States army accounts for only one-half million of this total. *United States News. O. 31, '38. p. 3.*

We in the Americas are no longer in a far-away continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. Instead, we

in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every general staff beyond the seas.

The vast amount of our resources, the vigor of our commerce, and the strength of our men, have made us vital factors in world peace, whether we choose or not.

Happily, you and we, in friendship and in entire understanding, can look clear-eyed at these possibilities, resolving to leave no pathway unexplored and no technique undeveloped, which may, if our hopes are realized, contribute to the peace of the world. Even if those hopes are disappointed, we can assure each other that this hemisphere at least shall remain a strong citadel wherein civilization can flourish unimpaired.

The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.

We as good neighbors are true friends because we maintain our own rights with frankness, because we refuse to accept the twists of secret diplomacy, because we settle our disputes by consultation, and because we discuss our common problems in the spirit of the common good. We seek to be scrupulously fair and helpful, not only in our relations with each other, but each of us at home in our relations with our own people. *President Franklin D. Roosevelt. From address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. August 18, 1938.*

Suppose events develop rapidly along two lines: the dictator finds himself more and more opposed by democratic or leftist organizations; at the same time, Germany and Italy increase their propaganda, accompanied by intrigue with the dictator. (Note the recent case of Austria, as illustrating the means of preparation for invasion which takes place without a shot.) When he finally faces

a crisis and is madly grasping for any aid that will help him to keep his seat, he may easily accept such aid from one of the oversea fascist powers, which in the meantime has used its own nationals and agents within the American country to prepare the ground.

If this were to take the form of out-and-out military help, and as a reward either of these countries were given a slice of Brazilian territory or anything else which clearly limited the sovereignty of Brazil and tied her definitely in a political way to a European state, a grave situation would present itself to the American countries.

The protection of the Panama Canal has always been considered as vital to our very life. If a non-American nation, in these days of modern bombing planes and swift submarines, secured a hold near the border of the United States, a still graver problem would be presented to this country. This problem is particularly acute in Central America now, because Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador and Nicaragua are supposed to have a common understanding to protect one another against "communitistic influences." *Samuel Guy Inman. "Democracy Versus the Totalitarian State in Latin America." p. 4-6. American Academy of Political and Social Science. '38.*

The more recent development of the Monroe Doctrine has been humorously described as the "new streamlined Monroe Doctrine, the continentalized, Pan Americanized, multi-lateralized Monroe Doctrine." Even so, the jest contains much of the truth about the new application of the foremost foreign policy of the United States.

Our Latin American friends have gained much in the way of security, protection, independence, and freedom from the need of huge navies and standing armies thru the application of the Monroe Doctrine in its original form, unilateral though it was. Let it also be said that the United States, while taking a certain risk of war and defense, realized great benefits from it as well.

The later applications of the Doctrine have not been so fortunate, from the standpoint of both our Latin American friends and the United States. Departures from non-intervention, and from *defacto* recognition, easily justified from a unilateral interpretation of international law, have nevertheless occasioned a certain distrust on the part of the nations to the South as regards our professions of friendship, viewed in the light of some of our official actions. It has been said that we speak in words of cooperation, under a profession of "Pan Americanism," while we act singly and selfishly under a declaration of the Monroe policy. Can these policies be harmonized?

An attempt to do so has at last been made, and should receive the encouragement of all countries of this hemisphere. If a policy which is for the good of all, can be interpreted, declared, and applied by all, most of the objections made against the Doctrine will be removed. Doubtless this can be done in most instances. Should an emergency develop threatening the independence and integrity of one or more of the nations of this hemisphere, even unilateral action would be welcomed, provided its objective is expressly limited to the purposes of the Doctrine as stated by President Monroe. The dissatisfaction with the Doctrine has not concerned its original purpose, but has arisen from later interpretations, and aggressive action based on such interpretations.

The recent effort may fail. But it is worth a trial—a forth-right and sincere trial—by all members of the American family of nations. *Charles E. Martin. World Order. O. '38. p. 255-6.*

The troubled state of the world today, the unpredictable nature of the new forces at work, would make complacency both inappropriate and dangerous. Whether we like it or not, we live in an age of political and social turmoil. Ominous storm clouds overhang many parts

of the world today. We must continually and unremittingly use the full strength of our continental solidarity to advance the cause of peace and to improve the welfare of our peoples, in so far as that is possible thru international efforts. If we in the western hemisphere can persevere and succeed, we can make a vitally important contribution to world peace.

We can do this, I believe, because the influence of this hemisphere is completely disinterested. We wish to live and let live. We covet no man's land or property. Our influence can therefore be exerted without ulterior motive in favor of the causes we hold most precious, and which we feel are essential to the preservation of our civilization. I believe we would be shirking our responsibility if we did not continuously strive toward these ends. Thru devotion to peace, in principle and in deed, our countries can properly exert an urgently needed stabilizing influence in a world which is woefully in need of sanity and balance.

Whatever we of the American republics have accomplished in recent years has been the result of the best kind of cooperation. I fervently hope that this sort of cooperation may continue in the future and that it will help us all to achieve to the fullest the results for which we are striving to the best of our ability.

Our road is not an easy one; it is beset with every conceivable kind of obstacle. We must patiently endeavor to surmount these obstacles and persevere in our determination that relations among the nations shall be regulated by the rule of the good friend and the good neighbor. Let us continue to follow this rule in all of our dealings with each other and with all other nations ready and willing to adopt it as the guiding principle of their policy and action. *Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Address. Ap. 14, '37.*

One of the most potent causes of war is the desire of private firms to make a profit by selling armaments to their own and other countries. The United States has lately been considering the question of how to take the profits out of war. Far more important even than this, however, is the need to take the profits out of preparation for war. The war that has just ended between Bolivia and Paraguay would never have been possible if it had not been for the copious supply of munitions that was sent indiscriminately to each country by private armament firms in Europe and America, which had no interest whatever in the war except the making of profit. A convention which could prevent such a state of thing would be of the utmost benefit to all.

The Buenos Aires conference might well consider the possibility, first, of preventing the import of arms into any part of America from outside, and second, of putting a stop to the passage of arms from any one country in America to another. If the trade in arms could be stopped in one part of the world, every other country, in Europe and elsewhere, would heave a sigh of relief.

Another important contribution that might be made to world peace by the conference is the investigation of the possibility of withholding all supplies of essential minerals and raw materials produced on the American continent from a nation that is declared to be an aggressor. Any action along this line would have to be concerted if it were to prove successful, and it would be necessary to work out in detail the best method for putting it into effect. The preliminary steps could, however, be taken at the conference.

But perhaps the most interesting possibility of all is the question of whether or not the nations of America could form among themselves a continental "police force" that would keep law and order thruout the entire continent of North and South America. Such a force might

be made up of contingents from every country in America. It might be stationed, say, in three zones—north, central and south—or it might, on the other hand, concentrate all its strength in that part of the continent where it was considered most likely that war might break out. On the outbreak of war, it would then take action against whichever country had been declared to be the aggressor.

There are indeed infinite possibilities for good which may come out of the Pan-American Conference. It is to be hoped that wise counsels will prevail, and that the conference will avoid any course that may weaken the efforts being made in other parts of the world to build up a peace system, and that it will rather add to those efforts a distinctive contribution of its own. *Major Clement R. Atlee. Christian Science Monitor. Weekly Magazine Section. My. 13, '36. p. 2.*

The six years preceding President Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration witnessed no fewer than five definite reversals of policies of the United States with reference to Latin America. First: The United States has in several instances permitted Caribbean countries to establish governments that are representative of majority political elements, even though anti-American in attitude, whereas, formerly, minority governments in those countries had either been maintained by United States Marines, or thru the influence of United States recognition and moral support. Second: the United States government has since 1928 served notice to American investors in certain Latin American countries that in the future they must look for the redress of alleged wrongs, at least in first instance, to the courts of the country where their investments are located, and also, that they must be willing to arbitrate their claims in case the alleged offending government is willing to do so. Third: the United States has stripped from the so-called Monroe

Doctrine of yesterday all of its historic corollaries and, in so doing, has, in effect, reaffirmed the original Monroe Doctrine of 1923, by declaring it to be "a declaration of the United States versus Europe, not of the United States versus Latin America." Fourth: the United States has, except where prevented by treaty obligations, reverted to the historic and traditional national policy of according recognition to *de facto* Latin American governments, irrespective of whether they were established by revolutions or *coupe d'etat*. Fifth: the United States government in mid-April, 1931, reversed a well-established policy with reference to the protection of its nationals in Nicaragua and Honduras when notice was served upon them that the United States government would not undertake to protect with armed forces its nationals in Nicaragua from acts of banditry or those in Honduras from the result of "a revolutionary movement against the Honduran government," unless, in each case the endangered nationals should withdraw from the country, or at least to the coast towns, whence they can be protected or evacuated, in case of necessity.

The "newest deal" was played at the Montevideo Conference with the laying of five great bases of Pan Americanism. They are: First, free and open discussion at international conferences of any topic of general interest, second, the disavowal by the United States of any intention to act as an agency for the collection of debts; third, the agreement to discuss tariffs as an international question; fourth, the general endorsement of all existing peace machinery and the willingness to unite behind whatever peace agency may be best fitted to obtain peace in a given dispute; and fifth, and most important of all, the unanimous and enthusiastic endorsement of the principle that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal and external affairs of another." As a result one can dare to hope that if we follow the paths marked out into a new Pan Americanism at Montevideo,



then we may have a unity on this American continent that we had not dared to hope for before, and, having found that unity on the American continent, we may be able to direct the whole world into a new unity. *Charles W. Hackett. Institute of Public Affairs, Univ. of Va. Jl. 2, '35.*

The question now arises, do we stand at the beginning of a new epoch in Pan-American relations? Will the Pan-American movement become one of the guiding forces in world politics during the coming years and decades. Issues of the utmost importance are at stake. Europe prepares for war. An armed clash in the Far East appears almost inevitable. Looking towards Asia on the one side, and Europe and Africa on the other, as Bolivar did when he issued the invitations to the Panama Congress, the American statesmen are confronted with the problem of what America's attitude shall be toward a coming world struggle which may arise a few months or a few years hence, embroiling all Europe and large parts of Asia. Will it be possible for the New World to steer clear of the storms ahead, or at least to enter them with its own affairs in order and with the possibilities of inter-American trouble eliminated? The task is a gigantic one. Many obstacles, it is true, have been removed during the past few years from the way of a Pan-American understanding. Much distrust nourished in Latin America against the United States has been dispelled by the new American policy which is characterized by the word: non-intervention. But all conventional means of diplomacy and foreign policy may not prove capable of mastering the problems ahead. A future war in Europe and Asia, if or when it comes, will not only be a war between nations, between national politico-economic units, between empires and races, but also a war between creeds, religions and philosophies, fought probably within individual nations. Already the

skirmish of the Spanish struggle and the possible effects of its outcome also on Latin America may serve as a slight hint of what the future problems of inter-American peace preservation may be.

Do we have the faintest conception of what, for instance, an overthrow of fascism in Italy might mean for the fate of the Church in that country, and what the repercussions of such events in other Catholic countries would be? Do we have the faintest conception of how India, Australia or Canada might be affected by a war into which England, with or against her will, might be drawn in the not too distant future, and how events of this size would affect the American continent? It may be wrong, or at least premature, to interpret world events as leading to the closer cementing together of continents. But the political observer cannot fail to notice strong forces at work in Europe and Eastern Asia endeavoring to overcome the narrow boundaries of national imperialism, and making for broader supernational, regional or continental units. It is towards this background, determined by historical forces whose effects on world politics we comprehend only vaguely at present, that we must try to understand the Pan-American movement.

The countries on both sides of the Atlantic form together that unit called "the West." The western world is a concept signifying a unit of life, of feeling and thinking, of artistic and technical creation—a "soul," a culture in its morphological development thru all its inescapable stages. Western culture is an organic concept, older, broader and superior to that of any national culture. Does the cementing of American continental unity mean a step in the direction of strengthening this cultural unity politically and economically, or a step in the direction of breaking western culture in two parts, developing more and more independently from each other? *Fritz Ermarth. International Law and Relations. D. 5, '36. p. 1-10.*

The question may be raised as to what attitude this country would take if confronted with a breakdown of law and order in any country of this hemisphere. Contemplating that contingency, the President has said:

It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their joint concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.

Second, the government is endeavoring to improve and extend the trade relations, principally thru the medium of the trade-agreements program. The United States has negotiated agreements with nine of the twenty countries.

Third, the United States has ratified every one of the ten inter-American peace treaties. This machinery has been constructed little by little as experience and need have shown desirable. The prestige and influence which this body of international law is acquiring is revealed by the rapidity with which a direct settlement was arrived at between the Dominican Republic and Haiti after the latter had invoked one of the important peace instruments.

Fourth, the United States has ratified the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablishment of Peace adopted at the Buenos Aires Conference, which provides for consultation "in the event that the peace of the American republics is menaced." Moreover, in the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, the American republics stated: "That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation" provided for in the Convention just mentioned. This government stands ready to consult at the moment that any country on this hemisphere requests consultation in the belief that there exists a threat to the peace

of the Americas. The Convention and the Declaration of necessity could not precisely define what constitutes a threat to the peace of the Americas. A threat probably would include the attempt at the use of armed force against any country of this hemisphere by any foreign power. However, a threat might also be considered to include many other actions, however veiled they might be.

Fifth, if there is to be real understanding between this country and the other American countries, it is essential that our people thru education come to an appreciation of the many aspects of life and culture in the other American republics, and in turn that these countries develop an appreciation of the nonmaterial aspects of the civilization that is in process of dynamic development in the United States. The Department of State is now giving careful study to the ways in which it can interest and cooperate with private organizations in this important work.

In the good neighbor policy, this government believes that it is contributing its share toward the improvement of international relationships on this hemisphere. The general acceptance and support of this policy by the nations of the New World is the most convincing testimony of the soundness and broad applicability of its principles that could be adduced. Indeed, no higher plane of international relationships can be conceived than one of fair play, equity, mutual accommodation, and mutual trust. It is superfluous to mention that departure from this plane by any country at any time presents large difficulties for the other countries, who recognize that not only their own particular advantage but the welfare of all is advanced by conducting their relations on that plane. There may have existed a day when a country could go its own way without greatly affecting the destinies of other countries, but if that day ever existed,

it has now passed. Our present civilization is characterized by the interdependence of peoples and nations, and it is therefore more than ever desirable that some common and satisfactory basis for the conduct of international relationships be found. It is my belief that the good neighbor policy provides that basis. *Lawrence Duggan. Annals of the American Academy. Jl. '38. p. 131-2.*

## AFFIRMATIVE DISCUSSION

### CAN THE NEW WORLD HELP THE OLD AVOID WAR?<sup>1</sup>

You who assemble today carry with you in your deliberations the hopes of millions of human beings in other less fortunate lands. Beyond the ocean we see continents rent asunder by old hatreds and new fanaticism. We hear the demand that injustice and inequality be corrected by resorting to the sword and not by resorting to reason and peaceful justice. We hear the cry that new markets can be achieved only thru conquest. We read that the sanctity of treaties between nations is disregarded.

We know, too, that vast armaments are rising on every side and that the work of creating them employs men and women by the millions. It is natural, however, for us to conclude that such employment is false employment, that it builds no permanent structures and creates no consumers' goods for the maintenance of a lasting prosperity. We know that nations guilty of these follies inevitably face the day either when their weapons of destruction must be used against their neighbors or when an unsound economy like a house of cards will fall apart.

In either case, even though the Americas become involved in no war, we must suffer, too. The madness of a great war in other parts of the world would affect us and threaten our good in a hundred ways. And the economic collapse of any nation or nations must of necessity harm our own prosperity.

<sup>1</sup> From address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Buenos Aires Conference, December 1, 1936. *Vital Speeches*, 3:130-2, December 15, 1936.

Can we, the republics of the New World, help the Old World to avert the catastrophe which impends? Yes, I am confident that we can.

First, it is our duty by every honorable means to prevent any future war among ourselves. This can best be done thru the strengthening of the processes of constitutional democratic government—to make these processes conform to the modern need for unity and efficiency and, at the same time, preserve the individual liberties of our citizens. By so doing the people of our nations, unlike the people of many nations who live under other forms of government, can and will insist on their intention to live in peace. Thus will democratic government be justified thruout the world.

In the determination to live at peace among ourselves in the Americas make it at the same time clear that we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that others who, driven by war madness or land hunger, might seek to commit acts of aggression against us, will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good. I repeat what I said in speaking before the Congress and the Supreme Court of Brazil:

Each one of us has learned the glories of interdependence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.

Secondly, and in addition to the perfecting of the mechanism of peace, we can strive even more strongly than in the past to prevent the creation of those conditions which give rise to war. Lack of social or political justice within the borders of any nation is always cause for concern. Thru democratic processes we can strive to achieve for the Americas the highest possible standard of living conditions for all our people.

Men and women blessed with political freedom, willing to work and able to find work, rich enough to maintain their families and to educate their children, contented

with their lot in life and on terms of friendship with their neighbors, will defend themselves to the utmost but will never consent to take up arms for a war of conquest.

Interwoven with these problems is the further self-evident fact that the welfare and prosperity of each of our nations depends in large part on the benefits derived from commerce among themselves and with other nations, for our present civilization rests on the basis of an international exchange of commodities. Every nation of the world has felt the evil effects of recent efforts to erect trade barriers of every known kind. Every individual citizen has suffered from them.

It is no accident that the nations which have carried this process furthest are those which proclaim most loudly that they require war as an instrument of their policy. It is no accident that attempts to be self-sufficient have led to falling standards for their people and to ever-increasing loss of the democratic ideals in a mad race to pile armament on armament. It is no accident that because of these suicidal policies and the suffering attending them many of their people have come to believe with despair that the price of war seems less than the price of peace.

This state of affairs we must refuse to accept with every instinct of defense, with every exhortation of enthusiastic hope, with every use of mind and skill.

I cannot refrain here from reiterating my gratification that in this, as in so many other achievements, the American republics have given a salutary example to the world.

The resolution adopted at the Inter-American Conference at Montevideo endorsing the principles of liberal trade policies has shone forth like a beacon in the storm of economic madness which has been sweeping over the entire world during these later years.

Truly, if the principles there embodied find still wider applications in your deliberations, it would be a notable contribution to the cause of peace. For my own part I



have done all in my power to sustain the consistent efforts of my Secretary of State in negotiating agreements for reciprocal trade, and even though the individual results may seem small, the total of them is significant. These policies in recent weeks have received the approval of the people of the United States, and they have, I am sure, the sympathy of the other nations here assembled.

There are many other causes for war—among them, long festering feuds, unsettled frontiers, territorial rivalries; but these sources of danger which still exist in the Americas, I am thankful to say, are not only few in number but already on the way to peaceful adjudication.

While the settlement of such controversies may necessarily involve adjustments at home or in our relations with our neighbors which may appear to involve material sacrifice, let no man or woman forget that there is no profit in war. Sacrifices in the cause of peace are infinitely small compared with the holocaust of war.

Peace comes from the spirit, and must be grounded in faith. In seeking peace, perhaps we can best begin by proudly affirming the faith of the Americas; the faith in freedom and its fulfillment which has proved a mighty fortress beyond reach of successful attack in half of the world.

That faith arises from a common hope and a common design given us by our fathers in differing form, but with a single aim—freedom and security of the individual, which has become the foundation of our peace.

