# CECIL RHODES

## HIS POLITICAL LIFE AND SPEECHES

C. J. Rhodes

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### 1881-1900

BY

VINDEX

*WITH PORTRAIT IN PHOTOGRAVURE AND A MAP*

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TO THE

CITIZENS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE LOYALISTS OF THE COLONIES, AS WELL AS OF THE MOTHER-COUNTRY, WHO HAVE REALISED, UNDER THE PRESSURE OF A GREAT WAR, THE EMPIRE'S UNITY, THIS RECORD OF THE MAKING OF THAT EMPIRE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS INSCRIBED.

# PREFACE

In this volume are collected for the first time the speeches of the Right Hon. C. J. Rhodes, from his first appearance in the Cape Legislative Assembly early in 1881 up to the present time.

The history of Mr. Rhodes's political work I have written to serve as an introduction and commentary to the speeches, which thus accompanied will, it is hoped, be more easily and fully understood.

For the correction of the facts connected with Mr. Rhodes's school life I have to thank the Rev. R. Geare, of Bishop's Stortford Grammar School, and for a correction in the date of Mr. Rhodes's matriculation, the Tutor of Oriel College, Oxford.

The map has been coloured to show the increase of British territory made through Mr. Rhodes since 1881, almost the whole of which territory was rescued by him from Transvaal annexation, attempted in defiance of treaties and of the Paramount Power.

The speeches have been carefully collated. The varying reports in the newspapers of South Africa and England have been compared, and, except in unimportant passages which are occasionally summarised,

a full text is given. In this work help has been obtained in newspapers too numerous to name, from the chief Cape Town journals, the *Cape Argus* (to the managing director of which in London special thanks are due for his courtesy in placing the files in his office at my disposal) and the *Cape Times*, to excellent local organs, such as the *Bulawayo Chronicle* and the *Diamond Fields Advertiser*, while in some of the later speeches help has been obtained from the *African Review*. The reports of the Chartered Company's and De Beers meetings have supplied the text of the speeches made on such occasions.

No one has suffered more from the shortcomings of reporters than Mr. Rhodes. In part this is due to the imperfect state of reporting in South Africa, in part to the fact that the speaker does not help the reporters with typewritten or printed copies of his speeches, for the simple reason that he never prepares what he has to say, but throws his ideas and facts before the public in such words as come on the spur of the moment. 'No one ever accused me of preparing a speech, though, no doubt, it is the proper thing to do,' is his own admission in one of his speeches.

The speeches, except for obvious verbal corrections of reporters' errors and repetitions, have purposely been left unchanged in their natural careless form. In these speeches the ideas and the facts on which they are based are the valuable things, the ideas

being the growth of years, the language the work of a moment; yet the speaker has sometimes struck off sayings that will not easily be forgotten, such as 'the Suez Canal of the trade of this country' for Bechuanaland in 1883, 'the North is my thought,' 'unctuous rectitude.' There is also a certain general form to be found in many of the speeches, unpremeditated though they are, like the sculptor's first rough blocking out of a statue, in which the idea is plain enough to the seeing eye, though the completeness of the finished work is left to the imagination.

Deeds, not words, are the natural expression of the Empire-maker's energies, and though he has so often held immense audiences spellbound, his success is not due to the art of the orator, but to the effect on his hearers of the great record of a life devoted to the Empire, and to the magnetism of a big personality talking to thousands in the same direct, familiar, homely language he would employ to one. This large simplicity of manner, backed by absolute conviction of the value of his matter, carries him to the heart of an audience, and his power as a popular speaker is best understood by those who have been present in the crowd on such occasions as the last Chartered Company's meeting, or, better still, at the enthusiastic meeting which welcomed him back to South Africa at the Drill Hall in Cape Town in July 1899.

These speeches are of special value and importance at the present time, being the authoritative account by the chief statesman of South Africa of the progress of political ideas in general, and of the ideas of Imperial expansion and unity in particular, in South Africa, from 1881 to 1899. Mr. Fitzpatrick has given us 'the Transvaal from within'; these speeches give us the more important knowledge of 'South Africa from within,' and trace every phase of its growth and development. They give the inner history of nearly twenty years. They lay bare the working of the two rival ideas—the Imperial idea, with equal rights for every civilised man without distinction of race, the true democratic idea; and the so-called Republican, or rather, exclusive Dutch idea, with political rights reserved for an oligarchy of Dutch farmers, on the ground of priority of occupation, that is, really on the ground of race. They disclose in their proper order and true relations the real causes, and show the significance of the present war, as the conflict of the two ideas—the Imperial idea, progressive and democratic; and the Republican, reactionary and aristocratic, its aristocracy of ignorance being the helpless prey of a resolute and crafty fanatic, supported by a clique of corrupt politicians and hare-brained enthusiasts.

In the growth of this exclusive Dutch idea, which for convenience one is forced to misname republican, the idea of an independent South Africa under

Dutch supremacy and under the hegemony of the Transvaal, we find the key to the whole external and internal policy of the Transvaal and the attitude of its allies the clique of politicians at Bloemfontein, and the clique at the Cape, since 1881. This idea, for instance, explains the Transvaal's appeal to the Free State in February 1881, which I quote here from Chapter II.: 'Come and help us. God rules and is with us. It is His will to unite us as a people, to make a United South Africa, free from British authority'; it explains the warnings of President Brand that the appeal would be accepted, and the threats and warnings of the Hofmeyr party that there would be a rebellion at the Cape. It explains the formation of the Afrikander Bond by Mr. Reitz and Mr. Borckenhagen in 1881. It explains, again, the Transvaal's attempt to seize the key to the interior, Bechuanaland, in 1883-4, and the help it had in this daring aggression from its allies the Cape Dutch Republicans and their leaders, the same warnings as before of a rebellion at the Cape being employed, when the Imperial troops were ordered up under General Warren. This explains the steady application of the same policy, the support given to the Transvaal by the same Cape Dutch politicians with the same threats and warnings, when the Transvaal attempted to seize Zululand, and by their help did actually retain three thousand square miles of

territory. This explains the Transvaal's repeated attempts to 'rush' Mashonaland, and the persistent opposition of Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond party to Mr. Rhodes's policy of northern expansion, their opposition to the northern railway, and their attempt to drive its extension into the territory of the South African Republic. This explains the steady and successful effort of President Kruger to make the Transvaal a centre of anti-British influence, and, as the wealth of the mines supplied the funds, to make it the paramount military power in South Africa. This explains the condition of vassalage to which by deliberate enactments the Transvaal reduced the Uitlanders, for to the advocates of this idea all South Africa is 'Ons Land,' our land, the proper possession of the Dutch race alone, and the Transvaalers are the fighting vanguard of this exclusive idea. This idea explains the attitude of the Bond party not only on all the occasions enumerated above, but immediately before the invasion of Natal and Cape Colony by the Republics in 1899. Furthermore, their very practical sympathy with this idea explains the action of the Bond Ministry in allowing munitions of war to pass through the Cape to the Free State shortly before the present war, and the refusal of Mr. Schreiner, the Premier, in June 1899, and again in August, to allow the battery of artillery and the rifles stored for Kimberley at

King William's Town to go up to Kimberley, when the Mayor of that town represented its defenceless state. This idea explains clearly enough why an important and wealthy centre, the chief place on the Transvaal border, was left undefended; and if Kimberley held its own, thanks chiefly to Mr. Rhodes and its own citizen soldiers, it is certainly not the fault of the Bond Ministry or its chief. Thus the Bond in 1899 again maintained its consistent record (broken only during the years when Mr. Rhodes thought he had almost won them to Imperialism), and did its best for its allies in the Transvaal, and for Mr. Hofmeyr's long-cherished idea of a United States of South Africa under its own flag. For the vigorous growth of that idea England's ill-timed magnanimity after Majuba is, of course, primarily responsible, for from that time dates the deep-seated conviction that the Transvaal had beaten and could always beat the British army, and Roberts in 1900 has to teach a far sterner and severer lesson than Roberts would have had to teach in 1881. It was as early as 1883 that the idea showed itself openly in the Cape Colony, for in July of that year Mr. Rhodes in the Cape House compared the then recently declared policy of the head of the Afrikander Bond (Mr. Hofmeyr) with his own. 'I would like to know whether he (Mr. Hofmeyr) is still in favour of a United States of South Africa under its own flag.

I have my own views as to the future of South Africa, and I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire.' This idea was, of course, behind the accumulation of the vast armaments, including the most powerful modern artillery, which took a new departure after the Drifts Ultimatum, with its threat of war, in 1895; for that ultimatum was the immediate occasion of the great increase in preparations for war, and of the mission of Dr. Leyds to procure support on the Continent, not as has been often asserted, the futile Jameson Raid, which never really endangered President Kruger's power at all. One of the unnoted reasons which probably influenced President Kruger to declare war in 1899 will be found several times alluded to in Mr. Rhodes's speeches, *e.g.* 'I have one-eighteenth of his burghers, and if he does not mind, I shall have half of them before long.' That is to say, President Kruger's best fighting men, the Boers of the Northern Transvaal, were gradually emigrating and settling in Rhodesia in spite of the efforts of General Joubert and the President. The first burghers who went in found the broad pastures of Rhodesia so attractive, and the rule of the Chartered Company so pleasantly bearable, that all the warnings and entreaties of Pretoria could not prevent their kinsmen from following them. His old guard was leaving the President's dominions, and to wait for a better opportunity for

declaring war than 1899 was to wait for an uncertainty, while there was no uncertainty about this yearly and steady leakage of the Transvaal's best fighting men.

It is in the ending once for all of this impossible idea of an Independent Dutch South Africa, freed from the British Empire, that the hope for the future lies. This the war and a proper settlement will effect; and if it be argued that the sword cannot make a stable and firm union, a united people, it may be answered that we have only to look to the United States of America and the German Empire to remember that American unity and German unity are the work of the sword, and there is no reason why South African unity should not be brought about in the same way.

Mr. Rhodes in his latest speech (February 19, 1900), at the annual De Beers meeting at Kimberley (the report has just reached England, too late to include in my book), is fully persuaded that South African unity will follow the war. These are his words: 'All contention will be over with the recognition of equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. That principle, for which we have been so long striving, is the crux of the present struggle, and my own belief is that when the war is over a large number of Dutch farmers in this country will throw in their lot with us on this basis,

that neither race shall claim any right of preference over the other. We have no feeling against them. We have lived with them, shot with them, visited with them, and we find, owing, I suppose, to the race affinity, that there is not much between us. But they have been misled by these gangs at Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and even Cape Town.'