If, then, by making war in our midst impossible, and if within ourselves and among ourselves we can give greater freedom and fulfillment to the individual lives of our citizens, the democratic form of representative government will have justified the high hopes of the liberating fathers. Democracy is still the hope of the world. If we in our generation can continue its successful applications in the Americas, it will spread and supersede

other methods by which men are governed and which seem to most of us to run counter to our ideals of human liberty and human progress.

Three centuries of history sowed the seeds which grew into our nations; the fourth century saw those nations become equal and free and brought us to a common system of constitutional government; the fifth century is giving to us a common meeting ground of mutual help and understanding. Our hemisphere has at last come of age. We are here assembled to show it united to the world. We took from our ancestors a great dream. We here offer it back as a great unified reality.

#### AMERICAN LEAGUE OF NATIONS \*

Space does not permit any detailed examination of all the similarities and differences existing between the Pan American Union and the League of Nations; but a comparative study of the institutions will show that the real, the essential, the fundamental difference between them lies in the fact that while the Pan American Union is absolutely non-political and confines its executive activity to economic, administrative, commercial, humanitarian, intellectual and social endeavors, the League is primarily a political organization. The most important functions with which the Council of the League is vested are aimed at the enforcement of peace and the maintenance of the situation created by the treaties which ended the World War. Such functions must needs be essentially political.

The conclusion is therefore that what is really meant by the proposal of an American Association or League of Nations is to convert our present non-political union into a political organization.

\* From article by Ricardo J. Alfaro, Former President of the Republic of Panama. *World Affairs*, 101:158-65, September, 1938.

The governments that have brought forward the momentous problem of the organization of an American Association of Nations have been animated not by superficial considerations, but by deep sentiments of American brotherliness, by an intense love of peace, by a sincere conviction that if the present association of the states of the continent is to grow closer, in accordance with the consistent and general desire expressed in them, then it must assume the form of an association operating thru organizations clothed with political powers.

When the illustrious President of Columbia, Dr. Alfonso Lopez, visited Washington in June, 1934, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union held a session in his honor, and on that solemn occasion President Lopez said: "It must be my greatest satisfaction if this tribute, for which I am so greatly indebted to the Governing Board, should give rise to a new call to the belligerents of the Chaco war, made jointly by all the members of the Pan American Union, to bring to an end the international tragedy which burdens the conscience of the continent." Much as the members of the Board shared the feelings of their peace-loving guest, they found with sincere regret that in accordance with the agreements in force they were inhibited from making jointly and officially a call that could be interpreted as an attempt to exercise the political function of international mediation or conciliation.

The underlying thought of the Colombian project is that the actions of the Geneva League, which have aroused such general dissatisfaction at times, require, for the League's own prestige and future, that a regional association, unifying the sentiment and will of the American continent may become a greater force in the deliberations of the whole world. Expounding the policy of President Lopez, the Colombian Foreign Minister, Dr. Soto del Corral, said at Buenos Aires:

The insistence of Colombia upon the creation of an Association of American Nations is precisely a reaction favoring

the Universal League. Our aim had its immediate origin in the League's own defects, observed with close attention and increasing concern by my government, which could not accept with resignation that successive failures of the noble peace agency, inflicted by those who look upon it with suspicion or animosity, should continue to push it to a loss of prestige capable of affecting not only the organ itself but its juridical and ethical foundations. Colombia has proposed, as a topic for discussion by the Inter-American Peace Conference, the organization of an American regional association which will cooperate with the Geneva association. Without a spirit of presumptuousness we can declare that this group of nations which heretofore have been mere spectators in the League, may become its saviours, for we cannot fail to see that if they should withdraw, they would become its gravediggers.

This idea of our continent acting as a universal force for peace is entirely in harmony with the thought expressed by President Wilson in 1916, when in proposing the outline of an American association of nations, he ended his address with this prayer: "God grant that it may be granted to America to lift this light on high for the illumination of the world."

In corroboration of what I said in an address on the same subject in 1933, the opinion was also expressed within the conference, that as a matter of fact an association of nations already exists in America, and that the proposed covenant contemplates only a change of form. As remarked by the eloquent Dr. Antuña, Delegate of Uruguay.

For reasons of general psychology, not easily interpreted outside America, we, the American countries, have always been federated. America has always tended toward federalism in the international sense, toward the interlocking bonds of solidarity, from the first hour of her political organization. We have our continental organ. It is the Pan American Union. But we must perhaps perfect it, overhaul it, in its foundations, in its operation and in its economics.

Inasmuch as it is recognized that in fact an association of American nations exists already, and it is recognized also that the new covenants which have been proposed will constitute only a change of form, which of course is a change from the non-political to the political

form, it is desirable to examine what causes there are for such a change and the possible effects it may have in the American continent.

Looking into the immediate antecedents of the proposed American league, we find that the purpose for which the Geneva League was invested with political powers were the following: 1. The administration of certain territories, such as the Saar Basin and the Free City of Danzig. 2. The government by mandates of certain countries or peoples classified as not fit for self government. 3. The protection of racial or religious minorities. 4. The investigation by the Council of the League of the conditions stipulated in the Versailles Treaty regarding armaments, including the power to search. 5. The application of sanctions, including the use of force, to covenant-breaking states; and, 6. Conciliation.

The mere enunciation of these purposes suffices to show that with the single exception of conciliation, they have no place in the political life of the western hemisphere. We do not have in America territories calling for a special administration. We have no countries in need of a mandate regime. Neither do we have racial or religious minorities in need of foreign or international protection. And finally, the power of investigation and search by the Council of the League, in connection with armaments, is a post-war requirement which evidently is extraneous to conditions in the New World. Furthermore, recent European history has taught us in what manner and with what results the political powers of the League have been used in connection with sanctions, armaments, and the preservation of the situation created by the Versailles Treaty.

Thus, conciliation and the prevention of war, including the question of collective security and of sanctions against aggressor nations, remains as the sole purpose for which the use of political power would seem to be desirable in inter-American relations.

Therefore, the whole question boils down to this: whether it is sufficient for the purpose of securing peace to concentrate the use of political powers in bodies charged with the conduct and activities relative to collective security and continental peace, or whether it is necessary to give a political structure to the whole system of international relationships.

This is the crucial question and the one that deserves attention, because there is always danger of rivalries, prejudice, suspicion, jealousy and national selfishness whenever nations have to sit around a table and discuss political issues and vital interests. The example of the League of Nations is not encouraging. The League aims at being universal, yet, for political reasons it is, and has been, incomplete. Today, five nations which are among the greatest in the world are out of the League: the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Brazil. And at different times and for different reasons Russia, Turkey, Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Paraguay and some others have been kept out or have withdrawn from the League. The result is that, being out of the League for political reasons, many nations fail to participate in the humanitarian, social, intellectual, economical and technical work of the League, which is admirable and worthy of the utmost support. Now, it would be most deplorable if the Pan American Union, which has always been complete, should have to suffer in the future similar disintegration in case of any differences arising within its membership by reason of the exercise of political powers in the delicate political questions that might come up between them if they were organized as a league after the Geneva pattern.

There is no question but that the nations of America have built up since 1889 a splendid system of cooperation and rapprochement, and of economic, commercial, financial, statistical, cultural, humanitarian and social

relationships. Perhaps it is safe to aver that such work has been smooth because it has been non-political and that its present and future success might be compromised if it had to be carried on by a political body. I believe that the experience gained by the League of Nations and by the Pan American Union shows that perhaps the best solution of the problem of international life in America, in case a political association is formed, would be to maintain two distinct and independent sets of relationships: the political and the non-political. The latter would comprise the field of activities carried out at present by the Pan American Union. The former would be created by means of special covenants setting up new organisms the function of which would be to bring about a closer association of the American republics and to put into operation the methods of assuring peace, security and justice. Such covenants might embrace all such questions as the pacific settlement of conflicts, the creation and functioning of an American Court of International Justice, the creation of an inter-American Board of Conciliation, the solidarity of the continent in case of aggression by an extra-continental power, the enforcement of peace in inter-American conflicts, neutrality, sanctions, definition of the aggressor and all kindred questions.

It has been apparent for many years, and now it has been made evident at the Buenos Aires parley, that it will not be possible to obtain the consensus of all the nations of America for the conclusion of treaties dealing with these subjects. It has been clearly shown that there are a number of states that will not be parties to a treaty creating an American League or constituting an American Court of International Justice; that perhaps the same thing is true with regard to a treaty placing continental solidarity upon a conventional basis and that in this matter there is such a wide divergence of views as to its scope, that if a treaty is signed at all, it would

have to contain great concessions from those nations who aspire to a maximum solidarity, tantamount to a defensive alliance, to those who would or could only agree on a minimum of international commitments.

### UNITY OF AMERICAS AGAINST ASSAULT<sup>3</sup>

The world situation today makes it necessary as never before that there should not exist between the American republics any shadow of misunderstanding or suspicion in their common relations, and that the difficulties which may still exist between some of them be solved in that spirit of friendly tolerance, and of mutual forbearance, which I am glad to say is becoming proverbial in our inter-American life.

The preservation of peace, the revitalization of international law, the settlement thru pacific negotiation of international differences, the removal of trade barriers and equality of commercial opportunity among nations are all of them fundamentals of inter-American policy. These fundamentals must be understood and supported by a strong public opinion not only as abstract principles but in practical application if they are to become an effective force in assuring peaceful and understanding relations among our nations.

At a time of great crisis not many weeks ago, a practical demonstration was given to the world of the great moral force that can be exercised by public opinion. The unanimous appeal of the twenty-one American republics for the maintenance of peace in Europe cannot be overestimated in its effect.

The American republics today are bound more closely together by understanding and by identity of purpose than they have ever been in their history, but that rela-

<sup>3</sup> From radio address of Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State, November 6, 1938. *New York Times*. November 7, 1938.



tionship is clearly something that by its very nature cannot remain static. It requires the will for betterment, for enhancement, for perfection, not only on the part of the governments of our republics, but on the part of the twenty-one American peoples to whom their governments are responsive.

On this continent we have had an exceptional opportunity to establish an order based upon justice and upon law, and it is clear to all of us that we are making progress in taking advantage of that opportunity.

Permanent peace will come only when nations observe the sanctity of the pledged word, when they refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, when they settle their disputes by peaceful means, when they make necessary adjustments and revisions of treaties and agreements in a spirit of equity, rather than by the use of force or the threat of force, and when all nations respect the just rights of others in the same measure in which they expect their own just rights to be observed.

We in the Americas still have much to do to carry out and to perfect the implementation of these principles, but we can also take heart from a most encouraging record of accomplishment. The action taken at the Inter-American Conferences in Montevideo in 1933 and at Buenos Aires in 1936 resulted in the perfection and strengthening of our peace machinery and in the reassertion of the application of the principles of equality of treatment and fair dealing among nations.

The American republics have assumed many obligations under a series of treaties and conventions which govern certain phases of their relations with each other, and they have established an enviable record in the observance of those obligations.

They accept the principle of the pacific settlement of international differences and have loyally and repeatedly observed that principle in practice and only recently—

and I refer, of course, to the settlement of the Chaco dispute—they have successfully demonstrated that even in international disputes which have culminated in armed strife, the will for pacific negotiation, facilitated and encouraged by impartial and friendly neighbors, can result in a fair and just peace and a peace which has not been imposed but one which has been freely negotiated.

Our own government is giving constant and increasing attention to a broad program of inter-American cooperation. All of the interested governmental departments and agencies are contributing to this effort. We are fully alive to the natural ties and mutual interests existing among the American republics and we are making every effort to strengthen those ties and to develop those interests. Specific projects dealing with many subjects in the economic, financial, social, and educational fields are under study and will be carried out as expeditiously as possible.

The other American nations show the same interest and desire for such healthy cooperation as is shown here in the United States.

The system of consultation and cooperation which crystallized in such an initially satisfactory form in the last Inter-American Conference at Buenos Aires indicates, I believe, the course which we must pursue in our inter-American relations in order to achieve the objectives we have set for ourselves. It has already been proved good in practice. It holds even greater promise for the future.

That it be strengthened and upheld is of vital importance to every one of our nations. Our respective freedom, independence and future welfare may depend upon our continued solidarity. Just two years ago the American republics in a joint declaration unanimously proclaimed that any threat to the peace of any one of

the American republics was a threat to the peace of all of them and justified immediate consultation between them all.

Not only the physical integrity of the nations of the New World, but the security of the individual rights and liberties of their citizens, may also depend upon the maintenance of that relationship.

At this epoch in the history of the world, the doctrine of hatred is threatening civilization. You can see it extending its influence month by month, day by day, as its shadow darkens more and more the face of the earth.

How can there be peace in the world, as the President said the other night, if the reign of law is to be replaced by the recurrent sanctification of sheer force; if national policies adopt as a deliberate instrument the dispersion all over the world of millions of helpless and persecuted wanderers with no place to lay their heads; if men and women are not free to think their own thoughts, to express their own feelings, to worship God?

As a nation we will assure ourselves that we are in a position to defend ourselves from all aggression from whatever source it may arise, and to be prepared to join with our fellow-democracies of the New World in preserving the western hemisphere safe from any threat of attack.

But the nations of the New World can do still more; they can guard and maintain inviolate the freedom of men's souls and intellects by the preservation and strengthening of the spirit of tolerance and the democratic institutions which are instinct in the national lives of every one of our twenty-one nations, and thru such example and thru their continued close cooperation they can greatly aid in the establishment of a better world order.

## ARE THE AMERICAS SAFE? \*

"Let no one imagine," said President Roosevelt alluding in his Chicago speech a few weeks ago to the present state of international terror and the threat of a world war, "that this western hemisphere will not be attacked."

Take a look at a map of the hemisphere. The naval strength of the United States certainly does not invite attack upon the northern half, except perhaps upon its Achillean heel—the Panama Canal. It is the southern half—South America—that is the more vulnerable of the two, and the more inviting. Did President Roosevelt have South America in mind when he uttered that warning?

Whether he did or not, it is a fact that the great powers that are doing all the international bullying today, are maneuvering into position in that continent, not only as the greatest potential market of the century, but as a possible scene of warfare. The parvenu imperialist nations—Italy, Germany, Japan—are jockeying for advantage in South America, evidently in anticipation of the impending duel, and the United States, with vital economic interest there, is facing the challenge.

At first sight South America seems far removed from European wrangling. But when you realize that most of the western nations of Europe could not wage a long war without the help of South-American supplies and that the South-American market is one of the largest aims in a struggle for economic world supremacy, that part of the western hemisphere appears dangerously nearer to European events. America, north and south, fed Europe and the European armies right thru the World War and supplied them with munitions. South-

\* From article by Genaro Arbaiza, *Current History*. 47:29-34. December, 1937.

American raw materials and foodstuffs—especially Chilean nitrates and Argentine grains and meats—were perhaps as much of a factor in the Allies' victory as the help they received from the United States.

While no naval action took place in American territorial waters during that war, two significant sea battles were fought in South-American waters, not far from the markets where German enterprise had been displacing British commerce. Cradock's English squadron, ordered to the Chilean coast to attack German trade and protect the shipping of Chilean nitrates, was destroyed by Von Spee's German Pacific squadron off Coronel in November, 1914. England then rushed Sturdee to the lower latitudes of the Atlantic with the most powerful fleet ever sent there, and the British met and sunk Von Spee near the Falkland Islands, right off the tip of South America, the following December.

Up to the present time South America's exportable wealth has been under Anglo-American control. Great Britain and the United States are the largest investors there, their aggregate interest probably exceeding ten billion dollars or more than two thirds of the total foreign investments. They control the greater part of the machinery by which South America carries on her economic exchange with the rest of the world, and their combined sea power guards their immense stake in the continent. To be sure, they have been and are rivals in the market, but German, Italian and Japanese aggressive expansion has given them a common task—to preserve the present economic status quo in the territory.

Germany, Italy and Japan seem determined to break this dual control. However, the Anglo-American position is so strong that they have only one chance to break it, and that chance is war. In a war against Britain, and provided the challengers would break thru Gibraltar or prevent a blockade, Italy and Germany would seek two objectives as far as South America is concerned:

first, to cut off British communications with that continent across the southern Atlantic, which constitute one of Britain's vital food lines, if not the most vital of them; and second, to get food and other supplies for themselves. With Russia and most of the other great grain-producing countries closed to them—for there is hardly a doubt about the attitude of the United States, Canada and Australia in such a war,—Italy and Germany, even supposing they are able to get access to the Danubian grain fields, which may be devastated in a conflict after all, would have to turn to South America for food supplies in a long war. This is how a war for naval supremacy in the Mediterranean may eventually spread to the shores of South America, and also how it may bring the United States into the fight, for a British defeat in the Mediterranean would by no means be the end of British sea power, and in trying to get access to the South-American sources of supply any European power or combination of powers fighting England would only extend the war to this hemisphere.

What are Italy, Germany and Japan doing to supplant Great Britain and the United States in the South-American market, and to strengthen their own position for the event of war? Concretely, they are disputing inch by inch and with renewed vigor Anglo-American influence in trade. Italy and Germany are carrying on the most active propaganda that has been witnessed in South America since the Allies' campaign during the initial stages of the World War. They are also helping to organize apish fascist and nazi organizations in some of the southern republics. Lastly, they are gaining influence in South American military, naval and air establishments as suppliers of arms, and in one instance at least they have succeeded in securing a strategic foothold in the military establishment of one of those countries.

Altho Italy is far less formidable than Germany or even Japan as a trade competitor, she is the most presuming and daring of the three powers in their South-American drive, for she relies for support on the population of Italian extraction which is much larger than that of all the colonies of the Italian empire put together. Since the middle of the nineteenth century between five and six million Italians have crossed the sea to set up their tents in South America, and now the Italian strain is found probably in fifteen million or more. Fascist Italy has lined up a great number of them, particularly among the most influential, into a fighting force.

In the South-American commercial battlefield, Germany, Italy and Japan have waged a guerrilla war against their stronger rivals in almost every line, particularly since the British trade recession at the beginning of the Twenties and the American recession toward the end of the same decade. But they have won their most important gains since the crash. In 1929 the exports of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan to Latin America amounted to nearly 65 per cent of the total Latin-American imports. The Anglo-American share in that percentage was about 83 per cent, while the German, Italian and Japanese share did not exceed 17 per cent. In 1936, the Anglo-American share had gone down to 72 per cent while the German, Italian and Japanese share had climbed to 28 per cent. Centralization of foreign trade under government guidance, diplomatic action, cheaper prices, diligence in seeking and securing business, the German barter strategy and propaganda among their settled nationals were factors in the increase. It was in a counter move to stop the expansion of German trade in Brazil, that the United States granted that country a \$60,000,000 gold credit last July.

Propaganda is being carried on thru the press and in books, lectures, interviews and dispatches from Rome,

Berlin and Tokio. Fascist news, feature articles explaining the theory and philosophy of the totalitarian state, fascist illustrations and pictures of Mussolini and Hitler are flooding most of the South-American dailies. Fascist literature appeals to the "Latin" pride. Rome, with Mussolini, is at the head of a new civilization, a renaissance of the old and glorious Latin civilization that led the world before, and is to lead the world again. All the "Latin" peoples are to be organized into a great "cultural" league, according to Signor Nicola Pende, of the University of Rome, who publishes an appeal in the South-American press. He says that the league has already been joined by "half a million intellectuals thru South America," and at the present time Italian agents are making preparations for a "great international Latin cultural congress" which is to meet at Buenos Aires and which, "will place Rome," Signor Pende tells us, "by the unanimous vote of the Latin nations at the head of the Latin cultural world." Latin America is, of course, a province of the Latin world. This appeal appears in the pro-fascist *El Comercio*, the wealthiest paper of Lima, under the title "For the Cultural Empire of Fascist Italy."

With the help of the Catholic Church, Italian paid propaganda has completely bamboozled a large part of South American public opinion into a hostile attitude toward republican Spain, and a favorable attitude toward aggressive Italian policy in world affairs.

Fascist and Nazi groups and political parties have been formed in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and other countries, in most cases with the aid of Italian and German agents. Representative Meza in Santiago charged not long ago that German concerns are supporting the Chilean Nazi party financially, and the Aço Integralista Brasileira that claims a million Fascists in Brazil is said to have had the backing of the famous Count Matarazzo,



an Italian banker, and Egon Renner, Von Hartt and Hasenclever, German industrialists.

Red-hunting is now a favorite sport among tropical dictators, who invariably call their political enemies "communists." President Vargas of Brazil set out the other day to crush a "communist" revolt in the making, and found at Porto Alegre, as the first evidence of the conspiracy, a cargo of more than \$1,000,000 worth of arms and ammunition sent from Germany to Flores da Cunha, Governor of the Rio Grande do Sul and a formidable political enemy of Vargas. The arrangement was made thru Etzberger Brothers, a German concern. As no shipment of any kind, much less of munitions, can leave Germany without the supervision and approval of Nazi authorities, either Hitler has been helping the "communist" conspiracy or he has been taking a hand in overthrowing the dictator that had just signed a pact with the United States undertaking to stop the expansion of German trade in Brazil.

But the fascist powers' drive has not stopped at trade gains, press propaganda and the organization of mimetic fascism. It has gone further than that.

They are promoting the present armament boom among the South American republics, and they have been supplying arms to most of them. They are today making a determined effort to furnish them with warships at advantageous sale terms.

Mitsubishi, the Japanese naval constructors, have been particularly insistent in doing business with Brazil and Chile. Not long ago there was a report circulating in Brazil that Japan had offered the Brazilian government 200,000,000 yen worth of warships to be paid for half in coffee and half in cash over a ten-year period. More recently the Japanese submitted to the Brazilian Federal Trade Council a \$100,000,000 plan for the reorganization of the Brazilian merchant marine. Incidentally, the Japanese, who are very fond of fishing,

have been trying to secure fishing rights in the Galapagos, off the coast of Ecuador, a group of islands ideally located for any one who would wish to spoil the work of Goethals. Japan at the present time is bidding for the construction of two modern cruisers for Chile.

Germany is selling munitions to almost every country in South America. In many instances the Krupp and Rhine Metall Borsig wares are being exchanged for South American foodstuffs and raw materials, and it has been reported that Venezuela is negotiating with Germany for the construction of two destroyers. Some time ago the Nazi government awarded three scholarships for military training to officers of the Ecuadorean army, and the commercial agreement concluded last May between Germany and Colombia opens to Germany the door for oil investments in that country. Chile is buying bombing planes in Germany.

Italy has sold warships to Brazil and to Argentina and is marketing munitions and military aircraft thruout South America. Mussolini has sent aid and military missions to several countries, and he has offered scholarships in military academies to some of the South American governments. According to a recent report, the Italian government a few months ago offered Chile the two 10,000-ton cruisers Pola and Zara of the 1930 class, now in the Italian fleet, in exchange for Chilean nitrate and certain concessions.

And Italy has made the boldest move in this game by setting up an assembling factory of bombing planes on the west coast of South America. Last year the Peruvian government signed a contract with the Caproni aircraft company of Milan for the construction of a \$75,000 plant at Las Palmas, ten miles from Lima, and now the site of the largest hangar in South America with a total area of 7,000 square meters. The Italians are financing the deal against plane sales. Steel for the plant was made in Germany, and a German technical

director, Herr Von Stach Goltzheim, served as engineer in the construction.

The factory was finished a short while ago, and now is turning out and repairing Caproni planes, with which the Peruvian government has been abundantly supplied. Italians operate the plant under the direction of Aldo Bert, who was a lieutenant in the Italian air forces during the World War and is now a reserve captain under contract with the Caproni interests.

On a strategic point midway down the west of the continent, commanding communications with all countries bordering upon that coast and with landlocked Bolivia, Italy—using in Peru the same tactics she has used in Bulgaria, where the Caproni company has another plant—has secured a *piéd à terre* which is the biggest question mark about her intentions in the southern continent. This question mark still grows more in size when you become acquainted with some details of Italian plans for airline concessions over the South Atlantic. A few months ago General Pellegrini, director of Italian civil aviation concluded negotiations in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil for an airline linking Rome and South America via Gibraltar, Dakar, Natal (Brazil), Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo (Uruguay) and Buenos Aires (Argentina). The amusing thing about this is that the Savoia Marchetti seaplanes put thru trials for the purpose are of the bomber types.

#### EUROPE VERSUS THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA <sup>5</sup>

The United States, the one country apart from the South American nations themselves which ultimately will suffer most from the establishment of these new

<sup>5</sup> From article by Gaston Nerval, *pseud.* of R. Diez de Medina, of Bolivia. *Foreign Affairs.* 15:636-45. July, 1937.

and dangerous bonds, is taking absolutely no preventive measures. On the contrary, the so-called "neutrality policy" just adopted by Congress—placing a permanent embargo on arms, munitions and essential war materials and imposing restrictions and limitations upon all trade in commodities and raw materials with warring nations—carries serious implications for the future course of Latin American relations with Europe and the United States.

In the first place, the fear of a strict embargo on war materials will tend to make Latin American governments turn from the United States to European sources of supply for the equipment and replenishment of their stocks of arms. Knowing that in war-time the United States will no longer provide them with weapons of defense, they will start in time of peace to look for new and more permanent bases of supply. There is a real danger that, given the limited financial capacity of many of the present Latin American regimes, the European powers may exact concessions and privileges from them in exchange for military weapons. These concessions may be of great domestic importance. When the rôle of the United States, a democratic and, today at least, non-imperialist nation shall have been taken over by European powers ruled by confessedly anti-democratic ideologies and sorely in need of the raw materials which abound in the southern continent, the consequences may be highly dangerous.

What, too, if a state of war should occur between two or more Latin American countries? In view of the embargo on United States arms, some European power or combination of European powers could determine the outcome of the conflict by discriminating in the sale of the implements of war. Obviously, favors thus given would demand their reward when the war was over. The same sort of thing might be feared, and perhaps with even greater reason, about a civil war in

any of the large Latin American states. Reference is not made here to a simple *coup d'état* of the type so well known in that part of the globe, but to a real internal struggle in which groups were fighting bitterly over sharply conflicting ideologies. If the arms factories and the ports of the United States were closed, again the European powers could decide the outcome of the strife by providing the faction which they wished to see win with the material elements of victory. And conceivably any Southern republic might thus be converted into another Spain.

But the worst, because the most immediate, effect of the Neutrality Act will be to accelerate the pace at which some European powers will want to assure themselves of permanent sources of supply of raw materials essential for war and for the subsistence of their civil populations in time of war. The limitations and difficulties placed in advance upon the acquisition of such materials in the United States will naturally cause the European nations to turn elsewhere. They will ask the Latin American countries to enter into far-reaching agreements to insure regular supplies. Here, again, it so happens that the European nations most in need of such raw materials are precisely the fascist nations.

Now the fascist powers are just beginning to learn the advantages of concerted action. On the day they have mastered their new technique there will arise across the seas another "Holy Alliance"—much more energetic and much more dangerous than the one which disturbed the sleep of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams more than a hundred years ago. If the people of the United States realized the far-reaching implications of this threat, not only in connection with the ultimate success of Pan Americanism but with regard to their own interests, actually even their own safety, they might cease deceiving themselves with the illusion of blissful isolation.

### PAN-AMERICANISM, ITS JUSTIFICATION AND FUTURE \*

Pan-Americanism and Inter-American cooperation are two expressions meaning exactly the same, whether we take the broadest view of Bolivar, the Liberator, who cherished the dream of a confederation of the American states, or whether we take the view of simply bringing together the American nations into a system of moral, economical and political cooperation without impairing in the least the independent status of any individual nation.

Pan Americanism has been, therefore, the action of the American republics in helping themselves to maintain their independence from foreign powers, to consolidate their position as members of the family of nations and to lend themselves reciprocally such help and cooperation as may be necessary to preserve a spirit of solidarity which has real existence in each one of the peoples of the New World.

You have undoubtedly heard that some foes of Pan Americanism profess to regard it as something that is incompatible with a clear understanding of different conditions prevailing in the American continent. They speak about dissimilarities in the customs, education and feelings of the United States of America as compared with those of the Latin nations.

We find in history that sometimes within the boundaries of a single independent state there have been differences between the peoples living on its soil that are by far more pronounced than those that exist between our peoples in the western hemisphere; and yet the national unity was not broken on account of such differences.

\* From article by Dr. Hector David Castro, Minister of Salvador to the United States. *World Affairs*. 101:112-14. June, 1938.

We cannot find, therefore, any reason why in order to keep the spirit of solidarity and cooperation of the republics of the western hemisphere any one of them should change in the least its customs, or lose the respect for its traditions. What we need is to emphasize the fact that in spite of such differences Pan Americanism is and has been a growing concern for more than a hundred years.

We are not going to deny that at certain times there have been controversies and suspicions which have created temporary barriers to the cordiality of relations of some countries of the New World, but we may fairly assume that they have been overshadowed by the controversies and suspicions that have always prevailed among the nations of other quarters of the globe. We may also state that we find in the history of the Old World that when the sentiments of the peoples against war have been made manifest as promising signs of an enduring peace, the respite has been short and almost immediately followed by a new alignment of nations that simply accentuated the reciprocal distrust prevailing among them. Contrariwise, we find in America that after any period of armed strife the nations that were neutral to the conflict try persistently to obliterate the hatred that so long endures after any war. In recent years, when a state of violence prevailed on a certain section of the American continent, we saw the Diplomatic Representatives of the belligerent nations sitting at the same table of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union as a silent proof that not even the calamities of war may shake away the spirit of solidarity which animates the American nations. Pan Americanism has had its crises, but it has lived thru them successfully.

I said before that Pan Americanism has been unparallelled by any similar movement in other parts of the world. Twenty-one republics which find their territory covering the greatest part of the western hemisphere,

and which became independent within a short period of time that barely exceeds a century and a quarter, could not but find in their common birth to freedom a clear warning that they were to tread upon the paths of the future united in a spirit of reciprocal helpfulness. Pan Americanism was not, therefore, the result of treaties or any other kind of international compacts. It was the mere realization of a common destiny of the countries of the New World which, thru a benevolent design of a Providence superior to man, shared a great heritage after attaining their freedom from European powers.

It is only natural that we should expect little sympathetic understanding for the Pan-American movement in some other quarters of the world. Those who will oppose it will speak of unity of the human race, and of the danger of forming continental blocks that will make it difficult to approach on a world basis the common problems of humanity. However, American problems need American solutions; and we may say in return that the western hemisphere has never yet found any handicap for the solution of world problems arising out of Pan Americanism; nor will such a handicap ever be found, as the Pan-American movement has never been aggressive, but on the contrary it came out of a natural sentiment of self preservation and of solidarity against the ambitions of some European powers. The republics of America have constantly proven their readiness to cooperate with all nations of the earth in the cause of peace, and many of them have enthusiastically cooperated in the formation of world tribunals of international justice and of the League of Nations.

#### BRIEF EXCERPTS

There has been some discussion of the desirability of building Pan-American naval bases on our two con-



tinents with United States equipment and engineering skill. In return for their cooperation the Latin American governments would get extensive financial assistance for their armament programs. *Nathaniel Weyl. Nation. N. 5, '38 p. 473.*

The people of America are unable by themselves to resist an armed offensive of European totalitarian imperialisms and should seek refuge in continental alliance.

The traditional policy of Argentina has been solidarity with England, with whom we are united in spiritual and material bonds. But without breaking any traditional link—indeed contributing to the reinforcement of world democracy—we must listen and heartily support the initiative of the United States and President Roosevelt toward a defensive union of America. *Raul Damonte Taborda. New York Times. N. 17, '38. p. 17.*

A continental solidarity exists today among the twenty-one republics and Canada which is more definite and more unanimous than ever before in the 120 years since the Latin-American republics were struggling for their independence. Therefore, on this continent we are substantially unanimous in the belief that, as a continent, we must be prepared to carry out the outline of the continental solidarity which was established at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires. Consequently we have to check and see what is necessary to maintain this continental solidarity against any threat from any other country. *President Franklin D. Roosevelt. New York Times. N. 16, '38. p. 6.*

I am pretty sure that no one knows exactly how to preserve world peace. But I want to point out how we have progressed toward peace in this hemisphere. I would also like to say that the methods and machinery

we employ are so opposed to European methods that it is folly to try to cooperate with Europe in the organizing of peace machinery at the present time. If you get this entire hemisphere, which is a little over a third of the entire area of the earth's land surface, composed of twenty-one republics, numerous islands, possessions, with two hundred millions in population, thoroly imbued with maintaining peace between ourselves, it will be the greatest step toward bringing about world peace that you can possibly have. *Edward Tomlinson. Institute of Public Affairs. Jl. 9, '37.*

The question of Canada's own interest in closer cooperation with other American states is, of course, one which Canadians alone can decide. Apparently there exists a division of opinion upon the balance of gain and loss, with a substantial body of influential opinion in favor of cooperation. On the other hand, it would be of obvious political advantage to Canada to be given greater assurance of defense against attack should a disaster befall the British navy. While Canada may at present count upon the protection of the United States, it is obviously embarrassing to Canadians to frame a policy of national defense based upon such considerations; whereas if Canada were a party to the treaty recently signed at Buenos Aires, it would enjoy such protection as one of a group collectively pledged to consult together to meet the situation brought about by a threat to the peace of America. *Charles F. Fenwick. American Journal of International Law. Jl. '37. p. 475.*

Pan Americanism proclaims the union of the countries of this continent, not as an alliance destined to realize sordid ambitions of domination, but as a policy of harmonious cooperation, based on the mutual respect of peoples and on a desire to reach peacefully the realization of their highest destinies. While the old-style group-

ings were organized for the destruction of hostile peoples, Pan Americanism stimulates feelings of friendship, with the aim of attaining an effective solidarity between men and nations. And this is possible in America, for the peoples of this continent are not divided by traditional enmities, but, on the contrary, have common historical antecedents in the struggles for liberty, which occurred not so very long ago. *Baltasar Brum. Current History. S. '27. p. 824-5.*

Pan Americanism today is, in my opinion, not merely a continental institution but, and I should almost say chiefly, a notable step in the progress of ideas and in the improvement of our collective life. It has exiled from international procedure secret agreements, previous understandings and *combinazioni*, as Machiavelli called them, by which a well-organized minority could overwhelm the majority in conferences and congresses. Under its influence, we have seen every individual pact fit into the general whole. Every bloc, altho based on similarity of interests, has been considered a practice of questionable morality. Secret diplomacy, so difficult to banish from world affairs, has been abolished for many years on American soil. A real equality of states, large and small, has arisen under the Pan American aegis, and our gatherings give the impression that the strong recognize it as beneficial to themselves that all should enjoy high international standing and prestige, for only thus will all have the deep sense of responsibility indispensable to the general good. *Orestes Ferrara. Bulletin of the Pan American Union. Jl. '32. p. 498.*

Marines, guns, threats, interventions, exploitations, support of revolutions, amputations of territories of friendly nations, are things of the past that we all regret. In exchange, we have good will, commercial treaties, Pan American conferences, inter-American pacts, consolida-

tion of peace, anti-war treaties, arbitration and conciliation accords, confidence and harmony, in short, we have a *new deal* in the Americas.

Probably many of the grievances against the imperialism of the United States are regarded now as past family quarrels that may and should be forgotten. After all, our Latin American politician is no angel, and his ambitions, his greed, his voracity frequently opened a shameful door for the marines, the interventionist, or the unscrupulous contractor to enter his country.

The great strides that the good neighbor policy has made in Latin America are not due to subtle or mysterious causes. They are simply due to the fact that the words have been backed by acts entirely in accord with the doctrine preached. *Abraham Martinez. World Affairs. D. '37. p. 253.*

If an international controversy on the American continent should arise, under the agreements entered into at Buenos Aires consultation is obligatory upon all of the twenty-one governments at the request of any one of them. It is perfectly incredible that, should a controversy arise and consultation take place, public opinion would not mobilize. Once the people are informed, they themselves will demand of their governments that a peaceful solution be found; and if they are told the truth by their governments, their voice is going to determine the outcome. That is the reason why I feel that the really significant accomplishment of emphasizing and proclaiming that the principles of democracy are a determining factor in the maintenance of peace, is something which has been of help to the world at large. Because, if the peoples are told the truth, they will not only demand of their governments that their governments find a peaceful outcome and a peaceful solution, but they themselves will secure peace. *Sumner Welles. American Society of International Law. Proceedings, 1937. p. 204.*

At the present moment no European power is likely to invade Latin America. But the activity there of the totalitarian states, and the growth of their economic and political power, might produce a set of circumstances which they could exploit as they have exploited the civil war in Spain. The United States has pledged its word not to intervene in Latin America; but no European power has made any such pledge. The struggle for trade and raw materials, in the course of which the so-called fascist powers have improved their position in the countries to the south, is undoubtedly being carried on with one eye cocked on the possibilities of a world war. In the case of a major conflict, by means of their emigrant colonies, their propaganda, and the influence of their banking and commercial enterprises, Germany and Italy might be able to interfere with the flow of supplies from Latin America to nations against whom they were fighting. Wars or revolutions fomented in Latin America at opportune moments might serve the same end. These possibilities may force us to a reappraisal of the Monroe Doctrine: territorial conquest is no longer the only European danger with which we have to reckon in Latin America. *Carleton Beals. Foreign Affairs. O. '38. p. 89.*

There is an evident spiritual affinity between the American nations. Perhaps it cannot be defined, its boundaries delimited or its origins fixed; but it is certain that it exists. It is manifest in certain constant and visible signs and evolves naturally, asserting itself more every day, even in crises in the sentiments of brotherhood and peace, in relations between the American states.

The assertion of Pan Americanism is not a concept of continental isolation; far less is it an expression of hostility toward or mistrust of the Old World. It is indeed the recognition of an indisputable reality, the result of geographical, historical and social conditions,

which act as natural forces all tending to the unity of the great American family.

I see no reason why the principle of continental solidarity should not be stimulated. On the contrary, I think that it is the duty of the governments to cooperate by every means in their power so that America, diverse as are her states, shall stand forth in the world with majestic unity. This will make her great, without sacrificing the individual countries of which she is composed. *Dr. Afranio de Mello Franco. American Society of International Law. Proceedings, 1937. p. 218.*

There are indications that in certain quarters the convocation of this conference was regarded as an attempt to drive the League of Nations out of the western hemisphere. Obviously no tangible evidence is produced to support this thesis. It is a fundamentally fallacious thesis. It stems from the discussions of the relative merits of regionalism *vs.* universality in world organization. Some ardent supporters of the League of Nations profess to see in moves toward regional arrangements a desire to sabotage the League. Perhaps some such moves are so motivated. Basically, however, the opposition to regionalism is akin to the outcast notion, once prevalent in politico-economic thought, that the prosperity of one state depended upon the destruction or poverty of its rivals. With reference to international organization today, any forward step taken anywhere in the world is of direct value and assistance to any similar moves elsewhere. The improvement or perfection of the machinery for international cooperation in the western hemisphere is of great value to the fundamental purposes which the League of Nations was designed to serve. It is also pertinent to recall that the agenda of the Buenos Aires Conference specifically calls for consideration of "measures of cooperation with other international entities." *Philip C.*

*Jessup. American Journal of International Law. Ja. '37. p. 86.*

The reasons generally advanced in favor of such a League or Association of Nations may be summarized as follows:

First, it is maintained that the Union of the American Republics should have a written covenant specifying the purposes of the Union, and the machinery for carrying out these purposes.