Again, he says: 'This is not a conspiracy on the part of England to seize the neighbouring Republics; but it has been a long, long conspiracy of the neighbouring Republics to seize British South Africa. They call themselves Republics. They are not Republics. Each Government consists of a small political gang. They humbug the poor Dutch people by appealing to their patriotism, and they divide the spoils among their coteries.' . . . 'I venture to predict that the day of reckoning is coming between the Dutch farmer and these people who have misled him.'

There is another less urgent but still not unimportant purpose that will be served by the publication of Mr. Rhodes's speeches. They will enable the British public to learn for themselves the plain truth about Mr. Rhodes's career, the unchanging consistency of his policy of Imperial expansion and unification, the liberal and broad-minded nature of his staunch Imperialism from the first day he came into politics till this day. The knowledge of the truth about Mr. Rhodes is necessary, for he has been very grossly

and persistently misrepresented. It is easy to show, from the most recent and able of these attacks, the reliance that can be placed on the knowledge and fairness of its author, who poses as an authority on South Africa. This attack is contained in an article by Mr. J. A. Hobson, entitled 'Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa,' which occupies the first place in this year's January number of the *Contemporary Review*. The Capitalists, according to Mr. Hobson, are the causes of the present war, and Capitalism has simply used Imperialism for its own purposes in South Africa. Mr. Rhodes, the leader of Imperialism in South Africa, went into politics, according to Mr. Hobson, simply to safeguard the interests of Capitalism. 'When that district (Griqualand West) was annexed to Cape Colony in 1880, it was very necessary that some tactful man, not too scrupulous, who well understood the needs of the diamond industry, should represent Barkly West, and hold the fortress of a monopoly worth a quarter of the capitalised value of the Colony.' This is a single sentence of Mr. Hobson's, and it contains as much original history, of Mr. Hobson's own manufacture, as one is likely to find in any sentence, even in Mr. Hobson's writings. 'It was very necessary that some tactful men should represent Barkly West.' Why? Barkly West, Mr. Hobson is perhaps not aware, is not a diamond field constituency at all—it is a rural constituency, for

which Mr. Rhodes has been member since 1881 as the representative of farming, and of farmers, largely composed of Dutchmen. If Mr. Rhodes had been put in by the diamond interest, he would have been returned for Kimberley. But a far worse blunder follows: 'And hold the fortress of a monopoly worth a quarter of the capitalised value of the Colony.' This was in 1880, at a time when there was no diamond monopoly in existence and no prospect of one. The amalgamation which established the monopoly did not take place till 1888, so that it would have been a little difficult to go into politics to represent what at the time had no existence and no prospect of existence. That is an excellent euphemism of Mr. Hobson's, 'not too scrupulous,' and I think before my readers leave the next statement I shall examine, they will have no difficulty in fitting the description to its author. Up to this I have certainly proved that he is 'not too well informed.' 'The first public post,' I quote Mr. Hobson's words, 'occupied by Mr. Rhodes was that of Deputy-Commissioner in Bechuanaland in 1884-5, at the time when bodies of Transvaal Boers, presumably with the connivance of the Transvaal Government, had entered that country and established the Republics of Stellaland and Goschen (*sic*). The possession of Bechuanaland by the Transvaal would have closed the road to the North against British Imperialism: this was clearly

understood by the rival claimants, and when remonstrances had failed Sir Charles Warren was sent up with an Imperial force to assert the Imperial interest and establish the Imperial control. What part did Mr. Rhodes play at this critical juncture? He threw all the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal, and against the Imperial authority. The following extract from a speech delivered in the Cape Assembly, and reported in the *Cape Argus*, July 16, 1884, deserves attention.'

I will examine, as briefly as I can, Mr. Hobson's statements in this passage, which certainly deserve attention. One may perhaps observe that the passage begins with a misstatement. Mr. Rhodes's first public post was not that of Deputy-Commissioner in Bechuanaland in 1884-5. Mr. Hobson, I suppose, is unaware that Mr. Rhodes, when he became Deputy-Commissioner in 1884, had already occupied the following posts—a Commissionership for the Compensation of Loyal Natives in Basutoland, 1882; a Commissionership on the Northern Boundaries of Griqualand West, 1882-3, in which capacity he obtained the offer of the key of South Africa for the Cape Colony through the chief Mankoroane and the Stellalanders, and proposed annexation in an important speech in the Cape House, July 18, 1883, a proposal which would have given the reversion of the North to the British Empire, had it not been rejected

by the Cape House, Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond holding that the Transvaal Republic was to have the North, and the rest of the House being blind to the importance of the territory. Mr. Rhodes had also, earlier in the year, been Treasurer-General in Mr. Scanlan's Government. Moreover, at the time when Mr. Rhodes agreed to represent the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland at the request of the High Commissioner, who found Mr. Rhodes's policy exactly in harmony with his own, Mr. Rhodes had already made himself the leading, though not the sole exponent of the policy of Imperial expansion in the North through the Cape Colony. He was well known already as a strong Imperialist, who had the year before boldly taken Mr. Hofmeyr to task in the Cape House for his belief in an independent South Africa, 'A United States of South Africa under its own flag,' in other words, a Dutch Republican Confederation, while Mr. Rhodes had at the same time declared his own uncompromising belief in the establishment of 'a United States of South Africa as a portion of the British Empire.'

The speech which Mr. Hobson advances in support of his astonishing assertion that Mr. Rhodes, the untiring advocate of Imperial expansion, was a supporter of the Transvaal's ambitions in Bechuanaland was made before, not (as Mr. Hobson seems to think) after Mr. Rhodes went up as Deputy-

Commissioner for Sir Hercules Robinson, and instead of supporting Mr. Hobson's assertion that 'he (Mr. Rhodes) threw all the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal and against the Imperial authority,' the speech absolutely contradicts it. I hasten to explain, I mean the speech as fully reported in the *Cape Argus* (July 16, 1884), not the extract of the speech designed by deliberate omissions to support Mr. Hobson's assertion. The purpose for which the speech was made would, if it had been stated, have at once overthrown this gross misrepresentation. The speech was made in support of Mr. Upington's motion in the Cape House to take action for the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape. It was Mr. Rhodes's last urgent appeal to the House to annex Bechuanaland, an appeal which he had made in vain the year before. It was the appeal of an advocate of Imperial expansion through the Colony, a believer in the fitness of the man on the spot to carry on Imperial expansion rather than the man at Downing Street, and this appeal addressed to a house largely composed of Dutch members, who were supporters of the Transvaal's claim to the territory, was based in part on the danger of the Imperial Government dealing with the question directly, and a war ensuing between the Empire and the Transvaal. This danger to the Transvaal might be prevented (Mr. Rhodes urged) if the Cape

annexed Bechuanaland, an annexation which Mr. Rhodes hoped to carry out by an amicable arrangement with the Transvaal; for at this time (July) he had not yet gone up as Deputy-Commissioner and discovered (as he did before the end of August) that President Kruger and General Joubert were the wire-pullers behind the raiders of Rooi-Grond, and were bent on acquiring through them the road to the North. When Mr. Rhodes made this discovery he at once set to work to bring in the Imperial factor, being quite willing to use force, when peaceful negotiations had failed, and the expansion of the Empire was in danger.

The significance of Mr. Hobson's extract of the speech lies in his omissions. This is his extract, to which from want of space I am unable, as I intended, to add the full report. His extract is taken from the *Cape Argus* report, July 16, 1884:—

Mr. Rhodes said:—He proposed (last year) to the House to enter into negotiations in connection with this territory, and he warned the House that he feared the Imperial factor would be introduced into the question before long, and with the chance of a recurrence of the unfortunate affairs which he had seen in this country.... The House and the country was at this moment plunged into what he then foresaw—that if we did not move in this question of Bechuanaland in connection with the Transvaal Government, the Imperial Government would interfere, and possibly the interference of the Imperial Government might lead to a repetition of those unfortunate occurrences which they had had in connec-

tion with the Transvaal. . . . They were running the risk at any moment of a collision (*between the Imperial Government and*) with the Transvaal. It might be said that he was one of Imperial instincts, but he could ask those members of the House who were present last year to support him, for he said then that we must not have the Imperial Factor in Bechuanaland. He implored the House then to pass a resolution for acting in conjunction with the Transvaal, and he said that if they did not pass it they would regret it. He said once more to them that they must act. . . . They should at once negotiate with the Imperial Government, and with the people of the Transvaal, and first and foremost they should (*try and*) remove the Imperial factor from the situation. He believed that if they did not, there was on the border of the Transvaal great danger for South Africa.

I will now take from the same report a few of the sentences omitted by Mr. Hobson, and I ask whether they do not absolutely prove the falseness of his statement that Mr. Rhodes 'threw all the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal.' These are Mr. Rhodes's arguments to stir the self-interest of the colonists in favour of Imperial annexation through the Cape, and against annexation by the Transvaal. 'Was this House prepared to say, after the debt we had incurred, that we should allow these republics to form a wall across our trade route?' Again, 'Were we to allow a neighbouring state (*i.e.* the Transvaal) to acquire the whole of the interior.' 'Bechuanaland was the neck of the whole territories up to the Zambesi, and

we must secure it, unless we were prepared to see the whole of the North pass out of our hands, and our railway system to be shut in at Kimberley.' 'He did not want to part with the keys of the interior, leaving us settled just on this small peninsula. He wanted the Cape Colony to be able to deal with the question [of the union of South Africa—ED.] as the prominent and dominant state in South Africa.' All these passages are among Mr. Hobson's omissions, and they are enough alone, not only to dispose of his assertion that Mr. Rhodes 'threw the weight of his influence in favour of the Transvaal,' but to show the deliberate nature of the misrepresentation. The question now is not 'Is Mr. Hobson ignorant of South African history?' but 'Is he possessed of common honesty?' Of course the evidence is, if possible, stronger against Mr. Hobson when one remembers that this is only one of several of Mr. Rhodes's speeches, all strongly urging Imperial expansion through the Colony. The history of the Bechuanaland question will be found in Chapters IV. and V. of this book, where Mr. Rhodes's dispute with General Warren, in which he was supported by the High Commissioner, is fully explained. Briefly, it was his devotion to the honour and pledged word of the Empire which was the cause of that dispute. It may be added that in the debate on Bechuanaland annexation, in which the speech quoted by Mr.

Hobson was made, Mr. Hofmeyr and the Transvaal party poured cold water on the idea of annexation, while ardent Imperialists like Mr. Leonard strongly supported the annexation advocated by Mr. Rhodes.

Did space permit, Mr. Hobson's ridiculous theory that Imperialism has been the instrument of Capitalism in South Africa, and has made the war—really made by the corrupt Kruger clique at Pretoria—might be easily demolished. The truth is exactly the reverse. The leading representative of Imperialism, Mr. Rhodes, has used his capitalist friends to assist him in carrying out Imperial expansion, and Capitalism has been the instrument of Imperialism in South Africa for the last decade. Does any one suppose that Mr. Beit, for example, whose interests are centred in the Rand, guaranteed half a million last year for any other purpose than the satisfaction of helping his lifelong friend's ambition to carry his Rhodesia railway to Tanganyika on its way to the Nile?