In the second place it is advanced that an inter-American League or Association of Nations in no wise would conflict with the Geneva organization. In fact, it is said, the new organism would have the character of one of those "regional understandings" to which Article 21 of the League of Nation's Covenant makes reference and could in many cases bring about effective help to the Geneva organization by unifying the policies of the American nations in regard to matters of common interest to both leagues.

In the third place, it is alleged that the present organization of the Pan American Union, under the direction of the regularly accredited diplomatic representatives of the various American countries in Washington, with the Secretary of State of the United States, is not satisfactory. Some critics of the Union even go so far as to suggest that its seat should be transferred to another country, possibly one of the smaller and more centrally located states of the continent, so as to allow a more active participation in its activities on the part of the other American governments.

A fourth reason is the desire to create a permanent international organ with adequate powers to prevent the recurrence of armed conflicts in the New World similar to the Chaco war. *Raul D'Eca. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Virginia. Jl. 8, '37.*

The policy of the "balance of power," which colored international life during all the last century and the beginning of the present, was never accepted in America; and the system of alliances, altho practiced with disinterested motives and for the common good, could not survive the first obstacles encountered. Pan Americanism had its origin in an aggregation of free and equal nations, with no intermediaries between the national unit and the continental whole, and it still maintains this basic principle intact. Those who prophesied that chaos would result from this international society of free and equal members were as mistaken as those who believed, when modern democracy was born, that it would inevitably descend to anarchy because of the absence of dominating leaders and dominated masses.

An international structure conforming more closely to the ideas of general good and general usefulness does not necessarily presuppose perfection. Conflicts of interests exist and will continue to exist as long as mankind rules our planet, but the results of such conflicts are weakened; the solution is found not in the threatening and arrogant diplomacy of other times, nor in political or economic aggression, but in the application of the principles of justice, which brings everything controversial within the field of law. We may claim with pride that even in cases of century-old disputes over American territorial questions when the parties, influenced by inflamed public opinion, not unnaturally lose sight of all the different and complex aspects of the problem under discussion, of the pros and cons to be weighed before reaching any solution, the proposal to maintain friendly relations at any cost encourages them to accept the friendly, sincere and scrupulously impartial cooperation of the whole continent. *Orestes Ferrara. Bulletin of the Pan American Union. Jl. '38. p. 498-9.*



Foreign influences, it is well understood, will not determine the fate of Pan Americanism. The New World states themselves will determine that. They will decide whether mistrust, or self-aggrandizement, or petty jealousies shall stand in the way. They will decide—indeed they have decided—that there shall exist on this continent a union of equal, freely cooperating nations. Consequently they are not deterred by the arguments of those who attempt to prove that the ideal has neither been realized nor can be realized. They know that the differences in language, culture, and racial characteristics, which are sometimes urged as obstacles, are not incompatible with international unity. They know that Pan Americanism imposes no economic or other restraint on the free exercise of national sovereignty. They know that the fears, suspicions and hatreds that are supposed to actuate some of the states in their relations with some of the other states do not obscure the larger aims. They know that in Pan Americanism lie the hopes of a continent.

That Pan Americanism was the choice of the United States rather than imperialism is a fact of great moment to the independent states of this hemisphere, and it may prove ultimately to be of vast significance to the world at large. If imperialism had been the choice, the map of the continent would have taken on a different appearance. The republics within the reach of the United States would have been absorbed, while those at a distance would have been driven to seek safety in foreign alliances. America would have become the meeting place of empires. Its vital principle would have become the balance of power and not a concert of nations; its frontiers would have been fortified; its vast area would have been overrun by alien armies; and its peace would have been disturbed by wars of alien origin. Happily the peoples of this continent do not confront any such situation. Secure under their separate flags, they are free

to demonstrate to the world that nations can live together as good neighbors. *Joseph B. Lockety. American Journal of International Law. Ap. '38. p. 243.*

Most international misunderstandings, (students of international affairs) observe, arise from antipathies and conflicts of interests between *neighboring* nations. Rarely do people of one country work up a genuine hatred of the people inhabiting a far-off land. Hence, the most practical step in the direction of international peace would seem to be the development of understanding and cooperation between nearby nations.

Granted, that is by far a more difficult program than the proclamation of high-sounding platitudes about the oneness of mankind and the brotherhood of all nations. Yet it stands to reason that if genuine neighborliness could be developed among an appreciable number of nations in even one portion of the globe, an inspiration would be provided to other countries and the attainment of world unity would be that much nearer to realization.

Nature has provided a region of the globe that is peculiarly fitted to be a gathering-up place for values and forces that could later be used in a vaster program of international cooperation. That region is the American hemisphere.

The promotion of understanding among the nations of the New World, therefore, is not only an end in itself, but one of the means to a still greater finality.

Now, it would be foolhardy to assert that inter-American cooperation constitutes the only step toward world unity. But few will deny that the nations of America are today more favorably situated than probably any other group of nations, to give potent aid to the cause of world peace by the example of their own inter-relationships. And example is far more effective than preaching, among nations as among individuals.

Outside of the Americas, age-old habits of thought and action have engendered fears and hatreds which make international peace little more than a pious wish at this time. In direct contrast, the New World presents a more hopeful picture, despite the deplorable instances of international friction which have registered here and there, for the general trend has been to build up international comity on a scale hitherto unknown in the affairs of mankind. *Philip Leonard Green. World Unity. Ja. '35. p. 197-8.*

For nearly a century, it has been possible, and fashionable, to sneer at the Monroe Doctrine in its original purpose of protecting Latin America against aggressive attack from overseas.

"What nonsense," people said. "Who is going to attack South America? We are secure, just as secure as the United States, behind our oceans and mountains. It is silly to say that we need protection of a doctrine or a big brother. That's just an imperialist pretext of the United States."

Things have changed now. For the first time, Latin American politicians can refer to the possibility of a foreign attack on their shores without being scoffed at by their compatriots. A high-ranking Argentinian official recently explained the situation in these words:

The problem of South American security today develops parallel with the progress of science, especially in the realm of transportation. Unfortunately for us, the moral aspect cannot be considered. It has been proved to us in Europe and Asia that treaties and understandings mean nothing. When a state is "hungry" or invokes its own "special interests" no moral law will stop it from attacking any sphere within the operating compass of its military machine. That is the unfortunate situation for the present and, as realists, we must base future policies on present facts.

The operating compass of the military machine is expanding rapidly. We have seen what has happened in the past ten years. Who would deny that in another ten years the Atlantic will be spanned by fast, gigantic flying-boats? It may be earlier;

in that case the menace to our shores is correspondingly advancing. Directly or indirectly, this menace must be faced by all American nations.

A similar view is expressed in *La Nacion*, distinctly not an anti-fascist paper, in Buenos Aires: "Distance destroyed, America has only the Monroe Doctrine to fall back upon. The nations without their own arms industries will be at the mercy of those who have them."

With Latin America in anxious mood, with the United States more solicitous of sensibilities than ever before, with the Old World in turmoil and the New World still peaceful, the attractiveness both of a western neutrality bloc and of an American peace system are evident. *Round Table. D. '36, p. 73-4. Macmillan Co. Lond.*

In the past year the administration has been increasingly anxious over Italian, German, and—to a lesser degree—Japanese activities in South and Central America. The fascist powers have kept pace with the trade increases the United States won by reciprocal-trade treaties. But, what is more alarming to the State Department, Latin American countries have been swapping raw materials for fascist-made war materials.

Among examples of so-called fascist encroachment: in Peru, the largest and most powerful bank is Italian-controlled, important newspapers reflect Italian influence, Italian experts train Peruvian police and aviators; in Brazil, a German colony of about 400,000 flourishes despite recent suppressions of Nazism, German interests reputedly control important iron mines, at least three Italian-made submarines operate in the Brazilian navy, and the Japanese population exceeds 130,000; Venezuela this year got two Italian cruisers in exchange for oil; Chile recently bought 65 German and Italian warplanes.

Finally, fascist propaganda pours over the southern continent like tropical rain. Italy, for instance, dis-

tributes free telegraphic news service, used by at least one leading Buenos Aires newspaper and by numerous smaller papers in the interior. To offset such European penetration, the United States sent Army planes on a mass good-will flight last February. South America received them ecstatically, but the fascist drive lost little headway.

Resolved not to let its "good neighbors" thus drift into the arms of "bandit nations," the administration last week took the offensive by turning one of the fascist powers' chief propaganda weapons, radio, to its own ends.

Broadcasting from Lima (the Italian stronghold), Ambassador Steinhardt took it upon himself to speak for all the American democracies. He warned bluntly that "conquest and ultimate subjection are accomplished . . . by propaganda rather than armed force. We are determined to protect ourselves against these insidious methods." Without naming them, Steinhardt referred directly to Germany and Italy.

We may as well ask ourselves why nations thousands of miles distant and already known to be seriously impoverished should expend such huge sums for propaganda among us. We may be quite certain that in due course the bill will be presented, perhaps by those who believe in a philosophy of force. We should . . . marshal public opinion on our hemisphere against those who still believe the law of the jungle is man's destiny.

Next day President Roosevelt reminded foreign dictators that, under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States will not brook aggression in Latin America. He interpreted the doctrine as binding all American republics for mutual protection. *Newsweek*. Ap. 25, '38. p. 15.

If nature failed to provide Canada with defenses to the South, she has more than compensated for this on the East and the West. On the East, more than 3,000 miles separate her from the European mainland. In order to approach Canada's vital areas, an invading fleet

would have to sail up the St. Lawrence River which, incidentally, is closed to navigation for five months of the year. But even before arriving in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the fleet would run up against formidable barriers. The Strait of Belle Isle, between Newfoundland and the tip of Labrador, could be effectively closed—for the small part of the year that it is open to navigation—by mines, coast artillery and perhaps a few submarines. From Newfoundland to the tip of Cape Breton Island is a scant sixty miles, in which space there are a number of easily fortified small islands. These islands, plus mines and submarines again, should be able to close this avenue also to a hostile fleet. But even if a hostile fleet were to penetrate this first line of defense, it would be nothing short of suicide for it to attempt to sail up the narrow St. Lawrence River. It would be possible to stage a landing on the coast of Nova Scotia, but this would not cut off anything vital to Canada and there would still be a long and difficult terrain before the invaders. As for a landing on the coast of Labrador: it would be a slight improvement on a landing at the North Pole, but not much.

The Pacific coast presents an equally inhospitable picture to the would-be invader. Vancouver and Victoria, and the most vital districts, can be approached only thru the narrow Strait of Juan de Fuca or thru the much narrower Johnston Straits at the northeast of Vancouver Island. The Dixon Entrance, gateway to Prince Rupert, could also be effectively fortified against a hostile fleet. Elsewhere, the coast is wild and rugged. Yet it is the Pacific Coast that is today occupying Canada's attention, not because she herself fears invasion, but because there is a very real danger of war between Japan and the United States.

It is generally agreed that a Pacific war between Japan and the United States would follow the course of the semi-circle formed by the North American coasts,

the Aleutian Islands and the Japanese archipelago. With the virtual abandonment of the Philippines, America's main line of naval defense may be said to cut across this semi-circle from the Aleutians to Hawaii to Panama. The United States is in fact today developing the Aleutians as a base for defensive and offensive action against Japan; and for offensive and defensive reasons as well, Japan would have to attack along the same route. Canada's position in such a war has already been likened to that of Belgium during the World War.

In the event of hostilities, Canadian collaboration would be imperative to the United States. If the Japanese were able to occupy some inlet along the British Columbia coast and use it as a base for raiding operations, they would be in a position to threaten seriously American shipping and American coastal cities. And should sea communication with Alaska at any time become hazardous, it would be necessary for the United States to have at its disposal a back door route thru British Columbia. That is why America is so concerned over Canadian Pacific defenses and why, in addition, she has been sponsoring the project of a military highway extending from the American border to Alaska. Canada is beginning to wake up to the concern that their southern neighbor feels. *David Martin. Current History. Je. '38. p. 22.*

## NEGATIVE DISCUSSION

### PROPOSED CREATION OF AN INTER-AMERICAN LEAGUE OF NATIONS<sup>1</sup>

In the first place, a League or Association of American Nations would not fit the exigencies of inter-American politics. It is not difficult to demonstrate this. All that is necessary is to remind ourselves of the diversity of economic interests and power of the various American nations, as well as their political importance in the world at large. Could a political association ever be established between such dissimilar nations? Would not such an association soon fall under the sway of a few large states, as it has happened in other similar organizations, or even under the control of one—the largest—of all the American states, with the help of a sufficient number of the smaller and more or less economically dependent states? These are questions that cannot be ignored in the discussion of an inter-American political union. Listen to the words spoken by a well known South American statesman at the Montevideo Conference of 1938:

The relationship between different human groups everywhere is that of weak peoples erecting defensive institutions on the one hand and the expansive tendencies of powerful countries on the other. In America it will always be necessary to overcome the inequality among the countries as regards power by their equality of sovereignty as legal entities. In Europe there is the balance of power and the resulting equilibrium. In America no such thing exists. In Europe it may be that the mountains unite. Not so in America, where there is only one vast

<sup>1</sup> From address by Dr. Raul D'Eca, Office of Education, Department of the Interior, before the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, July 8, 1937. mime. p.7-15.



mountain system culminating in an enormous elevation, which cannot be compared in proportion or equilibrium to the rest.

It is all very well to talk about sovereignty and equality of nations. They may be equal in the realm of law but remain unequal in their degree of political and economic power. Under existing conditions each nation exercises directly or indirectly its influence upon its neighbors. The influence exercised by each differs in degree according to its moral prestige, historical record, intellectual attainments, size of population, amount of wealth and all those other factors which together constitute the standard of civilization.

No problem has probably created more difficulties within the World League of Nations itself than this matter of equality among nations. You recall that the question proved to be one of the major stumbling blocks encountered by the statesmen gathered at Paris in 1918-1919 when the basis for a World League came up for consideration. The words of General Smuts in regard to the matter have timely application:

The League will include a few great powers, a large number of small states. If in the Council of the League they are all to count and vote as of equal value, the few powers may be at the mercy of the great majority of small states. It is quite certain that no great power will willingly run such a risk by entering a league in which all have equal voting power. Will Great Britain be prepared to put her fleet at the mercy of a majority vote of all the other states who are members of the League?

*Mutatis mutandis*, can you conceive of any of the large powers of America, say Argentina, or Brazil, or Chile, or the United States, doing what Great Britain, in the opinion of General Smuts, would never do?

On the other hand, is any American nation willing to concede greater power to a few among them in a league or association into which they might enter? Is it not true that some of the most emphatic protests against

inequality of membership in the League of Nations have come from the American states which are members of the Geneva organization? As early as 1920 Argentina proposed an amendment to the Covenant to suppress the distinction between great powers and small states and to render all seats on the Council elective. When the discussion of this proposal was adjourned, the Argentine delegation left Geneva and did not reappear there until 1933 to accept election to the Council. Other Latin American countries have made similar proposals at one time or another.

As to voting power, unanimity, except on procedural matters, would be the only acceptable basis to most of the American nations, particularly to the larger ones. But on these bases a league or association of nations is of little, if any, practical value, since the negative vote of one among them hopelessly defeats the affirmative votes of all the others.

You recall that this question of voting was also one of the most difficult ones met by the Paris negotiators in 1918-1919. Lord Phillimore's Committee recommended unanimity except in matters of procedural character. Colonel House's draft, based to a certain extent on Phillimore's, did not specifically provide for unanimity, but declared that in procedural matters majority vote would be adopted. The implication was that unanimity in other matters was to be adopted. General Smuts' draft recommended majority rule, altho he admitted that equality would be impossible as already indicated. He, therefore, recommended the scheme of a general conference with equality and the creation of a council in which the great powers only would take part. President Wilson's second draft shows the influence of Smuts': In the council, to be constituted of five great powers and four smaller states, a negative vote of 3 or more would operate as a veto.

The two points of view were well expressed in the following words. Said General Smuts:

We want an instrument of government which, however much talk is put into it at one end, will grind out decisions at the other. We want a league which will be real, practical, effective as a system of world-government. The scheme . . . which brings representatives of all independent states of the world together in conference to discuss the most thorny of all subjects and requires that their decisions to be binding must be unanimous, is from that point of view not worth discussion.

That that (unanimity) will to some extent at any rate, militate against the rapidity of action of the organs of the League, is undoubted but, in my judgment, that defect is far more than compensated for by the confidence that it will inspire that no nation, whether small or great, need fear oppression from the organs of the League.

Most statesmen in the United States at that time expressed themselves emphatically in favor of unanimity. In fact, it was to satisfy American opinion that unanimity was finally included in the Covenant of the World's League.

This point has been dealt with at some length by the present speaker because he feels that it is one of crucial importance in any discussion of a political association among nations; one which, indeed, is prone to prevent, in the case of the American nations, any real and efficient continental league to be established at the present time or in the future.

Another important reason militating against the creation of an inter-American League or Association of Nations is, in the opinion of the present speaker, the fact that there is already a sort of Pan-American League with all the advantages of such an organization and yet without the pitfalls of a strictly political union.

In fact, the Union of the American Republics, as now constituted, consists of a series of inter-American conferences held at more or less regular intervals since 1889 and of a permanent organ or Secretariat located at Washington and called the Pan American Union. The first In-

ternational Conference of American States was held at Washington in 1889-1890 at the invitation of President Harrison authorized by Act of Congress of May 24, 1888. The others followed at Mexico City (1901), Rio de Janeiro (1906), Buenos Aires (1910), Santiago (1923), Havana (1928), and Montevideo (1933). Each conference has been held in a different country as designated by the previous conference and at the invitation of the respective government. There is no written covenant binding the American states together as already mentioned; but a tradition of cooperation and united action is growing up which is more precious than all the written treaty provisions because it is based on purely voluntary action and similarity of interests. This willingness to work out together the solution of the various common problems has resulted in many agreements and recommendations the value of which can scarcely be measured in words. It may suffice to say here that the nations of the New World are now bound by treaty provisions regulating such important matters as patents and trade marks, extradition, arbitration of pecuniary claims, exchange of official publications, copyright, status of naturalized citizens returning to their country of origin, uniformity of commercial and industrial products, cultural interchange and cooperation, and, above all, by treaty stipulations on the maintenance, preservation, and reestablishment of peace, prevention of controversies and their pacific settlement in case they arise, besides the important provision for consultation with one another, and all of them together, in the event that the peace of the American republics is menaced either by war, or virtual state of war, among them, or war or a state of war outside the American continent. There exist also stipulations for non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of any of them, and for non-recognition of any territorial arrangement which is not obtained by peaceful means or

territorial acquisitions which may be obtained thru occupation or conquest by the force of arms.

That these provisions are not without effect can be deducted from the peaceful and satisfactory settlement of such dangerous controversies as the boundary disputes between Colombia and Peru in 1934, and between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 1935, as well as the cessation of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1936 and the negotiations still under way at Buenos Aires for a satisfactory settlement of the Chaco dispute.

The organ or Secretariat of the Union of the American Republics is the Pan American Union, reorganized as a permanent institution under the terms of a convention signed at Havana in 1928. As now constituted, the Union is under the direction of a Governing Board composed of the Secretary of State of the United States and representatives, diplomatic or otherwise, of the other American governments. Its affairs are administered by a Director General and an Assistant Director elected and responsible to the Governing Board. There are special divisions on foreign trade, statistics, finance, cultural cooperation, tourist travel, agricultural cooperation, all of which maintain close relations with the official and non-official bodies in the countries, members of the Union. There exists also at the palace of the Union in Washington a specialized library on Pan-American matters containing some 90,000 volumes and pamphlets, many periodicals, and valuable maps. Monthly *Bulletins* are published in English, Spanish, and Portuguese as the official organs of the institution, besides numerous pamphlets containing all sorts of valuable information on the various countries of this hemisphere.

To instill into these valuable activities the all-pervasive and not always beneficent, spirit of politics would be, in the opinion of the present speaker and many other persons, an unwise and even dangerous step. In the words of a distinguished delegate to the Buenos Aires

Conference of 1936, Dr. Max Henriquez Urena, from the Dominican Republic:

The Pan American Union can and must continue the efficient work for which it was created without obstructing its activities with the burden of political problems.

A third reason why an inter-American League or Association of Nations is not desirable is the present need in the world at large, not for more regionalism, but rather for more universality.

In fact, if one stops to consider in as dispassionate a manner as possible, the present situation in international affairs, the conclusion can hardly be avoided that unless means are found to bring about a world reorganization on the basis of mutual willingness to consider the respective national problems and to solve them by intelligent compromise, the whole structure of our modern civilization is in immediate danger of crumbling and giving way to some other form of social life.

The creation of an inter-American League or Association of Nations would represent, despite all the assertions to the contrary, a new and very dangerous secession from universal organization. Besides the duplication of work in regard to many phases of international cooperation, there would inevitably arise in many cases an antagonism of interests and possibly even hostility of purposes. Take, for instance, the matter of sanctions: They are now generally recognized as an absolute necessity if any effective means is to be had for the enforcement of the general principle of pacific settlement of international disputes. With two independent leagues of nations how could we expect to have unified action in regard to an offender nation, particularly when some of the most important nations of the smaller group are not, and show no inclination to become, members of the larger group? The whole matter would be dependent on the prevailing mood of public opinion in these few nations that are not

members of the Geneva organization. This, of course, means that a situation would develop not unlike that prevailing in recent years and which has brought into disrepute the whole idea of international organization for peace in the world at large.

A similar situation would obtain if, for instance, a group of American nations, say, the South American or the Central American groups, were to secede from the Pan American Union and organize its own independent union. Could, under those circumstances, the American continent as a whole continue to strive successfully for unified action in the various spheres of international endeavor as it has done so far? It might happen; but with national interests dictating, as they always do and always probably will continue to do, the policies of nations and groups of nations, unified action between two independent leagues of nations would be rather difficult, to say the least, to secure in any emergency of major importance.

Of course, nothing of what the present speaker has been saying is in any sense new. Others, in far better condition to know and to judge, have expressed similar convictions in a much more cogent manner. Thus, for instance, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, the Honorable Anthony Eden, speaking last September at the ordinary session of the League of Nations on the League's work since the previous Assembly meeting declared that:

The principal causes of the failure of the League in this instance (collective action against Italy), were twofold: the lack of universality of the League itself and its failure, for whatever reason, to play a more energetic and effective part in the earlier stages of the crisis.

And to this one of the Argentine delegates, Senor Cantilo, heartily subscribed when he said that "the League's weakness is largely due to its lack of universality."

It is useless to prolong any more this discussion of the reasons why the creation of an inter-American League

or Association of Nations is not expedient at the present time, altho in the past it might have represented a step forward in the organization of international life.

### EAST IS EAST BUT SOUTH IS SOUTH \*

Consider the accomplishments, together with the underlying fallacious geographical assumption, of the great Inter-American Peace Conference, lately concluded at Buenos Aires. Admirable accomplishments they were, so far as words on paper and in air may be called such. For three weeks it sat, in an atmosphere tense, almost hysterical with Pentecostal good feeling, greatly inspired by Cordell Hull, our own Secretary of State—not forgetting the stirring introductory speech of President Roosevelt in person. Whatever its ultimate results in action, those utterance were wholesome in the air and expressed bravely the heart-hunger of the peoples all over the world. That conference produced nearly seventy written conventions and protocols, each impeccable in intention and utterance; embodying the purpose of collective security as against aggression, not merely among themselves but from all the rest of the world. They transform the Monroe Doctrine from a declaration of hegemony by the United States into an understanding and agency of mutual defense, removing a cause of irritation among our American neighbors. They provide a machinery (or, rather, a policy) of group consultation in the event of a threat against the public peace; definitely authorizing themselves as "neutrals" to regard it as the international public business. They call for equality of treatment in international trade and the progressive reduction of trade barriers. They envisage broad cooperation in respect of international law, intellectual interests, exchange of

\*From article by John Palmer Gavit, Associate Editor, *Survey Graphic*, 26:97-8. February, 1937.



publications, utilization of radio, citizenship of women, and so on. Given a common intent to carry out their spirit; given good faith on the part of the nations participating in them, these provisional agreements would suffice to establish the great fellowship in this hemisphere. "Provisional," I say, because none of them has yet the force of law. So far as the United States, for only one, is concerned, there is still the Senate, that notorious graveyard of international treaties.

It is easy, too easy, to pick flaws; to point out that the outcome is in many ways only the ghost of the United States draft proposals; that like the Pact of Paris it provides no technique of enforcement, no sanctions upon violation, no pledges to accept any verdict of anybody. These were not the only disappointments. On the whole, however, it marks a great advance upon the achievements of the Montevideo Conference of 1933; it looks forward to further steps.

But all of these measures and aspirations are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which they have been widely described as a "challenge." Every whit of that Pentecostal intensity of fellowship has been matched repeatedly in Assemblies of the League. Some commentators, hitherto vociferous against the League of Nations and particularly against our participation in or traffic with it, apparently imagine some difference, with respect to our "minding our own business," between East and South. We must not, forsooth, however distantly get involved in the affairs of Europe or the Orient; but from their point of view it is all right for us to step into the notoriously explosive doings and inter-relationships of South America! Will it then be all right for us to participate in the projected "American League of Nations" to insure collective security and neighborhood in the western hemisphere, while somehow unsuitable and dangerous to join or even collaborate with

the great one designed to make those desirable conditions world-wide?

It cannot be a question of distance—as the crow flies Istanbul in Turkey is no farther from New York than Buenos Aires. In terms of travel it is much nearer. Steam south in the Atlantic as far as the voyage eastward to London; you will hardly have abeam the “bulge” of South America, and you must continue full half as far again to reach Montevideo. In time of getting there Moscow is much nearer than Buenos Aires. It cannot be a question of ocean-water—unless by air, to reach any Latin-American country you will go by sea. Interests and psychology in common? Berlin, Rome or Moscow is no farther from us psychologically than Rio de Janeiro: in terms of dictatorship none of them need give odds to Brazil. Even our own step-child Cuba is now to all intents a dictatorship as ruthless as Mussolini's. Spiritually, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chili, Peru, are to us as exotic as Latvia. Generally speaking, our interests, sympathies and contacts outside our own territory are far more real and vital from every point of view with Europe than with any country south of the Rio Grande. I have not at hand at this moment adequate statistics for comparison; but I notice that the World Almanac table showing “country of birth of foreign-born, in cities, in 1930,” lists countries of Europe but ignores the relatively insignificant Latin-American element in our population. By every tie, whether of history, blood, language, mentality or commerce, the people of the United States are closer related to Englishmen, Scotch, Irish, Frenchmen, Germans, Dutch, Italians, Scandinavians, Austrians, Czechs—yes, and Russians—and so on down the line, than to those of any or all of Latin-American countries.

Our very weather itself, like our commerce in normal times, moves eastward. As for danger to our peace from international strife—South America ablaze from Panama to Terra del Fuego would threaten us immeasurably less

than would a general debacle in Europe such as now again hangs by a hair.

Far be it from me to deprecate or despise any move or declarations such as those at Buenos Aires, however inadequate or academic, toward peace and good understanding anywhere, by individuals or groups or peoples, of any nationality, race, color, condition or locality; but I am unable to see that it is any better—or in the circumstances as good—moving north-and-south across parallels of latitude than east-and-west across the meridians. I hereby nominate that distinction as fit subject for the grim laughter of the gods.

#### PAN AMERICANISM: MYTH AND FAILURE \*

Most of the Latin Americans appraise the positions in which their countries stand with the United States chauvinistically and pragmatically. In matters which practically concern their national interests and Latin American-United States relations they are far more addicted to realities and to adherence to them than statesmen, publicists or doctrinaires north of the Rio Grande, in or out of the Department of State.

Pan Americanism has failed, chiefly, because it is founded and has been conducted upon premises and conclusions which possess slight foundation in fact. Broadly, the basic structure of the theory conceived and sustained, without more than tenuous support in actuality, by the originators of the Pan American fallacy in the United States, the leader of whom was James G. Blaine, when he was Secretary of State, is this: politically, the United States and the Latin American countries have a common origin and purpose. In this there is some truth, but with these qualifications: all of the Latin American govern-

\* By Robert Hammond Murray, Mexican correspondent. *American Mercury*. 33:407-13. December, 1934.

ments are, and always have been, no more than hypothetical democracies. With our encouragement and blessing they adopted our form of government, but only in form. Every government in Latin America is a despotism, controlled and run by whatever political oligarchy may chance to be in power for the moment.

The theory also is that there is an inherent, vigorous, cohesive community of interest, spiritually, culturally and materially, between the people and the government of the United States and those of Latin America; and that, to a high degree, their national underpinning and fibre, ambitions, objects and outlooks are kindred. Therefore, argue the Pan Americanists, we should cling and work together, as neighbors on the same sea-isolated continent. Nothing could be further from the facts.

Spiritually, culturally and politically we and they are as remote from each other as the poles. To a great extent this affirmation also applies to our individual material interests. Theoretically, Latin America—perhaps because it is enamored of our size and puissance or of our *beaux yeux*, or thru gratitude—should by preference purchase from us the bulk of its imports, while we should absorb most of its exports; the field of Latin American exploitation and development should in the main be naturally an appanage of the United States. The hollowness of this postulate is betrayed by the facts.

Until the World war, and despite more than a quarter of a century of strenuous and strident beating of the tomtom of Pan Americanism, our export trade to Latin America was negligible, in comparison with that of European countries. Latin America gave most of its patronage to Europe. Europe then was far closer, in travel-time, than the United States. The Latin Americans knew and liked Europeans better than they did, or do, North Americans. European penetration, thru immigration, was far in excess of North American, of which there was virtually none. European prices and credit

terms were more favorable. European goods were more acceptable and not infrequently of better quality than those offered by the United States. United States manufacturers exerted slight endeavor to open up or cultivate the Latin American field; and if, in order to dispose of a temporary surplus which they were unable to sell elsewhere, they did break ground a little, they were easily discouraged and put forth only languid efforts to consolidate or extend their footing.

Development enterprise in Latin America, railway, public works construction, etc., was almost entirely monopolized by European energy and capital.

Change came with the World War, which shut down on supplies and capital from Europe. Needs of both in the southern republics continued with no considerable abatement. Europe was out of production in manufactures for export, especially Germany, England and France, which had been the principal sellers; their capital was absorbed for war purposes. By fortune, the United States remained in production and had plenty of capital. Latin America turned to us. Substantially, we were its only source of supply. Thus the Latin American market fell into our lap, literally. Latin America was compelled to buy from us, not because it wanted to particularly, but in lack of any other reservoir of goods or capital upon which it could draw. We merely took what was offered to us on a golden platter.

Swollen with prosperity and war profits, the purses of American investors, handed over to banking groups, poured more than a billion dollars into Latin America, in state loans; in part, in private development enterprises. Our bankers granted loans and provided capital unstintedly.

What happened to the American investors' money is shown by a comparison of the current prices of Latin American bonds and the prices which they paid for them,

and by scanning the list of these "securities" which are in default. None of them will ever pay out in full.

Gradually, after the war, when European manufacturers got back into production and into their stride and reached out to regain their markets in Latin America, they succeeded and at the expense of American trade. They are pressing and expanding their successes.

Latin America in the future, as in the past, will never purchase more than it is compelled to from the United States, unless prices, credits and qualities can compete with European offerings, or unless satisfactory and inviting reciprocal tariff adjustments are arranged between the United States and each Latin American country. So much for our chances of resuming our fortuitous and evanescent warborn trade supremacy in Latin America.

Thus one sees that even materially Pan Americanism has fallen short of its object. Its failure has been still more complete and discouraging, and for obvious and ineradicable reasons, in consolidating and strengthening spiritual, cultural and political ties and in inculcating mutual trust, cooperation and friendship, at least on the Latin American side.

Spiritually and culturally there is absolutely nothing that operates to draw us into closer communion with Latin America. North Americans and Latin Americans stem from sharply differing and conflicting bloods, cultures, traditions, customs, aims, schools of thought, ideals, and personal and national ambitions and outlooks. Fundamentally, we and they are in ancient, irreconcilable racial conflict. We are not whelped of the same litter. It is the identical racial conflict which, at bottom, causes the Englishman to dislike the Frenchman, the Gaul the Teuton, the Italian the Austrian, the Russian the Japanese, the white-skinned man the brown-faced man, and so on and vice versa.

In mass, the Latin American does not understand, evaluate, like nor trust us, more than we do him. He

does not want nor try to. Nor do we. Fault cannot justly be charged to either. We and they were born that way. And in our relations, in our mutual attitude and purview, the light of each shines accordingly: "You in your little corner and I in mine."

None of the foregoing material provides food upon which Pan Americanism may feed and grow affirmatively and importantly great and useful.

Latin Americans look askance at Pan Americanism, chiefly, perhaps, because the movement emanated from the United States. They regard it as a unilateral affair, devised by shrewd and unscrupulous Yankee politicians and imperialists, as an instrument to enable them to boss the guileless, generous Latin Americans and to get the better of them. They vaguely connect it in some way with the Monroe Doctrine, against which they persistently and bitterly rail, to which they refuse to subscribe and which they hold to represent a patronizing, unsought-for and unwelcome species of tutelage. Under Pan Americanism, their rôle, as they see it, is to practice Pan Americanism according to the pattern provided for it by the United States and to assent supinely and unquestioningly to whatever the United States decides should be done, or what it desires to do, in the name of Pan Americanism. Their inclination thus far has been to go along, but suspiciously and grumblingly, and to reap what benefits they may, which are inconsiderable, from organized Pan Americanism. Whether they are right is not relevant to this exposition. The fact is merely stated. They can hardly be blamed, for such expression, direction and policy-shaping as thus far has been given to Pan Americanism has, as a whole, proceeded from the desires and conveniences of Washington, as enunciated by the Department of State.

The Pan American Union, which is composed of the Latin American diplomats accredited to Washington, is run by the Department of State, thru the Director

General, whom it selects. He has always been a North American. It is inconceivable that a Latin American should ever gain the post.

It is asserted in Latin America that the United States has utilized Pan Americanism and Pan American Congresses to coerce the Latin Americans to blink at our imperialistic and interventionist activities in the Central American and Caribbean countries and to accord them tacit endorsement. Until the latest, the Seventh, Pan American Congresses were invariably conducted and their agendas drafted, as Washington decreed they should be conducted and drafted. Washington took care to manage that topics and discussions which were calculated to annoy or embarrass it were adroitly, but implacably, sidetracked. Unpleasant and vociferous revolt was planned, and partly erupted, in Havana in 1927, against imperialism and the rights we arrogated under our extended and distorted interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Warned and apprehensive, Washington advanced its premier special-pleader, Charles Evans Hughes, into the breach. By his eloquence and plausible dialectics and rhetoric he temporarily smothered the revolt and overbore and confounded the revolters. But he merely drove the insurrection underground. There it fermented sourly and waxed.

Another insurmountable obstacle to the success of organized Pan Americanism, that "tiresome nonsense" as *El Excelsior* rightly stigmatized it, lies in this: Pan Americanism is predicated upon the feasibility of a hard and fast union, combination, coalition, understanding, working arrangement—call it what you will—between two prime entities: the United States and, collectively, the Latin American countries. But it is grievous to be compelled to admit that beyond the theoretical, there is no sympathetic feeling, no solidarity, between any two Latin American countries. There should be, perhaps, considering their spiritual, cultural, racial and linguistic similitudes. But there is not. They are all supremely



jealous and mistrustful of one another, especially those the territories of which adjoin. They are set on hair-triggers, for quarreling, for war. If they could afford it, war would be raging among them most of the time. Consider, for example, Chile and Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, Paraguay and Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil. Some of the most bloody and tenacious international strifes recorded in history have been waged by the "sister republics" of Central and South America.

This being true, in face of the chronic, peevish and incessant dissonances among the Latin American countries themselves, what effective service are they in a position or disposition to render, in the way of harmonious, collective and continuing effort and cooperation, to the cause and prosperity of Pan Americanism?

If Latin America presents a solid front on anything it is this: Opposition to the United States; jealousy, mistrust, dislike of us.

If searching analytical processes are applied to our new "good neighbor" Latin American policy, what stands revealed? What are the bone and sinew beneath its amicable and altruistic surface semblance? In reality, it amounts scarcely to more than a gracious, timely, needed, and commendable gesture, spacious, generous and sincere. It puts the record straight and places us on record. We pledged ourselves against intervention by arms, such as those of which in the past we were guilty, in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba. We abjured imperialism. We followed it up immediately by abrogating the Platt Amendment, which gave us the right to send our troops into Cuba at any time when it became requisite to protect our nationals or other foreign interests there, in the prevalence of domestic disorder and the inability or failure of the Cuban authorities to keep order and extend protection. That was well done.

But it is completely erroneous to interpret this as a blanket and irrevocable surrender of our right, according to international law and practice, to do anything in Cuba, or in any other Latin American country, which we were specifically permitted to do by the Platt Amendment. We yielded nothing, save our privilege, granted by a special treaty and incorporated upon our insistence in the Cuban constitution. The treaty has been denounced; the section of the constitution in which the treaty was embodied has been repealed. So far so good.

But we have certainly relinquished none of our rights, duties or responsibilities to our own citizens, conferred upon us by the currently accepted and practiced warrant of international law; the right, duty and responsibility of any nation to send its troops into foreign territory to safeguard the lives, if not the properties, of its nationals when the government of that country is powerless, refuses or neglects to provide that protection.

Should by evil chance several Americans, among them, perhaps, women and children, tomorrow be slain in Cuba during riots or rebellions, before the lapse of twenty-four hours marines, followed later by army troops, would be policing the island and protecting our nationals; and, incidentally, the politics-drunken Cubans from each other.

#### DICTATORS, AND MORE DICTATORS!<sup>4</sup>

In recent years the specter of armed intervention has receded into the shadows. The elimination of this threat has brought a sense of relief to the nations in closest proximity to the powerful neighbor on the north. The long history of military occupation in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republics, Honduras, Panama and Mexico has left a sense of humiliation, rancor

<sup>4</sup>From article by Professor Richard Pattee, University of Puerto Rico. *Christian Century*. 54:141-3. February 3, 1937.

and irritation which the few short years of a revised policy have been unable to wipe out. Intervention had come to stand for belief by the United States in the weakness, incapacity and political immaturity of the smaller republics of this hemisphere.

At the present moment, Latin America is living under a new dispensation regarding this ancient evil. It would be hazardous to affirm that the specter has been completely laid. The memory still clings to past injuries, and the ills suffered have not been forgotten. The new policy, heralded at Montevideo and repeated by President Roosevelt from time to time, has naturally awakened satisfaction in Latin America. The withdrawal of troops from Haiti and Nicaragua and the restoration of national sovereignty to these states have been hailed in Hispanic America as evidences of a new spirit in international relations with the United States.