A few extracts from Mr Rhodes's speeches may, at this point, be admitted to show the fervent and consistent Imperialism, which has been the mainspring of his action from the day, some twenty-two years ago, when, moving his hand over the map at Kimberley from Cape Colony to Egypt, he declared his purpose: 'All that English; that's my dream,' and which has directed his policy since then throughout his public life—an Imperialism the nature of which can be

known by its fruits in the devotion to the Empire which has inspired the grand resistance of Mafeking, largely due to Mr. Rhodes's young men from Bulawayo, and the successful defence of Kimberley, mainly carried on by the citizen soldiers of De Beers, encouraged by Mr. Rhodes's personal influence, and fired by the daring of the heroic Rhodesian, Major Scott-Turner.

(1) 'I believe in a United States of South Africa, but as a portion of the British Empire.'—Speech in Cape House, *July* 18, 1883.

(2) 'I think all would recognise that I am an Englishman, and that my strongest feeling is loyalty to my own country.'—Speech in Cape House, *June* 30, 1885.

(3) 'The hon. member for Stellenbosch (Mr. Hofmeyr, the advocate of an independent South Africa under its own flag) has no bait that can tempt me.'—Speech in Cape House, *June* 23, 1887.

(4) 'We must endeavour to make those who live with us feel that there is no race distinction between us; whether Dutch or English, we are combined in one object, and that is the union of the States of South Africa, without abandoning the Imperial tie.'—Barkly West, *Sept.* 28, 1888.

(5) 'I know myself I am not prepared at any time to forfeit my flag. . . . If I forfeit my flag, what have I left? If you take away my flag, you take away everything.'—Kimberley, *Sept.* 6, 1890.

(6) 'Well, we have made mistakes in the past in reference to the neighbouring states, and if I had my will I would abolish that system of independent states, antagonistic to ourselves, south of the Zambesi.'—Kimberley, *March* 20, 1891.

(7) 'He (Mr. Borckenhagen) said, "Mr. Rhodes, we want a united South Africa," and I said, "So do I." "Yes," I said, "I am with you entirely; we must have a united South Africa." He said, "There is nothing in the way," and I said, "No, there is nothing in the way." "Well," I said, "we are one." "Yes," he said, "and I will tell you, we will take you as our leader." He said, "There is only one small thing; we must, of course, be independent of the rest of the world." I said, "No; you take me either for a rogue or a fool. I would be a rogue to forfeit all my history and my traditions, and I would be a fool, because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by yours." . . . That was the overpowering thought in his mind, an independent South Africa. . . . But it is an impossible thought, an impracticable thought. It is only a fool that would indulge in it now. . . . The only chance of union is the overshadowing protection of a supreme power. Any German, Frenchman, or Russian would tell you that the best and most liberal Power in the world is that over which Her Majesty reigns.'—Cape Town, *March* 12, 1898.

I have said that the hope for the future lies in the ending once for all of the impossible idea of Dutch Supremacy. I may add that the fusion of the races will be aided by a generous attitude on the part of the victors, an ungrudging recognition of the magnificent fighting and generalship of the Dutch in their misguided struggle for a lost cause. The memories of many a hard-fought battle, where Englishmen and Dutchmen have learned to respect and admire their antagonists, will help to weld them together into one united people, as has been seen in the case of the great struggle between the North and the South in

America. The loyal Boers of the future may feel somewhat the same pride in the achievements of Joubert and Botha, as loyal Scotsmen take to-day in the deeds of Wallace and Bruce; and the Empire will rejoice in the national feeling and the warlike renown of one more of the many races united in fervent loyalty under the Imperial flag. This generous attitude has been always Mr. Rhodes's attitude to antagonists; for instance, to his great rival, President Kruger—*e.g.*: 'It was at that time I began to acquire my admiration for the man who was then ruling the Transvaal, for had he not conceived the noble scheme, from his point of view, of seizing the interior and stretching his Republic across to Walfisch Bay?'

Admit that the Dutchman, though he underestimated our power when he staked his independence against our supremacy, has played the war-game bravely and skilfully (if also with occasional forgetfulness of such rules as that of the white flag), and he is too good a sportsman to nourish a grudge because he has to pay his stake.

To those who still assert that the Transvaal's preparations for war were defensive and began with the Jameson Raid, I may point out that as far back as 1889 President Kruger was continually urging on the burghers the necessity of preparedness for war, and it was perfectly well understood against whom alone that preparedness was directed, though

loyal South Africans then regarded the idea as mere 'bluff.' The *Cape Argus* of March 9, 1889, notes the fact: 'There has not for some time been a public occasion of meeting the burghers in the Transvaal, on which President Kruger has not said something about preparedness for war.' It is now plain that over ten years ago President Kruger was gradually educating burgher opinion for the attempt to expel the British flag from South Africa, which was made somewhat prematurely, though with astonishing resources and ability, in 1899.

In dealing with Mr. Hobson's attack on Mr. Rhodes I have dealt with a typical case of gross misrepresentation. Mr. Rhodes, in his careless contempt for such attacks, leaves them unanswered, when, and this is very rarely, he knows of their existence. The frequent repetition of these misrepresentations cannot fail to influence the general public, and I shall therefore deal rather somewhat fully with the chief of them. As an instance of the parrot-like repetition of the charge of disloyalty made against the greatest Imperialist of his time, one has only to look at the *National Review* for April 1900, where 'Coloniensis' appropriates, without any acknowledgment, one of Mr. Hobson's weapons, the garbled extract of the speech in the Cape House (July 1884), the gross dishonesty of which I have exposed, and repeats some of Mr. Hobson's charges.

It is amusing to observe that 'Coloniensis' so exactly adopts all Mr. Hobson's deliberate omissions, that it is evident he has taken the extract of the speech directly from Mr. Hobson's article, not from the original report. The points of attack are that Mr. Rhodes wished to remove the Imperial Factor from Bechuanaland, and that he gave '£10,000 to Irish rebels'—that is, of course, to Mr. Parnell. Now this charge of desiring to remove or eliminate the Imperial Factor from Bechuanaland, which I have explained to bear beyond question the perfectly innocent meaning that Mr. Rhodes desired to carry on Imperial expansion through the Cape Colony, not through Downing Street, is so often advanced, that it may be worth while to point out who is the author of an intensified version of the much misrepresented and, apparently, misunderstood phrase.

If such a statement as 'the idea of the permanent presence of the Imperial Factor in the interior is simply an absurdity' were to be found in any of Mr. Rhodes's speeches, one can fancy with what delight it would be pounced on by Mr. Hobson, by 'Coloniensis,' and by Mr. Hobson's weekly organ, the *Speaker*; and what an indictment they would frame of black disloyalty against the traitor to the Empire who uttered it. The words, however, were spoken by a man whose loyalty even these critics will hardly question, Her Majesty's Governor and High Commissioner at

the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson. Sir Hercules Robinson, in his farewell speech at the great banquet given to him at Cape Town (April 27, 1889), described with admirable lucidity the political situation in South Africa. 'There are three competing influences at work in South Africa. They are: Colonialism, Republicanism, and Imperialism. As to the last it is a diminishing quantity, there being now no permanent place in South Africa for Imperial control on a large scale. With responsible government in the Cape, and Natal soon likely to attain that status, with the Independent Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and with Germany on the west coast, and Portugal on the east, *the idea of the permanent presence of the Imperial Factor in the interior, of a South African India in the Kalahari, is simply an absurdity.*' (The italics are mine.) That is to say, Her Majesty's Governor and High Commissioner ridiculed the idea of direct control by Downing Street over the interior of South Africa, which is exactly what Mr. Rhodes opposed in his speech in 1883 advocating the annexation of Bechuanaland by the Cape Colony: 'We want to get rid of the Imperial Factor in this question,' etc. The Imperial Factor is by Sir Hercules Robinson taken to be direct Imperial rule, and is so explained by Mr. Rhodes in a speech of June 23, 1887, which I give in full in its proper place. Sir Hercules Robinson continues: 'There being, as I

have shown, no longer any permanent place in South Africa for direct Imperial rule,' it is to be viewed 'simply as an aid to colonial expansion.' Sir Hercules believed in and supported Colonialism, that is, the expansion of the Empire, and its development through the men on the spot, the colonists, and this was and is Mr. Rhodes's view, with which the loyal colonists of Australia and Canada, as well as South Africa, would be found in complete agreement. All our difficulties in South Africa have come from the blunders of Downing Street, its ignorance and vacillation, its disregard for the loyal colonial sentiment and the larger colonial knowledge. Colonialism is, in short, the firm foundation of our Empire, and the ardent loyalty and splendid courage and capacity of the colonial members of the Empire will scarcely be questioned with the proofs before our eyes in the present war. The colonists are our staunchest Imperialists; and, as such, must often oppose the too frequent feebleness and muddling of Downing Street—that is, of the Imperial Factor—which has repeatedly sacrificed Imperial interests to party considerations. Like all our colonists, Mr. Rhodes, himself a colonist, is as staunch an upholder of local self-government, of the capacity and the right of the man on the spot to decide on colonial questions, as he is a loyal upholder of the Empire.