True enough, the withdrawal of armed forces from Haiti and Nicaragua allowed the establishment in both republics of dictatorships—in Haiti with the flagrant violation of constitutionalism by President Vincent and in Nicaragua by the machination of General Somoza. But these are only incidents in the long process of political evolution. The preference in Latin America is not for dictatorships, but the people of these states prefer a Trujillo or a Machado to the suspension of all normal political processes thru the imposition of a foreign and arbitrary authority.

The recent treaty between Panama and the United States, revising many features in the former relations between the two countries, has been taken as a recognition of national maturity, gratifying to Latin America. But is this policy of the "good neighbor" received with rapture and uncritical enthusiasm in Hispanic America? There still exists a strong undercurrent of doubt and suspicion. There is recalled the enthusiasm with which Pan Americanism was received in former years when

close upon the elevated declarations of fraternity and concord came armed interventions and the unseating by violence of governments. It is impossible for Hispanic America to accept the *volte face* of the present administration until the guarantees of sincerity are overwhelmingly convincing.

Two doubts assail the Latin American mind on the matter of the abandonment of intervention—unquestionably one of the essential features of the Roosevelt policy. First, the new declarations apply only to armed intervention, that is, the employment of armed forces in foreign territory. And second, the stipulations regarding this policy of non-intervention cannot in the nature of things be extended beyond the period during which the present administration holds office. This does not prevent what many have already seen as the more indirect, less tangible, but even more disastrous forms of intervention known as “diplomatic intervention.” Cubans have felt the unscrupulous activities of American ambassadors in Havana, whose influence has been enormous in internal politics.

The influence of embassies and the manipulation behind the scenes causes fear and anxiety in the Latin American mind. Will the policy be one of strictly “hands off”? No meddling, no manipulation, no intervening? It is this which Hispanic America wants to know, as well as whether this new doctrine will be permanent or is a mere release for eight years from the pernicious practice of assuming the guidance of the weaker nations of the hemisphere. In general the renunciation of intervention at Montevideo has restored much faith in the good will of the United States. But fear persists that the change will not be permanent.

In addition of these broad international questions, both economic and political, which absorb the attention of the thinking man in Latin America, there are grave

problems of an internal character no less thought-provoking and difficult. There has been an infiltration of European political philosophies which have manifested their presence in social and political movements within the republics. Dictatorship predominates today in the region washed by the Caribbean. There is the crude dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, vindictive, violent and unabashed. There is the more subtle civilian rule of Sténio Vincent in Haiti, suave, meticulous and refined. There is the military sword rattling of Ubico in Guatemala and Martinez in Salvador, ruthless and harsh. There is the dictatorship of a political philosophy in Mexico, relentless in maintaining the forces of social revolution against any and all opposition, grouped generally under the term reactionism. The form of arbitrary government varies widely. The reality is there. The older democratic institutions as originally conceived have been cast aside.

Can stability, progress and a high cultural level be attained on an economic basis of exploitation? Can a colonial economy lead to an elevated standard of life and achievement? These questions are asked persistently in Hispanic America. There are signs of rebellion against systematic exploitation. Doctrines of an extreme character have taken root in some places. From Peru has come a new creed called *Aprismo* from the name of the movement initiated by Raul Haya de la Torre, *Acción Popular Revolucionaria Americana*. The essence of this movement, which has reached the corners of Hispanic America, is unflinching opposition to American imperialism. It rejects communism, casts aside all affiliation with European radicalism, and appeals to Hispanic America on the basis of the struggle against foreign exploitation.

WHICH WAY CANADA? <sup>5</sup>

The Canadian isolationist, in minimizing or repudiating the Commonwealth connection, is by so much weakening his country's chance of preserving the realities of its national independence on the American continent. The people of the United States have, indeed, long been given to exaggerating the significance for Canadian-American relations of the autonomous tendencies in Canada's development. Their own history has led them to believe that the national independence of an American country depends essentially upon the complete severance of its European ties. They naturally find it difficult to realize that it has not been such isolation from Europe but rather preservation of a European connection that has been the essential condition making possible the creation of a Canadian nation independent of their own republic. United States isolationism is a reassertion of national independence, while isolationism for Canada, on the contrary, places Canadian nationality in jeopardy by increasing the liability of its subjection to American domination, and so it is not a guarantee of the Dominion's national independence, but rather the reverse. The position of an isolated Canada as a neighbor of the United States would be considerably more precarious in the long run than that of Mexico. The centers of Mexican life are far removed from those of the states, while Canada's lie very close. The transportation systems and indeed the economies and the cultures of Canada and her neighbor are much more closely interwoven. Americans would hesitate to try to assimilate the population of Mexico, but they are prone to take for granted, tho certainly without full warrant in fact, that apart from

<sup>5</sup> From article by Reginald G. Trotter. *Queen's Quarterly*. 45:292-99. Autumn, 1938.

Quebec the Canadians are already assimilated except in political allegiance.

Canada, then, has continued need of a genuine Commonwealth connection, sufficiently vital to cause opinion in the United States to take it for granted as an essential accompaniment of Canadian nationality. It would be interesting to speculate how long American opinion would acquiesce in Canada's preferential tariff system if it were merely a Canadian system. Obviously American recognition of its validity rests upon its intra-Commonwealth character. Continuous demonstration to the republic is still necessary that the Dominion as a nation is not exclusively American in its interests and outlook, nor likely to become so. Canada needs and will continue to need the prestige and strength of the Commonwealth association if she is to preserve not merely the professed friendship of her neighbor but the latter's respectful recognition and acceptance, in practice, of the realities of the Dominion's national independence.

Continued necessity for her neighbor's amiable forbearance also argues that Canada will be wise to avoid unprofitable occasions of friction. It may be discreet, for instance, to let cities and states south of the Great Lakes bear the brunt of any contest with Chicago over diversion of lake water. If they cannot win that case, how could it be won? Furthermore, while opportunities may properly be seized for gestures of cordiality, these should be made only after duly weighing their implications in each instance.

In this connection there arises the question of Canada joining the Pan American Union. An invitation would no doubt be forthcoming if its acceptance were assured, and the step is not without its advocates both in the United States and in Canada. Supporters of the idea in the former country seek Canada as an ally in the mobilization of democratic influences within

the Union against the growing fascist tendencies in some Latin-American countries. It may be wondered just how useful an ally Canada would be in such a cause in view of the present situation in Quebec, since that province would doubtless largely influence Canadian policy with regard to such matters in Latin America. However that may be, the point to be noticed is that Canada is desired in the Pan American Union as a potential supporter of United States policy.

In such association Canada would certainly on many occasions disappoint the hope that she would strengthen her neighbor's hand. As a small power the Dominion would instinctively resist, along with other small powers, the natural instinct of the United States to use the Union to strengthen her position of leadership if not of domination among the states of the western hemisphere. The widespread Latin-American suspicion of the motives of the United States would in the long run receive more Canadian sympathy than would be accorded that country's ambitious purposes. Canadian interests in Latin-America, moreover, are in considerable measure competitive with those of the United States. In the Pan American Union, then, Canada would be likely to give her immediate neighbor fewer occasions for gratitude than for irritation. Yet her relations with that neighbor are infinitely more important for her than all her Latin-American associations. She does not need the Union for the sake of her relationships with the neighboring republic. Even if by joining the Union she could help notably the general intra-American situation, it would still be appropriate to consider the probable effect upon her relations with the United States. Since the positive fruits of membership in the Union would be slight at best, and since relations with Washington would almost certainly be repeatedly embarrassed by such membership, the gesture of joining, however cordially



intended, would hardly fulfill the expectations of its advocates.

In so far, moreover, as entering the Union might tend to create an impression in the United States that Canada was substituting Pan American for Commonwealth associations, it would weaken the Dominion's position in its general dealings with the republic. A step that might be appropriate enough if the United States had joined the League of Nations or were frankly allied with Britain or the Commonwealth, would therefore, in a long range view of Canadian interest, seem under existing circumstances to be inadvisable.

Geography and history have determined for Canada a more natural regional grouping than Pan America. Her most important relations are with Great Britain and the United States. The cultivation of closer associations within this triangular group, overlapping Commonwealth boundaries, offers immeasurable potential usefulness to Canada herself, to the Commonwealth, and to the larger comity of nations.

Much has been said about Canada's natural role as "interpreter" between the United States and British countries. Altho it is a role that has possibilities of usefulness to all concerned, attention may be called to an even more fundamental role. Aside from questions of understanding one another better, the people of the States, on the one hand, and of Britain and the Commonwealth, on the other, have in the past tended to take continued friendship for granted on account of Canada's dual position in the British Empire and in North America. Canada cannot revoke her geographical situation if she would; she is American in this sense and is fated to remain so. By still preserving also the validity of her overseas connection she may continue to be of service to the Commonwealth as well as to herself in the role mentioned above. In the

United States the attitude that assumes friendship with Britain and the Commonwealth is more likely to remain ascendant in popular feeling and official policy if the boundary of the Commonwealth continues very obviously to run at the Canadian border.

The people of the United States are becoming increasingly conscious of the community of interest between their own democracy and the democracies of Europe in face of the threatening ambitions of the non-democratic powers. The nation whose Monroe Doctrine was so largely rendered effective by the backing of the British Navy faces the possibility of requiring British naval help to keep open its essential trade routes in time of national peril. The national interest of the United States, on this account, in maintaining good relations with Britain, strengthens the chances for generous friendliness towards Canada as a nation so long as the Dominion keeps its own British association alive and vigorous.

Canada's national position, then, will be more secure if she cherishes her organic membership in the British Commonwealth. In her national interest, she can afford to draw into closer political affiliation with the United States only as the republic itself shall draw closer to Britain and the Commonwealth in a relationship holding some promise of permanence. She may well give any cooperation in her power towards cementing a British-American *entente* by economic or other means, tho she may expect to face the necessity in such a situation of subordinating some of her more particular interests for the sake of her own larger interest in relation to this *entente*. However greatly such an *entente* may be to the Dominion's advantage, it will not remove the necessity for delicate adjustments of policy. A principal element in the strength of Canada's national position must still be found in the opportunity to balance one against the other her associations with Great Britain

and with the United States. Any thing that diminishes that opportunity lessens the likelihood of the Dominion's survival.

In conclusion the assertion is ventured that by shaping her policy along such lines as are here advocated Canada has her best chance as a nation, not only to avoid becoming a protectorate of the United States, but to play a constructive part in drawing the democratic countries closer together including both the Commonwealth and the United States. Upon the fate of these two and upon the relations between them Canada's own national destiny depends and must depend.

#### BRIEF EXCERPTS

We don't feel an urgent necessity for establishing a complex system of collective security, involving pacts, treaties of non-aggression and mutual assistance accords. This is because there already exists on our American continent a more durable and efficacious collective security engendered by our own spiritual nature. *Correio da Manha, Rio de Janeiro. Literary Digest. Mr. 28, '36. p. 15.*

Despite the fact that President Cardenas advocated a Pan-American navy in his speech delivered before the World Congress Against War on September 12, there is reason to believe that Mexico has reconsidered its position and is unenthusiastic about the scheme. Since the United States navy has about four times the tonnage of the combined Latin American fleets, cooperation under these conditions might become subservient. *Nathaniel Weyl. Nation. N. 5, '38. p. 473.*

All parts of the world are now linked by trade, communication and transportation in one society. If

these parts try in spite of this fact to act independently of and in opposition to each other, a kind of civil war or disturbance will always result. If they will act in cooperation with each other and as parts of a single whole, the result will be a collective system of life, similar to the "collective system" under which our cities, our provinces, and our country live now. They are subject to one law and the whole force of the society is used to enforce that law against anyone who breaks it. *Interdependence. O. '34. p. 160.*

Though Latin America has had its share of wars, it has been better known during the last two decades for widespread civil strife.

Political changes below the Rio Grande have usually been accompanied by violence. Only three Latin American countries—Haiti, Colombia and Venezuela—have been undisturbed by revolutions since the World War. And even these three excepted countries have either had to contend with sporadic internal uprisings not serious enough to be called "revolutions," or else have been engaged in periodic frontier warfare with their neighbors. *United States News. O. 10, '38. p. 1.*

"Collective security without coercion" was the phrase being bandied about Washington. If you asked how collective security was to be enforced without coercion you were generally told that it wouldn't need to be enforced, that was just the point.

Or from franker folk you got the more realistic interpretation that as the United States navy was incalculably stronger than any force, naval or military, south of the Rio Grande, threat of its use against an aggressor would effectually prevent any aggression without actual "coercion."

If, however, you followed that up by asking how the United States navy as an international police force

for all America squared with the doctrine of non-intervention, you found again that you were up against an impenetrable confusion of thought. *W. N. Ewer. Labour. Ja. '37. p. 108.*

If the United States signs a pact of non-interference, then there will be nobody to police the Caribbean coast and past events have shown only too clearly that the republics cannot be left to their own devices without endangering foreign interests. It is not that the assurances of the presidents are worthless, for they are not; it is merely that revolutions have taken such a part in the life of Central America, that the inhabitants find it strange and unnatural to exist without them. The good intentions of those in power are often unquestionable, but revolutions in themselves breed bandits and all kinds of other unpleasant people, who have nothing to lose and everything to gain by dipping their fingers into the foreign pie. During these frequent disturbances, the republics are left helpless in the hands of revolutionary and bandit chiefs, while the outgoing presidents and other executives find themselves fully occupied in "flight" and quite unable to protect foreign interests. *Rawdon Hoare, English Review. D. '34. p. 665.*

As for the Monroe Doctrine being equally shared by all of the twenty-one republics, I propose only one simple test. Suppose that the newspaper headlines tomorrow should announce, on the basis of credible evidence, that Mussolini was about to establish a powerful naval base on the Colombian coast within striking distance of the Panama Canal. Do you imagine that the United States would waste much time in consultation before taking action?

Indeed, I predict a new vitality for the original Monroe Doctrine as a result of fascist penetration into

Latin America. James Monroe, in a forgotten passage of his now famous doctrine, warned the European powers to keep their peculiar political systems as well as their control out of the Americas. President Roosevelt, without doing violence to the memory of Monroe, could smashingly resurrect this forgotten clause. In fact, I shall be surprised if he does not do so. *Thomas A. Bailey. Institute of World Affairs. Proceedings, 1937. p. 75.*

There is no Pan Americanism worthy of the name. There is no conviction of a dynamic continental unity among Americans. There never has been such conviction. There is none today. The people of Kansas and Connecticut have none of it, nor do the people of Argentina and Chile. Pan Americanism, a romantic and unreal dream, was the child of Simon Bolivar's high-minded but somewhat light-headed imagination. Pan Americanism, as a trade thrust, was the child of New England thrift. The romanticists forget that the lines of commerce, whether in goods or in ideas, usually run east and west, not north and south. The cultural ties of Latin America are with Paris and Madrid. They may buy from us, they may sell to us, but they do not think and feel with us. Perhaps things should be differently ordered. Perhaps indeed, the Americas should draw together in fraternity and mutual appreciation. Perhaps, in short, there should be a large measure of Pan Americanism. But the fact remains that Franklin Roosevelt was speaking to nations which do not take Pan Americanism seriously. And, with all candor, we might add that he was speaking for a nation which does not take its Pan Americanism very seriously either. *Hubert Herring. Harper's Monthly Magazine. Ap. '37. p. 454.*

We do not desire to be nor could we continue being Pan Americanist. The famous Monroe Doctrine which appeared for a century to be our guarantee of political independence against European conquest, has revealed itself gradually as a right of the North Americans to intervene in our affairs. The powerful neighbor and officious friend has developed to the highest extent the régime of capitalistic protection and has reached in the last war the hegemony of the world. With this economic power the voracity of the privileged class has grown in imperialistic sentiment until it has made the government an instrument with which to capture sources of riches and exploit the workers of the world. In the governing class there has grown at the same time a sentiment of expansion and conquest, so that the classical phrase, America for the Americans means now nothing more than America—our Latin America—for the North Americans. Let us make it clear that we are citing facts without condemning their authors. We are not slandering nor scoffing at the North Americans. The danger of the United States does not come from her inferiority but from her superiority. She it to be feared because she is great, rich and strenuous. The thing that interests us is the possibility of balancing her power in order that the independence and sovereignty of our nationalities shall be saved. *Dr. José Ingenieros. Nosotros. O. '22. Quoted in Current History. F. '23. p. 798.*

The question whether Latin America will go totalitarian or democratic is far from being a merely domestic problem of the countries concerned. Peace and international cooperation will depend upon the future of democracy. This future can certainly not be secured by intervention nor by merely counter-propaganda from this country thru radio, newspapers, visits, and dinner speeches. There is no better way to demonstrate the

superiority of liberty than by means of its highest achievement, i.e., thinking and knowledge. The only suitable way to secure good neighborhood on this continent is therefore by way of mutual assistance in cultural development, by definite and stable forms of educational and scientific cooperation which involves not only a few selected intellectuals, but also are prone to reach the masses.

Only then will these masses be able to reach a higher standard of living and to offer suitable positions to the educated youth, thus easing the tendencies toward radicalisms and the concentration of interest upon politics and political jobs. Only then, consequently, will they attain political and social stability and make marked advance toward a true democracy. Give your Latin American neighbors the opportunity to study the necessities of their own countries below the surface of political propaganda of whatever tendencies, and you will make at least this continent safe for democracy and peace. *Richard F. Berhandt. World Affairs. Je. '38. p. 110.*

The *London Times*, in a leading editorial on December 18, after pointing out that the consultation program does not "go so far as the original proposals of the United States delegation, which would have set up a permanent committee of the Foreign Ministers of the contracting countries," cited the provision that "nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights and duties under the League Covenant of those countries which are members of the League of Nations." It added:

This has been perhaps the most ticklish point in the discussions. The United States representatives have disclaimed from the beginning any desire to set up an American League which should even appear to be a rival or substitute for the Geneva organization. In their view there was nothing in the original proposals of the United States which would interfere with the



effective working of the Geneva machinery. Some of the sixteen South American members of the League, however, insisted that no room should be left for any obscurity or for any possible conflict between their new obligations under this Pan-American Convention and their old obligations under the League Covenant. Their insistence is worth noting, showing as it does that in the view of Argentina and other South American countries the League of Nations is far from being the useless and moribund institution which some of its critics would have the world believe.

*International Conciliation. Je. '37. p. 568.*

As a result of the increasing disinclination to accept American leadership in international affairs, and of the growing scepticism regarding the power of the League to settle international disputes, the South American states are now looking to themselves for the settlement of their continent's problems. In this movement Argentina has been particularly active. Argentina is very proud of her remarkable progress during the past generation. She regards the leadership of Latin America as naturally falling to her, and sees herself as the protagonist of Latin America versus the United States. This attitude is not shared by the people of other Latin American states. In fact, nothing could be more mistaken than the belief that because a latent distrust of the United States exists in most of the Latin American countries it has led to the building up of anything like a unified bloc against the United States. Too many divisive influences exist. Moreover, the dislike of the United States held by many people in Argentina is paralleled by the dislike of Argentina held by many people in other countries of Latin America. They resent any attitude of superiority upon its part as much as they do any attitude of tutelage upon our part. Nevertheless, the recent visit of President Justo of Argentina to President Vargas of Brazil would seem to indicate that the Argentine foreign office believes it possible to organize the countries of the southern half

of South America into a group under its leadership, for the consideration and solution of questions of mutual interest to them.

If such a movement succeeded the result would be a further dilution of Pan Americanism. *Stephen P. Duggan. Foreign Affairs. Ja. '34. p. 292.*

An enemy strong enough to attack will feel strong enough to ignore the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, what assurance have we that a modern war would not be over before notewriting diplomacy brings this doctrine into play? We are in an age where stern realities and not theories or conventions must be faced. Nowadays, nations fight first and declare afterward. Furthermore, we must not forget the feverish activity and huge expenditure of our friendly neighbor in her armament program. We know she has no aggressive designs in mind. Why, then, this enormous expansion in army, navy and air equipment? For defense! Defense against what or whom? Perhaps no particular nation, but it is convincing evidence that the United States clearly envisages the possibility of attack and she intends to be ready. If such a situation unfortunately developed, how, if at all, would it affect us? The answer is made obvious by the Great War. What guarantee have we that Canada would not be a convenient Belgium, an easily seized base from which to direct military operations, and in the process suffer destruction and tragedy just as Belgium did?

It is safe to say that Canada has rejected the isolation policy advocated by some well-meaning persons, and has taken an important step toward essential cooperation with Great Britain and the rest of the Empire in matters of defense.

We are not arguing the question of war or peace. There is no reason for argument. We are all for peace. There is in Canada no war party. It is equally

obvious that Britain is just as firmly bent on peace as we are. In our zeal for imperial connection, our desire to maintain the sentimental ties that bind us so firmly to the motherland, we are not needlessly risking our future. In the present state of world opinion it is obvious to most people that a strong Empire working for a common goal of peace, but fully prepared for any emergency, is the best insurance against attack. *G. Howard Ferguson. Review of Reviews. Jl. '37. p. 52.*

The New Americanism will crack up if the gaps and lags in the economic and cultural status of the Americas are not closed. Equality *de facto* must come before equality *de jure* ceases to be much more than a pious hope. Doctors Saavedra Lamas and Barreda Laos, perhaps more clearly than any other Latin American delegates, understood Latin America's great need for larger, richer and more educated populations. Furthermore Latin America's credit in the money markets must be restored before the wider of those gaps can be closed. There is no question that the financial progress and position of the Argentine made it possible for her to stand up and defy the United States. Her credit was good, her debts are being paid off. During the Conference she floated an internal loan of ten million pesos at the incredibly low rate (unheard of in Latin American financing) of 4 per cent and bought the Standard Oil interests, to boot, for a mere bagatelle of slightly fifty million dollars. Whether she was wise in using her newly acquired independence as she did is another question.

On the other hand, the President of the United States and the State Department have a most important task ahead of them. This is to educate the masses of average American citizens, whose representatives in the present and future congresses can undo the work which they have done, in the achievements of the "good

neighbor policy." There must be continuity in these policies if the gains are not to be wiped out. In Dr. Saavedra Lamas's last speech he hinted at the dangers of making binding agreements with a people whose policy has changed and which may change in the future. As a sane Latin American policy benefits our nation as a whole, this process of education must be done on a non-partisan basis and without partisan considerations. *Paul Vanorden Shaw. North American Review. Mr. '37. p. 39-40.*

I should be very sorry to see the United States join in any binding pact to join with the other nations of the Americas in resisting aggression, no matter what might be its justifications. I do not like that kind of alliance and do not find it within American tradition or sentiment.

What if a nation make aggression almost inevitable by its unfair acts—are we to support the guilty party? What if part of the nations of this continent side with one belligerent and part with the other—are we going to run the risk of being involved in a general war? But I doubt whether this was in the mind of the Secretary of State. I think he was merely trying to find a compromise for the Monroe Doctrine in a consultative pact.

Such a pact has, of course, its dangers for us because if, after consultation, we refuse to join in active military operations we should be no longer respected. On the other hand it is far less dangerous than a binding defensive alliance which an agreement to join in resisting any aggression would be.

Canada, it has always seemed to me, should be asked to take part in all Pan American conferences and discussions. It could not possibly join an anti-aggression pact without reservations because it could not be put in the position of having to fight England

—no matter how unlikely British aggression may be. For our own sakes, however, I believe that Canada should always be a full and active member in any Pan American arrangements in which it is willing to join.

The best way to bring about Pan American solidarity is not thru the signing of endless agreements. It is by building up trade and friendly understanding, by making it quite clear that we have no thought of aggression, that we do not pretend to dictate on any subject, that we want only to live as one member of the family of American nations. Above all we must make no promises that we cannot or will not fulfill to the letter. *William R. Castle. United States News. D. 7, '36. p. 2.*

No equivalent length of long coast line could be defended against an attack in force so effectively as the long Atlantic coastline of the Dominion of Canada—with one exception: the long Pacific coast line of the Dominion of Canada. If space permitted, the same sort of description could be given of the Pacific coast as has been presented for the Atlantic. This country may in fact be compared with a turtle: it can pull its head and its tail in under its shell, as it were, leaving none of its vital parts exposed.

We could defend our country from an attack on a large scale by equipping ourselves with suitable aircraft, air bases, heavy coast batteries, mines and submarines, all these not cheap, it is true, but among the cheapest forms of armaments, far cheaper than cruisers, battleships, and forces of infantry. A modern fighting plane costs somewhere under \$100,000 but a modern battleship may cost up to \$60,000,000.

But suppose another assumption is made. Suppose we decide, as Sir John A. MacDonald once put it, that Europe's troubles are not our business, that the world may be out of joint but that we are not born

to put it right. What becomes of the likelihood of attack then? For a parallel, go back to the Great War. Altho that war raged over almost the whole of Europe, five small countries almost within sound of the guns found it possible to keep out of it, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and, closer still, Holland and Switzerland. Why? Simply because they were prepared to defend their neutrality and were not in the path of marching men. Belgium was in the path, and she became a battlefield in consequence. But the others, more fortunately situated, knew what was best for them and remained neutral. Why was their neutrality not violated? Simply because both sides preferred to have them as neutrals rather than as enemies. If Germany had invaded Holland, the Dutch would have defended their country and that would have meant an additional enemy. Incidentally no great power has ever been able to conquer Holland; if this little country has always been able to defend itself, even if right next door to the giants, it is hard to see why Canada, so far away, cannot. No country at war deliberately increases the number of its foes. Thus, altho they badly needed its supplies of oil, the Germans did not molest Roumania until it came in against them. Therefore if Canada wishes to stay out of the next war, she will not be attacked by one of the fighting nations. Nothing is more certain than that. *A. R. M. Lower. Canadian Forum. Ja. '38. p. 343.*

In this question of peace we come close to the heart of the matter. Peace is essential to the development and exploitation of markets. And it was to obtain a larger share of the South American market for the United States that Messrs. Roosevelt and Hull uttered high-flown phrases in Buenos Aires. They have a major goal and one or two minor objectives. With regard to the latter, they want to make sure of

two things. First, they want it so arranged that when the United States gets into the coming imperialist war none of the South American republics will be found fighting on the other side. Second, they want to protect the sources of certain raw materials that America might need in that war. Meanwhile, of course, they want to see to it that, pending the entry of the United States into the next world war, the United States gets the trade that Europe and Asia must perforce abandon if the Americas, in consequence of the "new neutrality," isolate themselves at the beginning of that war.

But the major objective was to push England, Germany, and Japan out of the South American market in time of peace as well as in time of war as far as that can be done. That is the purpose, and the only purpose, of the so-called "good neighbor" policy. It is but another example of that "peaceful economic penetration" to which modern imperialists everywhere are turning—so long as peace serves their purposes. If Mr. Roosevelt can persuade the South American countries that the United States has mended its ways, ought not these countries to reciprocate by buying more American goods? That at least is what they are expected to do.

But this does not mean that the United States has renounced its "right" to intervene. It has renounced nothing. It will have the "right" to intervene so long as it possesses the power to do so. The very fact that it is maintaining armed forces far larger than it needs for genuine self-defense reveals that in the last analysis it intends to depend upon its armed strength in any matter involving its self-interest, or "national interest," whether in South America or elsewhere.

Behind the Pan American front? Peace? Democracy? Not at all. It is just the old American imperialism in a new false-face. And when it comes to a showdown the results will be no different from

what they have been in the past. *Mauritz A. Hallgren. Nation. Ja. 23, '37. p. 111-12.*

First of all: Who is this new Good Neighbor?

Take off the false whiskers, his hip boots, his black glasses and green domino and—there stands the skeleton of our old friend, the Monroe Doctrine, holding in his arms the skeleton of our dead young trade.

He is the old doctrine of James Monroe, the keep-off-the grass, the this-is-my-baby policy of that long-ago President, which has caused so much sorrow, misunderstanding and dissension among the brethren of the western hemisphere in its frequently wretched and awkward applications upon people who couldn't see why, which has sent our marines into family fights, which has alienated trade and allies when it should have been winning both, which has inspired secret agreements of the Machiavellian stripe which sent Maximilian before a firing squad and Carlotta to an asylum, and which has sowed the seeds of bitterness against the United States and affection for the Old World in the hearts of millions of Latin Americans.

The doctrine probably was all right in the beginning—the idea that the strongest of the American republics would not tolerate foreign interference with the weaker. But in the years which have followed its promulgation its original ideal has taken on a number of others which have been highly offensive wherever they have been forced upon prospective recipients of benefits.

There have been, for instance, our constant high-handed meddling in business and trade, our indefensible attitudes toward Mexico and a brutal war against her; our general policy in regard to Cuba, our rows with the West Coast states of South America which have, once, at least, led to the very gates of war. There have been our strong-arm methods in Panama, and our unconquerable tendency to be the Western World police chief and



bounce the gendarmes upon states in upheaval. But to end it all, the most biting offense has been our gradual cultivation of the idea all over Latin-America that our governmental and private business idea was to be defined as "We take—you give," whether justly or not.

The question is: Can even so persuasive and so sincere an administration as the present one sell the good neighbor idea on these terms?

There are skeptical observers of the conference who say that in spite of the diplomatic words of the President and the Secretary of State both at Buenos Aires and at Rio de Janeiro, the United States has no intention whatever of changing her policy in regard to her twenty sister republics; that out of the State Department the United States is simply offering them a sweet and sugary version of the sour old Monroe-and-trade pickles in the hope that the change in taste will make arrangements happier and permit her still to be boss. They also say that the promotion of our leading part in the conference rose from our belief that if Europe fell into war, some of South America might get lugged in by the ears or go off on a trade debauch and leave us cold and friendless.

One pertinent example they quote is the curious insistence by the Central American bloc—a bloc closely allied by financial reasons to the Ogre of the North—that an amendment be made to the original almost-too-pious Article 2. The article is too long to quote, but the proposed amendment reads:

"Each of the American nations will consider as an affront against itself any affront by extra-continental nations against the rights of any of them, and such an affront will occasion a united common action."

This, they say, means that should the Kingdom of Graustark jump upon Uruguay, or insult Uruguay, that would constitute an insult against the remaining twenty-one republics, including the United States, of course—and that if all the other republics decided to do nothing about

it, the United States still would be morally obligated to put a stop to it, and could do so. This is arriving at the Monroe Doctrine thru the barn lot, the back gate, the back door, and thus to the parlor.

Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Argentine Foreign Minister, power in the League of Nations and Nobel Peace Prize winner for 1936, said practically the same thing at the conference. *Herbert C. Henderson. Today. D. 26, '36. p. 6-7.*

## SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

**RESOLVED:** *That the United States should follow a policy of isolation toward all nations involved in international or civil conflict outside the western hemisphere.*

### INTRODUCTION

- A. Among the leading alternatives in the foreign policy of the United States in respect to wars abroad are:
  - 1. Cooperation with nations at war in concerted or parallel action.
  - 2. Adherence to a neutral, isolated policy that will prevent our involvement.
  - 3. An indeterminate "middle of the road" policy.
- B. Recent world events have aroused much apprehension with respect to America's being drawn into a war originating abroad.
  - 1. The policies of aggressor nations are seen as a constant and increasing threat to world peace.
  - 2. The processes of international law are no longer a pledge of security.
- C. Simultaneously with overseas events and policies, the cementing of inter-American ties has assumed special importance in relation to the maintenance of peace and otherwise.
  - 1. A possible future threat to our hemisphere is seen as arising out of policies abroad.
  - 2. Our defense program is being envisaged as one of protection of the entire western hemisphere.
  - 3. The good neighborhood policy of the present national Administration has stressed the common ties of the Americas.
  - 4. The proposal has been made to further promote the solidarity of the Americas by a policy of mutual defense against threats to peace.
- D. By "isolation" is implied detachment from any direct action or policies that might tend to involve us in war.
  - 1. It implies political action, trade ties and other policies that might reasonably tend to violate our neutrality.
  - 2. It does not imply complete severance of relations normally existing between nations and their peoples.

## AFFIRMATIVE

- I. Isolation from conflicts outside the western hemisphere is the most desirable policy.
  - A. Isolation is best justified from the standpoint of world interests.
    1. We cannot under present conditions change the policies abroad under which wars arise.
      - a. The causes of international disturbances today are due to maladjustments.
        - (1) Former wars have left seeds of injustice and discontent.
        - (2) Change and progress require the breaking away from old conditions and the establishment of new.
      - b. Totalitarian nations will brook no interference with their policies.
        - (1) They have fully determined to reestablish their rights and hegemony.
        - (2) They have found the policy of might the only policy effective in the realization of their ends.
    2. The greater democracies abroad have themselves been responsible in part for conditions that today menace the world.
      - a. They took no action when it was called for to prevent the weakening of international law and the organs of peace.
        - (1) They permitted without effective protest the violation of international agreements.
        - (2) Their policies contributed to the failure of the League of Nations.
          - (a) They made use of it in support of nationalistic interests.
          - (b) They placed its maintenance of the status quo above the correction of world injustices.
          - (c) They have ignored the League in their recent international policies.
      - b. Their recent policies have been far from reassuring from the standpoint of other peace-loving nations.
        - (1) The Munich sacrifice of Czechoslovakia contributed to the widespread undermining of international faith.
        - (2) The policy of "appeasement" has been productive of further menace.
          - (a) It has strengthened the warmakers.
          - (b) The resulting changed balance of power has increased the insecurity of

their own countries and of the rest of Europe.

(c) It has brought new possibilities of discord and contention in the new implication of minority right, etc.

3. We have no real concern with affairs abroad.
    - a. Our interests are not vitally tied up in affairs overseas.
    - b. Nations abroad are entitled to the same freedom from our interference in their concerns that we claim from them in the Americas.
  4. Our active participation in war would not be of material advantage to the democracies abroad.
    - a. It would probably not be essential to the non-fascist nations.
      - (1) They are now superior to the fascist nations abroad in resources.
      - (2) The fascist powers have not the military power to overwhelm them.
      - (3) The Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis is not secure.
      - (4) It is probable that their own internal weakness or want of decisive policies will be their greatest menace.
    - b. A peace attained through their own efforts would be of more outstanding advantage to advantage to them in the end.
  5. We can best help nations in conflict by remaining at peace ourselves.
    - a. Our interference might well lead to worse conditions.
      - (1) It might lead to stiffened resistance and an increase in the area and intensity of the war.
      - (2) It might tend to embroil the whole world in war.
      - (3) It might lead to the collapse of all democracy and be a menace to civilization itself.
    - b. We can give the nations with whose causes we sympathize practical and important help while remaining out of war.
      - (1) We can strengthen them with our moral sympathy.
      - (2) We can aid them by maintaining our normal trade relations.
      - (3) We can aid them by refraining from undue support to nations opposing them.
- B. The policy of isolation is more in accord with our own national interests.

1. The principle is most in consonance with our accepted national practice.
  - a. It is a part of our established historic policy.
    - (1) It follows the injunctions of the founding Fathers.
    - (2) It follows the traditions of our history.
  - b. Isolation is currently observed in practice in relation to important phases of our international relationships.
    - (1) We maintain isolationism in a degree by staying out of the League of Nations and the World Court.
    - (2) The intention of our neutrality policy is the protection of our isolation and the keeping out of war.
2. Isolation would not of itself jeopardize any of our vital interests.
  - a. It would not involve the abandonment of any essential interests.
    - (1) Refraining from particular activities would be for a limited period only, or the duration of the war.
    - (2) Isolation would be merely a negative policy to avoid interference with conditions that more vitally concern others than ourselves.
  - b. Isolation would not, of itself, draw us into war.
    - (1) It is the policy least likely to involve any menace of invasion or other threat against us.
    - (2) Only policies we are active in would be likely to involve us abroad.
    - (3) The practicability of isolation was apparent in the World War where nations at the very border of the war were able to avoid being drawn in.
3. Participation in war would bring us no outstanding gain.
  - a. We want none of the results of war, in material conquest or power.
  - b. We should be unlikely to realize the fruits of any higher incentives that might bring us into war.
    - (1) Nations would merely use us to attain their own ends.
    - (2) The World War showed the futility of participation in conflict as a means for realizing altruistic ends.
4. The cost to us of participation in war would be immense.

- a. It would be costly economically.
    - (1) The financial outlay would be beyond computation.
    - (2) It would entail heavy drain upon our resources.
    - (3) Economic reactions to our nation might well assume disastrous proportions.
      - (a) The loss in trade, production, etc. might be immense.
      - (b) Readjustments after the war might entail great economic disturbance.
      - (c) The problems of international finance and debts would be still further complicated.
    - (4) Any economic results of isolation would in the end be less costly than those resulting from war.
  - b. It would entail tremendous loss in manpower.
  - c. It would lay us open to air bombing, attack, or invasion.
  - d. It would bring the possibility of disastrous social and political change.
    - (1) It would tend to fix a dictatorship upon us.
      - (a) Mobilization would bring widespread regimentation.
      - (b) Dictatorship would very likely continue with us for an indefinite period after the war.
    - (2) Widespread reaction, unemployment, loss of our liberties and other deterioration of our social structure would result.
5. Concerted action with other military powers would not be to our best interests.
- a. It would commit us to the support of policies that might be alien to our interests.
    - (1) It would essentially pledge our aid in support of policies, activities and political alliances of the countries we were allied with.
      - (a) We should have to place our economic and military resources at their practical disposal.
      - (b) We should be required to uphold, for the time being, possible nationalistic and imperialistic policies to which we might not otherwise subscribe.
      - (c) It would tie our hands as to our own policies and as to our freedom of

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- action in new international crises and developments.
- (d) It would tie us in respect to our regional responsibilities.
- (2) It would possibly align our aid to ideologies and principles we could not fully accept.
- b. Concerted action would link us with the international aftermath of the war and its possible chaotic results.
  - (1) The nations most directly concerned would dictate the new settlements.
  - (2) The new conditions would become in part our problem, affecting us as well as the nations more directly concerned.
- c. Military alliances are undesirable.
  - (1) They are precarious.
  - (2) They breed rival coalitions.
- 6. Participation in a war in Europe or Asia would lay us open to more widespread involvement than the immediate field of action.
  - a. Involvement in Europe would leave us and our interests in the Pacific exposed to attack.
  - b. A Pacific war might leave us weakened and endanger our interests in the Atlantic.
  - c. Military weakness at home caused by our occupation abroad might conceivably be followed by a totalitarian attack on Latin America and further endanger our safety.
- II. Coincident with our overseas policy it is desirable we maintain the peace of the western hemisphere through the institution of a defensive alliance.
  - A. Increasing menaces to the New World make a defensive alliance desirable.
    - 1. A war threat to the Americas is no longer beyond bounds of possibility.
      - a. The possibility of a totalitarian threat to the Americas exists.
        - (1) It would be in accord with their expansionist policies abroad.
        - (2) American resources would be of immense advantage to them.
        - (3) They have already obtained a widespread non-political impenetration in the Americas, particularly in Latin America.
          - (a) Their nationals have settled in the New World.
          - (b) Their economic and other vital interests are immense.