And now a word as to the other charge so often

repeated against Mr. Rhodes. 'Those,' says 'Coloniensis,' 'who still believe implicitly in Mr. Rhodes's good faith, should not forget his subsidy of £10,000 to the Irish rebels.' The whole story of the gift of £10,000 offered and paid by Mr. Rhodes to Parnell in 1888 is given in full, with copies of the original letters, as Appendix IV. of this book. I will content myself here by pointing out briefly the conditions required by Mr. Rhodes and the terms agreed to by Parnell. Mr. Rhodes's conditions were Parnell's support of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster in any future Home Rule Bill, and the support, or, at any rate, acceptance of a clause giving to the Colonies permissive representation at Westminster in numbers proportional to their contribution to Imperial expenditure. The first condition was, it may be remembered, the very crux of the struggle over the Home Rule Bill of 1886 between Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Gladstone, of course, being for the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster, or, as Mr. Rhodes once plainly told him, for creating 'a taxed Republic,' Mr. Chamberlain being resolute in insisting on the retention of the Irish members, as a safeguard against separation, on which point he left the Gladstone Ministry. Mr. Rhodes furthermore desired a reduced Irish representation at Westminster, that is, a representation proportionate to Ireland's contribution for Imperial purposes; but Parnell

refused to admit this principle unless he first got all he asked, including constabulary and judiciary, in which case he would have been willing to accept it. Mr. Rhodes's aim in helping Parnell with a gift of £10,000 was, as his letters and the conditions he made plainly prove, the furtherance of Imperial Federation. The retention of the Irish members at Westminster, with a local Parliament at Dublin, would be, Mr. Rhodes saw, the beginning of a workable scheme of Imperial Federation. Local questions would be dealt with at Dublin, Imperial at Westminster. The permissive clause asked for by Mr. Rhodes in the Home Rule Bill would allow any colony to send representatives to Westminster in proportion to its contribution to Imperial purposes, that is, Army, Navy, and Diplomatic; and Mr. Rhodes considered that the Irish representation ought to be calculated in the same way, and to be in proportion to Ireland's Imperial contribution. Lord Rosebery, now the one great Liberal statesman left in England, had already at that time (1888) proposed, in a speech at Inverness, a reduced Irish representation at Westminster, to be based upon the amount of the Irish contribution to the Imperial revenue. This demand of Mr. Rhodes, that Irish representation should be proportionate to Ireland's Imperial contribution,[1] was omitted at Parnell's request

[1] The omissions will be found in brackets in the copies of the letters in the Appendix.

from the letter; which Mr. Rhodes followed up with a definite offer of £10,000. A draft of the letter in which the offer was eventually made was submitted to Parnell and his omissions accepted. This was after Mr. Rhodes had met the Irish leader and talked over his views. Parnell would not agree himself to insert the clause for permissive colonial representation at Westminster, but promised that if any one in Committee would propose a permissive clause for colonial representation in proportion to Imperial contribution he would accept it. Parnell wrote to Mr. Rhodes, three months after his visit to Hawarden in November 1889, to say that Gladstone had come round to the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, but intended to reduce the numbers, a reduction which was almost exactly Mr. Rhodes's original proposal to Parnell, and was very much the same as Lord Rosebery's still earlier suggestion in his speech at Inverness. And so one finds at last, when the history of the gift of £10,000 to Parnell is mastered, and the reasons for it understood, that so far from showing disloyalty, that gift is a fresh proof of that far-sighted devotion to the Empire which is the distinguishing characteristic of Mr. Rhodes's statesmanship; for he has been always ready to lavish time, thought, and money on the advancement of Imperial interests, and always keenly watchful to find, in the most unexpected directions, fresh opportunities for such service.

One more instance of misrepresentation, based on a curious misunderstanding of Mr. Rhodes's somewhat careless use of the coin of current colloquialism. In a speech to the Chartered Company in 1892 Mr. Rhodes said 'The line to Egypt, provided that the Mahdi is "squared," will cost,' etc., and 'I do not propose to fight the Mahdi, but to "deal" with him. I have never met any one in my life whom it was not as easy to deal with as to fight.' This has been actually taken to mean that Mr. Rhodes proposed to buy the Mahdi, and that he boasted that he could buy any one. Such an interpretation is obviously ridiculous. There was no idea of bribery or corruption in dealing with the Mahdi or any one else. The passage really sets forth one of Mr. Rhodes's strongest convictions, gained in the experience of a life of active work, that people, however keen their antagonism, could generally arrange their disputes peacefully if they were to meet and discuss them. His idea is that most of the conflicts between man and man, or nation and nation, might be brought to a peaceful termination if only the opponents were to meet. Thus he pointed out in a speech in 1898 that the true solution of the Transvaal difficulty was for him and President Kruger to meet and arrange matters peaceably by mutual concessions. The most notable instance of his faith in this principle is the famous Council with the Matabele chiefs, when he succeeded in 'dealing' with

the leaders of the rebel host, instead of fighting them, and in a few hours arranged terms which brought a terrible and costly war to a peaceful conclusion, and saved thousands of lives. Mr. Rhodes's method of dealing with the native chiefs is his method in every conflict, and is so often successful because he is always reasonable, is ready to make concessions, and does not insist on having everything his own way, because, in short, he has the rare gift of imagination by which he sees things from his opponents' point of view as well as from his own.

Before leaving this question of misrepresentation one would like to point out the latest and most laughable instance by asking the *Speaker* first for the evidence of its remarkable discovery of 'Mr. Rhodes's saying that "every man has his price,"' a saying which I have heard ascribed to somewhat earlier authorship. One would like next to ask the *Speaker* for the name of the lady journalist who 'was cleverly taken with him to depict a conference with the Matabele chiefs,' and 'whose description was telegraphed all over Europe.' Can the *Speaker* have made the tremendous discovery that one of Mr. Rhodes's three companions at the celebrated conference was a lady. We suppose the *Speaker* does not make this soft impeachment against Dr. Hans Sauer or Mr. Colenbrander. There remains Captain Stent, the actual writer of the report. Captain Stent is, I

believe, at Mafeking with Baden-Powell, from whom the *Speaker* might ascertain the correctness or otherwise of this remarkable revelation, which bears a family resemblance to all the *Speaker's* facts.

ERRATA

*Read throughout* Scanlen *for* Scanlan, *and* Barkly West *for* Barkley West.

# CONTENTS

## APPENDICES

# INDEX TO THE SPEECHES

# APPENDIX II

## RHODESIA CHAMBER OF MINES

## MONTHLY GOLD REPORT

*(Published on the 12th of each Month from Official Returns furnished by the Companies)*

### *OCTOBER 1899.*

| DISTRICT AND COMPANY. | FROM MILL. | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tons Milled, 2,000 lb. to the Ton. | No. of Stamps. | Days Milling. | Tons per Stamp per Diem. | Yield of Gold. | Value of Gold. | Per Ton. |
| | | | | | oz. dwts. | £ | £ s. d. |
| GWANDA— | | | | | | | |
| Geelong G.M. Co., . | 1,881 | 20 | 28·00 | 3·36 | 941 17 | 3,414 | 1 16 4 |
| SELUKWE— | | | | | | | |
| Selukwe G.M. Co., . | 3,870 | 35 | 28·00 | 3·95 | 2,430 5 | 8,810 | 2 5 6 |
| BELINGWE— | | | | | | | |
| Consolidated Belingwe Development Co., . | 176 | 5 | 11·00 | 3·20 | 101 17 | 370 | 2 2 1 |
| BULAWAYO— | | | | | | | |
| Criterion Development Co., | 438 | 5 | 21·87 | 4·01 | 271 8 | 984 | 2 4 11 |
| FILABUSI— | | | | | | | |
| Filabusi (Charterland) Gold Fields, . . | 305 | 5 | 18·25 | 3·34 | 180 9 | 654 | 2 2 11 |
| From Other Sources, . . (Returns supplied by B.S.A. Co., etc.) | ... | ... | ... | ... | 350 12 | 1,271 | ... |
| TOTAL, . . | 6,670 | ... | ... | ... | 4,276 8 | 15,503 | ... |

| | | oz. dwts. |
|---|---|---|
| Output for September | 1898, . . | 2,346 10 |
| ,, October | ,, . . | 3,913 00 |
| ,, November | ,, . . | 5,566 13 |
| ,, December | ,, . . | 6,258 19 |
| ,, January | 1899, . . | 6,370 15 |
| ,, February | ,, . . | 6,423 18 |
| ,, March | ,, . . | 6,614 2 |
| ,, April | ,, . . | 5,755 1 |
| ,, May | ,, . . | 4,938 13 |
| ,, June | ,, . . | 6,103 18 |
| ,, July | ,, . . | 6,031 7 |
| ,, August | ,, . . | 3,177 2 |
| ,, September | ,, . . | 5,653 7 |
| ,, October | ,, . . | 4,276 8 |

C. ARNOLD, *Secretary.*

## APPENDIX III

I HAVE added in this Appendix the most valuable portions of Mr. Rhodes's powerful speech at Kimberley on February 19, 1900. The success of the defence of Kimberley, in which the handful of regular soldiers did well, but the citizen soldiers of the town, who were to the regular troops as eight to one, did better, was very largely due to the presence of Mr. Rhodes, to his foresight and resource, his hard work and personal influence. On the outbreak of the war he went to Kimberley to take his place in the forefront of the conflict, exactly as he had done in the crisis of the Matabele revolt in 1896. He had no opportunity of repeating the achievement of the great Indaba in the Matoppos; but the danger he faced was a very real one; for the besieging Boers, assured by President Kruger and their other leaders that Rhodes was the enemy of their race, would not have hesitated to shoot him—somebody's rifle would have gone off by accident—had they taken the town.

Lord Roberts, in his despatch of March 20, 1900, says: 'I would add that the citizens of Kimberley . . . seem to have rendered valuable assistance. . . . By the active part which he took in raising the Kimberley Light Horse, and in providing horses for all the mounted troops in Kimberley, Mr. Rhodes, in particular, contributed materially to the successful defence of the place.' The commanding officer,

Lieutenant-Colonel Kekewich, testifies, in his despatch of February 15, to the same effect.

The siege was scarcely over when Mr. Rhodes had to address the annual meeting of the De Beers shareholders, not so much the few who were present in Kimberley, as the great mass of absent shareholders, largely composed of French investors, to whom he had to account for the heavy expenditure De Beers had undertaken during the siege under the direction of himself as life-governor and head of the Company. His desire to justify the large sums of money spent on the defence of the town led to the much-criticised statement that 'we (the De Beers Company) have this satisfaction, that we have done our best to preserve that which is the best commercial asset in the world, the protection of Her Majesty's flag.' This passage has been misunderstood, and misrepresented to mean that Mr. Rhodes regarded the British flag as nothing but a commercial asset. Such an interpretation is obviously unfair, for, when it is remembered that his words were addressed to the shareholders, who were largely foreigners and chiefly French, it is plain that this was no occasion for 'spread-eagle' language, but for such an appeal to the self-interest of the owners of the shares as would show them that the expenditure was really wise even for their financial interests. No doubt this was not the main reason that had weighed with Mr. Rhodes, whose first object had been to hold the most important town in the Colony against the invader, for its fall would have been the signal to thousands of Dutch colonists to rise and throw in their lot with the victors. But he knew that the one telling argument to foreign shareholders was this, that the protection of Her Majesty's flag does really represent

a better security, and therefore an enhanced value, for all property, as has been proved in Egypt, where the French have learned this fact from the great and steady increase in the price of Egyptian bonds, directly due to the protection of Her Majesty's flag and the security for the best government in the world which that flag unfailingly brings.

Apart from this passage the speech is a notable one, containing three main divisions, which I give in full: first, the contrast between the imaginative and the unimaginative shareholder, with its characteristic recognition of the obligations of capital; secondly, the account of the causes of the war and the prospects for the future; and thirdly, the sketch of the siege and of the achievements of the citizen soldiers of Kimberley, a sketch which will appeal to all Englishmen, and especially to those who see in those achievements a strong argument against the thoroughly un-English system of conscription.