- (c) Their propaganda and ideology are widely prevalent.
    - b. The menace of a direct attack from overseas is no longer far-fetched from a practical standpoint.
      - (1) Technical developments have created a menace.
        - (a) They have lessened the obstacles of distance.
        - (b) They have brought the Americas within range of bombing attack.
      - (2) The growth in power of the totalitarian nations may make such a contingency possible.
        - (a) They may attain naval or air bases in closer proximity to the Americas.
        - (b) Democracies abroad may become so weakened as to no longer present a foil to their further expansion.
      - (3) A strategical occupation of American territory may aid an overseas invasion from American territory itself.
        - (a) The consolidation and extension of local influence among its nationals in America might aid it.
        - (b) The acquisition of bases in the western hemisphere would give material aid to operations.
      - (4) An alliance between a South American dictator and a European fascist state is not beyond possibility.
  - 2. The lack of a defensive alliance in the Americas constitutes a weakness.
    - a. With the exception of ourselves, the countries of the Americas are not strong enough to stand alone if attacked.
      - (1) They are generally weak from a military standpoint.
      - (2) They are economically weak.
    - b. Without some political alliance coordinated defense would be rendered difficult.
      - (1) There would be lack of a common, pre-determined policy.
      - (2) Divisive influences could more readily gain a foothold to disrupt it.
- B. An inter-American alliance would be a logical outgrowth of links existing between the Americas.
  - 1. The western hemisphere is a natural unity.
    - a. The countries of the New World have a common origin.

- b. There is geographical proximity between the two continents.
- c. The hemisphere has a common geographical detachment from the rest of the world.
- 2. The northern and southern hemispheres are united by a community of bonds and interests.
  - a. There are close cultural and diplomatic ties.
  - b. They have extensive trade and economic ties.
  - c. There is a similarity of political ideals embracing our concepts of liberty and democracy.
  - d. Canada's ties with us are close.
    - (1) We are close geographically, historically, politically, economically, financially.
    - (2) There is much similarity of outlook between us.
- 3. It would accord with long-standing aspirations of the Americas for a closer unity.
  - a. For more than a century statesmen have envisioned a closer link and unity between the Americas.
  - b. It would accord with a long series of treaties, agreements, etc. forged at various Pan American conferences.
- 4. It would be in keeping with efforts of recent years to better consolidate the unity of the western hemisphere.
- 5. It would accord with the greater destiny of the Americas.
- C. A defensive alliance would be feasible as a means for keeping us out of war.
  - 1. It could be established along sound and practicable lines.
    - a. An inter-American alliance could be constituted along lines of sound and high principles that would be generally acceptable and beneficial.
      - (1) It could embody acknowledged and mutual responsibilities and duties.
      - (2) Equality of constituent states could be established.
      - (3) It could embody avoidance of any political interference.
    - b. It could embody a permanent consultative committee to collaborate on policies and ways and means of avoiding war.
    - c. The experience gained in other international organizations and instruments of international policy should aid in providing the pattern of an effective organization.
      - (1) The Pan American Union points in part to the constitution of a body that would

- be acceptable for inter-American cooperation.
- (2) The European League of Nations presents an example of what can be accomplished in international cooperation.
    - (a) What is sound and workable in it could be adapted to an inter-American association.
    - (b) Its lines of weakness and failure can be made an example of what to avoid.
  2. A defensive pact would tend to prevent wars from threatening our western hemisphere.
    - a. It would strive to prevent conditions here from giving rise to war.
    - b. It would present an effective front against any nations or coalitions that might threaten us.
    - c. Guaranteed protection to all countries would enable the Americas to keep their armaments at a minimum consistent with safety, and avoid the excessive costs and dangers of armament races.
  3. A defensive alliance would tend to keep us out of conflicts waged elsewhere.
    - a. We should not so readily be drawn into war through the violation of our rights and the principles supported by us.
    - b. It would provide united effort against such wars.
  - D. A defensive alliance of the Americas would be otherwise beneficial.
    1. It would promote the general interests of the western hemisphere.
      - a. It would strengthen the bonds of good neighborhood.
        - (1) It would bring about greater mutual accord.
          - (a) Greater sympathy and understanding would result.
          - (b) It would encourage the promotion of other accord promoting agencies.
          - (c) It would provide a greater measure of protection to the Americas against alien propaganda.
        - (2) It would tend to bring the nations together at more frequent intervals for mutual cooperation.
      - b. It would strengthen the economic and political ties of the Americas.

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- c. It would facilitate the handling of our purely continental problems.
  - (1) We have many problems that relate predominantly or exclusively to our hemisphere.
  - (2) Continental problems are better handled in the light of regional welfare than as concerns of separate countries or on an international basis.
- 2. A defensive alliance would be beneficial internationally.
  - a. It would strengthen world peace.
    - (1) Nations would be discouraged from going to war.
      - (a) Notice would be given of our united stand against nations so engaged.
      - (b) Notice would be given that our resources and foodstuffs would be withheld from nations at war.
    - (2) It would provide a united alignment for policies standing for peace.
      - (a) It would stand for the protection of democracy.
      - (b) It would stand for united action on the side of all international law and order.
    - (3) It would provide a regional example to other nations of the practical working of peace.
  - b. It would provide better cooperation with the League of Nations and other international agencies.
    - (1) An inter-American alliance would not require the withdrawal of membership of the nations now in the League.
    - (2) The present weakness of American influence in the League would be replaced by regional cooperation on such League policies as are acceptable to the Americas.
- 3. A regional alliance would not present any injurious effects.
  - a. It would present no disadvantages to the western hemisphere.
    - (1) It would leave the nations full autonomy.
    - (2) It would leave full international freedom to each nation except as to measures freely entered upon.
    - (3) It would constitute no threat to any American nation.

- b. It would bring no danger from the United States.
  - (1) There is no danger the United States would attempt to make it an agency of imperialism, or of its own policies.
    - (a) Each nation could have an equal vote and influence within it.
    - (b) The United States has in many ways manifested an altruistic attitude of goodwill.
      - x. Its goodwill policy had its beginnings before the present administration.
      - y. Its sacrifices at the Pan American conferences have been the greatest.
        - x' It consented to the continentalization of the Monroe Doctrine.
        - y' It accepted machinery which will operate to check interventions.
    - (c) An attempt by the United States to control it would lead to a balance of power on the part of South American nations.
  - (2) The United States has no motives that would constitute a threat to the security or sovereignty of any American state.
- c. It would not withdraw Latin America from a universal system into a policy of continental exclusiveness.
  - (1) Nothing would prevent the adherence of individual nations to the League of Nations.
  - (2) Nothing would call for conflict with existing international obligations.
  - (3) It would be purely a defensive alliance for the maintenance of cooperation.

NEGATIVE

- I. It is undesirable that we maintain an invariable policy of isolation from wars abroad.
  - A. The maintenance of our international cooperation and world responsibilities is more important today than ever before.
    - 1. Widespread menaces exist to world security and order.

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- a. Lawbreaking nations constitute an increasing menace.
    - (1) Totalitarian nations are seeking expansion and power by force of might.
    - (2) Through aggression and other means they are remaking the world in their own interests.
    - (3) The principles of international law that are at the foundation of world order are being repeatedly defied.
  - b. The world is held in the thrall of growing insecurity and fear.
    - (1) Threats are of growing prevalence.
    - (2) The nations are steadily increasing their armaments in size, deadliness and menace.
  - c. There is a threat in world policies to our own position and security.
    - (1) American principles are being menaced.
    - (2) Our world interests and future security face challenge.
  - d. Threats to democracy may well constitute a menace to civilization itself.
2. There can be no security today that is not collective.
- a. Nations are interdependent today in many ways.
  - b. Few if any nations have the requisite strength to face alone possible opposing forces.
    - (1) They have not the military and economic strength.
    - (2) The developments of technological warfare are too great.
    - (3) The strategy of modern warfare may penetrate all relationships of national life.
  - c. The policy of individual nationalism holds no assurance of peace.
    - (1) It allows the development of authoritarian policies.
    - (2) Only when there is mutual protection under law can peace be really secure.
  - d. The denial of cooperation intensifies the evils of war.
    - (1) It strengthens the hands of the war-makers.
      - (a) It gives them the practical right of way in realizing their aims.
      - (b) New acquisitions in territory, resources, bases etc. make them the more formidable.

- (c) Their alliance presents a greater menace.
  - (2) It tends to future warfare on a larger scale.
  - (3) It subjects nations to irreparable losses.
  - (4) Without the assurance of support the moral sense of nations may flag.
    - (a) Unless directly menaced they may be disinclined to uphold principles.
    - (b) Policies of expediency and appeasement may rule.
  - (5) Conditions of warfare now prevalent in the world have been strengthened by our isolationist attitude.
3. Non-isolation in war when conditions call for our cooperation would be widely beneficial.
- a. Our help would aid in establishing a quicker peace.
  - b. It would ensure the benefits of our influence in the afterwar settlement.
  - c. It will better ensure the protection of the principles for which our democracy stands.
  - d. It would materially assist us to strengthen and make workable the machinery of peace.
  - e. It would materially help to prevent future war.
    - (1) The knowledge that our resources and strength would be used against warmaking nations if occasion demanded would tend to prevent aggression.
    - (2) Our leadership would without doubt ensure the moral or material support of other nations for peace.
- B. Isolation would be detrimental nationally and otherwise.
- 1. It is not a feasible policy today.
    - a. We cannot consistently observe it.
      - (1) We are bound to the world today by many close ties which cannot be abrogated.
        - (a) Political ties cannot be separated from economic and other ties.
        - (b) A great power cannot be completely isolated today.
      - (2) We have not in the past maintained consistent isolation.
        - (a) We have not maintained a non-interference policy in Europe and Asia.
        - (b) We have been associated with many international cooperative movements abroad.

- (3) We are not now pursuing a policy of isolation.
  - (a) We are maintaining naval forces in China.
  - (b) To avoid applying our Neutrality law, we have upheld the fiction that because war has been undeclared it does not exist.
- b. We are not neutral in any situation which threatens to disturb world power.
  - (1) We are openly aligned in sentiment in respect to certain nations and policies.
  - (2) Even though not united in any war we are maintaining an attitude of watchfulness in all world affairs.
- 2. Isolation would require the abrogation of important interests and rights.
  - a. It would threaten vital interests of our nation in the world.
  - b. It would require insulation against all contacts that might tend to draw us into war.
  - c. It might mean the abandonment of many traditional policies.
- 4. Isolation would be economically detrimental.
  - a. It would jeopardize our trade policy.
  - b. It would react upon economic welfare.
  - c. In one way or another we should pay for war whether directly involved in it or not.
- 5. Isolation would be morally unjustified.
  - a. It would be an encouragement to fascist aggressions.
  - b. It would deny all help to weaker nations.
  - c. It would abet international injustices and wrongs.
- 6. Isolation would in the end, tend to bring us into war.
  - a. The changes produced in the world balance of power would inevitably present factors that would weaken us and vitiate vital rights.
    - (1) They would sooner or later present a threat to our interests.
    - (2) We should face the choice of fighting or of abject surrender.
  - b. The possible defeat of the great democracies would vitally affect the security of the United States.
    - (1) The weakening of Great Britain would affect us in the Atlantic regions.
    - (2) It would fundamentally change our position in the Pacific.



- (3) It would leave the British Dominions to be absorbed by fascist powers and thus further menace us.
- 7. Isolation would irreparably weaken our world leadership.
  - a. Nations would regulate their policies without regard for us.
  - b. We should lose our moral influence.
- II. The creation of an inter-American alliance would not be expedient at the present time.
  - A. A Pan American alliance is not called for under present conditions.
    - 1. There are no grounds for the concept of a strong, cohesive community of interest between the American nations.
      - a. There is no political community of interest.
        - (1) Our governmental structures are different.
        - (2) Latin American governments are virtual despotisms, democratic only in form.
      - b. In spite of geographical proximity the two continents are closer to Europe than to each other.
        - (1) The racial stock from Europe is in excess of that from our continent.
        - (2) Communication is greater and more frequent with Europe.
          - (a) Travel is quicker and more frequent.
          - (b) Radio, newspapers, etc. more largely reflect Europe.
        - (3) Latin American economic relations with Europe are at least as important as with the United States.
        - (4) The culture, religious life, social customs, traditions, sympathies and outlooks of the Latin Americans are more closely bound to Europe than to their northern neighbors.
    - 2. There are difficulties in the way of a genuine Pan American policy.
      - a. Latin America itself is not a unity.
        - (1) Its racial stock is not uniform.
        - (2) Its various republics are to a considerable extent isolated from each other.
        - (3) Divisions and jealousies exist among them.
      - b. Suspicion of the United States still remains.
        - (1) The ill-will engendered by our "big stick" and "dollar imperialism" policies of the past is not yet fully allayed.
        - (2) There is no assurance of the perpetuation of our good neighborhood policy.

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- (a) It is of relatively short standing.
- (b) There is no assurance that it may not change with our next administration.
- (3) Distorted views of North American life disseminated by movies, talkies and newspapers, tend further to accentuate lack of understanding and suspicion.
- c. Latin American countries have links with the European League of Nations which they would not readily abrogate in favor of a regional alliance.
- 3. Attack on the Americas is a remote contingency.
  - a. No minor power could attack America.
  - b. It is inconceivable the major non-fascist nations would find incentive to assume the risk of such an attack.
  - c. The danger of attack by a totalitarian nation is less probable than has been assumed.
    - (1) Their ambitions and efforts are fully engaged in home and adjacent regions.
    - (2) No nation has now the means for the prosecution of a successful war against the Americas.
      - (a) They have no base sufficiently close.
      - (b) Air transport does not constitute a real menace over so great a distance.
      - (c) They have not the fleets, transports and finances.
    - (3) They would expose themselves to flank attacks at home.
    - (4) They could not feasibly hold any American territory even if they acquired it.
- 4. In case of a threat from a foreign enemy the Americas can be defended without the necessity of a military alliance.
  - a. Most of the Latin American countries are becoming strong enough to provide for their own defense.
  - b. Canada is protected geographically and by her membership in the British Commonwealth.
  - c. The United States can effectively protect its interests thruout the western hemisphere.
    - (1) The projected naval increase is expected to give us a navy capable of action from Canada to Cape Horn.
    - (2) Under the Monroe Doctrine we would stand ready to repel any threat to any American country that might menace our security.

- (3) We could repel any direct menace to our own territory
- 5. The Pan American front is a camouflage intended to further our own interests.
  - a. It is intended to protect and extend our economic interests.
    - (1) It would facilitate the pushing of foreign powers out of American markets.
    - (2) It would assist our own commercial expansion.
    - (3) It would protect our sources of raw materials.
  - b. It is a device to keep Latin American countries from joining the other side in a future war.
  - c. Under cover of expanded military necessity a huge armament program would be created which might be turned to the revival of industry at home.
- B. The difficulties and pitfalls presented by an alliance of a political and defensive nature would be great.
  - 1. It would not be practicable.
    - a. A workable alliance would be difficult to establish.
      - (1) Ideological and other barriers tend to prevent it.
        - (a) Jealousy and distrust exist among the nations.
        - (b) There is disinclination for the limitation of freedom essential to its realization.
      - (2) Our past experience in regard to unified action is not promising.
        - (a) Our experience with the European League points to the difficulty of establishing a workable international organization.
        - (b) The history of the Pan American Union indicates the obstacles to be encountered in establishing an effective Union.
    - b. There is no assurance such an alliance would prevent war.
      - (1) There is little assurance the Americas would not be drawn into a world war if it comes.
      - (2) There is no assurance it would support New World isolationism.
      - (3) There is no assurance it would work in united accord in a crisis.

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- c. We could not altogether give up our right to intervene if conditions called for it.
  - (1) Under the implied equality of the nations in an alliance, multilateral rather than unilateral action would be called for.
  - (2) Our own safety might call for immediate action in case of an emergency.
- 2. There would be no positive advantage in establishing such an alliance.
  - a. It is not called for by American needs.
    - (1) The menace of war to the Americas has been over-estimated.
    - (2) In case of real menace the nations would cooperate to a great extent without the necessity of an alliance.
      - (a) Their mutual safety would call for it.
      - (b) Regard for mutual ideals would lead them to unite.
  - b. Little that is practical has so far resulted from our Pan American cooperation.
    - (1) The technique of enforcing agreements is weak.
    - (2) Agreements are workable only if the parties display good will and a willingness to cooperate.
  - c. It would present a vast duplication of effort.
    - (1) It would represent duplication with regard to other policies of international cooperation.
    - (2) It would duplicate the efforts being carried on by the League of Nations.
- 3. A Pan American alliance would break down through the exclusion of Canada.
  - a. As a member of the British Commonwealth Canada would very likely not find it feasible to join.
  - b. Canada is practically secure from invasion and would not require membership in such an alliance from the standpoint of self-defense.
  - c. Canada would wish to avoid intervening in disputes between the United States and Latin America.
- C. A Pan American alliance would be detrimental.
  - 1. It would be detrimental to Latin American interests.
    - a. It would place Latin America under the tutelage of the United States.
      - (1) There would be no real equality of the nations.
        - (a) There would be no equality of economic and political power.

- (b) The United States, as the most powerful power, would be the dominant one.
    - (2) The United States might use its position to further imperialistic designs.
  - b. It would cause widespread detriment to trade interests.
    - (1) It would accentuate the trade interests of the nations under the alliance.
    - (2) Trade with outside nations would tend to be discouraged.
    - (3) Outside governments would seek new sources of raw materials.
  - c. Freedom from war would by no means be guaranteed to Latin America.
    - (1) In being allied to the United States, the southern countries would be allied to the country most likely to be drawn into a European or Asiatic war.
    - (2) The alliance might abuse its power by the adoption of a military policy of its own.
- 2. It would tend in many ways to be detrimental rather than beneficial to the interests of the United States.
  - a. The abrogation of our right of intervention as implied under the equality of states in an alliance, would be detrimental to our interests.
    - (1) It would take away our right to intervene to defend the Panama Canal.
    - (2) It would mean that we should not be able to prevent European intervention in a matter concerning their interests.
    - (3) It would restrict our action in case foreign control and insidious propaganda in Latin America should jeopardize the interests of the continent.
  - b. It would restrict us from guarding our interests otherwise.
    - (1) Under new rulers and policies action by us might be essential.
    - (2) There is no assurance our relations will always be as friendly as now.
    - (3) Our good neighborhood policy might lead to definite disadvantages.
      - (a) The loss of American property might result through expropriations due to our lenient policy.
      - (b) It would open the doors to borrowing.
- 3. It would tend to be detrimental to world interests.

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- a. It would jeopardize our interests abroad.
    - (1) It would curtail our policy in respect to Asia.
    - (2) It would prevent our national cooperation with Great Britain, with whom our interests are closely bound.
      - (a) Our interests are parallel in a great many respects.
      - (b) Any disaster to Great Britain would most certainly affect us.
  - b. It would tend to weaken existing international institutions.
    - (1) It would further restrict our international policy in respect to treaties and agreements.
    - (2) The World Court would be weakened.
    - (3) The League of Nations would be further weakened.
      - (a) Nations now in the League might tend to withdraw in favor of an all-American policy.
      - (b) Policies would be divided between the American alliance and the League.
      - (c) The complications resulting from varied policies in the different countries would make united action in League policies more remote.
  - c. It would bring the disadvantage of a new partition of the world in a regional alliance.
    - (1) An inter-American bloc against the rest of the world would be developed.
    - (2) It would encourage and perpetuate other regional alliances such as Pan Latinism, Pan Germanism, etc.
    - (3) Unified action between independent regional alliances would be virtually a revival of the discredited and unstable "balance of power."
4. The need is for universality in our foreign relations, rather than for regionalism.

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