### I.—THE IMAGINATIVE AND THE UNIMAGINATIVE SHAREHOLDER.

'You will have noticed in the report a few observations dealing with our various transactions with the Chartered Company, and in that connection I should like to put before you in simple language your present position. Shareholders may be divided into two classes—those who are imaginative and those who are certainly unimaginative. To the latter class the fact of our connection with the Chartered Company has been for many years past a great trial. Human beings are very interesting. There are those of the unimaginative type who pass their whole lives in filling

money bags, and when they are called upon, perhaps more hurriedly than they desire, to retire from this world, what they leave behind is often dissipated by their offspring on wine, women, and horses. Of these purely unimaginative gentlemen, whose sole concern is the accumulation of wealth, I have a large number as my shareholders, and I now state for their consolation that the transactions with the Chartered Company are closed, and closed satisfactorily. The De Beers Company possesses no shares, it does not even hold a railway debenture in the Charter—every sixpence that you have advanced has been repaid in full, and in addition you have received a great profit. The connection that remains is that the whole of the diamonds in the interior of Africa, wherever the Charter exists, now belong to the De Beers Company, who have practically acquired those rights without any payment. And so I trust that my unimaginative shareholder will not continue to nag me about the transactions between De Beers and the Charter, of which I was the author, and which were rendered possible by that change in the trust-deed which enabled us, instead of dealing exclusively with diamonds, to embark upon other undertakings in various parts of the world, and which was devised in order that the De Beers Company might lend its assistance to the work of Northern extension. We have also, I am glad to say, the imaginative shareholder. To him I would say: "It is pleasant for you to consider that undertakings which were embarked upon in the spirit of what I may call the doctrine of

ransom have turned out so successfully. Had they failed I feel sure I should never have heard a word of reproach from you as to this trifle that we spent out of our great wealth to assist the work of opening up the North. We have now got the country developed far, far into the centre of Africa, largely through the means supplied by this commercial Company." If I might go further and venture to draw a picture of the future, I would say that any one visiting these mines one hundred years hence, though he saw merely some disused pits, would, if he pushed his travels further into the interior, recognise the renewal of their life in the great European civilisation of the far North, and perhaps he would feel a glow of satisfaction at the thought that the immense riches which have been taken out of the soil have not been devoted merely to the decoration of the female sex. And so, for my part, when the policy of this corporation is challenged, I always feel that it is no small thing to be able to say that it has devoted its wealth to other things besides the expansion of luxury.

### II.—THE WAR.

'I might conclude briefly, and ask you to pass to the ordinary routine business, but we cannot forget that during the past four months we have not been miners: we have been warriors, fighting for the preservation of our homes and property. We are a purely commercial Company, unconnected with politics, but certainly there are strong reasons for referring to the war which is now raging in South Africa, because

during the period I have mentioned, every one of our workmen, and those of our directors who were here, have all been dealing with the science of war under various able individuals placed here by the military department. And the puzzle has always been why this war arose. If you were to read what they term the Republican papers — of course, they are not Republican at all, because the Governments which they represent are in reality oligarchies—you would really believe that our country desired to seize the neighbouring Republics. Yet, if we go into the history of the past, what do we find? We find that the gentleman who was once President of the Orange Free State, and who is now Kruger's State Secretary (Mr. Reitz), boldly stated to his close friend, Mr. Theo. Schreiner, a brother of the present Premier of the Cape Colony, so far back as seventeen years ago, that the one aim and object of the party to which he belonged was to turn England out of Africa. We will follow that train of thought. I remember very well indeed, when I went to Bloemfontein on the opening of the railway to that place, that I was approached by Mr. Borckenhagen, who, pleased for the moment by some speech I had made, invited me to throw in my lot with what he termed the Afrikander party. I have told the story before, but it is worth repeating. I asked him what he meant. He told me that the Afrikander party was working for an independent South Africa, and they would take me in their arms if I would join them. I replied that I was neither a knave nor a fool. I should be a

knave to leave my own people, and a fool to join his, because I should be hated by my own people, and despised by his. Mr. Borckenhagen was, you remember, the closest personal friend of President Reitz, and, therefore, in close touch with the conspiracy which has existed for the last twenty years. Poor Borckenhagen has passed to another world, and President Reitz is now State Secretary at Pretoria. The impudence of the statement, that England was desirous to seize the Transvaal for its gold, is shown by these facts which I have dwelt upon, and which are vouched for by the brother of the present Cape Prime Minister, and universally believed, viz. that years and years ago Mr. Reitz avowed that the one aim and ambition of his life was to drive England out of Africa. What did we find when this war broke out? We found that the two Republics had obtained artillery of the very highest class, and immense stores of ammunition, and we know that if England had been involved in European complications, the consequences for her would have been most serious. Therefore the boot is on the other leg. This was not a conspiracy on the part of England to seize the neighbouring Republics, but it has been a long, long conspiracy of the neighbouring Republics to seize British South Africa. They call themselves Republics. They are not Republics. Each Government consists of a small political gang. They humbug the poor Dutch people by appealing to their patriotism, and they divide the spoils among their coteries. And it is these gangs who were going to turn the British Government out

of South Africa, and prepared for it by dinning it into the ears of the misguided people that their independence was threatened. I should like to ask, what are these Republics? The Americans have found them out. They all came here, one after another, talking about their opinion that Republicanism in South Africa was the best thing. But they have found out that no such thing as Republicanism exists. How can a Republic be said to exist in a country where every newcomer, every South African of British descent, is treated as a helot or slave, and rights of citizenship are vested solely in persons of Dutch birth? The poor, simple people, who hand their souls over to the King who happens to be ruling in Pretoria, Bloemfontein, or Cape Town, have been deceived, and they have appealed successfully to the worst prejudices of those poor farmers with whom I have worked in the past, and with whom I shall be able to work in the future. Well, gentlemen, I venture to predict that the day of reckoning is coming between the Dutch farmer and these people who have misled him. What is Pretoria Government? Simply President Kruger and a gang of Hollander placemen, steeped in corruption, and the whole Government is consequently rotten. The people have no voice. Even the Dutch people have no voice. They have been deluded into the belief that their independence was threatened, and all the time this old gentleman was piling up armaments to threaten the flag of Her Majesty in South Africa; and it is quite a question whether, if he had threatened it during European

complications, he might not have been successful for a considerable time. And what of the Government of the Free State? They were left alone; we did them no harm. But, gentlemen—and really it is the most amusing story in the world—that State has been plunged into war at the will of two individuals. We had here a rather indifferent attorney called Fischer, who left us and retired to Bloemfontein. There he became a member of the Raad, but he left it in a fit of temper, and I suppose he thought in his retirement that he could bring himself again before the public if he upset the existing order of things. And so he and that bucolic President Steyn have plunged his State into war. And their people are going to reckon with them, not with us. Presently they will ask, "What was the fight about?" and "Where was our President?" I noticed the other day that President Steyn had been to Pretoria, and Kruger sent him back with a message. He said, "I am so old I cannot lead my burghers, but tell them if I were not so old I should be leading them." This message was greeted with great enthusiasm, but, curiously enough, no one saw the humour of it. The humour was this: Why was not Steyn leading his burghers? He is a great, fat, hearty man of forty, and quite physically capable of going into the field, but he preferred to stay in Bloemfontein, or make trips to Pretoria; and I have not heard of Mr. Fischer, ex-attorney of Kimberley, leading the burghers either. I suppose both are now hiding in Bloemfontein, or packing their traps for Pretoria. Well, I suggested to President

Steyn that he should finish the balance of the war by leading his own burghers instead of wasting his time in those passionate denunciations of England which invariably finish up with some religious cant and appeal to the Almighty. I will tell President Steyn that if the Almighty looked down upon this part of the world, He would ask him why the Republics treated all these white people as slaves, why the Government of Pretoria was corrupt, and why it was not possible to share the government of that big country with the people who came to settle there from other lands? The Dutch politicians claim the right of priority, but what does it amount to? So far as those Republics are concerned, it does not extend back beyond my personal life; it is not the right of priority which belongs to old countries like Portugal, Italy, or some of the old empires of Europe. The Transvaal and the Free State have barely existed one generation, and therefore when you talk about priority, such right as it gives belongs to the native, and to speak of "Ons Land" on the basis of a temporary occupation dating back twenty-five or thirty years before the arrival of the Uitlander, is insolent presumption. That is the reply to make to this wretched nonsense about "Ons Land" and priority of occupation, because the contention will be over with the recognition of equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. That principle for which we have been so long striving is the crux of the present struggle; and my own belief is that when the war is over, a large number

of Dutch farmers in this country will throw in their lot with us on this basis, that neither shall claim any right of preference over the other. We have no feeling against them. We have lived with them, shot with them, visited with them, and we find—owing, I suppose it is, to the race affinity—there is not much between us. But they have been misled by these gangs at Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and even Cape Town; and I say that now they have not to settle with us the Uitlander, they have got to settle with those who have used them for their own base and immoral purposes—I speak warmly because I have been through it all. I might add a few words on our experiences of the past few months. I have to tell the shareholders in Europe that we have for the last four months devoted the energies of our Company to the defence of the town.

### III.—THE DEFENCE OF KIMBERLEY.

'The first question that cropped up when I arrived was whether, with regard to our 2000 workmen, upon whom were 4000 dependent women and children, we should adopt what, I suppose, is usual in other parts, the half-pay system. I and my fellow-directors looked at it broadly, and we came to the conclusion that with the troubles and trials coming upon us, it would be very small-minded on our part to put our employees on what I may call board wages, and the result was our people received their usual

pay, only instead of digging diamonds they were fighting Boers. I feel sure that the European shareholders will not cavil with us for adopting that view. In many ways afterwards we learned the strength of a great corporation, for we were able by the means readily at our disposal to materially assist the defence of the place. We were able to make a searchlight to keep the Boers at a distance. When the water-supply was cut off, we pumped water from our own mines; when they raided the mules, and the sanitation of Kimberley was brought to a standstill in consequence, we were able to place others at the disposal of the municipality; when we saw your defence was deficent in regard to mounted men, we were able to buy 800 horses and to assist the military authorities in creating a mounted force. We also called upon De Beers workmen to form a corps themselves. They responded most nobly to the request. Then we dealt with another difficulty. Owing to the town being shut up, 3000 to 4000 people were out of work. It came home to us at once that these people could not starve, and as they could not get away, the sensible thing was to employ them on public works. Perhaps in the future the roads we have created will be pleasant to you; at the same time, by adopting that course, we saved the citizens from the danger of their houses being robbed in search of food by a desperate and starving population.

I must now say a few words regarding our late chief engineer, Mr. George Labram, who, with his fellow-

workers, came to the assistance of the defence of this town, first manufacturing shells for the military authorities when they were deficient in ammunition for their small guns—shells which answered most satisfactorily —and afterwards, as you are aware, constructing here, right in the centre of Africa, a gun throwing a 30-pound projectile, which I am told is equal in all essentials to anything turned out by Woolwich or Krupp's. We know the results. We were able to compete with our opponents, and the town felt perfect confidence, because at length we had a piece of ordnance far, far better than the guns which had been brought against us up to that time. It is sad to think that the man to whose genius all this was due should have been singled out as the victim of the tragic occurrence which so shortly afterwards took place; that the one man in the town to whom we owed everything, and upon whom we relied, should have been taken from us, out of a population of from 45,000 to 50,000 persons. I am correct in this estimate of the number of inhabitants, because the last census of the military authorities, after the departure of the natives from the compounds, showed over 45,000 people. Yet this one man, upon whom we were all so dependent, and whose mechanical genius had achieved this remarkable result, was snatched from our midst, and on the surface it would appear that the reward of his labours was this dreadful calamity that put an end to his career. But his record will remain, and we shall never forget that in our direst moments he worked for us night and day,

and that his wonderful skill in utilising the resources here obtainable, produced something which is, I believe, without precedent in the history of warfare.

'You have, therefore, the position, so far as this Company is concerned, that we did our duty by this community, a community to a great extent made up of our own people, and our own workmen. I believe the population of Kimberley includes 14,000 to 15,000 whites. Our workmen number 2000, their women and children another 4000; so that we represent almost half the white population and most of the property in this place. And when we are thanked for our services, as we have been by the Mayor and Town Council, I am bound to reply: We were helping ourselves; we did our duty by the place, and we are pleased that our exertions have met with the approbation of the members of the community other than our own employees. We merely did our duty. I believe, however, that by our assistance we have materially helped to maintain the defence of this town.

'And when we consider this matter of the defence of Kimberley, it really is not a bad record. You must remember that it was a defence practically sustained by citizen soldiers. Our garrison consisted of about 4500 men of all arms, and when we consider that out of this number the military authorities contributed about 500 men—to whom we express our most cordial thanks—I think the fact will be recognised that it is the brunt of the work that has fallen upon our citizen soldiers.' Our poets have lately been exercising their talents on military

themes, and I would offer a suggestion to Mr. Rudyard Kipling that he should devote his thoughts to a lay of the Citizen Soldier. I think we made a fair defence. We do not claim to have performed exceptional deeds of heroism, but for four weary months the citizen members of the defence force have sat on those heaps, and day in, day out, they have cheerfully carried out the obligations which they undertook. Then if you turn to those citizens who joined our mounted forces, you will find that theirs, too, is not a bad record, even from a military point of view. In three short weeks, out of an effective force of 700 men, there were nearly 120 who now lie in your graveyard, or who are severely or slightly wounded. The work they did during the earlier portion of the siege was, as you are aware, materially assisted by the bravery of their leader, the late Major Scott-Turner. I read the account of the fight in which he was killed, and I could not believe my eyes. I suppose it was owing to what is termed the military censorship, but I read in the *Times* that there had been a "reconnaisance in force," during which Major Scott-Turner had lost his life. What are the real facts? On the Saturday, as you remember, he took a redoubt, with forty men under his command, and came back with thirty Boer prisoners. On the Tuesday he found that the redoubt had been again occupied by the Boers, and he again attempted to take that redoubt, this time with seventy men. In so doing he lost his life, and of the seventy men he took with him only twenty got back unscathed—there

were fifty killed or wounded. Very few people know these facts, and I take this opportunity of placing it on record that seventy citizen soldiers of Kimberley went to take that position, and that out of that number there were only twenty who were able to creep away alive, or unwounded, after nightfall. That is the true statement of what took place, and I think it may go forth to the world without in any way prejudicially affecting the military situation. I should mention that a deep debt of gratitude is due to the Cape Police, who have done such yeoman service. I look upon them as part of the citizen soldiers, as they are all men of this country who have taken to police duty rather than to farming or pursuits in the town. Well, we went on, and finally we had the big gun brought against us. We will not make a long story of that. We all know how unpleasant it was to be shelled all day by a gun throwing a 100-pound shell, and which, I am given to understand by military men, is one of the most perfect pieces of artillery that has been made. I think we were right to put the women and children down the mines. But, let me say, there was no thought of surrender. We had a meeting. I, as chairman of this Company, the Mayor, and some of the leading citizens, met together, and we sent word to the military authorities that we considered that the situation was serious. But we never talked of surrender. We knew that we could keep the women and children down the mines and could hold our own, but we felt that the relief of Kimberley was not only the personal

relief of ourselves, but would change the whole military position, and that the right thing to do was to strike from the western border for Bloemfontein and Pretoria. The results have proved the correctness of that view; to-day the whole situation is different, and we feel sure that before long order will be restored throughout this country. Our thanks are due, then, to our citizen soldiers, and they are especially due to General French, who made that brilliant ride and relieved us, cleared the Boers around Kimberley, and then, barely stopping a day here, got back to Modder River to help Lord Kitchener in those further operations which are still going on. We thank our military assistants in the defence, but we insist upon it that the defence has been a defence by citizen soldiers. In conclusion, let me say how thankful we are that the War Office at home has at last sent us Lords Roberts and Kitchener, for we, as simple civilians, not versed in military tactics, only know that since their arrival a complete alteration has taken place; and finally, I would submit to you this thought, that when we look back upon the troubles we have gone through, and especially all that has been suffered by the women and children, we have this satisfaction, that we have done our best to preserve that which is the best commercial asset in the world, the protection of Her Majesty's flag.'

# APPENDIX IV

## THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. RHODES AND PARNELL ON THE GIFT OF £10,000 TO THE IRISH PARTY

On his way to the Cape, in the autumn of 1887, Mr. Rhodes had as a fellow-passenger one of the Parnellite members, Mr. Swift MacNeill. The two had frequent conversations on the question of Home Rule for Ireland, with regard to which Mr. Rhodes had formed definite and independent views. He wished, as he frankly admitted to Parnell the following year, to use the Irish question as the stalking-horse for a scheme of Imperial Federation. That was his primary and absorbing object, and the question of Home Rule for Ireland was chiefly interesting as furnishing an excellent opportunity for advancing his own special question, Imperial Federation, by opening the door to a practical scheme which would gradually weld together the Colonies and the mother-country in a close and vital union.

As regarded Irish Home Rule, his attitude was that of a Colonial Imperialist. Like most of our colonists, he had been convinced by personal observation and experience of the advantages to the Empire of perfect colonial self-government without abandoning the Imperial tie. He was certain that the gift of responsible government to the colonies, and the abandonment by Downing Street of all

attempt to interfere in their internal affairs, had removed the one real danger to Imperial unity; for, where there is no interference in colonial affairs, the desire for independence cannot develop, cannot even arise, while the greatness of the mother-country will continue to exercise its centripetal attraction, so long as the mother-country keeps true to her great past. He considered that, self-government having so greatly strengthened the Empire in the Colonies, there would be no danger in some carefully devised measure of Home Rule for Ireland which might remove Irish discontent, conciliate Irish sentiment, and thus make the union real and effective. Against the one great danger that such a measure might have a separatist tendency, he was thoroughly on his guard; and at once detected and condemned this separatist tendency in Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886. The exclusion of the Irish members in that Bill he considered a step in the direction of pure separation, and the acquiescence of the Irish members in this exclusion seemed to him to give good grounds for the common belief that they were really working for complete separation from England. From this point of view Mr. Rhodes told Mr. Swift MacNeill that while he was in sympathy with Ireland's desire for self-government, the actual Bill of 1886 seemed to him open to the gravest objections. Mr. Swift MacNeill, who was very anxious to win the approval and support of an influential colonial politician to the Home Rule policy, assured Mr. Rhodes that there was really no such separatist intention, that the Irish members had merely accepted Mr. Gladstone's measure as it stood, and that they would support the retention of Irish representation if a suitable scheme was brought forward. Mr. Swift MacNeill in due course returned

to Ireland and acted as the intermediary between Mr. Rhodes and Parnell. From Avondale he wrote to assure Mr. Rhodes in South Africa of the correctness of Parnell's attitude and his willingness to satisfy Mr. Rhodes's requirements.

On Mr. Rhodes's return to London later in 1888, a meeting was arranged by Mr. Swift MacNeill, and Parnell called on Mr. Rhodes at his rooms in the Westminster Palace Hotel. Parnell had himself in 1886 been in favour of the exclusion of the Irish members; but the result of what he had heard from Mr. Swift MacNeill of Mr. Rhodes's requirements, and his intention, if they were granted, of giving substantial financial aid to the party funds, had led him to consider carefully the criticisms of Mr. Rhodes on the Bill of 1886, and his conversations with Mr. Rhodes himself completed his conversion, so that he came round completely to Mr. Rhodes's views of the question, and agreed to accept his main condition. That main condition was the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, which had been the battle-ground in the Home Rule Bill of 1886, when Mr. Gladstone had insisted on their exclusion, and Mr. Chamberlain had left the Ministry on that very point of difference. Parnell, while he agreed to the retention of the Irish members at Westminster—that is, abandoned the separatist feature of the Bill of 1886—would not agree to Mr. Rhodes's proposal that the Irish representation should be made proportionate to Ireland's Imperial contribution, because this concession would have greatly reduced Irish representation, that is, the number of his followers. Until he got all he wanted, including control of police and judiciary, he could not (he said) afford to consent to any reduction of his strength at Westminster. He agreed,

however, readily enough to accept and support the insertion of a permissive colonial clause in any future Home Rule Bill—that is, a clause giving permission to any colony to claim representation at Westminster proportionate to its contribution to Imperial purposes to Army, Navy, and Diplomatic service. This permissive clause, on which Mr. Rhodes insisted very strongly, Parnell did not agree to propose himself; but said, 'If any member in committee will propose a permissive clause for colonial representation at Westminster in proportion to a colony's Imperial contribution, I will accept it.' Mr. Rhodes having thus obtained the greater part of his conditions in his personal discussions of the question with Parnell, proceeded to formally set forth in a letter the conditions and terms on which he would contribute £10,000 to the funds of the Irish party. The original draft of the first letter, which I give in this Appendix, was submitted to Parnell, and certain omissions which were pressed by the Irish leader as matters of expediency were agreed to by Mr. Rhodes. I have given within brackets the words omitted from the original draft. The three letters are the formal statement of the agreement between Mr. Rhodes and Parnell, and set forth unmistakably the purpose of the gift of £10,000. It may be remembered that at that time not only had the Charter not been applied for, not been thought of; but even the mineral concession from Lobengula had not been obtained, so that not the most shadowy claim to what is now Rhodesia had then any existence. There was thus no possible idea of securing the support of the Irish party to the Charter, but there was the plain compact that Parnell should support Imperial Federation as a corollary to Home Rule; and Parnell, whose vision for essential facts resembled

that of Mr. Rhodes, was so deeply impressed by the great colonist's arguments, that he made it known through the press that he believed that Home Rule for Ireland would lead to Imperial Federation, which the Irish party were prepared to support.

No. I.

WESTMINSTER PALACE HOTEL, LONDON, S.W.,
*June* 19, 1888.

DEAR SIR,—On my way to the Cape last autumn I had the opportunity of frequent conversations with Mr. Swift MacNeill upon the subject of Home Rule for Ireland. I then told him that I had long had a sympathy with the Irish demand for self-government, but that there were certain portions of Mr. Gladstone's bill which appeared open to the gravest objections. The exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster seemed rightly to be considered, both in England and the Colonies, as a step in the direction of pure separation, while the tribute clauses were on the face of them degrading to Ireland, by placing it in the position of a conquered province, and were opposed to the first principles of constitutional government by sanctioning taxation without representation. It has been frequently stated that the hearty acquiescence of the Irish members in these proposals gave good grounds for believing that they were really working for complete separation from England. Mr. MacNeill assured me that this was not the case; that naturally the first object of the Irish members was to obtain self-government for Ireland; and that when this, their main object, was secured, it did not become

them to criticise or cavil at the terms of the grant made to them. Moreover, he said he believed that the Irish members were only too anxious to support Irish representation at Westminster, should a suitable scheme containing the necessary provisions be brought forward.

[1][Lord Rosebery, in his recent speech at Inverness, has suggested a possible solution. He there proposes a reduced Irish representation at Westminster; this representation could be based upon the amount of the Irish contribution to the Imperial revenue.

And though it seems illogical that Irish members should vote on English local matters, still, taking into consideration the large indirect contribution that Ireland would make in connection with trade and commerce, and that the English people are not prepared at present to accept any vital change of their constitution, it would appear more workable that this reduced number of Irish members should speak and vote even on purely English local questions, than that at doubtful intervals they should be called upon to withdraw into an outside lobby.]

With [some such] safeguards, and they must be effective safeguards, for the maintenance of Imperial unity, I am of opinion that the Home Rule granted should be a reality and not a sham.

If the Irish are to be conciliated and benefited by the grant of self-government, they should be trusted, and trusted entirely.

[1] The portions of this letter enclosed in brackets are the omissions made by Parnell from the original draft submitted to him. The words italicised were omitted in favour of mere verbal alterations.

Otherwise the application of popular institutions to Ireland must be deemed impracticable, and the only alternative is the administration of the country as a Crown colony, which plan in the present state of public opinion is totally impossible.

My experience in the Cape Colony leads me to believe that the Ulster question is one which would soon settle itself.

Since the Colonial Office has allowed questions at the Cape to be settled by the Cape Parliament, not only has the attachment to the Imperial tie been immeasurably strengthened, but the Dutch, who form the majority of the population, have shown a greatly increased consideration for the sentiments of the English members of the community.

It seems only reasonable to suppose that in an Irish Parliament similar consideration would be given to the sentiments of that portion of the inhabitants which is at present out of sympathy with the national movement.

I will frankly add that my interest in the Irish question has been heightened by the fact that in it I see the possibility of the commencement of changes which will eventually mould and weld together all parts of the British Empire.

The English are a conservative people, and like to move slowly and, as it were, experimentally. At present there can be no doubt that the time of Parliament is overcrowded with the discussion of trivial and local affairs.

Imperial matters have to stand their chance of a

hearing alongside of railway and tram bills. Evidently it must be a function of modern legislation to delegate an enormous number of questions which now occupy the time of Parliament to District Councils or local bodies.

Mr. Chamberlain recognised this fact in his Radical programme of 1885, and the need daily grows more urgent. Now the removal of Irish affairs to an Irish Legislature [*Council*] would be a practical experimental step in the direction of lessening the burden upon the central deliberative and legislative machine.

But side by side with the tendency of decentralisation for local affairs, there is growing up a feeling for the necessity of greater union in Imperial matters. The primary tie which binds our Empire together is the national one of self-defence. The Colonies are already commencing to co-operate with and contribute to the mother-country for this purpose.

But if they are to contribute permanently and beneficially, they will have to be represented in the Imperial Parliament, where the disposition of their contributions must be decided upon.

I do not think that it can be denied that the presence of two or three Australian members in the House would in recent years have prevented much misunderstanding upon such questions as the New Hebrides, New Guinea, and Chinese Immigration. Now an [reduced] Irish representation at Westminster [with numbers proportionate to Ireland's Imperial contribution] would, without making any vital change in the English constitution, furnish a

precedent, by which the self-governing Colonies could from time to time, as they expressed a desire to contribute to Imperial expenditure, be incorporated with the Imperial Legislature. You will perhaps say that I am making the Irish question a stalking-horse for a scheme of Imperial Federation, but if so, I am at least placing Ireland in the forefront of the battle.

The question is, moreover, one in which I take a deep interest, and I shall be obliged if you can tell [*assure*] me that Mr. MacNeill is not mistaken in the impression he conveyed to me, and that you and your party would be prepared to give your hearty support and approval to a Home Rule Bill containing provisions for the continuance of Irish representation at Westminister. Such a declaration would afford great satisfaction to myself and others, and would enable us to give our full and active support to your cause and your party.

[I shall be happy to contribute to the funds of the party to the extent of £10,000. I am also, under the circumstances, authorised to offer to you a further sum of £1000 from Mr. John Morrogh, an Irish resident at Kimberley, South Africa.]—Yours faithfully, C. J. RHODES.

No. II.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, *June* 23, '88.

DEAR SIR,—I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 20th inst., which confirms the very interesting account given me at Avondale last January by Mr. Swift MacNeill as to his interviews and

conversations with you on the subject of Home Rule for Ireland.

I may say at once and frankly that I think you have correctly judged the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster to have been a defect in the Home Rule measure of 1886, and further, that this proposed exclusion may have given some colour to the accusations so freely made against the Bill, that it had a separatist tendency. I say this while strongly asserting and believing that the measure itself was accepted by the Irish people without any afterthought of the kind, and with an earnest desire to work it out in the same spirit in which it was offered, a spirit of cordial goodwill and trust, a desire to let bygones be bygones, and a determination to accept it as a final and satisfactory settlement of the long-standing dispute and trouble between Great Britain and Ireland.

I am very glad to find that you consider the measure of Home Rule to be granted to Ireland should be thoroughgoing, and should give her complete control over her own affairs without reservation, and I cordially agree with your opinion that there should be at the same time effective safeguards for the maintenance of Imperial Unity.

Your conclusion as to the only alternative for Home Rule is also entirely my own, for I have long felt that the continuance of the present semi-constitutional system is quite impracticable.

But to return to the question of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, my own views

upon the point, the probabilities of the future, and the bearing of this subject upon the question of Imperial Federation. My own feeling upon the matter is that if Mr. Gladstone includes in his next Home Rule measure provisions for such retention, we should cheerfully concur in them, and accept them with goodwill and good faith, with the intention of taking our share in the Imperial partnership. I believe also that in the event stated, this will be the case, and that the Irish people will cheerfully accept the duties and responsibilities assigned to them, and will justly value the position given them in the Imperial system.

I am convinced that it would be the highest statesmanship on Mr. Gladstone's part to devise a feasible plan for the continued presence of the Irish members here, and from my observation of public events and opinion since 1885, I am sure that Mr. Gladstone is fully alive to the importance of the matter, and that there can be no doubt that the next measure of autonomy for Ireland will contain the provisions which you rightly deem of such moment. It does not come so much within my province to express a full opinion upon the question of Imperial Federation, but I quite agree with you that the continued Irish representation at Westminster will immensely facilitate such a step, while the contrary provision in the Bill of '86 would have been a bar. Undoubtedly this is a matter which should be dealt with in accordance with the opinion of the Colonies themselves, and if they should desire to share in the cost of Imperial matters, as certainly they now do in the responsibility, and should express

a wish for representation at Westminster, I quite think it should be accorded to them, and that public opinion in these islands would unanimously concur in the necessary constitutional modifications.—I am, dear sir, yours truly, CHARLES STEWART PARNELL.

C. J. RHODES, Esq.

NO. III.

WESTMINSTER PALACE HOTEL,
LONDON, *June* 24, 1888.

DEAR MR. PARNELL,—I have to thank you for your letter of the 23rd inst., the contents of which have given me great pleasure.

I feel sure that your cordial approval of the retention of Irish representation at Westminster will gain you support in many quarters from which it has hitherto been withheld.

As a proof of my deep and sincere interest in the question; and as I believe that the action of the Irish party on the basis which you have stated will lead not to disintegration but really to a closer union of the Empire, making it an Empire in reality and not in name only, I am happy to offer a contribution to the extent of £10,000 to the funds of your party. I am also authorised to offer you a further sum of £1000 from Mr. John Morrogh, an Irish resident in Kimberley, South Africa.—Believe me, yours faithfully, C. J. RHODES.

*P.S.*—I herewith inclose a cheque for £5000 as my first instalment.

Mr. Rhodes's correspondence with Parnell did not end here. In November 1889 Parnell was asked to Hawarden to confer with Mr. Gladstone as to the main features of the next Home Rule Bill, in the event of the success of the Liberals at the next general election. Three months after he wrote spontaneously to Mr. Rhodes in South Africa to say that the retention of the Irish members at Westminster was to be a part of the Bill; but that Mr. Gladstone insisted on reducing the representation in order to conciliate English public opinion.

A somewhat fuller account of this letter may be interesting, as it shows that Parnell had felt strongly the depth and intensity of Mr. Rhodes's desire to help on Imperial Federation. On November 29, 1890, Parnell, entering on his struggle against English dictation to the Irish party, published in the press his manifesto to the people of Ireland, in which he gave an account of Gladstone's intentions in a future Home Rule Bill as set forth at the conference with him at Hawarden. The accuracy of Parnell's account was strongly denied by Gladstone: 'I deny that I made the statements that his memory has ascribed to me, or anything substantially representing them, either on the retention of the Irish members or on the settlement of the land or agrarian difficulty, or on the control of the constabulary, or on the appointment of the judiciary.' Parnell's reply to Gladstone's denial was made in a speech at Limerick on January 11, 1891, in the course of which he read portions of his own letter to Mr. Rhodes, sent nine months before to South Africa, which, after Gladstone's denial, Parnell wrote for and obtained from Mr. Rhodes. This letter contained a remarkable confirmation of three main points in Parnell's manifesto—Gladstone's

intentions with regard to the constabulary, with regard to the judicial body, and with regard to the reduction of Irish representation. The strength of this confirmation lies in the fact that at the time Parnell wrote this letter to Mr. Rhodes, the Irish leader and the English Liberal chief were allies, and Parnell had no possible reason for misrepresenting Gladstone to Mr. Rhodes. The letter cannot be found; but these extracts are taken from the *Times* report of Parnell's speech (Jan. 12, 1891), which differs in no way materially from the report in the *Freeman's Journal* of the same date. Parnell, in the course of his speech, said: 'I will just read some passages which relate to these matters in my letter to Mr. Rhodes. "March, 1890. Private. Dear Mr. Rhodes,"—then there is some introductory matter which does not bear upon the present question—"I had been thinking of writing you for some time past, as I thought you might like to hear some of the views entertained by the Liberal leaders upon certain points as I learnt them at Hawarden. Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have been considering very fully the direct question of the retention of the Irish members, and there appeared to be three alternatives"—this was the question in which Mr. Rhodes was interested—"(1) the retention of all Irish members for all purposes; (2) the retention of all Irish members for Imperial purposes; (3) the retention of a reduced number (34) for all purposes. Mr. Gladstone told me that the conclusion at which he and his colleagues had unanimously arrived was overwhelmingly in favour of the last alternative—viz. the reduction of the number of Irish members to 34, but that it had been agreed that no public reference should be made to their views on this point, and that

the matter should remain perfectly private and confidential. I represented to him that I could not yet express my concurrence in the proposed reduction in view of the unsatisfactory state in which the question connected with the constabulary and the judicial body had been left." And then I go on to say, "With a reduced Irish representation it might easily happen that a Conservative Government might come in, and, with the constabulary and judicial authority under their control, might treat us as badly as they are doing now. From this point of view a reduced representation would be dangerous"; and then I go on to discuss certain alternative methods in which this difficulty might be got over. But as the question is no longer a question of reduced representation, but a question of something being made clear in the Bill itself—that the questions of the constabulary and of the judicial body and the land question shall be placed upon a satisfactory basis—it is not necessary for me to go into that portion, and then I conclude, "Yours very truly, Charles Stewart Parnell." Now here is what Mr. Gladstone says: "Not to one of my suggestions did Mr. Parnell offer serious objection." If I did not offer objection to Mr. Gladstone, why did I offer objection to Mr. Cecil Rhodes? I wrote to Mr. Rhodes "that I could not yet express my concurrence in the proposed reduction, in view of the unsatisfactory state in which questions connected with the constabulary and the judicial body had been left." I did not write this letter to Mr. Rhodes in view of this controversy. It was written nine months before the controversy. I object to three points in this letter to Mr. Rhodes. I object to the reduction of the Irish members, and I object to the unsettled state in which the question connected with the constabulary and the judicial body had been left.'

Parnell, as we have seen, wrote to Mr. Rhodes for this letter, and read it, to show that nine months before the controversy he had sent to Mr. Rhodes this account of Gladstone's suggestions, and his own objections to them, and the reasons for his objections. The evidence might have been strengthened, if he had pointed out the passages omitted at his request from Mr. Rhodes's first letter to him—the passages, I mean, enclosed in brackets in the reprint of the letter in this Appendix.

At a later date, March 1, 1891, when entering on his last desperate struggle against the power of the Roman Catholic Church, put forth to support the seceders on the pretext of the O'Shea exposure, Parnell, with his back to the wall, forced to rely on the support of the hillside men, the old stalwarts of Fenianism, began a speech at a great meeting at Navan in these words: 'Men of royal Meath, perhaps some day or other in the long distant future some one may arise who may have the privilege of addressing you as men of Republican Meath. Of that future I know nothing and shall predict nothing here.' (My report is taken from the *Freeman's Journal* of March 2, 1891.) Mr. Rhodes, on reading the speech, wrote to expostulate with Parnell from the standpoint of his old agreement of 1888 for the loyal maintenance of Imperial unity in any measure of Home Rule for Ireland. So strongly had Parnell felt Mr. Rhodes's Imperialist influence, and so sincere was he and so anxious to prove the sincerity of the pledges he had given Mr. Rhodes that the Home Rule movement did not aim at separation, that he at once wrote in reply to regret the words he had used, and to say he had gone further than he intended, the words in question being in fact contradicted by

other passages of the same speech, *e.g.*, 'We are willing . . . to show that the existence of Irish autonomy is compatible with Imperial prosperity and progress.' Parnell, who would never have made this admission to an enemy, felt that Mr. Rhodes had treated him as a friend and had trusted his assurances, and hastened to explain that he had not forgotten them, though, in his endeavour to rally the hillside men to his banner, he had used the kind of language which appealed to them. Mr. Rhodes assured Mr. Barry O'Brien that he found Parnell the most reasonable and moderate of men, and certainly his conversion to Imperial Federation, with Home Rule as a part of it, is as remarkable as Mr. Rhodes's conversion of Mr. Schnadhorst to his policy of Imperial expansion. The letter was, unfortunately, burned in the great fire that destroyed Mr. Rhodes's house, Groote Schuur. Parnell was a man of his word, and had he lived and remained the leader of a united party, the Home Rule Bill of 1893 would have contained Mr. Rhodes's permissive clause. It did include his chief requirement, the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, and, as Mr. Rhodes had desired, in reduced numbers.

The originality and value of Mr. Rhodes's plan of colonial representation at Westminster was, of course, that it was to be permissive and optional, and in proportion to Imperial contribution; for colonial representation itself is not unknown in Europe.

There was, for instance, in Spain a most remarkable gift of colonial representation in return for voluntary contribution to Imperial purposes when, in 1809, the Spanish Colonies, at that time of vast extent and importance, rallied to the mother-country in its struggle with Napoleon, and sent nearly three

millions sterling in that one year, in return for which contribution to Imperial purposes the Central Junta at Seville declared the Colonies entitled to representation in the Cortes. This reform no doubt proved a fiasco, as the wave of Liberalism soon spent itself, and the thirty colonial deputies at Cadiz were nothing but a name; but the admission of the principle at such a date and in such surroundings is at least interesting. There are, of course, existing examples of colonial representation in the Parliament of the mother-country which may be remembered. In Portugal, for instance, deputies from the Colonies sit in the Cortes; and in France, if Algeria, where each department returns a senator and two deputies to the National Assembly, be excepted, as not strictly speaking a colony, there are to be found in the Senate one senator, and in the Chamber of Deputies two deputies, representing Martinique, and the same representation severally for Réunion and Guadeloupe, with a senator and a deputy for French India and a deputy each for Senegal, Cochin-China, and Guiana.

To return to Mr. Rhodes's conditions with Parnell. The second of these conditions, the permissive colonial clause, to which he obtained Parnell's promise of support in committee, with a view to thus introducing the thin end of the wedge of what he regarded as the only possible foundation of any future Imperial Federation, is far the most important at the present time. In it lies as in a nutshell the kernel of any workable scheme for the federation of the British Colonies with the mother-country. It contains the first essential of success, namely, that every step towards closer union should come from the colonists themselves. According to Mr. Rhodes's clause, which was permissive and optional, any colony

was to be able to send members to the House of Commons at Westminster, if it desired to do so, the choice and the mode of choice of the members being left to itself, the only condition being that the members it might send should be limited to a number proportionate to the colony's contribution to the normal expenditure for Imperial purposes, that is, for the Army, the Navy, and the Diplomatic service. This proportionate representation would satisfy the people of the mother-country, who would naturally object to colonial representation without, or out of proportion to, colonial contribution, while it would satisfy the Colonies by enabling them to increase their representation by increasing their contribution, as their increase in wealth and importance made this desirable.

If it be objected that two or three members from a colony would have no effect at Westminster, the answer is that their opinion would be listened to as the opinion of the colony, and their power of influence would be very much greater than that of an Agent-General buried in Downing Street, who is consulted privately, and cannot explain the wishes of the colony directly to the House. As to the difficulty a colony would have in finding a few members to represent it at Westminster without payment, that would be easily got over, there being always enough wealthy colonists to undertake that honourable position from public spirit and the ambition of representing their country in the mother of Parliaments. The wisdom of Mr. Rhodes's plan, the plan of a colonial statesman, was that he simply proposed to leave the Colonies an open door by which, if they were so minded, they might enter and take their place in the ancient Council-chamber of the nation at Westminster. The value of colonial representation at Westminster is

obvious, when one remembers the many questions that arise from time to time on which the opinion and needs of the people of each particular colony might profitably be made known by its own members. To take Australia, for example—there have been in the past such questions as Chinese Immigration, the New Hebrides, New Guinea, etc., and to-day there is the question of clause 74 in the Australian Commonwealth Bill concerning the right of appeal to the Privy Council. Able as the delegates are, how much more satisfactory it would be to have members from Australia on the floor of the House to explain what the colonists desire and why they desire it! The speeches of such members would be on their own subjects accepted as the evidence of experts, and would have weight accordingly.

That Imperial Federation is in the air is certain, and that it may be expected to take shape in the early future is, at least, very probable. The trend of progress is wholly in the direction of some such federation as Mr. Rhodes set forth in 1888, and still confidently advocates. Any intelligent reading of events suggests the belief that local questions will gradually go more and more to county councils and such local government organisation; and we shall wake up one day to find nothing but Imperial questions left to occupy the Parliament at Westminster.

The merit of Mr. Rhodes's plan for Imperial Federation lies in the fact that it would work gradually, and that it would be satisfactory to the Colonies, as being permissive and optional, leaving, that is, the choice to them, while it would be satisfactory to the mother-country as making representation proportionate to contribution. That Lord Rosebery, our

most gifted speaker as well as the most valuable perhaps of our statesmen, if he could be persuaded to return to active political life, still shares Mr. Rhodes's views of Federation seems to be indicated not only by his Inverness speech in 1888, but by his speech at the National Liberal Club on the occasion of the banquet to the Australian delegates as lately as May 2, 1900. 'Are these Parliaments,' he said, 'all to remain mere scattered local bodies without any union except the august symbol of the Crown, or is a centripetal movement from the outer Britain to the inner Britain, which we see daily taking place, to have a wider and a closer application yet?' And he decided exactly in the spirit of Mr. Rhodes's plan of permissive and optional representation. 'However,' he said, 'it may come, it will not come by legislative schemes, but by voluntary and spontaneous effort.' 'Voluntary and spontaneous'—that is exactly the distinguishing characteristic of Mr. Rhodes's idea for Imperial Federation, set forth twelve years ago, an idea which found its first convert in Parnell; and however the details may differ, it seems probable that the same distinguishing characteristics will be found in any plan of Imperial Federation in the future.

# MAP

TO ACCOMPANY

## THE SPEECHES OF The Right Hon. C. J. RHODES.

The DARK RED colour shows the extent of British Territory when Mr. Rhodes entered political life and began his work of Imperial expansion in 1881.

The LIGHT RED shows the addition made by this policy of expansion up to 1900.

Scale of Statute Miles.

0 50 100 200

*Railways open* ——— *in progress* - - - -

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